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Telephone numbers for that office are (703) 274-6847. or DSN 284-6847. The Reference Services Branch, DTIC-BCR, will assist in document identification, ordering and related questions. Telephone numbers for that office are (703) 274-7633 or DSN 284-7633. DO NOT RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO DTIC I EACH ACTIVITY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DESTRUCTION OF THIS I DOCUMENT ACCORDING TO APPLICABLE REGULATIONS. (This cover sheet is unclasped when sqiarated from classified documents) SECRET AO-C003627 SECUftlTX RE»*ARKXN6 REQUIREMENTS DOD 5200. DEC 78 REVIEW ON 28 OCT 87 RHPORT R.125 AIRTO-AIR ENCOUNTERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (U) Volume 1 ACCOUNT OF F-4 AND F-8 EVENTS PRIOR TO 1 MARCH 1967 (U) John S. Attinclio. Projccc Leader CctoUcc 1967 \ 'XV.tii.'.Sori^c*! Dir.::-.;. ja Svi-itd D D C n)f?f7Qf?{Tn nf7| INSTITUTE FOR DEFEASE ANALYSES SYSTEMS EVALUATION DIVISION 4. , Prcparri under contrr.ct with the - WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP as V/SEG Report ll6 I ^ 1 WSEG Log Nc. 126571 Log No, JD VhQ 67-6d30 Copy 'fStt'' of copies 7in "EXCLUDED FROM GENEflAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE."-.. PRESCRIBED BY E. 0. 11652./^ ' ?rnnrT-i Chk $ag» b nnckBsUled) Thi: i2 llilltiil liiiiiu,iiii inroftnolion offecl'i^ the Ntleno! djfcme of iM^niMd^tatei within Hie meening e# the Erpicitege Uwi^Title^lB, U.S.C. , Seoieiii 793 oml m. The tiwur ilnim" er^he.f«vefotwn ef itt conttntt in on^ r-ionner ^ ^ on wneutherized persoit is protiibited by lew. EATieSAt S2cv:%ii' i;.;-v>.wi ii-- Un-ivt,horl=»tl disclosure suijsst to cri^if}al2iu "EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE.". PRESCfiiBEO BY £. 0. 11652 D D C a B fi 8 S S i bI ii a ^ s I 20 October 1967 MEMOy^JUM FOR HOU)ERS OF VOLUME I. WSEG REPORT 1 16 / SmiJCT; RED BARON Report of a scries of four volumes on *A.r-to-A.r ^''^^nt^imot the data to aoaly- cause of the voluminous dam =°''="=''/,'^';J,"^trftecMZm be published, sis from a variety of vievvpoints, all of the ^^^"^"its IVr-^-air encounters Volume 1 is a compilation of available data on F-4 and F-8 air to air e between January 1965 an d 1 March 1967. - ]^ Publication date is expected to be Maith . ^ li'cation in March 1968, . ^ A Volume IV will bo the report of analyses, recommendations, and conclu^fiPS l;riXd frm *: Wtot^ut«re research and d^^^^^ This volume will be published in December 1957. 5. The user organisations are encoutascd u, utilize ^^'^^Jj^^^^;^^"' ::-^Z^:^^^^ - — these docun^Jt. would be appreciated. ; FOR THE DIRECTOR; -mo 1^ Jack e. mcMahan 'colonel, USA Executive Secretary i ! 3^ R-123-/- l-lj' AIR-TO-AIR ENCOUNTERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA; 'i 13 "I .J Volume T# ^ ACCOUNT OF F-4 ANDJF-S EVENTS PRIOR TO l^MARCH 1967(U)--[: October 1967 This report hos been prepared by the Systemi Evaluafion Dlviiion of the institute for Deferue Anolysei in response to the Weopons Systems Evaluation Group Task Order SDHDAHCI.5.67 C,QQ12-T.=104A rioted 6 December 1966. -^r-.'^I^^A . . /•> if'-^i #^ / ^ . '\ \ * ^ In the work under this To^ Order, the Institute hos been ouistedl^ mttltofy personnel assigned by WSEG. •SAIIOIUL S£CURIIY lAFORIUIIOH* . "Unauthorised Disclosure Subject to Crimlnnl Sanctioaa* ID/I D D C OCT 24 BT5 INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES SYSTEMS EVALUATION DIVISION 400 Army-Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202 i.i / "EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECUSSIFICATION KJHEDULE.".. PRESCRIBED BY L 0. 11652 v ^ v4iNCUSSiFIED FOREWORD This report Is a product of the Weapons System Evaluation Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses In conjunction with the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group In response to WSEG Task Order SD-35-T>10i* , as modified In a memorandum for Director, WSED, from Director. WSEG, dated H August 1966, The memorandum resulted from a request by the Deputy Director, Tactical War- fare Programs, ODDR&E. The Task was coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (J-3 and J-5), At its inception (October 1966) the RED BARON Project team consisted of: John S. Attlnello, Project Leader Douglas N. Beatty, Ass't Project Leader ' John W. Walden, Cdr. , USN, Senior Navy Malcom J. Agnew, LCol., USAF, Senior Air Force Phillip J. Conley, Jr., LCol., USAP, and Thomas J. Hughes, Capt., USN, also worked part time on the project from its inception, primarily acting as an Interview-debrlef team. LCol. Agnew and Cdr. Walden were the other team. In November John Rublno, Charles Tiffin, William Eason, Capt.. USN, and Charles R. Shaw, Col., USA, Joined the project. In December Robert J. Lynch, Jr., Col., USMC, Joined, and Philip Brooks, Col., USAP, became Senior Air Force representative. Richard Stewart, Capt., USN, was assigned In February 1967. These later military arrivals shared their time with other WSEG projects. While developing Interview methods and techniques, the project was valuably assisted by two psychologists from. IDA/RESD, W. Sinaiko and W. Richard Kite. UNCUSSIFIED 111 UNCLASSIFIED For interviews in the U.S., teams consisting of military and civilian project members supplemented the two teams designated initially to "'^llect data in the combat theater. In the SEA theater, two Navy-Air Force teams (Conley-Hughes and Agnew- Walden) conducted the interviews. LCol. Agnew and Cdr. Walden also interviewed SEA returnees at European bases. As interviews were conducted. It became apparent that much more data were teing collected than had been initially estimated from official reports. Therefore, a rapid Increase in qualified personnel was needed to collate the data for publication. Roy G. Anderson, Rear Admiral, USN, Senior Navy Member of WSEG, through appropriate channels, obtained the services of four Navy fighter pilots for a period of two weeks. The assist- ance to the RED BARON Project of the following Navy pilots Is acknowledged: Dennis E. Becker, Lt., USN denjamin Cloud, LCdr. , USN -Samuel C. Plynn, LCdr., USN William D, Kiper, LCdr., USN A. J. Beck, Major General, USAF, Senior Air Force Member of WSEG, with the cooperation of Headquarters, USAF, obtained the services nine tactical fighter pilots for a thirty-day period. The assistance to the RED BARON Project of the following Air Force pilots is acknowledged: Thomas H. Curtis, MaJ . , USAF Leslie C. Long, Capt., USAF Robert S. Maxwell, Capt., USAF R. P. Moore, MaJ., USAF Sam P. Morgan, Jr., Capt., USAF Michael G. Pennacchio, Capt., USAF William P. Robinson, MaJ., USAF Ronald W. Scott, Capt., USAF Ronald J. Ward, Maj., USAF The project also acknowledges the assistance of the following individuals who assisted the interv'.ew teams in the data collec- tion phase: iv UNCUSSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED J. J. Berkow, Col., USAF, ARPA R&D Field Unit, BanKkok, Thailand R. Hlller, Assistant for Operations Analysis, 'CINCPACAF Staff PTMrPArviT staff E Kapos, OEG Representative, CINCPACPLT Starr G Koviades. COMNAVOCEANO ^ 4 ^„ S: L^nsenmeyer, Chief, Scientific Research Advisory J.°v!"'p4t?erson' Co?!' USAF, ARPA R&D Field Unit, B.'liSers/olG^Hepresentatlve. CINCPACPLT Staff H L. Wood, Col., USAF, Headquarters, 7th AF D. G. Lynch, LCol, USMC, OPNAV The project acknowledges the assistance of Dennis 0. Medlock and his assistant Marie Zoellner and the many mem- bers of the IDA support staff who transcribed the interview tapes. The assistance of the SED Publications Department is also acknowledged, particularly that of Walter J. Hamilton and his graphics artists, who were responsible for the special illustrations and who coordinated work with Computer Graphics, The Boeing Company, Seattle. The commands, whose cooperation made it possible to reach the participants of air-to-air engagements are also acknowledged. COMMANDS Commander-in-Chief, Pa'ciflc Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces Commander, Seventh Air Force, Tan Son Nhut AS, Vietnam Commander, Task Force Seventy-Seven Deputy Commander, 7/13th Air Forces, Udorn Airfield, Thailand Commander, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TPW), Ubon Airfield, Thailand Commander, 366th TPW, Danang AB, Vietnam Commander, 355th TFW, Takhli AB, Thailand Commander. 388th TFW, Korat AB, Thailand UNCLASSIFIED V UNCLASSIFIED Commander, ^32nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Udorn Airfield, Thailand Commanding Officer, USS KITTY HAWK (CVA-63) Commanding Officer, USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-41) Commanding Officer, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) Commanding Officer, USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)-65) Commanding Officer, USS HANCOCK (CVA-19) Director, ARPA RiD Field Unit, Saigon, Vietnam Director, ARPA R4D Field Unit, Bangkok, Thailand Commander, Hat Air Division, Yakota AB, Japan Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Forces, Europe Commander, Seventeenth Air Force, Ramsteln AB, Germany Commander, 9lst TPW RAF, Bentwaters, England Commander, 36th TFW, Bitburg AB, Germany Commander, 50th TFW, Hahn AB, Germany Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, Fleet Air, Miramar, California Commander, Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellls AFB, Nevada Commander, 15th TFW, McDlll AFB, Florida Commander, 831st Air Division (TAC), George AFB, California Commander, 835th Air Division, McConnell AFB, Kansas Commander, 3525th PTW, Williams AFB, Arizona Commander, i4531st TFW, Homestead AFB, Florida Commander, ^^53rd Combat Crew Training Wing, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. iiuriAQCinrn UNCLASSIFIED CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 Data Sources • ^ Data Presentation • • . 3 DATA DEFINITION AND COLLECTION 7 Background - Goals and Limitations 7 Approach ^ Description of Interview Procedure 11 General Conunents on Data 13 EVENT RECONSTRUCTIONS ' 15 UNCLASSIFIED vii 1 I I. INTRODUCTION At the request of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group has undertaken a study of air-to-air encounters in Southeast Asia. The project code name is RED BARON. Data that have been collected on approximately 320 such encounters through 1 June 1967 will be analyzed primarily to assist in the selection of suitable research and development programs for future high-performance fighter aircraft. A secondary purpose of the study is to pro- vide data for use by the military services and of the scientific community. This volume is a. partial documentation for the secondary purpose. A. DATA SOURCES Data contained in this report were taken from two sources: the official reporting media and personal interviews with par- ticipants. Past WSEO experience in collecting combat data^^ has shown that the official reporting media, which are designed primarily for military operational and statistical needs, are Inadequate for many analytic purposes. The project groups con- ducting these earlier studies found that personal interviews with participants were necessary for RiD analyses. In Project RED BARON, interviews were considered the primary data source, supplemented, where available, by official reports. ri iWSEO Staff Study 134, Adequacy of Data from Sou theast Asia Vj Combat A ir Operations for Research and Development Analyses ^ of Aircraft Losses and Damages (U) . SECRET, February i967> t>. 2WSEG Report 101, Requirements of Defense R&D A gencies for I J Data from Combat Air Operations in S outheast Asia, SECRET, August 1966. '.J For purpoces of this study, encounters that were Investi- gated were defined to Include the following types; • Sighting of enemy aircraft (either visually or by radar; , • Either U.S. or enemy aircraft initiating hostile or evasive maneuvers, • Either U.S. or enemy aircraft expending ordnance, and • Loss or damage in combat of either U.S. or enemy air- craft. During -he data collection phase, an effort was made to assure the /.haustlveness of the information contained in this report. Hc.ever, It was establls/isd that certain aspects of air-to-air combat could not be included; For example, during the conduct of CAP and escort missions, frequently it was neces- sary for the fighter force to intercept radar contacts which proved to be friendly aircraft. Also, during the course of missions, aircraft sighted were Initially identified and called as enemy, only to be recognized later as friendly. These occur- rances v/ere not reported and therefore are not documented in this vclumo. While numerous sightings of enemy aircraft are contained In this volume, it is believed that there are many other sight- ings v.hlch were not documented (and therefore not Included). This is partially substantiated by the numerous Instances which were mentioned during interviews for which no date or location was recalled and which were not correlated with reported sight- ings . The first type was considered in decall only if the sight- ing was of R&D interest, e.g., if a U.S. aircraft made no attempt to engage enemy aircraft because of Inferior or malfunc- tioning U.S. equipment. Where no R&D implications were indi- cated, siglitings were noted to record the information collected for potential use for other analyses. 2 Since "test type" Instrumentation does not exist on most combat aircraft, the validity and quality of data are limited to the tolerances of human senses and recollections (aided where possible by official and personal records, notes, tapes, etc.). A detailed account of the precautions taken to Insure the validity and quality of data gathered in such interviews is presented in Section II. Originally the data sample consisted of 248 encounters through 1 March 1967 • However, from this date through 22 Nay, 65 more encounters were identified (not including "sightings"). In the 23-raonth period from first encounter to 1 March, 47 "confirmed plus probable" MIG kills were reported. In the six- week period in April-May 1967, the 65 engagements resulted in 37 "confirmed plus probable" MIG kills. ^ B. DATA PRESENTATION Though the analyses to be conducted in the RED BARON study werti to be limited to exposing problems for R&D considerations. Interest in the basic data was expressed in many areas of the military and scientific communities. To satisfy these needs the data have been formalized and will be published in several volumes as follows: No. of Encounters U.S. Aircraft Involved to 1 March 1967 P-UB 13 P-4C 55 F-8 8 P-10i| 1 U-2 1 Volume I Total Events Reported Volume I - - - - - 78 1 Concurrently, there was a shift in targeting policy (NVN airfields were bombed by U.S. aircraft from 23 April) and the Introduction of new equipment (e.g., SUU-I6/A guns installed in some F-4C aircraft). Because of these factors the additional engagements were Included In the RED :3AR0N data base. 4» 4> No. of Encounters U.S. Aircraft Involved to 1 Marc h 1967 P-105 151 RP-4C I Volume II V RF-?,, RP-101 ' ■ ^' Misc. (Incl. A-1, A-1) 6 Total Events Reported Volume II 170 Total Events Volumes I and II 2^18 Volume III - Encounters from 1 Mar 1967 through 1 Jun 1967. For ease of study and analysis, the available information nas been summarized under the following headings: •Primary Mission and Tactical Situation •Mission Route •Aircraft Configurations •Flight Conditions Prior to Encounter •Initial Detection • Acticm Initiated •Situation Development • Ordnance • Equipment Problems • Aircrew Coinments • Data Sources Following the aboye, an edited narrative is presented which integrates all the information sources pertaining to the desig- nated air-to-air engagement. Wherever an air-to-air engagement proved to be of sufficient complexity that a perspective drawing aided in its understanding, such a representation was developed. Although every precaution has been taken to depict the engagements accurately, the artists' representations serve only as guides to the reader in following through the complex series of situations and should not be Interpreted as the precise flight paths of the aircraft involved. Terrain features have been added to the drawings princi- pally to give perspective and to present an appreciation of ground features that existed in the general locale. Tracks relative to ground features should not be taken literally ex- cept where the narrative makes specific reference thereto.- The perspective representations of the alr-to-alr engage- ments were the result of cooperative efforts of the SED Graphics Department and the Boeing Company, Computer Graphics Division. These drawings were developed with the aid of a specialized analog computer (Illustromat 1100), by employing maps and over- lays developed during interviews. Artists then added perspec- tive views of aircraft in approximate attitudes and positions Indicated in the Event Summary charts. Although the flight paths are to the same scale as the terrain, the aircraft shown are greatly enlarged for Illustrative purposes. The names and official call signs of the participants have been replaced by standardized nomenclature to give anonymity to the interviewees. This precaution was followed throughout to encouraee frank and honest answers to all questions posed by the interview teams. UNCLASSIFIED II. DATA DEFINITION AND COLLECTION A. BACKGROUND - GOALS AND LIMITATIONS The broad goal formulated for the data definition/collec- tion effort was to obtain sufficient data to enable reconstruc- tion of the various alr-to-alr encounters In appropriate detail with maximum accuracy and completeness ("reconstruction" being the key word) . The scope and degree of detail was not simply defined. It revolved around the needs of the R&D community and the limitations of the available data. The primary limitation was human ability to sense and recall. There were no recording devices in U.S. aircraft, and, therefore, with few exceptions (such as taped communications and photographs), all data had to be extracted from the minds of participants and observers. There was also the question of the adequacy, for event re- construction, of data reported from Southeast Asia through the standard reporting systems. WSEG experience^ showed that while these systems offered certain worthwhile information for R&D purposes, they were far from adequate for the purposes of this specific study. It was decided that WSEQ would Interview participants In air-to-air encounters as the principal source of data. WSEG Report 101, Requirements of Defense R&D Agencies for Data from Combat Air Operations in Sou:;hea5t Asia CU), July 1966, (SECRET). W3EG Staff Study 13^, Adequacy of Data from Southeast Asia Combat Air Operations for Research and Develop ment Analyses of Aircraft Loss and Damage (U), February 1967 j (SECRET). UNCLASSIFIED 7 UNCLASSIFIED B. APPROACH The data collection program Involved several Interrelated areas of operations. They were: 1. Identification of alr-to-alr encounters and the participants. 2. Development of more specific data needs and resolution of needs with limitations. 3. Collection of appropriate documentary Information on Southeast Asia alr-to-alr encounters. k» Development of optimum interview techniques. 3. Location of and arrangements for interviewing participants . These operations were not necessarily sequential and were continued throughout the data collection phase. Items 1 and 3 initially were interrelated, i.e., the means of identifying encounters was through search of existing docu- mentation — various formally and informally maintained "box scores" and other files. Early information was gained from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the USAF air staff. Additional basic documentation came from the USAF' Tactical Fighter Weapons Cen- ter, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, COHNAVAIRPAC , and the Commander, 7th Air Force. It was quickly determined that the various "box scores" did not agree. This was attributed to a variance in definition of what constituted an air-to-air encounter/ engagement and possibly administrative or communications failures within the commands. Additionally, early in the study, the CNO and the Chief of Staff, USAF, were advised of WSEG Project RED BARON and re- quested to provide reference to appropriate documentation. Numerous replies were received from various offices within the Services. 8 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Gradually, sources of documented information were In- creased until they included: standard reporting system (OPREPs, COACT, Navy 3^80 Reports, Guided Missile Performance Reports); various reports of associated studies made by OEG representa- tives and other analytical groups; letters from pilots who could not be interviewed; various records kept at all levels of command; gun-camera films; tapes of communications made by pilots; and miscellaneous message traffic among military commands . Identification of participants was a particular problem since there is no existing mechanism for providing this infor- mation. With a relatively few exceptions, names of partici- pants were not included in reports. However, names were gradually acquired through informal communications with USN and USAP pilots and, as the Interview program proceeded, other persons were Identified by the interviewees. Some specific items of data desired were defined by visits to various Service R&D and training organizations and through meetings with representatives of various industrial organiza- tions concerned with components of U.S. fighter weapons systems. (These visits and conferences also provided information on the technical and operational aspects of the weapons systems con- cerned.) Eventually, a categorized list of data specifically desired from each encounter was formulated. Having, established the data requirements, an Interview program was desired which would: • Allow the greatest number of interviews, while • Maximizing the quality, depth, and scope of informa- tion obtained from each interview. There were uncertainties about the interview program, however. They involved such considerations as the human ability to recall stressful incidents and the effect of elapsed time between the event and attempt to recount it. Large numbers UNCLASSIFIED 9 ■ ' 1 gacussuiai of people throughout the world had to be Interviewed great , quantities of Interview data had to be reduced, and time and I manpower had to be ecnsldered. | With the assistance of IDA psychologists, H, W. Slnaiko I and W. R. Kite, basic Interview concepts were, delineated. These concepts stressed unhurried Informality, anonymity of | the interviewee, a chronological approach to the entire flight in question (not Just the alr-to-alr encounter period of It). | and much use of visual aids - maps, sketches, airplane models — to reconstruct events. | A systematic program was developed to Interview a maximum number of participants in the combat theater and throughout | CONUS and Europe. There was little chance to control tne elapsed time between events and Interview. As a result, the . elapsed time varied from days to more than one year. ■ Efficiency of operation was approached In various ways. -;. several levels of encounter were defined according to their complexity- and Intensity,* and the basic Interview procedure was somewhat expanded or abbreviated according to the level of encounter and the knowledge of the interviewee. Data formats were devised which attempted to facilitate the recording (and g subsequent reduction) of Information while stimulating the memory of the Interviewee. Q A total of ten persons were trained as interviewers. Where it was possible to communicate with a participant but Q not practical or possible to interview him, he was contacted by mall. | While there was the desire to interview a maximum number of pilots, it was superseded by a desire to maximize coverage | over the largest number of encounters. Consequently, where a 'siehtlng only (visual or radar); either side taking hostile g or evasive action; expenditure of ordnance by either side, loss or damage by either side. g 10 UNCLASSIFIED || UNCLASSIFIED choice had to be made as to whom to Interview, tieadth of coverage was the first consideration. At the start, various test Interviews were conducted, their results evaluated, and Improvements made before a llrge scale program was undertaken. Minor changes In procedure were made throughout the program. C. DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEW PROCEDURE In spite of the small changes that evolved and flexibility Included to accommodate each situation, the basic Interview procedure remained largely constant after the early test cases. Ideally, the Interviewee was given advance notice and a general idea of what would be discussed. The Interview team consisted of two persons, one a military pilot with a signifi- cant amount of flying experience and the second person a mill- ' tary officer or civilian. The team would meet with one crew- man at a time in a closed room, with minimum distraction, and with what was intended to be more than ample time allotted for the meeting. The team attempted to create an air of relaxed Informality. The interviewee was given an explanation of the study, how It came about, what it hoped to accomplish, and what his role was. It was emphasized that his name would not appear in print and that, in general, attempts would be made to pre- serve the anonymity of the persons interviewed. This was done to encourage frank and honest answers. The complete interview procedure was explained in detail. Next, the pilot was asked to give an uninterrupted narra- tive of the encounter in question. He was asked to start from planning for the mission and discuss all aspects through the fllght»s return to base. He was first given examples of the kind of detail desired. Early In the project it became stan- dard for the interviewers to use a tape recorder for the UNCUSSIFIED 11 UNCUSSIFIED narrative phase. This, of course, depended upon the inter- viewee's consent and he was always free to ro back and erase anything he wished from the tape. He was assured that the tape was only for the use of the interviewers in gaining com- plete, accurate information from the meeting and its use was limited to the project. Next, depending on the intensity and complexity of the encounter, a sketch of the action was made. Again, the sketch covered a greater part of the mission than Just the air-to-air encounter, dealing with ingress and egress as well. The technique was to put a transparent paper overlay on a large scale map and trace the paths, in plan view, of the various aircraft known to have been present (as they were believed to be) relative to known geographical points. The third dimension to the picture was introduced by means of a keyed time-sequence vs. altitude plot at the top of the overlay. With regard to time, early In the study it became clear that the -air-to-air combatant rarely had any reasonable concept of the time duration of events or phases of the combat. He could, however, recall well the sequence of events. This caused the Injecting of time-sequences into the Interview process. The procedure was for the interviewer to "stop the action" at a point where something significant was occurring and try to elicit a detailed account of the scene at that instant — the location and altitude of each participant; status of the interviewee's aircraft in the way of speed, g»s, fuel state, avionics modes, etc.; action by the individual and his reasons therefor; communications which took place; enemy actions; etc. After such a stop the description would continue until the next significant event occurred at which point the action would be stopped again. These stops correspond with the "T" (or "Time") marks in events and pictures. While one team member 12 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED worked with the pilot In making the sketch, the other kept notes on a specially designed note pad. Upon completion of this step-by-step microscopic phase, the interviewers consulted their checklist on data items and asked specific questions about points which had not come out. Finally, the interviewee was encouraged to coirunent on the whole range of considerations which might be of Interest to the study — comments derived from his experience in this specific encounter as well as from his overall experience. The duration of an interview was from minutes to several hours, depending on the significance and complexity of the encounter and the knowledge of the interviewee. D. GENERAL COMMENTS ON DATA WSEQ identified 2*t8 air-to-air encounters that occurred prior to 1 March 1967. Participants in ISH of these encounters were interviewed, with a total of 331 interviews conducted. ^ In addition, 37 written accounts of engagements were received. In general, priority was given to the more complex encounters; events for which no interviews were conducted were usually a sighting only, with no R&D significance. The study group found that human ability to recall the details of Incidents stressful to them is sometimes quite remarkable. With regard to the validity of recall, various comparisons were made between OPREP reports of the encounter and interviews and between interviews of various participants in the same encounter. There was generally good agreement. Where significant discrepancies appeared, they could usually be traced to the confusion of a fast moving, complex situation If an Individual was interviewed in connection with two or more different encounters, this would he considered as two or more interviews. UNCLASSIFIED 13 UNCLASSIFIED rather than memory failure or some psychological phenomena. (Discrepancies between various accounts of the same event did cause some difficulty In the final reconstruction process. In almost all cases, discrepancies were resolved through repeated study of the data, use of logical deductions, and/or relntervlew. ) intuitively, it might appear that the best Information would be Obtained by minimizing the time lapse between encoun- ter and interview. However, there are opinions and Illustra- tions which counter this. The thought cannot be proved or disproved at this time. As noted earlier, elapsed time between encounter and Interview ran from a period of days to more than a year. Dates of events and Interviews have been included In the published data. The interview techniques. In general, were highly regarded by interviewees for effectiveness In stimulating accurate, detailed recall. In some oases, through the procedures used, interviewees were able to correct and clarify their concep- tions of events. UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL HI. EVElsfT RECONSTRUaiONS The account of each event Is presented in at least two basic parts: (1) An outline which gives an abbreviated pres- entation of the highlights of the event, and (2) A narrative of the encounter. All of the events contained In this Volume are summarized in Table 1. A Glossary of Terms was developed to aid in the Interpretation of events and is included at the end of this report. The glossary also contains descriptions and lllustra-> tions of the more common aircraft maneuvers. In addition, whenever an alr-to-alr engagement proved to be of sufficient complexity that a perspective drawing aided In Its understanding, such a representation was developed. The perspective drawings were keyed by an Event Summary Chart which describes the actions of friendly aircraft (BLUE 1,2, etc.), and enemy aircraft, as well as known communication in- formation, at significant points in the event. As explained in Section II, these are identified by "time marks" (Tq, T-j^, T2, etc.), and are Instants In time when significant points arose and are not Intervals of seconds or minutes of clock time. In the perspective sketch, a vertical line representing altitude appears on the flight path at each of these "time marks" with the time mark sequence number printed at the top and the participant to which it referred printed at the bottom (e.g., B2, M3, etc.). The keyed flight paths presented in the sketches were color coded such that the paths of all friendly aircraft were shown in blue and those of enemy aircraft, in red. CONFIDENTIAL 15 CONFIDENTIAL ^ ■ * It Is recognized that precise flight paths could not be re- constructed since the participating airplanes did not carry Instrumentation for recording of position. Thus, while every effort was made to depict the engagements as accurately as possible. It must be remembered that artists* representations serve only as guides to the reader In following the complex series of situations and should not be interpreted as the precise flight paths of the aircraft Involved. Terrain features have been added to the drawings prlncl-> pally to give perspective and to present an appreciation of the ground features that existed in the general locale. Some- times these features were referenced during intsrviews to assist the pilot to recall details of the event, but it was rare that exact features played a significant part in the en- counter even though most encounters took place at low altitude. Tracks relative to ground features should not be taken literally except where the narrative makes specific reference thereto. 16 CONFIDENTIAL Table 1. LIST OF EVENTS Date/Time Aircraft Involved No . /Type U.S. Enemy Resu 1 ts Los t/Oaniaged U.S. Enemy 3 Apr 9 Apr 31 May 4 Jun 17 Jun 10 Jul 1 1 5 6 Jul Oct Oct 8 Oct 1 Nov 23 Dec 9 Jan 22 Jan 3 Feb 3 Feb 6 Feb '65/1110H •65/0840H '65/1505H '65/0712H ■65/1030H '65/170GH '6S/1520H *65/1040H '65/1040H '65/1530H '65/1030H •65/0730H •66/0926H •66/1925H •66/2100H •66/2100H •66/ 4 Mar'66/1703H 10 Mar'66/1025H 5 Apr'66/0915H 21 Apr'66/1232H 23 Apr'56/1616H 23 Apr'66/1421H 25 Apr'66/n37H 25 Apr'66/mid- afternoon 26 Apr'66/1520H 26 .Apr'66/1425H 29 Apr'66/fflid- af ternoon 30 Apr'66/0900H 8 May'66/1515H 10 May'66/1810H 12 May'66/1622H 30 May'66/1750H 12 Jun'66/1446H 14 Jun'66/0040H F-8E F-4B F-4C F-4B F-4B F.4C F-4C F.4C F-4B F-4C F-4C F-4C F-8E F-4C F-4B 1 F-4B 1 U-2 F-4C F.4C F-4C F-8E F-4C F-4C F-4C F-4C F-4C 2 F-4C 4 F-4C 4 F-4C F-4C F.4C F-4C F-4C F-4C F-8E F-8C F-4B 3 MIG-17 4 MIG-17 8 Pcss MIG 4 MIG-l? MI6'17 MIG-17 Unid. MIG-17 MIG-17 Unid. Unid. MIG? Unkn. 1 Unid. Unknowns 1 MIG-17 1 MIG-21 (3 MIG-17 \3 MIG-17 1 YAK-25 1 Unid. Unknown 1 MIG-21 4 MIG-17 2 MIG-21 2 MIG-21 3 MIG-21 1 MlG-2n 4 MIG-17f 4 MI6-17 4 MI6-17 3 Unid. 3 MIG-17 4 MIG-17D 4 MIG-17 4 MIG-n 2 Colt 0/1 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 Si ght ing 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting Si ghting Radar Sighting 0/0 0/0 Si ghting iO/0 \S i ght i ng Sighting Sighting Radar 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/1* 0/0 0/0 Sighting 0/0 0/0 Si ghting 0/0 0/0 0/0 1 Prob/0 0/0 0/0 2/0 2/0 0/0 1 Prob/0 0/0 0/0(deleted) 0/0 1 Prob/a 2/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 2/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 1+1 Prob/0 1 Prob/0 ^Damaged by AAA. Event Date/Time Aircraft Involved No. /Type Results Lost/Oanaged U.S. Enemy U.S. Enemy 1-36 1-37 1-38 1-39 1-40 1-41 1-42 1-43 1-44 1-45 1-46 1-47 1-48 1-49 1-50 1-51 1-52 1-53 1-54 1-55 1-56 1-57 1-58 1-59 1-60 1-61 1-62 1-63 1-64 1-65 1-66 1-67 1-68 1-69 1-70 1-71 1-72 1-73 1-74 1-75 1-76 1-77 I-7B 21 Jun'66/1535H 13 JuT66/1102H 14 Jul' 66/1251H 14 Jur66/1200H 20 Jur66/1550H 7 Aug'66/0910H Aug-S3p'66/1430H 5 Sep'66/1645H 14 Sep'66/1655H 16 Sep'66/1020H 20 Sep'66/0920H 21 Sep'66/1121H 23 Sep'66/0800H 27 Sep'66/1600H ---Sep'66/ 1 0ct'66/0814H 5 0ct'66/0748H 9 Ocf66/0830H 9 0ct'66/0845H --.Oct'66/ 2 Nov*66/1700H 3 Nov'66/1541H 4 Mov'66/1548H 4 Nov'66/1556H 5 Nov'G6/1630H 5 Nov'66/ 21 Nov'66/Late morn 4 Dec'66/1665H 5 Dec*66/1105H 30 Dec'66/1620H 20 Oec'66/0207H 30 Dec*66/1610H ( 2 Jan'67/1500H iz Jan'67/1510H (2 Jan'67/1515H 3 Jan'67/1550H 5 Jan'67/1201H 6 Jan'67/1030H 6 Jan'67/0920H 16 Jan'67/1545H 17 Jan'67/0807H 21 Jan*67/0855H 22 Jan'67/1140H 23 Jan'67/ 5 Feb'67/1530H 4 F-8E 4 F-4B 3 F-8E 4 F-4C 3 F-4C 1 F-104C 3 F-4C 2 F-8E 4 F-4C 3 F-4C 3 F-4C 2 F-4C 2 F-4C 4 F-4C 2 F-4C 1 F-4B 2 F-4C 2 F-4B 4 F-8E 3 F-4C 3 F-4C 3 F-4C 4 F-4C 3 F-4C 4 F-4C 1 F-4B F-4B 4 F-4C 4 F-4C. 2 F-4C 2 F-4B 4 F-4C (4 F-4C h F-4C U F-4C 4 F-4C 4 F-4C 2 F-4C 3 F-4C 4 F-4C 4 F-4C 3 F-4C 4 F-4C 12 F-4C 4 F-4C 4 MIG-17 6 MIG-17 3 MIG-17 2-3 MIG-21 1 MI6-? 1 MIG-21 1 MIG-? 2 MIG-17 1 MI6-21 4 MIG-17 2 MI6-17 2 MIG-21C 4 MI6-17 2 MIG-17 3 MI6-? 1 MIG-? Poss MIG 2 MIG-? 2 MIG-21 Unknown 1 rtI6-21 2 MI6-21D 1 MIG-17 1 MI6-? 2 MIG-21D Unknown MIG 2 Unid. 1 MIG-? 3 MIG-17 2 Colt ? 1 MIG-21? (5-7 MIG-21 {5 MIG-21 1? MIG-Zl MIGs 2 MIG-21 4 MI6-21C 2 MIG-? 3 MIG-21 2 MIG-".7 1 MI6-17D 2 M1G-? None-SAMs 8 MIG-17 1/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting Sighting 1/1 0/0 lProb*/0 1/0 0/0 Si ghting Sighting Sighting 0/0 1 Prob/0 1/0** 0/0 Sighting Si ghti ng 0/0 Sighting Sighting 0/0 Two rada Radar Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 (0/0 {o/o In / 0 Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sightinc 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/0 2/0 1/0 0/1 2/0 0/0 0/0 • 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 2/0 r contacts 0/0 1/0 0/0 (3/0 {l/O 13/0 0/0 2/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 * Loss probably due to MIG. **Not Included in official box score. UNCLASSIFIED GLOSSARY OF TERMS (All Terras Unclassified Unless Otherwise Stated) AA - alr-to-alr weapon AAA - antiaircraft artillery AAM - air-to-air missile AAWC - Ant 1- Air-Warfare Commander AB - afterburner ACM - air combat maneuvering ACT - air combat tactics ADF - automatic direction finder AEW - airborne early warning AGL - above ground level AIM-7 (D&E models) (SPARROW) - semi active radar type, air-to- air missile AIM-9 (B&D models) (SIDEWINDER) - passive IR type, air-to-air missile AIM-9C (SIDEWINDER) - Radar guided alr-to-alr missile AI radar - airborne intercept radar Aircraft commander - a pilot * designated pilot-ln-command of a given aircraft (Air Force name for front seater in F-4) ALKALI - Soviet air-to-air missile - radar beam rider type ALQ-51 - Broadband deception ECM system AUl-71 - Noise jamming ECM pod (production model of QRC-I60-I) ANCHOR (Various colors) - See Figure 9 on page 31 - code names for specific refueling tracks AN/APA-157 - CW radar illuminator and fire control computer for SPARROW missile system. Angle-off - angular position off the tail of the reference aircraft APQ-72 - airborne intercept radar in P-^IB aircraft .UNCLASSIFIED 19 UNCLASSIFIED - airborne Intercept radar In P-8E aircraft APQ-lOO/109 - airborne Intercept radar In P-^C/D aircraft APR-25 - vector homing and warning system - providing 360" directional warning of threat signals in certain bands with Instantaneous bearing to radiating source. APR-26 - crystal video airborne warning receiver to detect SA-2 guidance signals APR-27 - airborne radar warning receiver armed reconnaissance - an air mission flown with the primary purpose of locating and attacking targets of opportunity, i.e., enemy materiel, personnel, and facilities in. assigned general areas or along assigned ground communications routes, and not for the purpose of attacking specific briefed targets. ASE circle - allowable steering error - circle on radar display provided by fire control computer. ATOLL - Soviet air-to-air missile, infrared seeker type autotrack - automatic tracking in which a servo mechanism keeps the radar bean trained on the target. Back - the individual occupying the back seat of the P-i|; in Navy called RIO, in Air Force called pilot or GIB. BARCAP - Barrier combat air patrol - a MIGSCREEN for one or more missions barrel roll - See Figure 2 (page 27) - a 360*» rolling maneuver in which the flight path of the aircraft describes a helix about the- Intended direction of the flight. BDA - boirtb damage assessment BINGO (fuel) - minimum fuel quantity reserve established for a given geographical point to permit aircraft to return safely to home base or aerial refueling point. bogey - unidentified aircraft boreslght mode - in the boreslght mode the radar antenna is aligned and locked to the roll axis of the aircraft. break - an emergency turn in which maximum performance is desired Instantly to destroy an attackers tracking solution, break X - minimum range Indication for missile launch, X ap- pears in the radar scope at minimum range. 20 UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL CAP - combat air patrol - an aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, ovc the force protected, over the critical area of a combat zone, or over an air defense area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their target, (NAVY) Condition I CAP (Standby): aircraft ready for immediate (maximum delay of two (2) minutes) takeoff. Aircraft with engine not running (starter batteries plugged in) will be positioned for take-off. Pilots In cockpit and deck drew on alert. CAS - calibrated air speed (knots) CBU«2'l - canister dispensed air-to-ground bomb let type munition; the canister is carried externally on the aircraft and opens after release at a preset altitude. centerllne tank - a fuel tank carried externally on centerllne of aircraft. chaff - a type of confusion reflector, which consist of thin, narrow metallic strips of various lengths to provide different responses « used to create false signals on radarscope. chandelle - a maximum performance climbing turn in which speed is converted to altitude while reversing direction. CMR-312 (Little Ears) - aural radar warning receiver CROWN - call -sign for rescue force commander CRT - Combat Rated Thrust - maximum augmented thrust condition of engine DF - direction finder DME - distance measuring equipment dot - (aim dot, steering dot) - electronic dot appearing in radar scope when radar is locked on providing computed steering vector Information element - Air Force term for the basic fighting unit (two air- craft) EWO - electronic warfare officer PANSONG - tracking radar for Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile system (CONFIDENTIAL) fighting ( wing) position - an area for the wingman in which optl-- mum coverage and maneuverability is achieved in maximum performance maneuvers . finger-four formation - see Figure 6 (page 29) - also fingertip formation - a four-plane formation in CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL which the aircraft occupy positions suggested by the four finger tips of either hand, the fingers being held together In a horizontal plane. flak - antiaircraft fire fluid element - the second or supporting element In fluid four formation, flying In a high or low element position. fluid-four - see Figure 5 (page 29) - a tactical formation having the second element spread in both the vertical and horizontal planes to enhance maneuverability, mutual support and look-out ability, fragged - mission directed by fragmentary operational order from higher headquarters. Front - the Individual in the front seat In the F-^i aircraft; in the Navy called the pilot, in the Air Force called the aircraft commander, g - unit of acceleration (32.2 ft/sec^) gaggle - slang for a number of aircraft operating in close proximity, not necessarily in any semblance of formation. GAM-83 - BULLPUP; air-to-ground guided missile GCI - ground control Intercept GUARD - emergency UHF radio channel usually monitored by all aircraft and ground stations as a secondary frequency. Hard turn - a planned turn in which the intensity of the turn Is governed by the angle-off and range of the attacking aircraft. HEAT - armament switch setting for using infrared missiles hot mike intercom - intercommunication system continuously active (hot) IAS - indicated air speed ICS - intercommunication system ID - identification; to make Identification IFF - identification, friend or foe; aircraft transponding beacon received by radar distinguishing friend from foe. Immelmann - see Figure 8 (page 30) - maneuver in which the air- craft completes the first half of a loop and then rolls over to an upright position thus changing di- rection 180° with a simultaneous gain in altitude. IMN - indicated Mach number 22 GONFiDEilTlAL CONFIDENTIAL ^ IP - Initial point i a well-defined point, easily distinguish- able visually and/or by radar, used as a starting point for a bomb run to the target. IR missile - an infrared or heat-seeking missile IRON HAND - a code name for a flight with special ordnance and avionics equipment whose mission Is to seek and destroy enemy surface-to-air missile sites, JCS target - a target appearing on the JCS target list Jinking - constant maneuvering in both the horizontal and vertical planes to present difficult target to enemy • *• defenses by spoiling the tracking solution. Bank, pitch and velocity are all simultaneously changed in this maneuver. karst - a limestone outcropping or ridge r kt - abbreviation for knot (nautical miles/hour) L. >LAU-3 - a rocket launcher adaptable to external bomb racks holding 19 2.75 inch air-to-ground folding fin rockets LAU-17 adapters - stub pylon on F-A loose deuce - a term to describe fighter tactics in which two to four airplanes maneuver to provide mutual support and Increased fire power. Luf berry circle - a circular tall chase, ascending or descending ^ i M - abbreviation for Mach number ••• MER - multiple ejection rack ml - nautical mile, as used in this report tj> HI6CAP - combat air patrol mission whose actions are directed against MIG aircraft r^j MIG SCREEN - mission wherein protecting fighters are placed ilii between the threat and the protected force in a specific area % military power - maximxmi unaugmented thrust condition of engine missile free - authority Is granted to fire unless target is identified as friendly i missile tone - audio signal indicating AIM-9 is locked on to an IR source fj^i MRT - military rated thrust - see military power ^ MSL - altitude referenced to mean sea level /j» OPREP - message report in Joint operational reporting system A PANAMA - call sign for GCI site located near Danang 1 CONFIDENTIAL 23 CONFIDENTIAL . II plpper - aircraft weapon sight Indicator (a dot of light within a llKhted ring) m 3 a lighted ring) PIRA2 - positive Identification radar zone PRP - pulse recurrence frequency QRC-160 - noise Jamming ECM pod RAG - replacement air group Q ready light - light which Indicates a particular avionics/ munitions system is operating and available for use RED CROWM - voice call for USS LONG BEACH (CLN-9) RESCAP rescue combat air patrol RHAW * radar homing and warning RIO - radar Intercept officer RO - abbreviated form of RIO road interdiction - to prevent or hinder, by aerial means, ^ enemy use of a road or route » ROLLING THUNDER - code name for air strikes against North Vietnam Route Package - see Figure 9 - geographical division of North Vietnam for purposes of air strike targeting rudder reversal - a climbing aircraft maneuver In which direc- tion is changed by rotation around the air- Q craft's vertical axis SA-2 ' Soviet surface-to-air missile system SAM - surface-to-air missile SAR - search and rescue scissors - See Figure 1 (page 27) - a defensive maneuver In which a series of turn reversals are executed In an attempt to achieve offensive after an overshoot by the attacker. 3 3 3 3 3 3 SCAN-ODD - MIG airborne intercept radar (CONFIDENTIAL) section - a Navy term for a tactical element of two or more B aircraft (usually two) /an Air Force term for two ■ flights of four SHRIKE (AGM-^»5) - air-to-aurface radar seeking missile Q SIDEWINDER - see AIM-9 SIDEWINDER tone - see missile tone SIP - selective Identification feature - electronic device with variable codes for identification 24 CONFIDENTIAL 3 0 3 SILVER DAWN - a code name for an Intelligence collecting air- craft (SECRET) "S" maneuver - a weave in a horizontal plane Snap-up - a rapid pullup to establish a climb in order to launch a weapon SPARROW - see AIM-7 "Split-S" maneuver - see Figure 7 (page 30) - l80° rotation about the aircraft longitudinal axis followed by a 180° change of heading in a vertical plane (half loop starting from top) STBY - standby steering dot - see dot Switchology - a coined word addressing the human engineering considerations of switch arrangements TACAN - tactical air navigation - an active electronic naviga- tional system which locates the aircraft with respect to another Installation TARCAP - target combat air patrol - aircraft assigned the air- to-air defense role in the target area TAS - true air speed in knots TCA - track crossing angle - the angle between flight paths . measured from the tall of the reference aircraft TOT - time over target TRACK (various colors) - see Figure 9 code names for specific refueling tracks TROJAN HORSE - a code name of a U-2 air reconnaissance program (SECRET) unit (of turn) ~ divisions on 'an angle-of -attack indicator on P-U aircraft UHT - unit horizontal tall (applied to F-8 aircraft) - a tail design whereby the whole surface rotates about a pivot point unloading - decreasing g*s V - closing velocity (relative) vector box - see APR-25 WILD WEASEL - P-105F specially equipped for locating and attack- ing SA-2 sites (employed on IRON HAND missions) yo-yo - see Figures 3f ^ (Page 28) High Speed - an offensive tactic to In which the attache maneuvers through both vertical and hori- zontal planes to prevent an overshoot In the plane of the defender's turn. Low Speed - a dive for airspeed and a pull up for position closure • a 3 3 3 ZUNI - five Inch air-to-ground ungulded rocket ^ 3 3 3 3 26 3 3 a 3 a a 0 a 28 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED FIGURE 6. Fingertip or Finger Four (AH at Same Elevation UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED* ^ evCNT 1.1 Aircraft Xnvplved: Pour P-8E« vs three HIG-lTsi Result: One P-SE damaged Vicinity Pf Encounter: 19*58'N/i05»5i«E K PRIMARY NtSSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Package IV Date/Time: 3 Apr 1965/IIIOS » —.1''°"'' ^'^^ aircraft (BLUE flight) were providing flak suppression and TARCAP for a M «ch^;^SS^? thi^;'^ *^''^K^^^'■*'^ fUeJ^t). BLUE niEht had conpleted a ZWH attack Md# o? -1 f^S^T' "li^S* ^'^'^^^ ^it" suapected. The attack waa the last made of a larger (3'i aircraft) flight group on the target. ?. MISSION ROUTE Gulf iP'-nnv^l^" f^^''^' "'^^ night, was launched from the aircraft carriers in the VilLti A Prcceeded on a not tnwesterly heading to the coast. The coast line was So« tJ« ^°L°^'*'K ^^^^^^ approached the target on a westerly heading . Egresa from the area was by reverse route except for the airplanes that dlvertrd to Oananl: 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-8E BLUE 1. 2. -j. U 2 - SIDEWINDER HENT PROBLEMS Utility and PC-2 hyiraulic systems rendered Inoperative by enemy gunfire. Emergency utility system operated satisfactorily. ^ j 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS EVENT 1.1 Experience BLUE 1 BLUE 2. 3, «< Total Hours 2500 P-8 Hours 6C9 Combat Mlsslona Remarka Pilot had flown TP-9 and A*«. Not interviewed-' Comments on this Encounter BLUE I « Radio was clear of chatter. Pelt he had received insufficient tralnlnt; In air combat tactics. Did not realise there were KIGs in the area until second sighting of tracers. The pilot was directing nXs attention to look for flak and was not looking for air targets. Low visibility due to haze contributed to the loss of flight integrity. Conunents froa Overall Experience BLUE 1 - Good, .reliable guns are required with the restraint of a positive ID. A lead computing gunsight with minlaun tracking requirement needed. Tall warning highly desirable. Por Interceptor role or for use of AI radar a second crewman very desirable. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE 1, 3 March 1967 Hes sages . Reports : CTO 77.7 >5sg O30417Z Apr 1965 CTG 77.7 Mag C3011UIZ Apr 1965 CTG 77.7 Ksg 031i'51Z Apr 1965 CTG 77.7 Msg 0«0117Z Apr 1965 CTO 77.7 Msg O'»O202Z Apr 1965 CTO 77.7 Hag 0402212 Apr 1965 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Pollowing a flak suppression run, the four meabers of BLUE flight became separated in the hase. which reduced visibility in the target area to 1-2 ml. BLUE 1 was orbiting over the target at about 6030 ft when tracers and hits were observed by the pilot. B-1 was in a 30-'tO° bank speed 350 knots. ELLTS 1 inir.edlately broadcast that he was hit, and turned right to exit the area heading 100*. BLUE 1 thought the tracers were from ground fire. BLUE 1 was concentrating on looking for flak in the target area, and was not maintaining a lookout for enemy fighters. On the way to the coast, BLUE 1 climbed to about 18,000 ft. After crossing the coast BLUE 1 turned to a southerly heading and upon rolling out on co'irse the pilot saw more tracers, again on the left cHde. BLUE 1 turned hard right, saw nothing, reversed the turn to the left and saw a MIG at 7 o* clock at a range of 2000 ft and 200 ft up not firing. BLUE 1 engaged afterburner, 'noqed over, and accelerated to 1.0 nach and came out of AB. While in a shallow dive, to maintain 1,0 Maeh In military power, BLUE 1 turned hard left * to reacquire the NIC, but It was not In sight. BLUE I broadcast the presence of the MIG and established a course for Danang. The gunfire damaged the utility and PC-2 hydraulic systems in BLUE 1. En route, BLUE Joined BLUE 1, confirmed the damage, and escorted BLUE 1 to Danang. The emergency utility system functioned satisfactorily and allowed the pilot to land safely. Most hits were by the 37mm cannon. BLUE 4 was in a left turn at 11,000 ft about 220" and three miles from the target when on rolling his wings level he saw two airplanes at his 3 o'clock position level at a range of about two miles and identified them as friendly aircraft. As BLUE k banked left and continued to observe the target, he saw three airplanes assumed to be k-Us diving towards the target area and one opened fire with guns. This airplane was then observed to flatten out in a pursuit curve, while the other two continued to dive on the target area. At this time BLUE ^ positively identified all three attacking airplanes by their silver color and silhouette as MIGs. He went to 100 percent power and attempted to close on the firing MIG. BLUE 4 selected an AIN-90 and had a good tone but withheld launch of the missile because of the many friendlles in the area. At this time BLUE 4 heard BLUE 1 report that BLUE 1 was hit and was exiting. BLUE 4 then broke off the ehaae to locate and Join BLUE 1. BLUE 2 and 3 did not see the MIGs in the haze . The P-4 flight assigned as TARCAP at 25,000 ft never made contact with the MIGs. The P-Ss in the strike group had used radar to spot the attack aircraft but at the time of the encounter were watching the target for flak. ^MSQ OaOimiZ Apr 65 and CINCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67 quote MIGs as MIO-15. tUHl 1-2 Aircraft Involved: Four P-UBs and four M1G-17» Result: One nlssl'ns One NIC>17 probably destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: Gulf of Tonkin, 25 nl SM of Hainan Island K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/Time: 9 Apr I965/08^aH MIC barrier In nortnern Tonkin Gulf about halfway between Haiphong and Hainan (approx 20"00*;i/103'00'£) to divert ar.y XIGs away from a strike in the Hanol/Halphong area. The first element (LiL'JE 1 (LeaJ) and 2) launched aoout ?0 ir.in ahead of the second elerrent (BLUE j and *) tjecause one aircraft a&orted launch and had to be replaced. Each element engaged MICs independently. 2. MISSION ROUTE Element 1 (BLUE 1 and 3), launched in vicinity of Point Yankee, proceeded to the HW (heading: 315*) clearing Hainan Island by about 30 mi, proceeding to the CAP station (approx 20O00'N/103«00*E). Element 2 (BLUE 3 and U) launched approximately 20 nln later and proceeded on sane general heading. 3. AIRCRAFT CONF IGURATIOKS F.OB BLUE 1. 2. 3 BLUE 1 2 - SPARROV; (AIH-7D) * - SPARROW (AIH-7D) 2 - SIDEWINDER {AI>l-95> 1 - centerllne tank No camouflage palnt« MIC»17 MIC 1. 2. 3. ft No missiles Cannon Not all-weather version; no radone in duet Highly polished silver finish. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Solid undereast Mith few breaks, tops at 23.000 ft. Visibility at altitude, unlimited. BLUE BLUE 3 6 Data not available Altitude : 35.000 ft Heading : — 135' Speed : ... Hach 1.2 — — — Fuel State : Unknown (probably full Internal) Plight Format ion ; First and second elements were about 50 ml apart at initial MIO . detection. 5. INITIAL DETECTION (First element data only) First element heard that second element had MIGs on radar. Plrst element turned south, went to AB, to attempt to Join engagement. First element sighted four MIGs at great di&tance (30-50 ni) pulling contrails. As they approached, they could also distinguish F-4Bs pulling contrails. «. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 requested clearance to fire, and used radar acquisition to begin SPARROW attack. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPHENT BLUE I(L) fired SPARROVs at NIC and followed jp with SIOEUINDERs, breaking off engage* ment when other MIG section started to pull behind him. He departed area to the south, checked fuel, and requested permission from ship to reattack and pursue over land (Hainan) If necessary. He reentered area and resunied engagenjent using boreslght acquisition (opti. cal sight plus radar). Proceeded with another SPARROW attack and then departed area because of low fuel. Engagement took place at supersonic speeds at about 40,000 ft. Total time of engage- ment was approximately 20 mln. BLUE 3, 4 (second element) were seen to fire missiles at MICs. BLUE 4 did not return from mission; cause of loss is unknown. BLUE (Front) Squadron Commanding Officer, had about 1000 hr In the P-IB, and had many missile firings — a well-experienced pilot. This was first MIO engagement. Data on other crew ■embers not available. Comments from Overall Experience Air-to-air IFF would help by clearly Identifying friendly targets In a poor visibility condition. (Not a factor In this engagement.) There Is a need for a close-in weapon as a backup on any missile system. If an ID pass has to be made, aircraft should have a weapon to give him w Immediate attack capabil- ity If the target proved hostile. Guns would also be useful as an air-ground weapon (stopping a truck convoy, for example). n. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ! BLUE 1 (Lead) - Front, 17 January 1967 Messages . Reports :" • „ . — ^ CTP77 110322Z (MIC Encounter Recap) CTCST-'l 1007152 Amplifying Reports on Missile Firings by BLUE 1 and 2. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE 1 and 2 were launched from carrier at about O8OOH and proceeded to the NW on a heading of 315", clearing Hainan Island by about 30 ml -and then proceeding to the CAP sta- tion in the Gulf of Tonkin. They then proceeded to orbit at their assigned stations. The second element (BLUE 3 and i») was not able to launch from the ship until about 0820H. BLUE 3 and 1 rendezvoused and proceeded in a northwesterly direction to Join the first element. At about 08.', j„ afterburner. BLUE 2 then maneuvered into a stem position on the HlG-17 and again •Ji attempted to fire the SIDEWINDER missile on station tD at a range of 1-2^djI. *galn the SsBUe would not fire. BLUE 2 then returned to the ship. This SIDEWINDER was examined ^ back aboard the ship and the EPU was found to have fired, but not the motor. BLUE * did not r-'um from this mission. The ctuae of loss was rot known. Extensive investigation of the snt was made and no definite conclusions were reached. The Chinese c aimed that on that aay an F-H was shot down by friendly forces, but careful Investlga- 4»> tlon of that possibility has been made and this has teen ruled out. It is presumed that ' BLUE * was lost either due to fuel exhaustion or hit by a MIQ. 37 ■ f Note: EVENT l-> SUHHAW r Thi* reconstruction covers the first element only. Tine Hark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2) Status Action Other Friendly CoM«un1cat1ons Enemy Actions (MI6 1 .2,3.4) Remark s AU: 35.000 ft Approx Hach 0.9 Lit AB and headed south B*(L) Instructs second clenent. (See Coaaunl- catlons) B3. 4 reported tar> gets on redar, Iden- tiffed visually as ni6s B1 directed other elenent tJ go to AB and obtain sepa- ration from HIGs MI6 4 dropped tanks. All rolled in to ettacii 83. 4 First elenent was 50-60 mi N of second elenent, heard activity on radio and headed S to ioin engagement AU: 38.000 ft (B1) Mach 1.2 AU: 35.000 ft (82) Hach 1.2 in AB MiGs sighted by B1 end 2 B4 requested clearance to ftre on NlGs S1(L) requested clearance to fire from ship KICs appro* 30-50 mi away. Coy Id see contrails of both MICs and F-40S F4B contrail was considerably darner and heavier than- niGs. Alt: 38.000 ft (B1) Alt: 35,000 ft (62) Nach 1.3 in AB SI gave clearance to fire B2 acquired target on radar, made left turn to obtain collision course w1 th HIGs . started cilab Ship gave clearance to fire AU: 41.000 ft (BZ) Kach K3 In AB B2 fired SPARROU ■Isslle NIGt epptered to turn Into first element (B1, 2) KIGs were in westerly heading, wide finger-four formation. One NIG was well below contrail level Ranqe - S mi . MAP mode, wide display. 1 inear pol arl i. , narrow speed gate. 10 mi range. Interlocks IN Missile motor did not fire c;.:^ tc^5 ^ ^ ^ ^3 ^rr] L.- ^ ^ ' EVENT I'i yuMitA«Y fContlwued) Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2) Other Friendly Comunicatlon! Enemy Actions (MIG 1 .2.3.4) Reaarfcs Tine - Mark Status Action u Alt: 40,000 ft (SI) Hach 1.6 in A6 Passed under H16s Position of B2 not known Turned right to get separation KIGs turned left. Here in widely spread formation Individual air- planes clearly discernible Alt: 40.000 ft (Bl) Hach 1 .1 82 flying wide wing position Acquired HIG on bore* sight at 6 mi off to right. At 5 ni ob- tained radar lock-on (81) HIfi-17 at 44,000 ft Mach 0.9. not maneuver inq. Heading E. 1 Range - 5 ml radar lock on, switched to HAP mode to obtain autotrack u Alt: 40.000 ft (bl) Hach 1.1 30* right bank Fired SPARROW at rang* of 3 ni to target (Nose was pulltd to right to center tlie steering dot) HIG at 44,000 ft Had steady steering dot. slightly below optimum, but well within range. Hissi le fired, tra- jectory good but did not guide. Alt: 44.000 ft (Bl) Mact) 1.2 to* left bank Switched to HEAT, ob- tained good tone, fired SIDEUINOER at 1.5-«1 range. Target heading ENE NI6 at 44,000 ft SIDEUINOER picked up guidance Alt: 44.000 ft (Bl) Hach 1.2 Tried to follow H16 but could not turn with bin NIG broke hard left and down SIDEUINOER could not follow hard left turn and went behind HI6-I7 In turn trying to foDoM HIG (Bl) Bl dropped nose down and broke off, eased off g, accelerated, and departe* area 5. Caw out of AS. orbfted. B2 followe .B\(L>. Called others to check fuel state Other element of BLUE I and 2 were in abeam fornatlon at 13.000 ft, headlnr. 120", airspeed unknown, and sighted four HIG-lTs (two leading, two trailing farther back (distance unknown)) In 5ri^ ^""^ heading 250«», altitude unknown. The KIGs appeared to be under CCI control. BLUE 1 continued ctraUht ahead, and BLUE 2 turned left to make an Identification run on the HIGs (1 and 2). MIGs 3 and H fired ungulded rockets at BLUE 2 and nissed. BLUB 1 ^oi^on-j^t'"'^ behind MICs 3 and U, obtained radar lock at ^4 ml , and attempted to fire a SPAKRO/T from 2-1/2 ni. There was no missile select light and the pilot could not fire. The Rlsslle system had been in standby, and when switched to ready, the light would not come on thus Indicating a nalfunctlon. BLUE 1 continued through 60' angle off toward trailing position to make a SIDEWINDER attack on MICa 3 and 4. He was then attacked by MIGs 1 and 2 firing two salvos of 6-10 ungulded rockets at SLUE 1 which missed. MIGS 1 and i had pulled up into a 15,000 ft overcast and commenced their attack from above, SfPi**t"^^i directed. BLUE 1 broke off attack on MIGs 3 and H and took evasive action. BLUR 2 made an Identification pass but was never In position to flr«. The engagensnt lasted 3-* minutes. 1 I I I a 9 J 16 a* 3 9^ 3 a 9 a' a EVENT 1-5 Aircraft Involved: Two P-^Bs vs four Hia-17s Result : Two MIC-17a destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: 20«08'M/105''l5' E Route Paekase V 1. PRIKARV NlSSIOrt ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 17 Jun 1965/1030H Six F-UB aircraft (BLUE nip;ht) In tfiree elerr.ents were on BARCAP for two strike groups attac;M. At approximately IO3OH with both aircraft flying at approximately 10.000 to 1^.°;? ft In a race-track pattern with radar on scale, Just as they turned to the fJ// E-UE 1 DlcVed up a radar contact about 30-35 ni , which was Interpreted to be comlnj froa the vicinity of Hanoi or Just to ifie west of It. They went Into an "Idcnt-attack formation. The wlncHMin went in a 3 -ml trail and the clement headed directly for the contact, wuring the run-m toward the contact, they noted drift on the radar scope and established ^rc» that that the unknowns were on cor.ewhat of a southerly to southwesterly heading, ihey turned from a heading 3f abcuv 330° to a heading of about 280o to effect an intercept. {RIO thought intercept course 31O0, turnlnii: to 290o prior to firing.) The eler^nt accel- erdted to about 550 kt. Th*?y jllnfced slightly to lU.ooo ft and spotted the contacts visually at about 5 nl (four airplanes) 15« to the right. Both RIOs had deternlred that there were four contacts, and they had determined that they were not locking up on -he saRW airplane. BLUE 1 was locked on the MIO 2 contact and BLUE 2 was locked up on cltner RIG 3 or MIO 1. The boeeys were cutting across the F-tJB's nose at almost a 90" an?le, 5ust slightly above at 15,000 ft, Just under the overcast; HIG 2 was flying In tralx of KIC 1 at about 1500 to 2000 ft, NIC 3 ar.d KIO U were In a good section forr.atlon In the nelKhborhood of another 2000 to 3000 ft behind XIG 2, At almost the sane tine that BLtB 1 spotted then, they either spotted the F-J»s or got a vector In their direction. i^iG 1 turned, cane directly towards BLUE 1. BLUE 1 could tell that they were "snail sliver air- planes > but no positive Identification was nade at this tlrie MIC 2. l^'^'^ad ^f cutting Sj^H'the corner to Join his leader to clo.e the gap. flew the sane "^^^ ^^'J^^'^J S^^jf that his leader did. 3y the tlr.e he turned the corner, tanked up in a steep ban* l^urning toward his leader, the lead F-H was close enough to r.ake a positive ID on hla. he shouted -KIc;.- BLUE 1 RIO reported "...we are In range. Fire. Fire. Fire." The steering dot was 'ust slightly out of the circle. Lead made a slight turn and fired station 8, rlght- wWsPARROW at about 2-n:l ran^re (RIO reported flrlni at 3-5 ml). It appeared that the SPARROW went nff about 10 ft behind the MIC 2 tall, i About this same tlr.e, MIC 2 roiled uD on his wing and was a mass of flames. Smoke started" pouring from the center of ^^e aircraft on aft. and "t.-.e whole thing was a sheet of flar.e." The wlngaan saw this also. In the .iieantlce. the second section of HIGs had tended to cut across the corner of this turn and close on MIO 1. The P-i» wlngman fir-d at MIG 3 and his =;lssile hit when iiTG 1 was directly above BLUE I and MIC 1 (which passed about 500 ft to the left, canopy- to-canopy. of BLUE 1). Melther BLUE 1 nor the pilot of SLUE 2 saw MIG 3 get hit; both were engrossed in the maneuvers of MIC 1. BLUE 2 RIO observed his olsalle hit a AIG and explode. The MIGs did not appear to fire at any time. The P-*s commenced a separation maneuver In AB, flew into the clouds, lost sight of the MIGs. completed the separation maneuver, turned to the left at 30,000 ft and came r-, back out of AB; no radar contacts and no visual sightings were made. They could see the 1 vapor trails from a SPARROW mlssUe. It was obvious that they returned to the same area, v| but made no sightings or radar contact»5. While attempting to reacquire the MiCs. ra^ar JSntacts were detected to the SE. The ?-H thought It logical for the "I-'/^^'j'^f /f^^^ wav toward the strike force. BLUE flight headed toward the contacts and Identified them as friendly EF-102s. BLUE then returned to the firl.ig area. They searched the area and sighted one parachute about 2000 ft off the ground. They were extremely low on fuel and m{ departed the area. BIMGO fuel was 5800 lb and the initial contact had been made at 7000 lb. I 1 9 U 1,9 » -4 Tine Mark Action Aircraft ( Status BLUE 1) Action Other Friendlles BLUE 2 Comnunlcati OAS Enemy Actions (MIG 1 .2.3.4} Remarks To 91 coning left counterclockwise to NW orbit, 375 to 4vU**Kk ina, 10,000-11.000 ft, Conf 1 guratl on : centerllne tank 3 SPARROW 2 SIDCUINOeR B2 slipping back to line abreast at 1-1/4 nf as section ap- proached NU leg. Checked with progress of strike and shifted back to CAP fre- quency BARCAP to NU Of target. Radar on 50-nl scale, ttlssllcs turned and CM on. ^1 (about 1032) Bl made rh^tr contact about 340» True at 30-35 ml as he cane out of turn. Bl accelerated to S50-kt IAS and proceeded on heading of about 330* climbing to 14.000 ft to investi gate B2 si Ipped Into 3-ai trail. B2*obtained radar contact at about 25 nl. Lead directed: "ARM; fuel transfer switches on." Heading S Co SU at 400 to 4S0-kt IAS. Attempting to establish drift. (about 1034} Contacts drifted left. Intercept course of 280». sec- tion at 550- kt IAS and M.OOO ft. Changed course to 280* True. Backs of BU2' agreed that contacts were multiple bo- geys, agreed to different "lock-ons." Bl took Ml ; B2 took M3. Continued Straight and level at about 15.000 ft. ^3 (about 1035) Sighted contacts visually about IS' to star- board . 5 mi. Both aircraft were locked on. Four sliver air- craft In two sections turned left into F-4s. M2 followed path of Ml . H3S4 cut inside of turn to close on leader. I £3 69 Ci»^pB^ OSai I 0^ i« m M 1^ r— ^ r- EVENT I»5 SUMMARY (Continued) Time Mark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1) Status Action Other Friendllei BLUE 2 Conmunfcatlonf Enemy Actions (HI6 1,?.3,4) Rcnarkt (about (about 1536) (about 1037) B1 1<}ent1f1ed second aircraft as It presented plan view In turn as MI0-17 about 3*«1 range. Jockey 1 ng slightly to get dot In center BUZ In AS climbing to 30»000 ft on a heading of about 280* B1 called "MIGs." B1 may have changed course si Ightly (up to 10<=>} but basically was flying straight and level; dot was In circle but out of center. Lead RIO re- ported "... we're in range . Fire " 61 fired one SPARROW at M2 at 2-3 ml; went to AG after firing and CDtnmenced climb to 30.000 ft B2 fired at H3; firing at naxl- mun range with interlocks com- pleting 'the firing ci rcul t. After firing and seeing his SPARROW leave rail, B2 saw M2 burst into flames from B1 missile. \ On reaching about 5-m1 separation , 8I&2 turned to port and descended back through clouds, drop- ping out of AS - looking for remaining two MIGs. B1 RIO had called for turn to right because MIGs last seen cn stbd quarter. Lead MIG approached head on. Kl passed SOO ft on left on opposite heading to Bl. HI passed 100 yd abeam 82. SPARROW appeared to ex- plode 10 ft aft of M2. 82 saw M2 brought down, but didn't see his own hit because of concern for Ml . RIO of B2 saw their missile Impact and M2 explode. M2 rolled In a sheet of flame from center fuselage «ft and went out of control M3 exploded. F-4s returned to scent of engagement (could still see smoke trail of SPARROW) but couU not detect MlGs. A. A EVEHT 1-5 5UHHART (Contlnugdl Mark Time Action Aircraft (SLUE 1). Other Friendlles BLUE 2 Communications Enemy Actions (HIG 1 ,2 »3|4] Re Dia r k s Status Action (about 1038} 81 heading to S£ searching for MlCs, got radar contact toward strike group and in- vestigated 81 prepared to engage radar contacts B2 returned to Ident-trall forMatlon. r (about 1340) B1 maneuvering to visually Identify radar contacts and be ready to fire BUZ sighted EF-lOBs which . were pro- viding active ECW support for strike group B2 In trail Turned back to NU to search area of engage- sent for remaining NIGs. h t Jl^OUt 1043) Bl searching for remaining HiGs, sighted parachute about 2000 ft from ground and watched It descend to ground Bl departed area, low on fuel after parachute landed and NIGS not located durl ng search. 82 continued In trail. 3. tfn cr3 a t23 ca u c;;^ Im9 ^ EVENT I.f Aircraft Involved: Pour P-*Cs vs two MIQ-lTs Result: Two MIG>17s destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'lT'N/lOSnS'E Route Packaee VI 1. PRIMARY NISStON AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time; 10 Jul 1965/I659H A flight of P-ftC (BLUE flight) aircraft was to follow a force of P-105s striking the Ten Bal ordnance and ammunition depot and provide NISCAP. 2. HISSION ROUTE Take-off from Ubon, refueled at approximately 18'00'M/lOl^OO'E and proceeded to Just, south of the target 21*'iiO'N/10ii 50*E, turned east and established an orbit 25 ml east of the target. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS BLOZ 1. 2. 3. ^ * - SPARROW (AIM-7) * - SIDEHINUER (AIH-9B) cn Inboard pylons 2 - 370-?al tanks on outboard pylons Radar on; TACAN and IFF off Painted light gray on upper surfaces » white underneath KIO-17 Wltj 1. g Sl?.ver with North Vietnamese markings Red stripes on the wings Two external fuel tanks per aircraft Fo missiles observed )'.o afterburner operation observed 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Scattered cumulus with bottoms at 8000-10,000 rt« tops about 14,000 ft. To the northwest of the target there were thunderstorms, buildups with tops at 28,000-30*000 ft. The action of the engagement took place mostly in ciear areas. BLUE T 2 1 >r Altitude ; 22,000 ft Heading " —Turning through E Speed : Mach 0.92 Puel"3tate : About 8000-6500 lb, near BIMQO Flight Formation: (Fluid-four) 44 REAR ELEMENT S. INITIAL DETECTION ^ ^ LOV/IR The MIOs w<»re initially detected on radar at about range, dead ahead. Visual contact was made head-on at 10 ml by BLUE 1 (Back). The MIGs' track was displaced about 1/2 ml to the left and at the same altitude as BLUE flight. Due to the element separation, BLUE 1 and 2 saw the MIGs before the following element (SLUE 3 and U). In the lead ele- ■ent BLUE 2 identified the MIGa first. In the second element BLUE 3 sighted the MIOs first. C. ACTION INITIATED At radar contact It was decided to go to an Identification formation cal"' d the loose- deuce, with the lead element (conposed of BLUE 1 and 2) making the Identification pass. Due to fuel considerations, the lead element did not accelerate in afterburner, and inauf- ricient separation was achieved at identification. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT As enemy and friendly flights passed, each turned Into the other, tut due to separa- tion of the elements of the BLUE flight, the MIOs end-d up attacking BLUE 3 and U, firing cannon at a high angle off. During the turn into the MIGs the two elements of the flight became separated, and after the MIGs attacked, BLUE 3 and 4 split. 55 SimTIOK DCVCLOPHENT (Conttnued) ^^^^"^ ^'^ BLUE * unloaded g'a and after accelerating to »«P*"°"i^ 'P"*** """Jjj ^1^0? wnnm oiiMh k Mlne.over and a 180* turn at the top enabled him to get on tne laii 01 Sr«i cJuli ?olS2 the »an;S«r! BLUE Tthen fired four SIDEWIMDEBS. reaultlng In a kill. BLUE 3 attempted to gain separation throuRh a scissors "maneuver but was unable to ■min An «dvant«M However, throurh acceleration separation was achieved and on reattach BLUE Ws Sbl! U fo?ce the MlHrover shoot . BLUE 3 fired four SIDEWINDERS resulting In S kill. ?lle lapse f^om fJrst radar slghtlns to the time BLUE flight -as headed home «« 'ess than 4 «lnu?e». The engaeer.ent of BLUE 3 from the initial turn J° [J^i^f last missile was about 1-1/2 minutes. The engagement of BLUE H fron the split until the last Blssile was fired was judged to be •1-1/2 minutes at the most. B. ORORANCE BLUE 1, 2 BLUE 3 BLUE H NIO 1 MIO 2 (No. fired/No. hits) SIDEWINDER AIM-9B CANNON No firing. 4/2 4/2 1/0 X/0 Remarks Fired Ho. 1 — no tone; No. 2 and 3 exploded to the right of the MIC; No. 4— unknown. No. 1 and 3 detonated near SIO; No. 2 and 4 fired in haste. Pired on BLUE 3 and 4 on initial break and on BLUE 3 in scissors maneuver. Pired at BLUE 3 and 4 on initial break. 9. EQUIPHCNT PROBLEMS BLDE 2 - Radar was not operating at peak performance. BLUE 3 - Radar became Inoperative during the hlgh-g scissors maneuver. BLUE 4 - Intercom between cockpits went out during the engagement . Could only operate radar on emergency and, therefore, was not searching. be established.' The radar later failed. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Exoerienee 4 » •» No automatic lock-on could Total Hours P-4 Hours Combat Missions Remarks 2500 250 Unknown Had not completed checkout until Ubon. 1000 700 250 400 75 60 TAG background. Had only observed one SIDEWINDER firing. £600 250 60 Little ACM. Pired only one SIDEWINDER. 2700 2000 200 350 50 50 Never fired a SPARROW or SIDEWINDER; alr- to-alr experience. Had never fired a SPARROW. ADC experience with GENIE firing. BLUE 1 Pront BLUE 2 Pront Back BLUE 3 Pront BLUE 4 Pront Back Comments on this Encounte r BLUE 1 (Front) - Expressed desire for a fighter with maneuverability thatcan be exploited. Some optical aid should be available for visual ID, !*h !raf wo5l5 SedeslraEle in P-4. Seat restraint harness is too restrictive for Rood J^iiJjfJtr canopy distorts view in some areas. Heads-up display to give range to JiJiSl ioJid SrSSlpfil. Had trouble with SIDEWINDER due to h.ad pitting. Believed caused on takeoff when AB kicked up debris. BLUE 2 (Pront) - Expressed desire for a tail warning radar. Needs missile with less minimum range. Backseat la helpful for radar observation. BLUE 2 (Back) - Peels that KIGa were OCI'd since they mad^ lfiO» turns away from them and into them. 56 Corotn'nts on this Encounter (Continued) EVENT i.g BLUE 3 (Front) - Gun not necessary; It will Ret oeople Into trouble. Woul'l UHe c.p.bnUy\o nre all mlsclles on P-i. with "nterllne tank on Less minimum jan^.e for missiles Instead of guns. Front cockpit means of going to boreslght on F-««. t.or.„ana Sistri" is MS^yfJoiR m case it locks on friendly. ^^^^ ttnPB that he did not know were In the area. Because of lack of ACT at tine of event, 5S SoJ SoS hSi tS maSSSJcr the F-U as well as he could later after sone experience. BLUE H (Front) - Felt that all the requirements demanded of pilots Tlylng nultl- ■ission aircraft meant that some aspects (e.g.. ACM) would not receive sufficient I training* BLUE 1 (Back) - Expressed desl.'-e for better visibility at 6 o'clock. Could not see niG when they pushed the nose over. Would llXe Internal gun. Ran a lot of Intercepts on Savy aircraft anJ ri.-st thour.ht the bogey picked up was Ilavy. Likes two-man crew but wants an RIO for the second crew. Second crew needed as specialist to operate the equip- Bcnt, particularly in degraded environment. \l. DATA SOURCES P«>ieet Interviews ; BLUE 1 (Front). 13 Jan 1967; BLUE 2 (Front), 9 JaS-^^JJ^ ^J:"LLif * 7 Mar l$b7; B LUE 3 (Front), 9 Jan 1967; BLUE H (Front), l6 Mar 1967; BLUE 1 (Back), 9 Mar 1967. Wessacies. Reports ; J ' 2AD, 101509Z JuLy 65, 2D0T0 03538 ?AD, 1011592 July 65, 2D070 03532 CINCPACAF IIOIOIZ July 65, DO 31155 PACAP Tactics 1 Techniques Bulletin Mo. 25, 27 Sep 65 '"; USAP Fighter Weapons School CAD Bulletin No. 10, 7 Feb 67 CIMCPACFLT Staff Study 11-66 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION As bombing action was Initiated in the northernmost part of Vietnam In the summer of 1965. particularly north of Hanoi, a certain pattern of enemy air activity was noted. As the bombing flights continued to follow a pattern, the enemy actions also assumed a pattern. The pattern was evident In the MIC warnings which were broadcast by the BIG EYE sup- port aircraft. The MIG warnings at this time were of two types: Yellow warning signified f the MIOs were airborne, and red earning slg;nlfled the r-TICs were about 10 mln away fron a i possible engagement. The following events developed the pattern of Interest. As the first strike entered the area, the first warning -*a3 "yellow," followed by "red"; however, shortly afterward the red warning was changed to yellow. As the last flight departed the t area after the strike, the red -earning would be called, and the MIGs would follow the ■ flight out of the area. Unaccountably, the MIGs did not attack. ^■1 The tlaing of the second red warning was such that the escort had only minimum fuel remaJnins. Information would be received that MIOs were coming up from Phuc Yen, and it ms suspected that the MIGs could determine from their GCI, when the escorts would return • ' to base. Consequently, the only possible action on the part of the escorts, which were low oa fuel was at most one fast intercept or attempted intercept. The pattern was noted by the strike force pilots. A recommendation was made to Seventh Air Force to take advantage of the fact that the MIGs always retreated when the attack force came Into tht area and then attempted attacks on the last flights. On 10 July, the morning strike flights again observed this pattern of MIG activity. As a result, the afternoon flight was briefed that a plan to engage the harassing MIGs would be put Into effect. BLUE flight was instructed to change the takeoff tine for this particular flight, 20 min later than the normal strike flights. The escort would then fbllow the last P-105 flight and arrive approximately 15 min after the normal flight. A tactic was designed to give the P-l flight the appearance of the last P-105 flight on target. They would actually meet the last strike flights and press on to the north, on a search-type mission. Radio silence was to be -nalntalned, and the speeds and altitude flown on the way Into the orbit area would also give the appearance of an F-105 flight. From the planned holding orbit the F-^is would be in a position to attack any MIOs attempting to attack the withdrawing strike flights. V •' I. ." I i 1 I f. Action Prior to Enaaeement V ''f\ BLUE flight consisted of four P-'^C aircraft. Each aircraft was armed with four f'. J/i SPARROW (probably AIM-7D) missiles and four SIDEWIMDEFt missiles — two each on each of I trw inboard wing pylons. The outboard wlnp; pylons carried the 370-gal fuel tank. No '/ eenterllne tank was carried since there were only a few in the theater at that time. ^* .J., The aircraft were not camouflaged, but painted light grey on the upper surfaces and ^ White on the lower surfaces. t Kore than the normal ground checks were performed for this mission. During cllmb- ; oyt SPASROW miaslle tuning --as accomplished. The SIDEWINDER was checked on th- ground to see if its head would track a flashlight, and In the air by sighting another aircraft S; '■ lO assure that a tone developed. The SPAHROV/ mlssl'.e tuning was accomplished every 15 !■ !„ ^n. If one would not tune iTxiedlately , the pilot vas instructed to leave It on. This procedure insured that the SPARROWS were inrr.odutel / available despite wear on the radar. 57 NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION (Continued) EVENT 1-6 As planned, BLUE flight nalntalned radio silence from Ifbon to the refueling point. The rendezvous, refueling, and subsequent departure fron the tankers with full tanks was accomplished In complete radio silence. The tankers had been briefed cn this special mission, and no radio contact was attempted. The refuellntr point as noted on the map (PlRure 1) was not the one that was later chosen for eonununlcatlon. BLUE flight was assigned a radio frequency different fron that of the strike fllshts, although the strike frequency was nonitored. Fornatlon and RaJar Search The flight refueled at 28,000 ft (H3L) and 310>kt CAS and proceeded north at Mach 0.65 and about 20,000-rt altitude which approximated that of the F-lb5 strike aircraft. The track was toward the target, and the flight was spread in a flu.ld-four fornation -- BLUE 1 and 2 on the left, BLUE 3 and U on the right roughly 2000 ft apart and the elements spread approximately 5000 ft. This formation was selected to obtain more coverage to the rear of the F-'4 . The second element (BLUS 3 and ) provided cover by weaving behind the Lead. The radar coverage was assigned to BLUE 1 and 3 (the element leaders); one searched high and the other searched low. BLUE 2 and ^ were assigned the responsibility for visual search. If a target appeared it wculd be called out until Lead (&LUE 1} locked on. After lock-on the flight would resume its assigned sweep modes. En route to the orbit area the radar was set on a range scale of 100 sil. Zr. the area* each aircraft was assigned quadrants for search with the Front scanning the sky visually, and the Back responsible for the radar contacts. The track to the orbit area was in the direction of tho target. As a result, the aircraft searched ahead and to the side as they orbited, expecting the MIG threat In the area Indicated In Figure 1. During the orbit, BLUE U ' s radar was not operating properly. Although the radar checked at take-off, after reaching altitude, loss of pressurlzatlon In the wave guide caused the radar malfunction. The radar could be operated in emergency mode but due to other failures the automatic lock-on feature did not function. Consequently, all operation of BLUE 4*9 radar was manual and waa not operated unless other flight members reported a contact. BLUE flight was far enough behind the preceding flight of F-105a to be out of radar range. The IF? was switched off during this mission, and the flight employed the inertlal system for navigation. Just south of the target, the flight turned east. To minimise detection the turn was executed by a single radio command. In addition to the F-105 strike aircraft, two other CAP flights of P-tts and a few B-66 aircraft were in the area. An EC-121 BIG EYE aircraft was stationed over the Gulf of Tonkin. The flight did not recall receiving any warning or other Information from the BIG EYE aircraft. (Hote: This disagrees with CINCPACFLT UOIOIZ July 65 which states that "...MICCAP which subsequently destroyed two MIG-175 reports receipt of BIG EYE warning.") The BIG EYE aircraft later reported that it had Identified six or eight MICs airborne during the engagement. During the flight to the orbit area and during the time spent in clockwise NE/SW orbit, BLUE flight Investigated several radar contacts. The contacts proved to be either friendly aircraft or radar lock-on to ground clutter. The orbit altitude was 22,000 ft since SAMs were not considered a threat at that time. The orbit altitude was slightly lower than normal (30,000-38,000 ft) to simulate an P-105 flight. When almost to BIKOO fuel' levels for normal return (which was about 8000 lb in this area), it was decided to make one more pass to the N, from which the threat was expected. Action at WIG Detection After Just completing the turn at the southern end of the orbit, BLUE 1 picked up a radar contact at 33 mi (one other flight member quoted ml). Shortly afterward, BLUE 3 also locked on. BLUE 1 instructed the flight to assume the loose-deuce formation. The element composed of BLUE 1 and 2 was to make the identification by accelerating ahead of BLUE 3 and 4. The Ideal separation vas from 7-10 ml to permit the lead element to break away after Identification and permit the second element to fire SPARROW missiles. Due to the fuel state, which was about 7000-8000 lb at this time the lead element chose not to use afterburner and accelerated In military power. The absolute BIMGO fuel levels for the area of operation were 6500 lb to engage in ccmliat and 3500 lb to reach home. In order to enter the engagement at a reasonably high airspeed and prevent losing radar contact, the second element (BLUE 3 and 4} flew an S-pattern to gain separation for the identification. The result of these conflletlng requirements was that when the MIOs were visually contacted, the elements were separated by only 2-3 mi instead of 7-10 ml desired. As a result a SPARROW chot could not be safely attempted by the second element. Vhen BLUE flight prepared for the ID, BLUE 1 had no confirmation that the other flight members had acquired the target. Actually, they had. Vhe lack of communication • resulted from a contlnulni? attempt to minimize radio transmissions to conceal the presence of the aircraft. At initial contact by BLUE 1, one bocey waa noted. It tracked down tne scope and then turned 130* and went away from BLUE flight. Af :er following the radar con- tact for awhile, It was realised that there was an overtake vei,ocity of about 200 kt. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOH (Continued) ■ The flight continued to follow the target, until It was clear the target would reach t China before an Intercept could be accomplished. A right turn toward home was initiated when the overtake velocity changed to 900 kt . The flight Immediately returned to an Intercept course. Due to the high overtake velocity, the MIGs were visually sighted a short time thereafter. Tq - Only two KIOs were seen slightly high and to the left. Ti - BLUE 2 (Front) identified the HIGs first; they were difficult to identify and were not smoking. Positive Identification was not made until the MIGs were at 90«.< beam (9 o clockj. The MIGs started to turn after the lead element but rolled out and continued to turn after the second element. The two HIGs were In close formation, not In fighting position. ^ T, - BLUE 1 and 2 turned left-Tnco the MIGs, During ID BLUE 1 led the first element only wfijle BLUE 3 was In control of the second element. BLUE l and 2 Jettisoned tanks, lit AB, and In the turn observed the MIGs turnini? behind BLUE 3 and k and Jettisoning their tanks. (BLlfE 1 mistakenly assumed the tanks were missiles.) T3 - BLUE 1 and 2 initially started to turn left, but BLUE l unloaded and accelerated while BLUE 2 Started a climbing turn which spilt the element. Tj, - After accelerating, BLUE l climbed to 2U,000 ft and orbited the area. During this orbit the other members of the flight were contacted and their actions were monitored. T5 6 - BLUE 1 called for a "Join up" south of the river at the termination of the engage- ment. Til - BLUE 2 started a climbing left-hand turn and Jettisoned tanks when the Back reported that the HIOs had done likewise. BLOT 2 continued looking for two other MIGs since they had been briefed to look for HIGs In groups of four, but none were ever seen. During the I . turn the MIGs were lost from view. T5 - At the top of the climb to 35.000 ft BLUE 2 observed BLUE U's attack and subsequent hit on a MIO. Tfi - BLUE 2 flew toward BLUE U, but the action was completed before BLUE 2 had Joined. •■■ To - BLUE 3 and H heard BLUE 2 call Identifying the bogeys as MIGs and lit afterburners at ID As the MIGs passed BLUE 3 and , the MIGs dropped their tanks, and (T3) BLUE 3 and - . it did' likewise. (Tj,) breaking into the MIOs. The MIGs then turned very tightly behind BLUE 3 and firing. Both BLUE 3 and U saw the firing, but BLUE 3 did not notice any ( tracers. Just "the nose of the r-:iG lighted up" by -luzzle flashes. The HIGs were not ^ tracking, and although the HIGs initially out-turned BLUE 3 and U, the F-Hs accelerated during the turn which permitted BLUE 3 and !i to gain separation. BLUE U was initially flying a flghtlna; wing position with BLUE 3. at 200 ft out and 200-300 ft behind. Because he felt that BLUE 3 had sufficient lookout protection (i.e., u. 0LUE 3, Back). BLUE U broke right during the turn in an attempt to either sandwich Or split" the MIGs. J The MIO» spilt, one following BLUE 3 and the other following BLUE 1. Tc - After the MIGs split, BLUE 3 executed several reverses, the MIG slid by behind In an overshoot and BLUE 3 again reversed, During these maneuvers BLUE 3 felt that the MIG had an airspeed advantage, hence BLUE 3 did not unload the aircraft and attempt to disengage. 'Tt During the scissors maneuvers BLUE 3's radar went out. When the MIO overshot. ? .^' BLUE 3 decided to gain separation. ' -BLUE 3 executed a roll right and went Into a 30° dive. The MIG tried to follow ' ending up at 7 o'clock, three-fourths of a mile away. This was followed by a slight f left turn resulting In a 5-ml separation. During this period, Back proved extremely ^ helpful to Front by keeping him Informed of the enemy positions. 1 T7 - After gaining the separation BLUE 3 started a hard left turn into the MIO, attacking lii almost a head-on position. The Back, aware that the radar was out .told the Front to "Go HEAT." The Front interpreted this as a problem In acquiring the HIQ, and replied, •Oo boreslght." During the subsequent communications resulting from the misunderstanding (Tq) the MlG passed head-on, very close and firing but scored no hits. After the aircraft had passed, SLUE 3 made a slight left turn to keep the MIG in sight and then made a very steep (about 60«») dive to 10,000 ft. The afterburner had been turned f^! on in the Initial break and was still operating so that the speed increased to Hach 1.3- 'j7 To - BLUE 3 then Initiated a high-g barrel roll with the MIG behind at approximately 1 ml. A?ter reaching the 270» position, tTjoJ the MIG opened fire from \° " ^Jf,^'* ^^^i^^-'^i J^"8*»i however the firing range was excessive and no hits were scored. As BLUE 3 dished back (eraerKed from the maneuver), the MIG overshot. The MIG changed his attitude to pull up but could not change the direction in which the aircraft was moving due to a stall. After the MIO overshot, he started to turn, then leveled and descended toward a cloud. 1 ■J •71 59 NARRATIVE OeSCRIPTION (Continued) EVENT 1-6 Til - BLUE 3 was now at about 13,000-15,000 ft, Mach 0.9-0.95, with the MIC ahead. BLUE 3 'rired a SIDEWINDER at range, without tone. This first; missile went unobserved. ^ Shortly thereartffr, BLUE 3 fired a second SIDEWINDER which produced a lurF.t fireball at, or Just to the rlijht of, the tall cone. A third mlssHe was fired and de:onated slightly to the rl^ht of the MIG . A fourth nlsslle was fired but was unobserved. Followlni; the first nlsslle, the next three were fired within a period of 10 sec, all with a gQOd tone. BLUE 3 did not see the MIG blow up, Just the fireball entering the cloud. Ti2 - After the fourth nlsslle was fired, BLLT. 3 broke left »flth the intent of heading to Udorn as fuel level had reached jOGQ lb. - BLUE t, after breaking rlRht, started a dive from 20,000 ft In afterburner and unloaded the alrcrar-, . BLUE U accelerated to about Mach l.H at 12,000 ft (Tg) and started a l-flj pull-up. The MIG had lost ground, but continued to follow BLUE "J . During the pull-up, BLUE H lost sight of the MIG. He cllT.bcd to 33,000 ft (Ty) and came back over the top, Inverted In a "sort of launelmann" to rejoin the engagement. At this time the radar was completely Inoperative. On rolling out at the top of the climb, BLUE U observed the MIG at about 28,000 or 29,000 ft falling off on the left wing in a 090* bank, doing a vertical recovery. The HIC smoothly pulled out In a 020" bank, de!":endlng slightly, to the left. The MIO at this time was looo-^OOO ft in front of BLUE 4, ha BLUE 4 came out of afterburner. BLUE « felt that the MIC must have started to climb at the same time as BLUE ti's climb was initiated, and lost sight of BLUE U during the ensuing climb, Tft - The fall-off to the left and the turn gave BLUE * an excellent firing position. BLUE t cane out of afterburner, cc.-apleted the Immelaann, nade a sll;?ht turn to the left, fired the first SIEEWINDSR. At the tine BLUE tt was straight and level with a slight descent (15° nose down) closing on the MIG. The first missile, fired with tone, did not contact the MIC. It went by the tall pipe and then detonated off to the left about i then established a tone with the third SIDEHIHDER and fired. The missile tracked well and exploded short of the tall pipe but In line with it. The fireball expanded until only the wing tips were seen. Ho debris was seen leaving t.*-.e aircraft at any time durlnn the encounter, but when the fireball subsided, the NIC started to emit dense white smoke from the tailpipe. Before the explosion of the third missile, SLL'E k saw fire in the MIG tailpipe but could not ascertain if it was afterburner operation or not. During the firing BLUE 1 continued to descend with the MIG, continuously closing. At the time the MIC reached about 6000 ft, the MIG was 60° nose djwn and inverted. T9 - BLUE ft was about to overshoot so he rolled Inveited, pulled the nose through the MIG and fired a fourth SIDEWINDER but did not observe the missile. At thls-tlme BLUE t (flack) broadcast flak warning. The flak was In the area of both BLUE 4 and the HIO. BLUE 4 lit the afterburner and began maneuvers to evade the flak while exiting the area. BLUE 4 never considered firing the srARROW.* He had set up for HEAT at the initial encounter and planned to use the SIDEWINDER. The Intercom was not functioning properly, and BLUE 4 had difficulty communicating with the Back whose duty was to "clear the 6 o'clock position." After the encounter, all aircraft exited the area low on fuel and Joined about 30 ml from Udorn. The flight landed at Udorn with about 1800 lb of fuel. Later information . .^>m the BIG EYE aircraft revealed that a large flight of MlOa was 10-1^ ffll behind the flight as they exited the area. A . 4 EVENT 1.6 sUMHARy Keyed to Figure 1 TUe Action Aircraft (SLUE I, 2, 3, 4} Status Action Other Friendly COBRiuntcAtlons Eneny Actions (NIG 1.2) Reaarks r 'OA '08 B) .2.3.4 altitude 22.000 ft. nach 0.9, ainost at BINGO fuel 8t fuel state 6000 lb B2 fuel Stat* 8000 lb B3U 84 fuel ebout 8S00 lb Coning out of turn at southern'end of orbit. In fluid-'four for«a- tion 81 (8Ack) picks up one bogey at 33 ml goes to Military power Goes to ■Hilary pOHer Throttle back and start weave to gain * separation. Acquires targets on radar 81 Nach 0.92 altitude 22.000 ft 82 Nach 0.92 altitude 22.000 ft 83S4 Nach O.BS fuel 8000 lb Range of bogey 20 breaks lock and un reacqutsltlon Identi' fles two targets 6ets radar lock-on at range 1 7-20 nl . Both have radar lock at this tine 8t calls contact ahead at 30 nl and ID posture. No confirmation that others have acquired bogey. None None Bogey at 11:30 o'clock at same altitude Nllitary power used since fuel is low 84 Is not searching due to radar problems. He operated it on emergency only after others had called bogeys. Bogey turns 180* closing velocity 200 kt 81 (Front) asks 81 (Back) to check lock-on. Lead almost calls off the chase nt this point since Lead felt bogeys would fly Into Red China. * r EVENT 1-6 SUHMARt (Continued) Keyed to Figure i Tine r.irk Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2. 3. «) Status Status for all aVcraft sane I BU2 Mach 0.92 altitude 22.000 ft 83l>4 Nach 0.85 altitude 22.000 ft 2.1/2 Hi In trail of lead tleaent Action V:sua11y acquire NIGs Other Friendly Comnunicatlons Enemy Actions (MIG 1 .2) Remarks ClotInQ velocity 9oes from 200 to 900 kt. Heading jtdys same, indi- cating 180* turn by HIGs. range about 18 n1 . Tifw Mark EVENT 1.6 SUMMARY (C ontinued) keyed to Perspective Sketcn Action Aircr«tt (BlUt I. 2. 3. O Status 81 Hach 0.92 aUltude 22,000 ft in full mnftary power* tanks on B2 Hach 0.92 attitude 22,000 ft on left In close wing fomatton on B3&4 Hactt 0.8S altitude 22.000 ft about 2-t/2 mi in trait Acti on Other Friendly i\ saac status 82 saeie status B3&4 sane status NIGs visually acquired by B1 HIGs sighted at about 11 o'clock up, hard to identify at first, no snoke fron MIGs. B2 sees the M!Gs first. Back sees HIGs at about 045* off, range less than 1 mit seen noM due to canopy restric- tions Comunlcetlons Lights afterburner accelerates B2 gets definite ID when HIGs pass 9 o'clock, lights after- burner B2 (Back) starts to call out over air but advises Front who calls Encny Actions (ttlG 1.2) HIGs about 2000 ft higher, range approximately 1 ml HIGs In close for- oatlon, level At this point ihe action of the flight las luffieitntly sep rated to treat each 61 calls ID and break to left for Bl and B2 only HIGs pass to left of BU2, 1/2 ml away in a close formation. Pass about 1500 ft up Remarks Sun behind them helped to Identify as HIGs pass abeasi, since sil- houette "stood out." aircraft individually IP JUJIiAJl'.PJjtUii f EVENT 1-6 SUM HARY (Continued) Keyed to Ptrspectivt Sketch Action Aircraft (BLUE 1) Other Friendly Communl cat 1 ons Enemy Actions (HIG T 21 Remarks Time Hark Status Action ^2 Bl in afterburner Hach •^.0.9S altitude 22,000 ft Starts • 4 to 5-9 level turn. Jettisons tanks • None NtGs Start to turn after B1&2, see second element {B344) roll out and continue In afterburner, has completed 180* of turn, attitude 22,000 ft, tanks gone Goes to 0 9 end accelerates for sepa- ration None During turn loses track of all other aircraft, except MIGs. Sees HICs jetti- son tankt and thinks HIGs are f 1 r i ng ml ss i les «t hioi In afterburner, nach t.3. ettltude 15,000 ft Has accelerated suf- ficiently, starts climb. Sees enerny aircraft during climb. None Du<-1ng the climb 81 sees an enemy aircraft 5000- 7000 ft below and back at 7 o'clock Loses contact with HIGs In afterburner, Hach 1.2, altitude 25.000 ft Ends climb, shuts off afterburner and sets up orbit B1 calls rest of flight. Contacts B2,3,4, .and moni- tors their actions. Hears B3 call that he Is In a scissors. Also hears 83 call . "I got one." Hears B2 say that 82 has B4 In sight ^6 Hach %0.9, altitude 24.000 ft Has B2li4 on radar. Join up Mith others south of Red River Bl calls for Join- up and egress, be- cause fuel Is loM. Join-up south of River. I EVEWT 1-6 SUHHARY (Continued) Keyed to Perspecttve Sketch Time Mark Action Aircraft (SLUE 2) Other Friendly Communications Enemy Actions (NIC 1.2) Remarks Status Action In afterburner Starts wide turn and climb to the left HIGs Start to turn Into 81A2. see second element (S3K4}. roll out and continue. Then turn after B3A4. NIGS at 7:30 o'clock Climbing In after- burner After receiving word that HIGs Jettisoned tanks, B2 punches off tanks B2 (Back) sees tanks Jettison and advises Front to do sane, front advises flight to drop tanks MViS start very tight turn and drop their tanks. Turn Is 'aMaalng.* During the cllicblng turn, wings are rolled level periodically to check airspace for other possible MIG. as they were advised to expect them In f1 Ights of four. Also plenty of J 1 nK 1 ffig u Climbing In after- burner 82 loses sight of HIGs. Altitude 35,000 ft Sees 64 at 2 o'clock down naybe 5000-10.000 ft and a "couple of Miles out." Sees B4 fire at least two mis- siles. At 25.000- 30,000 ft sees one Missile detonate behind MI6. Following this NIG noses over trailing smoke. Into an Increasingly steep dive. f f EVENT 1-6 SUHMAWY( Continue d) keytd to Perspective Sketch Time Action Aircraft (BLUE 2) Status Action Other Friendly Coninunlcetlons Enemy Actions (HIG 1.2) (teaiarks (Continued) Back sees MIG trailing light oreylsh-whlte smoke In • 050*-05S* dive. Also sees a cnlsslle fired, and the aircraft nose over trailing more smoke. Altitude 35.000 ft Descends to al titude of 64 to Join up. Joined at 2S,000 ft and then c1 Imbed together to optlnun cruise altitude I RS9 .4 ^- f fesS ^ EVENT 1.6 SUMMARy (Continued) Keyed to Perspective Sketch Time Hark Action Aircraft (BLUE 3) Other Friendly Communications Enemy Actions (MIG 1,2) Remarks Status Action ^2 Altitude 22.000 ft Hach %0.8S Hi afterburner Hears &2 cal 1 , -They're MIGs, they' re MIGs, break left." NiGs Start to turn after 8142 see second element (B3»4) roll out and continue NIGs at 11 o'clock 1-2 ail fron B3 fi 3 1 9 1 A f flAM A Ait of his element (6314). Altitude 22,000 ft Hach 'vO.SS, Jettliont tanks MIGs jettison tankt and start a hard tjrn B3 calls the NIGs turn "unbeliev- able." ^ Breaking to left, afterburner on FroM T5 on the ac Continues turn to left accelerating, loses track of 84 tlons of B3 and B4 are se are not synchronized. parated and the NIGs shooting one at 83 and one at 84. Range 2000' 3000 ft and coming up 83 sees no tracers Just nose of NIG Hght up. 63 now follows only the NIG which stayed behind him. '5 Afterburner en Reversed and started several "scissors' or reverses with the MIG. Dfd not 90 to 0 9 because B3 felt NIG had airspeed advantage. Calls 64 for help, but B4 says he can- not help, has a MIG on hin. NIGs split. NIG slid by behind In overshoot and r»- versed. 63 feels MIG made a mistake in re< versing after the overshoot. The NIG should make a single pass only. Radar goes out during the sds- SOrs maneuvers. NIG Shoots at each crossover. A. 4 99 EVENT 1-6 s»MM*BY ^Continued) Keyed to Perspective Sketch f— TiBte Mark Action Alrereft (BLUE 3} Status I 10 Afterburner on Action Altitude 20,000 ft Afterburner on Altitude 10.000 ft Hach 1.3 270* through barrel rol 1 (I.e., In a 090"* bank to left) Rolled right and down In 030' dive, then ■ade • »1l8ht left turn, gaining separa- tion Start hard (6.5 to 7 g) left turn Into.HIG Other Friendly HI6 passes head on, starts slight left turn to keep HIG In sight and then dives at 060* to 10,000 ft Starts high-g barrel ro1 1 . Comes out of af terOurner . 01 shed back fron the barrel roll In a left turn Coflimunl cations Back calls. "60 HEAT." Front re- plies, "60 bore- sight." Conversation be- tween Front and Back Enemy Actions (HIG 1,2) H16 seen at 7 o'clock, range 3/4 ml . continues to follow B3 MIG shoots, nose lights up Renarks Has gained speed advantage so B3 decides to gain separation Front thought could not get lock on and did not realise that the radar was out MI6 astern at 1 mi HIG at 7 o'clock range 1/2 flii and firing During left turn KIG overshoots due to higher speed of MIG. HIG changes attitude to pull up but cannot change direction. MIG starts to turn then leveled and headed toward a cloud, descending range 1-1/4 cai B3 felt niG was out of range MIG Is now stalled as Indicated by condensed vapor over the wings. f 1! ^ es^ ^5 t L ; J L. EVEHT t>gSUHHA«T( Continued) Keyed to Perspective Sketch Time Hark Action Aircraft (BLUE 3) Stetus Action Other Friendly Communications Enemy Actions 2,4. 63 does not know what happened to missile Ml. site fZ deto- nates wHh large fireball at the tail cone or just to the right of it Missile #3 deto- nates slightly to right of MIG Fuel was main concern through- out encounter. f «V4 EVENT l-C SUMMARY (Continued) Tlae Merk Action Aircraft (BLUE 4) Other Friendly Conntinlcatlons Cnetny Actions (MI6 1.2) Remarks Status ■ Action Altitude 22,000 ft Hach icO.85 Lights afterburner, sees NI6s MI6 starts to turn after BItZ see second element (83t4) roll out continue, HIGs about 2000 ft up and to the left Altitude 22,000 ft Mach «0.85, after* burner on Jettfsoni tanks HIGs Jettison tanks and start a hard turn. HIGs pass about 2000 ft to left side u Aftcrburntr on From on the acti Accelerating and descending In a left turn. In fighting Ming 200 ft out and * 300 ft back of 83. During turn B4 si Ips to outside of B3 ms of B3 and B4 are sepa ated and the time m irks are not sj^nchro MIGs turn to In- side, start firing nlzed. HIGs were not tracking Afterburner on, altitude 20,000 ft, Nach 0.9 Hard right break and descent away froa 83 MIGs split, one follows B3, other following B4 back about SOOO ft Haneover planned to split HIGs or of MIGs. u Nach 1.4, Altitude 12.000 ft Starts a smooth 4-g pull-up. Pulls straight up, relaxed g's momentarily, and then comes back over the top. KI6 pulls up at same time as B4 e=3 c:3 C3 CmSI tsia Ka ks;3 ftja u CU3 UJ /A Tine Hark EVENT 1-6 SUHHARY fContlnutdt Keyed to Perspective Sketch Action Aircraft (BLUE 4) Status Action Other Friendly Conmunlcetloni Encay Actions (HIS 1.2) Rcnirki Altitude 32.000 ft 350 Result : No damage Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'lO'.N/loe'tO'E Route Package VX 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATICN Date/Tlrae: 5 Oct 1965/12* IH One RB-66 (CREEM flight) on an ECM alsslon with four P-ICs (BLUE flight) In the general area to provide MIGCAP for both GREEN flight and the Btrlke force. BLUE flight was not In orfolt with ORzcV* flight. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE flight took off fron Korat and flew due east to rendezvous with the tanker over the Gulf of Tonkin. BLUE flight flew north to Just above Haiphong and flew west to the orbit area. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F-ftC 3LUE 1. 2. 3. " k - SPARROW (A 1.1-7) ft - SIDEWINDER (Ai:'.-3D) 2 - 370-gal tanks 1 - 600-gal eenterllne tank RB-66 GREE?< 1 Unknown HIG.17 MIC 1. ?. t. S Unknown 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Reported as good, with no thunderstorms. BLUE GREEN I 5 5 ? ~r- Altitude : -25, 000-2$, 000 ft— 33.000 ft He ading ; Unknown Speed ; Unknown PueT'Statet Pull internal and Flight, Formation : Unknown partial in external tanks 5. INITIAL DETECTION OREEN gave MIO alert for the area. About a minute later OREEN was alerted to MIO presence at sound of firing. GKZZtt then called for BLUE flight MICCAP. BLUE flight obtained a radar contact In the general location of the bbgey. 6. ACTION INITIATED GREEN turned to follow MISa. BLUE pursued the radar contact. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT The MICs made one .T.ore pass at OREEN fliftht after the initial run, and then broke away. BLUE flight followed the contact until they entered a high threat SAM area, then disengaged. The coRiaand post gav*} Instructions to terminate the strike and OREEH and BLUE flights exited north of Haiphong. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1, ?, 3, * - More NIOs 1* 2, 3. 0, 5 • Guns 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS Hone reported XINCPACPLT Staff study 3-67 gives aircraft as MIO-l*. si Hours Combat EVENT 1-8 1.1 h 1 150 30 No alr-to«alr gun experience; no nlsslle flrlnB. . i - r-t radar. Wants more ACT training for this envlronaient. ', • (ri:«) - Weather not a factor. .»:* iCi.»CtS . : .>rv. '•»':' : E^^E 3 CEack), 10 March 1967 -'i CIJ:CPACFLT Staff Study 3-67 %i;(«UlI DtSCRIPTION ,-1 fll.'lts proceeded tc the planned orbit area, with OBEEN Preceding - ' - VfV'r. arrival in the area. SLUE flight was In radio contact with the airborne . 2'.rt*;f rcrce and CRr.EN filght '/I..*.-. — I'led GR-EV thit they were about 20 ml from GBEEJI and GREEN gave a rt [:ruV tS.y «re in! Aoout U5 to 60 sec later, GREEN called MIC attack. .1. «t coo ft ar.d Jaru-alng when the crew ncted sound of firing plus "slight . - r"Jv^tc be a niar nl.s. The pilot saw three MIGs foUo^ved by two others. :./j".'o '^.icw the HIGs and transsiitted for DP steer to BLUE flight. The MIOs :'r '»rtcr ai.atr.er pass on CREEH, two went north and three went south. .-e call. 2LUE flight Jettisoned all external tanks and lit ajltej''^"^""- ••.1' ■"■1' "js for 3LUE: to CAP about 1000-2000 ft belo- the altitude of the B-66s ;'* ■ ''l.T.t of ?-i*s at lower altitude to "sandwich" anyone attacking the S-bbs. . tfr.e of the call, the flight was at 25,000-26,030 ft. BLUE flight waa j'V.r.i;- radar search. Part of flight was searching on the 25-ml scale and tne .-r, scale, -•/ a.'"T r.eirlng the call, BLUE 3 (Back) got a single radar contact at 18-20 ml. »'- -• %-:ear contact and BLUt flight swung in behind the contact. The contact was -i:>i :ijr5e heading south. They locked on at V' ml with 200-kt overtake. * I * fil-xed the contact but broke off aue to the prOKlnlty to Hanoi mlsslle- e fact that the B-66 needed protection. BLUE filght never closed to to the bogey. •.f* Vre SLUE flight dlseneaged, the command post called off the strike. BLUE ■. rr.J^rvcysed with GREEN and stayed with the B-66 until the GREEN left the ilrlice force. tr-»t an! mum mum mm evCNT I. 9 Aircraft Involved: Two P-4Ba vs three NIC>i7s Result: One HIG probable kill Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^SO'N'/loe^lS'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Package VI Date/TlRe; 6 Oct 1965/lOUOH u '^Z I'^tV^ ^' '"•^•^^ E''«"P attacking JCS target 18. T"! Vu Chua Railroad Bridge north of Keo airfield. In iiliW racetrack pattern north of Kep airfield. 2. MISSION ROUTE Departed carrier on yA;:KEc: Station at about l8»30'N/between 107* and 108» B rendezvoused overhead with A-3 tanker, taking on about HOOO lb fuel. Then proceeded on intoic^r^^ ^5 westward to TARCAP in vicinity of 21«30'N/ 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-ftB BLUE 1. 2 3 - SPARROW (AIM -7D) 2 - SIDEWINDER {a:m-92) 1 - 600-gal centerline tank Radir and TACAM operating Navy color (not camouf.agcd} >»IC-17 MIC 1> 2. 3 Sliver color «. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Broken to scattered clouds 3OOO ft with tops about 4000 ft BLUE i ? Altitude ; 2500 ft — Hcaoingr 190" ..... Speed: 'lOO-kt TAS Fuel State ; Unknown (Centerline tank was er.pty} Flight Formatlc n: BLUE 2 in l500-ft trail behind BLUE 1 5. INITIAL DETECTION . BLUE 1 had radar contact at I8 ml and lock-on at I3 mi. BLUE 2 also achieved radar contact Immediately after BLUa 1 reported the pick up. 6. ACTION INITIATED oritir flight accelerated to about 500-kt TAS with BLUE 2 increasing his spacing behind BLUE 1 to be in firing posltlcn If 3LU£ 1 identified the bogeys as MIOs. BLUE flight In shallow left interception turn. » "snv »n 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT V:^^ ^ visual 10 at about one ajlle, he made right turn, passed over top of the MIO-17 flight, climbed, otserved MIG at his 7:30 position, and then executed descendlns separation maneuver followed by a hard right turn tc reengage. /^"t^ I ""'^ SPARROW at KIG 2, which detonated in close proximity to and probably downed nIG 2. b...., ^ started to posltlcn for attack nn MIG 3 when he observed MIG 1 closing on BLUb 1 who was In hard right turn. BLUE £ advised ELUE 1 to unload and BLUE 2 shifted his attack to MIO 1, who disengaged by going to the deck and proceeding to the south Into the heavily defended area around Hanoi. MIQ 3 had already disengaged to the south. 8. ORDNANCE (No. fired/Ho. hits) SPARROW SIDEWINDER A1M-7D AIM-9B Soviet AAM Reaarka BLUF. 1 0/0 0/0 BLUE 2 1/0 0/0 -.BOOO-rt range. 2 g. detonated within 10 ft behind NIQ 2. Probable kill. MIQ I, 2, 3 — . — — — _Ho firing observed 83 4r «k 9. CQUIPKCNT PftOBLEHS None 10. AlftCRCU COHNENTS Experience Total Hours BLUE I Front — --. Back BLUE ? eVENT 1-9 Hours Combat Missions Somarks Front Back 3500 -Not interviewed — — - -Not Interviewed-—— (Letter only) 600 105 -Not interviewed—— All fighter background. Comments on this Encounter BLUE ? (Front) - Turning and acceleration rate of the MlG-17 very impressive. The HIG leader was aggressive and a good Tighter pilot. Commenta Vrorx Overall Experience BLUE 1 (Back) - Satisfied with the AP3-72 AI radar. Would like a novin? target indicator for low altitude work. A nore precise gain control for the radar is desirable. Would also like ground :nappln5 radar capability. Need capablll'.y to Icck-on one target and search for other targets without losing original lock." Heed IFF interrcsatlon capa- bility computer. Requirement exists fcr short range nlssile for close in work. BLUE 2 (Front) - Would like to see fighter with about the gross weight of an F-8. Maximum speed of I A with rapid acceleration capability from ?20 knots to Mach 1.1 and better turning capability than the MIGs. Fighter needs guns or .-.hort-rance nlssile. Sold on energy naneuverJng diagrams. Need a clean airplane with nothing hanging. Does not favor multlnlsslon aircraft whlcn degrades pilot capabilitlvs as well as weapon system performance for any given mission. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE 2 (Front). 19 January 1967 Mesaatses. Reports ; CTO 77.5 OPREP-3 0707052 Oct 1966 Letter ; BLUE 1 (Back), 15 March 1967 12. NAPRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE (1, 2) were northwest; of Kep airfield-ln 3ARCAP orbit aUltuf.*? of about 2500 ft underneath a scattered to broken 3CCQ-ft cloud deck with tops to about "000 It. BLUE 2 was In about 1500-ft trail tehind SLUE 1. There were also F-85 In the area acting as TARCAP for the A-^s hitting the Vu Chua Railroad Bridge north of Kep airfield. To - On a southbound leg, BLUE 1 (Back) detected a suspicious grouping of targets at I8 ml in the karst ground return. Ti - Subsequent lock-on at 13 mi showed the targets to be airtorne with a closlnz velocity of 600 knots. BLUE l(back)had - A» BLUE 2 passed belo- 500 ft. HIG 1 broke right to the deck (pos.lbly as lo- as 25 ft) end dlsenjaged to the south. ,.i Lr.\txx ruM r.is-^.;rru"o"iof is,':„s'!JnSA'r' aboard the carrier. Ritw 1 2 retained 600-sallon =enterllne tanks throushout the engagement. By tne HsijSVi'-t :i^^rri>;To.tJ^i: irrc?frJ'5^Js:-rs "uj* speed Jettison. w ^ i« A low altitude engageaent facilitated by effective employment of radar resalted In probable kill of one Hia-17. No damage to 3LUE flight. 9 I 9 9 S I I 4 es EVENT 1.9 SUHHARy Tine Mark Action Aircraft (BLU£ 1. 2) Other Friendly Communications Enemy Actions (MIG 1.2,3) Renarks Status Action ^0 2S00 ft «400-kt TAS BZ In 1S00-ft trail behind 81 Bl reported radar contact 82 also had con- tact B2 indicated target probably F-8 TARCAP B2 backseater thought he had targets In the ground return h 2500 ft. 50O.kt TAS B1 has lock-on at 13 n1 . B1 accelerating to 500- kt TAS B2 falling back for spac ing Bogey closure rate s600 kt Bogeys start left 360' turn 2S00 ft. 500«kt TAS B1 observes zero closure rate Indicating bogeys making turn Bogeys continue rapid left turn h 2000 ft. 500-kt TAS B) sees HIGs at about one o'clock. 1 n1 500 ft low Bl calls "They're MIGs" three times Three MIG-)7s In 500-ft trail cliabing left turn U 1500*ft, 500*kt TAS Bl in right turn passed over top NIG flight. 31 made climbing left turn 12 had lock-on T '5 1500 ft. 500>kt TAS a fired SPARROH 2 g's ^000-ft range Just before break X HI in hard left turn N3 slow to tighten his turn SPARROW detonated -10 ft behind M2. Probable kill, not verified at time. A-4 flights later reported what they thought to be burning wreckage In the area. CIS O (Cd O ^ ^ ^ ^ c^ai €^ «a EiLa o ^ ^ ^ V r r:::;^ ^ ^ 4:,-^ EVENT !•» SUHHARY (Continued) Tine Nark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2) Othtr Fritndly ConnuRleatlons Cncny Actions (NI6 1.2.3) Rcnarks Status Action h T500 ft. 500* -kt TAS A6 B2 tailed in beiilnd M3 (within gun range If he had had a gun) passed close enough to HS to see pilot's hand on the stick. B2 pulled up in high side yo-yo to reposition for attack on H3 - HI pul ling around rapidly in his left turn Bl 6000 ft AB Bl 500 ft 1.2 Mach Bl observed Ml closing toward his 6 o'clock with about 90° angle off l/Z-ml range Bl nosed over ztro g , and headed for the deck to accelerate away from HI After what 61 considered adequate separation he started 6-7-9 right turn to reengage HI. HI closing on 61 Ml cut across Bl 's turn B2 8000 ft out of AB 32 in his high side yo-yo observed Ml cutting across Bl's turn and closing to Bl's 6 o'clocl* 11 discontinued attack on M3 and completed a left barrel roll de- (cending rapidly to attack HI. 82 slow In leveling his wings al- lowing HI Bore closure advantage 62 advised Bl to level his Mings and run Ml continued to close on Bl ap- proaching firing range SOO-ft altitude }2 S50-600 kt 10 AB 1000 ft n 500 ft tach 1.0+ iZ attempting to get )elow Hi to use his ilssltes H1 observed B2 feinted Into him but continued to chase 61 . HI closed to »3000 ft on Bl. Did not fire. EVENT 1-9 SUMMARY (Continued) Time Mark 10 Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2) Other Friendly Status 82 SOO ft B2 sttn trying to gtt into nissllt firing position Action CofliMunlcatlons BZ advised B1 Ml has broken off and told B1 to cone out of AB. r.re«y Actions (HIG 1.2.3) HI broke right and down to about 2S-ft aUltude jJnkIng around karsts and disengaged to the south. Remarks Bl had been In AB since 10 «t Tj. I IK [1 c:>ic::»c2ac»ii>cia<^M^ bJ» EVENT 1-10 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-ftCs and two RB-66s V8 two unidentified aircraft Result : Slghtlni; only Vicinity of Encounter: 2l<»3*' N/10««IB' E Route Package V 1. PftlNARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 8 Oct I965/1^30H Escorts on IPON HAND mission. 11. DATA SOURCES Messages . Reports CIMCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67 12. NARRATIVE OESCfllPTION Escorts on IRON HAND mission visually sighted two unidentified aircraft, escorts turned toward unidentified aircraft, when ttiey entered Hanoi area. EVENT I-n Aircraft Involved: Pour P-4Cs and two EB-66s v« four bogeys Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 22«2«i 'N/IOS'SZ'E Route Package VI 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/Tlme: 1 Nov 65/1030H BLUE 1 and 2 (p.iic) were escorting GREEN 1 (EB-66} and BLUE 3 and 4 (P-IC) were escorting GREEN 2 (EB-66). GREEN 1 and 2 were separated by about 20 ml at time of encounter. 11. DATA SOUftCES Messages; 2d Air Dlv nessage C20537Z Nov 65, DIO 00C03 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE 1 sighted four aircraft, possibly MICs, at about 25,000-ft altitude, climbing, at 6 o'clock and about 5 al distance from GREEN 1. BLUE 1 and 2 were weaving at 30,000 ft, GREEN 1 Circling at 30,000 ft, at 0.8 Mach. BLUE 3 and 4 and GREEN 1 condition unknown. BLUB 1 turned into the bogeys' path on a heading perpendicular to theirs. As BLUE 1 headed into the bogeys' path, they broke off to the east and disappeared Into the clouds. BLUE 3 was able to pick up the bogeys on radar at 18 mi, lock on and hold for about 30 see but lost contact as the bogeys maneuvered away. BLUE did not pursue the bogeys . EVENT I'M Aircraft Involved: Two F-UCs va two MIGs Result: Two MIGs sighted. Intercepted and visually Identified an A-3B. Vicinity of Encounter: 19^0 'N/108»20'E Route PacVage I 1. PRIMARY HISSIOM AND TACTICAL SIVUATION Date/TUe: 23 Dec 1965/0730H Pour F.«iCs were cn arn,ed reconnaissance In Route Package I. ' "J;"^ L and BLLE 2 were to alternate with BLUE 3 and BLUE U to maintain an on-station escort in tSe Gulf of Tonkin. Du.- to some unstated difficulties. BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 returned to Danang. and BLUE 3 and BLUE * arrived on station first. 2. HISSION ROUTE BLUE 3 and «» departed Danang and, after completing the armed reconnaissance "iMlon m Route Packa« I. refueled froa airborne tankers. The fUeht Proceeded to Point Bravo (iS^OO'IJ/IOT'aO'E) where BLUE 3 and U caise under the control of BIG eye. After tne second Intercept the flight returned to Danang. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGUBATIONS p-ac SLUE 3. " 4 . SPARROW (AIM-7D) 4 - SIDEWIftDFR (AI>;-9B) 2 - 370-gal external wing tanks H - 750- lb bomb TACAN and IFF HlC HIO 1. 2 Ordnance loid was not observed. Mot positively identified, either MIG-15 or 17, high tall, gray color. 4. FLIGHT CONOITjONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Ueather: Weather over land, clouds Altitude ! Headln^ T Speed: Fuel State : Plight Formation was clear over the gulf, visibility unrestricted. There was an overcast 1500 to 2000 ft. BLUE — 3 31,000 ft 31,000 ft OUO" 04C» 0.92 Mach 0.92 Naeh 1ft, 000 lb 14,000 lb SLUE 3 and were directly abeam with about 3000-ft separation, level In altitude. When BLUE flight was vectored in for the visual ir, BLUE 3 went into a 3-b1 trail, i 5. INITIAL OETEfTION BIO EYE detected a bogey In the vicinity of 2O«»iio'N/106«5O'E, between Hainan Island and North Vletnan heaalng toward Haiphong. BLUE 3 and >* obtained radar contact at approximately 70 ml. Uter, BLUE 3 and « were vectored to intercept a second bogey and acquired a radar contact at approximately 40 mi. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 3 and 4 were vectored CttO" for an ident I'lcatlon pass when the first bogeys were at a range of W ml. Both engaged afterburner and accelerated to 1,2 Mach. The bogeys vera lost in clouds near Haiphong, and BLUE flight turned to resume station. When vectored to intercept the second bogey, considered a hostile ay BIS EYE, BLUE 4 Jettisoned thej external tanks, engaged afterburner, and accelerated to 1.? lih. All swlt'ches were positioned for a SPARROW launch on each ID pass w.'. .-'.ven the Initial vectoR, 7. SITUATION i DEVELOPMENT On the first visual Identification pass BLUE 3 lost rad?.r concacn moneritarJ.ly , BLUE «> assumed the lead. BLUE 3 took a trail position with a separation of approximately 3 ml At 20 ml the target Initiated a steep dive. BLUE 1 followed by flying the steering dot and deseliectad afterburner. BLUE U attained an In-range position at an altitude of 12 000 ft whllr deacendlng In a 10« dive but could not see the target. SI.UE 4 covered the entire range spectrum of the SPARROW missile but cculd not see the target. At a range of 1-1/4 mi and yooo-ft altitude the target appeared tc execute a spllt-S naneuver. 9S EV£NT 1-12 BLUE 3 Mas in trail as BLUE U pulled up ncse high anticipating an overshoot. BLUE it (Front and Back) visually sighted the MIGs at H o'clock low. The bogeys were gray colored, high-tall r410-15 or 17. The MIGs dove Into the clouds. BLUE 3 did not see the MIGs. BLUE 1* climbed for altitude and headed to seaward, southeasterly. BLUE it was then vectored 2'»7'* to IntercepL a bogey that was reported :o be attacking BIG EYE. At an altitude of approximately 20,000 ft, external wing tanlo were Jettisoned and afteruurners were engaged, as BLUE * accelerated to 1.2 Mach. BLUE 3 was still in trail attempting to overtake BLUE U. BLUE U was cleared to fire without visual Identification. BLUE U realized the target was still 7 nl froni BIG EYE and elected to visually Identify the target Before firing. At acproxlRsately 3 ml BLUE 4 Identified the bogey as a Navy A-3B. BLUE of 250 kt. At 2° the target J^;;,^^^ through t... steering d^t, f<'li'--«<*,?2^?"*^!?^risc k[ cVe^take sp'^-ed^ U -as locked on 12. -10 rt at aOO kt. In. a 1C° ^Ive with l^C-kt overtake sp ed ^^^^^ ^^^^^ as the ln-ran(;e lU-V. car:e on at 5 ml. ^^Lallv acquire the bogey. At at. «hlle of the 2?ARRCW r^isslle BLL. u J^J 'I'J^JJj^^^ii^l^ecute f split-S as evidenced by trail Quring the fie^ Lhrto«ys' L In color with a high tall. the rlRnt turn to a southeasterly heaaln« with SLJl^ 3 still in trail. BLUE H was vectored 2«7« to Intercept a hostile declared to be "tacking BIO EYE, attempting to close on BLUE «. intercept. BLUE tt was at BIKGO --.i and returned to Danang. BLUE 3 remained on station for approximately another 5 hr by in-flight fueling. EVENT 1-12 SUNKARV 1 Time N«rk Action Aircraft (BLUE 3. 4) 1 Comuntcatlons Enemy Actions (MIG) Remarks Status Action BLUE flight 31 ,000 ft 0.92 Mdch under 8IG EVE control . heading approil- mately 060* BIG EYE Head) ng approx 285" en route from Hai nan to Ha j phong 31.000 ft. 0.62 Hach BLUE flight asked BIG EYE if 10 pass was desired. BIG EYE replied "Negative" BLUE flight turns right to 040V B16 EYE re- quests ID pass 816 EVE. -Vectcr 040* for ID pass." 63 Inses radar contact. Target 40 ml B4 takes lead, B3 In tral 1 approx 3 ml 84 begins correcting to ••Intiln closure 83 In trell u 84 rolls out astern target ?50-kt elostire. Approx 20 ni behind target, begins dive to keep a centered steering dot. B3 in trail Eneny s tarts d1 ve B4 passing through 12.000 ft. 10* dive. 400 kt, about 8~rai range of target, l50-kt B3 In trail Diving \ B4 7000 ft 300 kt, des cendl ng . Target 1 1/4 mi ahead B3 In trail Does a splft-S B4 realizes target had spllt-S. pulls nose up high In a climbing right turn 84 sees MIG 4 o'clock Ion. just prior to MIS going In cloud B3 follows 84 but did not see NIG Just before dis- appearing into clouds. '6 - 84 cItMbs to 20.000 ft on an easterly heading 83 still In trail Bie EYE. Gives vector ?47" Then makes an ID 1 ;>ass on a Navy K-2i EVENT I-n Aircraft Involved: One EC-121 and P-flEs (unknown number) vs unknown aircraft Result: Radar contact only Vicinity of Encounter: 19*40 'H/IOT^IS »E 1. PRIHAItY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOH Package IV Date/Tlice: 9 Jan 1966/0926H »oee,J po'r^-f IJ^'JiiJI^-J^f <«° "><»=) OuK Of T0„K1„ «h.n 11. DATA SOURCES Crq 77.5 OPREP-3 090752Z Jan 66 te. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Tonkin*? ?«?Mon"??S;;.S,^;-ff«.«re eacortlng^a^ CBJO LOOK) over the Culf of a3 approaching from the north bearing SJoVdrstaSce CJS^o^n destroyer at O.rSa^h'o'neirS "?alJe%';a'rr%'on?S:t''"^jrbo«: r^^vf ^^^''^ P""^- -ere recalled by the controller to retuJS to IJL^nf reversed course ana the P-83 The number of aircraft approaching SSt SeJeraiwi. ° ''^"'^ -letting waa made. e«eRt t-13A Aircraft Involved: Two P-4Bs, and one EF-lOB vs (a) two possible MIQ-21a and (b) two possible HIG-178 Result: No Damage Vicinity of Encounters: (a) 21''00'N/108''00'E (b) 1 9" 10 • N/106* 00 'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAl SITUATION Date/Time: 11 Jan 1966/C120H A flight of two USMC P-«lB« (BLUE flight) were escorting an EP-lOB (GREEN flight) on a nighttime FIRECRACKER mission over the Gulf of Tonkin. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE flight originated from Danang, rendezvoused for alr-to-alr refueling over Tiger Island, £nd rendezvoused with GREEK flight at spproxinately 19«»/106» . The flights then proceeded to Hon Hal, where one orbit was made to 21'>/lo8"'. After the single orbit, a return was made to Danang without refueling (See Fig. 3). 3. AIRCftAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-OB BLUE 1. 2 ^ - SPARRC: (AIM-7D) 2 or «« - SIDEWINDER (AIM 9B) Centerllne tank Grey and whlce paint MIOs Unobserved except for GREEN and RED lights. «. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Clear night but no noon. Cloud deck over land In north at about 9000 feet be- coming scattered and broken to the south of Thanh Hoa. BLUE 1. 2 QREEM 1. 2 Altitude ; 20-25,000' 20-25.000' Headln ,;; B-1 223''/B-2 MO* 223» Speed ; Hach .9 KACH .7 Fuel State : Unknown .Unknown Plight Fornatlon : P-4s orbiting the EP-lOB on opposite sides (See Pig. 1) 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 2 called two contacts on radar, three miles from B-1 and closing. BLUE 2 was about 15 miles from B-1 at this time. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 turned hard to the left and B-2 turned 16 0 degrees to follow GREEN 1. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 1 made radar and visual contact with two different bogeys and followed the radar contact as It descended to the north at supersonic speed. After breaking off thli con- tact due to proximity of land, B-1 rejoined B-2 and G-1 as they neared the end of the mission. BLUE 2 again got a radar contact and B-2 ar.d G-1 departed to the south. B-1 again got a radar and visual contact and pursued the radar contact to the land mass before breaking off. 8. ORDNANCE None expended. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None reported. I03a 4I» Event I-13A 10. AIRCREW CORHENTS Eiperlence Total HOURS Hours Combat i Missions Remarks BLUE 1 Front 500 200 20 Had flown P-8 BLUE 1 Back 775 715 30 Had EP-lOB experience BLUE 2 Front 375 150 3 BLUE 2 Back 200 120 3 4lnce USMC was not flying missions over '■he north which counted for rotation purposes, this is an estimate of the number of suci. rnlsslons flown by each crew. Because of this situation a crew could leave the theatre with r.uch less than 100 missions over HVN at that tine. Corjnents on this Encounter BLUE 1 (Back) It was very difficult for the P-ts to communicate with the EF-lOB so that their position and actions could be known. n. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUE 1 - Back, 2 Feb 1968 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION The mission was a nlghttlrae PIRECRACKER nlsalcn conducted over the Gulf of Tonkin. A sinale EF-lOB (GREEM fliaht) was to r.ake one orbl: to the north over the Gulf and return. The other scheduled EF-lOB aborted. Two F-^Os (ELJE flight) escorting GREEN were trying a new tactic at this time in order to provide rad^:- .;overage for the F,P-10Bs. as the EF-lOB moved along Us track, the two F-Hs flew • -lllptlcal orbit around the EF-lOB such that, as the P-Ub overtaking the EP-IO fro. fi rear lost radar contact, due to the fact that the EF-10 was too far off to the beam, -.hf lead F-^i would then reverse its course approximately 15 miles In front of the EF-10 in order to pick It up on Its ^adar (See Pig 1)» Navigation Itself was difficult since the onboard navigation equipment did not function accurately and locations were determined by use of radar contact with the coast line. A destroyer radar picket was on station near the orbit area. "P^" '^t*. destroyer informed OREEfl and BLUE Plights that they were the only frlendlies airborne at that tine. In addition to navigation difficulties there were significant corxiunlcatlon diffi- culties between the EF-lOB and BLUE flight due to the fact that the EF-IO constantly llstenlntt on Its ELI«T mission and was not nonltorlng the F-48. Also the EP-10 had no radar coverage of Its own and, therefore, could not perform station keeping assists to locate the P-iis . One other situation had a significant Impact on this particular mission. of this mission, that is. 11 January 1966. a truce was 1" eff*" ^^tw^!' ll?^llne explicit instructions :hat, under no circumstances, were they to cross the enemy coast line and overfly North Vietnam. The EF-lOB with Its P-H escort proceeded up the orbit track, the EP-lOB was cruising at .7 Haoh number, approximately 20 to 25.000 ft. As the EF-10 reached the northern ?ernlnua of the orbit, at about 21"»N/108'»E, the EF-lOB nade a turn to reverse course. Sue S ?he coS^uSlcation difficulties, mentioned previously, the "^fJ^SJ position. In particular, BLUE 1 was caught approxlr.ately 15 ^S. 5p lOB QREEN flight so that after reversal. BLUE 1 found hlr.self too far In trail of the EF-lOB. BLUE 2, hlwever. was In approximately a reversed course to the BP-lOB and was palntlne B-1 on t.'-e radar (See Fig. 2). Tn - At this time BLUE 2 picked up two radar contacts approximately 3 Sd closing. B-2 immediately notified B-l of this situation, and broke right l^-^ng 1" the direction of the contacts. B-l at this time was about 21,000 feet. BLUE 2 immedi- ately turned l80* to continue on with OREHH 1. T5 - After turning through approximately 60*. BLUE I saw twe lights coming at them. De- spite lack of accuracy In observing lights at night, they wtre estimated to be about 103b i i I B S B I S Q e B B fl i B 9 B § 3 a g a Q f II i i a a a Evtnt 1-UA \2. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION (Continued) 2 miles away. Red and 7.reen ll.'hts were seen, then they banked up and went out. Two more Itsrhts were seen about 12 -Ilea iiway. BLUE 1 continued through a hard turn with speed about Kach 5-1 was Ir. full afterburner and it took approxlnately 30 seconds to coripU-te 60 degrees of the slightly descendlr.ij turn. After 60 degrees of turn BLUE 1-back t went to the scope and BLUE 1 rolled out heading approximately north northeast (010 naenetlc) | at about r-iacn I and 15,000 feet. T-i - BLUB l-backseat get a radar contact at 9 to 10 miles In sround clutter and locked on to the contact. At this tlr.e the speed of the P-'i was about Hach l.Z but the target was openln.- at 50 knots. BL'JE 1 then saw land coming up, but It was not ascertained whether the laiidfall was P.ed China or Ncr-.h Vietnam; however, due to the ground rules, mentioned earllef, chey could not crosa land so SLUE 1 broke off. At this point BLUE 1 asked the PICKET Destrcyer !f Uiay nad any radar contacts behind them. The destroyer said, no, he had no IFF squawks. (Ccr.T.ent: this Is what he should have had since the enemy would not have been squawking on ^he IFF.) Til - BLUE 1 after making an Inplace turn at the coast, picked up OREE.** 1 and BLUE 2 about 50 miles down the track cn radar. The radar was on 1.00 mile range sole at the time. BLUE 1 then accelerated to about J';ach ,95 in order to close on 3REEN 1 and BLUE 2, who were proceeding back down the orbit at approxlnately Mach .7 at this ♦"ime. Tq - BLUE 1 causht up with cREE:; 1 and SLUE 2 somewhere off the coast near Thanh Koa. The approxlsiate coordinates were 19'«5'N, lOJ^E. As 3-1 caught up with the of the flight, SLUE 2 was abreast of CREE:i 1 so SLUE 1 started to make a 360" turn behind OREEN 1 in order to reestablish the orbit pattern around GREEN 1. T* - After BLUE 1 had gone through about 180" of his 360* (BLUE 1 was now heading back approximately north northeast) BLUE 2 called two radar contacts from 270« (about 10 mile range) BL-JE 1 therefore continued to turn. BLUE 1 expected to pick up the EF-10 on the radar, expecting the contact to appear somewhere In the left lower center portion of the ; scope. T7 - Upon rolling out of the 360" turn BLUE l-baekseat picked up a contact heading S'JO*; however, the contact appeared at longer range and more toward the center of the scope (I.e., higher up the scope and more to the center) than expected. To find the EP-lOB B-1 backseat then locked up on the contact, ^ The contact was suspicious however, since the closing velocity at 175 knots was con- • slderably lower than it had been previously despite the track being In the general direc- tion of the orbit. However, It was thought that the EP-10 had accelerated at the call of contacts. In order to establish the position of GREEJ 1, BLUE 1-back called for a 10 count ADF check. While attempting to make the check, due to communication problems enumerated earlier, BLUE 1 saw a sec of aircraft lights at 20 to 30° off to the right of ; the nose at what aotseared to be 10 to 12 miles. The radar c mtact at this time was : apparently over land at about a range of 6 miles. Since B-1 was close to the land it was anticipated that the E?-10 would then turn south to break off from the land contact and since ..he contact had not it was suspected by BLUE 1 that this was not the EF-10. After establlihlng the EF-10 location by an ADF direction finding check B-l-back found that the ADF needle was Indicating a location at B-l's 8 o'clock position, so that GREEN 1 was deflnlteiy off the scope. The concluslxin at that time was that the contact on the scope * was hostile. The other light was still seen. At tils point BLUE 1 went to afterburner; however, a posltlpn^check Indicate*., that they were crossing over the coast. At this time B-1 was aoout 2C',000 feet. Kach .9, I and flak was coning up. Due to the overland restrictions BLUE 1 oroke off. » The crews on this mission concluded that, due to the speed of the targets acquired ' at the northern end of the orbit, the contacts were probably MIO-Zl aircraft. Of Interest was the sighting of lights on enemy aircraft. It was unknown by the crew whether this was an apparent decoy; leaving the lights on to distract the pilots to other targets while a closer one made an attack, or the fact that the aircraft were out on training mission during the truce period and had not turned off their navigation lights after takeoff. At the point at which BLUE 1 had completed hla 360" turn. (T7) a.id picked up the * radar contact. BLUE 2 and GREEtl 1 had broken off to the south-southeast heading back toward Danang. After leaving the coast. BLUE 1 then also followed the EF-10 and BLUE 2 4 back to Danang without further incident. * Due to the slir.pliclty of this event the only drawings are a large scale picture ^ showing the track and the location of the two MIG encounters, and a smaller sketch Illus- trating the F-4 positions of orbit around the EF-10 during the mission. j 103c EVENT 1. 14 Aircraft Involved: Two F-ftCs V8 one unidentified aire raft Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 19''33'N/103'22'E Laos 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 2? Jan 1966/1925H Two P-Ucs (BLUE I and 2) on strike. n. DATA SOURCES Messages y Reporta : 2AD 2330*22 Jan 66 CCCO-0 12m»1 CIHCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67 12. NARRATIVE OESCRtPTlON BLUE flight reported sUhtlnj an ""Identified jet aircraft at 19«33'M/103«>22^^ at 1925H local tLe. It was grey color, swept or delta wing. ^Sighting was brief, no distinctive markings noted, and the type of aircraft was not identified. The sighting wa. made while In a turn following a strike. BLUE P^f;j^);"„;«?Jf"K turning to i. and the unidentified aircraft was In the same turn, at 9 ?/ I^^^J P°^"^°" airiJlghJly'hclow SL'JS fUgi't. BLUE flight wa, at 5000 ft. «° "'S- »J«r«[J/«** operating In the vicinity at the time. No hostile action on part of the unidentified aircraft was taken and It disappeared from view almost liaaedlateiy . 105 Event 1-1$ Aircraft Involved: Four P-iiBc va unknown number and type of enemy aircraft' Result: No danage Vicinity of encounter: 20*20'H/105'00»B Route Package V \. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOfI Date/Time: 3 Feb 1966/2100H Pour F-*Bs (BLUE flight) escorting two EF-lOBs (CREEtl flight) on nlghttlne ECM/ELINT alas Ion (Code Kara* FIRECRACKER) In HW/SE racetrack pattern. 2. MISSION ROUTE From Danang to initial orbit point about 20«n/l05«E without refueling, then to orbit, 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS Unknown 4. fLIGMT COKOITIOHS PRIOR TO ENCOUHTER Weather; Clear » bright moonlleht. BLUE OREEW 3 I UninSwn- Unknown- Islf-State : Unknown — Unknown- Fllght Kormation ; BLUB I and 2 on left and BLUE 3 and U on right, trailing GREEM flight 5-10 ml. OREEX 1 and 2 In close formation to maintain visual contact. 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 2 backseat Observed MIG identified with red star °"tall pass abeam and close aboard He could aJso see the pilot. Approximately 2 mln before this there had b«n « S?S ai;rt from an unknovm source with no coordinates flven. Subsequent detections were made as a result of cannon fire observed. (See para 7 and 12 below). After being alerted by BLUE 2 back, BLUE 2 front called for BLUE I to break. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 turned and gained radar contact, then lost It as the hostile aircraft descended thi Pada? horlsSn line and ground return. Other action later initiated in response S*otSSJ SSjSStJonS: (S« pa?! fand 12 below). BLUE 3 and BLUE 4. and GREEN 1 and GREEN 2 brok^ away from BLUE 1 and BLUE 2. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT PollowlnK initial visual detection and maneuvering. BLUE 1 and 2 regrouped and con- tinued escor? of CReIn flight, subsequently, SLUE 1 observed aerial cannon fire nearby iiS Sul s gave brief chisi to the source, abandoning chase due to '"'^ 'J??* "^^^ of SAM sites. BLUE 2 observed out-of-range cannon fire fron his 7:30 position. BLUE 3 «nd 5 in "iponse to the Initial cannon fire, made a 360« turn and gained radar contact irth^ee bogeys also observing some distant cannon fire. BLUE 3 and '♦P"""^ their SSgeJs"o ?hr5l. giving up thi cha^e. aa did BLUE 1 and 2, due to low fuel atate and proximity of S.\;l sites. 8. ORDNANCE Enemy : cannon 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEM! None reported 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS None interviewed ^Single AB operation; cannon armament and visual contact Indicate aircraft could be HI0-17D. 4^ Event LIS DATA SOURCES Reports : B 8 e Ca IMAW OPREP-3 O'iOY'i^Z Feb 66 USAF Tactical Fl^htep Weapons School Combat Analysis Division Bulletin #3, 1966 CIHCPACFL7 Analysis Stuff Study 3-67 > | 12. WAIIVt DESCRIPTION B A fo-JP-plane F-'*B fllfiht was eccortlp.15 two EF-lOBs on a nlp:ht ECM/ELI»T nlsslon over * V* North Vlctnan» They were flying In a KV/SZ racetrack pattern In the vicinity of 20^20'N/ >i i05*CO'K. BLUE 1 and 2 were on the left and BLUE 3 and k were on the rl(?ht, tralllni? the ||| | r;!--lC9s at 5-10 ml. At approximately 20^5H a MICJ alert was received on ^uard channel from B ; 1 an unknown source with no coordinates sclven. About 2 nln later BLUF. 2 observed a MIG, |§ IJentiried by a red star visible on the tall, pass abeam and close aboard and called, 'yia In formation." Visual contact was then lost, BLUE 1 turned and gained radar contact, Icslng It as his contact descended rapidly Into the radar horizon line and ground return. sLUE 1 and 2 regrouped, continuing the escort. «t some later time the EF-lOBs cor-TiCnced a final left turn to depart the area with the JiL'JE ;ilcht In radar trail. After 90* of the turn BLUE 1 observed cannon fire from hl3 C-:30 position at an estimated 1500-ft distance. BLUE 1 broke shirply Into the attack and called, ""IG attack." P.LUS 2 subsequently detected a tarset at '-i-mi dlstanc takln? evasive action, heading 06C** and intermittently us^n^ single burner. BLUE 2 followed but after 1 mln abandoned the chase due to proximity of SA.'I sites and to low fuel state. Approxinately 1 mln later when on retlreisent course, SLUE 2 received cannon fire from his 7 o'clock position. Firing appeared to be out of range and BLUE 2 accelerated and eonneneed evasive action. When BLUE 1 observed cannon fire, BLUE 3 and li were positioned approximately 1/2 mi behind and 3 ml abeam of BLUE 1. When BLUE 1 broke sharply away, BLUE 3 and U made a right 3£'0'* turn and upon co.Tipletlon of turn made radar contact with th~ee unidentified targets at approximately 6-8 ml. Upon completion of the turn, BLUE 3 observed cannon fire from his 3 o'clock position, out of ranfi;e with rounds falling well short of the F-^Bs. BLUE 3 and <> then made radar lock-on on one of the three targets and pursued the boiey aa It turned to about 060", descending. BLUE 3 and U closed to within ^ ml and descended to about 8000 ft. BLUE t obtained a radar lock on the target and achieved an in»ran^e light, ncwever BLUE h did not get a clearance to fire. At this point they were approaching a confirmed SAM Installation. Because of this and low fuel state, they broke off the tail chase and retired from the area without further incident. The low fuel state was a problem since psst-strike refuel was not planned and therefore no tanker was available. lOS B 8 6 Bii B B B B 6 B B B B B Event 1-16 I Delete Event I-I6 i n 109 EVENT i-17 Aircraft Involved: One Ri;^uLt: No danagc Vicinity of Encounter: U-2 V3 one MIG-21 20 ml NE of Diet. Elen Phu» Approx coordlna*;es : 21<»35*N/103'-0'E Rout . Packv.^ V PRIMARr MISSION A'JO TACTICAL SITUATION D3te/T1,T»;: (i rcu llto/ O-ie U-2 aircraft (BLUE 1) on phf^tor-conna I seance mission. DATA SC'jaCES U3AF Tactical Tighter W#2oons Cenfr - Coiabat Analysis Division Bulletin No. CI.'.'CPACFLT rtaff Study j-67 \2. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION TJjrer r.lnut-.'3 after BLUE 1 at 68,000 ft sighted bo^ey at 60, GOO ft, BLUE 1 photo- Brai»h»-'J an aircraft passing dlrecvly '/-.-Is** on an af.femated Intercepw. Aircraft proved to be a y.lG-3l wi'.fj a protatie r;l3slle urrier each wing. Two other visual sightings of very ^:i£^. alt!* -lie and fiign Wach tojlea were made In thlu area on the same date. 111 EVENT t-18 Aircraft Involved; Two F-UCs vs three MI0-l7s Pour P-JJCs va three HIG-lTs Four P-53 V9 MIOs Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: Sl'SO'N/lO^'lS'E Route Package V 1. PRIHARV MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 1 Mar 1966/1703H Three flights of aircraft were on a HICSCREEN In the area between 21«5* 'N/10U<=lU 'E and 21*'2C'fi/105°C6 'E. The JMc-its flew i,he same track stacked In three layers. Four F-UCs (CREEI." flleht) were In tha tcp orbit at about 15,000-rt MSL flyln? a fluid-four. Another niGJit of four F-i;Cs (BLUE rilght) was at an intermediate level of 13,000-ft MSL flying two eler-.ents In trail. On the bottom orbit was 8 flight of four F-5a (YELLCW flight)^ at 10,000 ft on thp same track. The MIGSCREEM was set up to cover the retirement of a 2'J-planv* F-105 strike force (one of which Is 3?{0'f,ll flight) which was operating In the area against the Lao Kat rail line. In addition, there were two EB-66s in the area with their own CAP. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE flight left Udorn, refueled at either BED or WHITE ANCHOR and proceeded north to enter orbit approximately 21*10'N/107) (Soth D&E were being used at this time. 14 - si:;ew:nder (aim-9B) 1 - fOO-gal centerline tank 2 - 370-s;al wing tanks Camouflage paint IFF and TACAN off P>S YELLOW 1. 2. 3. » 2 - SIDEWINDER (AXM<9> P>105 BROWN 1 Unknown MIC-17 MIG Silver color No external stores reported Chinese markings 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTTR Weather : Clear with dense haze and smoke to about 13,000-ft MSL. was 3-4 ml or less, depending on altitude and direction. Exact load unknown.) Air-to-air visibility BLUE Altitude ; Headin g; Speed : Fuel State : FllF.ht Formation; 13,000-ft MSL^ North2 480- to S20-kt TAS 8500 lb GREEN YELLOW 1 2 I >i 15,000-ft^MSL^ 480- to 500-kt TAS _ Unknown — - 10, 000- ft MSL — — Unknown .... Unknown — — — - Unknown — — . BROWN Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown SECOND ELEMENT LOWER There was some discrepancy concerning the '-S orbit Altitude, leader and OPREPs have been followed. The flights were continually jinking, cha.';£lne altltuie and direction. In this ease the flight EVENT 1-18 \. IMTUL DETECTION l-V.'t. 2 (Back) heard a MIC red warnlni? but no other fllg^t member heard it. Shortly ..,5^,r.^r J-LUE t (Front) saw a MIG-l? at BLUE j*5 6 o'clock, low In firing position, at • »r./:i.'-orf , distance less than 1000 ft. Atrj'. 2-3 fflln later CBEEW 2 (Front) folloiied by GREEK 3 (Front) saw three NIG-17s :«iilr.^ ur.icr the flight- i. ACTION INITIATED ^:.\JE 3 and BLUE U broke right and Jettisoned tanks to evade the HIG Inunedlately '*::;-lr..: hlUZ H'i sighting of MIG on BLUE ii. 3r.-K:; 2 and 3 called GREEN 1 but Lead never saw the NIGs. ?. SITUATION DEVELOPHENT iTr.L-d lately after initiation of their break, a MIG was seen at BLUE U's 6 o'clock 3 and 1 split. Due to the action taken, foraatlon spacing, and visibility, BLUE : Ar.i r <;uickly lost contact with BLUE 3 and 4. Both BLUE 3 and 4 successfully disengaged ; / -.nlcadinR and accelerating. On the way out, BLUE 4 was attacked a second time by a >':;-17 an.1 again disengaged by accelerating. ZhZ'ill lead did not acknowledge the corjnunications of the other members of GREEN r::.T.t; consequently, the lead was never transferred to a flight neraber who could direct :.::.>; ;.ien^ action. As a result, the XIGs were lost in the haze befo^-e GREEK flight could GREEK flight then continued in their orbit. e. ORO>iANC£ slUE and GBEEH flights - none MIGs - cannon (Incl 37niin} firing on BLUE 3 and k 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS SLL'£ t - Periodically fading radio which hampered communications, unreliable inertial r.»Tl£atIon, which prevented rendezvousing with BLUE 1 and 2. 13. AIRCREW COKNENTS ':-i- _e r _ ler.ce Total F-** Hours Hours Missions Remarks MVS 1 3300 500 Unknown Background in tactical fighters, consider- able ACT experience. Had fired the SIDE- WINDER but no SPARROW. !•:■•:£ 2 500 200 5 • No mlaslle-firlne experience. p.-cnt 1600 250 Unknown Never fired nlsslle from P-H. z?z,tn 1 500 Combat experience in Korea. Never had fired ffllsslle. ^^'^ 500 250 50 Never had fired missile. rront 3500 300 Tactical fighter experience. Completed fighter weapons school. Never fired SPARROW. frzm 2600 400 6o 8-66 and ADC experience. tl^VN Unknown — — — ^'.-^tnt s on this Encounter ^ (PPont) - Roll rate of f-H is satisfactory. Would like an external gun. Pelt r.,:r; "^^^r misaHe was better than "guided" for SEA situation partly because of Its slra- ""^^ longer range, hlgher-g llmltj and more look angle than present nls- ^* '*'Jml . second crew member in aircraft which has complex radar to operate. Also, he ^> -•mI second set of eyes. Likes two engines, and want? higher nhrust-to-weight ---lo. ratigue due to second mission contributed to poor shoiing. EVENT 1-18 BLUE 2 (Back) - Too many frlendlles in the area. They would be chasing then all the tini«i If they followed every contact. Back provides another look out. Ground cluttvr is bad. BLUE 3 (Front) - Saw y.TSs only because they had Just eonpleted the turn. Gun ifould pemlt Improved tactics since r.lnlr.um ranf^e la net a problem. Two reliable guns were wonted. Kli5*:-c capability In short-range missile needed. Second crew member In F-^ needed to help look outside ar.d Is valuable for SAM protection. Better aircraft would be possible If not n.ultlpurpose. Better raneuverablllty needed. GREEN 1 (Front) - Conr;unlcat Ions channels very garbled. GhEEN 1 (tacit) - Weapons system all right. The stereotyped missions that they had btien flying let tne e.-.eray know what to expect and so SAKs and then MIGs were sent against them. Due to the KIG<"AP, F-4 and P-5 aircraft did not feel It was necessary to drop ordnance at sight of MIGs. Feels that CAP aircraft at the strike force function more efficiently since the strike force need not primarily consider eneny aircraft. Never had to Jettison ordnance because of MIGs. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interview.- : BLUE 1 (Front), 25 January 1967; BLUE 2 (Back), 17 March 1967i BLUE 3 (Kror.t) , 23 January 1967; GRESN' 1 (Front), 13 March 1967i GREEN 1 (Back), 10 January 1967; GREEM 3 (Front), 2ti January 1967; GRLEH <( (Back). 25 January 1967; one member of BROWN flight, February 1967- Messages. Reports : 6252 TFW Danans DOI TELECOM ll8 ^ Mar 66 2AD 0^*17392 Mar 66 DOCO-0 H5?0 6252TPW Dar.ani^ DOI TELECOM 2 38 8 Mar 66 2AD Message 091107Z Mar 66 CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67 L etter : GRE£N 2 (Sack) 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION , BLUE, GREEN and YELLOW flights were fracged for a MIOSCREEN orbit Just south of the Red River and ncrthxesc of Yen 3al. The flights from Danang had performed CAP missions in the sane area for several previous days, with the same TOT. On the morning of 1 March, BLUE and GREEN flights had been In the same area on a mixed screen mission similar In type to the one for the afternoon. During the morning mission they had experienced flak, and on the preceding day's mission had had SAMs fired at them. Due to the flight time of the morning mission, at the time of the encounter they had been flying 5-6 hr. BLUE flight had not been able tb poststrlk? refuel after the morning mission and had no recover at Udorn. Consequently, in the afternoon they launched out of Udom for the mission. The flights were new to the theater and were experimenting with tactics. BLUE flight had decided to split the flight into two separate elements to provide radar coverage of each other's 6 o'clock. This radar coverage was lost In the turns wnlch were made toward the target at each end of the orbit. Due to the visibility limitations In the haze, the cluttered communications channel (large number of aircraft In the area using the same frequency) and the dograded radar coverage because of the terrain, was unable to ascer- tain position of flight elements of DLUE I'llght. QP.EEN flight was in a modified fluld- four with the second element displaced aft. While In the orbit, the flights were continuously Jinking, making up to Oi)5* Incre- Dients of turn, every 30-30 sec, in an effort to clear their 6 o'clock and confuse the flak. On the afternoon orbit, unlike the morning mission, no flak was seen, Hany brush fires burning on the hills contributed to the poor visibility at the lower level in the haze. Visibility was as low as 1 mi at 8000-9000 ft when looking away from the sun. YELLOW flight was seen only momentarily. Ac the time of the MIQ encounter BLUE and CREEM flights did not know YELLOW flight's position. Because of the very limited visibility and cluttered radar return, BLUE flight was not monitoring the radar very closely. A. BLUE Flight TQf^ - BLUE 1 and 2 were making a turn at the NW end of the oribt and BLUE 3 and ^ had Just completed a Jinking turn and headed north when BLUE U saw one Kia>17 coming up behind BLUE 3 from 5 to 6 o'clock low. The silver color o: the MIG>17 blended well with haze and when first noticed was less than a mile away. BLUE 4 called for BLUE 3 to break right. The MIC closed rapidly and BLUE 3 observed the 37nn sannon firing. 115 EVENT 1-18 When BLUE 3 end U were attacked, BLUE call alerted BlUE 1 and 2. BLUE 1 was cn the outside of a turn and did not aee the HIGs attacking BLUE : .and «». Tj^ - On observing the MIG, BLUE 3 broke hard rlshi, selected afterburner, and Jettisoned tanks. BLUE 2 Clack) did see the second element at 9 o'clock. He saw an F-t turning right with a HIS on his tall, followed by another F-1 behind the MIO. and another silver aircraft fol lowing the socond F-t. The latter aircraft overshot lh« second F-t. BLUE 2 took the lead and headed toward the engacement but lost slsnt of BLUE 3 and U as they dove Into the haze. T,. - BLUE 1 and 2 could not obtain a good fix on BLUE 3 and ^, and therefore con- tinued their orbit. BLUK 1 and 2 heard SLUE 4's call when he was under MIO attack for the second tlM. nLUE 1 and 2 made radio contact with BLUE 3 but did not rejoin either BLUE 3 or 1 until all returned to Danang, In the break, the HIG-17 on 9LUE 3 overshot underneath and started a high S-roll over the top, but then dropped low and to the inside of BL'JE: 3- Then the MIG was forced out- side and foi>ward of BLUE 3 by about 100 ft. As the MIG was forced outside, BLUE 3 pulled the nose up and executed a rudder reversal back to the left. The result of these maneuvers put BLUE 3 and tne MIG into a scissors, each approaching head on. T** - BLUE 3 then broke hard right and down to avoid a mld-alr collision. The MIG pulled Inside of the turn but did not stay in that position. As the MIG fell away, BLUE 3 unloaded and descended to the mountain tops. Tua - BLUE 6 followed the Initial rl?ht break during this naneuver; however, BLUE 3 saw a Ml8 cn the tall of BLUE U and called it. Almost itnnediately tiLUE h (back) also saw the KIG. Tne MIG appeared to overshoot from 5 to 7 o'clock to DLUE 14 broke left, unloading in afterburner. T- - - On loslnp; the MIG, BLUE 3 pulled up to 15,000 ft In an Inmelinann to search for the^AlS* The MIG slid to the outside at 5 o'clock low. BLUE ^ then headed for the deck coming out over a T.ountaln to obtain separation and the MIG fell well behind. BLUE 3 then stayed on station for a short tine until BIIICO was reached and then he recovered at Udorn. To, - When BLUE »» lost the MIG, he was heading E-N'E toward the Hed River; he then turned ?8 the south to avoid the heavy flak and SAX areas which were located to the lirjnedl- ate east of his position. 3LUE 1 then exited to the south and started a climb to cruise out. At about 15,000 ft another MIG-17 attacked BLUE H. Tq - BLUE 14 broke hard left and the HIO dove downward. BLUE U accelerated to 1.3 Mach ana*lnitlated a straJght-up climb breaking contact with the MIG. TlOA UA - At this time BLUE 1 was south of the position of BLUE 3. and due to fuel state, headed south to home. According to the persons involved, the HIGs seemed to be under CCI. The MIGs approached on the deck and were on top of BLUE flight with almost no warning. However, the MIGs overshot the flight possibly due to lack of visual acquisition. B. QPEEN Flight T„„ - GREEN flight heard BLUE flight's Initial MIG call but due to excessive radio communlSlt'ona by other aircraft In the area, it was not ascertained if MIGs had attacked or where the encounter occurred. OREESI Lead Indicated that there had been other MIG calls earlier which had proven to be F-Us. Tia - Shortly after hearing the call, GREEN 2 (Back) got a radar contact which appeared on the bottom sweep among the ground clutter at very snort ranr>e (5 nl>. Immediately, GREEN I (Front) called out. "MIGs at 11 o'clock low." GREEN 2 (pack) looked up and saw three HI0-17» popping up out of the haze layer, at about 9 o'clock. The MIGs were on a reciprocal heading crossing from left to rl?ht and were below the flight about level with the mountain tops in the area (2000-3000 ft above the ground). T^R - GREEN 3 and ft were starting to cross to the aouthslde of the orbit track when the MIGs were called. When GRIEN 3 relied up to the rl^ht to check underneath, he saw one MIO at 5 o'clock and on rolling up further saw another .410. The MIGs rapidly disappeared Into the haze before GREEN flight could alert Lead to the presence of the MIGs. The orbit was then continued without further contact, either radar or visual. As BROWN flight was heading NW, wln^man sighted enemy aircraft at 1 o'clock l» mi out and level, on the way In toward target. The wlngraan called ou!. the MIGs on the way into the target; and the fllp;ht continued on without Jettisoning or.mance. Im.Tiedlately after this, one of the MIGCAP was heard to call out "bogeys" on his radar. Due to the direction of the bogeys, they were identified as the strike flight. Shortly thereafter, the F-U was heard to call "bogeys" ani engage enemy aircraft. BROW.M fll;-iv continued on to expend ordnance on the target and return. On return from the target, the enemy aircrart were spotted again. 116 EVENT 1-16 SUKHARV OB IB *ct*on Aircraft {GREEN 1,2.3,4) 6^2.3.4 480-520.kt TAS Altitude ibout IS.OOO-ft HSL Heading NU '28 Continue orbit for 2-3 min SLUE flight In same 9ener«t orbit. 63A4 start crossing from right to left. C2 Back obtains radar contact In grou.id clutter at S>n1 range slight look-down.. Front cal ts out 3 HIGS at 1 1 o'clock loM and •Lead Me' ve got NIGs going under us," Back looks up and sees 3 NIGs popping up at 9 o'clock. Front never sees NIGs although he hears the call. Back sees 2 HI6s. 63 rolls up to rlg»t to check underneath, ^ees one NIG at 5 o'clcck. Mear B3&4 Jumped by HIG Commun 1 ca tlon Channels becone very cluttered. 6314 acknowledge, but 61 never does, G3 calls NIG pass 1 ng underneath 5 to 6 o'clock Enemy Actions («IG 1, 2. 3) Reaarks dRllH flight In nodi fled fluid- four finger-tip fornat^on. Echelon right, echelon level Three HIG-17s passing In rec1p> rocal heading from left to right about 2000-3000 ft below the flight NIGs proceeding SE. Disappear into haze NOTE: 8lft2 altitude 13,000-ft NSL at NW turn point in left turn speed 480-500 kt TAS Tq for GREEK flight Is the only corresponding T-mark with other flights. 0? bdck on 2S-ni scope, 3-bar scan, slight down look BREEN flight In sane general orbit ■bove BLUE Blt2 hear the call that B3&4 have been Junped by NIGs. BU2 did not hdve radar coverage of 8344 during the turns. t»EWT l.ie SUMMARY (COWTINUEOl TiM Action Atrcrift (HUE 1, 2. 3. 4) Eneny Actions Status Action Other Friendly Coaaiunlcatlons Renarks B2 looks out and sets at 9 o'clock 6314 with MIGs. B1 Ml th S2 in lead heads toward 63i4. B2 takes the lead since he has seen n 1 US • The scene observed by 82 Mas: One F-4 (B3) turning down to the right toward the haie w1 th a much snaller aircraft on Its tall. Another F-4 (64) was follow- ing behind the MIG and thpn another sma II silver a1 r- craft which had overshot the second F.4 (84). B2 loses B3t4 as they descend Into the haze. NOTE: Since BUZ arc separated fron B3k4, only T„ and T-. synchronlted Kith T,^ and Ig^. are comnon to both. T, and Tj for BLUE flight Is not > Action aircraft B3 and B4 only. ^OA B3«4 altitude H3,000-ft MSL. Heading about north. Speed 460- kt TAS. B4 sees a MIG-17 coning In on B3 at 5 to 6 o'clock low. range Inside 1 mi GREEN flight In same general orbit above 84 calls 83 to break right MIG-W with 75- lOO-kt overtake BLUE flight In general heading of 330* . 83&4 had Just completed a 30" , 4-g Jink to the right tn clear their 6 o'clock. ^A 63 starting 4-S-g right break, speed 500-kt TAS. alti- tude -10.000-ft RSI B3 sees MIG, breaks hard right. Into AB. Jettisons tanks. $-6 9. B4 breaks to right with B3. Jettisons tanks, goes to AB. MIG cl OS 1 ng and firing on B3 20*" angle off. range Inside SOO ft Observed 37inm cannon firing EVENT I-IB SUMMARY (COWTINUEO) Titnc Mtrk Action Aircraft (BLUE 3. 4) Other Friendly Entny Actions Ststus Action ComKunlcatlons Renarks t B3 In hard right break, altitude 9000 ft 83 sees HIG overshoot and one second later 83 reversed up and over to the left, by pulling nw9C up snu doing rudder reversal. MIG passed 'jnderneath , t t In AB 7000-8000 ft 6-6,5 g's. 500 kt O70°-080^ bank S3 pulled into MIG canopy t.o canopy, then broke hard right to avoid mid-air collision Mith MIG. Descended •nd armed SIOEyKtOERS B4 calls out warn- Ing B3 of possible n1d-a1r between 83 and NIG HIG passes out in front of B3 and turns back Into B3 200-300 ft In front %A Altitude 6000 ft, 500-kt IAS, 090**- T10° bank 84 In AB In right turn 83 still sees MIG on . his tail so continued to turn Into HIG. B4 breaks left and down B3 sees a HIG on the tai 1 of B4 and tells 84 to break hard right. Called reverse B4 Back calls MIG at 6 o'clock MIG pulls to inside then slips to outside H2 firing on 84. MIG overshoots from S to 7 o'clock MOTE: Since B3 and B4 split froa this point on, the tine narks for B3 end B4 are not synchronlicd. Action Aire raft BLUE 3 only ^A B3 one g B3 unloads, continues dive and passes a noun- tain. Also loses sight of HIG ^A 1.2 Hach. 4000 ft fn AB Pulls straight up and over to the right to heading of MW in a mod- ified lauatliaan. Tops out at U.000-1S.000 ft ^A 14.000-15.000 ft Cones out of AB. r j gVENT 1-18 SUMMARY (rOWTIHUED) Time Mark 7A 10A IIA Action Aircraft {BLUE 4) Status Action Action Aircraft BLUE 4 only B4 in loft break In AB Heading E-NE Heading south 1S.0OO ft, 5000 lb of fuel Unloads Heads for deck Reverses to right turn, comes out on top of inountal n Turns south Sees H16 at 6 o'clock low. breaks hard left, unloads and accelerates to Hach 1.3 Reverses over the top* In a cllnb Turns south and goes home Other Fi lendly Comni«n1 cat Ions MHiM'taiaaMMi Enemy Actions MIG slides outside to 5 o'clock low HIG falls behind Remarks HIG goes down and away '-" 'T^'iTlll EVENT 1-19 Aircraft Involved: Fo-i . --Ca va one YAK-25 (posnlDle) Result: Sighting only Vicinity ef Encounter: lft<»33'M/l07*10'E Laos I. PRIMARY KtSSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION ■ Oate/Tltne: 10 Mar 1966/1025H A fllp.ht or four P-iiCa (BLUE flight) on a TIGER HOUND mission against a target at 15*19*20"N/107-06' 19"E. 11. DATA SOURCES CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67 2A0 1014052 Kar 66 DOCO-0 14990 2A0 11*11252 Mar 66 DIO 288U8 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE night came off the target and turned to a heading for Plelku. The TACAN was determined Inaccurate and the flight obtained a radar vector. Immediately after turning to the vector, heading SSa' (approximately 200°) near the tip of Cam&odla, BLUE 2 3potted a bogey at approxlnately 10 mi off to the right. The bogey was closing from the west at 28,000 ft, heading 90°, abean of the flight. The bogey closed to 1 or 2 ml of the flight before It turned to a heading behind the flight. The speed of the bogey approximated that of the F-UCa, 510-kt TAS. The duration of visual observation was approximately 1 to 1-1/2 mln« BLUE 3 had radar lock-on to the bogey at the Sdme time and location but could not spot the bogey when BLUE 2 called It out. The bogey broke lock at approximately 2 ml from the flight and disappeared from the scope on a reciprocal heading from BLUE flight. The bogey was described as white or bright aluminum in color, no markings were observed, the wings were swept back very long and thin at 60^, "not a deltn wing." One pod was located on outer third of each wing. Pods were blunt, resembling engine naceilei> rather than fuel tanks. The fuselage nose was blunt and rounded and there was a high tall. 3ogey was closer in appearance to a yAK-25 than HIC15/17/19t 866 or A- 3D, "except nose was less rounded. 127 EVENT I -10 Aircraft Involved: Two P-fiEs vs one unidentified aircraft Reault: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: ?0«10'N/1C8<»10'E Tonkin Gulf 1. PRIHARY MISSION A»D TACTICAL SITUATION Pate/Tlne: 5 Afp 1966/0915H Two F-8E5 (BLUE flight) were on a strike against a target located 17'10'N/107*20*E. 11. DATA SOURCES HessajTo: CTO 77-3 0S0627Z Apr 66 }2. riAPRATlVE DESCRIPTION At about OllOZ fron 20*»10'ri/l08''ia'E BLUE fll.^^t s'-shted an unldentiried sliver colored aircraft. BLUE rii,-nt was at 32,CC0 ft, when the bogey passed directly overhead at an estimated altitude of ^0,000 to CC.OOC ft on ' a headlne of 120'. BLUE flight turned to follow but lost visual and radar contact. Identification not possible due to distance and altitude. BLUE flight continued and delivered their ordnance on the target. ml EVENT 1-21 K Aircraft Involved: Two ?-^Cs and one U-2 iJV Result: Radar contact only Vicinity of Encounter: 20°i45'N/10t''05'E Route Package V 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tiw: 21 Apr 1966/1232 to 12^5H Two ?-tiC aircraft were cn an escort cover mission for TROJAN HORSE (U-2). n. DATA SOURCES Mess are ; 7AP OPREP-H 0-210935Z; DOCO-0 17970 April 66 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION A fll'ht of two F-'JCs (BLU!-: flight) was on an escort cover mission for TROJAN HORSE (GREEN 1) iz position 20 = U5'tJ/l0tioO5'E. CREEH 1 aborted the mission <» In after MIG alert for unknown reasons. BLUE flight was heading 021o at 32,000 ft, airspeed 500 kt when It ml: alerted to the situation of bogeys 60 mi east. They turned right to 060* heading, er.saolished a radar contact at 65 ml (direction unknown), started a rapid descent »ni at SO ml lost target. 1*^ 131 8 4em EVENT 1-22 a* a a a a a a a 0 a a a a a Aircraft Involved: Two P-lCs vs one MIO-21 ResuU: 1 MIG kill, probable Vicinity of Encounter: 22*00 'N/IOS^SO'E Route Package VI K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/TlBie: 23 Apr 1966/l6l5H Two F-lJC airplanes (BLUE flight) eacortln;^ one ED-66 (CREEK flight). The EB-66, with escort, was orbltlnc In the vicinity of 22°00'NV106«00'E In support of strikes being con- ducted In the general area. The mission of the P-UCs was to protect the EB-66. 2. MISSION ROUTE Pour P-liCs departed Danang and proceeded into Thailand for aerial refueling. The flight then proceeded northerly and Joined two EB-66s. At the Red River, while heading northeasterly, the two EB-66s split and proceeded to assigned orbit areas with escorts. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-»C BLUE 1. 2 4 - SPARROW (AIH-7E) 4 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B) 1 - 600-gal centerllne tank 2 - 370-gal wing tanks Ho discrepancies with avionics at beginning of flight. Airplanes camouflaged with white underside and green/brown top surface. E3-66 OREEN I Unknown HIO-21 MIQ 1 Not determined. Silver color. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Haze layer began at about 10,000 ft and reduced visibility to 1-1/2 to 2 ml below that altitude. Sky clear with unrestricted visibility above the haze. BLUE CREEK — T 5 Altitude ; On direction of tlPEEH 1 all airplanes were Jinking in altitude while evading possible SAM launches. Altitude varied between 20,000 and 30,000 ft. Heading: Completed a 180' left turn, rolled out on a northwesterly heading. Speed : 0.82-0.88 Mach ^uei State ; Pull internal • Unknown, plus unknown in external. Plight Formation ! F-UCs were on each wing of the EB-66 about 1/2 mi wide and 30* aft of thj beam. 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 1 sighted four MIG-17S in formation, very low, headed north. Almost imnediately BLUE 1 sighted a single airplane at his 6 o'clock, U-6 ml and closing. This airplane was later Identified as a MIG-21. Silver color made it stand out as enemy. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE flight Jettisoned external tanks. BLUE 1 lit afterburners and broke right into the HIO. BLUE 2 remained with GREEN 1. When the MIG followed BLUE 1, GREEN 1 turned left and departed the area. BLUE 1 turned hbrd right in pursuit of the HIO. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT After about l80* of turn BLUE 2 sighted two targets at about 6 ml. Back-seat pilot obtained radar lock. Uncertain whether BLUE 1 or MIO. Closed range in afterburner accelerating to about 1.7 Mach. Identified target as MIG-21. BLUE 2 maneuvered to gain separation. Attemoted to fire two SPARROW r.lsslles, no launch. Switched to HEA? and fired two SIDEWIUDER missiles. No hit. Overran MIG again, so maneuvered for separation. Fired two SIDEWINDER missiles. .No hit. Disengaged in a right diving turn and departed the area. EVENT 1-22 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 BLUE ? MIC 1 (No. rired/Mo. hits) SPARRCW AIM- YE 2/0 SIDEWINDER AIM-9B eat pilot. BLUE 2 had attempted to launch two SPARROW missiles. Missiles failed to eject due to a malnLenance error. )0. AIRCREW CONMENTS Experience Total Hours BLUE 1 Front 3500 Back BLUE 2 Front Hours 300 Combat Missions Not Interviewed 500 Back ' 500 250 50 Not Interviewed Remarks T-33, P-S'J experience. Had completed fighter weapon school. Had never fired SPARROW. Had fired one SIDEWI.*jDER. Very experienced In fighters. Combat experience in Korea and Vietnam. Had never fired a missile, was never in an F-4 when a missile was fired. 4* GREEN 1 Comments on this Encounter BLUE I (Front) P-i| Is a good airplane. Believed MIO-21 pilot was surprised by performance of F-k, Knowledge of the SPARROW weapon system weak, therefore limited confidence in weapon. BLUE 2 (Front) Evaluated f^H as superior to the Mia-21. Pilot visibility from the cockpit of the MI0~21 very limited, structural restrictions to rearward visibility and to the down- looking field of view. Thought KIO pilot was also inferior. BLUE 2 (Back) Shortly after breakaway from OREEH 1 communication betv*IG was about 1-1/2 ir.l astern. BLUE 2 stayed with GREEN 1 to be sure there were no other KIGs In the area. The HIG turned to chase BLUE 1. T5 BLUE 2 then told GriEM 1 to depart the area. hLUE 2 engaged afterburner, turned hard- right and Jettisoned his external fuel tanks. The KIO was pursuing BLUE 1 but was unable to stay Inside the turn and was slipping to the outside. T^ BLUE 1 saw this and reversed to the left. BLUE 2 saw two targets ahead at about 6 ml as he was rolling out on a southeasterly heading. Because cf the distance he did net know which was the MIG and which was BLUE 1. BLUE 2 chose to chase the airplane that had not turned. This turned out to be the MIG. T|, BLUE 2 was unable to contact BLUE 1. BLUE 2 accelerated to Kach 1.5-1.7 as he closed on his target. Tc His back-seat pilot had a radar lock-on but because of uncertainty of Identification, BLUE 2 continued to close the target. Tc BLUE 2 Joined with the target at close range. The target was Identified as a MI 0-21. Blue 2 executed a hl^h-g barrel roll to gain separation. T7 From a position between 1/2 mi and 1 (A BLUE 2 tried to launch two SPARROWS. The missiles did not leave t.le airplane due to a maintenance error. The missile ejector mechanism was not properly connected. Communication between cockpits was lost. To BLUE 2 switched to HEAT and launched two SIDEWINDERS. Neither pilot saw the missiles in the air but the back-seat pilot felt them leave the airplane. BLUE 2 executed another barrel roll to keep from overrunning the MIG. Again in a position astern of the MIG two more SIDEWIMDERs were launched. Again neither pilot saw the missiles in the air but the back-seat pilot felt them launch. To BLUE 2 was below BIMGO fuel so he disengaged ar.d departed the area. In exiting the area he accelerated to supersonic speed for about 1',. mi and landed at Udon Instead of Danang due to low fuel, 600 lb. BLUE 1 landed at Udon about 15 mln later. 135 EVEWT 1-22 SUMMARY Time Mark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1,2) • CoMiRunlcatlons Eneiay Actions (KIG 1) Remarks Status Ac t1 on Othtr Friendlics (GREEN 1) 0 SI and B2 4$I0EUIN0E( 4 SPARROW 28,000 ft Hach 0.82- 0. 88 Full In- ternal fuel Bl Sighted four MIG- 17s low on the deck headed N. Bl sighted NIG- 2). Bl Jettisoned externa) fuel tanks. UI neaoing nm. Bl alerted flight of presence of HIGs. Ml connencing attack on G). 6U2. BU2 escorting Gt. Bl Into hard right turn and t^nttMttAM Aft engagsg no. B2 continued with Gl. Bl called "Break." 82 stated he was staying wi th Gl . Ml chasing Bl. 2 B2 accel- erating. B2 engaged AB . turned hard right, jetti- fuel tanks. G1 into diving left turn to clear the area oi aiisinpcing to disengage from HI. Ml Chasing Bl . unable to stay Inside the turn. B2 adviscJ Gl to dear the area. T •3 C2 sighted two airplanes out in front. Bl broke left as Ml slipped to 6 o'clock. Ml did not attempt to follow Bl In left break. . u B2 accel- erated to Mach 1.5- 1.7 B2 chasing HI. 82 unable to contact Bl HI heading SE at high speed B2 accelerated to V out of turn. h B2 gaining rapidly on MI. Obtained radar lock-on* No contact with Bl. Ml departing area at high speed. flK} BSI ^9 99^ aBK cSt'' 0 0^ «0» Mark Time Action Alrcntt {BLUE 1,2) Status Acti on Other Friendlles (GREEN 1) B2 joined Ml at close range. B2 executed high-9 barrel roll for sepa rat 1 on . 82 In posttlon to launch nfs< slles. Attempted to Uunch tMO SPARROW missiles. No 1 aunch 82 launched two SIDEWINDER nis- Slles. Old not see missiles in flight. Executed another , hi gh-g barrel roll to keep from ower- runni ng Ml . Launched two more SIDEWINDER ni ssl les . Did not see mUsl les. B2 disengaged in diving right turn fn AS. Comnuntcations Lost communi cation wi th pi lot in rear cockpi t. Regained comtnunl- cation with beck' seat pilot. Cneny Actions (MIG 1) No evasive action Engaged AB and attempted to get away. Remif k J B2 Identified target as HIG-21. Back-seat pilot had radar iock>on and called "Shoot" before ICS failed. Departed «rea. B2 landed at emergency divert field very low fuel state 600 lb. & €^ C9 ft C3 a IS Q. a n r* n o a G o. < -» C TO O O t- 3 »-• o. O o HI • (9 rt-a r* 3 O 3 «-« c CI s o o a" a -» or • rt « O. W c rt -» r* 3 i50 M m H C R> 3 *1 3 O »— "O (.^ 3 1 3 o », o O. 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O 3" too ct re r? rr 3 3 n a O o . rc rr 3" tn M C rt 3" to s> o re 3" "S M Q. >-3 1 01 1 r- pi re ct 3 O. O M- > O H- 3 ►I o >-» (-« re >-» o o tii <-» n 1 1 cr h-v: to T W -4 3^ n <^ 3 C o re C r1 3- re Mi M cr (d ;o X r> 10 M«< CI) re rr 3- J» Mi f-i 1 50 1 <- re re CT a> s re re o 3 3- O P M rr 9 n e M re' T] re << to P a o W cn 3 1 3- cr )-» re to to P 3 M 1 tN cf c a 3 ct ct re c -o M. rt o 1 3 3" cr C p W re C W 3 *- 3 rt t-» 1 3 A o 3 re re a < ctS At t* ap A M t- C a r-J r-- t-i cr V- 0 fj t-r on cr rr re rt :j- 01 3 ■» 1-^ rr re 3 re *■ a 3- A «t 'O to t o 3- 1 a A 3 P O rr CTTJ A ct to 1 i* 3- s: a re ct A r-« »• U 1 CI »«> -J A O, U t- n A M o 1 •» u c u to re •1 k -i 1 a O rr 3 re 3 M- o cr y M to re rt to w 3 3 jq- Mi cr a. cr re t-ii i-< c re 3 re ct n 3 O CA P re i-^ rr ■o *^ ■« re P 3 rr 3 3 3 I» 3 a M. ft O. re Oh* 1 to to ti ••3 3 rr X3 3 1 «< Mi O re P OB re 3 O to 3 rr o. D. -» rri« o o 1-^ Mi re 3 "> 3 M o cr Oq 3 ct i^ CT rr to rr cr CT p tn re • 3-(XJ M to tj cr cr to re 1 3 < «i re O 3 A o O M. 3 C rr i-i t~> • rr O a 3* 1 o re CT 10 c re to OQ rt » ar rr » 3 o to IB f r* r* r c c n n w m i-» c; <— M. ct 1 re a s 3 _( ^ (- Ct Q) fl 3- C 3 » 1 »»■ o r-» 3 re M cr "» O » 31 C :n 3 O rr O 3* CA*^ MM O P) M ? MO SC t3 M PI a » A 3'1 r* A M 0) A ■ O »-• cn cr 3 C W (BO ra 3) a 3 o o o 3 « rr re a Ml 3 re C5 Mia cr vaj Mi cr • o c 3 cr O 10 3 W A re o P 3 3 A o- a o a-o o iq Mi 3 o C r- cr H" M. a a O 3 C O. •1 -» O D 1 *t 3 o a mo r* CTV. >1 C O p c«' 3 •I » O « W 3 f a. a. G o c PI 3 0 •] O *< O Q. O T t-* » t-> •} r» O <* « 3 r» r» J« 3- <» .n — » 3 <-» C ft :7 3- V 3 u ►* c« K-l « M OOfcH rr O 3 O 1 » - M. O 3 rr < m O O » • -O <1 M O TS t-» w r» K» 3 ar rrjn • *- o o 3C3 9 O 0 «• vn r* o r: < OPI i\> 3. o w <♦ 3 n « r* <5 Pi O 3- W CT <» » rr c* O 0 l» C JC M- » 3 <» » *1 3 « < 01 ^ ft 1 f» ft rr M. 3- C 3 SP •liTi as 3 >-) ft 3 O rr rr rr 3 O 3 W -2 3 rr 3 r- rr l» O t 3 H. I» 3ft 3 rr« as- c* tJ ar a OP • ct <■ r» »• r* O g a> » r- r* <» o e a» _ 3 PI CM TO no r* r- • o r; 3 ^3 P] CD rr M» H ar 3 ov n V •1 rr B> «» 3- "1 r* (1 CD 0 M r* 1 C »» 3- f» PJ • H"^ B» rr 3 « M c: • « <» 1 ft 3 rr - a> o rr r* 3" y W C <» o r* in ft c « P) rr o O P> X M O «■ PI ft (7 > H- l» C H 3 <* 3 (N 1 P — « < O- W (♦«»-• M 0 ft n o PI 01 7 rr e W O <-« on Z C r^ O rr 3 H- PI » H ai M n • w » a» » ft a • 5 r^O «» ft » 3 H«3-a » r-" 3 3 rt ro 3 rr 3* n 0 • t- G r-3 sr B 3 <» « n C M PI ftm 1 3 3 T »-» O fo PI n m o rr rr ta S» O CO n rr o C 3 3- rr 3 O M <» -• O i-i < n T • ft O C - f w c s rr <» P> rr IT < 1 A T <» 3f » o rt » GO (S rr ru rr fl) rt 3 rt ft 3 3£ n p rr o O. ca » - <* «-l c rr cr O V-- (t - O rr a D O PI n 3 »— Ci O C 3" O H' u rr rr rr (V 0 rr M Cfl nj rr ft IB O {* TJ cr. o n u o <» 3 i» 3 O r- < T3 o c v< ft O o- ?r O. O »1 O o 3 A •1 CS rt w o • o 3 rr 3 « P r- r- 3 -o O r» u r* r» i> 3 n C (B O O »— ^ !-• la X 3 1 a PI3 W r C c» A <» W 0 fl M « o Ml t-i C rr rt H. rr j^- O rr ft son < ►* 3- 3 rt - 3" O O OT3 o « o rt « t- O o a o rr CD rr o (T 1 3 << 3 a 3 O • *>«<_' n o o 09 rr pr 9 O. M t-' tjl 9 O P» o "> 'J 1* <* t 3 Q rr JT 3 3 o n rr I— a < 3 m ft 1 rr Q «» r-ft rr - n O rr ft ti c u o 3 C rr ft w •« n t fi 3- O • • w 1 r» rr (I ^» O Mca 3 >- O 3 ft CD 3" c r* P» r-i 1 C ft O PI CD rw r» rr e 3- rr » W rt 3"^ r^T3 W p r- T M' WO rt 3 U O 3 1 rt W »-> »^ rt o «< IN ft 3-3 ft rr o B» t > rr u O O TI rt rt t-» o. ? » ^ (■ ai 3 «i n 3 1 ' *^ 3 [» t-' or 3 rt 3* c •* «♦ 3 A 9>ft » §03 o c- o c a" o CQ nil r* t/j rr rr » 3 3 3 O P rr C 3 3- « -» rt M «» 3 ►< r^ O r* O 3 3 13 « rt p O X r^ 0 ftm s rt J rt rr rr < • r* rt 1 3 1 3m » r- 3 *; PI 3" rt-O rt *< cr A CD ft a rt M- c ft < ft rt rt f rr H 3 3 rt p on M-w rt 3- 3 3 r* A O oq M ft o p W rt rr (J r* C 3 >1 p rt 3 3 u ft a> r" « ft c rt rt PI A w O 3 rj rt o p rr M O « C P 3 >^ CD P P rf r* rt rt C O ►» PI O A CT 3 C w ft rr 1 O 3 u A rt T3 *1 O A O rr 3 p rr A 3 « 3 O ft ft r» u p ^ p rr (p 3 P SS n ft 1 »-i C rr CJ PI cr A ►J ft(f» tA» o rt JC P rr p rt ft 3 ft rr 3 O rt IN «: rt 3 TJ r^ 3 TJ rr r-i rr e O rt O »- 1 »- rr rr »^ rt ZI V a « o »i !-• M. C 3 TJ rt 3 » -» cr » rr t-»tJ 3 • :n o o ct rr 3 B •*«»■ t Oft 333 rt o ft 0 3 r* « 7 3 A >-» rr U O P •1 rt rr P •-•a' rr A A rt 3 rt t-t 3 rt 1 rr O rr 3 P i 3 3- rt a P 3- 3 A >• ft :■: N t-* t-t rt C O ft r^ - »T P A €♦ 1 14 «< ft C O >- r w c rt PI o « 2 •* rt u P ft 3 A OD O < "< rr A ^ rr rt O 7 TO f w r^ 3 3« rr r-» n p 3 f-» w rt 1 D» rt :r rt p 1 •a rt p fi n r- 3" r'' U 3- o P r* a r->*1 A rt ft O 3 ►1 rr M 1 O M 3- •O p ^ I-' 3 n ftr- P M h- c- «— C rr • r^ tr rr rt p ►1 a • 3- M> 3V1 rr o ft rr • CJ O rt » n o rr p 3 A cr P ft o 3 C o p rr rt 3 ft nj r-> O 3 •J ■ W ft n CJ ft CD PI 3 r- a: rt c n PI z C3 rt ^ PI p ru ft « P P rt « 3 * p u A r- rr 3 3 rr rr o", P rt rt &0 o I e 3 o •-• R 3 ft IN« 3 rt CD • l" C PI CA 3- ru O rt r^ < 1 p rt u ft 3 Vi P ft *► rt 31 tr rt A u p \^ n M 3- ft 3 rt rrp rt or 1 O M C r» • w 3& rr 3 3; M rr 0 •J I? • rtP 3 0 rr M BP) n A 0:3 3 IH ct. T r- n p C» ft 0 rr H- p t* 3 K- 1 A n p m 3 3 0 f 3 0 ft T7 C 0 ►* r* 0 H> n W I rr U 3 Js- u 0 3- M'ln 1 r* r* rt rr 0 M P rt 3 A A 0 3" rr 3 3 « »-» 3 1 0 0 p 0 » 1 rr 0 3 0 rt X XJ} 3 CD P tl 0 rt r M > ft « 3 C TV «» m » 0 ft 3 0 ft rr p g H r> rt « 3 rt A I-* 3 w » 3 w *1 c CO H.> 3 c- < 3) rt I c rt 3) O T PJ .0 P c cm 3- < r* rt 3" r' o ft p n c rt a 3 r^ 3 ft P a. 1 C 3 p p 3 ft o U. W O UP rr tJ rr r (- a I p C i\j H O 3 rr o rr 3 3 OA A O P ft I-* P 3 1 rr H- ft rr A O g p ft t-* o uj r! rr M. a 1 r' 3 O A n O ft ft • O O r^ rr w O rr 10 rt JS s. u cr p 3> rt W 33 €♦3 O ? J? O *^ A 3 C a c* 3 A u »A O r» M 7 ft « t* A A O 3 XrrA M 3 C O A A O «♦ ft^* PI C rr rt . t rr I— C 3 D A A A r* • rt C 3 PI p S r^H» O 3- rt n» A rt O M 3 O •xiiw 3 > A rt rt 33 ft 3" w 3, rr A or* ? rt Q, C r« rt rt « ^ 1 « rt 3 (7» rn 3 3 on rr O w W O rt <^ p ^ 0 rt 3 P rr O, H 1 rr r- T H» rr ♦< W 3 CD r* O rt r" 3 3 C « O W PI ft 3 P P r^ C O 1 r- rt 3 r*-a ft-O « *» 3 O rt X r— »■» -» □ p o cr P O •rt ►^"< O 3 00 I 3 rt(N O O ft p rt o G ' 3 rr w P> A r- w rt r- « rt 1 A « rt M p »-» h» »-j cr o ft A o P rt W C r- 3 ■ rt rt U H> rt rt r^ 3 P r-' r* cr ij w H> p rt • rt H> »A r« H o A O 1 • r^ rt a* 7 p r-A (-^ c M- tn O" 3 O A rt p «< O 3 A ft rt p 7 nj u •q A rH ft I rt O ^rt w 3 f O >-» P rt (- o cr M. 3 7 04 A A 3 ft rt < rt 7 A li A rt (-» r-» 73 1 AO) 3rr rt o > r^ POO t-^ rt 3 3 t-> z vo S 3 t* r' rt P A o 3 M ^ O. ^ O 1 rt • rt Art « C ft 1 ^ O V p «■ rt fU U» W C rt ^- 0 W 3 r* to 3 O ,W >-* rt O P 3 O rt p i-n 3- ^ r-' a rt rt i» cr P O 3 rt »- 3 M- A M A rt Hi rt O 3 p T5 rt rt 3 3 1 3 p ti n rt X' M. a p o A o a I- V o 1 •-^•O A T n r-> o ft •3 1 w P »- r* C <-> -b 3 rt-o rt ^ rr ^ < rt 3 • A 7 A O A Mr* »-} r- ft *1 t-> 3- rt »tt p A 3 c -.-J 0 rt p 3" »^ 3 H- T rt t-» O 1 00 O O A 3- ID P 3 T» rt f* rt ct o cz r* P 1 P PI O O n rt 3 rt rt rt w ft rt OP ^ p •-»»-> 1 rt 3 3 P 1 ft rt O ft P 7 W P rt 4r A rt 1 rt ft ft cr u O 1 O H« O P O m 3 3 3 V rt C rt ft-O «< P rt A rt O t/> ft p rt ■B A3 > K 3 rt 3) r* ft O V/l n 3 CO on P U ft i~> ^ rt < «< rt 3 K r« > «-» rt U rr AAA A ri a (D^ 3 nvrt r" p m c 2 "-n P»3 A C r* c c <-« A A w r* 3*- ^ • o *i r^ o « rt rt H ft Z rt 3 >cn z 1 A M O i-> CO > •—or* 30 r- 1 • cr> C X) 3 O o p; > rt« o m 7 rj U • »^ »- rt rt 3 r-" < M p t-» )-» rtl rt k/i rt (n 3in A O 7 r- 7 €3 1 O O rt U rt m 3 O 3 U (/I W I iC I- O r» a>-» p o 50 O <-> M 3 ~> >-» o c >-» "o n o ft « o -< A ft A p C w 1 o rt o ae rr O A rt 'Q p p C 3 O I 3 3 1 ft *■ X ft o o ca X 3 O U p »-n < rr cr rt a * P O 7 rt p ft C rr W rt ti T •ii • CT A <3 I p A fvj O C •-■•3 A O O TJ OT5 3 O 3 7 vn -1 Oft u o ft p rj A ^ til n O rt i-J- rt 7 TJ A O r^ I-' -1 cr 3 o 3 A A O O X .»» ft 7 3 I r- r- rt »-• 3 i; IC 3 ODJ} M 7 ft CI A O) O c-> 3 rt r" O O o 7 G O M O rt rt PI 1 3 »^ H rt TJ L<0 rt p A rt rt - 1 3 << p p fin • ft 3 7 rt O ft A rt TJ rt p tr •1 f ft »-< r- (-» rt w oort O 3 3 • •1 rt imv 3 utO rt rt v£> HI O r* 0*-.3 3 O CD rt rt (sm * A 7 r- OP r* C M M "D A PI OT> 0*0 rt f 3 A p O r*»^ I ft 3 X 3 f*** iW n wO 4? 3 • o CD 3; p PI eO O C rt « I ■< A m rr o 50** iw o a ^7 I r" <* Era » ** a Mi r» rr |» o « n- C 3 a <» « 'O gat S> p> « M O »-. i-» f» M r» C n sc f-> rr « 3 01 •< 3- 3 r< r> C 3- « p» rt cf rf 1 O » f» 3 2 H > o n *i «t 3 *J Ik o n A n c o 3 1 n it 3 I <1 a> 3 tt o C/3 O WO 3 ^' O r» •O S rt A *1 O T3 ►J M o o o >-» J-* 01 X 1 T 1— ct ' o ^ M a -J oj P» p» to er 3' 3 3 cr r» o a p <* A 3 < *^ vy i << a A " 3 OAK • S A CJ*-' 0) pa a J o o >« rf 3 t» 3 3 H> • 3- C A K ft o A a a C r» ^ • c m « d TJ 33 crT> C O « 3 r» a O »» wag A M n • (» g O M a A » « „ BP o C T C 3 1 a A O ■o «-» o rf o »» ao o c o c « •-• o »-• o A O CD M t- r» C <-3 u 3 3 a' rr r» I— 3^ M-v: re r o « T T A 3 o A V) r* a. w O M ft 3 rt o m 3- A O r» «- :a OCA M- a f» t-- 3^ 33 »-» O H» n c < 3° rt » r» to ft A »^ tJ T O O O T (TP 3 »1 A C C A rr T3 CA a M O 3 A 3 1 A at) (jt) ft- T T A O ar a ft <<: 13 A 0 A ft o. '1 :y 3 b» h-* ill p A » *< Q, rr TD A - » 3 (T 3" 1 t«» A A 0 P X A ft»j A 3 a', A A P9 a 3^ a ►■^ A A i-* ►t 3 >- ft O ft rf . o a C 0 ft 3 ft 3r C a 3- p 'O A rf ft o rr 3 3 3 A ft u M 3 T O l<> A A M M ft (O rf P A p O C O rf CT 3 M. ft f- i-i rf 1-^ 3- M» 3 m M rf 09 rr (• *< « *< 3^ rf p »• V C o e>»N 3- •-•a • » a 3 » 1 a P CD ft r- 3 f- «< 3- O. P p a. a p »i 00 A >* n u c* c H M O H 3' p M *♦ M 5 a c K> 3 Q 3 X □ e « M p 3 » C Q ■ a3' > r-' M 20 A Lij M ft 50 CD ft O C u r> w X *: o A CM Pl 3 O C C A A 3 a o *-p Ui M h- rf *t- ♦-OA I— n n o. A < p JC < «» 3 V p A *1 O. P 3 »^ »-> rf P M rf a u) w w (» a f> »-> ►! p c 3 M cr p »-■ crw 3" c rf O 1 a prf c a OOf- 3- A o < o 1 a T O A CT O A 0 ' V) C t It A (Tl 3 ^ 3 1 ft rf >-} < A » 3 A u Qi A Cl rf r-" 1 • t C A o c« o p nj rf 3- O M O 3- O 3 c M (I rt I rr 3 1 > A to w< COP m *: 3 o. i» *: P K p u 3' 3 M O. 3 ft O A O. rf A u ■D « 3 P O C ►I A X- ft rs A O ft M- p rf ft o A C 3 o. 3 O f- A 3 (0 U « P C M M rf 3 rf o A O 3" P 3^ O P rt lo 3T3 M A TJ I— p P ►t 3 n A -TJ A 3 P ft ft • t- 3" «< A a o P ft u A OJ O n C O M r: m o a: ■ p 3 > 3 «♦ *1 A A ►I M o M" p p rf u nj n -0 A rf fT A p T fj 3' - ft U O A CD w tt « c ft A A 1 G o a ft M m f-» ft f-un M [j<> rf M 3 LT m C 3- 3 rf 3 M 1 m ft ^ ft a. o 3 p «Ai A C A 3 O -D ^ O ft O P TJ 3^ O ft O ft 1 O. f- ft 3" O t-" 1 1 rf •O CTs I— ' A P O p A • 0 0 3 3 T O o It w *7 ft ^ O V M u o «< o I O p- O ft » O 3 rt O 3 rf 3 rf a CT O O A ►» , c p f>a (* trt ct 3 U -~J O. 3 rf CT y> ft. >-< O A 30 3' O-O O 3" 31 A O 1 O*' O •! O O lain 3 ■CO -O — CO. A PI •O « *♦ 1 3- » P P P w 3 w p f} a ft a U O M rf A P f- P "O 3 rf O. U M p O M MTJ rf T 3 ►-•'O ct v; A « A • 3- 3 P 1 A (» rf rf M K» 3- 3 3 O K 1 A p ft c. 3 P M a o M M « 0 O ft 3- A C p p 3 M ft -» 3 rf 3 ft rf Q, M o 0 O 3*3 -> « O < 3 <-i O M 3 u O w GO 3 « » M r- (R (d p p rf c M T U> 3 PI o ft ft r- ft o A c: 3 Cki 1 3 t::ff 2£ W W O rf *-< h-» 3 XT o O cj M re Q, cr •o C >-) P M W < M CT rr • M ft "1 p rf i-j 3 n A o w < • a X- o A rf X- o. 3* p M . A A 3 3 t/> p t-t f-" A -c ft a> o p »» f c: c/j ro ft c Loj 3 3] c m o > O 1 ir ao -•: f- w o 33 O f— p O P o o f- M »: w ^ o *i 3 o IP o f* ■D 3 M -I 1 • 3 c «» o. < A » 3 -J A T A h- 3 t- P »-> C ft « rt CI p: 3 A or M T Cfti w A o A 3 < P 3 M P 3 3- -1 W ft K P M P ft 3 C c rf m 3 OA p A 3 P ft a 3 T 3 3 »— A A ri -J f- 7> AM A 3 1 r-t O ft »-< O a (J T »; o o •-> f-- ft PC 1- •-• A g A o o n p 3 m « a S 33 C A M» PICS 3 3 < ta o. A <« •>) r* T *i I e n o PI O P M 3 ^ 3 3 rf u> ft ct n o o 1 ft o f^ o O f^ *-> O 3 ►* 3- I-" 3 "J t-» A A M 3 ft 3 3 • rf n (Jq ct OA no ftT3 O r» O 3 Ct 3" u Irt M 3' A r» 3 A A ft PS n A f^ H'T) O V* A « 3 3 <-» 3" f- ct rf ct » p o • -» 3 cf rr a «-» O f- O 3- 1 O t-" P M> >^ a 3 A 3 iTO P CT p T r-* TZJ 3 A O 3- (N T W fD rt A D. »-» rf ■D OP P 3^ 3 f- P X P «-< rf 3 a A p P rj"0 *1 TJ f-" M ♦! «< 3 O O M < X- M A A 3 n P ft p rf M 3 A O ft p *< M "O M a Of-" wo CI -3 c: w r ft c: M o ft 3w A ft It Bi c* p to P CT 3 0 *i IT a 3 o c 3 p; o 9 ft cr p ^ (.1 3 w A A A cr 1 C P «> < 1 rt n A I TT ft A O D Ct ■-»«* «P1 « rr O O O- 1-1 p 1 p U 71 3 M 3 o I an ri a- 3* » M ft rf p o > 3 P n C ft 3 ^ 3 p a O T3 fU U ct-p 3- H» 0 Pm t* 3 „ 2 ft A U c 3 • :^ u •Of ^ 3 P f- Ci 1 •< a ff rf O IVJ 3" O ft . O rt C 3" 3 3 rt A CC H P 0 r- 3- 3 03 -4 C A ft T PI AO go P O M O • 3 M 3 ft C O ft 1 3 M M O ft )-■ 3 AC < ft ►* O P 3 cr » ct ft M 3- O A A f- A 3 a a 2 -i EVEMT i.2< SUHMARY Tine Mark Action Aircr Status *ft (BLUE 1. 2. 3. <) Action Other Friendlles Comffluni ca 1 1 ons Enemy Actions (MIG 1 ,2,3.4} Remarks 480 to SOO-kt TAS descending 14.000-18.000 ft Commenced left turn for ID pass, accelerated slightly. S3t4 jetti- soned wing tanks and widened turn for spaci ng Radar contact called out. Bl stated his element would make ID pass. Bl directed B3S4 to get spacing to be in firing posi tion. On course about 245". Continued this heading. One of the F-4s re- ported radar contact 45" left about IS ml . Other aircraft had almost simultaneous reading of radar con- tact rapid overtake. \ 500-kt TAS IS. 000 ft All F-4«^working for radar lock-on; SPARROW missi les retuned; 83ft4 behind 3000- 4000 ft above lead element. Bl(L) called "visual 12 o'clock" then "Shiny wings 11 o'clock." Bogeys remain on steady course. 15.000 ft B142 jettisoned ex- ternal tanks, armed ■Issi tes Bl called positive 10. Bl rear seater ha.i radar lock^on. advised front seater to fire. MIGs apparently did not see BLUE flight until after tanks were Jetti- soned. Still Straight and level to that time. Positive 10 as HIG- 1 7s by shape of vertical stabilizer 3 500* -kt TAS 15.000 ft Bt fired SPARROW, locked on from 45" stern In full system, overtake 150 kt. As missile left, break X appeared on scope. Bl reported he was 1 1 r 1 ng « MIGs jettisoned tanks and broke left Into BLUE f 1 tght. SPARROW fired about 4-ini range. Had Just passed mln range and aiming dot was not In the ASE circle. Knew he MOuld miss. Missile went 2000- 3000 ft behind HtGs. Gave no indication of guiding. T4 J 1 5004^ -kt TAS 15.000 ft BZ fired SPARROW 3-af range in boreslght node. BU2 went AB. descended slightly to accelerate and then made a hard climbing left turn. B3&4 about 2 mi behind [ B1. MIGs in hard left turn, making gun attack. SPARROW motor did not ignite although ais- si le left the, air- tcraft. Estimated four MIG-17$ in flight. No lock on was achieved. A A EVENT l'2i SUMMARY (ContlnMed) Time Hirk Action Aircraft {BIVL 1. 2, 3, <) Other KrIendHcs Conmunlcatfoni Eneny Actions MIG 1,2.3.4) Remarks bCttUt Action 500* -kt TAS 15.000 ft In slight dive S3 fired SIDEWINDER • 1 mos t head-on, then made hard left turn in attempt to get Into firing position on the MIGs. B4 In fighting Ming position. HIGs aggressively maneuvering to get in firing position on BLUE flight. B3 could not get radar lock-on. Switched to HEAT, Knew he had 1 < tt 1 e chance of getting a hit. SIOEUINOCR did not hit. The engagement developed Into a left Lufb^ry dogfight, number of turns made. Between Tg 4nd T^. It HAS not possible to reconstruct the octual SoflietliRe during this period B3t4 ev«ded a HIG approaching firing positicn by going AB and making c 1 1tnbi ng left turn . B4 reported four additional MIGs approached and departed the area. MIG at 6 o'clock on B3ft4 could net follow separation maneuver and broke off to the left Hach 0.92 17.000 ft 5 9'« B1 6 o'clock on a HIG attempted to fire a SIDEWINDER. Range 1-1/? mi . Could not fire due to high g's. Had to unload to 2 g's and reduce angle of attack to avoid losing Hach and altitude. Bl slides to the outside. 62 had his head in the cockpit attemot- ing to locate rea- son for no aotor fire on his missile (Tj). In process fell behind SI but still has Bl in sight. Bl observed B2 some distance behind coming to the side. B3t4 ?000-3000 ft above both B2 and the HIGs. S3&4 accelerated and maneuvered to engage the HIGs on 82's tall. B3 transmits that 3 MIGs are approaching firing position on 82. Three HIGs in trail on B2's tall. B2 later reported closest MIG 1500- 2000 ft back . 200 ft low at 6 o'clock, B2 could see tops of wings and knew the HIGs were not pulling lead. -^'•■Tfifiif--'-^-^-----riiBii EVtKT 1-23 SUHHARY (Continued ) Time Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4) Other Friendlies CoiMiunlcatlons Enemy Actions (NIG 1.2,3.4) Results Hark Status Action 83&4 closing gap to get In firing posi- tion on the MlGs. B2 went to AS. felt jolt, thought he was hit. B2 con- tlnue 370-gal wing tanks 1 - 600-gal centerllne tank Camouflage paint MIG-21 MIG 1 Silver color Presumably missile arr.ed, no positive Identification of ordnance 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Clear; contrail level started approximately 32,000 ft. BLUE GREEN 70.000 ft V 30,000 ft In turn. Hdg SW Mach 0.62 Pull Internal, and some in external tanks BLUE 1 and 2 In loose formation with BLUE 2 separated about 1/2 ml, Altitude ; Heading Speed : Fuel State : Flight Forr;atlon : 5. INITIAL DETECTION Visual detection of a contrail by BLUE 1 (Back) at 7 o'clock and about 20-Dl range. The contrail was heading 270". While a silver speck vfas seen ahead of the contrail, po;,ltive identlficatlcn was not made un.tll B-2 first attacked the MIGs. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE night dropped tanks, accelerated and turned to Intercept the bogey. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT After Instructing the U-2 to withdraw, BLUE 1 made a beam SPARROW attack, then pulled^; in trail for a SIDEWINDER attack, neither of which was successful. BLUE 2 made three attacks, the first was head on as the MIG attempted a snapup attack on the U-2. After the MIC made a I80» turn back towards Hanoi, BLUE 2 made a SPARROW attack and a SIDEWINDER attack on the' MIG. None of BLUE 2's attacks were successful and BLUE flight retired at the detection of a second .MIC, becat:se of fuel limitations. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 No. Plred/No. Hits BLUE 2 MIC 1 SPARROW AIH-7D 0/0 I/O 3/0 SIDEWINDER AIM>9B 2/0 2/0 No ordnance expended Remarks A SPARROW firing was attempted but . no missiles left the aircraft; one gas generator Ignited and burned Plrcd cut of range Plpper off tarpet during boreoleht firing. Two went ballistic, one appeared to guide through a portion of the flight Both fired out of range 4W 151 ] 1^ a EVENT 1-24 EQUIPMENT PROSLEMS Exact source of Bl's misfire unHnown, AIRCREW COMMENTS 10 Experience BLUF. 1 (rront) BLUE ? (Pack) BLUE 2 (rront) Total Hours 7000 700 Hours 60 0 500 Conbat Missions e 70 « 70 Renarlcs Some ADC time, fired only 1 SPARROW and no SIDEWIHDER, Little ACT. Extensive ADC experience In P-101. Corjents on this £nc;ountor BLUE I (Front) tactic would be to fly opposite the U-2 track so the threat Is faced. • Since BL'JE flight was operating in a location where the MIOs were under OCI, two more escort ali-craft would Increase effectiveness. • Did not realize how fast things can nove when both tarpjet and attacker are flying at supersonic speeds. • Felt that the :!IG aircraft knew t^.at there were F-^^ escorts and were foolish to attenpt an attack. BLUE 2 (Sack ) •Irpressed with the heat seeker nlsslle due to Its slnpllclty. .Dlsapoolnted In the pcrfor:.ance of the SPARROW since Its lack of perforniance under ideal Intercept was not explained. ^„ • AH crew mernbers felt initial expenditure of ordnance was an acceptable tactic to protect the U-2 even though missile paranetera were not met. Comnents fren Over all Exrorlence PLO' E 2 (Back ) . . . . battle If a gun was available. .Would like a fighter that could turn better. However, other performance features should not be overly compromised to achieve this., such as acceleration. •Would like the acceleration of the F-105 at sea level. 11. DATA SOURCES Pr-M^^t Interviews : BLUE 1 (Front) 13 Dec 1966; BLUE 2 (Back) 1« Mar 1967. Messages. Reports ; Letter from BLUE l (Back) BLUE 2 (Front) USAF Flgiiter Weapons School CAD Bulletin I**, 18 May 1966. USAF Flchter Weapons School CAD Bulletin 110, 7 Peb 1967. 7AP mse 2506132 Apr 66 DOCO-0 18303^ 7AP OPREP-3 250933Z Apr 66 DCCO-0 18322 7AP OPREP-1 251112Z Apr 66 DOCO-0 18327 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION The .isslon was Pl--^ a U-2 esco« with the requlre^^^ at J^f ven^loca-^ "r'^troJbtruii'evii^rnTnd^i ? r roSher'r^corSedlvonU). The'docu.entatlon' «tiibU;E?ie iSe fr^Sf^ncy of^attacks (5 times) mentioned b, BLUE 1 (front) was not found. Because of the limits Imposed by the time-distance points, nonavaJlabUlty of refuel- above 32,000 rt wnicn wou.u uioi^xw J" Pftr^tnnt w-'avo and orbltlnis was necessary p!4 at a decided disadvantage at the start of any hostilities. 152 EVENT 1-24 BLUE 1 To During a turn to the south, as part of the orbit pattern, BLUE 1 (Bf«il> 'P^"*^ * JSntrall a? 7 o'clock coning fron Hanoi area. Since f Jf?" ^^^^^ 35,000 ft, attacks were authorized on any target above this altitude without the necessity of positive identification. The BLUE crews had studied the flight profiles of MIO-21 aircraft niaklng CCI attacks on a hlr.h-altitudc tarr^t and had a knowledge of the expected SP^^^^^"? "JJ""*' °fj,*^r!_ bogey. After advising the 0-2 to withdraw, BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 dropped tanks and ""h the bogej now to the rear, BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 entered a diving turn to position and gained air- speed for an attack. In diving to gain airspeed. BLUE 1 bottomed out at 13,000 ft, necessitating a lone cUnb back to attack altitude. A beam attack '^^i^'l SPARROW firing was atten.pted in boreslght mode, plpper on the target and the aircraft in a 100° bank. It had proved Impossible to maintain radar lock-on during the turning ma- neuver. None of the SPAKHOW missiles left the aircraft although all were triggered. Tne gas generator on one missile did Ignite. T, Due to the altitude and low speed BLUE 1 fell off with the afterburner out. At thla time he saw the first irlssile fired by BLUE 2 pass the KIO. T BLUE 1 lit his afterburner »nd rolled out In trail of the MIO and, in desperation, fired two SIDEWINDERS out of range, BLUE 1 had a good tone and low-g load on the airplane. The missiles were observed to track; however, the range was too great and the missiles self dcstructed bahind the MIO. T Shortlv thereafter BLUE 1 came out of afterburner as fuel approached minimum fof re- turn- hoiever. h^tt ay Jd In trail of the MIO and Instructed BLUE 2 to make another attack on the MlCy BLUE 1 finished the engagement with 3200 lb of fuel, and with home base 315 ml awav he started a climb to best cruise conditions. While going out BLUE 1 saw BLUE 2 SoSrsO ml tS tSe «3t making his attack and also saw a contrail making J^i^^nS ^i'ted on BLUE 2. BLUE I informed BLUE 2 of the attack and BLUE 2 broke off the attack and exited. ^ At the initiation of the action, BLUE 2 accelerated out and turned to position hlm- iill2f„J^^'SJ^i2in ?D attack In the dive anJ turn BLUE 2 «nt to 25.000 ij^i^^- "int airspeed was achieved and since he could not get a radar lock-on he Initiated a snap-up attack from 29,000 ft. In boreslght. T^iTu At thla time the MIG began a rotation and climb to start a snaP;"P f"\^J^°". the U-2. The combination of this and insufficient airspeed precluded keeping the plpper on the target and a SPARROW was launched with the plpper slightly to the rear of ?irget. iSe missile, which was observed by BLUE 1 at this time since BLUE 1 was slightly behind BLUE 2, missed the MIG, passing about 100 ft behind. T*: The HIC pilot probably observed the missile since he broke off his attack, leveled out and continued on a westerly heading. BLUE 2 rolled out In trail of the MIO and got a rSdar lock-on. However, the overtake was negative and BLUE 2 decided to descend below contrail level and stay In trail. Tt The MIC finally turned l80» through south to east and BLUE 2 turned to "P^a f^ont Quarter Intercept. A descent was made to pick up speed and the afterburner isnlted. After !ccel«ating BLUE 2 remained below the contrail level until 11 ""^S'^^^f J^;,^* Nhieh time a snap-up attack was made. The radar was locked on to the MIG and the three remaining SPARROWS were set to be fired automatically, interlocks in. T,« All switch positions were rechecked. Including polarization. The first missile was f ?ed lime3la?ely as the In-range light came on at 5 ml «lt\an overtake of 1000 kn^^ After this missile fired, BLUE 2 resqueezed the trigger fnj the "^^^" '^e missiles SPARROWS. On each of the firings the steering dot was within the ASE circle. The "issii" aooeared to go ballistic, and did not track the target. The last missile appeared to make !SS eorreStlons but it ilso missed. All switch settings In BLUE 2 aircraft were in the proper positions. T,, BLUE 2 then rolled out at 3-* «1 In trail with the MIQ and fired two SIDEWINDERS. TR«se both appeared to track but the firing was made out of range. Ti7 During this attack the MIQ proceeded at the same speed and altitude. At this time BLUE 1 called mininum fuel and the attack was terminated. BLUE 2 had about JOQO lb of fuel at this time. After minimum fuel was called a contrail »»/",^"^«^"P^ """J^q ras sighted. BLUE 2 decided to remain In the contrail layer "o-^fntarlly to draw the MIO, ?SJn dive?; 10,000 ft in afterburner to obtain separation. At the end 2 had 3200 lb of fuel. BLUE 2 climbed to best cruise altitude for the return. On landlna BLUE 2 had 1200 lb of fuel. 153 • • • •» EVENT 1-24 SUNNARY Time Hark Action A1rcr«ft (BLUE 1. 2) Other Friendlles (GREEN 1) Communi cati ons Enemy Actions {HIG 1 .2) Remarks Status Action B1 AU - 30.000 ft. Hach 0.82 B2 same status Radar on 50-n1 scale In left turn to south as part of an orbit In support of 61 . . 81 sights high-speed con- trail coming from Hanoi area at 7 o ' c lock , range about 20 ml. In left turn to south as part of orbit G1 has Just turned to the west, alti- tude about 70,000 ft Bl calls (il warning of approaching bogey . Recei ved no reply. Bl calls B2 and advised him to accelerate out and atttmpt a head-on attack. B2 calls that he Is going In for the ID Alt 46.000 ft, speed Hach 1 .fi, Heading 270' making a con- trail which continued through encounter Clear air ipaca abovt 35,000 ft. Bl and B2 at 30.000 ft to stay below con layer h Bl same status as at Tg 82 sane status Lights AB, jettisons tanks and dives to accelerate. In bottom of dive goes to 13.000 ft and starts pull-up. Lights AB, accelerates straight out, jetti- sons 3 tanks and descends slightly to 25.000 ft In right turn . • Sane • 2 til Hach 0.9-1.0 Alt - 38,000 ft 50-60* nose-up 100' bank, range to target 6 ml , target 10 o'clock high B2 Hach super- sonfc, Alt - 29.000 ft level Radar on 2S-r1 scale Back cannot get lock- on so goes boreslght, trying to follow tar- get wtth pipper. Attempts to fire 4 SPARROUS. SPARROUS do not fire. Hex of 2 g B2 b««.l> t annot get 1o<.k-i>ii.' Mdrts snap- up naneuver in boreslght. B 1 called to Back to look at 10 o'clock then go boreslght Sane Bl sees silver HIG. The parameters were not met for Bl's Missile firing, how- ever. It was thought necessary to scare off the HIG. The gas generator Ignites on one missile of Bl's aircraft but It does not eject. Trig- ger held down 5-7 sec. ^3 B1 AB off, 10* nose dOMA B1 falling off HIG Starts snap- up attack on G1 Has good view out the side I EVENT 1-24 SUMMARY (Continued) I Tine Action Aircraft (BLUE 1.2) Other Friendly (GREEH 1) CoflHnunlcatlons Enemy Actions (MI6 1,2) Remarks Status Acti on u 82 Alt 39.000 ft Speed ISO-kt CAS Range - ? mi 30' nos* up. no bank 61 10* nose-down AB Off Fires a SPARROH In bore- sight. Due to Insuffi- cient speed, pfpper Is slightly to rear of target Falling off. lights AB. continues down to 25,000 ft and starts to Cl inb B1 sees Missile pass 100 ft behind NIG B2 Front calls bogej as M16-21 Upon seeing nf ssl 1e MIG breaks attack and returns to Mach 1.6 and 46,000 ft. heading 270* No lock-on Speed Judged from reactive velocity and knowledge of HIG's best speed for attack 81 Alt 35.000 ft Mach 1.25, Nose up, cHnblng 10* locked on in fuU system 10* angle off from MIG Fires 2 SIDEWINDERS out of ranQe. Good tone, SIDEWINDERS do track. Continues to follow HlG i n AB , headirg 270° Little talk between B1 and 82 Alt: 46.000 ft Hach: 1.6 Heading: 270** SIDEWINOERS self- destruct 3 ni be- hind MIG fired at S-7 mi range 82 AU 30,000 ft Hach 0.88 Radar cn 25-n1 scale B] fuel 3200 lb Rolls out 15 Ml behind NIG. Negativt overtake Comes out of AB and starts home Decision to follow MIG below con layer to see which way he will go. h 82 same Radar on S0«n1 scale Turn after KIG to set up intercept, and dive to accelerate. Goes to 20,000 ft and heading 220*. Lights A8. NIG Start* turn to south. Judgment Is that NIG will turn 180* vi'V iiipviv ■> www • h 82 Hach 1.4 Ind. Alt 30.000 ft In AB Heading 220* Radar on 25''ia1 scale MIG at 2S* to left on intercept course. Range 30 ail. Dot coaing down the scope. Coming out of turn heading 090* AU: 46.000 Hach: 1.6 B2 Mach 1.4 ind. Alt 30.000 ft in AS Range to MIG 12 n ai. Starts snap-up SPARROW attack. Interlocks In. Alt: 46.000 ft Mach: 1.6 heading: 90" EVENT 1-24 SUMMARV (Continued) Tlini Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2) M«rk Status Action Other Friendly (GREEN 1) Comnun Icatlons Enemy Actions (NIG 1.2) Remarks ^10 B2 Mach 1.3 J^tUOU ft Bl out of AS at 30,000 ft Computer fires first missi le at S ml • 1000. Remaining mi ss 1 les f i red at 4.5 and 4 mi . Steering dot in ASE circle. Sees SPARROy missiles miss Fl rs t missile fal 1 j to guide. Second missile falls to guide. Third mis- si le tries to guide but cannot make the Intercept. ^1 B? Alt 46.000 ft Mach 1.2 Indicated In AB RoT Is out in trai 1 " " MIG at 3-4 ml and fi res 2 SIDEWINDERS out of range. 10-15* stern aspect. SIOEUINOEflS explode 1 ml behind NIG ^12 Bl best cruise conditions B2 Mach 1.2 Alt 45.000 ft Fuel 4000 lb Bl exiting Descends to pick up speed and separation, then cIlHbs to best cruise attitude and exits Bl calls B2 that there is a central 1 on an Intercept course on 62 MIG continues. Second MIG contrail seen on Intercept to 62. EVENT 1-25 Aircraft Involved: Four P-ftCs vs two MIG-2ls Result: Mo damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21«50'N/10U«»ttO'E Route Package V 1. PRIMARy HISSI0.1 AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 25 Apr 1956/rald-afternoon Four F-UC (BLUE flight) escort for EB-66 (GREEN rilght) ECM mission northwest of Hanoi In the vlcinlt'/ of Yen Bal. Mission was to protect EB-65 and to attack MIGs only If the EB-66 was threatened. E3-66 was providing ECM support for P-105 strikes In vicinity of Yen Bal. 2. HISSION ROUTE Udorn to RED ANCHOR for refueling to 21*45 •N/10*''30'E to enter NE-SW orbit north of Yen Bal . 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F«1C Bt'JE 1. 2> 3. " ft - SPARROW (Ai:!-7C) 4 . SlDEUZt.XER (Ai;{-dB) 1 - 600-B:al external tan^. (centerllne) 2 - 370-cal external tanks Radar on, TACA.'l off Camouflage paint EB-66 CP.ESM 1 Not given MIG-21 MIG 1. 2 Not Itnown Sliver color 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Thunderstorm bullduoa to about 40,000 ft over mountains to the west. Some — lower clouds with tops about 15,000 ft. Visibility 10-15 ml. no clouds In the area and altitudes of the engagement. B LUE 2 r T Altitude : Headlng T Speed ! Fuel State: 32,000 ft 30,000 ft 30,000 ft 32,000 ft 045» Mach 0.82 (S-tumlng to stay with GREEN 1) 16,000-18.000 lb (full Internal olus some external fuel) GP.EEN 1 30,000 ft 045« Nach 0.76 Unknown Plight Forniatlon ; V4MI 1 B4 \n ml/ 2-3 Ml- 5. * INITIAL DETECTION No MIO warnings had been received. BLUE 3 (BacO spotted two silver glints 3 o'clock hl2;h, 6-7 ml on reciprocal course. Advlae-l Front and obaerved one of bogeys enter contrail level at accut 5 o'clock position and start right turn toward 6 o'clock on BLUE flight. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 3 called boc;eys. Jettisoned external fuel ^anks and made hard right descending 135'* bank turn to Identify the bogeys. BLUE 4 Jettisoned tanks and followed to be In firing position after ID. BLUE 1 and 2 remainea with QREBN I who broke left and down. 159 4» EVENT I-2S 7. SITUATIUN OEVELOPHENT CREEIl 1 er.ccrtc cllRO. !:o hits. KIC 2 in about 20° descent and 5LUE <> In 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1, ?, 3 BLUE U (No. fired/No. hits) SPARKOW SIDEWINDER AIM-7D AIM-9S 0/0 0/0 4/0 Remarks (1) No motor Ignition. (2) Fired boreslght 6 to 8 ml, >»5« h.jad-on asnect . Did not appear to r^ulde, oassei J.pi.ind MIC 2. (3) No motor Unltion; {^) "ired with lock on ainlna; dot In circle. Had ln-ra.i^e light H-nl range 45' tall-on aspect. Did not appear to sulde, passed behind 2. (Hay not have hai sufficient overtake and may have broken lock during the run.} MIG 1, 2 No firing observed 9. eqUIPNENT PR03LEHS BLUE 1,2,3 - "one reported BLUE ^ BacX Report-d that, while trying to find the tanker in the scope the radar went out. It did not go out completely but "there was something wrong with tne tracking. The dot was not fur.ctlonlng properly. There was no problem with the scope aS such, but there was a malfunction of sor.e of Its properties." After completion of refuelinr the radar set was turned to "standby" for a few .-nlnuces. V/hen turned back, on the Back was able co loci: cn to some r-1053 ccnlng back from a strike and the radar worked perfectly, getting Icck-ons with the lock-otis cordng down Che scope properly and with the dot in Its proper position. It seemed to have corrected Jtself after the short period In "standby". Radar worited satisfactorily when checked during the return flight to the base. See BLUE 4 Front and Beck eoirjnents on the SPAHRO'rf missiles in Paragraph 10 (below). 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total Hours F-l| Combat Hours Missions Remarks BLUE 1 - Front 190Q 450 All TAC flsht^.* t8ck;;round and two S month TDY tc.rs in air defense aa3ii::n mcnts. Back Hot obtained BLUE 2 - Front Hot obtained Back 300 BLUE 3 - Front 2200 600-650 40-50 Flp;ht»?r bacl rro'jnd, no for^ial ACT tralnln*".. Fired one SPARRCW and one SIDEWItlDEK In tralnlntt. Back 350 175-200 -50 BLUE « - Front BOO 650 ~30 Fired one SPARROW in tralnlni; Back :t50 300 40-50 1 Corrincnts on this Encc -. -tar BLUE ^ - Front Had studied Rti3Sl?.n training r:anuals published by POD concernlns; '-IIO tactics. Rec07.nl zed MIG taotlc:i of tnls cncojnter as those i'.c had rt-ad isout. Was certain the bor.eys wtre MI'J-21s but hesitated to fire t«ause .^e had previously been Jumped by f'-105J. IbO EVENT XIOs «pc>.areaW to the missiles. [Tnet-e was tions It was thous^nt U.ax It ^l^^^^^^'^J^J^lj!" /^.ji"^"^ four missiles (SPARP.Qv:). The another one that ^^^'^^^^^^^^.j'^t- f^l o.l o? t air before It Ir.pacted. first one rirod bores Irnt lowed J^^J-Id ev°rvthlng was Just beautiful, school He fired throe more on a heart-on 35^ snap-up and ^^-^-l^^^^j^ed. They looked at this solution, in^^erloclcs 1. Ju3t beautiful and none cf J-J/^J^^Ji,,,^,;; ,«uch. but the one also and ceesied to -.^^^^^-e?!.^^,.;;- PJ^he test equipment there to check this air- 5?i^e^'1er^ve:;'?^i^,r ^ve^'dld^Jj? S 'results on\il fissile. - ' I: SpIpRO. (AI:.:-7.) nlssiles used In this .Ission ■-%^^P^°^^^,;^S\iS: l^Ttlll from CicLnav.a and wer. see of t.e -^^-^ ^^^^J" ^J^r/'tJaes by^etn? f!own to altitude S^l irrou^^nin ale^r^o^lie^a ^^^^.^^^^ relJ^bllity oJ these missiles was considered very low. nnrrr.er.ts ri"2n Overall Exr erleoee Bl.iJg. 1 - rrcnt jjeed short-rance missile with hl^n-? capability. Felt that reltaolUty of SPARROW missiles was questionable due to the fact that they had been flown frequently over the previous year. Bac. seat pilot is a valuable assist particularly to the rii.nt eader Pilot IS much r-.ore effective than an RO ^ ^^J^^^jJ^"!!^^'. j ^'^o^SSeJ Sr m«t effective for In the front seat. Front and back seater need .me co,etu«:« team work. ^^"^^Hi^iTlf a definite advanta=;e to having crew of two whether back seater la a pilot or RO, particularly for nlisht Intercepts or ground attacks. Would like to be able to pull ^^'s at altitude cc.-nparable to F-lOU or better. SPAVHOW IS an excellent missile for uie in non-visual ID environment, but Is difficult to eircloy when vl.iual ID is required. r,I0-21 can whip P-i* at altitude. -Kced to get MIC.21 at lower altitude where F-U can utilize Its excess thrust to better advantage. , . . . u , ri.hr with two rl3slle envelopes (SIDEWINDER and SPARROW) complicates the Havlna; to fUht <*itn two '^•^^^^1'^^;"*'' ,7^.. in terms of available envelooes. fighter pilot's problems A good f^^^ter pilot J^l^f.^Jj^^^JJJe? ctpablUties could be -me addition of guns, a t^.lrd ^^y^^off • ^^^^^"^."r^JJa? ridar and missile capability SriS'SrSS^prSSn^r* Tl^^^^ tissue systems could beat an F-* with guns. ^ ^ ^„ Need forward hemisphere ID caoabllity. Transponder trlgijered by radar beam or other system to Identify friendllea. BLUE "i - Back nov-^i air defense role as an interceptor, in many alr-to-a r engagements and l"^5%^JIr!-,San a pilot because of his train- an RO (radar observer) =^^1J.,'*?/J= : ; good RO can practically turn ing. The little taste of ECl 1" 0^^"^^^,^ ""^J.r. iS the ECM environment is sadly an inexperienced fuy every way he ^o. Tra.. . in tne^o. ^^^^ lacking, r never pan Into an S.CM environment in '.nam cxcepv toi- ^ were dropping chaff. rather than master the radar. 161 EVENT 1-25 ^-.^ F-** la an outotand 1 np. aircraft even wltn mul tlinl:Jslon requirements. However, would \^V1Tv^ air r.urerlority and rround attack poles oe accorrpllshfti Uy airplanes ootlnally deiiiiVK-d for each .-;inr.ion rdtiier t;ian navlng a sln»';lc nultlalsalon airplane wnlch coinpronlDes cucH capability. HtHd a simple air ::uperlorlty weapon system utilizing a visually fired all aspect weapon wiLti no lock-on or tail ciiase requirement. Need rort* maneuverability and ssialler turn radius than the F«4. U. DATA SOURCES Project. Int?r'vl'?wj : BMJH 1 - Pront , 21 Dec 1966; Bac/. - 13 Mar igC? 3LUF ? - Front, U 'Jfjc 1966; Hack - 13 Mar 1967 8LUF 3 - Front, 71 Jan 1967; sack - 19 Mar 19C7 BLUF t - Front, 27 Jan 1967; oack - 1? liar 196? ?^es ja.:e.' . Po:-Drt5 : 7AK OrfviiP-J 2513322 April 1966 DOCO-0 iBSS" USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons School Combat Analysis Division Bulletin #U, 1966. K. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION To On the afternoon Z'i April 1966 four F-^Ca (BLUE 1, 2, 3, U) were escortlnir. an E3-6C (GrHE;: I) ai an altltud- of 30,000 In a V.F.-ZA orhlt t.-»n»rally north cf Yen 3al. GREEN' 1 wao providing EvM support for r-105 striken In the vicinity of Yen Bal. Cn a headlrr- of O^^j', In the third or fourth orbit, BLUE 3 Back observed two bogeys at 3 o'clock h',zv., 6 to- 7 nl. 3LUE 3 Sack advised t.-iat thero mlcnt ce aocethlns; at 3 o'clock on opposite course. As ne continued to observe, 3LU" 3 3aclc detected silver glints and tr.en as the bogeys approached the 5 o'clock position, still on opposite course, one of them entered tht* contrail level and started a right turn toward 6 o'clocii on 3L'J5 fligr.t, Ti,,,^^^^^\^ advised SLoE UL) of bozeys approaching 6 o'clock and that his element trfLUE 3,JJ) wo'Jid r.ai^e an ID pass. 3LL,T. 1 stated that he and BLUE 2 would stav with GREE'I 1 ana re-.uested ::Fir:s:i 1 to break left and down to clear the area. Just before OP.!::-.:; 1 broke left, 3LUE 3 Jettisoned external tanks and made hard right descending turn with an Initial Dank of about 135". BLUE 3 stated he w.-juld riake ID and directed SLUE to take spacln? to fire If bor^eys turned cut to be MOs. BLUE U also Jettisoned external tanks and niade hard right descending turn Into the bogeys. BLUE 4 lost BLUE 3 when 3LUE 3 jr.ade hard turn Into hln. ^2. 13, 3LUE 3 In afterburner arr.ed SP,\RP.OW missiles and had four select lights. As he accelerated through Mach 1 at about 25,000 ft, he snotted bot-.ey approaching- r.ead-on and descendlnc; fron hl.^her altitude. ?L'JE 3 could not get raciar lock on, switched to boreslgnt node, pulled up head on to the bosiey, and ^oc lock on at eight miles. BlUE 3 Front lost visual contact upon checking; his scope for lock on and did' not reraln visual until about two nlle3, but still did not have positive ID. The bogey "was dl'-flcult to see a«aln3t the thunderstorms In the background. bLUE 3, In 15° len bank. Identified and rront called MIG as MIO 1 passed about fifty feet above him In a 70° left bank turn. a^Uc. 3 observed MIO 2 turning cut to the right. BLUE 3 nade a descending tiard right turn to clear area so that BL'JS could fire, after which ho attempted to relocate MIG I. A three to four minute visual and radar search was unsuccessful. BLUE * after Jettisoning external tanks, made hard right US" banked descending turn to follow 3LUE 3 wtio was naklng the ID pass. SPARFOw" mlcslles were armed and four select lights obtained. BLUE a <> tall -on aspect 3-ii-r.l range. The mloslle did not appear tc i>:ulde and passed behind *'H3 "> BLUE U Front was not c-rtaln that ho nad sufficient overtake for this aspect. 3ack later reported that he thought the radar had broken lock during the run. 8 I e 1 8 8 i i 8 8 8 8 8 Q 8 3 8 a £VENT Aftwr firing the fourth SPAHROW, BLUE 1 was In about a three mile trail behind HIG 2, However, MIG 2 had an estimated 0.5 "ach speed advantage and separated rapidly. BLUE I* had biji^n cllmbln*; IS-r'C'* ansle and waa still below Macn 1 and 'MG 2 was estimated to be at aboui Macis 1.5. ai/JK 'i did not attempt to fire a £^DE*I^;DER because of the separation speed and did not follow ;iIG 2 which was enterlnp, the SAK defended area northwest of Hanoi . BLUE 3 and U t-ndert up within one mile of each other and quickly located and reJoir;(?d CJRirlJJ 1 and ULUE 1 and 2. The fllr.ht departed the area after determining that the last r-l()5 strive had left the target. neither "IC-2] was observed to fire cannon or missiles. No hits were scored on the y.ir,9 oy the four SPARROW missiles fired. No dainar.e to either side; however, the MIGa had disrupted the ECM coverage by causing CRCE;i 1 to leave his station to evade. V f EVENT I-2S SUHMARy 1 T Imo Action Aircraft (SLUE 1. 2> 3. 4) Stitui 61. 30,000 ft Mach 0. 76 B1 and 2. 30,000 ft H«ch 0.80 83 and 4. 32,000 ft Hach 0.S2 ActUfl Individual members of BLUE flight S-turnlng to maintain Nach and stay with GREEM 1 (EB-66) Othir FrUnitly (GRUN \) B3 Cdck advised his Front he thought there was something at 3 o'clock 6-7 miles Coinmunicitluni Two bogeys on re- jctprocal heading Hl9h.40,000-4$.000 ft fnimy Acttgni B3 In AB B3 hard right descending turn into B4. Inl t1 al ly 13S* banii, armed SPARRO'J missl les 84 jettisoned tanks followed In AB 33 Back advised Front one of bogeyi starting right interception turn 13 Front advised 11 (L) had two bogeys ligh turning to i o'clock on BLUE Flight )3 called right turn to ID. directed B4 to take up spacing to fire if bogeys IDed as HIGs )1 indicated he and 12 Mould stay with «1 break left and town I Sogeys continue turn to 6 o'clock an BLUE flight 84 lost Sight 63 when B3 turned 1 n to him 83. 24.000-25.000 ft -1.1 «ach B3 got lock on at about 6 nh as he pulled up in head on with oogey. Had visual but sti 11 no ID. Lost visual when he looked down at radar scope to check for lock on bogeys descending about 20* In head 30 pass. J 109 Gfi^^ 12a Baa 60 G9 BSD CEBI BSS UEM dB OSS 69 Btl BB BB . BBl SSSI EVENT 1-2S SUMMARY (Continued ) Hire Nark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2. 3, 4} Other Friendly (GREEN 1) Comnunlcatlons Enemy Actions (HI6 1 .2) Remarks Status Action S3. 24.000-25.000 ft. Kach 1.2 fi3 regained visual con- tact at 2 ml In slight left turn 10-15*. Still no [ 0 Bogey In left turn 30.000 ft 1.* Ma'-.h B3 passed beneath Ml who was in 70* bank left turn. 83 broke light and down to clear area so B4 could fire. Observed M2 start right turn B4 descended to about 26,000 ft after hard right turn. Pulled up 10-15* climb to head on with M2 In 20* descent. Could not get radar lock on, went boresigtit f Ml apparently de- parted the area to southeast N2 ro* descent head-on toward B4. B3 .searched toward G1 In attempt to relocate Ml. 3-4 min visual and radar search unsuccessful B4 30,000 ft 0.92 Mach 10-1 $• Climb B4 fired first SPARROW In boresi gt)t 8-9 mi , no fflissi le motor i gni ti on. M2 started easy right turn. Mach 1.0, still descending Had partial lock- on. Missile fell off aircraft B3. 31 ,000 ft 0.9S Mach < 1 9 b4 fired second SPARROW 6-7 mi range, 45* head on aspect angle while In easy left turn to follow K2 H2 still In easy right turn SPARROW did not appear to guide passed behind HIG 2 84. 32.000 B4 fired third SPARROW 4 mi . no missile motor Ignl tton. 64 Back reported he had radar lock on Continuing right turn Missile fell off the aircraft ▼ f ,1 IVEWT 1-25 SUMMARY (Contlnutd ) Time Mark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, 3. 4) Status B4. 32,000 ft < Mach 1.0 Actf on B4 fired fourth SPARROW about 4-ni1 range. Had interlocks full system. 45*^ tail-on aspect angle. Hisslle passed behind H2, did not appear to guide. B4 turned left to avoid getting into the SAM defended area, rejoined B3 who ended up Nithin one mile of B4 at end of engagement. B3 and 4 rejoined G1 , 8) and 2 and returned to home base. Other Friendly (GREEN 1) Communications Enemy Actions (HIG 1.2) M2 headed south- east over Yen Bal . approx Mach } . 5 rapidly separating with his 0.5 Kach advantage Renarks 64 f ront tidS not certain he had enough closure rate. B4 back reported redir broke lock during the run 4Mr EVEHT 1-26 Aircraft Involved; Two P-itCa and one RB-66 vs two or three MIC-21s Result: One MIG destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: 21»55' N/106* 15 'E Route Package VI 1. PRINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 26 Apr 1966/1520H Three of four scheduled F-UCs were available for escort of two RB-66s. The RB-66s separated over North Vietnam. The lead P-Uc accompanied one, the second and third P-HC (BLUE flight} accompanied the other. The RB-66 escorted by BLUE flight established a racetrack east>west orbit at approximately 22*N/106"C. 2. NISSION ROUTE Three P-^lCa launched from Danang, rendezvoused with two RB-66s and proceeded north to the Red River. BLUE flight of two F-4Cs then depart id with one RB-66 (GREEN flight) to proceed to Its orolt northeast of Hanoi while one P-4C remained with the other RB-66 In Its orbit northwest of Hanoi. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P.»>C BLUE 1. 2 H - SPARROW (AIM-7E) 1| - SIDEWIflDER (AIM-9B) 2 - 370-gal wing tanka 1 - 600-gal centerllne tank ZPP and TACAN operating, camouflage paint. RB-66 GREEN 1 Unknown MIQ-21 MIG 1. 2 (3) 2 - AAH Sliver color, very bright 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Scattered, very low layer; clear, visibility unlimited elsewhex^. BLUE GREEH 1 2 1 Altitude ; 31,000 ft 31,000 ft 30,000 ft Heading ; 270" 270«» 270» Speed ; —---——approximately 0.8 Maeh- — — — - Fuel State : Pull Internal, empty external tanks Unknown Flight Foraatlon ; 5. INITIAL DETECTION MIO warnings were received on Guard Channel , 10-15 ailn prior to BLUE flight reaching the orbit point. Plight was level, heading 270*, after completing a 180" right turn. BLUE 1 (Back) sighted two Kia-2l8 at 2 o'clock, high, descending, closing rapidly (estimated high supersonic). 6. ACTION INITIATEO BLUE 1 and 2 Jettisoned external tanks, lit afterburners, and broke Into a hard left descending turn. 3REEN 1 was told to depart the area. 169 EVENT 1-26 7. SITUATION DEVELOPHEHT The HlOa reversed their heading In a hard left turn and cllnbea out to ^Je northwest, BLUE I and a p"led up t^ehlnd them, lost sight of one . and {jf °% J^.^^fjrile BLUE 1 fired three SIDEV/INDERS at very close ranf^e. Unknown ^^UE }. hi- ""^^JJ""'' passed the MIC without detonation and the pilot ejected The third flriJhrlJ io2n ULU'-" the tall Dice of the MIG which fell straight down. While following the (debris down, ULU- 2 Sas attacked at hU 6 o'clock by another HIG-21. E3LUE 1 and 2 spUt. the « G c^-^bed awa" Sd from 500 ft BLUE 1 fired his last SIDEWINDER at him. The ^^"^ and 2 departed the area. No firings of any kind were seen from any of the MIGs. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 (No. Plred/No. Hit) SIDEWINDER AIM.9B U/1 Remarks MIO pilot ejected after first missile, second bal- listic, third a direct hit, and fourth passed close but did not explode. BLUE 2 O'O MIO 1, 2 (3) N« "fins 9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEHS BLUE 1 - None ^ . « ^ BLUE 2 - Mike cord disconnected after first missile fired. GREEN 1 - Unknown 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total Hours Hours Combat Missions Remarks BLUE 1 Back Front •b300 ^30 Had never fired a missile, only minimal ACT. Comments on this Encounter BLUE 1 ^ Believes l-'IGs were being vectored into stern attack and did not detect the ISO turn Just conpleted by GREEll and BLUE flights. Would like to have had Internal guns . Would like to have had a gun. Would like better performance at hl^h altitude. Didn't thlnK he had proper ACT in training. Thought MIO 2 may have flamed out In his original hard turn. BLUE 2 - Mot interviewed. Conments from Overall Experience None Back - 11. DATA SOURCES Pro,1eet Interviews ; BLUE l-Back 10 Jan 67; back seat of single .^-1 which escorted other B-66, 16 Mar 67 Messages, Reports ; Letter from 2LUE 1-Front Kp MSO 02l'»«3Z May 1966 01029^6 35?rrf MSG 261050Z Apr 1966 F«7EL 572 riMCPACA" M3Q 0522562 *5ay 196b 7AP OPREP-3 2613««82 Apr 1966 DOCO-0 l8a30 170 EVENT 1-26 12, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Two RB-663 and thr-'e F-UCs ( Trom Dananf^) pt'ocetded north to the Red River near Yen Bay. on. ^n 1 ^.e K.«C ren^.alnoci In the area while the f ll^'-^^.'^FiJ^^f ^^^jj^ ^^^^ \ Ini 2 and CHEEM 1) continued on to an orbit point a.out 60 nl ''^ "f.^^^^JpEH^ had Just 25 percent on radar and rS percent on visual outsidt scanning. BL'?E 1 on thi' rli.*ht side of GREEN 1, sir.hted two Mia-21s descending on them at 2 o'clor^'hlr:* , at hl-h ^up'^rsonic speed. BLUE 1 (Back) called thetn out to the Front and lo'bLUE 2.' Tt-.e MJGs were In a gentle rli;ht bank as they crossed over the flight and then they reversed hard to the left, level with BLUE flight. BLUE 1 called GRIEN 1 to depart and c Imultaneoualy with BLUE 2 ,1et6lB0ned tanks, went into afterburner, and r.acJc a hard left diving turn into the MIOs. BLUE 1 pulled out of his vertical reversal at approximately 12.000 ft. ."ach 1.6 and 5<6 g's. with BLUE 2 /lying a ticHt win.. PosUloa. He pulled up after the Mias wr.o were In afterburner neadlng UA at about 30,000 ft. .llG ^ was tiicn seen to be £!0'nr very slowly, descendlnr;, tralllne white vapor toward the eaat. BLUE 1 and 2 lost si. -he of ••'IG 2 and continued to close rapidly on WIG 1, who was making gentle clcarlnc turns as he cllnbed away. BLUE 1 achieved several boreal«ht lock-ons but closed Inside ranre for a SPARROW sho-.. At approxlnately 3000-ft ra^ge, nose high, BLUE 1 fired one 3IDEWlN5E.«i with a good tone. BLUE 1 then did a hlgh-g roll to the left to gain more lenaratJon and did not observe the .nisslle track. BLUE 2 still on BLUE I's wing, obs'^rved th'^ rnlsslie Mt or alT.cst hit (no exoloslor.) the MIC and the pilot eject; however, BLUE 2 had radio difficulties and could not Inforn BLUE 1 of his kill. BLUE 1 then pulled up behind 'Alo 1 aeain, at 500 ft, and fired another SIDEWINDER with no discernible tone that went ballistic. He again rolleii to the left, t-ulled up and fired another SIDEWINDER at 3000 ft, good tone, which suldod right up the tall pipe of the MIG which was now descending through 20,300 ft. The HIG exploded ir.tc many pieces and fell straight down. BLUE 1 and 2 then descended around the debris to watch It Impact In the ground. At 10 000 rt, ac BLUE 1 coaT.enced his pull-up, he looked back at his wingman and saw another mC-21 tracking hl.-n, (It Is not known If this was the original MIG 1 or another one) BLUE 1 called for a defensive sollt and broke down to the left, BLUE 2 breaking up and right. A3 BLUE 1 caT.e Cjt of r.is roll to the left he sighted the .MIG ahead In afterburner clln:bing away, makln; gentle clearlnp; turns. He rolled in behind hi.-n and climbed in afterburner. He continued a very steep climb and ended up directly behind the MIC at 500 ft, 200 knots, very nose hlrh at approxlnately 2?,0C0 ft. He then fired his last SIDEWINDER which oassed directly over the left wlnr, of the MIC who then broke right. BLUE 1 broke left, dived for the deck and egressed due to low fuel state CiSOO lb). •BLUE 1 and 2 became separated on the defensive spilt and BLUE 2 did not chase the last MIG that BLUE 1 fired on. Mo firings of any kind were observed from the MIGa although all MIGs carried 2 r.lssiles. The downed M13 was believed to be a KIG-21C. All MICs had distinct Chinese Connunlst markings. The time from initial MIG sighting to MIG explosion was 1 mln 29 sec (from tape carried In the flight). 171 EVENT SUKK178 Result: One P-OC damaged, ground fir* Vicinity of Encoui.ter: Pa'^JS'N/loe^OO 'E Route Package VZ 1. PRIHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlr.e: 26 Apr 106C/1^25H Four P-tc airplanes (bL'.'E flight) vfcre performing: a KIGCAP for three flights of strike airplanes. ELl'F- riif;ht had briefed to fly a fluid-four formation and to have one section nake the ID pass wnlle the other maneuvered Into position to launch missiles. 2. HtSSION ROUTE Departed Worn on a northerly headlnt^ to the Red River at a point about 30 ml south- east of Lao Cal, Then headed easterly and southeasterly Into the CAP area. Proceeded in at an altitude of about 20, COO ft. Descended into the orbit area and maintained an alti- tude of 10,000 to 15 ,000 ft. Airborne refucUn? was conducted en route prior to reaching the NVK border- The centerllne tanks were Jettisoned at the Red Rivci'. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-tiC BLUE 1. 2. 3. U - SPAHHOW (AIM-7D) l| - SIDEVINDSR CAIM-9E) 2 - 370-gal external wing tanks 1 - 600-cal external centerllne tank IFF, TACAN and UHF normal and operating. Camouflage paint, green and brown. HrG>21 MIG 1 Object sighted under the wing. Not identified aa AAM or external tank. Silver. NIC-17 Min 2. 3. U, 5 2 - 23njn guns 1 - STir-Ti gun At least one olive drab color, others were silver. 4. PLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Generally good visibility with ha'ze below 3,000 to 10,000 ft which reduced visi- bility to 5 n»l- Scattered, small cumulus clouds. BLUE 1 2 3 il Altitude : Heading: Fuel State: Plight Porwatlon ; Fluid-four 12,000 ft lOO" Approximately 500-kt TAS Full Internal plus some fuel in external wing tanks. Centerllne external tank had been Jettisoned at Red Klver. 1^1000 1000 l/i • 1 Ml Section 2000-3000 ft above Lead 5. INITIAL DETECTION MIG warning had been received. BLUE 3 first detected HIO 1 as a radar contact at 12 o'clock;, 35 mi, high (estlrated above 30,000 ft), closing rapidly. MIGs 2, 3, k and 5 were later detected visually while making an attack on BLUE 1 and BLUE 2. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 passed tactical lead to Blue 3. Blue 1 and H Jettisoned wing tanks as the flight lit afterburners and oonimenced an intercept. BLUE 3 took the lead and started a climbing right turn. BLUii 1 obtained a radar lock-cn and called he was taking back the 177 1. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 3 and U lost ziz night. The Intercept of Hanoi. I:I,UF. flight return race-trjcic pattern and not fire. rLl'E 1 and 2 ties-:an flrlnt:. BL'JE 2 broke h^rd burner and acccleratiri?;. and u lEet;r..'i,*,t;d as tUK '-'.iCi launched two 3ID£V;i:;l;ER -i HIG h, E'!.yF, 1 saw two Tiore continued in a split-r;-typ track orbit until reactilng EVENT 1-27 ht of ni,fE 1 and ? nr. FiLUK 1 rc:: tlto left rear quarter. BLUE 1 e .^nancuver and dlsenif:ir,ed. 3LUE 3 nnd 1 remained In the race- BINOO fufl and then returned to tase. 6. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 BLUE 2, 3, * KZGS (Ho. fl red/do. hits) ^ftRROW SIDEWINDEH [K-y.L)_ „AIM-93 0/0 2/0 0/0 0/0 Rewarka Missiles launched out of range. Plred cuns. No hits. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 2 was unable to Jettison external wlnp tanks after being hit by flak. BLUE 3 had two SPARROW missiles detune en route to the orbit area. Remaining two missiles de- tuned during Intercept of :4IG 1. Was unable to Jettison external wing tanks. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total v-n Hours Cor.l,at Ml::-xlons BLUE 1 Front Back BLUE 2 Front • Back BLUE 3 Front Back BLUB t» Front Not In the data available. 500 23 2700 8C0 6 Not. interviewed. 2000 500 30 500 300 30 Not Interviewed, Remarks Participated in one SPARAOW and one SIDEVINDER launch during training. Has been Instructor pilot. Participated in one SPARROW launch during training. Launched one SPARROW and one SIDEWINDEK in train- ing as aircraft eoimander. Very little ACT in training. Back Not with data obtained by letter. Comments on This Encounter BLUE 1 (Front) As a result of BLUE 1 resuning the lead after BLUE 3 had started the Intercept, the two elements became separated. Just before breaking off the intercept, BLUE 1 nay have been within range to launch an AIM-7E, but he had only AIK-7D missiles. Later, BLUE 1 knowingly launched two SICr.UI.'iDER missilea out of range. BLUE 1 (Back) The two-man crew in tanden was good. Th»- back seat pilot provided lookout to the rear. He considered silni!r.uni range of the SPAFROW to be excessive. The P- had acceleration and thrust advantage over MIQ-i7. He had r.evtr observed aircraft make a gun type attack against him. BLUE 2 (Front) Confusion developed on egress from numerous search and rescue facili' ties transmit ting slnuitancously on guard frequency and rescue frequency while attempting to expedite rendezvous with a tanker. " BLUE 3 (Front) Radio voice channels very cluttered. During the first intercept, he would have been In ranp,.,- In another 30 sec but broke off b'.-C£use they weru approachinr a SAM defense ring. The requirement to make an ID pass altere<; the Intercept to a rear quarter attack. BLUE 3 (Back) The target was sighted visually because of contrails. 178 Comncntr- or. this TncQunter (Continued) EVENT 1-27 BLUE tt (Back) It appeared that MIC 1 was tryinc to lure BLUE flight Into the SAM area. C>"ir;n<^nts from Pvcrrtll Exserler.ce BLUE 1 (F-acX) Stated h-j did not trust, the SPARROW nlsr.lle. Would prefer to be able to <:isoti.;a^e and rcattack rather than fi.'.ht a close-in turning encounter. Improved visi- bility to the reap was needed. Ccisclnatlon of no close-in weapon and restraint of a positive ID Imposed undesirable tactics. PLUe: 3 (Front) Restraint of the visual ID was the bl(?:gest problem. Feels a good airplane shoulu have a crew of two In tandos, twin engine, backup fllRht control systen, enerv.ericy electrical power to touch down, alrtorne interrogation of IFF/SIF and Ir.proved radio and ICS. A.-.alnst an airplane such as the MIO-17/19 not sure a ?;un would be useful because of the difficulty of attaining a *:un-flrlr.e position — if the MIC maneuvered to evade. Would have liked a longer range nlsslle. Very inportant to maintain flisht Integri ty . BLUE 3 (Eack) Could not rely entirely on radar to detect targets, visual search was very inportant. Important for flight crews to fly as a team. Inertlal navigation system very Inportant. 11. 'data sources Project Interviews : * BLUE 1 (Lead) (Front) lU Dec 1966 BLUE I (Back) 15 Mar 1967 BLUE 2 (Front) 9 Mar 1967 BLUE 3 (Front) 25 Jan 1967 BLUE 3 (Back) 6 Mar 1967 BLUE « (Back) Letter of 28 Mar 1967 Message Peports : TAP OPREP-3 26l32t8Z Apr 66, DOCO-0 l81(29 35 TAC PTF V?0 OPREP-3 2610302 April 66, DOI FASTEL 571, USAF Fighter Weapons School Bulletin-^ 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Tq As BL'JE flight approached the area where they were to establish a MIGCAP, a MIG alert' was received. The flight was on an easterly heading. 6ntE 3 detected several radar targets and obtained a lock-cn. The radar indicated a very high Vg (approx 1800 kt ) which showed the target to be approaching almost head-on. When BLUE 3 reporttJ the contact BLUE 1(L) passed the tactical lead to BLUE 3. BLUE 3 attenipted to Jettison his wing • tanks. BLUE 1 and BLUE ii Jettisoned wing tar.lts. SLUE c retained his tanks. BLUE flight engaged afterburner and commenced an intercept for an ID pass. Ti BLUE 1 acquired the target and resuced the lead. The two elements of BLUE flight lost visual contact with each other. .The target was sighted visually and identified as a MIG-21. BLUE flight saw the smoke puffs as the SIO lit afterburner. T? BLUE flight commenced a snap-up attack. The SPARROW missiles on BLUE 3 detuned. As BLUE fllBht decelerated, the Vj. changed to a negative value indicating the range to the target was increasing. Ti The intercept was discontinued because the Intercept had developed Into a tall chase and the MIG was- leading the flight Inuo the ring to the south. BLUE night returned to the orbit area with BLUE 1 and 2 In the southern portion while BLUE 3 and * proceeded to the northern end of the area. Ta As BLUE 1 and 2 rolled out on a ESE heading to recheck their position, BL'JE 2 was hit by flak which was later evaluated to be 57nn. BLUE 1 and 2 commenced an immediate Jink to the left. Tc As they rolled left into a diving turn SLUE 1 observed a burst of tracers pass close aboard and saw a MIC at 3 o'clock as well as one at 7:30 o'clock. BLUE 2 rolled out on a heading of 100° and accelerated in afterburner going to the deck. BLUE 1 observed rilO 3 starting to slide to the outside so reversed his tur.-i, engaged afterburner, and pulled up Into a steep hlph yo-yo. Tfi MIC 3 follow .id BLUE l and opened fire near the top of the yo-yo as he ran out of airspeed and fell off Into a dive. T, BLUE 1 checked the area for more MIGs and saw BLUE ? low at 10 o'clock with a KIG in t^all. BLUE 1 rolled Into a dive, selected :;EAT and launched two SIDKWINuER missiles out of range hoping to scare off MIG H. BLUE 1 did not launch SPARROWS at the p° because he felt BLUE 2 Slight also be In range. He knew the KIO was out of range for the SIDfcWIhDEH. BLUE 1 accelerated rapidly In afterburner dlvlr.i.; tcwird MIG U. To BLUE 1 cor„T;cnced a hlch-s; barrel roll to preven: overrunning MIG H. As he started an inte the maneuver the iack looked out at V o'cloci and saw one or more MIGa in a run on them. Back told the Front to keep the turn In. They continued around in a rolling 179 4j» NARRATIVE OCSCRIPTIOH (ConHn«ed) fVENT 1-27 splli-S maneuver. When they came .out of the maneuver, no MIGs were In sleht and BLUE 2 was cone also. Tq BLUE \ heaJed for the coast and ccirrenced a gentle oUmb to conserve fuel. When he * contrail hl^h at 6 o'clock, 10 nl. and assumed this west a , .V;'^'"'-''^ '•'•eve to the deck and continued outbound. The wing pylons and remain- ing SiDE....;;.)h°r> were Jfuilscned to reduce dra?. BLUE 1 landed at Danang with 250 lb of luci rc:-.alnlr;.:. An attempt was rr.ade to t-endezvous him with a Navy tanker, but he could not use the dropue type rei'ueler. BLUE ? secured the daT.aeed right enrlne when over the water. He was unable to Jetti- son the Kir.?: tantcs. After rcnde :voj:: In? with an alr'jorae tanker, he refueled with only 50 lb of ruol Indlcateil regaining In his tanks. All pilots stated th«re was confusion In radio transmissions and In Instructions given to effect rendezvous with the tankers. ruv^iwis % 180 § 9 « 0 § 9 9 8 S 9 9 9 9 9 r9 EVENT l'?7 SUMMARY Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, 3. 4) Other Friendly Commun 1 ca t i ons Enemy Ac t i ons (MIG 1 ,2,3.4 ,5) 1 Remarks i i Time - Mark Status Action BLUE flight 19 Ann f ^ A50-500-Vt CAS 4 - SPARROMS AIM-70 AiH-9B 2 . Wing tanks B3 has radar contact on Ml . Bl (L) gi ves lead to B3. B3 attempts to Jettison tanks. Bl and B4 Jettisons tanks. B3 and B4 into AB and com- mence Intercept for 10. B\(L) passes tacti- cal lead to B3. Ml high heading westerly, com- mencing a turn to the S. SLOE f 1 Ight en route to orbit area NW of iCep to provide a rtlGCAP. Fluid-four f ormati on . Bl acquires radar con- tact, Bl and 62 into AB. Bl calls he Is taking back the lead. HI Into AB. B3 and B^ do not have Bl and 82 in sight. HI sighted visually and identi- fied as MIG-21. 18.000 ft Mach 1.2 Bl and B2 commence snap- up. B3 and B4 do not have Bl and B2 in sight. HI continuing S. ^3 • Bl and B2 decelerated in climb. Ml starts to pull away. BLUE flight discon- tinued intercept because Ml was pro- ceeding into area heavily defended by SAKs. MIG heading S at very high speed. BLUE flight returned portion of the area. to the orbit area with B They orbited in the are 1 and BZ In the southern portion while B3 and B4 proceeded a for one or more counter-clockwise turns. to the northern 1 8000 ft Hdg 100* 350 kt CAS Bl and B2 in southern end of orbit area. BZ hit by flak. 81 and BZ jink left. B3 and B4 in northern end of orbit area. No longer In the action. Unable to contact B3 and B4. Exces- sive chatter on radio. Bl and B2 in left turn. Bl saw H2 at 3 o'clock. B2 into AB exiting. Bl saw tracer pass dose aboard. Bl 1U AB and reversed turn to the right. H2 sighted. H3 fireJ at Bl. '5 EVENT t'27 SUMMARY (Continued) t Tine M«rk Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4) Stttus 30* Dive Mach .8 Action B2 exiting area, Iom, high speed. K4 chasing B2. B1 took H3 into high yo-yo. H3 stalled out. Bl fired two SIDEWINDERS to scare off M4. 81 pursul ng M4 . F1 r1 ng geometry 10-10 off the stern. Range 2-3 «i. Fired for scare only. Bl into high-g barrel roll to reduce overtake. Saw one or two MIGs on tail. Conti nued clinbino left turn into niodifled spllt-S. bis- engaged at low altitude, very high speed. Bl heading out of area. Other Friendly BZ accelerated away from K4 and exi ted over water. Communications Enemy Actions (MIG 1.2.3.4.5} H3 shooting at 81 just before he stalled. H4 is 1000 ft in trail of B2. Breaks off it- tack on mis- sile firing. Remarks Bl launched SIDE- WINDER rather than SPARROW because of possibility of SPARROU guiding on 82 instead of M4. M4 was beyond SIDE- WINDER range. 5 V ' EVENT I-2B Aircraft Involved: Four P-liCs vs four HIG.l7s Result: Two MIGs destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: 21«»«iO'H/106*07*E Route Package VI 1. PRIHAftY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 29 Apr 1966/mldafternoon A flight of four F-iiCs (DLUE fleet) encountered a flight of four MIG-lTs while flying MIGCAF for a I2-plane F-135 strike against the Bac Clang bridge, some 25 nl NE of Hanoi. Orbit areas for the F-it flight was north of the strike area. It is believed that another ril|ht of F-^Cs v*as sir.ultaneously orbiting as MICCAP east of the target area, that two E3-66s were airborne north of the target to give SAM warnings, and that BIG E'?E was over the Tonkin Gulf. Other P>tCs were some 20 mln behind this mission, also covering P-I05s on what was believed to have been a different target. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE flight departed from Udorn. They refueled on Red track, leaving the tanker about latitude ig'SO'K, then proceeding HHE, at about 21,000 ft and 250-kt IAS to a turn- ing point approximately on the Red River, out of the SAM area. They turned east and com- menced descent to about 10,000 ft, dropping empty ccnterllne tanks at about the turning point, later turning SE toward the target area. Enroute, the F-'*3 flew generally above and behind the P-lOSs, nalntalnlng radar and visual contact with them, breaking off and going into their orbit area well befcre reaching the target. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION F-iiC BLUE 1, 2f 3. '* ti - SPARROW (AIM-TD), fuselage - SlDEWIf.'DER (Ai::-9B), Inboard wing stations 2 - 370-£al wing tanks, outboard stations 1 - 600-sal centerllne tank (Jettisoned enroute to nisalon area) Avionics - :;ornally TACA:i utilized early in the flight and then turned to standby; radar always on; IFF was optional at this time and was frequently left off over NVtl. Camouflaged MIG^7 MIC 1.?.3.^ Silver color Wing tanks 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Scattered cur.ulus, about 2/10 coverage, visibility good except soir.ewhat reduced in haze below about 10,000 ft. • BLUE I 5 3 T- Altltude : 8000 ft 8000 ft 12,000 ft 12,000 ft Heading :' generally SE Speed : t(O0-kt IAS Flight Fornatlon : Elements operating separately, generally on opposite sides of orbit; one element high, one low; weaving and varying altitude. $. INITIAL DETECTION Various MIG warnings were heard while enroute to orbit area, Including report from EB-66: "MIGs airborne at Phuc Y«n." Initially BLUE 2 aircraft commander detected and called a MIC at 9 o'clock low. Imstedlately tHereafler , various memoers of the flicht observed a total of four aircraft below, quickly identified as MIGa primarily by their sliver color. Flight r.enbers recalled no warning whic! alerted them to this specific group of MIGs. Initial detection distance probaoly less than 2 nl. 6. ACTION INITIATED All Jettisoned tanks; BLUE 1 turned left to engage, observed three other MIGs below In staggered trail and told flight to go after the ^roup of three; BLUE 3 pulled nose up then rolle-u to rlirnt, going Into AO to Cialntaln spead; wingnen maintained position on their element leaders. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 3 made a slncjc quick paaa at the MIGs from above, fired one SIDEWIMrPP, which downed a MIG, and pulled off. RL'JE 1, durl.i^ his '.ultlal turn, observed rLUE 5 and ^ rolliniT into the J-'IGs and iiad to break off In the o- poslte direction. He observed a MIG getting into an attack postltlon on BLUE 3 and quick y fired a SIDEWINDER to attract the EVENT 1-28 MIGa attention This MIG then went Into extreme evasive maneuvers with BLUE 1 Pursuing, Jiuh'cu;n5S;d In the mC's colliding with the ground. The JT^^ ^^J" J"? due to low fuel state, DLUE 3 making a quick pass and rapidly firing two SIDEWINDERS (out of .parameter) at two more MlGs which passed nearby during his egress. The MIOs initially encountered were flying straight and level, not very fast, at low altitude when encountered. They apparently were not aware of the F-Us or else had no !n5enSon of engaging them. Thiy Jettisoned tanks and commenced naneuvers only after the F-lt8 made hostile maneuvers. 8. ORONAKCE BLUE 1 BLUE 2 and k BLUE 3 (No. flred/No. hits) SPARROW SlDEWirroSR ATH-7D AIM-9B 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 3/1 Remarks Fired hurriedly without tone to attract attention of MIO on BLUE 3's tall. Missile attempted to track but could not follow. First missile fired with tone In param- eters, went up tall of MIG, exploded, pilot ejected with aircraft on fire and corkscrewlnf;. Other two missiles fired hurriedly with tone but high g and long range — no hit observed. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEHS None reported. 10. AUCREU COHHENTS Experience BLUE 1 Front Back BLUE 2 Front Back Total Hours 2600 Hours Combat Missions 1)5 total. 10 "counters* — Not interviewed 1500 500 700* 700 basic all pilot back training seat 500+ Unknown Unknotm Unknown Remarks Had little or no alr-alr maneuvering training; tnls was only alr-alr en- counter experienced. Noted that all members of flight had about sane com- bat experience level at this time. Had no ACM training; this was first ACM practice and first and only alr-alr combat encounter. Had gone from pilot training to CCTS, to a squadron — all time after pilot training was In P-"*. Had ex- perienced one SIDEWINDER and one SPARROW practice firing — both against nonmaneuverlng target. Had flown heavy bombers, then Into P-8it$ and F-Hs. Had fired 2 SIDE- WINDERS in training. Was 1st lit at time of this encounter. Was Captain at time of this encounter. Has Ist Lt at time of this encounter. Back BLUE 1 Front Back Comments on this E ncounter BLUE 1 Front At one point in the encounter he could have fired a SPARROW and probably gotten a MIG if his state of training had been higher. BLUE 2 Front Had flown with Uad and knew his characteristics so wel' that he could respond almost automatically. 186 B I I 9 a « 5 : 6 i f i 8 s EVENT I. 28 He was completely disoriented during the various maneuvers and concentrated on stayini^ on Lead's wlnt;';. BLUE 2 riack Unsure of what occurred durlni: parts of the engacement — much of the time was spent lookinr. out for the rest of the flight to maSte sure they didn't get a MIG at 6 o'clock, Mlfis did not ccem to react in a very capable manner. While on MICJCAP he spent about 90 p)?rcent of his time looking outside and 10 percent of time looking; ac radai". Reason for t;hlo was that NIC3 probably were going to come In low and you wculdn't detect thera on radar. In this situation where they were low, could never have Ufn:n cau.^hL on radar. Didn't think SPAfiROW could ever have been used in this encounter because all attacks were diving; at the ground and were never in the proper range band. SIDEWINDER was quite a bit more convenient in this encounter. Experienced llcht buffeting at times during the encounter. A gun would have been useful — could have gotten into gun range. BLUE 3 Front At this period there seeded to be no SAMs fired when the MIGa were airborne. BLUE 3 ^:ick After the Initial attack BLUE 3 was never able to achieve the necessary conditions for an Ideal r.isslle attack. The nearness to the grcund negated much of the missile effectiveness. ' An Internal gun couid have been used very effectively In thla environment. The radio calls during the encounter were minlital. The only other call after the initial sighting was: ">ie got one." BLUE tt 5aeic * BLUE 4 did not initiate any attacks during the engagement because of the need for element integrity. BLUE 4 cculd have successfully engaged a HIG on the first pass. Comiaenta from Overall Experl ence BLUE 2 Bae'^c It was not necessary to have a pilot in the back seat of the P-4 except during night air-ground nisslons when a pilot may more capably advise the aircraft commander. Ac- tually, a radar oficer would be mere interested in the back seat operations than a pilot would be. BLUE } Fron t It would be undesirable and possibly fatal for an P-tt to use a gun In fighting with a MIC because the MIG Is built to fight with guns and the P-it is not. As a last resort to kill a KIG's tracking solution on you, you can go Into a nose high rudder roll. We need a capability to fire missiles at higher g. It is best to fight the MIG in the vertical. BLUE U Back The Back is very limited in helping the aircraft commander during a elose-in en- gagement. His responsibility in such case should be to look for enemy aircraft In the 6 o'clock area. 11. DATA SOURCES Pro.tect Tnterylews : BLUE 1 Front (12/1/66), BLUE 2 Front (12/13/66), and Back (1.= '13/66). bLLS; 3 Front (12/13/66), SLUE b Front (12/13/66). J' Letter Accounts from : BLUE 3 Back, BLUE i Back. Messages : 7AF OPREP-3 291110: Apr 66, DOCO-0 I8638 7AF OPREP-3 Apr 66, DOCO-0 I865O Other ; 'JSAP Tactical Fighter Weapons School Combat Analysis Division (CAD) Bulletin ft, I966. 12. NARRATIVt DESCRIPTION BLUE fllcJit had been on MIGCAP station for about 15 to 20 mtn when they encountered four Kia-17s. (BLUE 2 and BLUE U flew a close combat wing on Lead and BLUE 3 througt.out I67 EVENT 1-28 (3 and U)) T Tnitiallv BLUE 2 «»lrhted and reported. "MIG 9 o'clock low.* All aircraft In 3LUE f^lcht ieulsi^J their ank=. BLUE Lad turned h.ri left to enr.a?e and saw three other 5rSf in locte t5all with a slnclc MIO at Lead's 11 o'clock headed In a different dlrec- i' 2n AS R*UE Lead attached th- slnrle r.IG xas observed to Jettison his tanks. BLUt S nK^UhteS the tSrce Si^s n t^ low and passing left to right. maneuvered nose iigS. rolUng right, uslnc afterburner, and Initiated a diving attack on the flight of three T RriiP t«.Ad slehted his Wing attacking the MIG formation of three and broke off his Iltack wuh a hard re^er e llAlln-^ barrel roll to the rieht . uslnc ^"«|;J"^"^r 'SlSI " ?a'5 air spe?d. The single MIG was not observed by any member of the flight after BLUE dll Srokl right. The KIGs Jettisoned tanks and went into an easy right turn. At least one HIG went Into afterburner. T, BLUE Wlnc continued his attack and downed one of the lead MICs with a single SIDE- WINDE? To preSeSt an overshoot due to closure rate BLUE Wing had Performed a h gh- speed yo-yo In his attack. Following nJsslle release he pulled up hard In Jf, -o a 50 cno^.i>™h PtiiF if'Ad'a ^ arrel roll to the outside permitted him to observe BLUE .Ulng s kUl Js'bLUE Wlng Julled up bISe Lead observed the HIG 3 trying to position hlr.self for Hi iitaJk on BLUE WiSg. BLUE Lead continued the roll, going into a descending turn. T BLUE Lead fired a SIDEWINDER without a tone and out of the missile's envelope. MIG S^apparently Observed the SIDEWINDER leave BLUE Lead's aircraft and went Into a maximum performance turn to the left and into Lead, forcing the mlssi-e to miss. T, BLUE Lead then passed "canopy-to-canopy" with HlC 3 and BLUE I-^aJ PuUed up hard and started over the top in a barrel-roll-type maneuver while the MIG continued turning in a shallow descent. BLUE Lead went Into spllt-S and a steep descent from about 12,000 ft in full AB toward ?heM?G. The SlS observing BLUE Lead closing at 6 o'clock made several hard nose- down turns and reversals. Tfi With Lead at 6000 ft. chasing the KIG and Just beginning to get SIDEWINDER tone the MIG rolled inverted to the left with an altitude of about 2500 ft and crashed. The MIG either lost control of the aircraft or attempted a split-S with insufficient ftltude. One member of BLUE flight declared BINGO fuel and the flight departed the area. .UG 2 m the group of three had been sighted only intermittently during the encounter and then doing little or no naneuvrrlng. r-f The flight rejoined and was egressing when BLUE 3 observed two MICs at low altitude going away. TB BLUE 3 oade one high-angle, max-g turning pass, fired 2 SIDEWINDERS, then rejoined. No hits were observed. s B : 0 0 Q I 1 0 & 9 9 Q cd^csi ^ ca? C3S S2> ca -sa c;a ^ "^'^^^ *^ EVENT I-'28 SUMMARY Ttme Mirk Action Aircraft (SLUE 1. 2. 3. 4) Status About 9000 Fuel lb Speed - 400+ knots Weaving an AB. B3 In 50"-60* cUmb In AB. Bl — 8000 ft • B3 —10.000 ft Bl fires SIOEHINDER at M3 (no tone) from this attitude; reveries to left, still descending, Bl 700 to 750-kt IAS Other Friendly Bl 'on top" and unloading at 12.000 ft Bl SOa-kt IAS. 6000 ft still In AB. 60» pitch. After Bl and H3 pass canopy to canopy. Bl commences hard (nax performance) pull up. Bl follows through to get on top of MI6. Split-S down to about 8000 ft. Following MIG collision with ground. 81 pulls up and cones to SU heading. 83 and 4 fol- low novenents of 81 and 82. Communications Enemy Actions (MI G 1. 2. 3. 4 ) H3 apparently ob serves Bl's missile and breaits hard left (streamers from wing root out) K2 apparently taking no hostile or evasive action. H3 -7000 ft. Remarks Bl fired SIDEWINDER to divert MIG from attack on 83 and 4 even though there was no tone and mis- sile was not wi thi n parameters . Mis- sile attempted to track but got no- where near MIG. Track of 83 un- certain after this point unti 1 T, H3 in hard turn, shallow nose-down, 8000 ft. K3 about SOOO ft still descending and turning toward Bl . Continues shal- low descent, comes gut of turn, weav- ing left and right. An aircraft In the flight calls BINGO fuel . Bl calls for flight to rejoin and egress. Location and action of H2 no longer known Bl feels he might have gotten off a SPARP.OU about this time if he had been in a higher state of training. Alternates between left and right turn then goes Into spllt-S from about 2S00 ft. Collides «1th ground. Bl almost on top of MIG and closing range; has SIOEUINOER tone. F-lOSs have com- pleted attacks and are egresslng. C9 ^ O C> ^ *Sa >. - .-J- t^i^ . ^ B3ft ttft ^^"f CVEWT 1>28 SUHHflRY fContlnued) Tine Mark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, 3. 4) Status Ac 1 1 on Other Friendly Comnunlcatlons Enemy Actions (MI6 t, 2. 3, 4) Remarks B3 • ^12.000 ft B3 +600-kt IAS. 70* nose down. In 4.S g turn; below BIK60 fuel. 83 turns and' descends tOM«rd new HIGs. SI and B2 continue egress. B3 sees two HIGs. B3 fires two SIOEUINOERs In this attitude; then pulls off and continues egress. Hisslles fired out of range. Flight continues egress. Two KIGs flying straight and level low altitude, going away. B3 has SIDCWtNOER tone and si Ight lead on HIGs , but Is at extreme ranqe and high g. Fired knowingly out of paraneters but fel t he cou ) d not afford fuel required to get Into better position. Did not observe missiles In flight or explosion. EVENT 1-29 Aircraft, Involved: Two F-UCs va four MIC-lTs Result : One KIG destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: 21''25'N/10'j''20«E Route Package V 1. PftlNARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Daie/Tlme: 30 Apr 1966/C900H An cKnent of twc F-bCs (BLUi 3 3nd k) were alternating with P-*Cs BLUE 1 and 2 In air refuellnr. and providing RESCAP for an attemot to recover two downed pilots. BLUE 3 and » Mere withdrawing; frcm the RESCAP area and rLUE 1 and 2 were returning when BLUE 3 and slr.htcJ four aircraft, subsequently identified as '•^XG-lTs, closing them. It is believed that the only other U.S. aircraft over HVll at this time were two A-ls searching for the pilots, possibly a helicopter or two encaged In the search, and possibly a normal ECH IntelMgencfr aircraft. 2. NISSION ROUTE BLUE 3 and 4 had been scrambled from Udorn for RESCAP, had refueled after takeoff, proceeded to their assigned area,' and had been on station for about an hour when the encounter took place. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-^C SLUE 3. ^ • - SPARROW (AIM-7D) fuselase 4 . SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B) Inbcard wing station 2 " 370-gaI wing tanks outboard wing station 1 - 600-gal centerline tank IFF. TACAN and radar operating Camouflaged HIG-I7 WIG 1. 2. 3. '» Sliver color VI ng tanks 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: High cirrus clouds; visibility much reduced in thick haze below about 15,000 ft. 5. INITIAL DETECTION Bl^UE 3 (Front) slanted four aircraft at o o'clock, level, about 5 ml. closing, coning out of the sun. BLUE 3 (Back) nay have seen the.-n at about t^^e same instanc . They were not imnied lately identified and an ID pass was Initiated. They were identified as HIC-17s at about 1.^ 911. There had been some NIC warnings earlier. There was no warning of this specific encounter. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE element broke left into the flight of four aircraft for an ID pass. Jettisoning fuel tanks. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT Following the P-iia' pass through the MIC forr.atlcn, they ccmmenced a cllr.iblnf, turn to engage. When they had completed about 150* of the turn, .MICs were observed clcslns; from the rear hemisphere, firing guns, but with apparently insufficient lead and out of range. The P-bs conncnced cllnblng in afterburner with apparently two MICs followln>;. Both KIGs full off in the climb. SLUE ^ then went into a dive, leveling out on the tall of a :!IC, and downing the MIC with one SIOE'a'XN'DER. BLUE element then departed the area due to low fuel. FLUE T Altitu de: Head! ng ; Speed ; Fuel State ; Flight Formation : — 15,000 ft— SW 300 to 350-kt IAS Approximately 5000 lb Co-altltude, BLUE i* behind and to the right of BLUE 3 195 8. ORDNANCE EVENT 1-29 BLUE 3 BLUE 4 SIDEWINDER AIH-9B 0/0 1/1 SPARROW AIK-7P 0/0 0/0 Remarks Missile guided up the tall pipe and exploded. 9. EQUIPHENV PROBLEMS BLUE H Following engagement, and while trying to rendezvous wIt^l tanker, radar became Inoperative. Steerin.-; dot was cut of position In back seat, causing Back to give erroneous steering Inforaatlon wnile tracklnig IMQ. Guard frequency receiver Inoperative, discovered only after return to base. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS EKperlence Back Total Hours 700 p.<4 Hours Unknown 500 Combat Missions Back — Not Interviewed — 500 250 ? Remarks Considerable ADC experience. Had commenced his combat tour at Udorn in Feb 1966. Had observed one SIDEWINDER firing in training, llo air-air gun experience . Had commenced combat tour at Udorn in Feb 1966. AU F- BLUE Back If you get into a turning or up and down fljjht, the only ^hing to do Is go "boreslght" and keep your head out of the cockpit. Tn extreaie maneuvers there Is nothing you can do in search mode. Confidence in SPARROW was low at thiJ point; there had been 13 firings with no hits n the previous week. While on RESCAP had radar on 25-nil scale, spent 20 to 30 percent of time or less !boking at radar. Rest of the time looking outs-lde. MIOs were apparently ground controlled; (1) came out of the aun^ (2) waited until P-ls low on fuel before closing; (3) were conlnt; right toward the F-4a but apparently didn't see then until they were very close. F-'is did not maintain flight Integrity during the hassle. Probably would not have gotten the kill If Integrity had been maintained. Training was not really adequate for t.'its engagement, didn't know what the Back should do in a hassle sucti as this. Would have liked to have been able to identify the MIOs earlier, In time to make a head'on SPARRC'ti attack. Enemy pilots In this encounter did not seen too good: (1) when P-'is f3ew through them they scattered: (2) they made one pass and started firing out of range and out of angle; (3) made the mistake of trying to climb with the F-ts. Comments from Overall Experience BLUE 3 Back Does not have confidence in radar-guided alr-alr missiles. Tlie two-man crew and extra eyes are an asset in an area where you must look out for SAKs. It Is desirable to have SAM warning equipment on a fighter. LU E 1 Back The lOQ-nl scale or. the radar scope is of no vf.lue in alr-alr corbat. A KIG-21 may glvi: you a good painting out to 35 ml. You might want a lonrcr scale to find a tanker. There is no need for a pilot in the back seat of an F-l. 296 B B t B 3 0 § I B B B I 9 B B S EVENT 1-29 r^mmgrits froa Overall Exporlence (Continued) 5^^"— — K.tn., thr. -^-ac home and land It solely from the It 19 a fallacy to ^^^y that you can bring thr -4C^ antiskid system; there back seat: You've cot to blow the c.oar <^°'^"^;*";^/-*^",i?tg:es- you r.ay be United to using Sruo-dra. Chute hamlK-; there are no ^1^* ^ ^jiSl; you'Ln't^o Into or out of AB. ran^e . t^ttetiAcccnmt.: BLUE 3. (Front) (3/67) Messages : 7AF OPREP.3 3006l'.Z Apr 66, DOC-VO 18703 MfplnJeiilJenfe Sua^ary 302:0.2. DIE 20530 Apr CS Other: USAP Fighter Weapon School Cor,b. . Analysis Division (CAD) Bulletin »K 1965- 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ^^^^^^^ To - BLUE flight, consisting S^^^ .J slewed at 9 o'clock almost simultaneously ShL^?.; Fri.?ran; S^^^ "^T^ Jr.Uevs%;rr;p!^anr approLmately 5 ml. level, ana could llTnir. tan^s .e.t .to a hard .ft tum. using ane„. r ".Tlu^! mc'rid^nuned the aircraft as .lO-Hs at abo.t 1.5 ml. as they steadied out : 'TuE^fUght passed directly -^--^^-ttfr^ra f ro^^irk/^ilS-c^f^MnS "^I'fWlr.. ip%roxlr.ately i5.000-rt aiatuu^ i'^^t^JtI;!?/a JloSe cir.bat\lng .n BLUE 3- possibly using arte. burner, followed in an attempt to execute a T«o of the HIG. ther. apparently .X^.T^^s rot otseriiS again. ..un attack. Action of the other .-o .-.I.- °' ; ^j,,. p^psulng then It "^l J^afSSrBrSrfaS^^^^i^rti^enS th^!? tiSls^nJ^cJ^tlnueo their steep climb. now in afterburner. aonarentlv out of range and T. - T.e l.a. MIO o»=.r,.d to i;^^lrlr5 at BL.=^^ .uJ^|PParentl, ,erAurn angle. There were no hli:s. oLL.. « r!^* * «t. vTO went into a high-g barrel roll. With !i i-ais rpsrir„r.«/Sor?r.n:;^rtJ«-''.".s «i ot..rve. to ran orr ..oot T. Z\.. t., .arrol roU ^U^E 3 ir he =o,,Unu.a i^'^-^i/t -JiJ/t ^.^Je?! 0? the lead HIG at deereas.d "W','"? rUnt puUlSg the no.e ».n ;.le>. the !;rrra:n°ir.n.?i!;"rn:r".i'« ;S:n^"SrM"-.-al! ./r .tr.Uh. th.n roll . ..T,- w..^ =e RTT^- u deaconded he observed one of the f.?t.Ton:;S/lf™ «t-P"n^ " ^« --"^ ,0 .-.IOC. ...ut ':in!;t5rsurojrn5srt«".is^ ■ »• -"-^ "™ " ::'! r:;«.Uht ....r .ee...h ac,...ed a;d ..UH ,._^cont..j„^,to^t„c. the MXO .Uh the p?pper for several seconds closlnr as BacK sa^e hl^ g SIDEWINDER envelope." T« - BLUE «. fired a single SIDEWTNDEH with a ^'^^.J^^ij^ "as oSJerved to break in two h^^^ fSra^er.Se^io-^w^fu;i iSatS (about 3.00 lb). The «I0 pilot «s observed to eject wltr. a good crmte. , .,,,.^„aiiy BLUE ft attempted rendezvous 3LUF 3 and did not rejoin but ^'^''^^sed lnd.\13uaiiy. ^^^^ uJorn. at ji'SoH "'i5o°s ;'r=rS^trBKrvsLi;.5°:r'4t:'^'2"".i;; ...hout attempt.. re,.euns. H..hut own at Udorr. with «00 lb of f-ael. 197 J fVgWT 1-Z9 SUHHARY Time - Action Alrcraf t (BLUE 3, 4) Action Other Friendly CommunicBtions Enemy Actions (HIG 1.2.3.4) ftemarkt Mark ^0 Status 3Z0-kt IAS 5000 lb fuel 1S,000-ft altUude Elenent breaks left Into hogeys, jettisons tanks. B4 takes position In fighting wing, increases speed (possibly into AB) DJ CflllCU DUyvy' at 9 o'clock Level . no prec 1 se foriration. roughly line abreast J3 observed 4 alr- :r8ft clfiing f ro^n 1 0 ' clock level , sbout 5 rti , coming out of sun ^1 B3 and 84 steadying up from turn, same al t1 tude B3 calls "They're HIGs" Straight and level In extended root formation Distance to MIGs sbout 1.5 mi . HIGs are silver with red stars, readily identified as NIG- 17s ^2 1 1 1 B3 and B4 pass through HI6 fornation and go into medium left cl1«b- Ing turn In AB or at least full military power . . — . Continue straight «nd level 1 In AB. at 16.000 ft 83 and 84 steady out of turn and Increase rate of climb. 2 MIGs fol low F-4s at -vUtOOO ft and climbing B3 sights 2 HIGs closing at 7-8 o'clock I B3 and B4 In AB. at £2,000 ft 83 and B4 continue climb with B4 going into left turn. Then B3 goes into barrel roll Ml firlnq at B4. M2 falls off. about 19,000 ft HIG apparently out of range and angle for firing. [• 1 1 B3 In barrel rol 1 , In and out of AB. B4 In AB at about 25,000 ft 3 3 pa rt way thru , comes out of barrel roll and continues clinb. B4 goes Into hard diving turn to right. Ml falls off straight ahead and roils right from about 22.000 ft B3 did not complete barrel roll because he would have rolled out in front of «IG t ^6 B' in AB. descend! ng , probably supersonic at about 19.000 ft B4 goes Into hard left turn (6 or 7 g) 54 sees HIG In shallow climb, ahead at 2 mi. lovements of B3 unclear from this point on. V EVENT' !-29 SUMMARY (Continued ) Action Aircraft (BLUE 3. 4) Time Mark Status B4 bottoming out, superson i c , at about 14,000 ft B4 in AB Mach 0.9, 15.000 ft Hach 0.9, 1 9 84 fuel 3S00 \b Action B4 pulls in behind MIG, Locks on in boreslfht. Comes out of AB 84 fires one SIOEUINOER B3 and B4 depart the area Other Friendly Communi ca t i ons B4 Front tells Back to "Go boresight and lock on" B4 Back calling ranges to target and calling "Steer left, steer left" B4 "I got one with a SIOEUIMOER" Enemy Actions {HI6 1.2.3;4} Remarks Straight and level 64 sees another MIG at 10 o'clock, up 2000 ft straight and level at 3 mi , opening. Decided to go after MIG. 34 front did not steer left in re- sponse to Back. Later discovered that steering dot in error Range to target dt firing is 1 to 1-1/2 mi . Missi 1e guides up tai 1 pi pe and explodes; MIG breaks In two behind cockpit; pilot ejects with good chute EVENT 1.30 Aircraft Involved: Four P-ICg vs three unidentified aircraft, possible MIGs Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: Two sightings: 21»30'H/106''35'E, and 21«'10'K/107''22'E Route Package VI ). PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 8 May 1966/16L5H A night of four F-tCa (BLUE flight) on a KIGCAP mission, escorting F-105 flights which were strlkln.- JCS TarRst 16.23 or .21 (brid(?;es along the Northeast Railroad) vicinity of 2l°30«t.V106*35*E. SLUE flight was in a NW/SE racetrack orbit over the above coordinates at. 15,000 ft. 2. MISSION ftOUTE BLUE flight departed Danang and rendezvoused over the Gulf of Tonkin for refueling and Join up with the F-105 strike flights. After refueling, the F-ts followed the strike flights west to the target area north of Haiphong at approximate coordinates 21^ 31* IV 106"35'E. After a r.ldalr collision, the flight proceeded due east to the Ouif then south over the water to recover at Danang. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F-aC {pf.'jt?-»'ov ) BLUE 1. 2. U k - SPARROW (AIM-7) 1^ - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B) 3 - External fuel tanKS (one 600 -gal centerllne tank and two 370-gal wing tanks) All aircraft canoaflase paint Unidentified Aircraft (possible MIGs) Silver color (no markings observed) Swept wings 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTEIt Weather : Low->level scattered to broken clouds, tops 2000-3000 ft with several thin layers at 10,000 and 20,000 ft, and some high thin cirrus. (First Sighting) (Second Sighting) BLUE BLUB I 3 3 IT I 2 3 IT Altitude ; ™ — 15,000 ft ——19,000 ft-— — Headi ng: Approximately 1*5» in a left turn Approximately 090* Speed: ™«ach 0.8-0.85 Unknown Fuel State ; -Unknown Unknown Plight F^ntation ; ----Fluid Four 3j,'i had separated; (relationship of 3 14,? close to each other, to 1 not specifically bui not actually In known) formation as they were attempting to join separately— one on 3 and the other on 4 5. INITIAL DETECTION First sighting: BLUE flight was about to roll out of a left turn on a heading of 145" In their i-llCCAP orbit when BLUE li looked down through the cloud layers and saw two unidentified swept -wing silver colored aircraft flying very low on an approxisiate reciprocal heading of 320* . These aircraft were headed In the r.eneral dii-ection of the strike air- craft, and since all mission aircraft were known to be camouflaged, BLUE 4 called out, "MlOs below." Both front and back seat BLUE 4 observed the unidentified aircraft. Second sighting: As SL','?- 1 and 2 were approaching the coast line on an easterly heading to Join and escort their damaged elenent bac'.: to Danang, BLUE 1 (Back) looked back and sighted an unidentified sliver aircraft, co-altltude, and 2000-3000 ft In trail with BLUE 2. BLUE 1 could se- '.o irarklngs as he ob3<;rved the unidentified aircraft making a turn away toward the - ^rth, apparently withuut firing. 203 EVENT 1-30 7. SITUATION OtVELOPHENT BU. U (Front a.. ^acK) .a.e tje UitUl =1.^ ^S^.ail.^/ fUcht turned back toward the ^iEhtlng, BLUE 3 ajco..r.^ »p.r...l, .nd 204 NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION (Continued) CVENT 1-30 turned east to set out over the water. BLUE 1 and 2 followed to Join and escort the crippled alrcrart. Approximately 13 ml west of the coast, BLUE i (Back) noticed another unidentified aircraft In BLUE 2'z 6 o'clock position, level, at approximately 3000-rt range. BLUK 1 called, "There's a KIC on your tall," but at this time the unidentified aircraft was making a turn away to the north without firing. Both BLUE 1 and 2 broke left, however visual contact was lost during the turn. BLUE 1 and 2 turned back east, reforming: by DP bearing on BLUE 3 and 1, and continued the escort to Danang. All air- craft landed safely thouch both BLl'S 3 and were badly damaged. The backseaters were looking at the radar scope about one-fourth to one-third of the tine. 205 EVENT 1-30 SUMMAHY fFlrst Slghtlno) Tint H«rti Actton Aircraft (BLUE 1 , 2, 3. 4) Status Left 180" t^jrn 15,000 ft Hcch O.B>0.8S Left 180* torn heading 145' 15.000 ft Hach 0. 8-0. 85 Action KibCAP orbit BLUE flight tr» left descending turn Left descending turn MIGCAP orbit B4 sights tMO unidentified silver aircraft low on sinost reciprocal heading. BLUE flight Initiates a left descending turn toward unidentified a ircraf t. 84 rolls aircraft 90' right to check for SAMs then rolls back left and at 45* right bank saw B3 closing. 84 tried to bank back to right but collided belly to belly with ST. Other Friendly BLUE flight in fluldofour forma' tlon Fluid-four forM' tton Fluid-four forna- tion B3&4 midair col- lision right m1 ng to right wing, belly to bellv B1li2 not Involved Communi cat i ons 84 calls, below." 'HlGs IRON HAND f 1 ight calls. "Hisslles away." B3S4 each call being hit Enemy Actions (Possible H16 1. 2, 3) Remarks Both B3&4 are damaged and momentarily lose control they re- gain control and egress separately to the E. t CZ3 GE9 BESi 69 CVENT 1-31 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-llCs vs three KIC-l7s Result: No dcfflage Vicinity of Encounter: 21«28'N/10'>°38'E Route Package V 1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/Tine: 10 Hay 1966/1 810H BLUE flight (F-ttCs) was on a MIGCAP 75 ml IW of Hanoi. OREEN flight (two A-ls tii c5'33) we^e a rescue mission and had Just picked « Pil^'^' A 130 (CROWN) acting as Airborne Air/Sea Rescue Control was in th9 area. I. MirilOR ROUTE * V n-i BLUE flight refueled and returned to an orbit point on the Red River north of Yen Bai. GREEN had made the rescue and was heading 190«, 13,000 ft. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS y-HC BLUE 1. 2. 3. » k - SPARROW (AIM- 7) 4 - SIDEWIHOER (AIM-9) 2 - 370-gal wing tanks A-1 and GREEN 1 . 2. 3. t Unknown MIG.17 HIO 1. 2. 3 Alr-to-alr rockets or missiles 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weathert Broken to overcast, V8 to 7/8. with 10.000-ft tops. ^UE flight in orbit at 25.000 to 30,000 ft, ?uel state was described as -very good. GREEN flight had completed a rescue pickup and was heading 190», 13.000 ft about jO-35 mi south of BLUE flight. 5. INITIAL DETECTION GREEN flight saw three MIG-178 on a parallel course 6000 ft above. 6. ACTIOS INITIATED OREEN flight called the reecue force comander (CTOWN) which called BLUE flight. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE night, after some communication difficulty ■''•a^ff./^lfJ^^J^JJi^^S^ S?gs from r aSr- S E^JirgSt'JSJtSieftSrfi^^^^^^ «en Hain by BLUE flight. BLUE and GREEN nights were on different frequencies. 8. ORDNANCE _ ^ One rocket or missile fired from a MIO. It la unknown whether It was guided or not. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None reported. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total P-'l Coo^at Hours Hours Missions BLUE 1 3500 600 50 BLUE 3 400-500 30-»0 Cowmen ts o n this Encounter BLUE flight expressed concern over 3 to H oln ""ted In getting position o flight from CROWN. CROWN was Slow answering reQ««t8 f«« ^^^^ tli-Z^^^^ ORSEH flight spilt into two sections which was not known by BLUE flight. 209 EVENT 1-31 IK DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUE 1(L) - Front, IS Jan 67 BLUE 2 - Back, 10 ;-:r.r 6? BLUE 3 - Pront, 9 Kar 67 BLUE 4 - Front, 13 Dec 66 Messages. Reports ; TAP OPREP-3 10202^;:. DOCO-0 192U6 Hay 66 TAP OPREP-'J 10165'^:: DOCO-0 19235 May 66 DIA INTSUM 10 May i6 12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTION BLUE night had been on station, 75 ml NV of Hanoi. They had Just finished air refueling and were back In their MICC/;' orbit. During this time GBEEU flight had successfully conpleted the rescue and 'lad started back. After about 20 mln In the orbit for the second tire, BLUE flight received a call from control advising that GREEN flieht had been intercepted by MIG aircraft. GREEN flight was heading 190" at 21*28' N/10U° 38 ' E about 13,000 ft when three MlC-17s were sighted 6000 ft above on a parallel "ourse. The NIOs then made three descendlnc turns over GREEN flight coming as close as 2 ml and 1000 ft high. GREEN fll^t did not obs<;rve a firing pass. During the attack CPf:EN flight descended rapidly exiting towards low clouds. BLUE flight was on one cornxunioatlon channel with CROVfW and GRCEN flight was on a different channel. It took BLUE three to four minutes to get GREEN' 3 position via CKOVII. BLUE flight finally was able to estimate that QRE2N flight was approximately Ii5 ml south of the pickup point, and BLUE fllgh:: headed south. The weather under and Immedlarely south of the CAP orbit was about 7/8' s broken clouds which were close to the top; of 10,000-ft mountains, consequently BLUE flight terminated the let down above this cloud deck at approximately 12,000 ft. BLUE 2, 3 and i| at this time got a radar contact at 12 o'clock, at between 15 to 20 mi. BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 were in the lead with BLUE 2 about 200 ft back and to the right of BLUE 1, BLUE 3 and BLUE U were back In tactical fornuition about 3000 ft behind the lead element left and slightly Mgher. BLUE 1 was searching low in one-bar scan (MAP-B mode) with a range set- ting of 25 ml' Since BL.'^- 1 did '.lot have a contact. BLUE 2 was given the lead. As the flight continued sou'.'h, closing on the radar contact, all missiles were tuned. At a range of 10 mi fror. the radar targets tha fllgh"; Jettisoned external tanks. By this time the cloud cover fiad improved to if/S to 5/8 with holes, with BLUE flight above the cloud deck. Unknown to BLUE flight, the rescue force had split Into two groups, with the HIGa circling the trailing olecent. The forward element was separated by several miles. BLUE apparently had radar contact with the forward element and on overflying the trailing element dropped the tar.ks between the HXGs and the second element by sheer coincidence. BLUE flight's descent was continued to about 8OOO ft. At this time BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 (L) saw an A-1 at 12 s^'jlock l:w running underneath the clouds at about 5000 to 60OO ft. BLUE 1 resumed the lead and BL'JE 1(L} and BLUE' 2 made a hard left-hand turn (5-6g) and descent in order to reduce speed and reldentlfy the A>1. During the turn radar contact was lost. At 3000 to 4000 ft all visual contact with the bogeys was lost. As BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 flev; over the rescue forces and turned, BLUE 3 and 1 arrived in the area and BLUE 3 saw two A-ls and a helicopter below to the right. As he was looking down through a break In the clouds, BLUE 3 noticed a smoke trail from what he thought was a mlasile (described as SIDEVINDER-type trail) or a rocket. As BLUE 3 was ready to roll down through the clouds, BLUF. U called "SAM break left," thinking the missile trails were SAMs meant for BLUE flight. After breaking left BLUE 3 and BLUE continued down through the cloud layer and again pl-:ked up blips at 10 to 15 mi healing away. BLUE 3 accelerated buth both BLUE 3 and BLUE U were low on fuel, 30 the decision was made to break off and return. It was reported thtt BLUE (Back) saw one aircraft that "looked ijke a MIG." BLUE 1 and 2, after Icr.lng contact continued on a basic heading of O6O' In an attempt to pick up the HIG? if they were heading back to Hanai. They searched until they reached the proximity of the SAM defenses and low fuel state (7500 to 8500 lb for BLUE 1). On return to the orlg.'nal area not more than 3 mln later, BLUE 1 also saw the smoke ^ trails but was utiable to lr:entlfy them. BLUE flight observed the two smoke trails at ^ 21«15'N/10H»20'E. 31 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 J CVCHT 1-32 Aircraft Involved: Three P-UCs und one RB-66C vs four MIO-lYPs Result: One HIO-17 destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: 22«01*N/10't'^15'E, Route Puc^aee V 1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 12 May 1966/1622H Three F-Uc aircraft (BLUE flight) escorted an EB-66 aircraft (CREL:n flight). The Eb-66 mission was to orovide active /passive ECM support for armed recmm&iasance and IRON HAKD aircraft. No blO EYE CEC-I21) was on station. 2. MISSION ROUTE The EB-66 flew froa Takhll to lfi'»02'M/103'*01 •£ to rendezvous point ( 19''30'N/103***0«E) then to IP at 21«tO'N/lO'4«25'E for a M-S orbit. The P-tC flight (three P-»»Cs; the fourth aircraft did not launch due to maintenance nondelivery) flew from Danan^ to the WHITE ANCHOR alr-refuellns track { 17'J»3'N/104<»«3'E) to drop off at 19'00'ri to the ^end^.•^vous Joining with the RB-66 and then to the orbit area. Plight altitude in the orbit area was 28,000 ft. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P»ftC BLUE 1.2.? k - SPARROW (AIM-7E) H - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B) 2 - 370-gal outtoard wing tanks 1 - 600'gal centerllne tank All radars operating, TACAN off and IPP off Camouflage paint EB«66 GRSEM 1 Believed not camouflaged Various active and passive ECH gear operating Including chaff MI0-17D MIO 1. 2. 3. " Ouns and cannon .Sliver color 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Very good* visibility was exceptional (75+ ml) BLUE CREEN I 2 5 — r~ Altitude ; —28.000 ft— 28,000 ft He ading ; 230« (In process of conpletlng left turn) Speed ; 0.82-0.86 Mtch 0.72-C.80 Mach fruel 'state : 9500-10,000 lb Plight Pcrmatlon ! 5. IHITIAL DETECTION Visual sighting of three HIGs by BLUE 3 (both crew members) at 9 to 10 o'clock to BLOE 3 and about 1 te 2 o'clock to QREES I and BLUE I and 2, bLUE 3 called out MQs to his flight. At approximately this sane tine CREEM 1 called that someone had fired on him. 6. ACTION INITIATED After passing GREEN 1 and BLUE 1 and 2. the MIOs sharply turned to their right. cl''mblng and reverslns: tr.«rlr direction to reattaek. BLUE 3 called for ali te Jettison tanks and for CREEN 1 and BLUE I and ? to fcreak richt. BLUE 3 started a left turn toward th« "IQs. 4V 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT ^^^^j ^ .^^ the lift inf passed BLUE 1 and 2 and continued after GREEN 1 "-ho had turned back to a llJeilVDS? BLUrriSd"! T '5.?'^'' ^^"^ 3 pursued HIJ 1 and desfjojed hS wUh eveifSaliy 5Uensa«ei. ^ ' meanwhile were attacked by MiGa 2 and 3, continued tuiVlJng wd 8. ORDNANCE (No. flred/No. hits) SPARROW SIDEWINDER BLUE 1, 2 BLUE 3 AIM-7 C/0 0/0 AIW-9 0/0 2/1 Pi red/0 MIG 2, 4 KW 1. 3 9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS BLUh 2 - Centerllne tanka did not Jettison from aircraft. 10. AIRCREU COMMENTS Experience CANNON Remarks One fired as MIG did a split-S, nlssed. Second guided up tall pipe. Not observed firing, Tot&l P-ll Combat Hours Hours Missions BLUE 1 Front 3600 600 60 Back BLUE 2 Front 1000 325 30 Back 600 400 80 BLUE 3 Front Back 750 •iOO 95 Remarka Cocimencs on this Encounter separation or out-acce'eratir^ th.-i it il.l ? no trouble obtaining vertical to^ake sone Shots at twi i rferenrMI^S dC^' n^%H!":-«"*5\' P^^lded an opportunity for missile firing. A shorter Ja^L i^ssf'i^^C^ ^5 encounter when aircraft were too close the MICs were Jelng vecSo?^ fccI) fnti a 6 «^nVii^^'°,?f^* ^^i^"^- ^■^'P''«»lon -as that suited in the head?on'p„r;hif{iu;j?e5 th^ in^S^SJ^J!''" "^'^^ Comments from Overall Experience )K DATA SOURCES Project Interviews: BLUE I (Front) - 8 Mar 67 (Back) - Mar 67 BLUE II (Front) - l8 Jan 67 (Back) - 7 Mar 67 BLUE HI (Front) - 2 Nov 66 (Back) - 3 Mar 67 Mesaagea. Reports ; IITKS OPREP-Ji iJlTRS PASTEL 032 May 66 7AP OPRFP-3 DOCO-0 19369 May 66 7AP OPREP-3 PASTEL DOCO-0 107 May 66 7AP OPfiEP-3 PASTEL DOCO-0 103 May 66 USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, CAD Bulletin #7. 12 May 66 212 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 Q 0 Q Q 0 3 3 3 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION EVENT 1-32 GREErf 1 had Juat rolled out of a left turn at the north end of his orbit on a heading of 210". BLUE 1 and 2 were In the process of crossl-iR from the outside to the Inside of the turn (right to left). BLUE 3 was on the outside of the turn approximately Z r.l and slightly back. BLUE 3 sighted three aircraft In a loose left-echelon in a slight climb at his 10 o'clock position. BLUE 3 called out the bogeys, then a few seconds later Identified then as MIGs. The three MIC-lTs were heading 050", almost on a reciprocal heading to RLUE flight. GREEN 1 called that he had been fired at. As the MIGs passed the OHEEH and BLUE flights, they pulled up In a right chandelle, dropping In trail as they rtade a right diving attack on GREEN 1 and BLUE 1 and 2. BLUE 3 called for a right break and to Jettison tanks. BLUE 3 started an easy left turn toward the KIGs. BLUE 1 In his right turn saw two MIGs (HIG 1 and 2) overshoot. The MIGs, after overshooting, did a defensive split; MIG 1 going high and NIO 2 going low, turning to the left. BLUE 1 maneuvered behind HIQ 1. BLUB 2 called at this tine that SLUE 1 was being fired on and to break rlt:ht, which BLUE 1 and 2 did. BLUE 1 saw MIG 1 turn Ittft toward GREEN 1, who after the Initial right break turned back left and was descending, making S-tums. CLUE 1 saw BLUE ? pass overhead after MIG 1 as he broke right. MIG 1 being high and at 6 o'clock to OREEN 1 rolled Inverted, BLUE 3 launched a SIDEWINDER at the MIG Just as the MIG began descending In what appeared to be a spllt-S. The MIG pulled dovm close to GREEN I'a altitude and rolled out. BLUE 3 still Lehlnd the MIG, fired the second SIDEWINDER au about the same time the MIG lit afterburner. The KIG took a direct hit and disintegrated. BLUE 3 Joined with OREEN 1 and both withdrew from the area. BLUE 1 and 2 In the meantime were In a right break, with MIG 3 and 1.5 Kach), but were unable to acquire the MIGs again. BLUE 1 and 2 later Joined with OREEN 1 and BLUE 3 on the return route. BLUE 1 and 2 recovered, without damage, at Udorn due to BiPlnum fuel. BLUE 3 continued to Danang. GREEN I recovered at Takhll. 213 4 % I EVENT 1-32 SUHMHRY Tine Hark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, 3) Other Friendly (GREEN 1) ComunUatlofls tnemy Actions (NIG 1.2.3.4) Remarks Status Action G1 altitude 28.000 ft, 0. 72 Hach, S1&2 28.000 ft. 0.85 Hach 93 30.000 ft, C.8S Mach. 210* Fuel 10.000 lb B3 lighted three bogeys at his 10 o'clock (1 o'clock to 61 and BUZ) G1 had Justrolted out of a left turn heading 210* No HIG alert fron BIG EYE wh*ch aborted due to engi ne f a^ lure* B3 calls out "bogeys'* to flight. Three MIG-17s In loose echelon to the left, making a head-on pass on G 1 B1ft2 crossing be- bind 61 to the inside of the turn 83 2 mi out on the right slightly back BINGO fuel 9S00 lb B3 1.) HEAT mode, radar on, armed in 3-bar scan. Bl S 2 25-n1 scan, radar on. arned. B3 Identifies the bogeys as MIGs. 61. BU2 break right. 61 Is fired tt jy NJGs In head-on pass. 61 right turn 61 calls that he has been fired at. 83 calls that the bogeys are MIGs and for 8112 and Gl to break right. 4IGs fire at 61 as they pass. Pull up in right chandelJe going to an 1n- trall formation 82 unable to Jetti- son centertlne tank \ 1 1 CI , BU2 In right turn 28,000 ft B3 in sl ight left turn HUZ overshoot 3U2 MIGs spill, Kl high, H2 lOM. Bt reverses in behind N1 (Bl Is very close 1500-2000 ft). Gi turns ^ack to the left and starts a series of descending S-turns B2 asked 83 where the HlGs were. B3 did not reply HIGs in right di V i ng turn attack nA2. MU2 over- shoot B112 In the ireak. Ml goes ligh and In front }f Bl reversing turn to the left. B3 preoccupied In his attack did not reply to 62 call on NIG position 81 Is too close to fire missiles and attempts to get spacing. Bl switches to HEAT aode. t=r:-^ t^'-^ ^4 EVENT 1-3? ^llMHARY (Continued I Time Mark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2. 3) St«tui Gl $-turn1ng and des cend i ng 8U2 behind Ml B3 •ttacklng HI Action '4A B2 advUes. B1 he ts being fired at and to break right B3 attacking HI as it turns left after Gl , BUZ break right. "1 Other Friendly (GREEN 1) S-turn1n9 descend- ing and heading In a SU direction out of the area. Gt continuing to S-turn and descend B3 attacking HI 1-1/2 ml In trail (BUZ) bA HOMi At thU point the Ml spilths diving afttr Gl. B3 fires SlDCWlNBER Just as HIG does sp1U> SIDEHINOCR Misses fnght splits 61 S-tiirnlng and descending htadlnci SU (BUZ) 83 fires second SIDEWINDER. Just as Ml lights AB. Missile hits Ml In the tall and the rilG disintegrates. 83 Joins &1 and escorts hia out of the arc*. Connunlcations B2 calls Bl that NIG Is shooting at Bl I 83 vs Ml. BUZ vs M3&4 Cneny Actions (HIG 1,2.3.4} nUZ turn left to attack Gl. H3 firing at Bl iplU>$ dive after B3 calls ha got the HI6. Note Gl did not hear any conversa- tion until B3 re- joined after the N16 kill. IIG closing on 61 . Lights his AB fien«rks M2 Is quite 1 om and Is probdbly not seen by 63. B2 did not see MIGs until they were at 7 o'clock. B2 sees HlGs jetti- son wing tanks. 83 does not believe that th# MIG knew he was behind hfm that the sp1U-S was not a defensive maneuver but Just a dive after Gl HIG 1 lit AB, apparently to close Into a better gun- firing range. EVIWT I>32 SUMMART (CoftKnwed) I Time Hark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2, 3) Communications Enemy Actions (HIG 1,2.3.4) Remarks Status Art 1 nit Other Friendly (GREEN 1) B142 in right break as M3 over- shoots. M3 goes high, M4 low In a vertical split. (BUZ) 81 maneuvers behind H3 after overshoot. H4 drops behind 6? and starts to ffre at BZ. overshoots Bl . 44 drops behind BZ •nd ftres. Bt Is too close to M3 to fire a ntssi 1e Bl Is atteeipttng to drop back Into firing position. BU2 in right cl tmbing turn, AB on. (BUZ) BZ has a MIG at 6 o'cloc firing. BZ starts i right, clinbing turn, outcl labing the HIG. Bl turns right breaking off his attack on N3, to assist BZ. B2 advised Bl that B2 Is receiving fire from MIG at 6 o'clock. Bl tells BZ to take the lead. 43 fells back and left. H3 turning Inside of B2*s turn !>ut dropping back. M4 «ade four sepa- rate bursts at 82. Otd not hit. After the right break. BZ does not think M4 was able to pull lead. ^ BUZ right ctiaibing turn, altitude 35,000 ft; air speed 220-kt IAS M4 dmiift down And h*» hind 82 turning left disengaging. BZ does right barrel roi 1' as . HIG drops back. BUZ descend end accelerate to 1.2 Hach. 14 drops back and ttown to the left, 11 sengag 1 ng 6Z turned back to the N after egresS" Ing the Imecdlate area but did not sec the HIGs again. 82 in Diking a right, high-9 barret rol 1 at low speed was attempting to get the HIG to spin out. me nib broke off however, probsbly just prior to the roll . NOTE: There Is dis< the first ov< repancy as to whether thi rshoot. He nay have nov< re were three or foi d back In. When N4 IT NlGs. N2 was los Is aentloned this m t sight of as h* wen ly have been H2. t down low on I "If IB i 8 V r e i B i B : i \ B ; a i s ! a I i EVUT I -33 Aircraft Involved: Twq P-4Cl v* four HI0-17» Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Er.;ounter: 21»50:n/10*«00'E Route Package V 1. PRlHAUr Mission AND TACT.CAl SITUATION Date/riBie: 196<:/i7^2H F-ftCa (BLUE flliht) esco-t Inj two SAH helicopters. n. DATA SOURCES Heasage , Report : 7AF MSG 3023192 ^6 CINCPACFLT Staff Study --67 12. KARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ELUE flight ,l.;hted fo.r aircraft believed to be niQ-lU. The •^^L;!" K.«H«n' (Tjt^« --i;'- fiiih' ..j.; » 13.000 ft, hcatimg north. BLUE flight turnea ana oStJtn'd loc^-.n. ^Tn^re ifs'n;; overtake and since J'.loS «re going a«ay aWE flight continued with RSSChF es=ort. 221 a a a a a a : a . s a a a a a i a EVENT 1-34 Aircraft Invc>lv«d: Two P-SEs plus two P-8Cs vs " four MIG-17S Result: 1 MIQ destroyed; 1 MIO destroyed, probable Vicinity of Encounter: 21<'20*N/106*30'E 1. PR] HART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Package VI Date/Time: 12 Jun 1966/14a6H A « ,J^?J"f^ ^^'^,^2. Pl"'/*'<' t« neadln? of 360" {nagnetlc), climbing lo an altitude of h.oS? ^ 1 * vicinity of Sac lor.ff Island, the flight turned to a northwesterly 5.oi ?L bI!'' t ''^fr:^" descended to an altitude of 2500 ft. ► • J'*/!^®?^ proceeded to assigned target area at low altitude. TARCAP P-8» orbited to a point 5 ml northeast of the target while the A-Hs eompletad the attack. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGl-RATiONS F-8E. C SL'JE 1. ?■ li 2 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9D) IFF and TACAN (unKncwn)j grey/white paint SOmrn guns Mia I. ?. u No external tanks or ordnance Color: a - grey; 1 - sllveri 1 - brown 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER ^^^^^^ituSS^-rifHfJfi?*" f 3500 ft with another cloud layer at a much higher altitude; visibility was 5 to 7 ml In haze. Sunlight penetrated the cloud layers. BLUE 1 ^ 3 li Altitude; 2500 ft 2500 ft 3^00 ft ^000 ft heading; : North-northeast (In jlow left turn) , aboutt 400 kt Fuel State; Eatlnated tSOO lb. PUffht Formation; BLUE 1 and 2 were on the lefi side and above the retiring strike force, and BLUE 3 and 4 were on the "f*'L5^'** °' strike force, slightly behind BLUE 1 and 500 ft higher. 223 EVENT 1-34 5. INITIAL DETECTION SLUE 3 heard MIC warning fron 310 EYE/BIG LOOK about 15 Jtc before MIGs were sl?;Sited visually. BLUE 1,2, and 1 received r.o MIG warnlne and BLUE 3 did not have tine to warn th.— . i)«fore MICs were slnhted. BLUE rilzht was In a slow left turn followlni; the A-4 3t:-lki.« force. The flight had Just passed through a heading of 360 when MICa 1 ani 2 were sighted by BLUE 2 at 10 o'clock, co-altltude. «. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 3 called out MIGs to flight. BLUE flight broke left and simultaneously lit af tec burners. BLUK 2 assumed flight lead since BLUE 1 had not sighted HICa. BLUE flight r.ct y.lG flight he.id-on and began a series of individual attacks on KIGs 1 and 2. MIGs 3 and were sighted ana attacked, after the initial encounter* by individual members sr rLL'E flight. 7. SITUATION DEVtlOPHENT During the Initial series of turns after the MIG sighting, the engagement became a "cne-on-one" situation with no flight Integrity. On the Initial head-on pass, BLUB 2 fired a ffw ireffectlve ?Orrxi rounas at KIG 1. BLUE 3 also fired with no apparent results. After the l:i:-lal pass, ELUK 1 resured the lead, with BLUE 2 on his wing, and began a series of si'.^irp scissor maneuvers with MIG 1 who was ultimately des':roy»d by BLUE 1 using a SIDE- VINlJSR. BL'JE 3 and 'i countered KIG 2, who had detached fron 'MG 1, in an engagement daring which three SIOEWir.'CEfIS were fired with no favorable results. Two additional aircraft, MIGs 3 and *, were seen at irregular Intervals, and engaged by individual elements of BLUE flight. BLUE 1 damaged HIO 4 with 20miQ cannon fire. S. OROKANCE BLUE 1 (No. fired/No. hits) SIDEWIHOSn AIH-9D 2/1 Guns 20min 175 rds BLUE 2 BLUE 3 BLUE 4 XIO 1, 2. 3, 4 9. 2/0 2/0 2/0 125 rds 100 rds 0 Remarks First SIDEVIKDER may have guided on false target; missed actual target. Second SIDEWINDER guided and detonated; direct hit. Fired approximately 150 rds of 20™n at fleeting, long-range targets; 25 rds fired behind MIO 4 damaged wing. Both lower 20ffln guna Inoperative due to electrical malfunction . Neither missile guided. Fired approxl* nately 25 rds at fleeting, long-range targets; 100 rds of 20mm fired In two bursts with unknown results before guns Jammed. Neither missile guided. Fired 100 rds of 20mm at fleeting targets with unknown results. First missile guided but fell short of opening target; second missile did not guide. Duns would not fire. No ordnance expenditure observed; no missiles carried. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 1, 2, 3. and 4: See Paragraph 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 2: Gunsight inoperative: No yaw stability: 10. AIRCREW COHNENTS Experience BLUE 1 BLUE 2 BLUE 3 BLUE 4 224 Total Hours 4500 2300 Combat Missions 170 No aileron/rudder interconnect. Remarks I e I e e B B I B B B B B 6 B B B B B i a a a Q a a a a a a a a ! 0 a EVENT 1-34 Ct'ia urita on Ihin Encounter F-8 wapons 3ysf;ems . alr-to-alr mtsslles and 20r.m cannon, l>est for air coxbat L.I^uJ^Hng where ;i.ual identification is a preliminary requiren«nt. siDr.wi::i;.i.H mssiie with short range ClOOO ft), hlgh-g, and low-altitude capability coald have been used to ROOd effect. The S!nE'*I!;DER (AlM-9) needs a range indicator. "I would nave had him If aiy guns had worked." The MIGs did not appear to fight well. There was never any P-8 In trouble. IK DATA SOURCES i TcvU-ct Interviews : KeasaRes, Reports; '•■I'lw 1 17 T'ini".rv 1967 CTQ 77-3 120822Z June 66 I: i'uoi:^?r 1966 CTG 77.3 120933". June 66 VVK % 16 Karch 1967 CTO 77-3 121513:. June 66 B.At 3, lt> Larcti 190/ ^^^^ 121733Z June 66 USS HANCOCK I6I&OOZ June 66 Other: USAF Fighter Weapons Center CAD Bulletin :io. 7 cc ^ I'cc uiwrnrif frvA iqi Alr-to-Mr Klsslle Weapon System FliP;ht Sepcrt 12 fijo" ^^S HAN^^^ (CVA-19) Air C0T.bat Report {CPJfAV Form SB^^O-^) 12 Jun 66, fron ";-,"^'';:OCK (c;a-19) DEC Rep. "cno of 16 Jun 66, Analysis of Encounter by USS nA..CCCK Aircraft. CIKCPACrLT ID:-'. Report, So utheast Asia Air rncldL-nts CIllCPACFLT Staff Study H-'jo CIllCPACFLT Staff Study 13-60 . 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ♦ BLUK flight was m a slight left-hand turr. following « "^J^^/?;" ',Jf was in a right turn. The strike force was at a very low altitude (approximately ;t ) jrthev approached a heading of north. BLUH 1 and 2 were at 2500 ft on the left of the "r5'ke for?e! and ELUE 3 and ^ were at 3000 ft on the right °'*the strike force ELLE 2 s ?hted a boeey at 3 mi. 10 o'clock, and slightly high (Tq) and "llfj^t?^ ""Ji^;**!;.^ , ?l5e fllei.t broke left and split into two sections. BLUE 2 assumed the ^"J "i^"^;^"-^, J °nui;f EtOrfr 2! .inc. Iloe fllsM lo.t J„ of «. ln-..srltjr .ft.r Tj. BLUE 1 BLUE 1 sighted MIG 1 as the two flights initially net head-on. KIG 1 continued his left turn and BLUE 1. resuming the lead, broke right to counter (T2). A series of Siarp sclsso; m^euvers Ensued at%ltltudes up to 4000 ft with BLUE 1 slowly KjlninS offenalve. During these maneuvers. BLUE 1 fired approxiniatelyiSO rounds °f ^Cmm with no oh- served results. BLUE 1 finally was in position (3/tt ml) behind MIO who in a right 5^ nosedown 3-g turn at i^OO let. Prom this position, BLUE 1 fired his first ^Pf«^DER whlJS guided temporarily and then fell off to the ri^ht without detonating. It la believed ^hat this missile guided on a cloud reflection since it was fired against a scattered c?oud Sackcround (T, Bl. MIC 1 then rolled wings level, and BLUE 1 frer. a position of 1/2 Si behind fired^hls second SIDEWINDER. This missile detonated at the tall of the MIC and parts of MIC I's win^ and tall were seen to come off before ne p unged out S con?rSr(Tu)B!. After BLUE 1 had destroyed MIO 1. he noticed MIOs 3 and In an orbit 9 o'clock high at about ^000 ft (T5}B1. BLUE 1 had no difficulty In fuming the 6 o'clock Dosltlon b'^hlnd :tIG 1. Prom this position BLUE 1 fired 30 rounds of 2Crr.T. and Inflicted damage (probable kill) to the right wing of KIG 4 before he unexpecteoiy ran out of SnLLrion (T6)Bl. An electrical malfunction prevented the lower guns fron firing. BLUE 1 then exited the area and returned to his ship (TyjBl. 225 BLUE 2 EVENT 1-34 BLUE 2 passed the section lead to BLUE 1 after the Initial enc.->unter with MIC 1 and 2 (Tj). As BLUE 1 maneuv*»r«d for poslt.lo(i on MIG 1, BLUE 2 at.ayed as wlnsrman until he detached when MIC 3 leveled 2ff at 3000 ft. SLUE 2 atte.Tipted to fire a SIDEWIHDER frora MIG 3*3 7 o'clock poslllcn, about 500 ft high, and at a ran(z;e of l/^ ml. BLUE 2 was In a slight nose-down attitude, with a good tone, and pulling r.ore than gs when he fired at KIG 3. The nlsslle huni;. A second missile was iRnedlately selected and fired but It did not guide and went ballistic (Tj)S2. BLUE 2 then broke right to exit the area but noticed KI2 d pass hla 12 o'clock position, low at 1500 ft. .'^LUS 2 easily took position behind HZG t and fired about 60 rounds of 20rj3 without the aid of a gunslght. As he continued to close to a range of about lOOC ft behind KIG i and launched his second SIDEWINDER, without a ir.lsslle tone, at an altitude cf 3000 ft, 450 let, at a ran?e of 1-1/2 t.I. The missile did not guide. DI.UE ^ was In a slight cllnblng attitude at missile launch (T5)B'). SLUE »» retired frora the area (T6)Bit. The A-'t strike force exited the area without being engaged by the MIGs. s Eza c:3 Ecia cia n Ea C3 era c:::^> csi EVENT I-34SUHME1 Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2. 3. M Other Friendly CoMunicattons | Cnevy Actions (HIG 1 .2.3,4) Reaiarks T i - Mark Status Action ^0 Bl , 2 at 2000 ft B3. 4 at 2500 ft 400-450 Fuel 4500 lb 82 sights MlGs at 10 o'clock, night breaks left. Afterburners en- Kjaged. 82 assumes lead. Strike force de- parting target at ICOO ft BZ calls MlGs at V 10 o'clock, !« slightly high; ji calls for left break IGs approaching in I asy left turn; escending slightly 41 and 2 passed j under BLUE flight. n\ continues in easy 3g left turn, WZ starts split-S. Ml is silver. M2 ts grey. Neither has external tanks nor o^d'^^^C^ 2000 ft 350-400 kt Weather: Many scattered clouds In area 81 gains position on Ml and fires SIDCUINDCR 62 had previously detached to engage H3 Ml then rol Is ngs level . Appears to ie returning to itome base Missile guided improperly. Possibly on a cloud ^4(81 2000 ft 350-400 kt Bl fires second SIOEWINOER *t Ml. Mis- sile detonated properly and destroyed Hi !11 in level attitude Ml appears headed for home base at 2000 ft. 2500 ft Climbing Bl breaks right after destroying Ml and notices H3 and 4 heading east 43 and 4 in level formation Enemy aircraft appear to be tn orbi t ^6(81 4000 ft levtl 3S0 kt Bl gains 6 o'clock position behind M4 and fires 30 rds of 20aB before exhausting a««unition. Right Ming of M4 danAgcd M4 continues In straight and level attitude I 4 EVEWT 1-34 SUMMARY 1 Continued) TUc M«rk Action A1rcr«rt (BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4) St»tu» Act 1 on Other FrUndly CoMinuiilCAtlons Enemy Actions (MIG 1 .2.3.4) 7(B)) 4000 ft 650 ft ai exits are* at high speed 3(32] 360O ft 400 kt I B2 has detached fron Bl on seeing M3. Fires SIOEUINOCR froM range of 3/4 oil . Missile hung. Second missile immedi- ately selected and fi red Did not guide and goes ballistic 4(82) 1500 ft 400 kt approx On breaki ng right to e«l \ area 82 notices H4 at U o'clock, low. Assumes 6 o'clock position and fires a total of 9S rds of 20«n before guns fail 5 Communications Fuel 2»00 lb }4 eilti area at high speed Mhile going to lower altitude Enemy Actions (MIG 1,2,3.4) ;('kRMwn KZ recovers from dive at high>g and very low altitude H2 tiucks Into cloud at high speed, cl imbi ng and turn- ing M4 appears , does no maneuver to evaaeat aircraft could not have carried out this operation. More than one friendly aircraft In the area at night or In bad weather CQmplleates the »ltuBtlon. Better If there Is only one. GREEN 1 Front Control switched from the RANGER to the C00NT2 before the attack was made. This was a amootfi transition requiring no frequency change; the COOHTZ Just started to control. The COCNTZ tried to run a elosed>control CGI, but was having problems due to low altitude of the engagement. Actually ran our own control with the COON'TZ providing supplementary vectors. C0ONT2 tried to break off the engagemenr as the target passed over the beach. Since Z was rapidly approaching firing position, I pressed on. Never saw the enemy aircraft. Later analysis indicated they were probably COLTS. One aircraft would have been better for this particular mission. Should have held one aircraft in reserve to reduce the confusion factor. Impossible to identify aircraft at night, must have authority to ahoot. Was "squawking;*' IFF on this mission. Probably of no help to COONTZ because of ground clutter. Comments froa Overall Experience QREEN 1 Front Firm believer In two-seater aircraft with two engines. Back seater Is a must for intercept missions such as this one and for night attack missions. Feel that many alr~ craft have been saved by having the extra set of eyes on night missions. Quns wouia be most valuable for the RESCAP role but not particularly valuable In the alr-to>alr role. However, do need a close-in weapon capability in the 2000- to 1000-ft range. Would like tall warning gear in P-^s for SAMs to tell when they are fired. Peel available SAH radar warning gear of little value because It creates mass confusion and disrupts the mission. Wants to know when the missile la about to be fired or has been fired. 11. DATA SOURCES Projeet Inverviews ; BLUE 1« Front and Back - 3 November 1966 QREEN 1, Front - 13 January 1967 GREEN 1, Back - 18 January 1967 Messages. Reports : CIO 77.1. OPREP 3. 132309Z June 1966 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION At IftOOlSH, USS COONTZ reported air radar contact vicinity 20*00' N/loe^OO* E. At 0027H» the contact was evaluated as two aircraft, below 5030 ft in a port orbit dropping flares to support KVil attack on friendly surface forces. At OQiiOH, two P-JiBs (BLUE 1 and QREEN 1) were launched from the USS RANGER and vectored to Intercept the enemy aircraft 320^/165 mi. OCI control switched to the UBS COONTZ lo'-ated approximately 19*30' K/107*00'E at about OO^OH «it which time the vector was 315*/65 ml. 236 EVENT |.3$ BLUE 1 launcht^ first, followeil by CHEEH I. Both aircraft Jettlaoned LAU-3, ?.*75" rockvt pods and KK-?!* flares after take-off, leaving two srARFOW and two SIDEWIKDER in addition to a 6C0-gal external fuel tank per aircraft. Tq The P-iBs proceeded on course at about 10,000 ft at 600-kt TAS. GREEN 1 was 15-20 ml In trail on BLUE 1. Both aircraft accocpllshed radar system checks and tuned SPARROW r.lsslles en route. Clearance to shoot was isiven &y USS COONTZ approximately 40 ml from the target. Klsslles were armd at that tine. Flares were observed by both P-uds. Ti BLUE 1 did not have radar contact upon closing with the target and executed a 360* rieht turn. GREEN 1 had radar contact at approximately 36 n ml. Tarret was low. The COONTZ Indicated the two eneny aircraft were in a left orbit between ^CO-1300 ft. GREEN 1 reduced altitude to 500 ft, airspeed to dOO-kt TAS. Tp As GREEN 1 approached firing range, he was not certain of the whereabouts of BLUE 1. GREEN 1 requested BLUE 1 to turn out to the east to clear the area. As CREEN 1 catne Into firing range, the target was turning hard rl£ht. GREEK 1 made a 360* right turn at 500-ft altitude approximately 1 g's trying to get into flrine position. Had two chances to fire, but did not because of uncertainty as to the loca^- tion of BLUE 1. T4 BLUE 1 and GREEN 1 exchansed position information using the C00:i7Z TACAN. GREE:i 1 requested BLUE 1 come in from the south and he (GP£EN 1) would clear area to the east. Te BLUE 1 received vector from COCNTZ 290*/l8 ml and had radar lock-on at 8 ml. Did not fire SPARROW because his estimate of GREEN l*s position, based upon exchange of TACAN position information, was only 3 nl from the target. Tg BLUE 1 got break X (minimum missile firing range) at about 2 ml, saw two red lights, flew toward tnem. T7 BLUE 1 passed within 20 ft of the two enemy aircraft which were recognized by their interior (cockpit) red lights. Aircraft were in a hard left turn toward BLUE 1 at 700 ft. Cockpits were large and rectangular and BLUE 1 j'udged them to be prop aircraft because of their shape. Tg BLUE 1 executed a 360** left turn and received an additional vector from the COCNTZ. T9 BLUE 1 got radar lock-on heading 300*, 700 ft, it50-kt, head-on aspect slightly nose- up attitude. TjO 0116K BLUE 1 fired first SPARROW- missile at ^ ml, no motor ignition. T-i-i BLUE 1 fired second missile at 3-1/2 ml. Explosion was observed approximately 2 sec later. GREE;.' 1 heard BLUE 1 call POX (missile away) and observed the SPARROW flight and explosion. C00KT2 reported losing radar contact on one target after this explosion. ApproxlT.ate time and location of this shoot down was OII6H at 20*09* N/106"17*E. BLUE 1 called he was breaking out to the east. T19 GREEN 1 made radar contact at 12 ml, had lock-on at 8 ml as target passed over the beach on a westerly heading and descending. Tx3 GREEN 1 doing 1*00-500 kt with 300* kt overtake. Til, GREEN 1 climbed to about 3500 ft as he passed over the coastline 'than fired one SPARROW slightly .nose-down, attitude, 2-21/2- to 3-ml range. CREEH 1 saw the SPARROW come off, guide and detonate at the proper time. T15 The radar broke lock after the explosion. BLUE 1 made a hard left turn after the radar broke lock and proceeded back over water. Approximate time and location was OliSH at 20"05'N/106«11'E. The C00N7Z reported no more contaeta. The two F-4B8 were released and recovered aboard the RANGER. A night low-altitude full radar Intercept assisted by the GCI radar aboard the COONTZ, although complicated by coordination problems between the two F-^iBs, resulted in one probable kill. 237 1 3 EVENT 1-35 SUMMARY Pw mil BB^^^^Bl - 1 1 me Hark Action Aircraft (GREEN 1. BLUE I) Other Frlcndlles Comnuni cations Enemy Actions Reaiarlts Status Action To 10,000 ft 600-kt TAS 315' 61 tn 20-in1 trail "behind Bl got radar contact at 36 ffll . Bl does not yet have radar contact. Bl and 61 de- scending to low altitude for the Intercept and slowing down USS RANGER pro- vided initial vectors. Function later taken over by USS COONTZ w/o channel change Two enemy flare drop aircraft In left orbit SOO- 1SQ0 ft Enemy aircraft held by USS COONTZ radar. COONTZ was controlling F<4Bs and had gl ven clearance to fire at 40 ml. h 500-ft alt •^300-kt TAS Z 9 B 1 did not have radar contact. Hade 360* right turn . Bl advised G1 turning to the r1 ght. 500 ft 400-kt TAS G1 approached SPARROW firing range. Did not fire because, he was not certain of 81'$ posi- tion. G1 asked Bl to break out to the east. 61 acknowledged and conplled. Target a 1 rcraf t In hard right turn son ft 400-ict TAS < 9 61 attempting to position to fire SPARROU. Had two chances to fire but did not due to uncertainty of Bl 's position. Bl and 61 ex- change position inforaation using the COONTZ TACAN. In hard right turn U 61 turned to heading 90' to start time pat- tern ta provide separation on Bl . Gl advised Bl to come In frofli the S and that Gl was clearing to the E. ti n C'l-:^ ^rrry rr-y f^.::y -a ir j c.,:? q u Ik r tVEHT I-3S SUHKARY (Continued) Time Action Aircraft (GReEN 1. BLU£ )) Other Frlendlles Communications EncRy Actions Rema rks nark Status Action B) turned to 290* to follow C00NT2 vector 1 n$ true ti on Gl proceeded to the i. COONTZ gave Bl vector 290*, la mi . Bl and Gl stiU exchanging posi- HO>l inTv rnio 1 1 un \ 700 ft Bl got lock-on but did not fire because his estimate of Gl's position was 3 mi f roffl target. Got break X at T, approxima tely 2 lal. • h 700 ft 340- to 350-kt TAS D 1 passed within 20 ft of prop- type a i rc raf t in hard left turn. Bl made left turn. Enemy aircraft In hard left turn \ SI continued left to follow COOKTZ vector of 300* COONTZ gave Bl addl tlonal intercept vector. 700 ft 4$0-kt TAS 300' Bl radar contact approKiMately 12 n1 Proceeding overland in apparent effort to evade F-4Bs . ho 750 ft 450-kt TAS 300* Bl fired one SPARROW at 4 mi. No notor Ignition Bl called FOX (missi le away) CVENT N35 SUHHARY (Continu ed) Time Mark Status Action Other Friendlles Connunlcatlons Enemy Actions Remarks hx 750 ft 4S0-kt TAS 3C0" Time 00] 6H 81 fired second SPARROW at 3-1/2 mi . Missile ex- pi oded after about 2 sec. Gl observed SPARROW flight and explosion, B1 right turn to 90* to clear area for Gl COONTZ reported 'loss Of radar target at explo- tlon tlire. Bl stated he was breaking out to the E. 400- to 450-kt TAS Gl got radar contact at }?. in i . 400- to 4S0-kt TAS Gl radar 1 ock-on , overtake speed on target approximately 300-kt (frorii rsda r ) CPONTZ called 61 •too are Bp- proaching feet dry, break it off." 61 continued attack due to Idea) conditions and • rapid closure rate. 3000-3S0O ft 450-kt TAS Tine OOIBH G) had climbed Slightly as ht approached beach at 3S00 ft. nosed ovvr, had good missile Indica- tion (2 lights). Fired one SPARROW in nose- down attitude at 2-1/2- to 3-«» range. Going for the deck to evade SPARROW appeared to guide and detonate at an appro- priate tine. The radar broke lock after the detonation. h5 61 broke left and departed the area. 81 and 61 returned to RANGER. COONTZ advised no ■ore targets I «9 ^Sj^ <^ * Gl SS9 «9 ■» ». • » » , 4 V UM^t. I&JJ OF i: rO^STirsM J 9 il s S* rn sr £ = (0 T3 8. * C n £?, o o CO SITUATION OLVELOPMENT (Continued) * EVENT 1-36 BLUE 3 returned brrnlnd CREEN 1, saw BLUE 1 af.;t transr.li t- i , "F-8 you have a MIC on your tall." After otiSt-Tvlns; BLUE 1 craoh, BLUti then detc-wV-d MIC on his own tall, within ranee and rirlng;. He aroke Into the KIG Jitid reallzea h« could nut out-maneuver RIG due to previous AA Jair.age. He then selectcJ aftert'urner to open on IIICJ and exited the area. Tlie MIG followe:! BLUE 3 for a tine tnen dls-.-nraf-'. J, and turr.f^d l80'. BLUE 3 detected KIG In turn, i-eversed ana Utstroyed yJG w\ih SIS'Jo IIILjKR. BLUE 3 then exited with extremely low fuel. The four P-3s had used aftertjurner Intermlttuntly . 8. ORON^NCC SIDEWINCER AIH-9D (No. rired/Ko. hits) BLUE BLUE Unknown 1/0 1/1 20nni Unknown 75 rds None BLUE 3 GREEN 1 MIG 1 MIG 2, 3, MIG 5 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None 20-25 rds 1/1 None 1/0 Remarks Suspect. BI.UH 1 did net fire. Kits vlUi 50 about 100 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; Messages, ReportsT BLUE 3, 3 Nov 66: GREEN 1, 21 Jan 67 Air Combat Report (OP»AV Porm 3^*50 ) for BLUE and GREEN P-6E Combat- Performance Report - CVA-I9/O3, 3310, SerU.l: 003^, 25 Jun 66 (OEO Memo analysis of MIG encouittar by USS HANCOCK aircraft 21 Jun 66) CTO 77.3 Msg 2122tt6Z Jun 66 COMUSMA'^V Msg 25II56Z Aug 66 CO 1st HAV OPREP-tt 21I202Z Jun 66 CTG 77.3 OPREP-3 2110062 Jun 66 Chg 1 CTO 77,3 OPREP-3 2107ii^Z Jun 6fi CTG 77.3 OPREP-3 2108122 Jun 66 USS HAtiCOCK Msg Zll'i'in Jun 66 CTO 77.3 OPPEP-3 212?U6Z Jun 66 Ci^^, 3 CTG 77.3 OPHEP-3 2liQUUZ Jun 66 Chg 1 CTO 77.3 OPREP-3 21122SZ Jun 66 CINCPACFLT Mag 30233'*2 Jun 66 USAP Fighter Weapons Center Bulletin *7 Alr-to-Alr Missile Weapon System Flight Report llND-FX.nAEG-6ei1/'i for BLUE 2 and 3 Statementa : BLUE 2, 3 and GREEN 1 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION f^/^f^'^^^^ EVENT 1-36 GHtEM 1 launch«.<<) aa photo escort with an R:'-8 from C\'i.~iO as photo recce for rKllway northeast of Hanoi. HL'JE flight launched as strlite fllf^Nt escort and TARCAP and proceeded to target (See para 1 and 2). Tfie photo and escort connenced their run aa plannffd. Arsproxlmately "3 mi from the start, the photo pl.in*? took an AA hit and cau::!iL fire. The- pJlot turned l80*» to exit and had to eject. GREKN 1 otiserved :he crash sc»;r;s find took GAR orblL whlJt; broadcasting Ion guaid for SAH assistance. b:,LI£ flight, wh'.U* on TAH'^A:', heard the escort broadcast. BLUE fJlRht procoeae-u to the sce.no (as soon sir. the atrlk.; /roup exited fro::; the target), with U? rron GREE-'I 1 eriei-gency calls. GREEH 1 Joined wit,;; hi.ijii fllsht as a section leader " ' with blue: 3 on his wing and both sections took up SAR or-':>it (ltjOO>2000 tl) lookinK for the downed pilot. IDuilnE the orbit BLUE 3 took an AA hit In hi:; rlf,hr. elevator from intense AA fire locateu by the rallroail Just west of the dowru'd pilot, hl.l',-; 3 decided to remain on station. GREEN 1 and BLUE 3 sighted the downed pilot Ju::t c-tist of thr- ridge line which was acknowl- edged by an orange flare and BLU-i: 1 and 2 cllrrrir-d to cr.':i.:)ct SAR forces. At 6000-7000 ft» BLUE 1 heard SAM warning; In his area and doscff.'idod to bf.'ir.v ovorcast and resumed orbit. BLUE 1 checked flight fuel state and sent CRKrJ:; 1 and Pt. 2 home sln':e they were approach- ing low fuel state. Prior to leaving all bLUK A'lD CREE'; crews saw an orange flare. Shortly thereafter, BLUE 1 called "MIGs,'- (T^). ^■i i:.'.'JH 2 crossed from BLUE I's left ,.. to right he looked up e.nd saw a section cf KrG--i7s (MIG 3 and 2) coring out of the clouds 500 ft above, at 1-2 o'clock and l/u to 1/2 ml Jsway. l^L!r: 2 pitched up and fired 75 rds 20Run, close range at MIC 2. As XIO ? passed, f-LUE 2 of.;i'.*rved fuel streaming from t'dG 2's wing, believed caused by SOrin, and this was credited as b kill. The MIO section split with HIG 2 diving for the deck. BLUE 2 bro''e left and down, ;:7t a harsh SIDEVItiDER tone on KIQ r 2 and fired — range unknown. MIG 2 pitched uf ls BLUE ? fired tall^on and the SIDEVrZNOER did not guide, due either to excess range or target inati«uvi.'r. The action cf BLUE 1 and MIG 1 was net cbserved rr::.i the tire BLUE 2 pitched up to fire on .MIG 2 (Ti) until SLUE 1 was observed ty ^LUE 3 o:; .'"ire from a HIO firing in trail (Ti|). Sudpect .^IC 1 followed BLUE 1 undetected tiy BLUH 1. I At BLUE I's tally ho, GREEK 1 and BLUE 3 wore 2-3 r.l to the east 3000 ft exiting area. i.- GREEN 1 and BLUE 3 ir.-r.edlately reversed hard left, to roturn and enrage. BLUE 3 could not turn with GREEN 1 (?ue to aircraft darr.az'i and followed 1-1/2 ml in trail to GREEN 1. Shortly after GREEN' 1 rolled out of his turn, h-:- objervod t.wo MICs (MIG 3, '*) (T-,) diving 1 out of the clouds at 2 o'clock, 200 ft. In a rlt^ht turn in Afl. GREEN 1 f^ulled hard ! ■ causing MIG 3 to pass out in front, at high ancl'^ off fanJ ?,tteir.pted a 20rjn firing pass. ' ' The guns Jammed after 25 rds. BLUE 3 returned 1-1/2 ml behind GREEtl 1 at 500 ft ITj^) and saw a MIG behind an F-8 on the deck. BLUE 3 transnltted , "F-6 you have a KIG on yo'jr tall." Kc then saw the HIG guns firing, and the F-8 tall burst into flame-.-., after wr.lih he observed the F-8 pilot eject. BLUE 3 then checked his own tall and savr a MIQ {I'.IQ 5) In range end firing. BLUE 3 broke Into the MIG but could not counter due to dtimncc austaincd previously by AA. BLUE 3 then dlsenga>-ed. As CRF.EH 1 finished his firing pass on MIG 3, he hof.rd BLUE 3's transmission and disengaged from KIC 3 and 'i, selected AB and dived to chock his tall. During GREEN I's maneuverlne to clear his tall, he observed a flr-oball later confirmed to be BLUE 1. GREEN 1 then exited to the east due to low fufl slate. As BLUE 3 departed to the east with MIC In trail oponJnp, he observod a MIG (KIO 5) to break off attack (Tg) and corjrcnce an easy left turn. As soon as BLUE 3 ascertained that MIG 5 had di3en>!;ar,ed , 33 reversed course to ar.sln er;;^;^!:*' the MIG for a SIDEWINDER shot. As BLUE 3 closed wir»-.in range on MIG ^ (Tjq) in i,M-t:.l trail, 3000-ft altitude, Slightly high, he atterpced to fire his left mlsr.lle out ft d]d not leave the launcher. BLUE 3 swltcned to the right missile and rircd» the mlsitilc detonated at the HIG's tail pipe. BLUE 3 Irjnedlately reversed to exit east due to cr!tlcflily low fuel but did observe MIG 5 to roll into stoep nose down, right wing down tui'it and smoking badly. NIO 5 eon*- sldered destroyed. From all information available, It Is assur.ed that bl/JE 1 fired neither SIDEWINDERS nor cannon. The leader of t.he first MIC section cane from a favorable position directly into firing range on BLUE I's tall and after a short ohiiSc c!osLroyt>d BLUE 1 with gunfire. HICs used afterburner Intermittently. All P-8 aircraft tanked on the way back to the carrier. No radar was used prior to ordering the encounter tii?cau::e of poor low-altitude capability. 0 n 2*7 3 D r. -. .-: C^: !^ 52^5 cn EVEhT 1-36 SUMKAWV {ConHoued) Mark Action Aircraft (SLUE 1. 2. 3. GREEN 1) Haneuvers , Ordnance , etc. Communications Enemy Actions (MIG 1.2.3.4 Remarks possibly 5) 1 Status Action U B3 In •pproxiaately 1-1/2.n1 tratt to Gl B3 sees F>8 with HIG on its tall and firing and transmits same. Determined later to be D 1 . 83 then checked hts tail and saw MIC closing and firing. B3 broke Into him. RIG at 7 o'clock. 500 rt B3 tranjKl ts , "F-8 you have a MIG on your tall." Al 1 F-Bs responded to this call ex- cept 81. 1IG bel teved to be il shot and do-^ncd Jnknoxn MIG engaged 13 in level flight ind ef f ec t i vely :ountered B3's actions. S3 was undble to 1 rca t n w i t n Gl j d u r 1 n the 160* ) turn due to AB damage inflicted during downed photo pilot SAR orbit. Although four !lIGs v*ere lis ted as the j n'jmbcr eicountered . It is believed tr>e | MIG that engaged 83 ( most probably was MS. h B2 recovering from nose down 5I0EWIN0ER firing on H2 82 hears nS's above transmission and looks back to check tail and sees two KIGs ap- proaching at 7 o'clock. 62 counters with series of hard turns . S2's hard turns were sufficient to keep the MIGs at a *iiqh angle off iind out of a firing posi tlon. IIG section be- \ ieved to De f13S4. countered i32 >ut did not reach a Tiring position. M3S4's fliqht pat** i t unknown. 1 1 I h Gt finishing high deflection gun shot at M3 Gl hears 63's trans- mission and disengages from H3&4, dives for the deck in AB and Checks tai 1 for HiGs, comes out of AB, sees fireball of Bl 1/2 n1 behind shortly thereafter . Gl fires at aVnost bank. lelleve 13*5 -e- jcined an<: con- tinued their diving right turn and en- laged B2 (see T^) . Gl ditf not obse've actions of K3&-: after his one firing pass. h B3 exiting to the east with MIG In trail B3 determined he cannot counter H5 possibly due to aircraft damage and dives for the deck to open on N5 and to exit the area. B3 also reaching low fuel state. B3 accelerated to approximately 600 KIAS which was maximum for main- talnlna aircraft control due to previous damage. >i5 did fire at B3 during their brief encounter but no lilts. NS appeared not to be able to iccelerate with B3. During descent 83 sees crash of F-8 (Si) and pilot's chute. 9 » A » EVENT 1-37 SUMMARY (PART B) (Continued) ■ Tine Nark Action Aircraft (BLUE 3) Other Friendly Communications Enemy Actions ( MI 6 I , 2 3 4. 5. 6) 1 Remarks Status Action In A9 Slight cMmb Headed straight up to 9000 ft MIG at 9 o'clock in 90* turn came across about 2000 ft away At top of climb Alt: 9000 ft Heading: -- Speed: ZOO kt Came out of AB . full left stick in corner- half flaps and rudder to slip aircraft around Oove down -- relit AB Came out of re- versal on SSW headi ng m1 th a 70' dive angle 'OB As nose swung e round . acQu i red MIG visual ly Leveled off at 4000-5000 ft In left turn Went to rtitr to pick up target. Finally picked up noisy signal and held lock by override Told Back that NIG Is 30* left Off nose and low MIG was In hard left turn going toward the east ^B Alt: 4000 ft Heading: 090' Speed: «S0 kt Continued left turn and closed range HIG In hard left turn, range about 2 ml Target was drifting toward nose, B3 pul 1 ino more g's than MIG i Got SIOEVINOER tono Alt: 3000 ft Sp«fd: 400 kt Fired SIDEWINDER MIG was still in left turn. Started hard right turn Alt: less than 1000 ft r I HIG wds 10* left of B3 D3 pilot saw mis- sile leave and make hard left turn (about 20 g's) ar*d head off MIC Range approx 1.5 to 2 mi Fused near tailpipe Still in left turn; followed MIG around to assess damage. Got down to 1500 ft alt. Speed: 350 kt Heading: 000'' HIG rolled into 120' bank and crashed Saw explosion. Orange fireball. HIG pilot did not eject B3 made one nore fast orbft -- observed no other eircreft and proceeded to coast. Speed: 4S0-S00 kt , AU: 2 500 ft. A. 4 EV£WT !«36 SUHHART (Continued^ Time Nirk '10 Action Aircraft (SLUE I, Z, 3. GREEN J) Stitut 61 determined tad c1e«r of HIGs. 62 maneuvering to counter H3ft4. 83 ex 1 1 1 ng at maxlRium speed w1 th MS on tal 1 . Altitude 3500 ft Kach .60 83 closes to within SIDEWINDER range to M5 500 KIAS. Kdch .85 AltUude 3000 ft Action G1 observes MIG heading up through the clouds. Exits to the east due to low fuel state. BZ breakt off his engagement and exits to the east. 83 observes HS to break off his tall chase and comntence a left turn. 83 wal ts to ensure M5 Is reversing and then also reverses to reengage MS. At 3/4 ml behind, slightly high, B3 fired SIDEWINDER In tal 1 on aspect. Missile exploded at MS's tall pipe. B3 Immediately turned left to exit area due to extremely low fuel state. P3 did observe K5 trailing smoke In a right tyrn and steep dive. Maneuvers, Ordnance, etc. Commun t ca 1 1 onj 83 attempted to fire left missile first with weak tone but It would not leave launcher. GI calls leaving the area 82 calls leaving the area t'nemy Actions (MIG 1.2.3.4 posslbW i) Remarks Believe NIG was one of HIG f I Ight engaged earl ier Enemy action unknown a Iter 82 d 1 sengages M5. upon seeing that 63 Is opening breaks off pursuit and turns easv left MS Mas apparently unaware that 83 had rpversed and was setting up for j SIDcWlri'JtR shut, altitude 2S00 ft Mach .6 B2 disengaged be^ cause of Superior airspeed capability B2 observed F-S tail on f 1 re and pilot In chute during engagement. F-B determined later lo be B I . S3 was able to disengage because of superior air* speed capabi 1 1 ty Left lower fuselage missile gave tone on deck Aid in a i r b'jt it would not leave aircraft on atterrptcd firing good tone on second missile, r c/sten. 10. AIRCKIU COKHENTS K«f crlence BLUK HI.) Front BLUE 1 back Vi l'SE 2 Front back Tfial Ho^irs 5000 1000 :00 Hour.i 600 130 650 300 Combat 15 22 20 BLUK 3 Front BLUE A Front data not available 850 6!') 550 25 25 Remarks Fired seven SPARflOWs an-l five SIDE- WIliDKRs In training. Leader was squadron CO. First ^10 encounter. First NIG encounter. Only had hlg;h-altltude ACM training, quite different from low-altitude regime. .'lown many ACM sorties. Tactics In- structor. Aeronautical engineer. On(! MIG encounter. Flist MIO encounter. Not much air-air eor.ibat training, one direct and seven or eight training missions. data not available Back Comwehta on thli Ene;:unter Cowmunl cat lens : Saturation of co.-?s"inl cation channel was a problem. The radios were cluttered with messat^es during the entire flight making flight coordination extreir.ely difficult. Hormal .*adlo proc^iures were Ignored during the heat of the engagement; callers were not identifying thcr.selves or spoclfying whoir. they --ere warning. This confusion caused some aircraft to broa^ uvay to lose a MIG whlcli was not there at all. Amount of traffic on UKF net also made use of intercom (ICS) very difficult. BLUE J - Pa ck A close-in ! cad-on weapon would have been useful In this encounter. BLUE 2 - Fro nt Visual Identification of KIGs presented a protiltm In this encounter since boL:i MlCs and A-Us were dark ar.d dull In color. When the MICs are not shiny (as is usually the case) It Is easy to r.istake MIG 17 for A-^s , partl .ularly at certain aspect angles when the tall surfaces fill Ir. the swept-wlnc area, making it appear like a delta wing. SLUE 2 felt he could have gotten one or both of the MIOs near BLUE I, had he known they were MIGs. Afjaln the corrsunl cation Difficulty deBcribui above prevented him from obtaining Identification Inforr^tlon from BLUE 1- Ordnance carried was three 5PARR0V missiles rather than four because of weight llnltatlons due to carrier operations. At the time period of this enf.accnent, iJavy ?-kr> generally did not drop their center! ine tanks because they were difficult to replace and pilots felt that the enpty w»l(Tht of 250 lb really did not handicap then to:> much. In the initial acquisition, BLUE 2 felt that thuy should have looked beyond the A-ls which were Initially Identified with radar, and i^ad they done so they probably would have seen the four ^'IGs trailing the flight of A-4s. BLUE 2 - Back He- felt that he did not have sufficient prdctlcn with "dog fighting" at low altitudes, which makes operation of the wcdpoiii'. system mu-.-n mcri; difficult, because of the [>roxlmKy of terrain which greatly increases the amount :f rad.ir clutter. 255 mm 1-37 They had problems with the radar locking on to t;lo«iJ targets, and It waa dirrieult to dlstlnsulsh these froa aircraft targets Inside cl?u::5. BLUE 3 - Front It was very difficult to maintain visual contac:: rfurlns the eng-'.cpnient . It was also difficult for th- Baclc to acquire radar locle durtnc t'u- brief enca:;erent and the pilot felt that although he had flown exactly as hu had darlt.j; training (pert.aps, not as well due to the combat situation) that extensive and reall::' Jc air combat irancuverlnc training prior to combat, particularly at low altitudes, woul'i t-.-tvu helped their performance. PLUE 3 - Back Visual ID rciiulrenents made the engac*"cnt muvh !:;r»re difficult. Would like to be able to fire at once, without visual ID, ar.t! probably 'rfculd have had better results. Because of the ID requirements, the SPftRKCV; la not to& useful because generally one must get too close to the target to riake the II). Having some additional Indicators In the back re.it *,c>uld eliminate sone of the need for talk between fronc and back seats. Tnc- Back feV. Urit the following would be useful: the IFF box control — the pilot la often too I'usy to 5v$. It and at times gets vertigo when ne must set It; the g-neter guage — tMs is parvl >.i;iariy helpful at night; rate of ellnb Indicator; eosununl cation channel indicator; r-iMle intiication on the radar scope (either 25- or 'iO-mi. range}; left and right .1PH gauge;:; fuel gauges. BLUE 1 - Front Probably should have aborted flight whon radars wore found to be Inoperative. The P-tt is at a distinct advantage when fight Irit: vertically to get separation. F-^s can always separate successfully by climbing in afterburner. 11. DATA SOURCES Pro.tect Interviews ; BLUE 1 (Lead) Front, 16 Mar 67; r^ack, 18 Jan 67 BLUE 2 Front, l8 Jan 67, Back, Id Jan 6? BLUE 3 Back, l8 Jan 67, Front, 17 Mar 67 (letter) BLUB 4 Front, 17 Jan 67; Back, 10 Kar 67 (letter) Messages. Reports : CTF 77 130309Z Jul 66 CTG 77.8 13R<(5'tZ Jul 66 CTO 77.8 131002Z Jul 66 7AF DAI •13225'«Z; DIO 29999 Jul 66 USAF Fighter Weapons Center, Bulletin No. 7 Air Combat Report. 13 July 1967, No. 1 USS CONSTIXLATION (CVA-6J|} 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION This event consisted of several Independent encouniors and Is described In three separate sections (Parts A, B, and C). BLUE flight, consisting of four P-i>B aircraft wai assigned TARCAP in support of an Alpha strike on the Co Trai Bridge. The flight was briefed to overfly the target area after departure of the strike forces to perform preliminary 3DA and to watch for possible KIGs. The flight did not receive any MIG warnings prior to the start of the engagement. After the strike force had departed the target area, RL'JE flight made another orbit. Two A-4E IRON KAllO aircraft (GREEM I, 2) were still north of the area. BLUE flight had Just decided to depart and were flying In a loose deuce of sections, with the second section (BLUE 3t ") about 5 ml behind and to the rici)^- of BIiUE 1(L) and 2. Part A T^. The first section (BLUE 1, 2) was proceeding on a heading of about 110° at an altitude of 3500 ft and speed of approximately U^o kt and Jinking. BLUE I sighted two contacts at his 8 o'clock position at 9000 ft and started to turn back and T%. sent BLUE 2 to make a positive ID. By this tin'.- the lontacts were close enough for BLUE 2 to identiry them as X-UZs. BLUE 1 :\>turnel to his original heading and almost lmr.ediately saw two aircraft at about the same position. They were MIC-17s T,. in a curve of pursuit and startlr; to fire at BLUK 1. At this point BLUE 1 called a hard left break (at full military power). The two MIGs, (MIG 1, 2) were follow- ing BLUE 1, 2 and firing as the range closed. tM.UE 1, 2 continued their turn, ^ went to AB and MIG 1, 2 overshot BLUE 1 flrltu; ^'^ he passed. At this point, BLUE T^, 1 was pointed N, still turning, when another DC-tlon of two MIGs (MIQ 3, H) started a pass on BLUE 1, also from his 7 o'clock poc-lMor. and high. BLUE 1 (and 2) con- Tc<. tlnued the turn In AB and MIC 3, U overshot. Py this time KIC 1, 2 returned for a m * second attack. BLUE 1 lowered hla nose and relaxed the g's on the aircraft to pick '6A 256 3 3 3 3 3 3 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 -3 0 u U 0 0 ft; J rj I. T ■■^IZA ^13A,'^l*A ^TA Part B 18' IC '2B ^3B f5B *7B ■^88 ^IIB Part C 5C '7C *'^QC '^9C t up speed . SLUE 1 descended to near tree aircraft. As PI,UF. 1 started to pull up, (probably MIC 3, ^'^ at a ran^t,* of ^ ir.l ri was unaOle to fire as he could not ^et nl left level turn (altitude aLicuL 1000 ft) crossed apprcxlraitf ly ?00 ft Lbovc his a! clln;bed sUf-htly he received call to r<'v- level. BLUE 1 was below the cleud decJ: :. he saw a bo?ey approxlniately «• 1.0 5 rA ?iw target but did not fire bec:it:u'/ no ID h..j approximately hpad-on, BLUt: 1 Identlfi-.l ably r-U" S) ar.d fired a Sl^ASHO'.v r.lssil-- i to 5000 ft. At the sap.e tl.ny the MIC oy.'i flashes. The SPARROW passed clor,e to "\C BLUE 1 head-on. bL'JE 1 stari-.-i a hard c' and checked his fuel state at ^vCO lb. Seeing no further contacts Pr.Ut:', 1 and Z i off the coast another contact xas seen rv the contact also turned back and was Icis^ BLUE 1 could not pursue the tarir,«t beeuuv. proceeded back to the ship. EVENT 1-37 top level and lost sight of all other r.tin turnln/, , he sighted two MIGs yi'AZ a hcad.-;n firing run. HLUE 1 3 pipper llnL\:e 2 was still flying wing to BLUE 1. roceeded to the coast, Jinking. Just cr land. BLUE 1 turned back, however* In the clouds (range about 7 Jfll). of low fuel. BLUE 1 and 2 then Vfnen the second .-.ectlon (BLUK 3, ^) hearti the MIC call of BLUE 1 and ? It headed W toward the other section locVrlng for \'.\'\z. Throu^'.hout this encounter the various aircraft of the striv.c were on tl.e air with iUG calls resultln<^ in a lot of confusion on the conxiun 1 cat Ions cimnel. BLUE 3 sighted two dots In the sky. Identified ther as XIGs and ^jlrected BLUE '1 to go in trail. BLUE 3 acquired L;-.e targets on radar at -i range of 5 ml, arT.ed the missiles and started an eauy right turn. The r:rGs were in a hard left turn about 2500 ft behind the two A-«F. IHCM HAND aircraft (GREEN 1,2). BLUE 3 locked the radar on the lead iilG and vras In ran^e. GRKEN 1, 2 were in a hard left turn. Just as BLUE 3 fired a SPAKKOW, the load MIG ducked Into a cloud and the radar broke lock (ran^e l-i/2 ml). The second '-UG broke off and BLUE ^ followed him. (This part of enj^agencnt Is covf:^rcn In Part C). The first HIC ("IG 5) reversed ranldly and cane back from IG o'clock — 1 to 2 ml away. BLUE 3 went to full AB and climbed to 9000 ft. The MIG turned 90° and crossed approx- imately 2000 ft ahead of BLUE 3- At the top of the clln.b BLUE 3 came out of AB and slipped the aircraft thi-ouj^h the turrt, then wont back In AB and headed SSW with a 70° dive angle. MIG 5 was ahead f>f Mm In a hard left turn, gcing East. BLUE 3 leveled off at about UOOO i-o 5000 ft In a left turn and went into the HEAT mode. The Back plcred up a noise target on radar and held lock by override. MIG 5 continued his hard left turn with BLUE 3 ^ ml behind and starting to close range oulllnc; more r.'s than the MIC. With MIG 5 10* left of BLUE 3 and a good SIDEWItlDEft tone BLUri 3 fired a STDEWIfrUFB. MIG was below 1000 ft at this time and had .started a hard right turn as the missile Impacted the tailpipe. MIG 5 then ^-rent into a 120" bank and crashed. BLUE 3 followed the MIC around to assess daman's and sai; .in orange fireball. After this BLUE 3 made one more fast orbit, observt;! no other aircraft and proceeded to the coast at a speed of 450-^00 ict» altl-;ude 3000 ft. . BLUE 3, had sighted tvo MlCr, chaslnp sighted the second ;^IC (MIG 6) first and left. BLUE H saw BLUE 3 char.o '-llfi 5 and pulled up his nose and climbed, turnlnt: r.et hln head-on. BLUE ^ could have gott working. BLUE 4 pulled up to repeat thi separation for a SIDEWIMDEf^ att.ick. (At had shot down a KIO.) He ar.ain made a h sec t.he MIG firing his guns. MIG 6 star to turn into the MIO. At this point two fired rockets at BLUE " who rolled to th MIGs. BLUE U, sighting a KIi! tailing P" (probably HIC 6), and tried to get Into KIG3 again attacked BLUE U with rockets rate fron the attacking MICs. BLUE ft pu saw the MIGs 25C0 ft below hlr., headln:: nff at 5000 to 6000 ft and headed for i !i of fuel left. BLUE ft had to use the t^n hr A-ftEs (GREEJI 1 and 2). BLUE ft had crossed over MIC 5 as they turned he went after MIO 6. BLUE ft .oft. niG 6 reversed course and BLUE 't on a SPARROW shot had his radars been .-. maneuver, hoping to get sufficient this time he heard BLUE 3 call that he ^ad-on paoa with the MIC and could ;pd to turn left and BLUE ft broke right other MIC3 (probably MIGs 3 and ft) c left and reversed into the attacking 1 and 2, headed toward the MIG :>03ition to fire a SIDBWIMDER. Two and BLUE ft broke left and up to sepa- lied up to makf a high reversal and :J, while he vsas heading S. He leveled •-; coast, having approximately ft600 lb •:er to t^et back to the ship. c 257 EVENT 1-37 SUMMARY (PART A) CB Time - Mark Action Alrcrtf Status t (BLUE 1. 2) Action Other Friendly Coauauni cat ions Enemy Actions fMie 1. 2. 3> 4. 5. 6) Remarks AU: 3500 ft Heading: 110* Speed: 4S0 kt B2 turned left to make ID pass. 61 stayed In 1 to 2 ml tral 1 • Bl (Back) spotted 2 smoke trails bogeys at 8 o'clock AU: 3500 ft Heading: 045* Speed: 450 kt Returned to original heading Two A-4ES (61. 2} heading In south- erly direction Alt: 8000-9000 ft Called "They're frlendlies.^ I(, separated t /2 mi , chastng Gl and 2. MS was at 4S00 ft M6 was at SOOO ft •Note: This is rot Substantiated by ■ B3's account Speed: 475-500 kt pU 1 ICO Uf# noac Ou*^ and cllnbed turning left B3 picked up HS and broke right chasing HIG H5 was still Chas- ing Gl , 2 M6 lurned left B4 lost sight of B3 for remainder of encounter r 4L Alt: 10,000 ft Speed: 375 kt (On top of pull-up and descending) Started down and re- versed to original HIG headi ng Met n6 head-on at about 3000 ft M6 reversed course H5 was Still chas- tng Gl. 2 Could have fired SPARROW had radars been working Passed H6 head-on Alt: 3000 ft Headlog: 135' Speed: 475 kt Pulled up to repeat maneuver to attempt to get separation for possible SIOEUIHDER launch B3 called that he got a HIG (HS) HIG reversed to left Out of AB for about IS sec Alt: 10.000 ft At top of pull-up maneuver S4 could see guns firing he Masterly htadfng Hade second head-on pass at MIG 6 K6 firing guns at B4 14 again was In position for IPARROW shot EVEHT 1-37 SUMMARY (PART C) (Continued) OS Action Aircraft (BLUE 4} Other Friendly Conmunications tneny Actions (MIG 1, 2. 3, Remarks Tine - Mark Status Action 4, 5. 6) (teading: W In AB oroKc riqnt \q turn Into NIG MIG started to turn left ^9C Alt: 7500-8000 ft Speed: 360 kt 1 It pull up Rolled to left and re- versed Into HIGs on tall of B4 9ack cal led "two MIGs on tall 7 o'clock position" MIGs (probably 3 and 4) fired air-to-air rockets Rockets passed be- hind 64. No evasive maneuver needed. ^lOC Alt'. 6500-7000 ft Heading: 180* Speed: 425 kt Came out of AB for turn Headed toward MIG 6 and 01. 2 61(L) and B2 In scissors with HIG C B1. 2 estimated at about 2500 ft MIG 6 3000 ft be- hind Bl , 2 Alt: 2000 ft F1 ring at Bl , 2 (probably M6) Sighted MIG 6 tat I ing Bl , 2 ^1 IC Alt: 1500 ft Speed: 275 kt and accelerating In AB Chasing MIG 6--tr1ed to get Into position for a SIDEHINOCR Shot MIG 6 was tfanging on to 61. 2 • ^IZC Closed to Z m\ from HIG 6 in front Broke left and up because of 2 MIGs on tall Bl, 2 continued thel r naneuvers Back called "2 MIGs at 7;30 posltlon-- flrlng air-to-air rockets" Tmo MIGs had evi- dently rolled in again and coflimen- ced firing rockets ^13C Alt: 13.000 ft Pulled up to make high reversal MIGs turned left. MIGs were below at about 2500 ft heading N, were In head-on situation Down to Alt SOOO- 6000 ft. full AB Fuel : approx 4600 lb Heeded for coast Ended up with low fuel -- had to use tanker I «ra ofsn lEsa 0SS C3 EEM £a3 63 BO B3 C3 CSS BO C3 «30 W tVENT 1-38 SITUATION OlVELOPHtNT (Cjntioued) lanmed PI/;-: 1 resur.^Mi lead and went Into a hlgn yo-yo Be. J"*-^ J*" . . ,„g ilG vV; cro55*-d -..'-.o circle and fired at BLUE I. scoring hlt-3 1" '^e '•Ich. ning. niu. ...u - cruj^'.u .... . s.*.^ nrttP 1 i->ti»r t»1ee»^ed over the suli o: .onKin as success. e. ORDNANCt' BLUE 1 BLUE 2 SIDEWlKDr.R M M-93 0/0 1/0 do.' fired/No. hits) SIDFVXNDER 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 20nuii Cannon None 124 rds None Remarks SIDEWINDER (A1M-9B) launched at high »'s. pitched down and hit ground. SIDEWINDER {AIH-9D) guided but could not follow target. Guns Jarr.ed preventing full firing, (See EQulpment Problems for details) Fired tmhnown amount of 23/37naa cannon BLUE 3 MIC 1, 2, 3 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLl^E 2 - While pulling over four g the P^^f ^J-f^jJ^f ^/.^^ :iS;nr:e!rSeK and fired the 20min cannon. The tracers i" };!s rianeuver, he saw a MIC overshoot to the left as the 'AtZ nadf ft ♦'!r':ii5 pt:«r-. ?.Ll'E ^ ftlao r.'sw a HIG ccr.c jp through the clouds on hla right. BLUE 3 revoi^^d hla *vt;:-.. '.o the Ivfi :o counter tJic first MIG. The ?110 saw BLUE 3 reverse, turned loft and dDV.- beicw the clo'^rii , -flth tH'E 3 fal lowing. To - BL'JF. with BLVK 1 In trail, leveled out below the clouds at 500 kt , and saw a MIQ In an ear,;;, rlrht turr,. zL^SE 2 rov-vac-i hla turn to tfie right (approximately 3 g) , and pulled inside the KIU \z track for a r'-in attack. T-^ - Just sr. ?LUE C wu.; n-s-dv to shoo*., he observed SLUE 3 passing right to left In front of the "IT. at a ranrc of 2rprcxl:ra:ely 1000 ft, liL'JE 2 called BLUE 3 to break left and advised tr.at he"».us r---sslnc In frcr.t of a "10. BLUE 3 did not hear any radio trans- missions t-?:a-ise ci-rhone cor.l app^jrent ly had bcsone disconnected during his first maneuver. Tht "in sj.-; :-.L'.'E 3 &nd rov?rsed his turn to the left and coriTnenced tracking BLUE 3 as he closed Wyi rince. BLUI-: 2 also rcver5(*d his turn, again pulled to the Inside of the turii to track thy Th - BLUE 2 rlased the i-.'ro plpper on the XIC and fired a burst of 20am but the tracers passed w.ll behind tl.v T5 - BLUE :* then use.l th- fixed plpter and pulled as n:uch lead as possible with 30° an&ie Off, 500 kt, and 6 p. .^h^n he flrod a?;aln, only the left guns fired, the right guns had Ja.'STTied. The ''13 war. hit at least twlcf, but before significant damage resulted, one of the two ^^\r\s flrln;; stcT.jieJ and the other gun fired erratically at a very reduced rate before It finally slct: fd. BLUE 2 was unable to expend more than about 25 percent of his amnunltJon. T6 - The encounter had developed Into a continuously turning, high-g, high-speed engagement, as the altltuJe ran*:cd froD the base of the clouds to the ground (estimated within 50-ft AGL). In trill behind tiL'JE 3 we:^ the M1C>, BLUE 2 and BLUE I. A second MIG descended through tt.K clouds ar..l was sighted by .BLUE 2 as It Joined the fight on the opposite side of the circle. Ty - Although well outside the nlssllo envelope, PLUS 2 fired a SIOEWIHDER-B at the MIG In an attv.-pt to force the away fro-n BLUE 3. T'.:c missile came off the launcher and pitched down and behlr.d the MIC Into a rice pad.ly. BLUE 2 then advised BLUE 1 that his guns had stopped flrlnr;. The tactical lead was resumed by BLUE 1 who started a high yo-yo to the Inside to move Into a firing position on the >I1C. T3 - As BLUti 1 reach?;;! the top of his maneuver, the MIG that had Juct entered the encounter took advanL3,-c of Bl.'jr. I's reduced speed and closed the range by cutting across the circle. The MIC flr-^'i at SLUs: 1 and scored hits in the tall, wing, and lower fuselage. Because of control difficulties, SLUE 1 dlsengaRed by entering the clouds. BLUE 3 observed the hits on BLUE 1 and for the first tine saw the XIO on his tall. Tq - After slowing to S^JO kt, to maintain control of his damaged airplane, BLUE 1 headed fi5r the coast, tn an atter.pt to dlst?n?;ape fror. the MIG on his tall, BLUE 3 d0V«» for the ground in afterburner open the range. The MIG did not follow BLUE 3 down to ground level, but rfer.alned a little hlg** at 6 o'clock, not in a firing position. Tio,3i .15 - Uriable to Icse the t'lO by diving, BLUE 3 pulled up hard Into tne clouds and then exc-cutt.d a 3^0" rlr;;it turn Juj^t above the clo'Jds followed by a 3^0" left turn below the cloudy nr.d departed the area to the :IE. As the MIG detached from BLUE 3, SLUE 2 launched a Cii^Ev;i;jnr:?i •..iih 60" an-le-off, in a IjS^-SOo climb, at a range of about 1000 ft. The missile appeared to guide initially but passed well behind as the MIG continued to maneuver. I'l.Uii: 2 continu-jd to fcllovj both MIG2, which were out In fronc heading toward ?huc Yen. Vlth no rCT-tlnlnir ordnft.'ise , BLUE 2 entered the clouds and turned toward the coast after giving BL'JP: 1 and 3 t^^.x■ to exit the area. The fllr.ht rendiVLivcuDed over the w;iter and proc- cannot refuel due to hydraulic f ai lure. 63 pitches up into clouds to evade HI and does a series of turns above and belOM clouds to ensure HI had not followed before heading for the Gulf. 62 tttll trailing HI 61 transmits that he doesn't know whether he will nake the Gulf or not. Ml breaks off from B3 as he enters clouds and con- tinues turn toward basi. 11 62 trelling MZ B2 observes Ml detach from B3. 62 fii .s SIDEWINDER (A1M-9D) at Hl--wiss11e Initially guides then passes behind without eic ploding. 62 also sees H2 ahead and follOMS both M1I2 4 n 1 t f 1 1 ah t 1 n 1 eve i 1 1 i t^it * ■CBentarlly breaking off t«1th nothing to shoot ot them. B163 heading for the Gulf Hi 12 both had broken off attacks and were heading home below clouds. Al though SIDEWINDER (AIM- 90) appeared to guide, 62 now believes he was Inside minimum range due to Nl's g forces. 82 breaks off attack Mild hcods for clouds enroute to the Gulf. M1&2 In level flight proceeding to base. / 0 r 9 i i i a I a J B B S e EVENT N39 Aircraft Involved: One P-105 and four P-4Cs va two or three MIG-21s Result; Two MIGs aestroyed Vicinity of Encounter: 2in8'N/105''32'E Route Package VI 1. PRIHAftV HlbSlOii AND TACTICAL SITUATION Dato/Tlr-^: !■! Jul l^oo/abcut 1200H V ^vT- fPna) -.•I'o flyltic f'.IC cover for an IRON HAND fllEjht of three F-ms ?'r^-;; :M";^y !m ; Ll-e in eJiu'.upportlng ROLLIIIG THUNDER strikes In the ar« L"-* or LV„i -:)C. w.ro t.c trail and maintain vlaual contact ""h IROIl HAND fjlsjj. AdiuMOT.ar'-'r.'^.-:. -lircrart (hi'i KYE, SILVtiK UAWN. and EB-668) were airborne at the time of I ho vnct> -ii: ■■ 2. HISSION i;l>!jtl 0 BLUE nU-.-. '.imparted D^nang about 1030li and proceeded on aPP^o*^';^^%^°""^of L to re-Je-v-v- -.Vth =he tanker In the vicinity of Udorn. After re fuel In?; at 26«000 J^'JiH It ?he fll k': - -CKe of f tne ta.;.cr about l^U, and proceeded to the ^^"'le^^O"* "^J J °f fll-MC wlti V-. t-llinr aPh-i 1 to 1-1/2 The fUght proceeded !n a J^^terly d •■cu^r c.:-"-; v:>cut i^coo-i';.ooo ft, aWE about 3000 ft higher at 550-560-kt TAS At a^L'-jxS^V-'V^w V :/ic:,0 35.i;, i^HEEU began letting down to 3O0O-0O00 ft. coB^tng to a gen- errM" stSth--".-.-"iy heading tcward the target area. char.iln.T course fron time to time and »«"Jnln° oJ;- " ■ . (ylri .soffc) contacts. GR-EM picked up a FAIJ SONG signal 0".f P.IKE !Is ^"i-^i -•: rh'n r-ov-.-rsed course and proceeded northwest picking up another FAN SOI. Q ;?r-i^ A. • " was too closo In for a 5HR1KE launch, GREEN lead advlaed he JsKc'a 300- -:ur;. eo tne ri£nt. It was during this turn that eneniy aircraft were sighted and !Ju^i3equ•f^.tli• "nr.aced. 3. AIRCP.Afl COMriGURATIOriS ii - sp A i. (Air-:- 7) 2 - 3?'-'"t-i -^ir.t tanks \ 1 - 60v-r- - cetiterllne tank j IFF (bl o :.-:,) cn, TAC/.S off» camouflage paint : F-io';. gree: .' 1 Not glv...n. At least two were P-105P WILD WEASEL aircraft and had SHRIKE; nlsallea. MIG-21 MI'3 ] . 2 One A A r.lsslle Silver color •« 4. FLIGHT C0N31TIOI*S PRIOR TO £«COUNTER ■..'oather: Sc:tt:ored to broken cumulus tflouds at about 8000-10.000 ft; visibility 10+ with sllflht Y.az^. BLUE QREEW 1 5 3 5 3 Aitlti^d^: 7500 ft 9000 ft 8OOO ft 9000 ft M500 ft HeaTiTnTT North-northwest (In right turn) iocThT' About 500 knots ^ , , f^r rstate ; 15,000-16,000 lb (full internal plus some external) FlUht ForrrAtJcn: Kot clearly determined. During the engagement some flight positions became Interchanged and it is not clear If this occurr«:d during the maneuver, prior to MIG sighting, or during the initial scries of turns after the sighting. Probable relative positions at the tlae of initial MIQ sighting, based on all interviews, is given oelow. 0 281 IKtTIAL OETECTIOH EVENT 1-39 No HIC -arnl.,s received fron su,port aircraft BLUB fllGjt was In a right C360«) turn, following OEEri:^ when 'MQ I was sighted by BLUE 3 at 7 o clock. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 3 caned out MIG to,ril£ht. BLUE Jettisoned tanks. «JQ 3. linn:edia:ely sl^.ted BLUE 3 at U °'<^i°^^ /"^^I^.f^^^ .U^tJd SiG toward BLUE 1 arter an Initial J^^^^^^^^j/r^jrUnr^rf^nrof BW^^^ had begun to turn GREEN 3; he turned to Intercept AIQ 2 ^''iiJ"! ^oti^ 1-1/2 to 2 ml behind becar.e engaged ?;sJ°i^;o.^:f :._.^:5S?;/n;::'??iS!.'r„:o;„t^^^/nSI?h:/iS,ouin. t.. .ir=r.r.. The two encounters will be handled separately. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT cuot« BLUE 1 and 3 were In a chase-type ensagenent. GREEH 3. ^^^H^^v^^fc'TShS 5af turn launch nlsslon (ilthcugh knowing he was under attack) -«%PJ^,^^J^JiJj/^%^oE5?NilR which srnj? ^^^ciiJ^^i fon^n^M^^^^iN f\iuiT.o'..iiii^ a^er «ig a and downed hla with a SIDEWINDER. ^ „- h BLUE 2 and u were In an eneaee.ent m which MIG 3 fired a »laaUe at ELUE (.^sacd). BLUE 2 pursued MIG 3 and downed hln with a SIDEMItlDER. Neither engagenent required extensive maneuvering. 8. QRDMANCE BLUE 1 BLUE 2 BLUE 3, " MIG 1. 2 MIQ 3 (No. flred/No. hits) SPARROW SIDEWINDER AIH-7 0/0 0/0 AIM-9 Soviet AAM 3/2 2/1 none none I/O Remarks No. 1 passed over MIG. No. 2 guided and detonated behind .MIG. No. 3 guided up tailpipe and detonated. No. 1 guided and detonated near right aide of tall. No. 2 not observed. Missile corkscrewed low and left rear of BLUE 4. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None reported. 10. AIRCREW COKNENTS Experience BLUE 1 Front B LUE 2 Back BLUE 3 Front BLUE >i. Back Total Hours 2000 400 2600 Hours 250 100 400 Combat Missions -40 -60 •Interviewed but this Information not re corded- Remarks TAG fighter background. Had fired SIDEWINDER (4) and SPARROW In training. Only alr-to-alr engagement . TAG fighter background. No missile firings. Coiignents on this Encoiinter Ene«y pilot capability not impressive as Indicated by providing good missile target source (afterburner) and falling to take evaalve action. (BLUE 1) P-4C aircraft is an excellent performer. In this case a better decleratlon capability would have helped BLUE 1 to back off. (BLUE l) 282 EVENT 1-39 An Internal gun ml^ht have enaOled BLUE 1 to down HIG on first pass. (BLUE 1, BLUE 3) Radio frequencies are overcrowded and overworked, creating confusion. (BLUE 1) Comir.ent from Overall Experience Need more ACT In training tall Inter /lewees ) . Need passive SAM detection gear (RlU:, 3 Front). Value of 2-man crew Is great, two se-s of **yes better than or.s, especially at night (all l:-itervlewees} . 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUE 1-Frcnt (9 Jan 67), BLUE 2-Back {IH Mar 67), BLUE 3-Pront (25 Jan 67), DLUti: K-Bac^c (10 Jan 67) Messages : TAP OPREP 3, l«l072?Zi DOCO-0 22886 Jul 66 7AP OPHEP 3, lt075lZ; DOCO-0 22888 Jul 66 7AP 1'I0755Z; DOCO-0 22887 Jul 66 7AP l'J0721Z; DOCO-0 22885 Jul 66 7AP OPftEP 3, 1108252; DOCO-0 22892 Jul 66 35 TPW OPREP 3 PASTEL 557 Jul 66 35 TPW OPREP 3 PASTEL 556 Jul 66 Other Letter, BLUE 1 (Lead) -Back USAP TFWC CAD Bulletin <7 12. MARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE fllp-.ht was in a right-hand turn following oaEEN flight (P-iOSs) wno was preparing to launch SHRIKE missiles. MIG 1 was sighted by BLUE 3 at 7 to 8 o'clock an! almost inunedlately afterwardi MIO 2 at H o'clock was sighted by BLUE 3. BLUE lead began a hard left turn and qulcltly rev?rsed Into a hard right turn as MIG 1 passed>behlnd him (estimated 2 rai). In this right turn he sighted MIG 2 coming up behind GREEN 3. It is not clear how other aircraft in BLUE filgh'- maneuvered relative to BLUE 1, especially in light of the uncertainty regarding the Initial formation positions noted previously. It Is known that In the Initial maneiivers BLUE 3 becaiTte wlngman for BLUE L. BLUE 2 and BLUE u oecame separated fron the other two and perhaps each other In the Initial maneuvers also. During the initial maneuvers all SLUZ flight Jettisoned their tanKs. After the Initial MIG sighting and maneuvering HLUE flight in effect became involved in two separate, nonrelated encounters - neither Involving the sa-Tie aircraft. Accordingly, this section will deal with the encounters separately. BLUE 1 (Lead) and 3 Tfl - About the time BLUE 1 reversed his turn to the right, CREEH 2 (Lead) called a MIG at 5 o'clock and GP.EEII 3 confirmed. (Jiote: It Is assumed that GREEN 2 and 3 detected the NIG airborne Intercept radar on their special equipment. Ti - BLUE l spotted the MIG coming up behind GREEII 3 md advised GREEN 3 to break right and that BLUE I ha3 the KIO. GREEN 3 declined to break, saying he was preparing to launch a SHRIKE, and continued In a alight rl?ht turn - the :'.IG turnlnp; to cut him off about 3 mi behind. BLUE 1 turned and got behind the MIG, overtaiClng the MIG rapidly. Ti - About the time the MIC had closed to approximately 1/2 ml behind GREEN 3 (who by this time has rolled out on an easterly neadlng) BLUE I was 1/2 ml behind the MIG and fired a SIDEWINDER missile wnlch passed without detonating over the canopy of the MIG. The MIG then lit his afterburner and initiated a 30° climb - In a slight right turn. Tj - BLUE Lead i,hen fired a second missile whluh deto:iated behind the MIC. Tfc - A third ndaslle then launched by BLUE 1 went up the MIO tailpipe aivX exploded - 'the MIO exploded Into many pieces. BLUE 1 a.nJ 3 then exited the area, rejoined GREEN flight and all returned to their respective bases. EVENT I-3» BLUE 2 and t ^ . »r ur mf To . At the tin* of Initial «G MrMln, and call by BLU£ 3. LLUE U «» to th« rear of B.UE I and 3. BLUE U spotted a «1G at « o'clock and or&Ke rlgfit. T, - The «IG turned In 0«hlnd -md fired a miasllc ^LUE tr,. nls = lle ml«ed lo« .o the left and rear. BLUE U continued his ri«nt turn and lost sU/.t of tiie mu. - BLU. 2 neanxMle .a. -^Ken r^nc and spotting ..e MIG ^J^lif^^^i^^Ji^^^rinl^S SlS'J'e BLUE 2 and "t. (BLUE had seen ite explosion and flc- over to investigate . ; Estimated duration of each engaEeaent, 2-1 mln. r^- — -- ' ■ ■ • . ..... E-a c?. c:::^ CO era era C3^ iTIme Action Aircraft (BLU£ 1.3) Status Action B1 7000-BOOO-ft altitude -500 kt, 1-2 q'$ Right level turn 15.000-16.000 lb fuel BLUE fllaht fol- lowing GREEN 1-3 ni B3 8000 ft -500 kt. 1-2 9's Right level turn 15,000-16,000 lb fuel Sees KIG at 7 o* clock On hearing HIS cal 1 from 83, Bl starts hard turn to the left, goes into AC and jet- tisons centerline t«nk. As t4IG passes behind him about 2 mi, he reverses turn to right and sights MIG to riqnt heading toward G3, turns to enaage H2, Jetti- soning v'.ng tanks. B3 calls cut »IG to flight. Jettisons • tanks. Breaks Into MZ then sees Bl turning In front of hitn toward MIG. Did not 90 into AB. C3' •a::^' c3 cr3 cr^ o E V £KT 1.3!? SUy.y.ARY Other Friendly Conmunlcations Enemy Actions (MIC 1 .2) Remarks GREEN flioht is in a right turn 50U0 ft or lower turninq toward an easterly heading to launch SHRIKE miss i le{s ) at FAN SONG radar sionals. C3 Is behind G1S2 and -1-2 mi ahead of CLUE flight. G1&3 pick up HIG A] radar on electronic equip- ment. B3--HIG at B 0 • c 1 ock high G1--HIG at 5 o'clock G3--Conf irned HIG at S o'clock Ml at 9C0O ft descendifiq head i ng f rom 7 0 ' clock to 6 o'clock-- —2 ml behind BLUE 3. M2 at 6000 ft heading toward G3 In -45* bank turn bU3 lose sig^Jt of t HI in initial turns as their attention was focosvd on H2 apparently heading to attack G3. It is possible HI was subseouently engaged with B2ft4. Loohs to-^ard lil {ri<>ht side) sees ei's tank(s) go and sees HIG at 4 o' clock passing by 81. tVEHT 1-39 SUMMARY (COHTIWUEO) Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 3) Other Friendly Connunlcatlons Enemy Actions (KIG 1,2) Remarks Tine - Hark Status Action 81 6000 ft ~S50 kt in AB 1-2 g's SI ight descent Bl rolls in behind MIG about 2 ml B3 6000 ft Front tells back to go to 10-mI scope end boreslght. Back ac- knowledged <^d advised fror.t to advise when HIG was in reticle, Bl was accelerating rapidly, up to 550-600 kt. Front jdvlsed back HIG In reticle. Back says he Is locked on the HIG, in range and also has G3 on the scope. Front started to squeeze the trigger but back advised they were too close. Some- time in here front reallied he was over- taking HIG rapidly and came out of AB and ex.- tended his speed brakes. Front then switched to HEAT. Sack advised they were In range and at less than 2 g's. riVinQ Q» Vfiriyniaii iv> Bl. G3 rolled out of turn on easterly heading. B1--''G3 break right. Bl has the HIG." G3 --'Negative-* have contaet-- getting ready to launch." (SHRIKE) H2 ~1 ml behind C3 and closing ~1 ml ■ ^2 61 5000 ft -500 kt 1-2 g's 83-5000 ft Bl launches SIOEUIKOER at HIG. Front saw missi le pass over HIG's right wing past canopy. He did not observe it explode but did see smoke trail. H2 about 1/2 ml behind 63. Aiier missile passed went into AB and started to climb to right. Front did not recall hearing mis* slle tone, and did not see missi le in night. Did get • break X as missile left. S3 sees 81 launch missi le. EVEWT 1-39 SUHHURY (CONTlHUEDl Time Mark Action Aircraft (SLUE 1, 3) Status Action B1 at 9000 ft -500 kt, \ g. B3--no data 81 at 10.000-n.OOO ft. -500 kt, 1 9 a3--no data B1 back Into AB. B1 pursuing MIG. Fires another SIDEWINDER with good tone just as he return* to minimum range l3/4 ml). Hissile explodes ~200 ft short. B3 flying wing. Other Friendly G3 continues on SHRIKE launch. 81 fires third SIDE- WINDER with good ton«. very quickly after second firing (T3). Coficnunlcatlons Enemy Actlor.s (HIG I. 2) H2 cHnbing but not turning. After SIDEWINDER detonation H2 cut of A6 then back In, ftemarhs Hissi 1e goes up tailpipe. M2 exploded into many p1eces--some on fire. Pilot ejects (seen by 83 only) before explosion. 61 tecs no ejection. B3 flying wing sees KIG pilot eject, J«»t before nisslic hit. and return to bases. CO c £VEUT 1-39 SUHMAKY (COHTIftUE D) Tine Hark Action Aircraft (BLUE 2. 4) Status Action Other Friendly Cominunl ;ati ons Enemy Actions (MIG 1.2) Renarks B2&4. 9000 ft ■X.500 kt; in A8 (catching up) B2: No data B4: 7000 ft x500 kt. 5 g'S 82, «>.9000 ft, S50 kt. SPARROU mode tO-Oii scope and boresight B2&4 hear. B3 HIG call . 82 sees HIG behind B4. 84 breaks right and down (5 g's). 82 at first eases left then also breaks right. Tanks jettisoned and into AB. BU3 ahead-- becoming engaged separately B2&4 both called HIG behind B4. M3 close behind 64. 84 in break. HIG fires Milssile. B2 is turning to right and begins to pursue HIG. MIG fires missile at B4. missile nlsses-'IOM «nd to rear; KIG then slides behind B4 who did not see tiln again. BZ sees KIG go Into AB and climb. B2 Is beMnd HIG and closing rapidly. Back advised too close so front put down speed brakes and went out of AB. Front went to HEAT and fired blDE- WIND::R after sliding back into range (good tone). Missile ex> ploded at side of tall pipe. Pilot ejected, 84 saw explosion off to left, flew over to look and saw chute. HIG hit. pilot balled out. H3 may be HI . the first one sighte** by 83. EVENT 1-40 Aircraft Involved: Three F-tCs vs one MIO Result: Sighting only »ie.„U, or Encounter. I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 20 Jul 1966/1550H oioi,n'vi/ioco26'E. Flight aborted. n. DATA SOURCES Hessap;ea. Reports ; -lt,TFW OPREP-3. 20 Jul 66, OOCC -0 7Af! 6pREP-3. ^OH-tilZ Jul 66. OOCO 023227 CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION nwht carried BLUE flight departed fronj a«!^,!\J505H; confUuptlon u„K^^^^ no ECK equlpinent. BLUE * sighted ^ : I- type aircraft at 1 . JH. n 6^^^^ night m color, 6 to 8 ml In trail with BLUE H. at ^0°- luy^ ii- vlaual contact with iJd MIC heading 150«. BLUE f \ ^"'^"^^^^.^f ^,^?^|c5^^2l4SWl05'26'E In conjunction WC. BLUE U observed an SA-2 missile explosion at 1555H. -^u «/x ? « with HIG sighting. [ r f: u u EVENT I-4t Aircraft Involved: One I--101C vs one HIG-21 Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 20*'50'N/107''lO'E Houtc Package VI 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 7 Aug 1966/0910H One F-IOUC (BLUE flight) was on an IROll HAND escort luisalon. n. DATA SOURCES Reports ; 7AP IBM Print Out, DI066>2196 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE flight observed one HlO-21 at 11,000 ft, heading 360** with a speed of about 550 kt. 6LUE flight was at 1500 ft heading 130» and U25 kt. The weather was scattered clouds with 5 ml visibility. i c EVENT I-4Z Aircraft Ir.volved: Three P-'IC vs one MIG Result: SI r.htlng only Vicinity of Kncounter: 2?"00'H/10t*'58'E Route Package V \. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlmo: Late Aug or early Sep l?>C6/li*30H or l^OOH Three F-tC aircraft (BLUE fUghl) escortlnp. a fllsht of F-105 strike aircraft In Route Package vi-A. 11. DATA SOURCES Protect Interview ! BLUE 3 (Back) - l6 Kar 1967 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE 1 at 10 COO ft. 350-^400 kt , on a headlriK of 030° saw a possible MIO (silver airplane) palsln^scr 6 n, behind the formation. BLUE 3 turned right to Intercept Jhe MiS and lost sight of hlrs. BLUE 3 searched in the direction the possible MIG was heading at 5000-ft altitude, but he was unable to find him. 299 [i EVENT 1-43 Alrciart iiivolved: Two P-8E9 va two «I0-17s Reault: ».:.e F-8E lost, one P-8E damaged. Vlcinltv '^V Encounter: 20*15' «/105''59'E Route Package IV Kith two other F-8Es. provldlnR TABCAP Lai heading of 300°, then proceeded north \. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOU Date/Time: 5 Sep 1966/16H5H Two P-8ES (BLUE 1 and 2), operating Jn rotstl.-- covering A-'Js during attack on a train. 2. NISSIOK ROUTE Penetrated SVW coast at 20»07'N/106«>20'E on U^ to the scene of action. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS p-flE BLUE 1 and g 2 - SIOEVIHDER (AIM-9) load «as eltner 1 AiK-9i> rjnd 1 AIH-9D or 2 AZK-90 UOO rounds - 20niin Radar off No external stores MIG-17 MIG 1 and 2 23nini and 37^i> cannon 4 FLIGHT COHDITIOHS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER weather; Broken to overcast, 1500 ft with tops ibout 2000 ft, occasional buildups to 7000 ft. BLUE (ill Altitude- —3000-5000 ft- South^ln right-har.. turn gUffht Fomatlon ; Loose-deuce, with BLUE 2 In prcce.s of crossing under BLUE 1. 5. INITIAL DETECTION .TUMro? r„w^ss^i ?:M-Ei?t rffi!- 6. ACTION INITIATED When hit. BLUE 2 turned left Into a cloud to evade further hostile firing, BLUE 2 Observed BLUE 1 turning right ilnto a cloud. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT . v, >, vi.„ai BLUE 2 transmitted to BLUE 1 that he had ^.en hU and ^aj^^eading for the beach. ^JU and voice contact «lth BLUE 1 was lost and never r-..^ J^P^ ^ Prior to loss of visual contact, B^;"^ ^ did not ^^^-/^ j,^^^^,^ terrain elevation was S^p"?oii:S?e5ri3iJ°« iSrsSSE^f l^^:.^^ ti^^:^ the doud. At no ti»e did BLUE 2 see enemy aircraft, e. ORDNANCE (No. rired/No. hits) BLUE 1, 2 MIO -None expended—— Sov!t>-. »AH 2'{ni:n ,ind 37ii"i> f i red Reaarks BLUE 2 hit by 23aua and 37{Rm fire. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS ^, The flUht was plagued with -xice c-.unic.Uon. jro^ ^.rtaS^filuJe may receive response 'ZJ^^^^^V^^^u^'co^^r^^^^ t,ut prior to that tLrhe^'har o %; :iief r;ipoLerti hU cui ll transmissions. 301 10. AIRCRCU CONNENTS EVENT 1-43 Experience Total P-8 Combat Houra Hours Missions BLUE 2 1800 1200 55-60 Cocuaent3 on this Encounter BLUE 2 believed that, due to :xtenslve damage to his aircraft the MIG (or MIGs) consloered it, unnecessary lo follow l-.lm fjriher. He stated that he did not receive a MIG warnir.^ from any source. Thci.sht there should b« aircraft particularly designed for the TARCA? nlsslon, as well as i.trlWe. This was aue In part to the fact that Ir. raulti-ralsslon aircraft the pilot in',..;t be proficient in too r.any areas and Is not there- fore good enouj;h In any one. It waj felt that the cinnur.icaticn difficulty was enhanced by the fact that the controllers cr. the ships did not u..der5tand what was going on. Ccmaents from Cvsrall Experience BLUE ? felt that a better gu:i il^ht would be desirable on the F-8 , and would prefer more amnunltlon per gun. Would li.00'E. The A-« al: :raft were dispatched to strike the train -Uth four flying TARCAP. The first eleri^nt (pair) of 7ARCAP was to fly Ir and orbit over the karst area almost directly south cf ?iiu Ly while the second section was to remain offshore to the south of the mouth of the rivers, E-'IE of Thanh Hoa. As tr.e first element reared BINGO fuel. It was to fly outbound and the ?"ccnd ele.-nent, BL'JE 1 and 2, was to relieve the first. The first element reached BImGO Vael after orbltlns approximately 20 min, at which tL-ae BLUE 1 and 2 flew ir.tound at about .'D'OO 'M/IOS' :0 ' E and proceeded alcr.f the karst, which runs from SE to !JW until the position i of Mho iuan was reacned. At this pcint, SLUE 1 and 2 turned north. The ir.bound fllcht w.i3 executea between 3000 ft and ^O-IC ft while Jinking. BLUE I and 2 held south of Phu Ly an-l pen'ormed rl^ht-r.and circles with rar.:!cm turns in a loose-deuce tactical formation. There /ere low clouds in the area with ceilings close to the ridge which at one place reacned ^530 ^t. Some of t.he cloud fcr.'naticns had buildups as high as 7000-7500 ft. This cloud c >ver required BLUE 2 frequently to fly to rear cf BLUE 1 to keep him in sight. After .leveral minutes or. station, fuel level was observed approaching BI!!00 and decision made to depart th<; area. 4l.^h-power settings had been maintained to hold about U50 kt In tight turns. At tines, BL'Ji 2 slowed to as low as 350 kt, which though not desl-aoie, became necessary because of the clouds and tight turns Involved. BLUE 2 had called BLUE 1 to report trut fuel was gettlnsc low, tut he dJd not receive an answer from BLUE 1. BLUE 2 assuned that 3LUZ 1 was monitoring other transmissions; however, later It was believed that BLUE 2*s transmitter had failed. As both aircraft rer-;hed a southerly heading at about UOOO-^SOO ft and turning right, SLUE 2 started to pass bc:-.lnd BLUE 1. At this time, BLUE 2 observed tr>»cers passing to the left of his cockpit. BL;:^ 2 was tnen a maxlnun of 200 ft behind BLUE I end possibly ttO-50 ft stepped down and at SLUE I's 5 o'clock position. BLUE 2 called BLUE 1 and said, "We are taking fire from 6 o'clcfk," at which time a shell struck BLUE 2's canopy. As the shell hit, BLUE 2 observed that BLIL 1 made what appeared to be a negative "g" right turn Into a cloud to the right and nead. BLUE 2 did not observe any hits on BLUE 1 nor any debris. At this tine BLUE 2 did not believe chat BLUE 1 nad been hit. BLUE 2 observed another clcud buildup to nls left and turned hard into it. As he entered the cioud, he turned left to see If there were any alrcr3.''t behind but saw nothlnij. He then turned hard, right. and at tne sane tine notlcea his fuel was down to about 2^00 pounds and that his hydraulic -.earning lignt was on. SLUE 2 locked to -.he rlgnt again a.nd noticed that a large section ol the rlgnt wlnjr. was ?one. A shell had |fcne through the ca.*icpy, and as a result, the nf.lse level v/ss quite 'hlnn. BLUE 2 had dimcuHy henrlns- radio transmissions. BLUE 2 callod BLUE 1, r»;;!orted the .^.It, wns aim- navln,^ tiydraullc problems, and now headjn*: "for the teach." At this tlr.;.', BLUE .■ thour.ht that he heard BLUE 1 mnke a call of some icii.d but he could not tell what It was. DL'*F. 2 was positive th^t Is war EVENT 1-43 c c s P i^^^T>»rrH-^i^^^^^ ''^^^V ^^"^ ^ considered turning back, but due to the danase to his r. i decided to continue to«j.rd the beach. BLUE 2 does not believe that BLUE 1 had been V;!^2 ?K •"J*'^<*. clouds, but felt that BLUE 1 flew Into the karat. BLUE 2 also be- hi!!?;?. K?! that wers firing on then broke off as soon as he had been hit ! » » * V"'^ **" sevf rvMy daoaBed and fuel was streaming out rapidly. BLUE 2 HlZJtJ: -"^^ '^""^ discovered beyond doubt that his tranamltter was not Inll^ ^''^^'^".^'•^f " ^««lve a MIG warning. It is unknown whether or not his lluw\ rZ .1 '^-\irunctlor.in^: or turned off. BLUE 2 thought he heard a beeper from Ir^l^i riJl .10 enemy all-craft were seen by BLUE 2 . and he did not observe any SSS BrtiF ? Ji^K,? "° launched. In view of the angle at Srn- ^ \ " hit. it was cuneluded that U was not ground fire. It is believed that the MIC8 were under excellent GCI control. BLUE 2 believed that the MIGs must have been under SiTi^i^H^th^?'*^-^?^' ^^"f ^ '""^ ^ " ^^'■'^ 2 passed under and behind BlSe 1. BLUE 2 ltl lj%i rf ^ ^'^r^^^fu*"^*" occurred 30 sec earlier op later, BLUE 1 and 2 night have seen the HIOs first. On the way out, BLUE 2 turned on his IPP when he was over the beach/ u ll^tt^^^ EVENT 1-44 Aircraft Involved: Four F-'tCs vs one MIG-21 Result : No dani.'ir.e Vicinity of Enco.int^r: 2in0 • N/106»00 ' E ' Route Package VI 1. PRtHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUAIION Date/Tlr.e: l'' Sep 1966/1655H Four F-UCs on ROLLING THUNDER nlsslon. 2. HISSIOH ROUTE -,i ei m M/in7"flO'E . nenu't to 21®;'?"I/107**3'i ' K, Dll'-SCt 21"'l8'N/107 00 «:•» 0.r.cr?!Jrr»5?;P?rrririrJlMO-5/io|So?i.;' k- Speed : 510 kt- ftiiipxi- "330* 120" H eaa>n a: cin Unknown ISIrstate ; Unknown Unknown tenant Format 1 an ; —floraal tactical— 5. INITIAL DETECTION Flight was flying 330«. level. 5LUE I slgfaed a MIC ml away desccndlne through 6000* ft. No HIO warnings given. (. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 dropped ordnance (four Kk-82s) and started toward MIO. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT HIC was lost m haze. 8. ORDNANCE None fired. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS Not available 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS None interviewed. n . DATA SOURCES Prelect Infrvlews : None available Messages. Heports : 35 TFW DCOI PASTEL 522 lU'^^SZ Sept 66 35 TFW DCOr PASTEL 518 lUHUi^Z Sept 66 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION » v . BLUE flight was flying toward tarpt Da ^-.J^'^^'^/^^.^Vj^fy JjitS^NAoSSSo'ETLlSI'! VI A heading 330°. il.OOO ft ^^J.^i" ' J'^^.^^J^^'iJ^Je^ htadlnc of 1^0". sighted «IG-21 r.1 lost him In the haze at BLU- 1 J e'^^ ironed four .-.k-c.s n>i.n U tnl. nor was a hostile rnfrnf'rnStiJtiS^^ ^h^oug^C? UriJc^eSt ;ie 'hw. encounter«d Intense 57/8^>™ AA. 1 I f 0 ■EVEHT 1-45 Aircraft Involved: Thre«.- r-'tCa vs four Result: 1 F-ftC probably lost; 1 MIG dcsaroyed Vicinity of Encounter: 21 "oO'N/lOC'OO'E Koute Package VI 1. PRlhARr MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION I Date/Time: 16 Sept 1966/1030H Three P-'«C aircraft (BLUE flight I, 3 and were to strike JC:; Turcet l6 IV, Dap Cau RR and ICr.hway Srldpc ( 21 "1? ' U-H/IOG^C} ' "E) , and convert to i*lp / * superloflty mission if MICj were encountered. F-0 and V-lO^y strike:; In vicinity I with 5 niln Intervals between strikes. BLUK I'llfjtit was thir-d fllelit to tarcct I . with several fUf.ht3 followlnG- See Volune II for HIO encounters oV strike ritf.htn. EC-121 DI'J EYE on station 2000/10700 and SILVEK DAWN an station, IROH HAHD flight In area. I 2. MISSION ROUTE Departed from Ubon Air Base, Thailand. Refueled at 18,000 ft off east coast of South Vietnam - proceeded up coast at 25,000-rt altitude to In-point {Cam Pha Mines area). Let down to 10,000 ft. In delta area, then along rld^e Hue and back out Into delta area at 5000 ft. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIOKS F-tC BLUE 1. 3. ^ H - SIDEWIHDER (Arf1-9B) 4 - SPARROW (AIX-7) 2 - 370-gal wins tanks Ji . 750-lb bcnbs on centerllne I . Camouflage [ No ECM equipment HIC-17 MIG 1. 2. 3. 1 r Cannon Sliver color - one with red star, others unmarked. i 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER : f" Weather : 13iOOO-ft scattered clouds, 3- to $-ml visibility In hase. 1 BLUE : I ! T Altitude (ACL) : 5000 ft f": Heading ; Approximately due W } Speed : 500 kt ; Fuel State ; —12,000 lb . external wing tanks empty Fllt^ht Formation S. INITIAL DETECTION M Pour HIGs sighted at 2 o'clock at approximately 2 mi by BLUE 1. location 21*10*30"N/ u! 106^23 'CiQ"£. Received BIG EYE NIG Marnlngs, and KIO calls from retreating P>105 flights. SAM calls from IRON HAND flight. 'f^ 6. ACTION INITIATED 1^. BLUE flight Itranedlately decided to engage MICs and entered rlcN- hand turn to gain 6 o'clock on HIGs. BLUE flli^ht ordered to drop external tanks, ordru»rice, centerllne MER at approximately 21''C3'N/106'*33*E. BLUE 4 did not drop ordnance or tanks and could '\'t not stay with BLUE 1 during turn. ■While at least four MICs vfere initially seen, the numerous attacks by MTCs could have indicated that there were more in the area. BLUE I estimated up to eli;hi KIGs. 307 7. SITUATION DEVELCPHENT EVENT |.4S 4* 4 • After sl»-hilntT .vna, BLUE flight turned rlpjht with BLUE 1 cUablng and BLUE 3 and BLUE re-.ai:iin>: cr.rcnt. 1 a 1 ly at 5000 ft. After first 360" turn, situation developed Into thrt'c aypaiaie ciu-.a.jcr.vnts . BLUK 1 was In clljr.ijlno and dlvln.: rlg^it-hand turns, slowing to 300 kt at 10,000-rt altitude anJ accel«T3t to 600 kt at 2,000-ft altitude. BLUE 1 observed MlCs firing on RLl'Si: 3 and EL'JiC and called warnings. BLUE 1 fired three SIDEWINOEKS and two SPARROWS unsuccessfully. BLUE *, after wide right turn and MIG warning, spllt-S to ground to escape MIG. BLUE 4 departed and returned to area, passed MIC head on, but without sufficient tine to fire a SPARROW. Turned, acquired another MIG, fired two SIDEWINDERS. Did not observe flight of missiles due to attack hy another MIC. BLUE J» then Initiated evasive maneuver of spUt-s to ground, turned and observed debris and parachute In vicinity of previous S1UE*7HI:ES firing. BLUE 3 was last observed with element of two MIGs in 5 to 6 o'clock position. BLUE 3 did not return fron i7ilsslon. 8. ORDNANCE (No. BLUE 1 SPARROW AIM-7E 2/0 flred/No. hits) SIDEWINDER AIH-9 3/0 MIC ZjKn 37iiiin Cannon BLUE 3 BLUE 4 MIGs Unknown 2/1 Remarks §1 SIDEWINDER fired and was un- 8ucc«»ssful. . #2 SIDEWINDER fired and was un- successful . #3 SIDEWINDER fired In radar mode and was unsuccessful. #1 SIDEWIKDEH did not fire. ? SPARROWS fired with full system lock-on with radar Interlocks In, dot almost centered. First ralsslle did not guide. Second missile guided but MIQ turned hard right and missile passed without detonat- ing, 500 to 1000 ft behind KIG. Loat in engagement. 2 SIDEWINDERS fired within 5 sec of each other with good tone about 1 ml range. Both Dlssiles appeared to guide. Did not observe mlbslle flight since it was necessary to evade another HIG. 23Bin cannon 9. tqUIPMEfJT PROBLEMS BLUE I One SIDEWINDER did not cheek out and did not fire. Centerllne MER did not Jettison, therefore two SPARROWS cculd not be launched. One SPARROW missile did not appear to guide, despite apparent lock-on". 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total P-ii BLUE 1 Front BLUE 1 Front Hours 35C0 800 CoiBbat Missions Unknown •Not reported- Remarks Background all tactical aviation. Begen combat tour in September 196f . In F-Ub since pilot training. 3 yr In back. 150 hr In front. Had fired three SPARROWS and fou! SIDEWINDERS before going to theater. 308 t ' Comwent;' on this Enco'Jt.t.,r..-.lr.r.ft nuht .a. .„-.s...i,I. ..c.u.. It forced =„. ».n .. ri«« ""*"c;ul<, h.v. u..d . p.n in ..«r.l specific pl.c.s (..«.. T,,. Hu.t h.v. . c»putl« gun-sight with It. Missile-firing envelope should be expanded in g and range. mure fighter aircraft should be more laancuver^ble. .Need improved visibility to rear and down. Had swltchology problen. Likes pilot in back seat for ACM situations, n. DATA SOURCES t»««».^*. Tntervlews: BLUE 1 - Front - 9 January 19v7 Protect Interview s, o^^^ ^ ^ ^^^^^ ^ ^^^^.^ ^^07 Letter from BLUE-l - Back - ■■ "'^" fApVpprP-r -i62321Z sept 66 DOCO 2559- TAP MSG 162356Z Sept 66 DIO Z^^^^ _ 5pflEP-3 1708352 sept 65 DOW KASTEL 7AP OPf.EP-3 leig'tTZ Sept 66, 2CC0 ->^-603 ^ USAP Plshber Weapons School CAD ^'Jltetln ..o. 7 ?AP OPRKP-t 1617242 Sept 66 DOCO 25c.0i. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ r.lsslon) against JCS Target 16 'ike I vfie mira tsfci irc e,- w-r - l\"T-Z a;.d"F-rd5rroIiovIns at 5-ciln Interva: BLUE Let down departed several SAM warninB= — ^ experienced MIG sightings BLUE flight was alerted to KIC threat In a^-c, and had .xpcrien on previous two days. westerly headlnc, approxlnately \2. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION (Continued)'"" **** target. BLUE 1 detccled a fUpht of t-o elernenta of two VllG'i:s, at ^ ° '^1"; P""l*»" ^ at 5 range of 2 mi. BLUE I called KIG warning to Ml«ht and ordered "Drop ordnance. BLUE 1 united afterburner, called "afterburner" and entered a ^i^^'^i^S.J^JlJ^j'if tarn. Kir.s also entered right-hand turn, '-ihlle In turn BLUE 1 observed a MIC firing and called "Break" to BLUE u, who broke and left area. After BLUE flight entered hard right turn the event developed Into three sfPfrate eneaeer.ents. The details of BLUE I's encounter will be dsscrlfced roliowed by BLUE « s encounter . BLUE 3 U assumed to have teen lost In the engagement. SLUE 3 was last observed by BLUE «• wl'.h an element of MIGs approaching 6 o'clock position and firing. BLUE 1 ccntlnucd to operate In rlRht turna climbing to 10.000-ft altitude and slowlr? to 300 kt followed by a dive to 2000 ft and accelerating to 6C0 kt . HICs also continued J?Bh?-haJ.d LurnsrSut level at 5000-ft altitude. While In turn BLUE 1 observed KIC firlnis Ind callid "BEili- to BLUE 3. -ho did not acknowledge. Radio reception was garbled at that time. During Initial three turna BLUE 1 fired three SIDEWINDER '"J^iJ"' "J?? oresented a plan view and mlsalle "tone" was not optimum. The fourth SIDEWit.DEP did iSunch! BLUE I felt that firing should be attempted even if the situation is non- optinu.Ti since the engagement time la limited because of fuel. After completion of another right turn BLUE 1 acquired a MIG a^^/ljl^i, ^l^''- . , SPARROW nlaslles without success. In both cases acquisition was complete with full fmeS loJk^on and interlocks In. At firing BLUE I's altitude was 10.000 and ?he HIG waJ a? 7000 ft . going away and In a slight turn. The first SPARROW that was Uuncied dL not appear fo gSlde.' The second SPARROW appeared to guide toward the MIC; however, the KTC broke as the missile was half-way to the target and it passed the KlO'a 6 o'clock position at 500 to 1000 ft. No detonation was observed, f BLUE 1 observed another MIO and attempted to fire last two SPARROWS. The J missiles did not launch since the XER was still oh. i BLUE 1 gained 6 o'clock position at 600 ft from KIC and again attempted to I launch remaining SPARROW and SIDEWINDER missiles without success. |! After the initial MIC warning from BLUE 1. BLUE entered a f^eht-hand turn i Kenerally level, and attempted to Jettison ordnance and tanl:s^ but missed the switch. Due 'k trheavler load BLUE U could not hold turn with leader. SLUE u received a '-•amln? from S BLUE 1 that a MIG «as closing at 6 o'clock end firing. BLUE U responded with a hard break S ?o the left tway fro.' the tuPn and a spUt-S to within 50 feet of the ground. Afterburner W- was iKnlted ar Ihls time. 3LUE U proceeded In a northeasterly direction toward ridge line i ^5 addtuoSal hard-breaking Maneuvers. At this tine the ordnance ^"f,""''^^ were f Jettisoned. BLUE a entered the ridges and maneuvered In the ridge line. After evading I tSe MW^ iLuE t returned to the engagement (our of afterburner). While at "-OOO to 5000 !? ft! BLUE u acquired a MIG dead ahead and approaching 2-to «?APROW Si! acquire with radar for a SPARROW launch. Soreslght firing attenpted but SFAMOW not i^^n^hPd BLUE '-i passed MIG with aporoxlnate ly 5C0-ft separation. At this tine SLUE « EM 51 ^fterburne?! made a hard tu?n, In attempt to catch MIG. BLUE^ 'Tg I if? flfc 1? o'clock - soins away, at 2-ml range. In afterburner, BLUE a closed on MIG and ^ SJeplrei to liSnch SiSeSindE?" With strong SIDEWIHDER tone. SLUE u launched two missiles V and both appeared to guide to MIO. I At this time a MIG was observed rolling on over the top In BLUE U's 6 o'clock position. C BLUE "made a hard left and then a hard right turn As BLUE i^^*^:?? stnEWlKDER rirlrss he observed debris and a parachute. The attacking MIG wa^ still foi- and BLSE f rolled Into a spllt-S to the ground and proceeded to ridge line, making hard maneuvers. Fuel was low and BLUE 4 exited the area. On exiting. BLUE U closed to within 2 or 3 mi of a flight of four F-105S, when he Observed a slnle aircraft on the south side of the ridge line closing ^he F-lOSs. iSnce tde^tif^cation could not be made. BLUE U turned to engage. BLUE U was SPARROW posUlon on the r^lsslle panel and the back seater locked on. Cn closing the aircraft turned out to be BLUE 1. BIUE U then loined on BLUE 1. with about 5 mln of fuel remaining, so BLUE 1 and BLUE H exited «u?h2fciSp5a Sines and'started to climb, to cruise altitude receiving pretty hiivv and accurate 85mm fire. BLUE flight (two aircraft) maneuvered tr^rou^h this and . 5t5S\^ta??er"er«:;cy squawk on IFF and SIF. BLUE flight then renaezvou.sed with the BROWtJ ANCHOR tanker through ADF and. after refueling, proceeded to Udorn. RiiiF \i eomnentf'd that the BLUE 3 aircraft seemed to be a little underpowered since durlnfcUnb aS S' evasion on way to the target BLUE 3 had trouble paying with the oUhe!J flight members. BLUE 3 also was flying at a single-plane element In this flight. A 310 EVENT I>4S SUMMARY Action Aircraft (BLUE 1) Other Friendly Communications Enemy Actions (HIG 1. 2, 3. 4) Remarks Time - Hark Status 1 Action ^OA Fuel 12.000 lb. 500 kt. &O00-ft altitude. 2 wing tanks 4 750 GP bombs 4 SPARROWS 4 SIDEWINDERS Bl Initially sights four NIGs 2 o'clock. 2 ml. Calls HI6 sighting. V formation In trail to target, Bl in lead. 5000-ft altUude. SOO-kt speed, heading W to target. Status same as B1 . B4 wing for Bl . B3 single aircraft element. Bl cal Is MIG warn- Ing--"M1G-17$ at 2. o'clock." F-105 (IRON HAND) flight coning off target also calls "HIGs." Flight of two ele- ment of two MIG- 17s each, heading St, 4500-ft alti- tude . E lemen ts are 1500 to 2000 ft In trail. (Possibly three elements of two HIGs each . ) it previously iborted at refuel- ing. BLUE flight part of strike forces cofT.posed of F-lOSs and F-4s with five minutes TOT separation. BLUE flight third flight In strike force with several flights be- Ulnd, h^ Jettisoned ordnance. tapk* dropped; center MER did not eject; A8 Ignited. Began hard right-hand climbing turn to 10.000 ft and came back down. 81 calls "Ordnance off— afterburner. HIGs at approx 5000 ft stayed level In hard right turns. Inmediate decision to engage MlGs, procedures for Jet- tisoning complex. T4A Altitude 6000 ft. speed 500 kt. Sees MlGs* cannon puff, loses visual contact with 03 & 4, continues three hard right 360" turns In vertical plane, climbing to 10.000 ft and 300 kt and diving to 2000 ft and 600 kt. In and out of after- burner in turns; used burner to close on tar- get. In the turns attempted to fire SIDE- yi?JO£RS--three fired, bul no hits; ene SIDEWI.'^OER hung. At one time a MIG approached from 4 o'cloc and an overshoot was forced by a high-speed yo-yo. After this, the third SIDEUIKDER was fired. For B3 & 4 activi- ties, see B4 event sumtsiry . k Bl called break to B4. Firing on BLUE flight. HIGs mak- ing level turns . A lot of HIGs In a turn, but seen singly. In plain view. Hfter the call of ] Sreak, the flight I cecamc cosipletoly separated, operating! as three separate aircraft. 1 Jsed burner to dose on target. Bl tried to pick up HIGs 4ith1n missile para- peters. The tone ten f 1 r i ng was ma r- jyinal. During the .turns , HIGs are | rcver a threat to Bl k-never sees deton- 1 'atlon of any missile. One SIOEUINOER was fired at a HiG who i was close behind an { 1 EVEWT 1-45 SUHM<^RT (ConHwued) Time Kark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1) StAtus Action Other Fritndly CoBinunlcatlons Enemy Actions (KI6 1,2) Remarks 4A After the tine/event narks are no longer synchronized between B1 end B4. I 5A Altitude 10000 ft; speed 600 kt. 6A 10,000 ft lookdown aspect on MIG-- almost straight and level. 7A 8000 ft. Sees NI6 at 5 o'clock. Sees HIG aheed. Locks on and ft res, full system two SPARROWS — Interlocks in. Does not see detonation of second missile. 81 up to 10.000 ft and left. Lost sight and concern for HIG. F-IOSs coning out from target also engage NIGs. See Volune 11. No contact. See B4 Time/Event Chart. F-105. MIGs ac- qui red at about a iT<1 le. and by the time an attack w^s established & set up, the range was about 2S00 ft. By time position reachec where he was tracking and had g profile regulated so g could be relaxed and still keep MIG In reticle A SIOC- HINDER g envelope, range was about 2000 to ISOO ft. Called break for 83, but not sure MIG firing at B3. No acknowledgement. MIG at S o'clock firing cannon. MIG at 7000 ft altitude going awaj In « slight right turn. KI6 heading NU 7000 ft. HIG brokejparameters right when ml ss (1 e halfway there and second SPARROU passed 6 o'clock position SOO to 1000 ft from HIG. HIG Initially in First SPARROM did not gul de . F 1 rings with full system lockon-interlocks In. sa c&si Gsa Kia u u a J 1 J w 4^ £~j r"" r^i m cr:. rri m r~: ' i 1 EVEHT 1-45 SUHHARY (Continued) Tine Mark HA Action Aircraft (BLUE 1) Stilus 10.000 ft. 10,000 ft. DA 6000 lb fuel, 15,000 ft. Actfon Picked another MI6. Attempts to fire last two SPARROWS In bore- sight. No lockons — no fire. Gained 6 o'clock «t 600 ft fron NIG eble to track left turn T/2 to 1 min broke off as energy dissipated. Tries SPARROU i SIOE- UIKDCR. No firing. Other Friend'y Picked up B4 end heeded E. Refueled on way out. Communi cati ons gives "BINGO" 11. Cans B4>- ca Join up. Cneny Actions (HIG 1.2) NIG 11 o'clock heading SC. Initial slight left turn, then rolled cut MtG at 12 o'clock. Renarks No tone on SIDE< WINDER firing atteapt. : I r::z ^2 ^^ ^ c EVENT 1-45 SUMMARY (Continued) Action Aircraft (BLUE 4) Other Friendly Conmunlcatlons Eneny Actions (HIG 1. 2. 3. 4) Renarks Time Mark Status Action Fuel 12,000 Ibi SOO kt; 4500 ft altitude; HRT. 2 Wing Tanks, 457 lb 4 750 GP bombs 4 SPARROWS 4 SIDEWINDERS B4 sees three 2-a1rcraft elements. See B1. See Bl. See Bl. See 81. 4500 ft altitude; 500 kt TAS. Turned right to attack MIGs. Lost sight of last tMO elenents of MIGs. Passed attack against lead elements. 31 message "Jettlsor ordnance and tanks.' HIGs approit 5000 ft Stayed level In hard right turns. B4 not able to Jettison tanks and ordnance--m1s5ed the switches. 1 4500 ft MRT. Turning to attack had eiemeni, oi niii5 in lo- unit turn. See 81 Time/Event Sheet. B3 one- half mile out and one-half nlle back In trail. Bl tailed "Break"-- MIG closing In rear. Lead element of MIGs outturn 84 and gained position at 4 to 5 o'clock. Due to ordnance loa( could not maintain turn. 4000 ft HRT. Turning right 3g. Bl leading attack. B3 observed with element of MIGs approaching from rear . B4 called 63 warn- ing of MIGs. Follows B4. B4 lost sight of second MIG of lead element which Is following him. 2000 to 30Q0 ft altitude; 500 kt. rime/Event narks are B4 broke hard left in AQ Mith spllt-S to 50 ft off the ground. MIG observed to begin to follow. Reversed to right, disengaged from HIG with hard maneuver- ing turns and Jinking, staying close to ground. not synchronized between B3 observed out wide in right turn with two HIGs at 4 to S o'clock firing. Bl and B4 fron T^ e 61 called "Break hard." n. HIG at 4 o'clock level firing at 84. Two MIGs at 6 o'- clock on B4« firing S4 realized that he had not jettisoned ordnances and tanks. EVENT I>45 SUHHARY (Continued) ActlQit Aircraft (BLUE 4) Other Friendly Comnunlcetlons Enemy Actions Remarks Time ■ Mark Stitui 1 Action (MIG 1 2) 50 ft & 500 ft AGL; 559 to ODO Kt TnS; in AB. Jettisoned wing tanks, bombs and MER. Makes hard turns to check 6 o'clock. Does not see MIG. Turns to return to engagement area, out of AD and climbs to 1000 to _5f)nn ft Lost contact with 81 and 63.' Much chatter on radio. Not Intel* Hglble. DHenjageil. Runs to ridge line area; makes man- euvers close to ridge line displte speed. AM stores Jettisoned cleanly. ^6B l 1 4500 ft: SOO-600 kt TAS; MRT. Sights HIG at 12 o'clock head-on. 3 to 4 ml awajf. Attempts radar lock-on without success. At- tempts borcslght firing Mtthojt success. HIG 4500 ft level. Cannot get radar lock due to clutter and confusion. 4500 ft; 5S0 kt; HTR. Passes KIG head-on. 500 ft separation. Coai- mences left turn and enaages AB. Turn Is 16-1 / unl ts . HIG 4500 ft level. ^3B 2500 ft altitude: 550 kt IAS. 16-17 units Of angle of attack. In AB. Hard left turn conpleted. At finish of tarn, sights MIG ahead in light maneuvering. Changed from SPARROW to SIDEUINOER. HIG Altitude 4SC0 ft. T 40uu ft altitude; 550-500 kt In AB slight left bank. Closes to Mithin 1 ml with HIG at 6 o'clock. Fires two SIDEWINDERS. HIG sighted rolling in on B4. Hard left break down to 2000 ft alti- tude. Turn is 20 units. Light maneuvering; shallow turns; no evasive maneuver. MIG In slight left bank. MIG attacks B4 rolling in from barrel-roll. MIG at about 6500 ft. Inverted. Fires two SIDEWIND- ERS within 5 sec. Both missiles appear to guide. Back sights HIG rolling as from above to attack 84. Could not follow SIDE- UINOER due to eva- sive maneuvering. sua u ikMa "-to EVENT 1-45 SUI^MARY (Continued) ActUn Aircraft (BLUE -* ) Time Mark Status IT 10B 2000 ft altitude; 500-600 kt In AB. Acti on Reversed turn to hard right. Sights debris and parachute Mhere HI6 had been. Turns are 20 units. Cones back over the top. Other Friendly Connunicatlons Enemy Actions (MI6 1.2) Remarks 11B 7000 ft altitude to 25 ft in AB; SSO- 6S0 kt; fuel State 2000 lb. Back still sees KIC fol lowing. Rollb around into a sort Of spl i t-S to 25 ft off the deck; nade some hard Jinks, heads out. Runs down B) on radar Intercept, thinking B1 Is hostile. Kefueled on Moy out. NIG above at 7 o'clock. 1 t r I. (i EVENT 1.46 Aircraft Involvea: Three P-lCs vs two MI0-l7s Result: Onr> P-i(C lost Vicinity of Encounter: 21*13*N/106«28'E Route Packaee VIA r 1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SlfUATIOtJ I . Date/Tln.c: 21 Sep 1566/0920H Strike on JCS-16 prl:r.:;ry ntissIup [r.lsslon, MIGCAP. Flight of three F-^JCs pro- ceeding to Route PacKage VI A (foui-Ll^ T'.- turned to tJiat- due to refueling difficulty). Two I minutes out from target area the F-lOL-3 over tar^^et reported MIG attack. F-iJs Jettisoned I ordnance and proceeded at hig^h sped lri:c trie delta Ju-.t east of the target. 2. HISSION ROUTE Proceeded west from Cuif of Tonkl::, north of the ridge line, north of Haiphong; during engagement turned toward HaU?iong ar.d ocrsssed Generally over inbound route. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS I I P-IC BLUE 1. 2. 3 * - CBU-2J1 (Bl) * - 750-lb bombs on ccnterllne (b2 & 83) f ■ 2 - 370-6al tanks ft - SIDKV/rMCER (AIM-9) on Inboard station !. 4 - SPARROW CAIM-7) Radar. TACAN, IFF operating i MICIT MIC 1. 2 I. '. Ouns Camouriage [" 4. FLIGHT CONOniONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER . Weather ; Clear, 5 ml in haze. BLU E I T 3 Altitude ; IJ500 ft- Speed ; ^bO knot.i- Fuel' State : Pull Internal (sorne still in winy „ tanks) 11,500-1<'?.000 lb I j Flight Pormtitlon ; Relative to BLUE 1: BLUrl 2 - 30° Cone behlitd bLUiS 1 and 1500 ft out to right BI.U£ 3 - iO^'-lO" back and flying high and 4000 ft to left 5. INITIAL DETECTION ^ Plight was Inbound to target when MIC alert waa called by RD-66 aircraft. At the same time warning was given wl'^jfi F-io^s wi-rv er.^;:aged by MIG^. MIGa were Initially acquired visually. They were se»:n cJlnblng uij "cut of the terr.iln" at 6 o'clock position. ([T Plight leader (BLUc: 1} reported seelri£; three MIGs; BLUE 2 noted two MIGa. Range |j at contact approximately 150O ft. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 2 and 3 Jettisoned the 4 TfO-lb boirbs carried on centerllne station at MIO alarm. BLUK 3 Jettisoned ftjol tanki^j f»I.UF: 2 did not. MIG 1 fired cannon at BLUE 2 "intermittently." MIGs at 5M'£ 2's 3. 9. and 7 o'clock positions, BLUE 3 maneuvered Into poaltlon to attack MIO 2. Bl. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT After MI(i 1 made cannr^n attack on Fil^UM 2, BLUE 2 was Instructed to break hard left and egress chu area. Although Ih'.re was no Jmcdlate indication that BLUE 2 hart been hit by gunfire, hf- had received four or five probable aircraft cannon hits. f7 BLUE ?'8 left enj-ine exploJvJ on route to the r.ujf of Tonkin. Later the rlj^ht engine J , flamed-out. frcm .''uel staviifi'.'jn and y-:.V>i 2 ejected. Hi, UK 3 alchted second MIO at I.' 9 o'clock and positioned tf* fire iij J.':',.'i;{!Li:Ra at VA?t 2, BLUE 1 maneuvered Into MIO 2'8 6 o'clock poaltlon and firctl bor.h SIDEWItlDKRS and SPAHHOWS at HIG 2. 4 a , MIG 2 did not turn bHc'»i to rij-lit. , biu. maneuvcrc;! -'.'olently to avoid the miaalles J 4> fired at hln while foilcwln.^ ."i t:Anvi';il ttrNidinK Lrc.vaitl i;alphonr.. On anticipated ' low-altltude cnri-'tgcnpnts. BLUl^ 71ight li.id prcpnt-ed to use SIDliWINOEKS. V^^^^^HV 323 I I I I I I 8. ORDNANCE V SPAFIROW AIM-7 (No. fl red/No. SIDEWINDER BLUE 1 "i7c hits ) Cannon 0/0 BLUE 2 BLUE 3 NXQ 1 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE BLUE BLUE 0/0 3/0 1/0 EVEMT 1-46 i i I ' Remark3 Good 5one before flPine; firing against blue aky jbackaround. Later opinion range was below nlnlrnum; nlsslles did not guide. One 'mlsislle known to be inoperative and was not Iflred; launch of the second r.lsslle Judged' to be wltt-.ln ran?e and g-force limits. Tracked enemy In AB; missile detcnated behind violently maneuvering aircraft. Plr^t 2 fired In boreyilght m.^de at 500- to 1000-ft altitude. 5-6000-ft range. Detonation not observed. Ill , . Of second 2, one nlsslle hung up on launcher; one .tracked and detonattd In vicinity of air- craft . ' No remarks . Fired singly. Opinion that alaalle launch was Inolde nlnlnum range . No tone. Hlssllea did jnot guide. Sporadic firing of guns observed. SIDEWINDER Inoperative before take off, one SPARROW malfun.tlon durl.ig encounter, k) radio and Intercom out when stores ljettlson*d. Survival raft inflated liflculty. SLUE 2 pilot's rift did not :tnflate. ^, ^ r SIDEWINDER Inoperative. Maintenance personnel reported no Pi^fy^o^^^hlstory c ms with tnlaslles fired, but SLUE i APA-157' launch computer failed pcstflljht 1 - One 2 - (Bac with difficulty 3-1 problems check of 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total tfours BLUE I (Front) 2«50 BLUE 2 (Pront) 130 BLUE 3 (Back) 3100 200 350 Combat Missions 75 62 20-30 I i ! I Remarka 5-1/2 yeara P-100, 3-1/2 years F-^iC - Instructor, te^t work; extensive gun/..^laslle experience, AF Fighter Weapons School, Nellls Air Force Base. Ho gunnery er missile firing experience. Hadi fired SIDEWINDEPS and cannon from P-100. Fired L SPARROW from F-« prior to event. Coraaents on this Encounter BLUE I I Would like 1 f Pront 5 - Believed HiGs have developed tactics jtc, defeat T.lsslles, to haSe gun -! feels would have mere control. N^^d ran^e information device to JndlctSe "in range.* and in firlr^ envelope. On each Hi n^. observed MIG to fly a continuing hard "S-lng" maneuver and toward lower a^^l ^jj". ftiuE 3 (Front) - MIGs broke off because BLUE 2 outran ' theia , reaching ' JhereTs about a tO^ cone In the where you cannot see a thing and the back iSs^ pull himself around to see'behlr.d. MIG seerjed radar vectored. BLUE 5 (Back) - Guns would have killed HIG. Struggled to open range for mlaslle envelope. Aircraft performance adequate for engagement. Cenanents from Overall Experience 1 Firm believer In two-man crew. Prefers j se eoiid man be a pilot. 2 : IJjantage of.ack seater on night miaslins -i simply keep pilot of altitude wSen pulling up from run unJer flares helps to k«p from runnlne out of EHrH^night-bomoti BLUE BLUE BLUE i 1 I 3 J f 3 a 0 32'» 0 I 11. DATA SOURCES E»EllT 1-46 Project Intcrvlcwa ; BLUE J (Front)- 8 Jan 1967 BLUK ?{Kront)- 9 Feb 1967 BLUE 3{bacV)- 8 Mar 19b7 Hessage? . Hoports : 7A'-' XSC/?in2'»Z Sept 1966 DOCO 25829 7AP OrfU:P-3/2^l5'*''2 Sept 1?66 DOCO 25906 35TFW ysc PASTEL 795 Sept 19t>6 21O9«0Z Sept 1966 35TF1*' MSG FASTEL iO'-i Sept 1966 211'»15Z Sept 19b6 35TPW MSG PASTEL 7S0 Sept 196S 2106152 Sept 1966 357r-< r-'-SI PASTEL 773 Sept 1966 210'»^2Z Sept 1966 TAP y.SG ?123522 Sept 1966 DIO 30^92 12. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTION . ri,^*st th,.p«. F-UCs was flylnz west at U500-rt altitude to provide HICCAP for P-105J uideTat ack 1^ the't'^Jg.t'ar.a. The P-i., Jettisoned "^dnance and pro- ceeSed to'^Vn. Lvz^t area at high speed. 3LUh 2 was abcut 1500 ft out and 30 -^«J^"^^?^UE 1. muE 1 ^as 20«-?0° bade arid high behind BLUE 1. BLU:. ^ was rlgnt wing, SLOE 3 wa3 ShSn 8'5e 2 tuSd leffAia 1 followed a pursuit course flrlns on BLUE 2. Internlttently ShlSe'aLUE 2 was turning left he was hit by "four or ' l[Vl -thumps"). BLUE 2 continued a hard diving left turn, cor.pletlng two 360» turns. . broke away to the rlgn'-. and was not seen a.-aln. BLUE 2 egressed the area at lo« S Sigh ?tte of speed and subsequently ejected over the Gulf of Tonkin after the left engine Mpllrted n a reSult of tne hits sustained from KTC I and the right engine flained-out from fuel starvation. BLUE 3 observed one KIG (MIG 2) In the 9 o'clock Fosltlon- BLUE 3 maneuvered behlnc MIG 2 and was followed ty SLUE 1. BLUE 3 could not obtain a "tone" but <»««"«J rtfS „„t STDEWI.VDERS "visually". The first two ralssiles were fired inside minimum range and did not guide. The MIG either outr^euvered the third missile or the, missile did not guide. BLUE 1 then took the lead and released three SIDEWIMDER and three SPARROW missiles. The first two launches were probably Inside rainlr.un rar.ge. The third SIDEWINDER within the envelope with good tcne and the HIG was in afterburner, but the HIO if maneuver the missile. BLUE 1 went bore5lg.nt. put the viC under the P^PP"^*"^ J^^J /"l" first twb SFARP.0V3 with Inter-lccks-ln. When the SPARROWS were re leased, the MIG aove for the pround. Two more SPARRWS were fired, one hung u? and the other detonated Close to the ••■IG The SPARROWS appeared to guide but the MIC was able to see them coming ana outcaneuvered them. SLUE Flight was near 3ING0 fuel ar.d the sngageiaent was moving close \o Haiphong so they broke off to the left and the KIG continued on toward Haiphong. EVEWT 1-46 SUHHAWY Time Mark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, 3) Other Friendly Communications Enemy Actions (HIG 1.2] Remarks Status Action T„ 0 Bombs J e Ct < soned \n preparation for MIG engagement. B) re t a i ned tanks , B2&3 Jettisoned tanks Inbound to the target {JCS-16) Head 1 n g mc s t a1 ti tude 4500- 6000 ft. tactical formation - 62 right wing 1500 ft out; B3 left wing 4000 ft out and high F- 105$ called MIGs attacking in the target area. B3 sights and cal Is "MIGs 3. 9 1 7 o'clock low" HiGs coming tn and up from 6 o'clock to 3 o'clocli position i ] B1 broke down and into MlGs, reversed to the left. B2 unable to . i cay f n turn, breaks off to left. B3 continues hard right diving turn 270*- 360*. Rllir fllnkf i tL DLuC. ilignt iS split up. B1&3 400 ft reversing left In climbing turn. B2 turning left. 83 continues right turn to about 270*. 62 rear seat sights MIGs during turn, calls them out , but intercom is not transmi ttlng. HI drops In behind 62. M2 probably followed Ml in the left turn going high. 3 MIGs sighted. 2 MIGs engaged. Same Bl after completing reverse sees MIG shooting at B3 sees 2 MIGs . ) shoottng at 62 and the second at 9 or 10 o'clock. 82 Starts < diving left turn Ml at 62's 6 o'clock. Bl ts 1000-2000 ft behind KI and B3 is 2500 ft behind Bl . Dl called 62 to break left. 83 called "Hie 9 o'clock" Ml shooting at 62. N2 Is at 9 o'clock to 82. \ SI same B3 Idle and speed brakes B3 turns into H2 and 61 fol lows B3 around the t urn . 62 is turn f ng left at high speed and very low level conpletes tMO 360* turns and de- parts the area for the poststrike tanker 63 in a left turn very close to H2. 61 behind then Ml broke off 82 in the turn and left the area. M2 is turning left with 83 very close behind him 83 too close to MIG and attempts to back-off to shoot SIDEWINDER. ? ! EVENT 1-46 SUMMARY Time Mark Actton Aircraft {BLUE 1.2, 3) Other Friendly Communications Enemy Actions (h:6 1.2) Remarks Status Action U 83 behind M2 trying to back off to get within the SIDEWINDER firing envelope. Bl pulled Into 63 6 o'clock and thence around to hts 9 o'clock. BLUE 3 fires three SIDEWINDERS at H2 82 on his way out of the area. B3SI behind H2 Hi has departed area. HZ Is m a ser'es of diving, climbing turns avoiding SIOEWINOCRS 33 fired 2 SIDEWINDERS inside the minimum range. They did not appear to guide. The third SIDEWINDER seened to guide but the HIG iiw it and out-turned the mis- sile causing it to miss . B) took over lead and fired 4 SPARROWS and 3 SIDEWINDERS. B3 flew fighting wing on 61., BLUE flight now in normal fighting foriaation with Bl In the lead enploying dives and ZDODHANCE BLUE 1 . No missiles fired BLUE 2 - No, missiles fired MIC 1 KIG 3 (No. flred/Ko. hits) Atoll C annon 1/0 1/0 ?/3 •/O Remarka Passed high and to right of BLUE 1 (unknown miss distance) Passed high and to the right of BLUE 2 approximai;ely 100 ft 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS EVENT 1-47 None 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS^ Corenents on this Encounter BLUE KLK Front "Due to excessive amount cf radio chatter, did not hear SLUE 3's numerous calls warning that MI3 1 was at ny S o'clock." This allowed MIC 1 to fire out before BLUE 1 knew he was In danger. BLUE 1 (Back) had not seen NIC 1. Conmunlcatlon situation also hairpered front- to rear-seat connunicatlons . BLUE 1 (Front) felt that his fllsht has been subjected to a coordinated MTQ/SAW attack . He felt that the two unidentified aircraft tnat he saw on reciprocal heading before the SA"s were fired were the MICs that later Junped hin. In essence, the enemy plan of attack appeared to have been the followin?: The SA"iS were fired knowing that If the F-lis saw them, they would break down. This would put the F-iis co-altltude with the MZGs* It would require accurate tliclng. However, the MICs in conjunction with the SAH firing could have made a l60" turn and arrived In position of the P-ds as they bottomed out of the SAM break. BLUE 2. Front Due to all flights operating on the sanie frequency, radio conimunlcatlon was almost Impossible. This lack of radio communications made any coordinated defensive or offensive action Impossible. The lack of an Internal gun and lead computing sight denied the flight the short- range, accurate weapon that was needed to turn a near defeat into victory. ConiT-.ents fron Overall Experience • BLUE 1. Front HIOs have a great respect for the KIG-21 has a real problem In disengaging from the F-ii. The only chance HIG-21 has Is to get down to the treetopa where It Is difficult to acquire him either in a SIDEWINDER or SPARROW shot. The P-lt has no problem turning with the MIO-21 below 15,000 ft at about Nach 0.9* The P-ii should have a gun but not at the expense of the existing missile capability* i.e.* a gun Ip addition to the missiles to give it a elose-ln capability. As to the utilization of the back seater during an engagement, he wants the back seater to lock his eyes on an Identified MIG. He does not want him to look away until relieved by the front seater. The F-4 should get every MIG that gets on his tall. 11. DATA SOURCES Pro ject Interview : BLUE 1 -(Front) 28 Jan 67 . M ess age 3 J Reports ; Letter - BLUE 2 (Front), Cundated, approx 15 Feb 67) 35th TFW, OPREP-3, SlQlJUOZ Sept 66 FASTEL 777 35th TFW, 0PP£P-3, SIOT'JSZ Sept 56 PASTEL 787 7th AP, OPREP-3 211U33Z Sept 66 DOC 258»»3 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION On 21 September 1966 BLUE flight of four F-^ICs was scheduled for a strike mission against JCS Target 16.00 (Dap Cau Hwy/RR Bridge) and to. function as MICCAP after the strike oiission. Two of the F-tCs aborted and the other two, BLUE 1 and 2, proceeded on the mis- sion as planned. Each F-4C carried six t{k 32 (250-lb general -purpose bombs), four SIDEWINDER missiles and four SPARROW missiles in addition to two 370-gal fuel tanks. Tq At about 1120 (local time) while at 17.000 ft on heading 260**, BLUE 1(L) observed two unidentified aircraft pass under the flight on a reciprocal heading. He assumed them to be F-105s departing the area. BLUE flight was scheduled as the third or fourth flight to hit the target that day. Ti At 1121 (local) BLUE 2 called SAMs at 12 o'clock. BLUE 1 also observed the SAMs, waited for the proper time, and called the SAM break. The two SAMS, when picked up, were at 8000 ft on a heading of 30* with a 20" climb angle heading directly toward BLUE flight. SAMs vera about 1000 ft apart in trail. BLUE flight was in a loose-deuce formation with SLUE 2 on the left. At "SAM break" BLUE 1 and 2 rolled almost Inverted (i.e., about iJ^* from the inverted position) and headed down, keeping the SAila in sight with the idea of making a pull- up as the SAMs started to maneuver downward. The 3AX5 coiititiu«j o«i the original path witn no attempt to track. ^Aircrew experience data not oUkained^,^ 332 EVENT 1-47 AS BLUE KL), while on heading about 170* and at 5000 ft, started pull up to the right lb return to ortclnal altitude and heaalnr;, BLUE 2 or. heading 190° observed a MIG-«:1 at BLUE I's 6 o'clock and flrlnc; at BLUE 1. MIG was at BLUE 2' s li o'clock position about 800 ft away. BLUE 2 called MIGs at 6 o'clock and Jettisoned bombs and external fuel tanks. However, due to the saturation of radio comnunl cat Ions on the assisned frequency, BLUE 1 did not hear this call and continued his cllnb to 15tOOO ft. MIO 1 fired one Atoll nlsslle from about 500-ft range which ml.i5>.*d BLUE 1(L) high and to the rlfht. MIG 1 continued to fire cannon, apparently firing out during the period. BLUE^I did not realize he had a MIG at his 6 o'clocic. Neither Front nor Back BLUE 1 observed the HIG. 1*^ About the tine he Jettisoned his ordnance, BLUE 2 observed a second NIC (NIG 2) at his 6 o'clock. MIO 2 fired one Atoll .-nlsslle, which passed lOO ft and to the right of BLUE 2. MIC 2 then fired cannon, after which he broke off the engagement. After several attempts to alert BLUE 1 of his situation. BLUE 2 was finally able to get throuch the communication clutter as BLUE 1 reached 15,000 ft. BLUE 2 advised hl.UE 1 to Jettison his ordnance, which he did, and then BLUE 1 heard BLUE 2 calling "You have a t-ilG on your tall, take it down." Ti| At this time BLUE 1 bro'Ke right and down, unloaded the aircraft, and accelerated past Kach I. BLUE 2 followed. T5 After about ^5 sec in afterburner at low altitude BLUE flight reversed course to reencac;e, but was unable to regain visual or radar contact. KIG 1 apparently disengaged about the tine BLUE 1 broke. BLUE flight remained on HIGCAP until BINGO {"uel was reached and then returned to Danang. BLUE fllcht had not fired any missiles and received no damage from the HIG-21C attack. ^ 1^ C-i EVENT 1-47 SUHMARY (Continued) Time Hark A^ior fltrcMft (BLUE 1 an^ 2) Status C'llnblitg to IS, 000 ft 450-500-kt TAS IS.OCO.ft A8 Hach \,* 500 ft 500 ft AB M«ch 1.2 Acti on B1 continues climb unaware of HIG firing at him (right turn). tiZ observes a Kir, (K2) at his 6 o'clock firing. Other Frlendltes 81(L) hears B2 Jet- tison call and Jet- tisons bombs and external fuel tanks. B1 breaks right and down to the deck In AB. az follows B1. After about 45 sec In AB BLUE flight reverses course to the right In an attempt to re> engage but cannot sight the HIGs. 81 and B2 take up MIGCAP station until reaching BINGO fuel and then return to Oanang w1 thout further Incident. Communl ca t1 ons 82 continues to transalt warnings to 81. 82 tells 81 to Jettison ordnance B2 tells Bl that he has a HIG on his tall and to take It down. 61 hears. Enemy Actions (HIG 1 and 2) Ml still firing at B). M2 fires Atoll at 82 which passes high and right aboiil 100 ft. M2 then fires cannon at Bi: and disengages. Aenarks HI probably dis- engages as 81 breaks. Kl and M2 have apparently departed the area. 1 tV£NT 1-47 SUMMAftY Ttme Hark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1 and 2) Status I Act1 on 17,000-ft MSL 450-500-kt TAS Hd9 260* SAMS at 12 o'clock 80° HOG 20° climb angle SOOU-ft MSL BHD Hdg t70* B2 Hdg 180* B1(L) observes two unidentified air> craft pass beneath hln on opposite heading. B2 on left of B1 flying loose>deuce fornatlon. 81 observes SANs and Mai ts for proper tine to _. - break. B1&2 roll almost inverted (tj within 45* of inverted) and head down watching the SAMs to see if they f 0 1 1 ow . 61 bottoms out of SAH break and starts right climbing turn to original altitude and headi ng. 82 observs MIG-21 (HI } at Bl' s 6 o'clock and firing. Ml is 4 o'clock. 800 ft from 82. 82 jettisons ordnance and fuel tanks and attempts to Dosi tlon on HI . Other Friendlles Communications 82 calls "SAMS at 12 o'clock.* 81 calls SAH break. Enemy Actions (HIG 1 and 2) SAMs do not follow - continue on same flight pa th . 82 calls several times telling 81 he his a MIG on his tall. At about 500-ft range Ml fired Atoll mirsile at Bl. Missile passed high and right, unknown distance. HI then fired cannon at Bl. Remarks 81 assumes the air- craft are F.lOSs depa'-ting the target area. Bl does not hear 82's MIC warning because of ex- treme saturation of the communica- tions. All flights are cn the sane UHF channel. ,i cr\ r.-ji c t *^ c.:> cJ^ f EVENT 1-48 Aircraft Ir.volved! Two P-lCs, one EB-66 V3 four M1G-17S Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21*12 'N/10«''50'E Rout * Package V 1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SHUMIOK Date/Tine: 23 Sep 1966/08OOH TWO F-tC airplanes (BLUE flight) escorting an E3-66 (GREEtl fUSht). J-^^gLUE air- -wift vior.. rrcund aceic^. a third was an airborne abort. Orbit point for QRttN riigni Uroxlr.a?el? ?I»3GVi/10U''5O' E. Numerous F-i05 fllshts were conducting atrlkea in the sarne area. The route of flight to the orbit point Is unknown. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE fllgnt departed Danang. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS r^HC BLUE 1. 2 4 - spAF.aov; {Ai:".-7E) 11 - SIDEWINDER (Ai::-99) 2 - 370-sal wing tanks 1 - oOC-gal centerllne tank IFF and TACAH operable but off, camouflage paint EB~66 GREEM 1 Not given MIG 17 HIC 1, Z. 3. " Unknown 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: A very thin, low, scattered layer; clear, visibility unlimited elsewhere. BLUE Alt itud e; He ad i n gT Speed •■ Fuel State ; Pllgnt t-'orratlon ; — 30,000 ft 360" — 0.8 Kach — 9000 lb OREEN J 31,000 ft 360« 0.8 Maeh Unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 2 Front and Sack slnultaneously sighted a flight of four MIG-17 airplanes at 1 o'clock 5000 ft, heading 25C», In direction of F- 105 flights, about 2 ml E of Yen Bay - BLUB fllcht was passing over Yen 3ay at this time ar.d was observing P-105 flights making strikes directly below them. 6. ACTION INITIATED None. BLUE 2 was unable to cormunicate to BLUi: l due to execsslvtt radio chatter by the F- 105 flights. BLUE I never sighted MIOs. 7. SITUATION OEVELOPMEWT BLUE fllcht maintained Its escort position In crblt until scheduled return tlee. EVENT 1-48 8. OMONA'fCE Nona expend-.-.i 9. EQUIPKENT PRiiPLFMS BLUr 1 - :!-^::-.' hiyiV. 2 - :.'j-.e 10. AIRCRTJ COMMCMS Total Hours I Combat Missions BLUE 1 - Frcnt — Unknown — , — 7 — : — blue: ? - Bac:c 830 500 l 1 IQQ C onnen ', p cn thlr rn counter i 1 1 i £LU£ I - Front 1 , 1 1 Kxi^esslve raJio cnattcr ty F-105 fllehts. 1 ' ' BLUE ? - Back ! ' ' ' I'iiot thot;;;-:t it would have been very slmplle to 'dive down on the MIQ fUght and shoot dswn at Icri/t one ocforc t!ic MIOs knew he Was there. He ssil he would have closed to 1 to 2-1/2 £skcrn anri then started firing SIDEWIMDERS. 11. DATA SOURCES Proje c t IntervlQv. .' : bLUE 1 (Front), 29 Jan 67 BLUE ? (5ac>:) , 17 Mar 67 o„„.^.,. .. -jrYF-..; 3253052 Sep b6 12. NARRATIVE PESCP.IPTION BLU-; rilf;r/L Jaunc!.°d fron Danang as a scheduled four-plane escort of an EB-66; however, only :-..o F-^C aircraft actually made the fllshtl BLUE 1 and 2 proceeded to the tankttr, then noz-U: to Yen Bay to the prescribed orbit Ipolnt. VvT.ere GREEM 1 Joined the flight Is unknc:.-:.. GREEN 1 established a left ortlt oriented N-S, escorted by BLUE 1 and ?. ! ' I I I I After aprrijxl:;.stely one orbit, heading BoO", BLUE 2 , Front and Back simultaneously sighted a flight 5f four :'.IC-17 aircraft at j o'clock,' very low (approximately 5OO0 ft) heading ?50* of the maKln ocuu-se of excessive radio chatter BLUE; 2 Iwas unable to Inform BLUE 1 On or tc! -..'am several flights of .-'-105s directly belcw BLUE flight ft rlkes . IGs continued 250° on an Intei^cept course for the F-1053, who very shortly called our. that they were being attacked by MIGsJ BLUE 2 finally contacted BLUE 1 uut SLLi; J ioclded to r;aJnt3ln position oni the EB-56. CREEH 1 continued In his orbit ayproxlr.ritely 20 nln and then egressed with j BLUE | flight . • I I I I EVEHT 1-48 SUMHABY Action Aircraft (BLUE 1 .2) Friendly Aircraft (GREEN 1) Conmun'.catlons Enemy Actions Remarks Tint MarV. Status Action (MIG 1 . 2, 3, 4) /o S and 2 at 30,000 ft. Kach 0.8. Heading 360*. 9000 lb of f uel . 2 mi in trail ofCi 82 sights a flight of 4 MIG-Ws Gl at 31 .000 ft. Mach 0.8. Heading 360' Several flights of F-105S directly below BLUE f 1 i ght making attacks 82 attempts to can 61 . but radio Is con- plstely satueted by r-'.ObS Four MIG-17S at approximately 50C0 ft. Heading 250° In direction of m> fl ights Unchanged BLUE flight continues on escort mission B2 finally infcrns Bl of KlGs 1 F^IGs seen only by Z2 EVENT 1-73 Aircraft Involved: Four F-^Cs vs three MlG-21s Result: Sighting Only Vlclnl^ty of Encounter: 2l'*30'H/104''55'E Route PacKaee V 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/TlT.e: 16 Jan 1967/15^5H 11. DATA SOURCES FACA7 Coirisand Vest Ho. 27 Hated on Project MIO Incident Summary 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION None > { r t.; Aircraft Involved: EVENT 1-74 Pour F-«Cs and four P-i05s va two KIC-17S Route Package V Result: No damace Vicinity of Encounter: 1. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH ^ Date/Time: 17 Jan 1967/0807H Four F-liC aircraft (BLUE fU?fa> Inbound to target area to provide escort (MIGCAP) for four K-105 IROII HAKD (GREEN flight) and twelve P- 105 strike aircraft! ^"^^cafj 2. MISSION ROUTE Dan«n?*Cfr'u2T??"^?r ■-^/■•'"^P/^'P"*^'' (Uotlan refueiing route) to target area and recovered Danang via WhiTK Af.'Cr-.vR (poststrlWe refueling). 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-»C BLUc. !. ?. 1. U t - SPARRCW (AIX-7) - SIDEWINDER (AlM-9) 2 - 370-gal tanks 1 - 600-c;al tanit P-IQ^ QRbEH 1. 2. 1. 0 2 - U^O-gal tanks 1 - QP.C-160 ped Ordnance had been expended at time of encounter. WIC-:7 MIC 1. 2 Drop t anks Sliver color 4. FLIGHT CONOITIOHS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Clear, visibility In haze 2-3 nil Into sun; AUKude: Heeding : Speed ; Fuel State : Plight Formation : BLUE 12,000 ft 130* True «»50-kt IAS 13*000 lb 3-5 ml away from sun. GREEN 5000 (estlirated) 310» True As fast as possible Unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION B-1 (back) called MIOb to BLUE t.ead on interphone and BLUE 3 called "Strangers f«®n??.?*^5w'K/'^2^?' was «re 3 o'clock low at 1-3 ml heading In opposite direction to BLUE flight and I ml In trail with a flight of four P-lOSs (OREEN flight). MIGs were picked up visually. No prior warnlns wae received, » ^r. 6. ACTION INITIATED the MIoillTs*'** *'*^^*'* '^^•^ right* and BLUE flight initiated a deaeending right break into 7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT The MIGs were not apparently had BLUE fll Jettisoned tanks and In into turn, BLUE flight disappeared into heavy with fragged mission. No Information on no indication as to who information on relative able to maintain relative position or overtake OREEN flight. MIGs ght m sight because as BLUE flight broke towards them, the KIGs ItUted a right cllrifclnc turn Into BLUE flight. Approximately PO" Jettisoned tanks. The MICs then reversed their turn back left and haze. BLUE flight was unable to reestablish contact so continued BLUE flight's radar was on 50>mi scan. the number of g's used or ti.m radius of MlOa or BLUE flight. Also was In the rest advantarfois position or gaining advantage and no positions when contact wa^ lost. Interviewed BLUE Lead only. «69 EVENT 1*74 8. ORDNANCE No ordnance expended by frlendlies or enemy. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS Hone 10. AIRCREU COMMENTS Eiperienee Total F-ii Combat Hours Hlsalon3 Remarks All tactical fighter background. Houra Hours BLUE 1 Front" — — — Unknown C oinmcnts on this Encounter j BLUE 1 - Look-down capability of radar la bad. Described NIGs aa light In color with swept wings and round wing tips. I < I 11. DATA SOURCES I Project Interviews ; BLUE 1 (Lead) - Front jteaaages. ^ Report a : 366 TW OPREP-3 17O500Z Jan 67 No. 003 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE flight (four F-^a) on escort/MICCAP mission, was Inb 130° at 12,000 ft, iJSO-itt IAS, In spread formation when they F-105S) beiow then at 3 o'clock, 5000 ft In QRC formation exit opposite direction with two strangers 1 ml In trail and fallln right and down towards the now Identified riIG-17s and Jettison time, the HIGs Jettisoned tanks and started a right climbing t MIGs then reversed their turn and disappeared Into heavy haze, raeatabllsh contact so continued with their fragged nlsslon. Six of the eight personnel Involved observed the enemy al •11 ordnance systems armed and working. OREEN had QRC-160 In ound to target area heading Ighted GREEN flight (four Ing target area heading in G behind, BLUE flight broKe cd fuel tanks. At the same urn into BLUE flight. The BLUE flight was unable to rcraft. BLUE flight had operation. '^-"^ f ^ ^ CTJ r:i r-*^ r-:> r~; EVENT 1-74 SUHMARV Tine Mark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1*2.3,4) Status Action Othtr Fritndly Conmunlcstions Eneny Actions (MI6 1.2) ftcaarks 12.000 ft 450-kt IAS 13.000 lb 4 SPAP.ROUS 4 SIDEWINDERS 1 QRC'UO SoMe F-T05$ were exiting Flight of F-4S were exiting to the SH then turned NW F-105$ in QRC formation All systems arned and operating All working Escorting F-IOSs Four F-IOSs IRON HAND Twelve F-lOSs ' strUe aircraft B1 Back called NIGs to lead over 1 nterphone B3 called "Strangers 6 o'clock- to F-105S BLUE flight Jettr soned tanks Lead called break right BLUE flight lost Sight of NIGs NIGs reversed and headed into haze KlGs were swept King, si Iver color Two MIG-Ws were In trail about 1 mi behind F-IOSs at about SOOO ft NIGs were not able to keep up with F-105s--were losing out MIGs started turn up toward BLUE flight--got about 20* Into turn--at this tine F-4s Jettisoned tanks Weather clear, but haty. Visibility Into sun 2-3 mi ; away fron sun 3-S mi PtcVed up KIGs visually at about 1 to 1-1/2 mi No HIG warnings Radar on 50-m1 scale Look-down capa- bility on radar Is poor CVrNT 1-75 r Aircraft Involved: Three P-^Cs vs one WIG-17D Result: No danage Vicinity of Encounter: 21''10*N/10J4<'50'E Route Package V 1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 21 Jan 1967/0355H Three K-«iC aircraft following an F-105 IRON HAND flight. ?. NiSSlOlt ROUTE Departed Darsanp; and flew directly to tr»e ORAjnE AHCHOR refueling orbit. After refuellnc:* tne flight proceeded to the area of the encounter. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS « - SPAKRC'*' (AI,':-7fc:) « - 5IDt;XINCtR (AIH-9B) QRC>160 pod Avionics, tank configuration, camouflage, etc., unknown KIG-17D Guns only Silver in color Scan-ODD radar 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Scattered clouds at 2000 ft. Visibility Into the sun was 3 mi and In other quadrants was 10 ni. T BLUE -5 — T Altitude : Head InVT Fuel State: Plight Forf»atIon ! 16,000 050° l«80-kt CAS -—Pull Internal plus some- fuel in the external tanks KZO -r 30,000 l8o" Unknown Unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION Plight was In formation shown above when BLUE 3 sighted a stranger at 10 o'clock high. Shortly thereafter he called "MIC 12 o'clock high." 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE flleht contlnuec? straight ahead until the MIG was In the 6 o'clock posltlon- eo-altitude and about ^jOOO ft back. BLUE 3 called a MIG break, and the flight executed a hard right descending turn as BLUE 3 jettisoned his tanks. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT ^'"^^ flight broke down and right, the MO disengaged and departed the area. BLUE night did not slgnt the MIG again. 8. ORDNANCE No ordnance was expended by any of the airplanes involved. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 1 - No problems BLUE 2 - No problems BLUE 3 - Had Indications (both a red and a green light) that his QRC pod waa only partially effective. Si EVENT I.7S 10. AIRCRCU COHMCNTS Experlencv Total Hours F-H Hours Combat missions BLUE 1 ■'if BLUE Front Back 2 Front Back BLUE 3 Front Back CcrjTtents on t^tlc Encnunter -Not Obtained- Remark a I Not Interviewed. First mission In N. Not Interviewed. Vietnam. -• ,c=u-"^ 'Jj??Lf!l.'v'«Li%:" fr°f"l> t.r.lnea,or mentally prepared for thl. 11. DATA SOURCES . Project Interviews : ;;*.Megsaire r.er.orts: — BLUE 3 (Front), 28 Jan 1967 366TFW 210608Z Jan 6? 12. MAftRATIVE DESCRIPTION I I I i and heaSlng'JiS* Ihenl^ jE^HTef'^f I ,ViP/<'"«"«n « If .000 ft indicating iiSO-kt CAS called a hr^*i. tS. rM:::-K-:L*!".:f:! I'^S *^?l?»"«"Y?f:«^.to ^,Oao ft at 6 o'clock. BLUE • jijjiin." ro*5i..s:,:i'£5 5s»:.?°i:.„*i^r At this I I ! I I ! I ! I ■ I r — » f EVENT 1-75 SUMHAPY Tine Mark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2. 3) Stilus Action Other Friendly Commun 1 cations Enemy Actions (NIG 1) Renirlis Loose finger tip formation at 16,000 ft, 4e0-kt CAS. heading 050* B3 sights i bogey «t 10 o'clock high Sene Same Same Saae 3 F-4CS following an F.105 IRON HAND flight B3 Identifies bogey, now at 12 o'clock high rollfnc In, as a HIG 83 obse-ves Nl at 6 o'clock to the flight 83 observes Ni 4000 ft at 6 o'clock to the f light BLUE flight breaks right and down to 6000 ft. 83 Jettisons tanks. B1 and 82 retained tanks. B3 calls HIG rolling In 33 calls NIG break B3 sights bogey an'* calls It out. B1 replied "No Joy.' 33 calls "He's at 6 o'clock. - Sogey continued toward BLUE flight Ml came overhead and maneuvered down anSIG observea. four, becoming separated from BLUE 3 and li at a:>oi.t : split into two elements and gained pursuit posit encounter continued as two on two with continuous -n:" termination with BLUE 3 and tt commencing egresa 'r.,-: • Into the clouds. BLUE 1, 3 and U fired mlssllt".';, attempting to get Mills off the other elements* tail, • BLUE I* also rired a SIDEWir.'DER at a >5IC with n^c.i entered a cloud. MIOs were observed to fire carir.-'^ „■ SIDEWINDER and two SPARROW eiissiles were fired EVENT I-7B • C3 V8 eight F(I0-l7s 7'N/105»22*E .a Package VI an F-105 strike ^his period some During this /105«22«E, then to :i\ had only three r.ige bar on vertical : moderate haze. fuel from their . Ing. •IG (readily Identl- Ings level, airspeed . , a second MIG was -'.^hted two mos at losing. At about . east. NIG warnings :ng of this apeelfle Plight made tlon. -hted MIG (which was -:nsueceasful missile •.er the one pass. •:;ck, closing from into the flight of '.,Tht of four MIGs -3 of P-iis. The . apparent mutual MIGs disappearing observed. In r nlaslle parameters. i.:king as the MIG •\ total of five OB? SITUATION DEVELOPMENT (CONTINUED) Two unguldc-cj SAMs crossed In front of lead element as they pursued a MIG, detonating more than a laile away. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 BLUE 2 BLUE 3 SPARROW AIM-7E 0/0 0/0 2/0 (No. flred/llo. hits) sidewi;:de?. AIM- 9 3 Cannon 2/0 0/0 2/0 BLUE « 1/0 1/0 NIGs 1/0 Soviet AAM Remarks Fired both missiles In salvo, knowingly out of parameters, and with unresolved tone. In sueeessful attempt to divert HICs from attack on other ele- ment. No bursts observed. Plred two SICEWINDERS, tcnow> Ingly out of parameters, and with no aural signal. In attempt to divert MIGs from attack on other element. Plred two SPAFROWS without lock-on (due to ground clutter). Ho bursts observed. Plred SPARROV with no lock-on In attempt to divert MICs from attack on other element. Ho burst. Plred SIDEWIHDER from good position, ^ood tone. Missile guided, fol lev/in? NIC Into clouds. (Jo burst observed. 2/0 Lead observed missile firing In his direction; flight broke hard. Missiles passed con- siderable distance from flight; unable to determine' whether or not they guided. Two r^IGs (other than the ones firing missiles) both observed to fire a 3- tc 3-sec burst at BLUE 3 I 4 at about the same time. 9. EQUIPMENT PROSLEHS BLUE 3 14 were unable to Jettison their centerllne tanks and could not feed fuel from theo. Vhlle no abnormal equipment problems were e/perleneed In missile firings. It Is note- worthy that the tactical situation dictated out -of -parameter launch of seven of the eleht missiles. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Exoerlenee Not known. BLUE 1, 2 i 3 aircraft commanders were grade of major; BLUE 4 was a cap- tain; all back seaters were 1st Lt. Comnent s on this Encounter BLUE 1 ?'ront The orbit area for this mission was between a river and a 3500-ft mountain ridge. The area was selected because of Its nearness to the. target and because the terrain masking permitted the flight to keep a loolcout for ".IQz without being concerned about SAMS. Even though Q.1C-160 pods were carried, flight traled not to rely on -shem. The MIGs' tactics seemed to consist of a single firing pasj and breakoff. Never had the opportunity to set up for an attack — there was always another MIG or two positioning themselves for attack at the same time. It was about a constant I- to 6-g maneuvering encounter, with the best pass BLUE I could ever get on a MIO being about 85^ off the tall. Elenent integrity was maintained throughout the encounter; It Is not believed that the final KIG was coordinated with the SAMs in an attempt to draw the P-irr~lnto SAM range. If the P-is had carried guns, they could have undoubtedly .-;otten off some reasonable gun attacks. [ c i AIRCRCU CONMINTS (CPNIINUCO) EVENT 1-78 The KhDlti cn^afement tciok place at such Ion altitudes and close ranges that lock on Mas nnt possible. BLUE 1 trii>d to draw the MIGs up to a higher altitude— at one point, with MICs at 6 o'clock pulllnc up to 8000 ft and reversing turn— but they wouldn't follow. It appeared that the first two MIGs were decoys to attract the F-Us' attention while others positioned for an attack — If you see two, there's going to be two more •round, was the normal expectancy. Radar mqs in a boreslght mode the entire time. The BaO was so confused by all of the aircraft In the vicinity that he wasn't Inter- ested in t:ie radar. The Back and his extra set of eyeballs helped "Immeasurably." The mCs did not maintain element integrity after an initial pass. A tighter turn capability and more maneuverability In general would have been very helpful. ' o f 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; 5te3safres. hei-c^rts; BLUE Lead Front, 12 Mar 67 3667PW. OPREP-3, 0510552, PASTEL 113, Feb 67 366TFW, Cnange 1 to OPREP-3, O51630Z, PASTEL 121, Feb 67 366TPW, Change 2 to OPREP-3, 061110Z, PASTEL 117, Feb 67 12. NARUTIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE ril5ht of four F-«Cs took off from Danang, refueled on WHITE track, proceeded TACAN channel 97 and tnen to an orbit area where they were to provide HICCAP for an -'rlke. The orbit was between a river and a mountain ridge In the vicinity of 105"22'E; the F-105 strike, involving about 20 aircraft, took place some 7 m: to F-105 Strike. ai^OS'M/ the E. ml to The average elevation of the mountain ridge was approilmately 3500 ft. The orbit liad been selected in this area because of its nearness to the target and because the ter- rain masking afforded by the rnountalns allowed the flight to keep a lookout for MICs with- out being too concerned about SAMs. ^ Each aircraft was carrying a QRC-160 ECM pod and the flight maintained a close-in (about one-half norr.al spacing) fluid-four formation. Altitude and speed in the orbit •ere about 3000 ft ACL and iiiiO-kt TAS. The fuel management switches for these aircraft had been modified In order to permit a setting which would force the external win<; tanks to feed before the wing Internal fuel. In this setting, the fuel from the wing external tank would be used first, thereby reducing the asynsnetrie fuel load as soon as possible. This was a field modifica- tion for the squadron to permit operation with full missile load and the QRC-160 pod. To Just after establishing the orbit and while on a southeasterly heading, BLUE 1 Front observed a single, readily Identified, KIG-17 at 10 o'clock, IQOO ft above heading about 285** <. He called out the NIC and told the flight to break right, going Into a 4.g turn and full military power. now Ti As the flight rolled out on a northerly heading to set up an attack, the MIG was observed by BLUE 1 to be entering a low cloud formation about 2 to 3 ml ahead and was also observed to be a flight of two. At about this time, BLUE 1 Back sighted two more HIGs closing from 6 o'clock, low. BLUE I Front then looked back and saw them at about 3 to ftOOO-ft distance, 5 to 6 o'clock, in a tracking situation. At about the same instant Front observed two missiles released by the lead KIC, apparently fired at BLUE 1 or 2. The MIGs then broke down and left. The flight continued i' hard (4 to «-l/2g) right climbing turn. The two missiles were observed to pass low and behind BLUE flight, 2000- ft distant, with no determination as to whether or not they had guided. At about the saae time BLUE 1 had seen the two MIGs closing from behind, BLUE 3 or U observed four mora MICs closing from the east. * iwur ner« Tfe It was apparently Just after this break In response to the missile firings that the elements became separated. In the turn, BLUE 3 observed two MIGs splitting from the flight or four and BLUE 3 and U broke into them as the MIGs were turning through their 3 o'clock position and descending. T3 As BLUE 3 and 4 tightened their turn to pursue two MIGs, BLUE 1 (with BLUE 2 on his «Tng} rolled out on a southerly heading and Jettisoned center line tank when his Back slehted the same four MIGs to the east. The lead element (BLUE 1,2) irr'.edlately broke right, Ti, It Is not cle|r what maneuvers the MIG3 executed after Tu, but after BLUE 3 11 turned through 360 and BLUE 14 2 assumed a northerly heading, the two elements net almost head-cn wl.h the lead element about 2000 ft above. At this time each element wis oursued by two FIOs. Two MICs were at BLUE 3 1 **a 6 o'clo:k position, about WOO ft distance 0 487 EVENT 1-78 NARRAIIVE OtStRIPTlON (CONTINUED) (both M1G3 rirint? cannon), and two MIGs were at BLUE . i 2's 'i o'clock position, 3000 to fcOOO ft dlr,taric«. Kacfi element leader had advlsuO the other of MIGa on his tail prior to Tt BLUE 3 now flrfrd two SlL'EV.ISDEiHS with no tone In an attempt to "scare off the t* KIGs behind BLUF. 1 i 2. Al.-^ost Imnedlately , BLUE H fired a single SPABROW, with no lock- on. in a slnlUr atteT.pt. Almost simultaneously BLUE 1 nade a 5^-10* divl.i^ attack on the KlGs pursulnr: BLUE 3 1", flrlnq two SIDEVIIJDERS with an unresolved signal due to ground envlrcnrent. tlo bursts were observed from any of these firings. T.^ere was no report of the missiles having guided or not. BLUE 3 I * continued in a cllnbing right turn. BLUE 112 pulled up and continued turning. Tc After completing about 270' of turn after flrlne, and still turning, BLUE 3 1 heading east , (It Is believed that >t dove Into the sighted two «ICs at their 2 o'clock low position, head these were the twc diverted while attacking BLUE I and 2.) BLUE 3 and KIGs from benind. Tfi BLUE 3 fired two SPAKROWS with no lock-on due to ground clutter. The MlC underflre broke right and then left. One missile passed 500 to 700 ft behind him and the other 200 ft In front. No bursts were observed. BLUE 3 then broke right and called for an egress due to nls low fuel state. BLUE »• continued following th«; MIQs. BLUE 1 & 2, rolling out on a southeasterly heading, observed a single MIG-17, very low, ahead, heading east. They turned left to chase, descending and going Into afterburner. T7 BLUE IJ , in position behind the ! 488 0 Q S a a a 3 3 # 4 ttftWT I-7« SUMHARY Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4) Other Friendly Communications Enemy Actions (8 HIGs) Remarks TIM - Hark Statu* Action 1 H,2,3.4 close-tn riutd-four forma- tion, 3000-ft alti- tude. 450-kt TAS, heading SE. 13,000 lb fuel. Flight breaks tight. 4-9 turn, full military power. Lead calls «N1G— break right." Straight and level B1 Front sees single, readily identified. HIG-17 at 10 o'clock, dis- tance 1 ml , up 1000 ft. heading about 285" - Rolling out of turn. 4000-ft alti- tude. SOO-kt TAS, northerly heading, full military pover. Continues hard right turn. Initial MIGs sighted enter clouds. Lead MIG of two at 6 o'clock fires two missiles, then both break down and left. Single MIG now observed to be flight of two. Bl Back sees two MIGs dosing from ( o'clock, low. less than 1 ml. B3 or 4 see four more MIGs closing from the E. In hard right turn, altitude SOOO ft. full mnitary pOHer 03 1 4 break Into two MIGs which are split- ting from the flight of four. 83 ft 4 observe two MIGs splitting from group of four to the E and descend- ing. '3 B1 * ? rolling «wt on southerly head- ing. 6000-ft alt. SOO-kt TAS. full nllltary power. B3 K4 about same ill^ B1 jettisons centerllne tank, going Into right turn after sighting four HIGs. Bl Back sees four ^ NIGs to £. close b>" at higher altl- ; tude. 1 n t 2 In shallow dive. SOO-kt TAS. SOOO-ft altitude. i\ t 2 make a S'-IO" diving attack on MIGs following B3 ft 4; 61 fires two SIOEHINDEftS at 2000 to 3000- ft range, 60* angle from head-en, unreso't /ed tone, to divert NIGs. Mo bursts observed. Elements advise each other of NIGs on the other's tall Two MIGs pursuing each element of r-4St Tiftng connon at B3 ft 4. A11 break off after BLUE missile fir- ings. Two NIGs at 83 ft i 4's 6 o'clock, * 4000'ft distance. Two MIGs at Bl ft 2's 4 o'clock. 3000 to 4000>ft distance BLUE elements meet almost head-on. tVEMT 1-78 SUMHAWY (Continued) Action Alrcreft (BLUE 1. 2, 3. 4} Other Friendly Conununl cat Ions Enemy Actions Renarks Merk Status Action (a wigs) U Cont. B3 tt firing 400-kt TAS, 4000-ft alti- tude. 4« g B3 fires two SIDEWINDERS at HIGs following Bl 1 2, 1S00 to 2Ci00-ft range, angle-off fron head-on 90'-100", no HIGs. No bursts Ob- served. B4 et firing 400-kt TAS. 4000-ft alti- tude. 64 then fires one SPARROW at sane two HIGs 1500 to 2000-ft range. 1 1\ f- A r 1 AT Ir < out. rftdAr iUbCi iw^^s boreslght. no lock-on. No bursts observed. B3 A 4 continue climbing right turn. 81 A 2 pull up In right turn after firing. .[5 B3 K 4 nake diving attack on newly sighted HIGs. 83 A 4 sight two MIGs at 7 o'clock, low, heading £. (Believed to be the MIGs that had been pursuing 81 A 2. ) B3 at firing. 400- kt TAS. 2g$. B3 fires two SPARROWS. 20". Interlocks out. radar In boreslght. but no lock-on due to ground clutter. No bursts. B3 turns right for egress; B4 follows one of the NIGs. After firing, 83 calls for egress due to low fuel. MI6 firtd upon breaks right, then left. One missile passed 200 ft in front of target, other 500 to 700 ft behind. 81 t 2 altitude about 5000 ft. Bl A 2 turn to chase MIG and descend, going Into afterburner. Bl A 2. rolling out on southerly heading sights a single KtG> 17 ahead, very low. heading E. U U fL^ fl UJ LJ^ LJ3 UJ U^! EVCWT l'7a SUMMARY (Continued ) Action Aircraft (SLUE 1. 2. 3. 4) Other Friendly Comnunicetions Enemy Actions (8 MlGs) Remarks Tine Mirk Stitus Action h D4 at firing 4$0-kt TAS, 3000-ft eltl- tude. Z gs. 84 fires one SIDEWINDER. 2000'ft range, behind target (S'). good aural tone. SO-kt overtake. No burst observed. B4 then turns. cIlMbs to Join B3. When nisslle Is 400 to 500 ft from target, HtG, in a diving left turn, enters clouds at about 1000 ft. Missile observed to track. 01 1 Z. 2S00-ft altitude. After SAM firing, 81 & 2 break off chase, turn left to Join B3 ft 4. Single MIG. going away froa B1 ft B2 81 ft 2 observe two SAMs cross in front of then from 10 o'clock to 2 o'clock, no threa t , detonate 1-1/2 to 2 mi away. Policy on the Redistribution of DTIC-Supplied Information As a condition for obtaining DTIC services, all infonnation received from DTIC > that is not clearly marked for public release will be used only to bid or perform Wfj work under a U.S. Government contract or grant or for purposes specifically authorized by the U.S. Government agency that is sponsoring access. Further, the information will not be published for profit or in any manner offered for sale. Non-compliance may result in termination of access and a requirement to return all information obtained from DTIC. We are pleased to supply this document in response to your request. 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(This cover sheet is unclassified when separated from classified documents) SECRET AD-C003628 SECURITY REMARKING REQUIREMENTS DOO 5200tl*R» CeC 78 REVIE4 ON ?.d SEP 88 00 CO WSl-G RHPORT 116 Alil-TO-AIR ENCOUNTERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (U) Volume II: F-103 livcnts Prior to 1 March 1967 September 1968 Comprising IDA REPORT K-\2\ ^ John S. AcfincIIo, Pr^jtct Ltadtr i o O u- INSTITUTE rOR DEFENSE ANALYSES SYSTEMS EVALUATION DIVISION (/ J WEAPONS SYSTEMS E VALL* ATlOxV GROUP 400 ARMY-NAVY DRIVE. ARLINGTON. VA.. ODC CONTROL Log No. J 3 520 J uetam m •ns Mr 1 nuiotnoi □ mmtkim.. IT ^ ■ttniHnN/«»««4iafn IttL iiitL ai/« mam. SPECIAL HANOLtNG REQUIRED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS nformafJon contained in the crfoched dociment wifl not b. lojed to fore.gn nctionols without the express ocprovol of he head of the originating office. Appro/ol sholl refer speciFicol!/ to this document or to specific informotton contained herein. ii i r SPCdiAL HANOIINC KEOUIRED NOT MUASASLC TO FORriCN NATIONALS AIR-TO-AIR ENCOUNTERS IN S,OUTH EAST ASIA. Y.oluine Jl»/F-y«5 Events Prior to 1 March 1967 (i^i-^^ '^^ - — — 7 c^^.- — k^. lOiCfl .^^-^ //n > '::> ^ n I ' September 1968 Thb raport hos baen prapared by the Systara Evoluotion Division of H«lmf!tut«forD«fem« Anolyfdtiniespoiuetothe WeaponiSyiteim Evaluation Group Toik Order SD-DAH05 &7 C00I2-T-I04A doted ^ In the woAgnder thU To$k Order, the InstiSte hoibeen on btod^ militoty per:onnel ossigned by WSEG. "Unautborlscd Disolosuni Sbibje«t to Criminal Saaetlona* ^.^^ INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSt ANALYSES SYSTEMS EVALUATION IMVISION 400 AfBiy-Nav/ Drive. Arlington, Virginia 22202 D D C OCT 84 Bn lEiSEinnstyj D "EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIHCATION IDA Log No. HQ A8-9047 ly DDC COiasoL UNCLASSIFIED -^-^.r-:^^---^^-^ ■\3t FOREWORD This report Is a product of the Systems Evaluation Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses, in. conj.untition. with, the ; Weapons Systems Evaluation Group in response to VSEG Task Order SD-35-T-104s as modified in a memorandum for Director, WSED, from Director* VSEG. dated 4 August 1966. The memorandum re- sulted from a request by the Deputy Director, Tactical Warfare Programs, ODDR&E. The Task was coordinated with tho Joint Chiefs of Staff, (J-3 and J-5). The RED BARON Project produced four volumes. Those mem-^ ;' bers who made primary contribution to Volume II were as follows: Velma M. Archer John S. Attinello Douglas N. Beatty Floyd A. Frlesen, Cdr., USN Charles W. Gardner Howard K. Hostler, MaJ., USA Ralph L. Kuster, Jr., MaJ., USAP John W. Rub in o Richard C . Stewart , Capt . ; USN" Earl A. Thomas John W. Walden, Cdr., USN David D. Young, LCol., USAF. At its inception (October 1966) the RED BARON Project 'teaira consisted of: ' John S. Attinello, Project Leader Douglas N. Beatty, Ass*t Project Leader John V. Walden, Cdr., USN, Senior Navy Malcolm J. Agnew, LCol., USAF, Senior Air Force Phillip J. Conley, Jr., LCol., USAF, and Thomas J. Hughes, Capt., USN, also worked part time on the project from Its inception, V^ r primarily acting as an interview-debrief team. LCol. Agnew and Cdr. Walden were the other team. . ' i ''y-^':- - 'i-l In November John Rubino, Charles Tiffin, William Easun; ": ■ '. Capt.» USN, and Charles R. Shaw, Col., USA, Joined the project. ■ 1 ■ ^ r 5>. ONGUSSiFIED ill: UN£LASS!FIED In December, Robert J, Lynch, Jr., Col., USMC, Joined* and Philip Brooks, Col.> USAF, became Senior Air Force representative. Richard C. Stewart, Capt., USN, was assigned In February 1967- These later military arrivals shared their time with other WSEG projects. While developing Interview methods and techniques, the project was valuably assisted by two psychologists from IDA/RESD, W. Slnalko and W. Richard Klt«>. For Interviews In the U.S., teams consisting of military and civilian project members supplemented the two teams designat- ed Initially to collect data in the combat theater. In the SEA theater, two Navy-Air Force teams (Con ley-Hughes and Agnew-Valden) conducted the interviews. LCol. Agnew and Cdr. Valden also inter- viewed SEA returnees at European bases. As interviews were conducted, it became apparent that much more data were being collected than had been initially estimated from official reports, "nierefore, a rapid increase in qualified personnel was needed to collate the data for publication. Roy G, Anderson, Rear Admiral, USN, Senior Navy Member of WSEG, through appropriate channels, obtained the services of four Navy fighter pilots for a period of two weeks, nie assist- ance to the RED BARON Project of the following Navy pilots is acknowledged: Dennis E. Becker, Lt., USN Benjamin Cloud, LCdr., USN Samuel C. Plynn, LCdr., USN William D. Klper. LCdr., USN A« J. Beck, Major General* USAF, Senior Air Force Henber of WSEC>, with the cooperation of Headquarters, USAF, obtained the services of nine tactical fighter pilots for a thirty-day period. The assistance to the RED BARON Project of the following Air Force pilots is acknowledged: IV UNCUSSiFiED UNCLASSIFIED Thomas H. Curtis, MaJ . , USAP Leslie C. Long, Capt., USAF Robert' S, Maxwell, Capt., USAF R. P. Moore, MaJ., USAF Sam P. Morgan, Jr., Capt., USAF Michael G. Pennacchio, Capt., USAF :. William P. Robinson, Maj., USAF Ronald W. Scott, Capt., USAF Ronald J. Ward, MaJ., USAF The project also acknowledges the assistance of the follow« Ing Individuals who assisted the interview teams In the data collection phase: J. J. Berkow, Col., USAF, ARPA R&D Field Unit, Bangkok, Thailand R. Hlller, Assistant for Operations Analysis, CINCPACAF Staff E. Kapos, OEG Representative, CINCPACPLT Staff G. Koylades, COMNAVOCEANO "7 R. Llnsenmeyer, Chief, Scientific Research Advisory | Group, CINCPAC Staff J J. V. Patterson, Col., USAF, ARPA R&D Field Unit, ] Saigon, Vietnam B. Powers, OEG Representative, CINCPACFLT Staff H. L. Wood, Col., USAF, Headquarters, 7th AF D. G. Lynch, LCol, USMC, OPNAV The commands, whose cooperation made It possible to reach the participants of air-to-air engagements , are also acknowledged. COMMANDS Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces Commander, Seventh Air Force, Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam Commander, Task Force Seventy-Seven Deputy Commander, 7/13th Air Forces, Udorn Airfield, Thailand Commander, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), Ubon Airfield, Thailand Commander, 366th TFW, Danang AB, Vietnam Commander, 355th TFW, Takhli AB, Thailand Commander, 388th TFW, Korat AB, Thailand UNCUSSIFIcD V UNCLASSiHED Commander, ^32nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Udorn * Airfield, Thailand Commanding Officer, USS KITTY HAWK (CVA-63) Commanding Officer, USS TICONDEROCA (CVA-^1) Commanding Officer, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) Commanding Officer, USS ENTERPRISE (CVACN)-65) Commanding Officer, USS HANCOCK (CVA-19) Director, ARPA R&D Field Unit, Saigon, Vietnam Director, ARPA R&D Field Unit, Bangkok, Thailand Commander, Ulst Air Division, Yakota AB, Japan Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Forces, Europe Commander, Seventeenth Air Force, Ramstein AB, Germany Commander, 8l8t TFW RAF, Bentwaters, England Commander, . 36th TFW, Bltburg AB, Germany Commander, 50th TFW, Hahn AB, Germany Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, Fleet Air, Mlramar, California Commander, Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellls AFB, Nevada Commander, 15th TFW, McDlll AFB, Florida Commander, 831st Air Division (TAC), George AFB, California Commander, 835th Air Division, McConnell AFB, Kansas Commander, 3525th PTW, Williams AFB, Arizona Commander, 4531st TFW, Homestead AFB, Florida Commander, 4453rd Combat Crew Training Wing, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona vl UNCLASSIHED UNCLASSIFIED CONTENTS INTRODUCTION , ' * * ' Data Sources Data Presentation * • • DATA DEFINITION AND COLLECTION . . . Background - Goals and Limitations Approach Deccriptlon of Interview Procedure General Comments on Data • . . . EVENT RECONSTRUCTIONS UNCLASSIFIED 1 1 3 7 7 8 11 13 15 1^ I. INTRODUCTION At the request of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group has undertaken a study of air-to-air encounters in Southeast Asia. The project code name is RED BARON. Data that have been collected on approximately ^400 such encounters through 1 August 196? will be analyzed primarily to assist In the selection of suitable research and development programs for future high-performance fighter aircraft. A secondary purpose of the study was to pro- vide data for use by the military services and of the scientific community. This volume is a partial documentation for the secondary purpose. A. DATA SOURCES Data contained in this report were taken from two sources: the official reporting media and personal interviews with par- ticipants. Past IDA/WSEG experience In collecting ccsnbat data^*^ has shown that the official reporting media, which are designed primarily for military operational and statistical needs, are inadequate for many analytic purposes. The project groups con- ducting these earlier studies found that personal interviews with participants were necessary for RfcD analyses. In Project RED BARON, Interviews were considered the primary data source, supplemented, where available, by official reports. iWSEG Staff Study 134, Adequacy of Data from Sout heast Asia Comb at Air Operations for Research and Development Analyses of Aircraft Losses and Damages (U) . SECRET, February 1957. 2WSEG Report 101, Requirements of Defe nse R&D Agencies for. Data from Combat Air Operations in Southeast Asia , SECRET, August 1966. For purposes of this study, encounters that were investi- gated were defined to include the following types: • Sighting of enemy aircraft (either visually or by radar) , • Either U.S. or enemy aircraft" initiating hostile or evasive maneuvers, • Either U.S. or enemy aircraft expen(f.lng ordnance, and : • Loss or damage in combat of either U.S. or enemy air- craft . Dui*lng the data collection phase, an effort was made to assure the exhaustlveness of the information contained in this report. However, it was established that certain aspects of air-to-air combat could not be included. For example, during the conduct of CAP and escort missions, frequently it was neces aary for the fighter force to Intercept radar contacts which proved to be friendly aircraft. Also, during the course of missions, aircraft sighted were Initially Identified and called as enemy,' only to be recognized later as friendly. These occur- rances were not reported and therefore are not documented in this volume. While numerous sightings of enemy aircraft are contained in this volume, it la believed that there are many other sight- ings which were not documented (and therefore not Included)-. This is partially substantiated by the numerous instances which were mentioned during interviews for which no;: date or location, was recalled and which were not correlated with reported sight* ings. • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■** • • The first type was considered in detail only If the sight- ing was of R&D interest, e.g., if a U.S. aircraft made no attempt to engage enemy aircraft because of inferior or malfunc- tioning U.S. equipment. Where no R&D implications were indi- cated, sightings were noted to record the information collected for potential use for other analyses. . since "test type" Instrumentation does not exist on moat combat aircraft, the validity and quality of data are limited to the tolerances of human senses and recollections (aided where possible by official and personal records, notes, tapes, etc.). A detailed account of the precautions taken to insure the validity and quality of data gathered In such Interviews Is presented In Section II. Originally the data sample consisted of 2*l8 encounters through 1 March I967. Hcwever, from this date through 22 May, 65 more encounters were Identified (not Including "sightings**). In the 23-month period from first encounter to 1 March, ^7 "confirmed plus probablG" MIG kills were reported. In the six- week period in April-May 1967» the 65 engagements resulted In 37 "confirmed plus* probable" MIG kills . ^ B. DATA PRESENTATION Though the analyses to be conducted in the RED BAfON study were to be limited to exposing problems for R&D considerations. Interest In the basic data was expressed In many areas of the military and scientific communities. To satisfy these needs the data have been formalized and are published In three volumes as follows: Volume I: Account of P-^ and F-3 Events Prior to 1 March 1967 (U) (WSEG Log No. 126571) No. of Encounters U.S. Aircraft Involved to 1 March 196? F^nfB n F-4C 55 P.P 8 ■ P-104 1 U-2 1 Total Events Reported Volume I "78 ^Concurrently, there was a shift in targeting policy (NVN air- fields were bombed by U.S. aircraft from 23 April) and the in- troduction of new equipment (e.g., SUU-16A guns installed In some P-^IC aircraft). Because of these factors the additional •engagements were Included In the RED BARON data base. ' Volume II: Account of F-105 Events Prior to 1 March 1S67 (U) No. of Encounters U.S. Aircraft tnvolved to 1 March 1967 P-105 151 Volume III: Account of ALr-to-Air Events from 1 March 196? to 1 August 1967^ and All Hlscellaneous Events (U) For ease of study and analysis, the available Infoi'mation has been summarized under the following headings: •Primary Mission and Tactical Situation •Mission Route •Aircraft Configurations • Pll ^ht Conditions Prior to Encounter •In tial Detection • Ac .ion Initiated •Situation Development • Ordnance • Equipment Problems • Aircrew Comments • Data Sources Pollowinc; the above, an edited narrative is presented which Integrates all the information sources pertaining to the desig- nated air-to-air engagement. Wherever an air-to-air engagement proved to be of sufficient complexity that a perspective drawing aided in its understanding, such a representation was developed. Although every precaution has been taken to depict the engager ents accurately, the artists* representations serve only as guides to the reader in following through the complex series of situations and should not be Interpreteu as the precise flight oaths of the aircraft involved. The perspective representations of the tilr-to-air engage- ments were developed by the SED Graphics Department employing the Illustromat 1100 Analog Computer at the Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground* Maryland with the aid of maps and overlays developed during Interviews of the air crews. Artists then added perspective views of aircraft in approximate attitudes and positions indicated in the Event Sunmary charts. The names and official call signs of the participants have been replaced by standardized nomenclature to, give anonymity to the Interviewees. This precaution was followed throughout to encourage frank and honest answers to all questions posed by the interview teams* UNCUSSIFIED II. DATA DEFINITION AND COLLEaiON A. BACKGROUND • GOALS AND LIHITATIONS The. broad goal, formulated for the data. deflnitlon/colleA?' tlon effort was to obtain sufficient data to enable reconstruc- tion of the various alr-to-alr encounters in appropriate detail with maximum accuracy and completeness ("reconstruction" being the key word) . The scope and degree of detail was not simply defined. It revolved around the needs of the R&D community and the limitations of the available data. The primary limitation was human ability to -sense and recall. There were no recording devlces*^ In U.S. aircraft*, and", therefore, with few exceptions . (such as taped communications and photographs), all data had to be extracted from the minds of participants and observers. There was also the question of the adequacy, for event re- construction, of data reported from Southeast Asia through the- standard reporting systems. IDA/WSEG experience* showed that while these systems offered certain worthwhile information for R&D purposes, they were far from adequate for the purposes of this specific study. It was decided that IDA/WSEQ would Interview participants in air-to-air encounters as the principal source of data. WSEQ Report 101, Requirements of Defense R&D Agencies for Data from Combat Air Operations In Southeast Asia (U)."?uly 196b, (SECRET). WSEG Staff Study 13^. Adequacy of Data from Southeast Asia Combat Air Operations for Research and Develop- ment Analyses of Aircraft Loss and Damage (U). February 1967. (SECRET). ; ^ UNCLASSiniD 7 UNCUSSIFIED B. APPROACH The data collection program Involved several interrelated areas of operations. Thsy were: 1. Identification of air~to-alr encounters and the participants. 2. Development of more specific data needs and resolution of needs with limitations. 3* Collection of appropriate documentary information on Southeast Asia air-to-air encounters. 4. Development of optimum interview techniques. 5. Location of and arrangements for interviewing participants. These operations were not necessarily sequential and were continued throughout the data collection phase. Items 1 and 3 initially were interrelated, i.e., the means of identifying encounters was through search of existing docu- mentation — various formally and informally maintained "box scores" and other files. Early information was gained from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the USAP Air Staff. Additional basic documentation came from the USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Cen- ter, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAP, COMNAVAIRFAC , and the Commander, 7th Air Force. It was quickly determined that the various "box scores'* did* not agree. This was attributed to a variance in definition of what constituted an air-to-air encounter/ engagement and possibly administrative or communications failures within the conmands. Additionally, early in the study, the CNO and the Chief of Staff, USAF, were advised of Project RED BARON and requested to provide reference to appropriate documentation. Numerous replies. were received from various offices within the Services. 8 UNCLASSIFIED Gradually, sources of documented Information were In- . creased until they included: standard reporting system (OPREPs, COACT, Navy 3480 Reports, Guided Nisslle Performance Reports); various reports of associated studies made by OEG representa- tives and other analytical groups; letters from pilots who could not be Interviewed; various records kept at all levels of command; gun-camera films; tapes of communications made by pilots; and miscellaneous message traffic among military commands . ^ Identification of participants was a particular problem since there is no existing mechanism for providing this infor- mation. With a relatively few exceptions, names of partici- pants were not included in reports. However, names were gradually acquired through informal communications with USN and USAF pilots and, as the Interview program proceeded, other persons were identified by the Interviewees. Some specific items of data desired were defined by visits to various Service R&D and training organizations and through meetings with representatives of various industrial organiza- tions concerned with components of U.S. fighter weapons systems. (These visits and conferences also provided information on the- technical and operational aspects of the weapons systems con- cerned.) Eventually, a categorized list of data specifically desired from each encounter was formulated. Having established the data requirements, an interview jprogram was desired which would: • Allow the greatest number of interviews, while • Maximizing the quality, depth, and scope of informa- tion obtained from each interview. There were uncertainties about the inter^'iew program, however. They involved such considerations as the human ability to recall stressful Incidents and the effect of elapsed time .between the event And attempt to recount it. Larg«»> numbers UNCLASSIFIED 9 UNCLASSIFIED of people throughout the world had to be Interviewed, great quantities of Interview data had to be reduced, and time and manpower had to be considered. With the assistance of IDA psychologists, H. W. Slnalko and W. R. Kite, basic Interview concepts were delineated. These concepts stressed unhurried informality, anonymity of the Interviewee, a chronological approach to the entire flight in question (not Just the alr-to-alr encounter period of It), and much use of visual aids — maps, sketches, airplane models — to reconstruct events. A systematic program was developed to Interview a maximum number of participants In the combat theater and throughout CONUS and Europe. There was little chance to control the elapsed time between events and Interview. As a result, the elapsed time varied from days to more than one year. Efficiency of operation was approached In various ways. Several levels of encounter were defined accordli.g to their complexity and intensity.! and the basic interview procedure ' was somewhat expanded or abbreviated according to the level of encounter and the knowledge of the interviewee. Data formats were devised which attempted to facilitate the recording (and subsequent reduction) of information while stimulating the memory of the Interviewee. A total of ten persons were trained as Interviewers. Where it was possible to communicate with a participant but not practical or possible to interview him. he was contacted by mall. While there was the desire to Interview a maximum number Of pilots. It was superseded by a desire to maximize coverage over the largest number of encounters. Consequently, where a 1 ■ : Sighting only (visual or radar): either side tairino. h«.«.4i.'- ' ;o%rS^^^Lt^:^- = eIJKJ- orS^Inle"b%'tiJMit^ 1° ONCUSSinEO I I I I I I i UNCUSSIFIED choice had to be made as to whom to interview, breadth of - coverage was the first consideration* At the .start, various test interviews were conducted, their results evaluated, and improvements made before a large scale program was undertaken. Minor changes in procedure were made throughout the program. C. DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEW PROCEDURE^ In spite of the small changes that evolved and flexibility included to accommodate each situation, the basic interview procedure remained largely constant after the early test cases. Ideally, the interviewee was given advance notice and a general idea of what would be discussed. The interview team consisted of two persons, one a military pilot with a signifi- cant amount of flying experience and the second person a mili- tary officer or civilian. The team would meet with one crew- man., at. a. tlme^ in a. closed, room, with, minimum distraction, and with what was intended to be more than ample time allotted for the meeting. The team attempted to create an air of relaxed informality. The interviewee was given an explanation of the study, how it came about, what it hoped to accomplish, and what his role was. It was emphasized that his name would not appear in print and that, in general, attempts would be made to pre- serve the anonymity of the persons interviewed. This was done to encourage frank and honest answers. The complete interview procedure was explained in detail. Next, the pilot was asked to give an uninterrupted narra- tive of the encounter in question. He was asked to start from planning for the mission and discuss all aspects through the flight's return to base. He was first given examples of the kind of detail desired. Early in the project it became stan- dard for the interviewers to u se a tape recorder for the more detailed discussion is presented in Volume IV of this report . DNCLASSinED " UNCLASSIFIED narrative phase. This, of course, depended upon the inter- viewee's consent and he was always free to go back and erase anything he wished from the tape. He was assured that the tape was only for the use of the interviewers in gaining com- plete, accurate Information from the meeting and its use was limited to the project. Next, depending on the intensity and complexity of the encounter, a sketch of the action was made. Again, the sketch covered a greater part of the mission than Just the air-to-air encounter, dealing with ingress and egress as well. The technique was to put a transparent paper overlay on a large scale map and trace the paths, in plan view, of the various aircraft known to have been present (as they were believed to be) relative to known geographical points. The third dimension to the picture was introduced by means of a keyed time-sequence vs. altitude pint at the top of the overlay. With regard to time, early In the study it became clear that the -air-to-air combatant rarely had any reasonable concept of the time duration cf events or phases of the combat. He could, however, recall well the sequence of events. This caused the injecting of time-sequences into the interview process. The procedure was for the interviewer to "stop the action** at a point where something significant was occurring and try to elicit a detailed account of the scene at that Instant — the location and altitude of each participant; status of the interviewee •s aircraft in the way of speed, g»s, fuel state, avionics modes, etc.; action by the individual and his reasons therefor; communications which took place; enemy actions; etc. After such a stop the description would continue until the next significant event occurred at which point the action would be stopped again. These stops correspond with the "T" (or *. ''Time") marks in events and pictures. While one team member 13 UNCLASSIHEO UNCUSSIFIED worked with the pilot in making the sketch, the other kept , ** notes on a specially designed note pad. Upon completion of this step-by-step microscopic phase, the interviewers consulted their checklist on data items and asked specific questions about points which had not come out. Finally, the interviewee was encouraged to coaunent on the whole range of considerations which might be of Interest to the study — comments derived from his experience In this specific encounter as well as from his overall experience. The duration of an ^.ntervlew was from minutes to several hours, depending on the significance and complexity of the encounter and the knowledge of the Interviewee. 0. GENERAL COMMENTS ON DATA The Project identified 2kQ air-to-air encounters that occurred prior to 1 March 196? . Participants in l6n of these encounters were interviewed, with a total of 361 interviews conducted. 1 In addition, 37 written accounts of engagements were received. In general, priority was given to the more com- plex encounters; events for which no Interviews were conducted were usually a sighting only, with no R&D significance. The study group found that human ability to recall the details of. incidents stressful to them is sometimes quite remarkable. . With regard to the validity of recall, various comparisons were made between OPREP reports of the encounter and interviews and between interviews of various participants in the same encounter. There was generally good agreement. Where significant dlscreoancles appeared, they could usually be traced to the confusion of a fast moving, complex situation ^If an individual was interviewed in connection with two or more different encounters, this would be considered as two or more interviews.. UNCUSSIFIED 13 rather than memory failure or some psychological phenomena. (Discrepancies between various accounts of the same event did cause some difficulty In the final reconstruction process. In almost all cases, discrepancies were resolved through repeated study of the data, use of logical deductions, and/or relnterview, ) Intuitively, it night appear that the best information would be obtained by minimizing the time lapse between encoun- ter and interview. However, there are opinions and illustra- tions which counter this. The thought cannot be proved or disproved at this time. As noted e€U*ller» elapsed time between encounter and interview ran from a period of days to more than a year. Dates of events and Interviews have been included in the published data. The interview techniques, in general, were highly regarded by Interviewees for effectiveness in stimulating accurate, detailed recall. In some cases, through the procedures used, interviewees were able to correct and clarify their concep- tions of events. i 5 i Hi ID BNCUSSinED> Ill, EVENT RECONSTRUCTIONS The account of each event Is presented In at least two basic parts: (1) An outline which gives an abbreviated pres- entation of the highlights of the event, and (2) A narrative of the encounter. All of the events contained in this Volume are summarized in Table 1. A Glossary of Terms was developed to aid in the interpretation of events and is included at the end of this report. The glossary also contains descriptions and illustra- tions of the more common aircraft maneuvers. In addition, whenever an air-to-air engagement proved to be of sufficient complexity that a perspective drawing aided in its understanding, such a representation was developed. The perspective drawings were keyed by an Event Summary Chart • which describes the actions of friendly aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, etc.), and enemy aircraft, as well as known communication in- formation, at significant points in the event. As explained in Section II, these are identified by "time marks" (Tq, Tj^, T2» etc.), and are instants in time when significant points arose and are not intervals of seconds or minutes of clock time. In the perspective sketch, a vertical line representing altitude appears on the flight path at each of these "time marks" with the time mark sequence number printed at the top and the participant to which it referi»ed printed at the bottom (e.g., B2, M3, etc.). The keyed flight paths presented in the sketches were color coded such that the paths of all friendly aircraft were shown in blue and those of enemy aircraft, in red. It Is recognized that precise flight paths could not be re* constructed since the participating airplanes did not carry instrumentation for recording of position. Thus, while every effort was made to depict the engagements as accurately as possible. It must be remembered that artists ' . ^representations serve only as guides to the reader In following the complex series of situations and should not be interpreted as the precise flight paths of the aircraft involved. I 1 t r i 1 r Table 1. LIST OF FVENTS Aircraft Involved Results No-Type Lost/Oanaeed Event . D«ie/Tinit u> « • Enmy II. 1 4 ADr'65/121SH 24 Jun'6S/1600H 5 0ct*6S/day 16 Nov*65/1540H 28 Nov'6S/1212H 16 0ec'6S/t630H 16 D€C'65/U2SH 20 Dec'65/1600H 16 Kar'66/1433H 4 F-105C 4 HI6-17 2/0 0/0 4 F-105 2 ftt6-15 0/0 0/0 n>3 1 F-105 NIGS vo 0/0 4 F-105 9 M 1 G - 1 7 tl 4 W — 1 / 0/0 0/0 tI-5 5 F-105 9 C n 1 u— 1 / 0/0 0/0 II-6 1 F-105 9 n lo- f sighting II-7 4 F-105 e MI/:. 1 7 Sighting II>8 3 F-105 9 C n 4 u - 1 Sighting 1 1 -9 4 F-105 9 HI 77 H 4 to— 1 f » 0/0 0/0 IN10 4 F-105 » t M t C^l n 4 a - C 1 Sighting ii-n 23 Apr'66/1532H 8.Hay*66/1605H 10 Nay*66/1621H < F-1050 MIC.l 7 n 4 ft- 1 / 0/0 0/0 I 4. F-1050. 2 HIG-17 0/0 0/0 11-13 4 F-105D 4 HIG-17 Sighting 11-14 10 Mav'Cfi/lBOOH IV wf 1 own 74 Jun' fifi '1 31QH 4 F-105 3 MIG-17 Sighting 11-15 4 F-105 4 MIfi-17 0/2 1/0 I 1 . 1 ft 1 4 * 1 O ---.lun' Alt 4 F-IOS 1 KIG-17 Stglitfng 11-17 2 F-IOS 2 NI6-17 0/0 0/0 4 F-105D 4 HI6-17 0/0 0/0 11-19 7 Ju1'66/161SH ft F-105D ;i F-105F 2 HIG-21 0/0 T t - 9n 1 1 "tU 12 .Jul'66/ 4 F-105 2 NI6-17 0/0 0/0 11-21 11 Ju1'66/070SZ /I F-105 11 F-10E {1 KIG-21 NIG-21 0/0 0/0 1 1 ■>? tl 1 1ll* HA 19 Jur66/1611H 4 F-105 1 HIG-21 Sighting n-23 8 F-105 4 HI6-17 1/1 0/3 1 1-24 4 F-105 2 HIG-17 0/0 0/0 II. 2S 20 Ju1*66/0842H .-.Jur66/1300H 20 Jur66/08S0H 4 F-IOS 2 NIG-21 . 0/0 0/0 ■ I " Cv 1 F-IOS 5 NIG-17 sighting 11-27 4 F-105 2 Unld. 0/0 0/0 1 T _2ft 1 1 — c o 20 Jur 66/1446H 4 F-105 1 HI6-21 0/0 0/0 11-29 4 r-105 1 HIG-21 Sighting 1 1-30' 22 Jur 66/1630H 4 F-105 3 HIG-17 Sighting 11-11 4 F-IOS 2 NI6-19 0/0 0/0 11.32 4 F-105 2 HI6-17 0/1 0/17 IN33 17 Aug'66/1S16H 2 F-IOSD 1 NIG-17 0/0 0/0 1 1-34 17 Au9 66/15uZn 18 Au9>66/1S28H 18 Au9'66/1603H 18 Au9'66/1603H 2 F-IOSO 2TNIG-17 0/0 0/0 T T _ 4 I - J3 2 F-105 2 HIG-17 • 0/1 1/0 r T _ IX 1 1 - so 4 F-1050 2 HI6-17 0/0 0/0 1 T _ 17 2 F-105D 3 NTG-17 0/0 0/0 f f _ lA 22 AU9*66/1626H 4 F-1050 4 HIG-17 0/2 0/0 11-39 9 Stp'66/0900H i1 F-105F 11 F-1050 3 HI6-21 0/0 A iA 0/0 T 1 -irt I I - *u 11 Sep'66/ ;4 Sep'66/1643H 14 $«p'66/1638H 15 Sep 66/1535K 3 F-105 1 Unld. sighting f T A^ 4 F-105 2 HI6-17 0/0 0/0 1 I - ^ « 4 F-1050 3 HIG-17 0/0 0/0 11-41 4 F-105 2 NI6-17 sighting 1 1-44 3 F-105 2 HI6-7 Sighting f t 66/1647H 4 F-IOSO 4 HIG-17 0/0 0/0 IN48 17 Stp'68/0927H 3 F-106 {1 Ht6-19 NIQ-r 0/0 0/0 11-49 18 Stp'66/0931H 18 S«p'66/1648H 18 $cp'66/1644H 18 Sep'66/1645H 20 Stp'66/U4SH 21 Sap'66/1027H 21 Stp'66/101$H 21 $tp'66/1000H 21 Stp*66/101SH 3 F-inso 3 M16-17 0/0 0/0 It>90 2 F-IOSO 4 Nt6-17 0/0 0/0 11-51 4 F-105 2 HI6-17 Sighting 0/0 11-52 4 F-IOSO 4 HIG-17 0/0 11-53 11 F-105 4 HI6-17 0/0 0/0 n-54 4 F-105 2 HI&-21 0/0 0/0 II-S5 4 F-IOS 1 HI6-17 0/0 0/1 11-56 4 F-IOS 2 Hlfi-17 0/0 1/0 I1-S7 4 F-IOSO 2 MI6-17 0/0 1/0 11-58 21 Stp'66/1025K 4 F-IOSO {\ HI6-17 MI6-21 0/0 0/1 tI-59 21 Stp'66/1032K 4 F-105 3 RIG-17 0/0 0/1 11-60 21 Stp'66/1030H 22 S«p'66/084SH 28 Sep'66/ • 2 F-IOS 4 MIG-17 0/0 0/0 11-61 4 F-105 1 MI6-7 Sighting 11-62 4 F-IOS 1 Ni6-2ir Sighting tI-63 28 Sep'66/1725H 4 F-IOSO 4 HI6.21 Sighting 8 Oct'66/1545H 4 F-105 • 2 H|G-17 0/S 0/0 17 Daie/TUc Aircraft Involved Mo-Type" Enemy Results Lost/Paaaged U.S. 1 Enemy 11-66 11-67 11-68 n-69 11-70 n-71 11-72 n-73 11-74 11-75 n-76 11-77 n-78 II-79 n-80 11-82 11-83 11-84 11-85 11-86 11-87 11-88 n-89 11-90 11-91 It-92 11-93 11-94 n-95 n-96 n-97 11-98 11-99 tt-100 11-101 n-102 11-103 11-104 U-105 U-106 11-107 11-108 11-109 n-110 11*111 11-112 lt-113 11-114 U-US 11-116 11-117 11-118 11-119 11-120 11-121 11-122 8 0ct'l(6/1545H a Oct' 66/1543H S 0ct'66/1S41H — i)et'66/ 3 NOV' 66/1 556H — Kov'66/ — - ---Nov*66/ ---flov'66/ — Noy'66/ — -Nov'66/ 2 Oec'66/1425H 2 Or;,'66/1430H 3 Dec'66/1220H 3 Dec*66/1240H 3 Dec'66/1213H 4 Dec'66/1040K 4 Oec'66/ 4 Dec' 66/1 040H 4 Dcc'66/1637H 4 Dec' 66/1 642H 4 0ec'66/1645H 4 0ec'66/1706H 4 Dec' 66/1 705H 4 0ec*66/1715H 4 Oec'66/1713H 5 Dec'66/1Q12H S Oec'66/101SH S 0ec'66/1530H S Dec*66/163QH S Dec'66/1652H 5 Dec'66/1655H 8 Dec'66/1615H 13 D*c'66/1610H 13 Dec'66/1600H 14 Dec'66/1625H 14 Dec'66/1530H 14 Dbc'66/17C7H 14 0ec'66/161SH 14 Cec'66/n04H 14 Dec'66/16S0H 14 0ec'66/1613H 14 9ec*66/- — " 19 Die' 66/1 548H 19 Dec'66/1600H 19 0ec'66/160SH 19 0cC*66/1603K 19 Dec'66/160QN 19 Oec'66/1603H 19 0ec'66/1549H 19 Dec' 66/1 54SH 19 Oec'66/IS47H 19 Dec'66/1S4SH — Dee '66/ 2 Jan'67/1S10H 6 Jan'67/1534H 7 Jan'K7/late afternoon 1 Jan'67/late afttrnoon 7 Jan'67/08302 4 F-105 4 F-105 4 F-105 4 r •Ivb 4 F-105 4 F-105 4 F-105 4 F-105D 4 F-105D 4 F-105 4 F-105 4 F-105 4 F-105 4 F-105 4 F.105 4 F-105 . 4 F-105D 4 F-IOS 4 F-IOS A r - 1 w* 4 F-105 4 F-105D 4 F-IOS 4 F-IOS 4 F-105 4 F-1050 4 F-105 3 F-1050 ii F-105F \\ F-10S0 \\ F-105F F-105D 4 F-105 8 F-105 4 F-105 16 F-1050 4 F-1050 4 F-IOSO 4 F-IOS 4 F-IOS 2 F-IOS 4 F-105 4 F-IOS 1 F-IOS 4 F-1050 4 F-IOS 4 F-10SD 1050 10S0 4 F-IOS F-IOSD F-105 F-105D F-105D FO050 F-1050 F-10SF F-IOS F-105 4 » 11 2 6 1 3 1 2 4 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 8-10 16 {! 4 4 9 2 2 4 1 MIG-21 MIf.-17 HIG-^1 HlG-n HIG-19 .n6-157 MIG-21 MlG-17 MIG-21 MIG-21 NIC-21 H16-17 N16-21 HIG-21 m;6-21 MIG-IS/W HIG-Zl MIG-17 NIG? HIG? MI6-17 HIG-17 MIG-17 MIG-21 HIG-17 HlG-17 HIG-17 MIG-21 MIG-21 MI6-21 MI6-17 4 F.105 :o-F-ios 4 MIG-21 2 MI6-17 8 Unid. 8 N16-21 . 1 N16-21 ? NIGS MIG-21 ■416-21 MIG-17 MI6-17 MIG-21 NIG Poss 2 NIG-21 ? MIGS 2 MIG-21 12 MIG-17 2 MIG-21 1 MIG-21C M1G-? H16-7 NIG-17 MIG-21 MIG-17 N1G-? NI6-21 14 MIG-17 9 MIG-17 4 NIG-21 2 NI6-21 2 HI6-21 1 NlC-21 4 MIG-21 4 MI6-21 2 NI6-21 0/0 0/0 Signting Sightlns Sighting Sighting Sightl ng S>ght1 ng Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting Sighting Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sighting 0/0 0/0 Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 Sighting 0/0 Sighting 0/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sighting 0/0 Sighting 0/0 Sighting Sighting 0/0 Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sighting 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting 0/C 0/0 0/0 0/17 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 17/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 Event -K4 -125 -126 -127 -129 -130 -131 -132 -n3 -134 • US • U» .137 >138 -139 -140 -141 -142 -143 -144 -145 -146 -147 -148 -149 -ISO -151 Oate/TiiBe 8 Jan' 15 Jan ' 15 Jan' 16 Jan' 16 Jan' 16 Jan' 16 Jan' 17 Ja«' 16 Jan' 17 Jan' 17 Jan' 17 Jan* 17 J«n* 21 Jan' 21 Jan* 67/0825H 67/1615H 67/ IbASH 67/0B18H 67/0838K 67/082SK 67/0825H 67/0759H 67/1538H 67/0838K 67/0715H 67/1609H 67/0820H D7/0(i44H 67/084 2H 21 Jan'67/1605H 21 Jan' 21 Jan' 21 Jan' 21 Jan' 21 Jan' 21 Jan' 22 Jan' 27 Jan' 29 Jan' 4 feb' 4 Feb' 4 Feb* 4 Feb* 67/0844H 67/1525H 67/0d40H 67/152?H 67/1621H 67/1620H 67/0936H 67/ 67/ 67/0848H 67/073OH 67/0859H 67/1600H Aircraft Involved So-Tvoe ■uTT F-1050 F-105 F-1050 F-105 F-105 f-105 F-105 f-105 F-105 F-105 F-105 F-IOS r-105 F-J050- F-1050 F-105 F-105 F-105 F-105D F-1050 F-1050 F-105 F-1Q5 F-105 F-1051) F-105 F-105 F-105 F-105 Eneoijf 4 HIG-21 4 ni6-21 1 MIG-21 4?MIG-? 2 MIG-21 1 NIG-21 2 MIG-21 4 HIG-21 1 MIG-21 2 niG-?: 7 MIGS 1 HI6-? 2 MIG-17 4 MIG-Zl ' 3 MIG-21 j8 MIG<17 12 NI6-21 1 NIG-21 2 MlG-17 107M1G-21 5 MIG-W 2 KlG-19 5*8 NIG-17 4 MI6-n NIG-17 NIG-21 HIG-21 MIG-21 Unld. HIG-17 Results Lost/Oamaped in sighting 0/0 Sighting Sighting SlQhtlng Sighting Sighting 0/0 Sighting 0/5 0/0 Sighting $1ght1no 0/0 0/0 0/0 Slghtlr.3 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting Sighting 0/0 Eneny 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 19 UHCLASSIFIED GLOSSARY OF TERMS (All TRrms Unclassified Unless Otherwise Stated) AA - alr-to-alr weapon AAA - antiaircraft artillery AAM - air-to-air missile AAWC - Antl-Alr-Warfare Commander AB - afterburner ACM - air combat maneuvering ACT - air combat tactics ADP - automatic direction finder AEW - airborne early warning AGL - above ground level AIM-7 (DiE models) (SPARROW) - semiactlve radar type, alr-to- alr missile AIM-9 (BiD models) (SIDEWINDER) - passive IR type, air-to-air missile AIM-9C (SIDEWINDER) - Radar guided air-to-air missile AI radar - airborne Intercept radar Aircraft commander - a pilot designated pilot -in-command of a given aircraft (Air Force name for front seater in F-4) ALKALI - Soviet air-to-air missile - radar beam rider type ALQ-51 - Broadband deception ECM system ALQ-71 - Noise Jamming ECM pod (production model of QRC-I60-I) ANCHOR (Various colors) - see Figure 9 on page 3^ - code names for specific refueling tracks AN/APA-157 - CW radar illuminator and fire control computer for SPARROW missile system Angle-off - angular position off the tail of the reference aircraft APQ-72 - airborne intercept radar in F-'tB aircraft UNCLASSIFIED 21 UNCLASSIFIED AFQ-9I1 - airborne intercept radar in P-8E aircraft APQ-lOO/109 - airborne intercept radar in P-ilC/D aircraft APR-25 - vector homing and warninc system - providing 360<> directional warning of threat signals in certain bands with instantaneous bearing to radiating source. APR-26 - crystal video airborne warning receiver to detect SA-2 guidance signals AFR-27 - airborne radar warning receiver armed reconnaissance - an air mission flown with the primary purpose of locating and attacking targets of opportunity, i.e., enemy materiel, personnel, and facilities In assigned general areas or along assigned ground communications routes, and not for the purpose of attacking specific briefed targets. ASE circle - allowable steering error - circle on radar display provided by fire control computer. ATOLL - Soviet air-to-air missile, infrared seeker type autotrack - automatic tracking in which a servo mechanism keeps the radar beam trained on the target. Back - the individual occupying the back seat of the P-^; in Navy called RIO, in Air Force called pilot or GIB. BARCAP - Barrier combat air patrol - a MIGSCREEN for one or more missions barrel roll - see Figure 2 (page 27) - a 360» rolling maneuver barrel roxx s^ ^^^b^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ aircraft decides a about the intended direction of the flight. BDA - bomb damage assessment BINGO (fuel) - minimum fuel quantity reserve established for a given geographical point to permit aircraft to return safely to home base or aerial refueling point . bogey - unidentified aircraft boresight mode - in the boresight mode the radar antenna la aligned and locked to the roll axis of the aircraft . break - an emergency turn in which maximum performance is desired instantly to destroy an attackers tracking solution. break X - minimum range Indication for missile launch. X ap- pears in the radar scope at minimum range. 22 UNCLASSIFIED -1 I I ■—1 I 1 I 1 I I 1 CAP - combat air patrol - an aircraft patrol provided over an. objective area, over the force protected, over the critical area of a combat zone, or over an air defense area, for the purpose of interceptlnc and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their target. (NAVY) Condition I CAP (Standby): aircraft ready for immediate (maximum delay of two (2) minutes) takeoff. Aircraft with engine not running (starter batteries plugged in) will be positioned for take-off. Pilots in cockpit and deck drew on alert. CAS - calibrated air speed (knots) CBU-2'4 - canister dispensed air-to-ground borablet type munition; the canister is carried externally on the aircraft and opens after release at a preset altitude. centerllne tank - a fuel tank carried externally on centerllne of aircraft. chaff - a type of confusion reflector, which consist of thin, narrow metallic strips of various lengths to provide different responses, used to create false signals on radars cope. Channel 97 - A TACAN station located during the period of the study at 20°27 'N/103°'*3'E used for navigational aids. (SECRET) chandelle - a maximum performance climbing turn in which speed is converted to altitude while reversing direction. CMR-312 (Little Ears) - aural radar warning receiver CROWN - call-sign for rescue force commander CRT - Combat Rated Thrust - maximum augmented thrust condition of engine DP - direction finder DME - distance measuring equipment dot - (aim dot, steering dot) - electronic dot appearing in radar scope when radar is locked on providing computed steering vector information element - Air Force term for the basic fighting unit (two air- craft) EWO - electronic warfare officer PANSONG - tracking radar for Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile system (CONFIDENTIAL) fighting ( wing) position - an area for the wingraan in which opti- mum coverage and maneuverability is achieved in maximum performance maneuvers • finger-four formation - see Figure 6 (page 29) - also fingertip formation - a four-plane formation in which the aircraft occupy positions suggested by the four finger tips of either hand, the fingers being held together ?.n a horizontal plane. flak - antiaircraft fire fluid element - the second or supporting element In fluid four formation, flying in a high or low element position. fluid-four - see Figure 5 (page 29) - a ^ap^ical formation having the second element spread in both the vertical and horizontal planes to enhance maneuverability, mutual support and look-out ability, fragged - mission directed by fragmentary operational order from higher headquarters. Front - the Individual in the front seat In the F-^l aircraft; in the Navy called the pilot, in the Air Force called the aircraft commander, g - unit of acceleration (32.2 ft/sec^) gaggle ^ slang for a number of aircraft operating In close proximity, not necessarily In any semblance of formation. GAM-83 - BULLPUP; air-to-ground guided missile GCI - ground control intercept GUARD - emergency UHP radio channel usually monitored by all aircraft and ground stations as a secondary frequency. Hard turn - a planned turn in which the intensity of the turn is governed by the angle-off and range of the attacking aircraft. HEAT - armament switch setting for using infrared missiles hot mike Intercom - intercommunication system continuously active (hot) IAS - indicated air speed ICS - intercioinnunieation system ID - Identification; to make identification IPP - identlftCv.clon, friend or foe; aircraft transponding beacon received by radar distinguishing friend from foe. Imnelmann - see Figure 8 (page 30) - maneuver in which the air- craft completes the first half .of a loop and then rolls over to an upright position thus changing di- rection 180" with' a simultaneous gain in altitude. niN indicated Mach number IP - initial point; a well-defined point, easily distinguish- able visually and/or by radar, used as a starting point' for a bomb run to the target. IR missile - an infrared or heat-seeking missile IRON HAND - a code name for a flight with special ordnance and avionics equipment whose mission Is to seek and destroy enemy surface-to-air missile sites, JCS target - a target appearing on the JCS target list jinking - constant maneuvering in both the horizontal and vertical planes to present difficult target to enemy defenses by spoiling the tracking solution. Bank, pitch and velocity are all simultaneously changed in this maneuver. karst - a limestone outcropping or ridge KIAS - knots indicated air speed kt - abbreviation for knot (nautical miles/hour) KTAS - knots true air speed LAO-3 - a rocket launcher adaptable to external bomb racks holding 19 2.75 inch air-to-ground folding fin rockets LAU-17 adapters - stub pylon on F-4 loose deuce - a term to describe fighter tactics in which two to four airplanes- maneuver- to provide mutual support and increased fire power. Lufberry circle - a circular tail chase, ascending or descending M - abbreviation for Mach number HEK * multiple ejection rack ml - nautical mile, as used in this report MIGCAP - combat air patrol mission whose actions are directed against KIG aircraft HIO SCREEN - mission wherein protecting fighters are placed between the threat and the protected force in a specific area military power - maximum unaugmented thrust condition of engine missile free - authority is granted to fire unless target is identified as friendly missile tone - audio signal indicating AIM-9 is locked on to an IR source MRT -> military rated thrust - see military power MSL - altitude referenced to mean sea level OPREP - message report in joint operational reporting system PANAMA - call sign for OCI site located near Danang 25 pipper - aircraft weapon sight indicator (a dot of light within a lighted ring) PIRAZ - positive identification radar zone Pod formation - A flight formation configured to maximize the Jamming of Femsong radar. Slight alteration is made to provide for better defense under MIO threat. (See Pig. 9) PRP - pulse recurrence frequency QRC--I60 - noise Janmlng ECM pod RAQ - replacement air group ready light - light which indicates a particular avionics/ munitions system is operating and available for use RED CROWN - voice call for USS LONG BEACH (CLN-9) RESCAP - rescue combat air patrol RHAW - radar homing and warning RIO - radar intercept officer RO - abbreviated form of RIO road interdiction - to prevent or hinder, by aerial means, enemy use of a road or route ROLLING THUNDER - code name for air strikes against North Vietnam Route Package - see Figure 9 - geographical division of North Vietnam for purposes of air strike targeting rudder reversal • a climbing aircraft maneuver in which direc- tion is changed by rotation around the air- craft's vertical axis SA-2 - Soviet surface-to-air missile system SAM - surface-to-air missile SAR - search and rescue scissors - See Figure 1 (page 27) - a defensive maneuver in which a series of turn reversals are executed in an attempt to achieve offensive after an overshoot by the attacker. SCAN-ODD - MIG airborne Intercept radar (CONFIDENTIAL) section - a Navy term for a tactical element of two or more aircraft (usually two)/an Air Force term for two flights of four , SHRIKE (A0M-il5) - air-to-surface radar seeking missile ' SIDEWINDER - see AIM-9 SIDEWINDER tone - see missile tone I I » I r ' 1 I 1 I I I 4 I I I I i . 1 ♦ SIP - selective Identification feature - electronic device with j variable codes for identification SILVER DAWN - a code name for an intelligence collecting air- craft (SECRET) "S" maneuver - a weave in a horizontal plane Snap-up - a rapid pullup to establish a climb in order to launch ^ a weapon I SPARROW - see AIM-7 f2 "Split-S" maneuver - see Figure 7 (page 30) - 180** rotation about the aircraft longitudinal axis followed by a 180° change of heading in a vertical plane (half loop starting from top) STBY - standby steering dot - see dot 1^ Switchology - a coined word addressing the human engineering ^ considerations of switch arrangements c» TACAN - tactical air navigation - an active electronic navlga- Itional system which locates the aircraft with respect to another installation TARCAP - target combat air patrol - aircraft assigned the air- I to-air defense role In the target area TAS - true air speed in knots TCA - track crossing angle - the angle between flight paths measured from the tail of the reference aircraft Thud Ridge - A nickname given to a prominent geographical fea- ture in North Vietnam. It is a ridge running in a general NW-SE direction from 21»ilO*N/105*'25E to 21^20 »N/105°'I8*E. TOT - time over target TRACK (various colors) - see Figure 9 - code names for specific refueling tracks TROJAN HORSE - a code name of a U-2 air reconnaissance program (SECRET) unit (of turn) - divisions on an angle-of -attack indicator on F-4 aircraft UHT - unit horizontal tail (applied to F-8 aircraft) - a tail design whereby the whole surface rotates about a pivot point unloading - decreasing g»s , V - closing velocity (relative) vector box - see APR-25 WILD WEASEL - F-105P specially equipped for locating and attack- ing SA-2 sites (employed on IRON HAND missions) 27 1 yo-yo - See Figures 3 and 4 (page 29) High speed - an offensive tactic in which the attacker maneuvers through both vertical and hori- zontal planes to prevent an overshoot In the plane of the defender's turn. Low speed * a dive for airspeed and a pull up for position closure. ZUNI - five inch air-to-ground ungulded rocket. 3 1 1 1 I I I UNCLASSIFIED FIGURE 1. Seisson At Ftortrayad in Perspective Sketch FIGURE 2. Borral Roll UNCLASSIFIED 29 B».nt Alrorftft Involvatt: Four P-105Ds vs four MIO-IT* . Rtsult: Two P-105* lost Vicinity of Bneounttr: 10 mi sauth of Thanh Hoa 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Datf/Tlnw: « April 1965/1215H ROLLZNO THUNDER 9 AX inlsalon - Target 14 - Thanh Hoa Brldga; 48 7-105s tttteklng target In flights of four; it F>lOOs on MICCAP . The flight of 4 P-105S Involvod In thla encounter was holding At the IP prior to attacking target. 2. MISSION ROUTE Take-off I13OH (local tine) fron Korat, fle« northeast to tanker* refUelvd about 1200. Proceeded at 400 kt to IP, 10 al south of Thanh Hoa bridge. 3. AINCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-105P BLUE 1(L). 2. 3, M Full lead ZCcn cannon assiO 8 - 790-lb bombs 2 - (150-eal external wing tanks Gross weight 49,000 lb at beginning of encounter MIO-17 MIC 1. 2. 3. 4 tight gray, Chinese Cosnunist marking - guns 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Hace layer - heaviest haze, between 12,000-15,000 ft Altitude ; 15,000 ft _ Headi ng; Bl(L), 2, 3» » all beginning left-hand orbit at IP. B3 on baadlng of 200" at acquisition Speed ! 325-kt CAS (approximately Maoh O.63) Fuel State ; 11,000 ib Plight Formation 5. INITIAL DETECTION Uhile in left-hand turn (beginning holding orbit' at- IP) 10^ to' 15° bank, B3 looked back fcnd sighted two aircraft approaching the flight about 5000 ft away. In 1 to 2 sea he Identified them as MIO-15 or ITs "coming out of the hase." Distance to NIQs when identified estimated at 3000 ft. Estimated KIC's speed at Mach 0.85. (F-105*s speed approximately Mach O.63.} 9hen first element Identified as MIOs, a second element of. HIOs were sighted following first and aligned for atcack on B3 and B4. B3 called NIOas 84 followed with oaU when B1(L) and B2 did not react or acknowledge 83*8 warning. 6. ACTION INITIATED B3 called break - B3 and B4 made hard nose^down turn into attackers, Jettismed stores, began switching to air-to-air mode. Bl and 82 continued in shallow banking la^t turn not reacting to warnings. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT Pour heavily loaded P-105s flying a holding orbit at the IP at 15.000 to 16.000 ft altitude were attacked by four MIO-iTs. The second element of P-lOSs (83* 84) detected NIOs and called warnings. The warnings appeared to be unheeded by the lead element. Both P-105S in the lead element (Bl and B2} were hit by cannon fire from the first two NIGa attacking from above at the loS's 6 o'clock position. Bl and B2 Jettisoned tanks after being hit. Enroute to acting RESCAP for Bl, B3 was attacked by two NXOs (unknown If element of original four NIGs). B3 evaded HIQ attack by executing a rapid slowdown ■anauver while in a diving turn, causing HIQs to overshoot. One NLO in vertloal dive near ground may not have recovered. Bl and B3 ejected. 8. ORORARCE Mo. Pired/No. Hits Hemarks BLUE 1. 2. 3» « 0/0 MIO 1 Guns 23 or 37nin/ye8 on Bl Mo BE flashes observed NIG 2 Guns 23 or 37na/yes on B2 HB flashes observed 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS , . 81 and 82 did not appear to receive voice transmissions fron B3 and B4 although other aircraft In area verified warnings transmitted by B3 and B4. Unknown whether equipment failure or heavy transmission traffic on strike frequency responsible for not raeelvlag or masking warning. Svont XX-l P-105 Houra 500 600 Combftt WlssJonj 2nd in SEA 5th In SEA Remarks Tactical fighter experience In P>81t and P-lOOs since 1957 Limited eun training. In training. Plr«d 2 AIH-9» 10. AIRCRCW COHHENTS Experience . BLUE 3 BLUE » Coaments on thla Encounter Briering to squadron, on rapid deceleration of P-105 vtien nos« Is pulled up sharply, was the naneuver employed to shake MIOs making second attack on 83 • B3 had never practised this maneuver previous to this engagement. Without radar protection (Big Eye, etc, were put into operation at a later date) the holding orbit near the target at low speed made the loaded P-105a Ideal targets for the NIOs. Coamunleatlons "breakdown" between flight elements responsible for sueeessfui MIO attack on lead element of P-105s. MIOs appearea to be OCI directed. Comment a from Overall Experience Rapid, simple procedures for changing from ground attack to air-to-air node without requiring pilot to look into cockpit are easential. Air cover Is inadequate and uncoordinated at this early date In war. "Sterilising" the target area against enemy air attack requires extraordinary coordination between OCI facility. Interceptors and strike aircraft. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE 3 - * January 1967 i BLUE » - * January 1967 Measagea. Reports ; PACAF Tactics/Technique Progress Bulletin No. 2 - 5 May 1965 Message from 2AD - Oiilil37Z April 1965 Nesssge from 2AD - 060740Z April I965 PACAP - 052213Z April 1965 DIA Intelligence Bulletin 6 April 1965 » page P-3 < 12. RARRATIVE DESCRIPTION The following MIO encounter took place 4 April I965 during an P-105D strike on Thanh Hoa bridge in Route Package III. The strike force^^conslsted of 48 P-105s in flights of four. Pour p-ioos on HIOCAP for the strike. are 'hot part of this event (see Event III-l). The flight of four P-105s Involved In this event are designated BLUE 1 (Leader). 2, 3 and k. This flight was the fourth or fifth element in the strike force. Because of refueling problems and consequent delays, (BLUE flight was 15 minutes behind schedule) the attacking elements were not on schedule and were "bunching up" over the target. The strike Was under control of a mission conaaander orbiting the strike area. As BLUE flight approached the IP the mission commander instructed them to orbit over the IP, which was approximately 10 ml south of the target. Tq blue flight was the third flight in orbit at the IP, flying at about 15,000 ft. BLUE flight could see the second flight orbiting ^out 2000 ft below In the has* which hung between 12,000 and 15,000 ft. Because of the bomb and fuel load (eight 750-lb bombs; 11,000 lb fuel) the flight required military power to hold at 325-kt CAS at 15,Q0a-rt altitude. T^Tj As the flight completed a 180^ left turn In the orbit, B3 and B4 were positioned about' 900 ft above B1(L) and outward. Tfie flight bad been briefed that MIOs had been In the air the previous day, had come south to a point 30 ml off the target, made I60* turn and headed home. The flight was therefore alerted that MIOs were getting airborne and hence were hunting them. As B3 began turning Inside Lead to maintain position In the turn, he looked to north for MIOs and sighted two airplanes approaching rrom benina In a 20^ dive approximately 5000 ft behind the flight (&3 was passing thru a heading of 200* at the time). They were not Identifiable 'or 1 or 2 sec. When at about 3000 to 4000- ft range, B3 Identified the airplanes as nlGs, aligned on Bl and B2. B3 called "BLUE Lead breaK - you have MIOs behind you BLUE Lead - Break - BLUE Lead we* re being attacked." This transmission on strike frequency was followed shortly by a similar warn- ing from Bli to Bl and B2. neither Bl nor B2 reaeti^.;to the warnings which were heard by fcWcnt I 1-1 other aircraft in the area. B3 reported that In aUilitlcn to the 48 F-103s, 30 or more' ' F-*lBs, F-lOOa, MIGCAPs, RESCAPs, as well as the mission coramartder, wvre calllnr. on the strike frequency - "the F-USs were dolnii a bit of talking and in fact the 100c p;ot Into some sort of engagement and they were doing a bit of talking" - although the channel waa cluttered, B3 and B'4 felt they were close enough to override the m&re distant trans- mission and both nade numerous attempts to warn Lead. The lead element of HiGs coning in on a southerly heading In a alight dive (approx 20*) from above and at 6 o'clofik, set up for an attack on the BLUK Lea.1 clement. Two more MIGs sighted further behind the first element were setting up to attack B3 arid B*: . B3 called break, B3 and B'* broke left Into the attack, lowered iio:^c, put In moxtnum bank and g'3. The attacking HIG element passed over and behind B3 and B'l - ccntlnulnc; In the original attack direction. Acceleration from 325 -kt CAS (-^ Mach 0.65) "was too slow to put either B3 or B'l Into an effective fighting position fast enough," The lead MIO element passed In front and above B3 and Bi* at hljrh speed (M&ch 0.85 or hlt;her). They were observed to be light grey In color with Chinese Conr.unlst red-star- and-bar markings on bottom of the wings and close enough to be Identified as HIG-17s. 7^^adcr'.: t^uiss be^an f^risliing vhui. about l^OC ft behind ill, and b3 obnervcd several hits {'pieces of netal coning off) in the aft section of Bl's aircraft, -fhe second MIG, flying In "almost" a flghtlne wing position fired on B2 "almost simultaneously." fi3 observed fla::ie3 on the aft section of B2s airplane (the hits on Bl did not flash), B2 called 31. .."Lead you have a HIO behind you - (pause) - I've been hit." The two XICs ceased firing at a range of approximately 700-800 ft, rolled wings level, and continued straight ahead at high speed. After a time the NIGs started a slow turn to the right and were lost to sight In the haze, B'ib bombs UG M 49,000 lb 340-350 kt Initiating holding orOiv ai ir ai ni>>ion Commander's order. 83 and B4 sliding out and under B1 and 82 as they approach 180' position of orbit Successive strikes "buRChing-up" over target required several flights to hold at IP 10 ml south of target Ti 1 1 Approaching southerly heading 320-kt CAS 15.000- 16.000 ft 83 called t*IGs and 7 o'clock high - two niGs attacking 81 and B2 at)Out SOOO ft beh1:id and 1SO0 ft to 2000 ft above. Closing speed « 200 kt 1 sec) * B3 and 64 see NI6s 81 and B2 unaware of attack (MIGs at 6 o'clock of B1 mud 82) 83 and 84 Jettison bombs and begin setting up switches for air-to- air. Kott second ele- ment of HIGs cosing out of haie. 81 and B2 made no change In flight position until HIGs complete fir- ing pass. 82 calls warning to B1 and reports being hit HI ar.d H2 initiate firing about 2000- f t range. Con- tinue to about 400 ft. (>5. 10 sec) • 81 and 82 Jettison bombs. 82 losing power headed for sea decending sloMly. B1 headed out to sea then south to Danang* B3 and B4 broke down and left 82 called going over to rescue frequency. Gave RESCUE information and tones for Of steers for B4 and RESCUE. All KIGs continued straight ahead after passes, climbed, then started to right Into haie. 83 and B4 were at low speed (320 kt) and without gun sights. Conolex switching not com- pleted - 83 to RESCAP 81, 84 to RESCAP 82 % : ■■■■ ■ ' "- HIGs turning right disappear Into naze 82 headed for sea d ft. 81 headed towar 20.000-22,000 ft, 8 act RESCAP (o.sni. act RESCAP (0.8N) ecending to about 5000 d Danang climbing to 3 trying to find Bt to B4 trying to find 82 to 81 reported on 165* heading. 83 homing In on transmissions on UHF/VF, 84 talking to 82 in attempt to find 82. B3 slowed down so as not to over- shoot 81 inttrval after list tiM M'rk RED BAROW EVEWT II-l SUMMARY riwt Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2, 3, 4) Encny Actions (Mta 1. t. 3. 4) St«tus Action Other Pritndljf Coniunl cations Reaarks B3 In left tarn 10.000 ft, 400 kt A8/for short turns Sees 2 HIGs firing. Rolls underv reverses turn and cllabs B1. 2 and 4 seperate 'B2 announced he was ejecting. Reported control p rob lens. HIGs shooting at B3 from rear (con- ing froa north) h B3 rolls as though going Into spllt-S nates corkscrew turn to Jeft (3/4 turn) pulls up- sharply slowing to 2S0*kt CAS at 4000 ft Decelerates In descending spiral by bringing nose up fast. 62 eiected Head HIG In verti- cal dive about 800 ft ahead and to side. Second HIG in 30»-40" dive (at 4000 ft altitude). h B3 recovers at 500.1000 ft B3 cllabs to rejoin Bt cai C3i c^i tr:::? : q;^ Cj^Sa C3a c:3a n3a tftort ii « « i fl >J r « M3 j W .fc l J r H iUi t i^ T i*.! 1 1 ft 1 1 1 I Event II.2 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105« « two HI0-X5*' Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 2l'23*H/105*17'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 2ii June 65/approxlmately l600H. Four P-105B (BLUE Flight) were fragged for Son U. Target was obscured by weather, therefore alternate railroad bridge was hit. 2. HISSION ROUTE Departed Takhll for tanker rendezvous; then proceeded *f^*!l* . u..^.^ target. After hitting the alternate target, BLUE Plight went Into '"Si^J 5 south to a point approxlnately northwest .of Phuc Yen, then turned north to a heading of 360O. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS BLUE 1. ^. I t 1,029 rounds M£I 20mA 2 - k50 gal tanks ^ ^ ^ . - « , 1 - center line MER with 6-HK-117. f50-lb bombs ♦ 2 Pylons IPF/SlP-off, Radar on search mode. MiGa 1 i 2 2 - external tanks Ouns 4. FLIGHT COttOtTIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; 20,000 ft overcast with S-"* mile visibility In some quadrants with aeatterod —"•''^ clouds at lower levels. Thunderstorms in vicinity. Altitude:— BLUE 1*2: 15.000 ft Heading : 360o Speed : t60 KCAS ^uel State : Unknown Pll>»;ht formation ; V BLUE 3 14: 17,000 ft 360° 460 KCAS Unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION MICs were observed by BLUE 2 at 6 o'clock position. 1 mile behind BLlffl 3 * «J. MIO RED warnings bad been received from BIQ EYE during the entire mission prior to initial contact. 6. ACTION INITIATED All aircraft Jettisoned tanks, BLUE 112 turned right and climbed into NIOs while BLUE 3 14 turned right and descended. 7. SITUATION OEVELOPNERT no 1 stayed with BLUE 4 th; -mghout encounter firing his cannon in*5e"'**"iy . until BLUB 4 went to Kach 1.1 and dove for the deck to break contact after 270*' o^^*"^"- . Itm 1 and 2 attacked KIO 2 who was trying to cut off BLUE 3 1" ^ turned sharply to the left at which time BLUE I attempted to hit hln with cannon firo. MM 2 went into the clouds. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 BLUE 2, 3. * 4 KIO 1 HIO 2 llo. Plred/No. Hits Fired short burst/0 0/0 Fired eannon/0 0/0 Remarks' Did not expect any hits, could not get sight to radar range. Very poor fire control system apparently. Pilot interviews give aircraft as Mia~17 but all other sources show MlO-15. *3 ■ Event H-2 9. EQUIPHCNT PROeiENS BLUE 1 vas unable to get a lock-on vith his eun sight. 10. AIRCREW COMNEmS EKperience Total Hour s P-105 Hours Hlaslons BLUE 1, 2 ft 3 Unknown BLUE « 1800 1000 Unknown Coaaaents on this Encounter BLUE i| - KIO 1 fire control system was apparently not too good because the bullets were Biasing by a gross range. KIO 1 apparently did not want to pull any nore g. HIOs dlda*t punch their tanks until P-lOSs did. BLUB 1 - As an effective fight, we didn't do too well as far as being attacked by the MIOs la eonoemed. This was our first actual engagement. Would have been nice to have a few missilss on this engagement. Comments from Overall Experience BLUE 1 - For an aircraft we need high energy maneuverability or a high sustained g capability. Heed good visibility to the rear. Need a good gun sight; we have a low reliability on our Integrated radar or computer gun sight, BLUE 2 > 105 should engage MIQ at Mach .96. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviewa i BLUE 1-9 March 1967; BLUE 2 - March 1967; BLUB 3 > 6 January 1967. Messages ; 2AD OPREP-4 2i)1721Z June 1965 2 GOTO 03230 CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Flight was scheduled for a target in the Son La area. Takeorr was delayed so as to arrive over target at about the termination time of the other strikes with a raini- Bum of fuel expended and then proceed on a MIO search. Refueling was normal but the target was weathered in and an alternate target was hit (a railror^.d) . Then BLUE Flight proceeded on a southerly heading in a Fluid ^ formation (3 * 2»000 ft high) to a posi- tion approximately northwest of Phuc Yen, when they made a turn to the north. On rolling out on a heading of 360**, BLUE 2 called out to the high element (BLUE 3 & 4), "Look out (BLUE U), you have twc at 6 o'clock." BLUE 'I couldn't see the MIOs. All four aircraft then jettisoned .their tanks. The MIOs came out of the clouds at a high altitude and on seeing the lOSs Jettisoning their tanks, did the same. BLUE l then called, "Break, right" and climbed toward the high element. BLUB 3 and 4 simultaneously turned right and de- scended 80 as to sandwich the KICs between them and the' low element (BLUE 1 and 2). At first only one MIQ wss sighted by BLUE 2, but 1000 ft behind MIO 1 came MIG 2 closing on MIQ 1. BLUE 1 and 2 managed to get behind the MIGs. While In the turn, BLUE 4 still eouxdn't see the Kias and at this time BLUE 1 called out, "Rog, they're MIOs, they're firing keep going." Again BLUE 1 called out, "Pour, look out, they're firing." BLUE I then crossed over to the left aide of BLUE 3 and saw the MIOs at his 5 o'clock position. BLUE 4 was so engrossed with the KICs and being fired on that he failed to notice BLUE 3 increasing Ills g'a. MIO 1 waa now about 2,500 ft back at BLUE 4*s 5 o'clock position. BLUE a became aeparated fum BLUE 3. By this tine BLUE 1 and 2 were approxi- mately 5000 ft in trail with the two NIGs when MIO 2 tightened Lis turn and appeared to be cuttl.ig across the circle possibly going after BLUE 3. MIO 1 was still on BLUE 4's tail and firing. At this point BLUE 4 asked for someone to get the MIO off his tail. BLUE 1 and 2 were unable to close on MIO 1 uainly because they hadn't selected afterburner « but when MIO 2 turned they were able to go after him. Just as BLUE 1 fired at MIO 2, the no broke left hard and inside BLUE 4*8 turn. BLUE 1 continued on around in his turn but MIO 1 was not pulling lead and waa maintaining 2500 ft separation. After 180" of turn, BLUE 4 was at 7,000 ft with MIO 1 still on his tail. Meanwhile BLOB 1 and 2 turned left and up with MIO 2 and went through some turns which appeared to BLUE 1 as though MIG 2 was looking for MIC 1. Then MIO ? turned right and appeared to see BLUE 1 and 2 at which time he tu:>ned left sharply and climbed into the clouds. BLUE 1 attempted to follow and called and said he had lost sight of BLUE 4. BLUE <> then lit afterburner, dove for ;1058 (BLUE Plight) on a ■Isaion on RT UKA*!. 11. DATA SOURCES RED BAROH MZO Incident Susoary. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight sighted the MZQa 1-1/2 miles behind the flight. Ho engagement occurred. !;<• r. r I I i Aircraft Involved Result: No danago Vicinity of Encounter Event 2X*9 Four P-105a vs tvo HIO^lTe 21*15 'H/IOT^IS 'B 1. rniMARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION D»te/Time: 20 December 1965/I6OOH. Four p-1053 (BLUE Plight) on a SARCAP for another P-105 (QREEM 3). n. DATA SOURCES CIHCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67. 12. NARRATtVL OeSCRlPTION BLUE Plight sighted two NICs coming from the direction of Haiphong. The P«105a attempted to attack but could not catch the MICs. The MZOa were eoming straight and level; and GLUE Plight turned Into the HIOs who passed under BLUE Plight with about 700 ft separation. The NlOa did not slow or turn, and no further aetlon rvsulted. Aircraft Involved: Event IX- 10 Pour P-105a vs two possible Mia-21s 1 Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21*26 •N/103*02'B PRIMARY HISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 16 March 1966/1*MH BLOE Plight was diverted from primary target for RESCAP niasion. Dropped ordnance on secondary target prior to RESCAP. 5. INITIAL DCTECTION It is not known which member of BLUE Plight sighted HIQs. HIOs crossed 2 nlles In front of BLUE Flight headed for Hanoi. 6. ACTION INITIATED Distance between aircraft prevented action. 7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT HIOs exit to Hanoi; BLUE Plight continued RESCAP. 8. ORDNANCE None exoended 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None noted. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS No interviews. n. DATA SOURC Message : 2AC lt..4.55Z. DOCO 1S376, Mat 66. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was on a strike mission. They were diverted to a RESCAP niasion and dropped their ordnance on a secondary target. At about 21<*26'N/103*02*E, they aighted two possible MIG-21S 2 miles ahead, heading to Hanoi. They did not pursue the KlOa. Markings were unidentifiable due to distance. HIQs were at 2«»000 ft. 53 laWiW* i*»Vr'to-alr ordnance, HICs had eannona and fired unknown number of times at BLUE 2. No hits. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None noted. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS None. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUE U lU March 1967 Messages » Repor ts: Neaaagea: a. 7AP 2311332, DOCO-I81I3. Apr 66, OPREF-3 b. 250'>20 Apr 66. OIAAP-2 9208 • CINCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE flight was part of the strike force which was supported by the U.S. aircraft In Events 1-22 (F-la escorting a B-66} and 1-23 (P-4s on MIO SCREEN). These aircraft were not involved In this event. After attacking the target, BLUE Flight, which was the last of 3 or 4 strike flights, turned north to evade heavy 37min, 57mm and 85mm flak from the Kep area. During this maneuver BLUE 2 became separated from the flight. BLUE 2 was heading 290 degrees about 55 miles NW of the target when he observed 3 MIC-17s at 3 o'clock on a reciprocal heading. Two of the HIQs made a 18O degree turn and gave chase firing on BLUE 2. Although the HIGs chased him for 20 miles, BLUE 2 successfully evaded by using cloud cover and low altitude. BLUE 2 did not use afterburner. During the ohasc, BLUE 2 infomed the rest of the flight of the situation, but BLUE 4 did not hear the transmiaalon. The remaining 3 aircraft of BLUE Plight turned weat for the Red River and the turning point south. BLUE 2 rendezvoused with the rest of the flight on the Vest bound leg but by thac time the HIOs had broken off. I i I I i Event 11-12 ^-^ *J Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSOs va tvo HIO-lTs ft Rc3ult: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21»22*N/107»05*K PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 8 Hny 196G/160',;H Pi' - - B^UC flle^t had left the target after a strike and was heading toward Tonkin Oulf . FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER I k > /*■' Altitude Speed HeadlnK I-': (■ BLUE 1. 2, 3, 5,000 ft 450 kt , 110° |.< 'I . KIC 1, 2 7,000 ft Unknown 130* ; BLUE Flight In Plngertip-Four fomatlon S. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE Flight had received a e«ne»*al MIC alert from EC-121, J.. BLUE 3 detected MIG flight of two aircraft at 8 o'cloclc, about 2,000 ft above. #< : «i MICs crossed over and continued to 3 o'clock position, apparently not detecting BLUE Plight. ^' : 6. ACTION INITIATED The MIGs turned to close on BLUE Plight. BLUE Flight accelerated to 575 knots. MIC 2 attacked from 6 o'clock. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 1 did not know of presence of HICs because of bad radio receiver and continued straight and level. BLUE 2, 3, and H started Jinking maneuver. BLUE h reported that KIC 2 fired his cannon. During maneuvering, BLUE 2 took a snapshot burst at NIG 1 at 3 o'clock position. MIC flight withdrew with no damage to either side. 8. ORDNANCE (H p . flr«;d/ N o._ httO Bewarks Cannon ' BLUE 2 1/0 Snapshot during Jinking maneuver. MIC 2 1/0 Mlas. 1 1 % 11. DATA SOURCES I a 1 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS Radio coamMnieatlona very poor. BLUE 1 had no receiver. 10. AIRGREU COMMENTS BLUE 2: HIO attacked from above and showed low level of training/experience. During later events, the HIQ attacks were tsore aggressive and attacked from below. Project Interview !- BLUE 2, 15 March 1967. Reports ; CIHCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ^ BLUE Plight of U P-105S was returning from a strike mission when BLUE 3 detected a pair of Mic-173 at 8 o'clock. The MIG flight was about 2,000 ft above and crossed over to the 3 o'clock position, apparently without seeing BLUE Plight, BLUE Plight continued straight and level and MIO flight turn«-d to close. BLUE Plight accelerated to 575 kt. BLUE 1, unaware of HIG presence due to radic malfunction, con- tinued to fly straight and level but BLUE 2, 3, and 1 flew Jinking maneuver. MIO 2 attacked fron 6 o'clock position. MIC cannon fire was reported by BLUE 4. BLUE 2 fired snapshot burst at MIO 1 at 3 o'clock position turning Jinking maneuver. NIG flight withdrew, no damage. % Ewnt .11-13 Alroraft Involved: your F-lOSDs v* four lixa-17t • Result : Sighting only ^Idnlty of Encounter: 21*10 *N/104«30*B 1. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION OateAlme: 10 May 1966/1621H by eaKlfiiS^ "SfurJ^T^il RESCAP mission in t-o elfloenta when NIOs irere elghted ei!oJ dSwI SrSJ^unS ??ri. "^"'^ ^^"^ * 5. BLUE 3 had bSn 2. MISSION ROUTE Enroute to Odorn from a bofflblng mission in the vicinity of Yen Bal. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS BLUE 1, 2 Onknown BLUE 1, 5 nrop tanks i* ? external stores » silver color MIO 3. 4 Unknown 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Altitude Hesdiwe Fuel State BLUE 1. 2 7,000 ft 2250 ^0^ 2i!P/',5 " 225« 1200 lb «I0 1. 2 7,000 ft 3150 -! MIO 3, 4 — 2250 5. INITIAL DETECTION fJ-PJ 1 and 2 visually detected two MIOs at 9 o'clock. BLUE 4 detected the presence of MIOs by means of a MlO-tyoe armed vector mto t ^ «>'«l*>c>^ •» t»o -pecks at a rangJ^^Jf M^n Siw'and JlLlS fast. The location waa between the Red and Black Rivers. closing «. ACTION INITIATED ourve!^"^ * * '^•"end as MIO 1 and 2 began a slow 30» bank Into a pursuit to oloiS! ** ^* ***** 13 BLUE 4 and $ beeaiw low on fuel and departed for Udorn. BLUE 1 and 2 folloved a few ■Inutes later. BLUE 1 and 2 sighted two MIGa at 9- o'clock in a alow 30*> bank aa If in a purault curve. The HIOs closed to about one mile at 6 o'clock as BLUE 1 and 2 deaeended to 3,000 ft AGL and accelerated to Kaeh 1.1. The MlOa vera out accelerated. No attenpt «aa nude to engage the MlOa because of the low fuel atate. BLUE 4 detected the presence of MIQs by neans of a HlC-type amed vector. NIG 3 and I were visually detected at 6 o'clock as two specks at a range of seven miles and closing faat. BLUE 4 and 5 decreased altitude, BLUE 4 dropped tanks* and both lit afterburnera. They deaeended to the dock at 1.3 Naoh and lost the NICa. i pi. ii w 3 i i i r.. I i 1 !i 1 1 1 I I I I I I I I I B¥«nt 11-14 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs thres MIQ^lTa Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21«10*N/10l|«30*E ' I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION DateAlve: 10 May 1966/1800K BLUE Plight was returning from a bombing mission near Yen Bal. II. DATA SOURCES DXA Intelligence Bulletin 12. NARRATIVE 0£SCRIPTIOII BLUE Plight of four F-1058 was returning from a bombing mission near Yen Bai Mhen they encountered three MIO-lTs. The NIQ flight nade three descending turns over the flight coming as close as two miles. Apparently no firing passes were made. A flight of F-ts was Informed of the Hiti's presence. The NZO flight withdrew on arrival of the P-4s. 61 E»«nt 11-15 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s va four NIO-lTa Result: One MZQ destroyed and two F-105s damaged Vicinity of Encounter: 21*33 'K/105*37»E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 29 June 1966/I31OH Pour P-105S were on an IROM HAND mission In the vicinity of JCS Tarset 51 at 2l»lO'ii/i05»51'E. The fUght had left the target and was heading northwaat at *-5,000 ft AOL when attacked by four NIG-17s. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE Flight took off from Korat at 1215H. They headed north at 0.8 Kach and at lu.OOO ft to rendezvous with the Orange track tanker. After refueling, BLUE Plight headed northeast at 18,000 ft and 020 knots ground speed. The flight proeeeded past checkpoint Alpha and on to JCS Tarfr^t 51. 3. AIRCRAFT C0NFI6URATI0N P-105P, P-105D. P-105D. F-105D, Aircraft BLUE 1 BLUE 2 BLUE 3 BLUE i; All of BLUE flight camouflaged. 3 had vector equipment. Tanks (Inboard) two, itSO lb two, 150 lb two, 450 lb two, 450 lb BLUE SHRIKE (Outboard) one left, one right ^ UU-3A (Outboard) one left» one right one left mm right one left, one right 1 had vector and WILD VEASEL equipment. BLUE ii« ^* .^^ ***** °" "^"8 *iP» on vertical stabiliser. NO missiles or missile racks were observed. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Broken to overcnnt bet»wen 2 and. 12,000 feet.. Below the cloud base. the. HIOs were closing with 50 to Weather : ...^r-.. „ ^..^.w^cv wvi.n visibility was about seven miles. Altitude; 4,000-5*000 ft AGL Spe ed ; 1|80 knots ground speed State : 13,000 pounds Flight Formation; Two elements of two F-105s. BLUE 3 and 4 approxlaately one-faalf mild to rear and one-half nlle to rltfjt of BLUE 1 and 2. 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE «l sighted MIO flight at 7 o'clock at 2-3,000 ft. 70 knots closing speed at an altitude of 2*3,000 ft AOL. 6. ACTION INITIATED ^trr^ V'^^H^^'^ffJ^} warning. BLUE 3 called for a hard left break, carried out by BLUE 3 and 4. BLUE 1 and 2 apparently did not hear the warning. ««Tiea ouc oy 7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT on .Ji^Ll/i"^' ^^"^ J " 3 and 4 break and dive, mo l and 2 continued on and headed for the lead element. (MIG 3 and 4 followed but did not take active pSS in i^^l'l E ^ ^ ***** *'*«^ * 1 sighted the MIO flight at 8 Sitw 5 :**S',5*^^*'* ^° ^l^^^ 6° afterburner, and Jattlaon ordnanea. MO 1 hit BlS 2 S^ot d^ wo"?? overflew the target and ended up at «LUE 2>8 12 o'clock. Meanwhile, MIC 2 attacked BLUE 1 causing damage. BLUE 4 engaged NXO 4. flrlnc 200 rounds of 20nm. blue 3 closed on MIO 2 and fired a fleeting shot! nnng zug BLUE 2 departed due to damage and BLUE 3 left to cover BL'vE 2. BLUB 1 took a lens range shot at two departing HIQs. " 8. ORDNANCE Ho. Plred/No. Hits SHRIKE cannon BLDE 1 BLUB 2 VO 1/0 1/1 Remarks Plred SHRIKE at SAM site. Site went down 40 seconds after launch. No BOA. Shor*: burst 20mm, no damage. 200 rounds. Conflmed MZQ kill. 8. ORDNANCE (Cont'd) No. Flred/»o. Hits SHRIKE eannon BLUE 3 BLUE H MIG 1 HIG 2 1/0 1/0 VO a/1 1/1 Event 11-19 SHRIKE fired Into the blind. 100 rounds of ZOosni range 2,500 ft at high angle off. 200 rounds* no damagn. Missed BLUE 3» damaged BLUE 2. Damaged BLUE 1* 9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS hlE. EJl^fwL*^.'?? f?r*^!?"°" °" °^ cockpit and one ahell through cockpit. Theae wtes knocked out all instruments except engine Instrumenta but Including the sun slcht and tbe oxygen equlpoent. MIG kill make In spite of lack of gun sight. *^ Communication problems between aircraft prevented effective HIO warning. )0. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience BLUE 3 Total Hours 3100 P-105 Hours lOOOt Combat Missions 25 Had no formal air-to-air training for 13 years. Qualified on DART twice a year. Would have liked to hava had better pombat training including more air-to-air practice. BLUE 3 stated the P-105 needa better turn- ing capability and a panic sMaiu to get Into alr-to-alr mode. The equipment worked fine. BLUB l,2,k Not Interviewed n. DATA SOURCES Project rnterview! BLUB 3, 6 January 1967 Letter ata teieent ! BLUE 2, 20 February 1967 Messages: 7XF/MMCC/2291150Z, 29 June 1966 7AP/OPBEP/Z291235Z, 29 June I966 7AP/OAI/C300226Z, 30 June 1966 7AF/AI0 913/0250627Z. 25 September 1966 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION To - BLUE Plight is divided into two elements of two. BLUE ? and H folloifinff «hA..<- . t..i*- . mile to the rear and a half-mile to the rijcht All ar« flvin* «?^Mk; -Hi f »bout a half- ''^ approximately ^.aS^kSoS'groJJJ SJleJ'' Sful'J'^fS^tJS MJ^llSt :u;iSSe"iJ%^?o1,JSo'?e%%' * ^ 3.Sio^f«t!"J„d"if l l^A^A^aS i MIO warning and BLUE 3 calls for a left break. AoDarentlv BLtm 1 T2 - BLUE 3 and k continue their diving break. BLUE 1 PAdia* mm b, nttt^^ ^ This sSni snieS%sss'2?s ^ittI jr?SrS«i:"(p«?t'i;«"i;?«''rj ^'^^ '^''^''^^ J«JgJd MS instruments, except eSg^'„:\^2jSS:iU:^^iJ^ IfM^SS MIG 2 fires at BLUE 1 and hits him^ in the vertical and horixontal 8tablll«.r Event 11^15 BLUE 3 ends br«ak after 270 of 360 degree turn and find?, he Is separated from BLUE 4. BLUE 3 heads Into clouds to lose any MIOs which may be attacking. Tk - BLUE 2 announces he la damaged and heading for Point Alpha. BLUE 3 acknowledged, said he would meet hlro there, and engages afterburner. T6 - In heading for Point Alpha, BLUE 3 sees MG 2 on tall of BLUE 1. BLUE 3 takes high angle shot at MIO who executes very sharp break. BLUE 3 dfsparts for Point Alpha. T7 - mo 3 Joins with KIG 2 as BLUE 1 fires burst at long ranee. Ho damage. Official weather forecast puts clouds at 5 to 12.000 ft. But both BLUE 2 and BLUE 3 mention clouds as low as 2,000 ft. The scattered clouds alternately helped and hindered the BLUE Plight as both sides uael the available cover when necessary. mm REO BAHOW CVEIIT H-13 SUWHAHY TIM Nark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, 3. 4) Other Friendly Communications. Enemy Actions (MIG 1,2) Remarks Statu* Action ^0 4-5.000 ft A6L 4B0 kt ground speed Straight and level Fuel 13.000 lb 84 catching up to flight sights 3 NIG-17S et 7 o'clock at 2 to 3.000 feet A6L. at approx1> ■ately 2-3.000 ft range. (A fourth H16-17 Is trailing by 4 lilies) 81 .2.3. flying straight and level , 84 : nlbs at 7 O'clock." 83: 'Are you sure they are HIGs?" B4: "Damn right," nio riignt closing at 50-70 knots. Apparently Bt and B2 did not hear transal sslon . 83.4 full after- burner Hard left break and dive to 1,000 ft AGL 81,2 continue straight and level. 83: Break* hard left." ni Ti res AC HI6 flight con- tinues on to 81 and 82. 1 81 and t btglfl Itft turn 81 sights NIG flight at 8 o'clock 83 and 4 In hard left break. 83: "Glad you called the HIGs." 81: "Brtak loft, go to aftorburnort* •nm jemson ordnance." MIG Flight closing on 81 and 2. HI daaagos 62 . H2 damages B1 . » Transmissions not heard by other element. 84 cones out of break at 2.000 ft 84 attacks N4 81 attempts to evade M2. 82 slows down as result of damage. 83 seeks out clouds to 1 cse any HIGs on tall . Nl overflies 82. N2 chases 81. H3 closing on 82. H4 avoids B4. B2 loses 1ostru> ■ents and gun sight as result of da«- age. 82 fires at Ml . sees flashes In left wing root. H2 at 10 o'cio k and H3 at 6 o'clock and closing. Evaded by diving Into broken clouds . 81 attempting to evade H2. 83 circling In clouds. 84 attempting to reacquire N4. HI hit. Rolls over and does Sptlt-S Into clouds at 2.000 ft. M2 and 3 continue after 81. N2 considerably ahead of M3. H4 departs. B2 credited with confirmed kill . 9 ' h 83 goes to afterburner to meet 82* 82; hit. I'll see you at Point Alpha. " B3: "Ooger. will meet you when I can." As above. » ( I I RtO BARON EVEWT ll-tS SO»IHABY TIM Nark Action Alrcrtft (BLUE 1. 2, 3. 4) Status 83 sights ttZ on t«11 of i\ . Fires 100 rounds at high angle off. Cannot turn with M2. Exits to Join B2. B1 circles and closes on H2 and K3. Ffres at HiGs at long range. Action Other friendly Comoun i c. t1 ont Eneaiy Actions (NI6 1.}) H2. makes very tight left break. N3 Joins with H2. Revarks Event 11-16 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs one HI0-J.7 ■ Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21«40»N/105*30'E * 1. PRtMARV MISSICK AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: Mid June 1966/unknown BLUE Plight was on a strike mission against Thnl Nguyen 11. DATA SOURCCS Project Interview: BLUE 1-5 January 1967 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was Inbound on a strike mission against Thai Nguyen. They were heading In direction north of Thud Ridge ?t an altitude of 1000 ft AOL and at a speed of 500 knots. BLUE 2 sighted a HIO at 10 o'clock at 5 to 6,000 feet AOL, 3 to 4 miles out, And.headinc In a w*stcrl. direction. As the r-lCZ-s- had been instructed to hit the target- «irst. they did not engage. Die KIG did not maneuver either and passed at a ran« of 3 to 4 miles. - NIQ warnings had been broadcast but none were of any eoi^sequence to this flight. Event II«17 Aircraft Involved: Two P-l'05« w two HIG-lTs. '. Rei»ult : No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21' 36*H/10y 20*E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: Late June or early July 1966/150OH BLUE flight of four P-lO^s were part of an P-105 strike force bombing a preselected- target located at 10 "30* N/105 e37'E. BLUE 3 snd 4 had separated from BLUE 1 ^nd 2 during a maneuver to avoid a SAM. 2. MISSION ROliTC BLUE night departed Korat and Joined ORANGE ANCHOR tanker for prestrlke refueling. BLUE rilght proceeded to check point near 22"N/10't''37*E and on to target near 21*'30'N/105*'37*E. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION BLUE 3> 1 Empty AER rack and two mmpty 450 gal tanks HZG 1, 2 Silver color 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Scattered eunulus north of the Red River. Visibility 10 plus miles with hare on the deck. BLUE 3 and H Altitude ; Approximately 1000 feet ACL Heading ;' Northwest Speed ; 500 KCAS Fuel State ; 75^0 pounds Internal 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 3 sighted two :^Ii'-l7s at 3000 to 4000 feet AGL, traveling at a speed of 400 knots and In a close formation, itange not reported. Bearing: 12 to 1 o'clock. MIGs were identified by their high titil and their silver color.' There was no MIO alert. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 3 called "Bogles at 12 o'clock high." BLUE 3 and 4 pulled up, went Into after- burner, and chased the HICs. (BLUE 3 noted they were in afterburner for "a long tine.**) 7. SITUATION OEVELOPN^ BLUB flight had reached a position 30OO reet to the rear and 1000 feet over the MIC's 7:30 sector. BLUE 3 told BLUE 4 he would take the one on the left. BLUE flight rolled and dove on the KIGs. At abcut this time the MIGs broke left. BLUE fired 3C0 rounds at MIO 1 while BLUE ^ fired 200 rounds at KIQ 2. Neither BLUE member csuld hold his sight on his MIO sr. BLUB flight disengaged by breaking (4 to 5 (t's) to the right. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 3 300 rounds 20om No damage observed. BLUE 4 200 rounds 20mM No danage observed. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 3: Radar would not lock on target. It apparently was locking on the ground. BLUE 4: Sight did not have a reticle and also could not get a radar look on target. 10. AIRCREW COKKENTS Eaperlence Total F-105 Combat Hours Hours Wleslons Remarks BLUE J UdO 600 BIS Very little ktH training, had fired at CART 3 or 4 times. BLUE 4 .Not Interviewed——* CoBgperita or. thlc Knccunter BLUE 3 felt this was a minor engagenert In that the two flights sort of ran Ir.tc each other and one made a pass at the other and then left. When asked why he dioenpiceed, he stated that he felt he was In a bad position so he broke it off. He knew he hac a speed , advantage and was capable of getting away. If he had hao an airplane that could maneuver - Event IX-17 with the NIG, he would have stayed and fought (unlesn such action was contrary to SOP). BLUE 3 18 or the opinion that it doesn't make sense to slow down with the NlOa or to get Into a dog fight with a MIG-I7 because of its sianeuverablllty. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interview ; BLUE 3, 6 Jan 1967. 12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTtON To.Ti- BLUE flight of four P-105s bombed a target at approxlnately 21** 32'H/105° '»7*E. As they were coming off the target at 2000 feet and a speed cf 500 knots CAS, BLUE 4 sighted a SAM and gave the warning: "Missiles, 9 o'clock, br10$D ■ vs two mo-zis Reault: No donage Vicinity of Encounter: 21oiS*N/10S«48*E 1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: ? July 66/1615H One P-105P (BLUE 1) and one P-105D (BLUE 2) on an IRON HAND mlaslon. BLUE 3 and 4 ground aborted. After BLUE 1 and 2 launched, a opare waa launched to fill In for one of the ground aborts. However, after the spare Joined the flight. BLUB I decided not to take a three ship flight on the misaion due to the HIQ environment and sent th* spara home. BLUE 1 and 2 then proceeded to North Vletnaa. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE Plight departed Korat, refueled in Orange Anchor, and flew to 21«55*N/104937*B (Ml of Jfen Bal, and down the south side of Thud Ridge toward Phue Yen. 3. AIRCRAFT CUNFIGURATIONS F«105F BLUE 1 and P.lObD BLUE 2 2 - AGH-45 on outboard stations 2 - LAU-3 on Inboard stations 650 gal tank on centerllne station BLUE 2 had radar vector gear MIO-21 MIC 1. 2 Dull silver color with no marking KIO-l had 2 air-to-air oasslles (probably ATOLL) 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTtR Weather; Clear with 13 mi visibility except for cumulus buildups over Thud Rldga extending down to the mountain tops. ^ BLUB Altitude ; 7000 ft AOL Heading ; about SSS" gP*5<> - 450 KCAS Fuel State ; Unknown Plight Formation ; BLUB flight in left turn o BLUE 2 500 ft out, aome distance back and slightly higher. 5. INITIAL DETECTION «. ^^'^-i * MIQ-21 at 7 o'clock, low and called that a MIO-21 was attacking the flight. The MIO, when observed waa about 5*000 ft behind BLUE 1 but was ovartaklnK rapidly (at about 100 kt). ^ 6. ACTION INITIATED As the HIO paaaed over BLUE 1 the mo rovorsed to a right turn In an 11 o'clock hl^ position to BLOB 1. BLUE 1 also reversed hla turn to the right to follow the MIO. 7. SITUATION DEVCLOFNENT After reversing to the right, BLUE 1 saw another NXO-21 close behind BLUE 2 and tracking. BLUE 2 then broke left and down, (never sselng the KIO) and oxitad In after- burner at low altitude. BLUE 1 continued to turn right and descended but was outtumed by the MIO. The MM ended up at 3 o'clock at about 90« angle off and with theae conditions and 2.000 ft ranae, the MIO fired two alr-to-alr mlsailes at BLUE 1. BLUE 1, who was now unloadlns In after- burner, obaerved the missiles to pass to the rear. 1 accelerated to high speed and low altitude and the HIOs were not seen again. BLUE 1 and 2 subsequently rejoined and continued the mission without further Incident. 8. OAONANCE BLUE 1, 2 MIQ-1 Event II.19 No ordnance expended Ho cannon ordnance observed No. flrgd/Uc. hits (aA Missile) 2/0 Remarks Missiles fired at high angle off. 9. EQUIPNENT PROBLEMS BLUE 2 a. Jettison circuit nalfunetlon - oould* not Jettison outboard stores. b. Visibility severely United due to condensation around outside of canopy at high Mach. An Inherent characteristic when flying in moist conditions. 10. AIRCREW CONNENTS EKperienee Votal Hours Conbat Hours Combat Missions BLUE 1 Front Back BLOE 2 2,000 >Unfcnotfn- 239 •Qhknoim- 15 Hemarks Pour years/1500 hours In B>52. Cottnents on this Encounter BLUE 2: In the high speed dash to evade RED 2, BLUE 2 had to slow down to decrease the condensation around his canopy and consequently Increase his vlstblllty. BLUE 2 estimated that RED I had approximately 560 kt on the first pass and this * surprised him because he thought that the llia>21 was limited to 500 kt at low altitude. Comments from Overall Experience BLUE 2 felt that BIO EYE did little more than garble up Guard Channel. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLOE 1 Backaeat (9 Har 1967) BLUE 2 (5 Jan 1967) Messages. Reports : Letter from BLUE 1 Backseat (July 1967} Letter fMm BLUE 1 (7 July 1967) 7AF 071650Z July, DIO 29957 7AF 0717Q2Z July, DOCO-0 22483 7AP 07133'(Z July, DOCO>0 22483 OIA Intsuffl, 8 July 1966 OS^ ri^.t;r Veapons Center Bulletin CAD-7 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ^^'^iJ ^^°!? "^^^ nl*«lon. The mission route extended In the general direction of 155" along the southern side of Thud Ridge, and near the end of thud Rides. ^^"^ fli.&ht received a strong signal and pulled up while B-1 lalmehed t^'*^?? missile. After missile launch, BLUE Flight started a left turn back to the north. BLUE Flight was at 8-12,000 ft altitude at about il25 KTAS. nor»n. BLOE 2 sighted a MlG-21 closing on the flight at high cpeed with about 100 kt over- 2"** alerted B-l. The MIG was at BLUE 2«8 7 o'clock, and at BLUE 1-8 6 o'clock 5 ■ 000 ft behind BLUE 1. Hw MIO was passing from BLUE I's t o'clock to his 10 o'clock £uE*i "* '° started slightly below BLUE 2, the MIO passed above * Due to the approach of the MIQ, it appeared that the MIO had been directed on a OCl out'S front* " »• MO overshot B-1 and 2, and pas'ed AS the NIO passed, BLUE 2 attempted to Jettison external stores and track the hlQ for ?-ffTi5* **f' "oj**"' 2 «a» too busy with the switches and could not simultaneously Jettison stores and setup for an attack, before the MIO passed out of range I! (I (I Ik ♦ * I:: event IX.19 «Tn passed BI,UE FUght, to the left, he started a right turn. Thl« put tba ma at BLUE I'a 10 o'clock position but high above BLUE 1. At this time BLUE 1 also started a right turn to stay with the MIG. The MIG was not observed to fire durlnK this pftss ■ QTitir ^i*"^ ^ ^^'^ °" outside of the turn when the flight was turning left, but on BLUE 1 8 right turn BLUE 2 ended up on the Inside. As BLUE 1 started to turn to the fifnS^i *'nrne''r''*?/^"i^ ^LfJ^^l ^ o'clock at 2,000 ft range and apparently tracking ^t^^ £;«^^"Lf . '^^^^ 2 to break and BLUE 2 did so. although BLUE 2 never saw V. * . ^ ^ indicates that his instructions were for BLUE 2 to break left, although BLUE 2'8 actions were described as a break to the right.) ""usu BLUE 2 executed a naxijnuin g descending turn to the deck, simultaneously going to afterburner and Jettisoning stores (except for the outboard stores which huns). BLUE 2 descended to treetop level (about 500 ft) and accelerated to Nach 1.1. He went up a valley through the clouds over Thud Rld^e. BLUE 2 left the Ridge on the north side, turned to Sy cJoisfng bJ?k oJer T^l Jldge'*''^""*" subsequently Joined on BLUE 1 with a DP steer, . ^ ^ continued to turn right, with BLUE I continuing to descend - • — blue l however, so that after ^irl ?£ ^'^^ angle off to BLUE 1 and at BLUE I's 3 o'clock position. The MIO then slnultaneously launched two air-to-air Bilsslles from 2.000 ft ISri*LL«d^d°«i^ f S'T; '^!!'* "^"^l" P*^"*** behind blue l, as did the MIO and reachinrs^o kJaI S„ ^K^^fr^****,^" afterburner) away towards the clouds at low altitude. bl!I ? 5«^J J J? altitude was reached. The MIO was not seen again. BLUE 1 was now heading back to the northwest on the south side of Thud Ridge. »r,H ^til*^ "^^i) ^' crossed back over the Ridge, the flight turned around Sf« B?nS ^°!:"-^^f "^'^se to continue the mission. Just before lea^ng the mlMlSn t[:?i.?'rout'ei:"SSrin'i?ei:r'"'"* """'^ " ' ^s..rS a" 1 .1 1 81 Brmit tI-21 JUrorftft Involved: Part (a) one F-105 ve tw> KI0>21s • Pert ()>} one P-105 va two Result: No Damage (One F-105 destroyed when aircraft ran out of fuel — pi lot recovered}. Vicinity of Encounter: 21*30 • H/105* 40 'E 1. PRIMARY HISStON AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 11 Jul 1966/0705Z BLUE flight > a flight of four 105s was on an IRON HAND SAM BUppreaslon miaslon 25 mil en northeest of Hanoi. Two separate engagements occurred In the vicinity of Thud * Ridge as the flight Mas egresalng the target area. 2. MISSION ROUTE The route of flight was from Takhll* direct to the tanker » direct to the northwest end cf Thud Ridge, and eaat to the Kep area (northeast of Hanoi). The egress route was back to Thud Ridge, southwest across the Red River to Takhll. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F-105P BLUE 1. 3 2 - AQM-45 1000 rd 20iam y-105D BLUE 2. 4 2 - LAU-3 rooket pods 1000 rd 20an All 1058 6S0-gal bold} bay tanks. MI 0-21 2 - AAM (Icnown) Aircraft silver with Red Star on wing. No- drop tanks . 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Broken clouds » 5/8 coverage, bases 3 to 4000 ft, tops 6000 ft, 5 miles In hase below clouds, clear and 7 miles plus above elouds. BLUB Plight had Juat attacked a SAM site and the flight had become separated frosi each other. All four alreraft were 4)proaohing Thud Ridge from the east individually. BLUE 2 BLUE 4 Altitude : 6000-7000 ft HSL 6000-8000 ft MSL Heading ; SSE 250" -270* Spegd : ISO XCAS 350 KCAS ?uei State ; Bingo Bingo Plight Pomatlon : Single Ship Single Ship 5. INITIAL DETECTION Mio warnings had been received; however, they ware not ealled in the same area that BLUE Plight was working. a. BLUE 2 sighted two unidentified airoraft at 12 to 1 o*eloekt 4-5 mileat whieh he asaumed to be members of his flight. b. BLUE 4 sighted two llia'21a at 4 o*eloek» 2000 ft hlgft. in a pursuit eurte attaek. 6. ACTION INITIATED a. BLUE 2 dosed In a tail ehaae atteiyting to join on the two unidentified airerftft (MIO-218) assumed to be friendly. b. BLUE 4 Jettisoned tanks and pylons* went afterbumert and dived atraight ahead* 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT a. Vhen BLUE 2 had closed to i^proximately 2 miles one of the then identified HZ0-31a made a hard right climbing break and the other MIO continued straight ahead. BLUE 2 Jettisoned external stores, went afterburner, and initiated a hard right 180 degree turn. As BLU?: 2 started to roll out of this right turn he saw a NIQ-21 "canopy to canopy" approxlraately 30 degrees ahead, 500 ft high and to the right. BLUE 2 then broke right, down, and under, rolling out "on the deck" and egressed the area auperaonlc at minimum altitude. - Event 11-21 »«fe l;-*I[i*rh!''S?n!"K"!I^ *° ^£?/^*^* * ''^^'^^^ ^"'i continued around to SJi - This MIO broke up and to the rlc^t and BLUE U reversed h?s ^;'^SrM?*T'^ *° ''••P ^" 'T^'^ tJeBan deccendlng in 2000 ft SeS Irf Vr^SiS"'? '° * ^ ^^^-a^l position, ind Ri fiF h J2l The MIO started down throuEh the clouds or. a northerly heading SSe t^-liH°?%?^f cllBbing turn toirarde hone. After establishing a climb; " iil il !^?*? to clear his tall and saw the other MlO-21 approximately 2000 ft behind JS-^StS JK^^e position. As BLUE k went to afterburner and broke hard left and down! St^h R?nr aT^ air-to-air missiles which appeared to track to the left but could not • i"" passed behind the P-105. The Hia broke up and to the left rolling BMi^ J Li*'?.!!?'* "versing direction for a northerly descent toward the clouds. Although ?o^ii SKT'* * Poaltion on the MC by pulling up and rolling out over the aSa considerations required hln to disengage and egress froa the B. ORDNANCE P-105 — Hone. MIQ-Sl — One WQ-21 fired two AAMs at BLUE 4. 9. EqUIPNENT PROBLEMS ♦..rf- r.'. ? ^ modular cooling. I?P, and all flight Instruments during his low altl- tude supersonic egress. The fuel quantity gauge was also suspected to be malfunctioning. fhm hl^h^S Si?'?^^*"^*^ failure during the strike on the SAM site. TOO bomb bay tank would not feed normally due to a continually popping circuit breaker. 10. AIRCREN COMMENTS Experience Total P..105 Cosibat ^o"Pa Hours ■ Missions Reaarks ^ 3000 350 31 Considerable tactical fighter experience * * — «w>t aTailable — Considerable tactical fighter experience. Hrn. "!f-! '^^5*w^* **** •fl«lPP«d with AAMs he mi«y have had a shot at the KEOa. Also he would have been nore psychologically prepared for an Sr-to-alr encouSter. The turning radius of the MIO-21 caught BLUE 2 by surprise. .»t.,^!ll*^?'S°P' aircraft was completely obscured with vapor from 2 to 10 fi^ Sy.Sifi/MiTJi?*".," ^1 T" supersonic on the deck. This prevented hin from clearing his 6 o'clock position to determine if the MIO had disengaged. BLUE 4 commented that he thought the maneuverability of the P-105 at hlah an«*d rs?sjoJS%s?;i°'' s"*^- ^^^^ ^^^^'^ mJt^c^ wjen L'iaSis tsrSio.s 6 o'clock position, he was too close to use an AAM. Both pilots coii«)lained about the eoavUcated switch settings reouired to ehanoe froa the ground attack mode to the air-to-air attack node. "quireo zo cnange rroa tt. DATA SOURCES Project Interview ; BLOB 2 (2 Peb 61) and BLUB 4 (6 Mar 1967) Messag es ; omP-3 DOCO-O 22712 Jul 66 AP Command Post Message S-12-02. 12 Jul 66 DAI Message 29966 Jul 66 Oet 5 Udom Thailand Message 30666 Jul 66 nSAP Plghter Weapons Center Bulletin - 7. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION a. BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 initiated a follow-up gun and rocket attack on a vlauaiiv SS!;*S«?i?t'5SliIS'Sf*?5Af*^? a"""**- ^^"^2 became sepj;;"; Tron Ms^iaXer a. both aircraft pulled off the target and entered a cloud Jinking to avoid heavy aa and automatic weapon fire. BLUE 2 broke out on top at 5-6.000 ft on a IwterlJ SadlnT toward the northern edge of Thud Ridge and requested a DP steer from BLUE I AftS' Sri?!/5 ®° ^'f! ^''^ indicated DP heading, BLUE 2 Hw two dots of aircraft in the distance on a southerly heading toward Thud Rld^. When the two aircraft J^dJ a iSft turn to parallel Thud Ridge. BLUB 2 becaiee concemedUnd asked BLUE 1 if S wariS 1 llrt turn. When BLUB 1 confirmed a left turn. BLUE 2 initiated a cutoff to Join Inl nSnJuvSred fl?!!?.VSiS»i?g,?"".P<'»-.ti o« k sdle, be hind the two aircrart n5w n^ng iSw^JhSS^wSr' aoout 3000 rt above the RidMlnyHBia^BLUB 2 dosed to a 2 mile- trail position. Event 11-21 approximately 2000 ft ..low the aircraft he realUed that tS'y.nHeS'iwJuSlJs He then noticed that hla reticle was °' . that Instant the air- arrangements did not believe he -aa set up Jj/Jj* J^^^f JJ^ other aircraft continued craft on the right broke »^arply up and tc the right ana the J^JJ^ identified. Obscuring all rearward visibility from 2 o'clock and JJ." a, crossed Thud tinuing a full military climb to 35.000 ft. ^^J^"*" '"^r.| " aTieS hiriFP was inopera- descending through Uooo ft. b BLUE H became separatcJ irom the flight as the flight * Inlill ^ finoff ft area or"uraulJS Clouds for a foUow-up attack after BLUE 1 launched a SHRIKE 2000 ft high and closing in a pursuit attack curve from J j'jlock. S^Jf^Jj^i^SJiJ^^'^SSS tanks and pylons, went afterburner and accelerated to 600 KCAS in a straigm -^/""^ f? BLUE ? broke hard right and continued around In his turn to meet one of the HIGs Je^d-on BlSJ 5 dW not See Ihe other MIG at this time. When the MIG broke up and to the Jight! BLulTreversed his turn and entered a climbing left turn to ^Je MIG 1" sight. ^o^? rnn5?ro!rs^pJs.Jiit:if Lsrft b-eninS rn^iiT^ vy^ -rbH° ?s iri; • mer tsiablishing-a 0^1^^*^ Resetting the fuel circuit breaker. BLUE 4 banked SS'to cUlr"lJ tin aSd saw the other MIG-21 approximately 2000 " behind him in ■"perfect- firing position. BLUE H went afterburner and broke hard ^•f* ^J^"*?"" J/" th* MB launched two alr-to-alr missiles. Although the missiles appeared to Initially JSJrf ?r«SJSj ?o ?he left! llVE ^ believed that the hard break at 600 KCAS J«n and Into gr"nS ciStter defeated missile guidance and caused them to pass observed detonation. After firing, the MIQ broke up and to the left, '^^""S over the too and reversing direction for a northerly descent toward the clouds. Although BLUE u h2 Mhlwid I t«ll position on the MIG by pulling up and rolling out his leS turn, fuel cSnslderatlons required him to disengage and J'^^ ^"Jj. BLUE ""as able to successfully feed out his bomb bay tank by continually rwettlng his circuit Seaker. He made a no-radlo recovery at Udom with 200 lb of fuel renaming. Event 11-22 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs on* MIO-21 . Result: Sighting only Vicinity' of Encounter: 2l'*38'H/lO*'50»E • I. PRINAftV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 11 July 1966/Unknown II. DATA SOURCES MessatTes. Regorta ; Message 7th AP lit225«2, WO 0003, July 66, Part IV. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION A MIO-21 was sighted by BLUE Flight (four P-1058) at Zl^aS-N/lOiiosO'E near the Black River. The MIC was low beneath clouds on a 120° headln,{. When BLUE Flight turned toward the MIQ. the MIO turned to 50» and then to a 310* heading. The MIO was lost in clouds before BLUE Plight could close. No markings were observed due to distance. / Bvant 11-23 Aircraft Involved: Eight J'-IOS* va four MlO-lTs • Result* One P-105 lost; one P-105 damtgedi three HIO-lTa daouged vicinity of Encounter: 21»13'N/105»'»8'B 1. PRIHARY HISSlOli AMD TACTKAL SlTUATlOri Date/Tine: 19 July I96S/16IIH Pour fllghta of four F-105 aircraft on ROLUHG THUNDER niaalon to atrlke JC3-51, « POL storage 7% nl north of Hanoi. Ttte flights were one to three minutes apart and follow- ing Identical route. The first four F-105* (BLUE Plight) and the second flight of four P-lOSs (GREEN Fllirht) were the only flights to engage hostile aircraft; however the third ?Ug^J iaf vJ.'al^SUhtlng of th. Lcou^ier. Two^RON HAND flights t^J-i;5a) *nd t^elr supporting MIGCAP flights (F-i^Cs) were within 25 n ml of the target, one flight north and thS other northwest of the target area. Also ABN/OCI EC-121 aircraft were supporting the strike mission along with B-66 ECM aircraft. Por the location of theee alreraft, see Figure 1. 2. MISSION ROUTE Sixteen P-105s Including BLUE and GREEN Pllghta departed Takhll Air Base for pre- strike refueling on Orange Anchor track extended N to 20o direct to 22«>N/104O32'E direct 21«U5'N/105''13'E direct target 2I010 •O8"N/105°59 ' 21"E. After crossing Red River and proceeding on a 135" heading at '4,000 ft, four missiles were observed converging on BLUE Flight. Missiles were evaded by changing altitude and heading. Plight eontlnuea through heavy small arms and BSnn fire to vicinity 21013'N/105'>'»8'E where aerial encounter commeHced. BLUE 3 and * became separated from BLUE 1 and 2 JI9'N/105''13'B. Post- strike refueling was on Red Anchor. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-IOS BLUE 1. 1 5 - 1000 lb OP bombs 2 - 450 gal tanks BLUE 2 .4 - 1000 lb QP bombs 1 - camera pod 2 - 450 gal tanks BLUE 3 d . CBU-24 2 - AIH-9B 2 - 450 gal tanks Lead aircraft I?P on, TACAN plus doppler. All aircraft eamouflage paint. P~105 GREEN 1. 3. 4 2 - 3000 lb bombs 1 - 650 gal tank oenterline QREEN 2 4 - CBU-24 2 - AIM-9B mO-lT 1. 2. 3, 4 Silver color with Red stars and had afterbumera. No external ordnanee or tanks. MQ.17 5 (This aircraft net engaged, visual sighting only) Silver color Underwing drop tanks 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS rniOR to ENCOUNTER Weather ; Clear, visibility unlimited BLUE Plight QREEN Plight Altitude: 4000 ft AOL > 4^00 ft Speeo ; Puel S 480 kt • 480 kt State : UrJcnown Unknown Plight Formation BLUB Plight not clearly determined. They probably started in normal fluid-four Event 11-23 formation, aircraft lined abreast. 500 to 1500 ft out for wlngmen and 1500-3000 ft betveen lead anc. No. 3. During missile evasion the elements became ooparated. the exact distance of Sfsparatlon Is not known. GREEN Plight formation was fluid four, aircraft abreast, wingraen out 50C-1500 ft. 5. INITIAL DETECTION Missile and MIG warnings were Issued on Guard Channel according to alrhorne QCI aircraft's log. However, BLUE and GREEN Plights did not receive warnings according to their reports. BLUE Plight was approaching Initial Point (IP) and had been Jinking to E^^lf"? senerally heading 135" at 4000 ft with BLUE 3 and H a short dis- S?? ^ Plight ono to three minutes behind BLUE Plight. Three I? approached BLUE 1 and 2 from 6 o'clock position, slightly higher than level with guns firing. BLUE 2 was the first to observe MlCs and called then over the radio. BLUE lead eonfinaed. Tiise of initial engagement 1611H. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 2 called out MIGs. BLUE one trans[r.itted "Roger nils - clean it up." BLUE 1 and 2 Jettisoned all external stores and broke into the firing MIGs. This is estimated 5f,« f S'^*'^?''' relative MIO positions in their attack formation la not known. BLUB 3 sighted NXCa attacking BLUE l and 2 and initiated a gun pass. ««»wn. 7. SITUATION OEVELOPNENT «^ -Tn^"^ ^.*™*o«o'*!I**if '"^» *«*^ * o'clock firing. BLUE 3 closed on MIGs, got a 90 deflection shot with gun at MIO 2 and observed pieces fly from the left wing and a puff of smoke. MO 2 broke left, leaving encounter, leveled out and started '^^t**^^"* toward Phuc Yen airfield. BLUE 3 and U continued after MIQ 2 While BLUE 1 and 2 attempted to gain advantage of MIC 1 and 3 . BLUE 3 set switches for l*4nc»»e<» 1 at MIG ? U.OOO ft in trail at 3-4000 ft AGL. Missile J5!;j^*irJ%S*!?4fK^fr""?V?? JPP^"'"'^ guidance. As MIC 2 started turn BLUE 3 launched l^ll^Lt^'^f ^^\fhi target. Suspected reason for miss was mlsalle g limits exceeded in turn. BLUE 3 continued attack with gun, observed no hits. MM 2 broke Sharply for ground causing BLUE 3 to overshoot. BLUE 3 and 4 then continued to target. BLUE ?^~J^T.5^r the encounter started. OREEN 1 asked BLUE I if he needed any help. BLUE 1 replied "No, hit the target." As GREEN Plight passed the encounter GREEN 2 SJnn'Jf*2 ^^FL^'"^.^''"'^ ""-178 -going around In circles in a lufberry at 3 to Jwge" • "^"^ contSuS on to (Prom this point, the statements and reports are conflicting and confuslmt. All ■iMibers of BLUE Plight are "Missing in Action" or "captured" and were not available for iSlST following is one logical sequence of events but the timing is not con- crotely supported by all reports and interviews.) BLUE 1 and 2's ensuing encounter with MIO 1 and 3 lasted for 13 to 15 minutes. Maneuvers in "dosflBht" reached from near the surface to 7000 ft and from point of initial encounter southeast to Phuc Ten airfield, with the majority of encounter in Ti^lui^H ^ «» l «™* 2- Maneuvers rRjpr^Srn*:^ H??^ turns- with maximum pcwer and -scissors." During this time period. GREEN Plight hit fraggea target, probably ahead of BLUE 3 and U. During OREEN Plight's delivery of ordnance. BLUE 1 requested assistance from both strike and CAP riignts. GREEN 3 and * came off delivery run and proceeded NW towards foothills north !?" "^T! \ V^J "potted, engaged in tight turns at 500-1000 ft oler the terrain at the 6 o'clock position of BLUE I and 2. All aircraft were at low UJI!''!? ^^y^ 1 and 2 losing out. GREEN 3 and H rolleo in from above the MIOs at high airspeed, fired gun at MIQ with no results, overshot, and yo-yo'd up to kill off airspeed and attempted to keep engagement in sight. GREEN 3 and i< lost sight of encounter in turn reversal at top of yo-yo and proceeded south toward Phuc Yen A? Green 1 JndTl SSf ordnance delivery. OREEN 2 was hit with ground fire. Since Q-l" orinlnle ms for flack suppression, and not required, it was dropped on trains in target areas. Thla caused separation of OREEN 1 and 2 and raquired a period of time for GREEN 1 and 2 to get rejoined and determine extent of damag> to GREEN 2. t.r-^^'ii^ ?!!J5?HVr? ! ^•J°^"lne' BLUE ? and 4 delivered their ordnance on fragged target and turned H toward Phuc Yen to answer BLUE I's rail for help. After OREEN 1 and S??\SS7^°'/i:'* "^^^^ ^^"^ 3 and II proceeded northward. bLue 2 in st«p im t^J was hit (believed but not confirmed to, be MIO rire). BLUE 2 broke rlKht and stated h« h»d h!'; ^ ^'Hf* ''"'^ ^" ^^^^'^^ B^"^ 2 alloSlSg blSI ? to gSJ'SeSlnS MIO 3 and damage horizontal stabilizer of MIc 3 with 20mm. MIQ 3 then broke of f bLUF 2 after aald he had to get out" and ejected at approximately 21-22»M/105o<»U'E. A beeo^r vaa heard from * parachute soon after BLUE 2'3 ejection. BLtJB I then hit bJ MIO fire and transmitted that ha waa over Phuc Ten with MIO in tall and hadbeen hit. OREEN 1 and 2, now rejoined, were directed 2. observing HlOa on BLUB 1. attacked frc 92 llE 1 to his position and OREEN 1 and ock with gun. QHEEN 1 started i i lir oi oi Oi a: Q fl a' I! a, a Event 11-23 firing at 3000 ft range and fired down to 50 ft damaging MIO I'a right wing, MIO I broke left causing GREEN 1 to overshoot. GREEN 2 with missiles attempted to track and turn with HIG 1 but was unable to track KIG using 6 gs. MIG 1 departed engagement and enabled BLUE 1 to disengage by use of afterburner descent, outrunning MIG 3, As BLUE 3 and «l approached Pbuc Yen to aid BLUE 1, MIO U was encountered heading east- ward. BLUE 3 and 4 rolled In behind MIG ii with BLUE 3 firing as the encounter crossed Phuc Yen airfield fron East to West at 50O-100O ft. BLUE 3 overshot and MIO 4 broke off and headed South. N'o nits observed. This encounter was witnessed by GREEN 3 and H as they crossed Phuc Yen after their pass at MIG 1 and 3 behind BLUE 1 and 2. The North Vlets were firing 37n.-n at MIG-« and BLUE 3 as they crossed the airfield. BLUE 3 and 4 made another sweep around Phuc Yen observing a fifth MIG with underwlng drop tanks. This MIG not engaged as BLUE 3 took a hit from ground fire and was below bingo fuel. GREEN 3 and 4, encountering heavy flak, egressed area also. 8. ORDNANCE (He. rired/No. hits) 0LUE 1 BLUE 2 BLUE 3 ORESU 1 OREEH 3 MIO 1 MIO ? MIQ 3 ■ AIH-9B 0/0 0/0 2/0 2 0mn VI unk/unk 3/1 1/1 l/l 23/37irjn yes/yes yea/no yea/yea Reaarka Hit HIO 3 with one burst ZOmm. Pilot did not return froa mission, but not suspected that he fired. Plred two AIH-9B at NIG 2. First missile did not guide. Second missile did not hit. Sus- pected exceeding "g" llsiits. Hit MIO 2 with 20mm. Plred second 20BBn burst at MIO 2. No hits observed. Plred 20bui at NIG i| with no observed hits. Hit MIO 1 in right wing with 2Qmm. Plred zona but observed no hits. Hit BLUE I with cannon fire. Plred at BLUE 1 and 2., no hits. Shot dom BLUE 2. 9. EQUIPNeNT PROBLEMS Malfunctions BLUE 3 GREEN 1 First SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B) headed for ground, no apparent guidance , Cunsight grossly out of calibration. Shortcomings 1. Conanuni cations difficulties lue to rar^e limitations, altitude (poasHble terrain masking) and single frequency usage by all strike and support aircraft. Neither NIOCAP aircraft nor strike aircraft heard MIO warnings issued at 1«I28, 1555, l601L on niard ijJJitloilal aircraft. All aircraft indicated radio equipment fulS BLUE 1 called KIOCAP for help on strike frequency but MIOCAP did not hear BLUE I's call and remained unaware of engagement. MIOCAP was 18 ml from sngagenent at altitudes varying fr« 3000 ft to IM.OOO ft supporting iron hand Plight. Altitude of BLUE Flight durins engagement varied from 500 ft to 7000 ft. NIGSAP is expected to react immediately to a eall frcMs strike aircraft and NIUCAP la on the aame frequency as strike alreraf.:. Frequency extremely crowded during engagement. 2. Inferior maneuverability of the P-105 against MlOa la. again, wall established by the HIOs being able to make seven passes agalnat BLUB 1 and 2 before aaking a niataka. Alao GREEN 2 was unable to gee eight on aaneaveritig NIG ualng 6 ga. 93 to. AIRCREW COHHENTS E»perlence OREEN 2 Total Hours 500 P-105 Houra 300 Coatat HlSBlona «5 Event 11.23 Alr-to-air exptrlence P-IOS checkout Nellls. One dart ni salon » One AIK-9B firing. Experlinee unknown OREEN 3 Connenta on thla Encount er Radio connunlcationa were all but lapcsalble due to the entire atrike force, ECN» VIU) WEASEL and Navy OCX aircraft being on the aame UHF frequency. When engaging enemy aircraft and evading SAN activity the frequency cannot be used effectively (ORE*'^ 3). There were Indlcatlona of ground control of the MIQs. The entire operation waa unusual. First, they encountered SAHs, then heavy flak, then the MlOa and i* mqs QREEN 2 'a Impreaalon that thla waa a coordinated effort against the atrike force (uREEN 2). NIO pilots weren't looking around enough (GREEN 2)« GREEN I should have got MIG* almost collided with him. Gun Bhooting to right (QREEN 2). Reaaon for QREEN 1 making gun attack rather than allowing OREEN 2, who was configured for alr-to-alr (2 AIM-9B), to make attack unknown. "OREEN 1 did what waa natural,^; l.e.> GREDI 1 saw NIQ and went after Mm. (GREEN 2). Comment from Overall Experience Too many switches to change to set up mlaallea and gun. {GREEN 2). HIOCAP mlsalona were not useful to strike aircraft. They were uaually toe far away to be of any help. (OREEN 2) The importance of having the N-6l cannon for HO eneountera at low level haaaeling cannot be overemphasised. (GREEN 3) 11. DATA SOURCES Project' Interviews ; QREEN 2 S Jan 1967 Message s ; TAP OPREP 3. 1121152 Jul 66 DOCO-0 23171 3S5TFW Aircraft Mishap Report. 0 191157Z; DOC P-66-S0625 Jul 66 TAP Pastel; 2210u7Zi DOCO Pastel 197 Jul 66 7AP Plap Item Report, Z2302'>8Z; DOCO 23316 Jul 66 Other ; Letter, OREEN 3 Letter, Member of third flight of four P-105*s against target JCS-51 USAP Fighter Weapona Center; Bulletin - 7 12. NARRATIVE OE^CRIPTIOK aLUE and OREEN Plights Ci F-105S ea) were the first and second flights of four flights of P-105S fragged to strike JCS target 151 (POL storage 7-8 n ml N Hanoi) on 19 July 1966 at l->3 minute intervals. IRON HAND, MIOCAP, CCI and ECH aircraft were In target area to support strike. Both BLUE and GREEM Plights had SAHs fired at them paaaing the northwestern end of Thud Ridge. SAMa were evaded by both flights but separated the elements of BLUE Plight (lead strike flight). Missile and MIQ warnings had been issued by airborne OCX but warnings were not received by Strike or MIOCAP aircraft. At the SE end of Thud Ridge approaching IP, three NIC-178 attacked BLUE 1 and 2 from 6 o'clock slightly high. BLUE 1 and 2 jettisoned ordnance and broke into KIGa allowing BLUE 3 who was a short distance behind to get a 90<^ deflection shot hitting HIO 2 who then broke left, leaving engagement, and started u slight climb heading toward Phuc Ten airfield. BLUE 3 and 4 pursued HIO 2 while BLUE 1 and 2 were engaged in a 15 minute "dogflghtf with MIQ 1 and 3. "Dogfight" consistca of "lufberry," "scissors" and hard turns with afterburner and ranged in altitude fron surface to 7,000 ft AGL. OREEN Plight, hearing and observing BLUE 1 and 2's encounter, offered assistance but were advised to strike tcrget by BLUE Lead 'which they did. BLUE 3 launched two AIH-9B8 at NIO 2, the first not guiding and the second missed possibly due to exeeedlug g limits. BLUE 3 made follow.-up gun pass at NIO 2 observing no hits and overahuotlng as Hip 2 broke sharply towards ground. BLUE 3 and I then proceeded to target and expended ordnance. HIO 1 and 3 accomplished seven passes at BLUE 2 heading- Jinking tc> avoid flak BLUE 3 14 short distance behind 81 A 2 82 calls HIGs. 81 confirais. 81 A 2 jettison stores and break Into HIGs GREEN Flight 1-3 Din. behind BLUE Flight. GREEN Flight 500 kt. 4.500 ft goes to full «1l power 82 calls HIGs. ei "Roger - HIGs - Clean ft up' NIG 1, 2 A 3 6 o'clock slightly high, firing on 81 A 2 IRON KANO. MIG- CAP, ECH 8-66, ABN/GCI on station Supporting strike HIG warnings trans- altted but not received by Strike or NIGCAP aircraft 83 A 4 separated from 81 A 2 due to evading SAHs fired at then earlier h B3 got 90* deflection shot Mith oun hitting N2 in left wing GREEN night closing on BLUE Flight H2 breaks left when hit, leaving encounter and starts slight climb toward Phuc Ven. H1 A 3 continue 6 o'clock B1 A 2 Pieces fly from M2 left Ming with a puff of smoke. HtGs silver In star markings and equipped with afterburners . HIGs had no ex- ternal stores or ordnance. 83 & < 3-4,000 ft Bl A 2 Altitude and A/S varying B3 & 4 behind H? 4,000 ft 83 launches AIN-9B at K2 - No guidance B1, 2 engaged In lufberry and scissors with HI, 3 GPt:ei night. passing 81 & 2 Engagement, con- tinues to target. G2 sees B1 A 2 and HIGs 82 sees 81 A 2 and NIGs GREEN 1 asks BLUE 1 If he needs help. 81 ^Negative - Hit the target" HI . 3 overshoot and reposition H2 wings level , slight climb AIM-9B headed for ground after launch 1 1 83 launched second A1H-9B at N2 turning left. No hit 81 , 2 In lufberry with HI, 3 GREEN Flight accelerating for pop-up M2 starts left turn causing nissllc to niss Second A1N-9B miss possibly due to exceeding g Units RED BAROW tVEWT 1 1-23 SUHMART TUe N«rk Action Alrcrcft (BlUE 1. 3. 4) Comauni cat Ions Eneny Actions (HI6 1,2) Renarks Status Action Other Friendly T4 B1 I 2 altltadt froi surface to 7*000 ft In dogfight B3 nade follow-up gun pass at M2 ' No hits observed - overshot B3 i 4 head for target &1 i 2 continued engagcaent with N1, 3. GREEN Flight - pop up and deliver ordnance. Haxlnua Alt 12 - IS, 000 ft ab^ve ground H2 broke sharply B3 to overshoot. H2 heads south disengaging Target 7-8 n ml SOUvn rrluC T€n Airfield G2 went nisslles air on weapon select; search and attack on radar for sight, selected outboard stations. (Earlier checks had obtained good grounds on the aiisslles) 63. 4 cllnblng 63. 4 off tareet, heed for Phuc Yen to eitlst 61. 2 61 6 2 losing engage- ■ent 62 dalivers CBU on trains In taroet area. 61 A 2 separated 63 A 4 deliver ordnance on ' target Bl cells for assistance HIS CAP does not hear Bl request for help HI A 3 Mile a total of seven passes at Bl A 3 during 15 nin engagcfaent Haneuvers In .dog fight "lofberry* "scissors" and hard turns T. s 63 1 4 nake gun pass at HI 6 3 behind 61 t 2. 63 t 4 overshoot and yo-yo up lossing :1ght of engafienent and head south. No hits on Ml 4 3 observed B3 A 4 off target, heed for' Phuc Yen SI A 2 trying ta rejoin 61 end G2 teU Mblle trying to Join up ni a J aaintaining advantage behind Bl A 2 1 », B2 hit (probably by H3) breaks right hard causing M3 to overshoot 81 gets behind N3 and hits N3 horizontal stebUlser Mith 20n 61 A 2 rejoined heed toward Phuc Yen B3 1 4 spot H4 heading east approaching Phuc Yen 62 calls he has been hit "An head- ing out 240o" Bl A 61 talking to establish contact N3 ovfrshoots B2 and rolls beck in on B2 allowing 61 to get In position at 6 o'clock M3 » BED BARON EVENT Il«23 SUHHj^Rr Tin* K«rk Action l^lrcraft (BLUE 1, 3, 4) Stittil Action Othtr Fritndly Connunlcittons Enemy Actions (MIG 1,2) Rtatrkt 83 ft 4 500 - 1.000 ft B3 I 4 behind M firing htading east - no hitt observed - overshot B1 1i hit by Ml't ftrt 63 i 4 observe 83 ft 4 In trail with N4 over PhHC Yen 82 calls ho has to get out B1 calls over Phuc Yen, NI6t In trail and havt been hit H4 breaks and heads south N3 breaks off 82 and gets behind B1 HI hits B1 tflth cannon G1 ft 2 1S»000 ft 350-400 kt In left hand torn B1 trying Ml 1 S to tvado 61 Makes gun past at Ml 62 trying to got on SI wf ng 61 ft 2 approaching engagenent Fuel state 6000 lb 83 ft 4 nake sweep of Phuc Yen after breaking off M 63 ft 4 encounter heavy flak over Phuc Yen and egress area 81 vectors 61 ft 2 to his position 62 sights Ml ft 3 calls 61 and continues calling NI6 positions 61 does not answer HI ft 3 In one nlle trail with B1 : Ml6s In left tarn at 3000 ft. HI6S at cruise speed 82 ejocts 10 83 ft 4 fuel below Bingo 61 hits Ml In rt wing and overshoots 62 tries to turn Mith Ml for nlsslle shot but cannot get In alsslle envelope (-*^6g) 81 lowers nose and lights afterburner 83 hit by ground fire 83 ft 4 stert to egress HI breaks hard left causing 61 to over- shoot HI disengages and departs M3 trying to catch 62 looses his position In the turn, has to use A/8 to catch up since gets separated by 2 at G2 configured with AIH-9BS set up switches for missiles but 61 kept lead, electing a gun pass rather than using 62 nissi les 63 or 64 has fuel Malfunction Parachute beeper heard after B2 ejection 61 opens fire with gun at 3.000 ft and ceased fire at approx 50 ft alnost colliding with Ml. 61 gun sight grossly out of calibration. 6unshootlng to the right. d CP' RED BAROW EVEHT II-?3 summjcv Tine H«rk Action Atr cnft (BLUE 1. 3, 4) Status n Action Bt outruns H3 disengag. Ing and egresses area Other Friendly 83 A 4 spot NS In turn over east end of runway of Phuc Yen biit do not attempt to engage Gl « 2 lose sight of HIGs so rejoin and strafe trucks In area of engage- ■ent prior to eg resslBfl Connuntcatlons Cneny Actions (H16 1.2) M3 cannot catch 61 H5 over east end Phuc Yen does not try to engage Remarks MS had under wing drop tanks No attempt at RESCAP Indicated Reason for no RESCAP unknown l£2 \ 1, Event H-2« Aircraft Involv«d: Pour P-lOSa »■ two MI0-178f Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: Unknoim PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTUAL SITUATION Date/Time: July 66/unknown ■JS"5hJ;/i!I; " "PPO*"* «f aircraft in the Phu Tho/Viet Trl area. 2. MISSION ROUTE Unknown 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-105 Bl. 2. ^. a 1 " Guns (Pull . 1,029 rounds) 20aa WIG-IT MIQ 1, 2 Quna 4. FLIGHT COKOITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: 3,500 ft broken Altitude: rieading T Speed: 1-5,000 feet 2ii0» 540 kt Unknoim Speed ; 1*1161 State ; Plight Pormation ; Unknoim 5. INITIAL DETECTION i.t i:hS^SJ?4^iJ?^\''*? heading 24o' at 5*0 kt between 4 to 5.000 ft .when B4 aaw two MI0-l7a at the flight's 6 o'clock poaltlon and flflnr. « nxu *i» C. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight broke hard left and selected afterburner. J. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT None, no encounter. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4 MIQ 1. 2 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS Unknown 10. AIRCREM COMMENTS Bjtperlence Unknown. Commenta on this Encounter None CoBmentafron Overall Eaaerlenee None Quna No rounds fired Unknown rounds fired Remarka MIOs did not hit any aircraft n. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; B3 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ch« ^^^^ ^^iP**' outbound after making a run on a SAM site at 4-5.000 ft. headlne 240* T ""-^^2 ^ "'•^"S- called f5r a left KJak?' IHe' ?iiSS ^rKS^J af'^^^^i^rner and went into a hard left tarn and descended under the broken iSJr ^^^^ disengaged in the turn and headed back for Hanoi- BLUE Plight then cor.tinued on with the aiaalon and returned safely to home station. lOT Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105= vs two "bogpya' Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21*30 •M/105'35'E 1. PRlMARt HISSION AHO TACTICAL SITOATIOM Date/Time: 20 July 66/03i>0H BLUE Plifsht (four F-lCi5s) from TaSthll enroute to target In Package VI-A 4. FtlGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ERCOUNTER Weather unknown Altitude; BLUE Flight ft, 000 ft . 130* 540 rrAS Unknown Heading ; Speed ; Fuel State ; Plight Porinatlon : Unknown 5. IKITIAL OtTECTlOM ^ BLUE Plight indistinctly spotted bogeva at 3 o'clock slightly high, heading 270 . 3 mllea away. 6. ACTION INITIATED The two bogeys turned to approximately 060* and launched two a^^^-^O'? "i"^^"* BLUE Flight turned into the attack and the nlaalles approached from 2 ® clocit and pas3ed behind BLUE Flight without detonating. The mla a Ilea were co match BLUE Flight's turn. The launching aircraft rcsalned about 3 mies away, than broke off the attack and were loat vlaually. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE Plight turned on course and proceeded to their target. 8. ORDNANCE Mo. Flred/tlo. Hlta AA Missiles . 2/0 Remarka Passed behind BLUE Flight RED Flight U. DATA SOURCES 7AF 200855Z July 66 DOCO-0 2320i, 7AP 2011»* • cloud 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT l.ft. BLUE • thougS? o5??tSn!; afS^i'.!; , •"J'"",?"! """"^ aescndlnj to th. tj. Cloud, h. ../„ioi ;t:=.°;;;r^^''aorfrJ.''?? . ;oS.''"SSe rh»i «? sssi'h^Jnj' 8. ORONANCE BtWB 4 - approx. 60 to 180 rounds of 20imn cannon. — no hits WO 2 - 2 alr-to-alr missiles > — dldn»t guide; no hits igstlfluited to be AA.2/A by 7th Air Force - DIO 0055 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None mentioned. Sv«nt 11-30 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Eytjerlence ! Total 105 Combat Hours Hours Missions BLUE 1 5000 200 20 BLUE 2 BLUE 3 UnknoMn— BLUE 4 3800 650 ConnffntB on this Eneouncep: BLUE 1 - 11500 hours Jst time, No forul gunnery school. Korea experience. F-80» P-86, B-52» B-47. BLUE 4 * Thirteen years In Jet. r-80, T'.33» P-84. F-100. n. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : Interview with BLUE 1—1 Feb 67, and with BLUE 1—5 Feb 67. Wessaeea^ Reports : 230825Z, TAP, DOCO 23352, July 1966 22153OZ. 7AF, DOCO 23353, July 1966 222236Z, TAP, DIO 0055, July I966 USAP Fighter Weapons Center Bulletin 7. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIOR BLUB Flight was returning fron a strike nlsalon on a secondary target. The primary target was not hit due to weather. The flight was at 17,000 ft, .85 Mach, heading 3W when BLUE «J saw two bogeys at 5 o'clock. The bogeys seemed to be following the flight, BLUE * notified the flight. BLUE Flight went around a cloud (there were cumulus buildups to above 23*000 ft), and the bogeys followed. BLUE 4 now saw three bogeys and identified them as NIQb. blue Lead called for a gentle left turn to keep the KlGs in sight and BLUE Flight dropped tanks and went to AB. MIQs 1 and 2 then fired two alr-to-alr rockets or mlaailea at BLUE 1 and 2. Missiles probably were Soviet AA-2 or 2A type of olaslles fired at a bad angle and near clouds and thus failed to guide. (Reference: 7th AF OIOD) BLUE 4 called the missiles and BLUE Plight broke left and down to a cloud bank. BLUE 105s (Blue Pllsht) from Takhll were on a strike mission. 11. DATA SOURCE 355Trrf 2505'»52 Jul 1966 12. NARRATIVE Blue Flight was e^resoing from a strike when they received alr-to-alr vector signals from 9 o'clock. They s&h two bogeys two miles awcy . The bogeys began a pursuit curve and Blue Fli^t broke tov;ards the bogeys and Jettisoned external tanks* then reversed and dlsenc:ared to the south. Evvnt 11-32 olved: Pour F-105a vs two mo-lTB Resui^^9Vl p-105 daiaaged 1 KIO-17 danaeed 1 KZO-17 posalble damage Vicinity or Enqounter: 21"il9*IlA04"42*E 1. PRIMARY NtSSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Dat^/Tiine; 12 August I966/IO88H GREEN (4 P-I05a) and BLUE (3 P-105s} rUghts had eonvleted their prloary atrlln alaalon against the La Danh POL storage area and were egresslng as separate flighta northwest of Thud RldRt when GPIEEN 1 was hit by ground fire and ejected. GREEN 2 Jetti- soned his external tanks to RESCAP GREEN 1. The remaining members of OREEN and SLUE Plights continued egress for RESCAP refueling and returned to relieve QREEN 2 who then departed for home with BLUE 3 aa an eaeort. 2. HISSION ROUTE GREEN Plight departed Takhli AB, Thailand, refueled, and then proceeded on a north- easterly heading to the target ar«a (La Oanh storage area). After Btrikin^ the target GREEN Plight proceeded northwest oi' Thud Ridge to approximately 21°'(9'N/10>)°42*E where GREEN I was downed, thence to the refueling area and back to this location.) BLUE Plight essentially followed this same route approximately 5 minutes behind OREEN Flight, Joining with GREEN 3 and 4 during RESCAP refueling. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION P-105 BLOE 1. 2. 3 2 - 2000 lb or 3 000 lb bOBba* 1 - Centerline tank 1 - N-61 Oatling Oun, 20am (1029 rounds) P-105 GREEN 1. 2. 3. H 2 - CBU-Zft* 1 - Centerline tank 1 - N-61 Oatling gun, 20Dm (1029 rounds) MIQ-17 MIQ 1, 2 1 - Qun (23nmi), clean wings No camouflage, dull silvtr color. Rod 3tar on wing. 4. FLIfiHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Broken to scattered building cumulus. Bottoma at 3000 ft and tope at IJ75?nPl5»il00 ft. QREEN 3. 4 BLUB 1^ 2 Altitude : 5000 ft 10.000-1$, 000 ft Heading ; Left Turn Left Turn Air Speed ; 300-350 KCAS Unknown Puel State ; Blngo Uttknown Plight Formation ! BLUE 1, 2 about 3-5 n mi behind OREEN 3* 4. 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE Flight waa in a left bank when they sighted 2 Kia-17s at 11-12 o'clock, ranc» of 2 n ml. trailing OREEN 3 end 4 in attgek position. «. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 warned GREEN Plight of KIOs and after QREEN 3 confirmed preaance of MlOa behind him at a range of about 1500 ft, QREEN 3 and 4 droppod tanks and beaded for tho deck in afterburner. BLUE 1 and 2 turned Into tho attaek with BLUB 1 dropping tanks and 2 keeping his tanks. 7. SITUATION OEVELOPNENT OREEN 3 and 4 split left and rl0tt, rospeetlvely . Then OREEN 4 turned on NIG 1 iriio was behind GREEN 3. GREEN 4, however, received some hits from HIO 2, yet waa able to continue attack of MIO 1. Neanwhile, BLUE 2 was closing in on MIO 2 and when he fired KIO 2 broke sharply left into clouds, which previously OREEN 3 had done. BLUE 2 does not know if he hit MI3 2. Meanwhile BLUE 1 was after HIO 1 who had aomahow gotten off of OREEN 4 '8 tail and both of them (NIQ 1 and BLUE 1) when Into elouda as obsonrod by BLUE 2 ^Dropped on target prior to fdO ongagement. «i Event IZ-32 8. ORONAllCe BLUE 1 BLUE 2 . GREEK 3 GREEN 0 NIO 1 NIO 2 Ho. PlredAo. Klta 1/1 (damaee) 1/0 0/0 1/1 (possible damaee) Bewarka Plred 157-507 rounda Plred 700-750 rounda Plred 580 rounds Unknown no. of rounda fired 1/1 (danaged C4) 9. EQUIPRERT PROBUNS BLUB 1, 2: Oun oaawrt film oane out black (apparently unespoaed) 10. ikIRCREH GOHNERTS SEA Combat Mlsalona Unknown Unknown Approx. 60 Unknown Experience Total Houra P_-105 Houra KiUE 1 Unknown Unknown l-^^^ Unknown Unknown OlfflBI 3 Over 5,000 Approx. 400 OWSBH I Ohknown Unknown Ceaaenta on this Encounter ; BI.UE 2: Unable to track KIO In turn. iStlll had external tanka). Meed more maneuverability to esq>loy guna, uae of alaallea rsqulree lesa positioning. general Conments BLUB 2: SIDEWINDERS carried at tinea were in poor condition (i.e.. scratched or pitted heads, etc.) ■ the training received did not Include sufficient live firing experience but relied too heavily on simulation. He felt the concept of alr>to-«lr nlaalles was good but should be backed up with a good gun. the mrnlng equlpaent carried on-board la good but falae alarna (or Mfelgultlaa) should be eliminated. «i«"wi TWO men are not a neoeaaity for type of nlaaion flown. 11. DATA SOUrtCES Project In tervlewa ; BLUE 2 (16 Mar I967) and QREEN 3 (8 Nar 1967) TXP 12 175*2 August 1966, 0000-24192, SECRET 7AP 12 2300Z August 1966. DOCO-24207, CONPIMNTIAL 12. RAftiUTIve DESCRIPTION ORBEir Plight dropped ordnance on target as aeheduled. On the way home, fllaht Observed truck traffic and proceeded to attack. QREBM 3 thought he wL hit by gJound <^«P^''**d area as a preeaution aSS headlrfS a taS??^ OREEN 1 waa hit by ground fire on a subaequent paaa and waa forced to eJeet OffiEM 2 llZlr. " JetUaonild hia centerllJS tSk ao u to Siv In arei V*^ ■eantlme, BLUE Plight, which was about five minutes behind GREEN Plight, had iiLf5L**'P*' 0*^" i do'^- BI-UE Plight co: Slated of 3 S'^i!^*" J*"^*?"? ftlr-aborted prior to hitting the target. BLUE Plight proSeeSed SJjSr-ffKlJjSSi ^''•y *^*"»"e for RESCAP If needed. BLUE^ 2 J?S*f»«^ 3 « returned for RESCAP and OREEN 2 and BLUE 3 were sent home. BLUE 1 and 2 were flying at high altitude (10-15.000 ft) while GREEN 3 and 4 were fSing at low altitude (approx 5.000 ft) looking for the downed pilot. * ^ nying , ^^M™ ' ^" * 1 (L) sighted 2 MlOa on the tall of OREEN 3 end 4. BLUE 1 called the Information to OREEN 3 who at flrat thought th! MM wJe hla wlngman. Upon verification GREEK 3 mw that they had 2 MIGs at 6 o ■fjloek at a ranle of •pprcxlmately 1500 ft. GREEN 3 and 4 Jettisoned external stores, lit the StJrbSJSr and !?r«£2S«*?*^'***^''i down to approximately 700 ft altitude. GREEN 3 turned left 5?nJ?5I «*versed and got on the tall of MIG 1 chaalng OREEN 3. and thinks he hit MO I with cannon fire. , MIQ l waa firing at GREEN 3 but scored no hits as the NIC '8 cannon fire went over the top of both wings. GREEN 3 waa able to duck into a cloud and loot contact with the MlOs and the other P-105a. NIO 2. behind GREEN * wae firing at GREEN 4 and hit him on the top of the left wing with caAnon fire but OREEM ! waa able to continue. Reanwhlle, BLUE 1 and 2 closed on the two MICs who were stlll^warl ?^!?5'.S""r2?A ^^^'-^ \ jettisoned his tank but in the excltemenral^a did nSJ? SE5e X and 2 Chased RIO 1 and 2 with a left descending turn, and in doing so BLUE 1 was sand- SS*?.??*r "^2 ^ ?"J ^' ^ get into Attack posuJSn on «0 2 e^l clAU BLUB 1(L) to break out due to MIC 2 on hla tall. Still in a deacendlng left turn. BLUE 2 approached firing position on MIO 2 when the MIG turned harti and reallj' out-tuJJSd BLUE I. E-ii P tl I I I 1 1 I I I 11 I i Event 11-32 BLUE 2 fired approximately 700 to 7^0 rounds but th-sre was no Indication of a hit. BLUE 2 BLUE 2 broke off and up to -the rl^ht to get on top to be able to pick up HlOa a«:ain; th- «?rl!\L^l!!«b!5 i!?/^^'! ^^"^ ^ reported that he thought he had hit a MIO and that Lfi^'^K*'*'^ 1 2 rejoined and both refueled Ull^ll SriuS eft^Jn^r??"' ^° ^o"**' "»<^"« service ^as postponed to the IS ? Tu^"" unusable alnce they either were not exposed or under- expoffJd to an extent that they could not be Interpreted. f L*nJ«lL^°J"^'* °" returned hone, low on fuel. They had «o recover at Udorn since no tankrrs were available to them. I I i I Event 11-33 Aircraft Involved: Two P-1050e v« one MM-IT ■ Result: No danaee Vicinity of Encounter: 21»10'H/105»5*'B I. PRIMRT mSSIOII AHO TACTICAL StTUATIOR Date/n»e! 17 August 1966/1516H Tub P-105D8 from Korst (BLUE 1 and 2) were to attack JCS 51 » an oil depot north of Hanoi? BLijE nnd^ al? aborted because one of the aircraft had radio problems and the other escorted him back to base. 2* KISSION ROUTE BLUE Plight refueled over the Oulf . they then P«"««>«* "S***!***!* •SJl^ of Hanoi, turned north, passed Hanoi to the wist «PP«;<»*°»>«J ^^e target In a JJJtJJJ'* heading. The bomb run on the target was made from the South (I.e., a northerly headingj. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS BLUE 1 and 2 2 - iJ50-gal wing tanks 6 - 750 lb bombs (centerllne MER) 1 - M-61 Catling gun, ZOmm (1,029 rounds) BLUE 1 had ECM vector equipment (to provide SAM warning) MQ-ITA Quns SllTor In color with Red Chinese markings FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Clear with 5 miles visibility with slight base. Thunderstorms over the mountains . BLUE 1 BLQg 2 Altitude : 3.000 ft AOL J^Jnown P u el S tate ; Oaing Internal, but had B»tepnal tanks only . fuel in wing tanks Heading ; 090* 0*5« Plight gorniation : BLUE 2 behind and to the right of BLOB 1. 5. INITIAL DETECTION As BLUE 1 was pulling off target on heading of 090* , BLUE 2 caUed a MXG-IT eloain* on BLUE 1 from his 7 o'clock position at 5.000 ft. 6. ACTION INITIATED HIO was closing rapidly, firing at BLOB I. BLOB X fop deck and both BLUB 1 and 2 jettisoned tanks and went afterburner. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 1 accelerated away from MIO who continued to flro at BLOE 1. BLOB 2 got into the MIOs 6 o'clock position and closed range. He fired at the HIO but detected. BLOB 2 overtook HIO who was flying stralcht and level and barrol-pollod 200 foot over KIQ and flew straight ahead. 8. ORDNANCE Ho. fired Ao. Hlta Remarka ••t» 2 1/0 Bspended approximately TS - • rounds 1/0 NO hits moordod* 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLENS BLUE. 2! Could not got his sight on. Bad to use center of wind screen for sight. Ifaa mooting low. US Bvent 11-33 10. AIRCR!:W COMMENTS Experience Total Hours P-105 Houra Combat Hlsalona BLUE 1 BLUE 2 1500 Onknoim «50 87 Comments en the gneounter t BLUE 2: Everything happened so fast he didn't have time to set up for a gun pus. If they had had a fll^t of 4 they could have sandvlehed the NIO and perhaps gotten bla. NIQ did not have any alr-to-alr missiles. Believes NIG orbited target area and attacked froa a high altitude to catch P*105 by surprise. Comments frotn Overall Experience ; BLUE 2; Felt he had Insufficient quantity of training for alr-to-alr type engagements. Thought NIG-17 Mas not a threat to F-105 due to the hl^ speed on the deolc of the P-IOS. F-105 needs a better gun sight. Would like to have AIH-9 faired Into the wine tips such as the F-104. Didn't like the fact that tre radar didn't trork close to the ground beoause of the ground clutter. Considers BIO EYE Is a waste of time for MIG tramings. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interylewa t BLUE 2, 5 January 1967 Messages ^ Reporta : 7AP DOCO 2 tit 03 August 1966, SECHBI. Fighter Weapons Bulletin 7 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIOfI Tvo F-1058 (BLUE 1, 2) were on a strike mission to hit the Nguyen Khe POL storage area. Enroute to the target* the aircraft refueled over the Oulf. Shortly before reaoh- Ing the target after BLUE 1, BLUE 2 started to pull-up, BLUE I received a r*M warning on his vector gear. BLUE 1 descended to S,QOO feet. Jinking to look for the SAM. When none was sighted* BLUE 1 pulled up again to 12,000 feet and rolled in on the target to drop six 750-pound bombs. BLUE 2 was behind and to the right of BLUE 1. As BLUE 1 pulled off the target on a heading of 90". altitude 3*000 feet, BLUE 2 sighted a KIU-17A (HIG 1) closing on BLUE 1 at his 7 o'clock position and at about 5*000 feet AOL. BLUE 2 at this time was in the bomb delivery phase. BLUE 2 delivered his ordnance and during pullup saM MIG I closing on BLUE 1 and firing as evidenced by seeing a flame of the small gun In the MIO's nose and a cannon going off and sheila bursting. BLUE 1 and MIG were both In a alight left hand turn. BLUE 2 called BLUE I to "break - you have a MIG closing". BLUE 1 and 2 went to after burner and Jettisoned tanks. BLUE 1 headed for the ground, maintained 4.5 g's and 400 kt in a left turn. MIO 1 outturned BLUE 1 and continued to close. The MID fired when reaching range of 4000 feet and continued until the range closed to 1500 feet. BLUE 1 dove to approximately 5 ft AOL, so low he had to pull up to avoid rice paddy dikes. MIO continued firing all the way. BLUE 1 finally separated at Maoh 1.2. Estimated speed of NIG was 560 kt. In the meantime BLUE 2 started to chase the MIO and set up his weapons by setting the weapon selector switch from "bombs" to "guns-air", the radar to "alr-to-alr" and the radar to "radar lock-cn" In order to obtain range Information for the gun. BLUB 2 hit the button to reject farthest target but did not get a good sight picture. He then oaneuvered the airplane to place the MIO in hla windscreen and fired (approx. 3/4 second or 75-150 rounds}. At this point, BLUE 1 cut In front of the NIO and BLUE 2 had to eease firing. Almost Inmiedlately BLUE 2 pulled up and barrel-rolled approximately 200 feet above the NIO, BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 pulled away from MIO as NIO began to drop off at eomple- tlon of turn and BLUE flight had established a high speed on a heading of 325*. Both air- craft recovered safely, BLUB 1 had to refuel enroute home. I f I I •I ii ii I I I Aircraft Involved: Results : Event 11-31 IVo F>105Da V8 one or tHO. MZQ-lTs Ho damage (P-lOSs Jettisoned ordnance and aborted strike mission) Vicinity of Encounter: 21*»05'H/105'*55*E 1. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION DateAloe: 17 August 1966/1502H BLUE Plight Wflts on a strike mission enroute to the Nguyen Khe POL storage area. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Altitude ; 3500 ft Heading ; 315' Speed ; 510 kt 11. DATA SOURCES 7AF. 172019Z, DOCO ZftftlS Aug 66, CONFIDENTIAL TAP, 1714202, DOCO 24398 Aug 6b, SECRET TAP, 180039Z, DIG 30251 Aug 66, SECRET-HOFORN 12. RARRATtVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight, consisting of 2 P-1058 on a strike mission enroute to target (Nguyen Khe POL area) encountered one MIG-17 (possibly two MIG-17s}. At time of encounter, BLUE Flight was at 21*05 'N/105'55 'E , altitude 3500 ft, speed 510 kt, heading 315". Aa the lUO started to turn In, BLUE Flight attempted to turn left into the MIQ. BLUE 1 and 2 Jettisoned ordnance and tanks, but the MIO-17 continued to gain advantage. BLUE 1 and 2 lit afterburners and dove to 500 feet ending up on a heading of 90*. Contact with the MIO tiaa lost during this descent; no firing was reported. BLUE flight reported heavy flak cctlvlty Nhich continued during the MIO encounter and the MIQ as well aa BLUE Flight had to fly through the flak. AlxiP*ttil»f«li»17 MIC 1. 2 Unknown 4. FLIGHT COROniONS PRIOR TO ENCOUMTER Weather: Scattered cloude, good visibility. • IhSSd of BLUE 1. BLUE 3 and BLUE 4, OREEM, BED, and YELLOW fUghta wara In the Innadiata area. I. IRITIAL OETECTIOM ' ..^ *0BBd1 l"lInII°MO at BLUE 2«a 6 o'clock. Bott. BLUB 1 aM BLOB 2 bagan Baowiwarlng. 7. SITUATIOII OE»ELOPHE«T , BLUE 1 Mil .hooting. Si"* »,l>«"»l.yjj2J S?^ii S?md o*-i«"o8 flrliig «tth hl« b* laaa than 2 nln. 8. ORDNANCE Event 11-39 BLUE 1 fired two SHRIKE ACK-45 missiles. BLUE 2 fired about ?00 rounds of 20mra ammunition at a MIG-17 wh.Ue In 6 o'clock position on Mir at 400- to 600-ft range. ' Both in gentle left turn. BLUE 2 did not have a gunslght. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 2 ordnance switches were set up for air-to-ground attack 'sode. BLUE 2 did not sequence switches properly when switohlng to alr-to-alr mode, therefore, did not have a gunslght. " 10. AtRCRCH COHNENTS EKperlence BLUE 1 BLUE 2 Total Hours 3000 P-105 Hcwrs 600 Combat Missions 102 Korea 51 Vietnam. Re marks Pilot was very experienced. This was about 'o.ls 50th WILD WEASEL mission, Althoup.h this was his first MIO en- counter, he had previously evaded SANs, Tketleal reconnaissance and tactical fighter background. Not Interviewed Not interviewed BLDE 3. < OREEN. RED. YELLOW Cosmienta on this Encounter BLUE 2 - Pilot was encutobered by the complexity of swltehology In attempting to Change ffom air-to-ground mode to the air-to-air mode. Did not haw use of the gunslght when needed. KZO aarly warning would have been helpful. Cpemtenta from Overall Experience More turning capability in a fighter highly desirable. Veapon system should provide ranje to the target. Pilot experience was a predominant factor in the auoeess of the engagement. 11. DATA SOURCES Proleet Interviews ; BLUE l (Lead), 14 Mar 1967; BLUE 2, 4 Jan 1967 Message Reports : 7th aP/0?llEP-3/l8l52CZ Aug 66/DOCO 2440 OSA? Tactical Fighter Weapons School Bulletin No. 7 Oun camera film from BLUE 2. 12. RARRATIVE DESCRIPTION The mission consisted of four flights of P-105Ds and one ?-105P. The target was a POL installation north of Hanoi. The lead flight (BLUE) was followed by three other flights (GREEN. RED, TELLOH) . BLUE 1 (liiON HAND) was the strike leader. BLUE 2 was wlngman for IRON HAND and with the section, BLUE 3 and BLUE 1 were to provido protection for BLUE 1 (L) and to strike SAM sites in support of IRON HAIIO. BLUE 1 (L) was armed with two SHRIKE missiles, two 2.75" i>ocket pods and a 20inin Vulcan gun, and was carrying a 650-gal external fuel tank. BLUE 2 was carrying two i(50-gal external fuel tanks, two rocket pods (2.75") and was armed with a 20mm Vulcan Kun. Both alrDlar.es were camouflaged with white underside and green top surface. The mission departed Korac, proceeded east- ward, and rendesvoused with the airborne tankers. Refueling was completed on a northerly heading. The flight made landfall at approximately 19^22 'N/105o56*G at 4500 ft, 520-kt CAS and turned westerly. The four flights (BLUE, GREEN, RED, YELLOW) were In trail at about five-minute intervals. As BLUE flight approached the second checkpoint, in the vicinity of Kin Diem a large thunderstorm blocked the desired course. After starting to circum- navigate the storm to the south, BLUE 1 (L) reversed his flight and passed the storm to the north. In maneuvering to avoid the thunderstorm BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 became separated trem BLUB 3 and BLUE 4 and the fcllowlng flights caught up. The strike flights were no longer in flve-mlnute trail but were within visual range of each other. The flights descended to the deck and proceeded northerly ana passed directly over Phuc Yen. BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 climbed to about 6000 ft maintaining ^l^-kt CAS an they approached the targiet area. Tnere were scattered clouds with good visibility in thfl ^'' rgeL. area . n s 0 0 0 a 1 NARRATIVE OESCHIPTIOfl (COMTD) / j i^W rllf Tr i E t I SAM3 had been launched. VlJIariLhJlK! Jl^f;. lll^'Vi"" f^J"*""' received Indicated warnlnjs. The flieht bioJcI il^?? !;f f ^ ©• clock conflrnwd the electronic pasaed underneath? P'-^^*** "P ln*<» • cllmblnK turn aa a SAM afterburner In BLUE 2 Anifh.! \tl ^* <;^ncus3lon from the blast blew out the we« aiSUd^S«rifr|-„o*??^S:t^ lllZUZll {J^^iiifJiSSSa?^*^"'''^- at thesis ^te?"*; S^RijrSiaJ^S ;ilJ't?e'SoJ'Sf irS^'i'* 2'*^'* '"J"'''- mJ"iles called, "BUifi 2 you have a MIO w mIJ SJi - SMiP^i^f ^ Airplane In the area on BLUE 1, " °" ""^"^ tall." BLUE 2 turned hard left and aaw the Mio wai ordnaJ«lnd^?5ei JSk^^^flLSE^rt^tMlL^'^K?" " Jettisoned all remaining external KUh thelr^Sd!^° ^^""^ Observed to enter an Inverted dive and Impact P""^ through the fiuht without en^glng and deoavted the area. Ught'dLge^Jro''?' .'H?ar'lL3E'5%fru hid Z'^'l'l^'' ' . ^ 200 rounds of 20mn munition. P*"*'" ^^^^^ 2 had fired about 0ha„«e"^^Si\°L!L!^;:^un^"SJdr?S";rr^?o^J,5^:^^^^^^ to srr:^fux;inrcis2rTtJj!"-rjsf e%'j?;;j; ::ra""Enj-\"r^^««" J'wSriruJj' rhave destruction of the NIC. eiperlence was a predominant factor in the aueeeasful 0RE5N and -.KLLOi, Plight actions contained In Events II-36 and 12-37. 131 RED BARON EVENT II-3S SUMMARY Ttme Mark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1.2) Other Friendly (GRECN 1) Enemy Actions (NIC 1,2) Status Action Coanunlcatlons Remarks ^0 h\ SHRIKE (2) External fuel tanks (2) 450 gal Full ZUna ammunl ti on B2 2.75" rocket pods It) External fuol tanks (2) 450 oal Full 20aB fltnmunl tion 3500 ft 525-kt CAS B1.2 Sight SANs. Both Into burner, begin diving turn to the left followed by cliaiblng turn. CoaatAced evasive aianeuvers. 61 alerted flight to 1au:*eh of SANs. Launched SAHs. ^1 2000-ft to 5000-ft 450 to 5S0-kt CAS 81 and B2 ■aneuvered to evade SANs. B2 out In front of 81. SAN exploded between Bl and B2, blew out AB In B2. Bl Maneuvering to fire SHRIKE. 81 was control- ling flight with voice csTls. Launched SANs. '2 61 launched SHRIKE. B2 hard left turn Mhen alerted to NI6. Saw SHRIKE and NIG on 81. 61 called. "Bl you have a NI6 on your tail." NIG attacking 81. I ai I — ta I gia ( „ RED BARON EVENT 11-35 SUKHARV (CONT.) Tim Mark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1.2) iicn'^r rrienoiy (GftEEH 1) CooMuntcatlons Enenjf Actions (HIG 1.2} Reaarks Status Action Bl Jettlsonad external ordnance and fuel tanks. B2 Jettisoned external tanks and attempted to switch fros A- 6 to A-A. . B2 tn hard left turn. Bl broke left and doHn» accelerating In AS. S2 called 81 to break left. The NIfi Mas on 81. NIG attacking 81. Bl broke hard left, passed under B2. 62 fro« a position above and to the right of HIG naneuvered Into firing position and opened fire. 81 called. "Get the NIG off By tan.* HIG pressing attack on 81 and firing. B2 firing at .MIG. no gun- sight. Saw HIG burst Into flaae. HIG burst Into flam* rolled Inverted and crashed. '6 B1,2 Joined and departed the area. 81 called alert that other HIG Mas In the area. Second HIG passed close to B2 on opposite heading and cleared the area. Bvtnt XI-36 Aircwtt mvolwd: Four r-105Dt " two MO-ITi ReauXt: No damage " Vicinity of Encounter: 21»13'M/1I>5«5«»VB PRIMARY MISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATIOH ...,4u..«,uP l8 AugU.t W66- S.« Ev.nt n-35. • .trlk. group, W *«8U 2. HISSION ROUTE See Event 11-35. 3. AIRCRAFT COMF1 CURAT I OHS P-105D Unknown MIG-17 Cne WTO wa»',»llver pray In eoXor. 4. FLIGHT CONOITIOdS PRIOR TO SNCOUHTER Meacher: Unknown. QREEM Plight Altitude: aOO ft Heading : 120 Speed : 500 KTAS Fuel State ; Unknoirn Flight Formation ; Unknown :; ^^^^ ^ through. a headlns- of 090". 6. ACTIOH INITIATED No action taken. Plight lo*t alght of MIO 1. 1 SITUATION DEVELOPMENT ^ , MIC 2 made a quartering, head-on pass from GREEN a lu aa S-^*?*-* 1-^0 kiq 2, While in were not aeen again. IK DATA SOURCES Meaaages ; 7th AF/OPREP:3/1815202 Aug JJJJl 7th AP/OPREP-1/181721Z Aug 66/DOCO 2l«*7 Brent ZI-37 >lv«d: TWQ P-lOSOs va thiw* NIO-lTs RSsult : ^Wdaoaga , ' Vlelntty of Eneountor: 21*22 *N/105"50*B 1. ■ PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 18 August 1966/lfi03H Tvo P-I05D aircraft (YEIJXnr Fli^t) were the last of four flie^ts Into the target area (see Events ZI-35 and 11-36). After looking 20 minutes for the target, the flight expended their bonbs on a bridge and vera cgresslng the area when three HIO-lTa were encountered. 2. MISSION ROUTE See Event 11-35. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-IOSD YELLOW 1. 2 'MER on centerllne 2 450-gal external fuel tanks K-61 canr.on - full 20su9 annunltlon Doppler - on Camouflage paint WIO-17 MIQ 1. 2. 3 Silver color - No other configuration information* 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS RRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Ceiling over Thud Ridge at 4 to S*000 ft. TELLOW 1*2 MIQ 1 HIO 2. 3 Altitude ; 3iOOO ft ACL clifflhlng thru 4,000 ft Unknown Heading : 310» 310» Unknown Speed ; 450 KCAS Unknown U..iEnown PXiel~3tate ; Unknown Unknown Unknown Pllithfc formation ; YELLOW 2 TELLOW 1 TELLOW a Tm,LOW 1 ^^—^"'^-^^^ 5. INITIAL DETECTION YELLOW 2 BSM a MIG-17 pass the flight 1-1-1/2 miles to the left and climb up into a 4 to 5.000 ft cloud layer. YELLOW 2 called the MIO out to YELLOW 1. YELLOW Plight had not received any NIO warnings but had overheard other flights engaging NZQs and had aaan the airborne fireball of a NIQ kill. «. ACTION INITIATED A few seconds after fUO 1 went into the elouds, it descended from the clouds about 1,000 ft in front of YELLOW 2 in a nose-low attitude. TELLOW 2 did not have an air-to-air si^t so he pulled the nose up» pointed the pitot boon at the HIO and pulled the trigger. No hits were observed. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT MIQ 1 pulled up in a barrel roll of sorts and was maneuvering for position on YELLOW 1. At this time YELLOW 2 saw two more NIO-178 (MIQ 2 A 3) Just pulling in on YELLOW l*B tall. TELLOW 2 warned YELLOW 1 and the fUght jettisoned all stores, ignited afterburner and headed down and toward Thud Ridge. TELLOW 1 now had NIO 1» 2, and 3 behind hia and could see tracers going over his canopy. YELLOW 1 and 2 suoeesafullp outran the MIQ flight, and recovered at hoBM base with no further incident and no aircraft damage . 8. ORDNANCE No. fired/No. htta Cannon TELLOW 1 0/0 YELLOW 2 184 rd/0 Kia 1. 2. 3 Unknown rounda/O Remarka fired without gun sight iu.iwv«..pn,ii Event 11.37 9. EQUIPHEMT PROBLEMS YELLOW 2 Alr<-to->alr gun sight was out. No other |>roblems notea. 10. AIRCREW COHttENTS Experience Total Houra Unknown Unknown P-105 Hra Unknown 400 Combat Nlssiona Unknown 25 YELLOW 1 YELLOW 2 Commenta on thla Encounter YELLOW 2 Very surprised at the oaneuverabllltj of NIG-17. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Intervlewa : YELLOW 2, 13 Mar 1967. Messages, Reports : 7th Air Force/OPREP-3/l8a825Z. Aug 66/DOCO, 2*16. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION YELLOW 1 and 2 were heading approximately 310** near Thud Ridge at 3tOOO ft and 450 XCAS when a MIQ-17 was sighted at 9 o' clock » 1 to 1-1/2 miles, climbing. HIO 1 then entered the overcast, cloud bases at H to 5,000 ft. A few seconds later HIG 1 descended out of the clouds In a shallow dive about 1,000 ft in front of and above YELLOW 2. Without benefit of an alr-to-alr gun sight, YELLOW 2 pulled up his nose and using the pltot tube for sighting fired a burst of 20om. No hits were observed. MIO 1 pulled up into a barrel roll type of maneuver towards the 6 o* clock position of YELLOW 1. YELLOW 2 then saw two more MIQ<-178 closing on YELLOW 1 from the 6 o'clock. YELLOW flight descended to the deck while accelerating and dlaengaglng aa they departed the area. 3 I I*' 140 RED BAROH EVEMT 1N37 SUMMARY TIr* Mark Action Aircraft (YELLOU 1, 2. 3. 4) Other Friendly Eneny Actions (MtG 1.2) Status Action Communications Remarks 0 Yl, 2 (2) 4SQ gal external fuel tanks. NCR on centerllne 3,000 ft 450 KCAS Hdg 310^ V2 sighted NIG 1 at 9 o'clock, .levelt In a cItBb. Yl 150-200 ft' at 3 o'clock, level Y2 alerted Yl of HIG at 10 o'clock NIG ] climbed Into cloud layer at about S.OOO ft No MIG alert recolved. Sa«e Y2 fired hurried burst of 20ui at MIG 1. Ho htts obstrvad. MIG 1 descended out of clouds approxinately 1 .000 ft in front of Y2» slightly high. Air-to-air gun- sight In V2 aal- functlon. Used pi tot boon for sighting. 1 Saaa VI and Y2 Jettisoned external fuel tanks and HER. Engaged A/8 and descended to •InlBUH altitude while accelerating Y2 sighted two more KIGs. • Y2 called *V lead you've got two MIG's on your tail. Jettison everything and go burner." NIG 1 executed a barrel roll over Yl and Joined MIG 2 and 3 at 6 o'clock position of Yl at about 2,000 ft range. Yl observed tracers pass hit canopy but was not hit. Accel froa 4S0 KCAS to 600 KCAS nog 3iD* YELLOU Flight dis- engaged by outrunning the NIGs. NIGs discontinued the chast. Event 11-38 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105D* v» four MIQ-17». - Results t Tmp P-1O5D0 doraaged Icinity of Encounter: 21«15'N/105»47»E 1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOW Date/Tine: 22 August I966/I626H io^^«tr°tL'''J°5' Plight) on strike mission to JCS target 51. They were unable to an!'NASi»5i'E! "'»'"*^"e "«* interdicted a road at approilnately 2. MISSION ROUTC 21-58^5/m*1vr*VI;°;; *° Red River at ilrlL^d J« l^r^ U Crossing the R^d River the flight let down to 7000 ft. Increased isSl To tVlir^ll fi!! "nJm%^?*K?*V"!**!f"' '^B*** *5 deg and flew diwn ihud 3. AIRCRAFT CON F I CURAT ION F-105D BLUE 1. 3> » 2 - 450-gal tinks 6 - M-117 (750-lb) bombs P-105D BLUE 2 2 - ISO-gal tanks 2 - CBtJ-2ils carouflage'pJjnS?^'* ' ""^^ doppler off, IPP standby except BLUE 1, MIQ-17S Color unknown, tanks unknown, no missiles 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weathen; Overcast at 12,000 ft with 3-5 miles visibility BLUE Remarks I 2 3 JT HeadingV o.„l!i?;! £ ^^"! "^B*'* generally scattered and Speed?" ' IS i? ^ "Jjrr*"»"* altitudes. Specific 7ffi-3tate : • 8OOO to 10,000 lb conditions given In narrative. Plight Formation : ^'^^ ^^'^ dropped ordnance and were not rejoined vet. BLUE 2 r2ii.:ni"s;idU is."""' """^ * "-"^ ^ -.'SAinS's? jt.„t 5. INITIAL DETECTION Ko MG warnings were heard. BLUE 3 saw a MIG at bis 6 o'clock, 3000 ft range. 6. ACTION INITIATED and dfJSS on'^S^^Mli!" ^ ' "° ^^"^ «* 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT *.K JK" I5°.?*'S** quickly inside BLUE 3*8 turn and started to fire. BLUE 2 dove toM»^ the MIO and fired at him. BLUE «I turned right and crossed behind BLUE 3 and thi MiS but not before he scored hits on BLUE 3's right flap. A second MTO att«ek.d nr hf a * and shot up his vertical- stabUieer. BLUE ii broke rieht as the Sia ^hoftfn- ^ ' "ring iio'JSMrb^jjr^'Mrjurj^s; ss ^y^."^^c^};^l?f:^bur^:r:^i^^^^^^^ - ti^raSi the 1«3 Event II*38 8. ORDNMCE BLUE 1 Ho. Plred/Ho. Hits . Cannon 20iam BLUE BLUE BLUE MIO 1 NIO 3 150/0 1 burst/O 0/0 1 short burst/O Cannon Remarks Plred on NIO attacking BLOE 4; gun Jannned after 150 rounds Snapshot at MIO on BLUB 3 Renarks Plred cannon causing damage to BLUE 3's right flap. Plred cannon causing daoage to BLUE 4*a Tortleal fin. mos also fired on BLUE 2 In two instances and on BLUE 1 in one Instanee.- 9. CQUIPN£NT PROBLEMS BLUE 1 - Gun Jammed after firing 150 rounds. l^^'^^ mechanical advantage shifter aotor out. This ma known before takeoff but SLUE 2 assumed he would not be going over 5*0 knots. »«"re taaeorr 10. AIRCREW COMHCNTS BLUE 2 Total Houpa 1400 P-105 Hours 550 Combat Missions 80 Remarks Had experience In P-86 and P*100. Has always been In TAC. Has air combat maneuver training In P-86 and P-IOO. The only ACM training In P-105 was non-scheduled traln^ Ing within the flight. Most of P>105 ACM was due only to squadron Initiative. Has qualified on the DART. Conanenta on this Encounter BLUE 2: Has read MIG-17 flight manual at 7th AP which helped to develop Jlnklnie escaoe maneuver since MI3 had airspeed Halt and needs 3-4 second tracking tlmS. ^ ^ post-night briefing decided that flak suppress.'on aircraft should bomb with strike aircraft rather than split up and loae flliht Integrity, ias set up for bombing required three switch changes to go to alr-to-alr mode. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUE 2, Dec 66. Letter ; SLUE U, 2 Mar 67. ' kessapes. Reporta : 7AP 22215182 7AP 2215342 7AP 22225OZ Aug 66 Aug 66 Aug 66 DOCO 24595 OPREP-4 DIG 30264 Aug 66 OPIIEP-3 Aug 66 USAP Air Staff Box Score 12. lARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOR BLUE Plight waa on a strike mission, JCS Target 51, In Route Package VI-a Thew were the last flight Into the area and saw the IRON HAND night on ingrSIs: HoweveJ l^ul STf."""?^* ^^^'^^ flooding m thf target £n! the?i?J?I' BLUE Plight elected to interdict a road near the sasiined target ind had not vet rMiln«l ihjs'i!f'i?2- ^/"^ " °" but BLUE 2^;s cSr?"nr?wr«; ifi^ Which he did not drop. He was staying high to use then for flak auppreaaton In the ^5n**^*r*V. *" ^^"^ """S^* between 10,000 -nd 12.000 ft heading NW st between 500 and 550 knots. BLUE 2 and BLUE 3 were about line abroMt with about one Sle lateral eeparation. with BLUE 2 on Che right or east side. BLUE 4 was flvlM in the same direction but S« of them about four miles. "y*ng in cne BLUE 3, at 2l»15'll/105«47'E, heading 320« at 11,000 at nls 6 o'clock position, 3000 ft range. He sailed out to the left. at 11,000 ft and 550 knota saw a niO-17 the MIO and broke down and 1«« a a a 'I I I I I I I i I i i I I I I i I i I .•' Etrant ZI-38 21»16'M/105»*8'E, heading 315' at 10,000 ft heard the Kio call by BLUE 3, inverted and saw the HIO under him and off to the left. The NZa was at about 8000 ft altitude, 000 ft observed HlO-17 on his tall (6 o'clock), approximately 3000 aft. BLUE 2 selected afterburner, unloaded and continued heading NW, while Jinking, thus evading the MIO. The evasive maneuver con- tt'^tiJ''t ? r&pld roil aiiu & »iuick pull to two to three g's then off to 1/2 a. He knew the NIG had no missiles. The MIO rlred at BLUE 2 but scored no hits. (Tuls mu or may not have been the sane MIO who hit BLUE 3), ^ — * Vhen the NIOs were called, BLUE 1 was at 10,000 ft in a right turn at 21«»10'N/105«SO»E heading 300". At the call BLUE 1 descended on down with BLUE 1, and was to the rlaht behind and above BLUE H. BLUE * observed another mO-17 at 6 o'clock and broke rllht* and down. The MIO moved to the Inside of the turn, fired and hit BLUE 4 In the vertical fin knocking six Inches off the top. BLUE 1, who was at 5000 ft heading 320» at 2in7'K/105-43'E breaka left and down firing at the MIG who was firing at BLUE H, forcing the MIO to disengage. BLUE l»a Kun ^i^'i^S ^50 rounds. BLUE 1 then observed a MIO at hla 6 oTclock position 3000 ft aft and firing. BLUE 1 went to 100 ft AOL and egresaed at Maeh iTo" All BLUE Plight continued to egress at a high rate of speed. BLUE 3 at ' 21"19'N/105'*45'E observed four more MIOs, one at 6 o'clock, low, at 4000 ft altltudei one at about 7 o'clock, low, at 4000 ft altitude; and two at 8 o'clock, high at approximately 10.000 ft altitude. However, these MIOs were not engaged and it is not «255»iJjS§Sj6?S^ ^^"^ J<»1«<» at'aJproxlSaiely MiOCAP of P-104s were available but they were orbiting too far north of the K^ven by BLUE Plight but apparently the CAP flight did not receive the calls as they did not respond. Despite a few contacts of Plrecan radars during the earlier part of the Ingress, the last 20 miles into the target was free of Pansong contacts and except for some sporadic firing, flak. Even in the pop-up to attempt to acquire the primary target, no flak or SANs were observed. VAille searching for the road to bomb, no flak was observed * 1*5 REO BARON EVENT I!>aa SUMPY I Nark Actfon Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, 3, 4) Connuntcatlons Eretny Actions (NIG 1.2} itenarks Status Action Other Friendly Ta Sane B3 danaae to right flap. B4 turns Into B3 and Ml and crosses behind then and fired with no hits observed; B4 pulled up over Hi and saw two nore MIGs at 7 o'clock continued left and down at over 500 kt. pulled up fron the deck and lost then. HI disengaged - after B4 nade a firing pasS. It Is not known where Ml went. However, he may have switched to- 62 after 84 fired on him. B4 was forced Into a high angle pass - fired one short burst under heavy g load. T, Sane Jettisoned CBU-29s B2 level at 4000 ft 320*. HIG-17 at his 6 o'clock, 3000 ft aft. Went afterburner. Jinked and egressed to Z1'55'N/105'43'E. B4 saw HI6 at BZ's 6 o'clock after rolling out of left turn heading 3)5*. B3 had completed 360* and heading 320*. B4 said. "He Is on you noM, 2." HlG-17 trying to close on 82. NIG closed to 500 ft firing. This HlG-17 may or may not be the same one who broke' off B3 - NIG dis- engaged when 82 wef»t afterburner - tried to drop ordnance armed. U Sam B4 has N16 at 6 o'clock. Breaks right and down. 61 Is above Breaks left and down and fires on the HIG who disengaged. B3 saw four HIGs. one low 4000 Tt 6 o'clock, one low 7 o'clock, two high 10.000 ft 8 o'clock. NIG OB B1. B4 called, "HIG on my tall." KI6 firing on 64 scoring hits In the vertical stablllitr. 82 loses MIG.. MIG 3000 ft behind, Bl fired 150 rounds of 20nn when gun Janned^KKj He did not hit W' the MIG. V B2 finally Jet- tisoned ordnance by using master panic button. Flak fired at B2 on egress. T» Sane B4 dSMOe to vertical stablltier BLUE Flight tgress arte. Flight egresses to 21*SS'N/10S*0S'E. HEP BAROH EVENT II-3> SUWARY Tiat Mirk Action Atrcrtft (BLUE 1. 2, 3. 4) Stttut Action Othtr FrUndYjr CoMunlcatlens Enemy Actions {HIG 1.2} RcMrkf Blue Y. 3. 4 Juit bOMbc4 ttrgtt. 62 had two CBU-24S Futl 8000 to 10.000 lb Bl 11,000 ft. 300*. 550 kt; B2 10.000 ft. SIS*. 5S0 kti B3 11.000 ft, 330*. 550 kti B4 11,000 ft. 330*. S50 kt; B3 saw on« MI6-17 «t hit 6 o'clock Had Just cone off target - not yet rejoined B2. Still had two CBU-24S. Was saving for flak suppression 0ns MI6 3000 ft bthlnd B3 Bt tt 9 B3 breaks left and down Into NIG I. B2 sees Ht left and below set up the cick- pit rolls Inverted and dives OB Ml. firtt aiid Kisses, leveled at 4000 ft. B2 did not use afterburner. B2 overshot, was level with NIG B3i "Get hin off vy talK' 62: 'I S0O him. I CM coalng la.* One KI6 shooting at B3, scoring hits In the right fUp. No bit observed fro« 82's firing NIG pulls up and to tho left 62 had to: (1) shift radar aiode froB ground nap to air-to-air by pushing a button. (2) rotate weapon ■ode selector two clicks to guns-air position. (3) depress action - reject button. Ca Ca' Ca O a cai Cai O cai cat rzm Csg crai c:=3» rzzu c:::a cz3Bi Event 11-39 Aircraft Involved: - One ?-l05F and one F-105D va three Hia*2l8 Result: No daaage Vicinity of Encounter: 21*20 'H/IOT^IS'E T. PRIHARV KISSIOM ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlae: 9 September 1966/0900H BLUE Plight waa 60 n ml northwest of Hanpl on an IRON HAND mlaslon departing the target area. BLUB 3 and tt had left the target earlier due to low fuel. 2. HISSiON (tOUTE Unknown.' Egresa was east to the Gulf of Tonkin. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS Unknow. WILD WEASEL aircraft In lead (P-IOS). 4. fLiCNT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO iKCOUNTER BLUE 1 and 2 MTO . 2. and 3 Airspeed: *25«kt Unknoim »faf^"g - 090" About 100<» Altitude : 6000 ft About 6OOO ft Forinatlon : BLUE 2 on right side In tactical formation. HIGs silver; no markings seen. No radar return on P-105 vector box; no nlaeilea observed; no external stores observed. 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 2 noticed three KIO-218 at 6 to 7 o'clock high end 2000-3000 ft out vhlle 37— was explodfng at 3 o'clock and in front of SLUE 2. No indication of MIGa from vector box. No MIC warnings were heard. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE c called for a left break, and BLUE 1 and 2 broke- left and down. BLUE 1 and 2 Jettisoned ordnance. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BI/.'E 1 and 2 broke down and left, and NIO 1^ 2 and 3 followed BLUE 2. BLUE 2 leveled at 2000 ft. BLUE 1 says, "MIGs behind you, break right." BLUE 2 breaks right and down to the deck. Evades .MIGs and exits to the east. About one minute later BLUE 1 sighted a MIG lu front of him and above. BLUE 1 closed and fired 600 rounds 20mii In two separate bursts. No hits observed. MIG k started right turn. BLUE 1 returned to the deck and exited to the east. No damage. BLUE 1 and 2 exited to the water and refueled. a. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 expended 6OO rounds of 20mm In two bursts. MIG 1, 2 and 3 fired at BLUE 2; no hits. BLUE 2 States he waa sure the shells were airburats and were from KlOa (iriiite ouffs of »moke). r - 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None noted. 10. AIRCREH COMMENTS Ttotal 105 Combat Hourt Hours jtLaalona BLUE 1 (Back) 2000 300 50 BLU£ 2 - NIOs were believed to be under OCX control. Tisibillty was bad. n. DATA SOURCES Pr oject Interviews ; BLUE 1 (Back), 9 March 1967 Messages. Reports; PACAP 17 0255Z DOCCO 064 Sept 66 { 7AP 09II8Z OOCO 256*9 Sept 66* CINCPAC 1702462 Sept 66; 7AP 0909332 Sept 66 DOCO 25259 0PREP-3i 7AP 0912512 Sept 66 DOCO 25308 OPREPU ^' Letters ; BLUE 1 Pront, Mar 67 BLUE 1 Back, Mar 67 BLUE 2 Pront. 22 Mar 67 Bvant 11*39 12. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was on an IRON HAND mlsalon. BLUE 3 and H left due to BlnRO fuel BLUE .^V^ heading 090°, at 6000 feet. BLUE Pligf.t was m a tactical formation with BLUE 2 on the right wing. BLUE 2 saw whUe puffs of smoIJ o?? Ma JiasiaSJs^i:? jisrt;::ciKs :s: «Sn%«"-"' •pp-aching^ro« 6-7 p-cipcrhi^s. *ft.^^i's«.t on^i*** ^ ^""^ *nd Jettisoned ordnance. ?^nH t ?^ 2000 feet, BLUE 2 and all three MlOa had overshot BLUE .1??? t^^^il ^ o'clock position. The ^llOa were stllX In trail of BLUE 2 at 2000 ft altitude »-d 2000 ft distance, firing at BLUE 2. ^^i*"^ nr?D*^) ^o** BLUE 2 to execute a right break which he did, with the MlOs following BLUE 2 In the break BLUE 2 descended to the deck In afterburner and accelerated Kfi.!rS : "^^^^"8 toward the water. While the HIGs continued to follow, they fell Behind and were lost from sight. BLUE 2 then headed to the Qulf of Tonkin for refueling. -*-i.*^"i^2?.J^}!^ ^'J ^^^^ '° right, BLUE 1 continued In a left turr but lost afSS ^ MIGs as they disappeared behind the hllla on tne ridge line. BLUE 1 then reversed and followed down the same valley at 100 feet AGL, 650 ktas. About cnL^i""^* later, at 09O3H, BLUE 1 3lghted me MIC-21 at hla 12 o'clock position about I range. Both BLUE 1 and the MIG were heading approximately east with the NIO at B?n2 r,??;^^^"'^*' '^'^ initially see BLUE 1 and was apparently looking for BLUE 2. BLUE 1 pulled up behind the MIG until he had closed to about 2500 feet and fired h!!!.f"r*-/*'°fi[« no hits. BLUE 1 then closed to 1000-1500 feet range and fired another i?n2 H'^JH indicating to BLUE 1 that he had been ^ rolled off to the right and accelerated away to the east for egress. No bits were received by BLUE I or 2. xw* ck^coo. ^ P-105B were never warned of the presence of the MIG-21's from any radar vector 2o8J;io?»; ILI^I of operation, the EC.121(B10 EYE/Ethan Alfa) orbiting at zo H/iOT E contained no radar plots of this engagement. At refueling BLUE 1 had 1000 pounds of fuel. Brmit II>40 Aircraft Involved: Three P-105» va an . unidentified aircraft Result: Sightlne only Vicinity of Encounter: 20«50'H/107»15»E to 21«00»M/107«20»E 1. PRIMARY RISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/TlBe: 11 September 1967/unknown 4. FLIGHT CONOtriONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER BLUE Plight Bogeys 19,000 ft 1,000 ft 5. INITIAL DETECTION Ho MIC Karnlns=. HLUS Plish't 'saw bo^ey. Slant r'ange approxlaately 15 n m. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT n. DATA SOURCES Messages. Rmpowtm- 388th OPREP-4/238, 11 September 1966. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION After _ their course 153 .•^ ■ Event Aircraft Involved: Pour 7-105s v» two Nlg-I7s Result: No damage Tlclnlty of Encounter: 21*13 'N/lOfi^lO'E 21*ia»N/106«35»B 1. PRIKARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: lH September I966/I6H3H and 16il7H (approximately) fK. nlZ"^ ^'n^^? ^^^H^ flight) on a flak suppression mission as part of a strike asalnst the Dap Cau Railway Bridge. The flight had hit the target and wis egress Ing! ^ 2. MISSION ROUTE Th«».-f«l!f°^f„II^! °" ^^""^ Oul' 'ingress over the mountains, Therefore, ingress and egress was north of Haiphong. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS r 2 430<-gal tanks Expended CBU No ECM pods Caaouflage paint WIG-17 MIG 1. 2 Silver color 1 missile under right wing 4. FLI6MT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Clear with visibility 10 miles. BLUE 1. 2 BLUE 3. H *iJ||H|£- 2000 ft AOL 3000 ft AOL Heading: 095* 092* iSlrltate. 500 KTAS Fuel State . Apppox. 9000 pounds Flight Formatloi^ ? ha« Bf?iP***i[SS 2^ J****!"* <^ position with BLUE 1 and 2 In reasonably close cSitScU * "* farther back and did not have visual 5. INITIAL DETECTION ifTrt ,5^^ ^ finished a right turn to 095* after pulling off a run on the target. Two SiSiiilj!*" detected at BLUE I's 6 o'clock position fiOO^ards behind SSt no f £lS w. 6. ACTION INITIATED contact^SeidJSriSSh!** " ^^^"^ 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUB 2> subsequently acquired two Kia-178 at 2 o'clock at 5 miles range and attaekeii but his gun jammed. BLUE 3 and 4 were later attacked by two more MIQs. attacked a. ORDNANCE (Nb. fired/No. hits) Cannon Remarks JSI ? ft Jammed due to part failure. "^"^ 3, •» 1/Q pi„a 3 BLUE 4 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 2 - gun malfunction 1 The OPREP-3 and the RED BARON Interview conflict, in that the OPREP-3 says BLUE 2«8 gun if^i ^^^r^* 3 ^r** " attacked by MIOs. The Inter^leiSe claimed tS Se BLUE « and that while he attacked 2 MIOs and his gun Jaimned, BLUE 1, 2 and 3 never saw n}?tl *'*?."!''*^ attacked. The reconstruction assumes that the interviewee was BLUE 2 (Since It la Judged unlikely that two such occurrences could happen on the same day) and he never saw BLUE 1 during egress. •^vt^" w 155 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Eiperleno : Event 11-41 BLUE 2 F-105 Coisbat Hours Hlaalona - Remarks 550 6 Baeksrpund was all TAC. Plghter Haapons School graduate. Comwtfnts on this Encounter ; elght!**^ "^"^ '""^^^^^ ^^^^^ to go from bombing node to a full computing alr-to-alr High speed at low altitude of the P-105 wia a good asset. The enemy pilots mre poor. If IIIS•«r^S.^'2eSil,^;.^^"„S'^ik.5! ««inE. «re indicative since n. DATA SOURCES Project Intervlgw«. BLUE 2, 17 January I 967 Hepor ts: 388TPW OPREP-| U September 1966. PINNACLE/308 TAP DAI 1423352, September 1966 DIO 30050 JAP OPftEP-3 112022Z, September 1966 DOCO 25526 TAP OPREP-il ltl737Z, September I966 DOCO 25527 TAP OPREP-II H>2024z; September 1966 DOCO 25532 12, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION tar«f^^TJl^??L!l?'*«!"*''*5 ^^''^ suppression ordnance and was pulling off the target. The flight was spread out and receiving quite a bit of flalc. at «;QS'l?r«!'*in5^?^rt5*'^*?n?**\^^^ ^ finished a tight turn to a heading of 095« he was Srs\°°dSJ?te^\ °2°o^ li?t*6oS%SJ: SSnS* T JjJjS ll lit SS""^ The'SlOs'Je?:' appeaJ:d'tf bl sjJej'thl'r^Ji ivVr^i Tui^ <:ithJJ;;i^SLS^'*!JJ';j'*'» "^i- other flight member at thls%'lne) r'^^TiJ^SSs^SSjJfS !t"f o'ciocratTSKj "lUS KL is iJviraSs^id'jsrip^-eSj ?i^^;wa?i"^f^jp;- - ;i f --rl'"?' --^ nWe-an'^ssSurs: s.r s^""?rge?Tco^mS;?!S«^J!ghn«^v;j5 the afterSrS; aSd%5oSS"o*'JoJo%i":";eJd' Tl'cllli' '^STklot^lilVn rl^^ '^T .team wipe Jhrou^ hlS%;^%rJC«iurfran^ Jh^S'lStlSeS ?0^JJJ:!?*?;%S; iS.^SJo'"""* " a .heJrjJn'JJuJj^ "'^ « -topped firing due to burst"^ i^tlvlng 85.. nr.. m barrage-type After BLUE 2's encounter. BLUE 3 and 4 at 2l*i9*M/inK*9e»B> w..^. at 3000 ft AOL, observed two MIO-lTs tSlQ \\na l\ IL^Cl ll^^ ll heading 092« . 500 KTAS ^ Event I 1-4 2 Alrerart Involved: Pour P-IO5D0 ve three HIO-lVs • Result: No danage Vicinity of Encounter: 21«20*N/106*10*B' 1. PRlPfARY KISSION Date/Time: ifl September 1966/I636H Pour P-105D aircraft (BLUE Plight) on a atrlke flight against the Dap Cau Highway Bridge 15 n ml northeast of Hanoi. This was one flight of four attacking the bridge and o h ^1 operating In the area, some ahead and sone behind. Including an F— H flight. 2. MISSION ROUTE * * !f?"J ^0 Brown Anchor eaat coast of North Vietnam west along the ridge line SaSlon'route*'" * the reverse of the Inbound route. See Figure I for 3. AIRCftAH Ctii'iFIGURATION BLUE 1. 3 and 0 2 3000-lb bomba 1 650-gal centerllne tank 1000 rounds 20 m.fli. anrno BLUE 2 2 CBU-2ls 1 650-sal centerllne tank 1000 rounda 20 m.m. aimio MIQ 17 Ordnance unknotm Silver color (did not aee markings) • 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Scattered thunder storms. 2-3 miles visibility but clear In the target area. BLUB 1 3 » BLUE 2 *5oo ft 806-1000 ft ^ffCat.. 552-"" 550 KAS Puel State; Unknown Unknown Plight Pormatlon ; "".f" ? 'i;*** •*»''WS out, lead aircraft in front and BLOB 3 and « cutting off on the Inside to Join up. See sketch. V t\ Tr • •KM. 7 ll* not Tiio S. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE Plight was In a right turn. BLUE 1 sighted three MO-lTs headina aut <. ACTION INITIATES BLUE flight accelerated and continued to turn to egreaa heading, 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT ID* «Q» BLUB flight for about twojminutes. but never approached closer than Ji!?*f*- ^2ri2«/«"" 2 *ttempted to attack one if the NlOa b5? could not ItEaln poaltlon. BLUE % waa ahot down bp ground fire after the NlOa broke off but was reaaSS. Event II»42 8. ORDNANCE Ko ordnance expended 9. EQUIPHeNT PROBLEMS None. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS E»p«r lance ; BLUE 1 BLUE 2 BLUE 3 BLUE 4 11. OATA SOURCE Project Intervlewg ; Total Hours 4000 400 2600 Unknown P-105 Hours 900 300 650 Unknom* Combat Mlaslona UnknoHn 75 70 26 Remarks Considerable fighter experience P-86, P-100, P-105, F-9, P-11. Completed P-105 gunnery school at Nellie. This Mas his first assign- Mnt. Hessages ; BLUE 1, 16 March 1967 BLUE 2, 17 February 1967 BLUE 3i 6 January 1967 7AF 15171BZ. September 1966 DOCO PASTEL NR 106 36Bth TFW OPREP-3 PINNACLE 317 7AP 142335* September 1966 DIG 30450 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE flight had Just pulled off from their bombing run on the Dap Cau Highway bridge and were in a right turn Joining up about ^500 ft, altitude 500-550 KIAS. BLUE 1 was in front followed by BLUE 3 and BLUE 4. BLUE 2, with flak suppression ordnance, had hit a flak site about 2 miles north of the target and was trailing BLUE 1 by 4 to 4.1/2 miles and BLUE 3 and 4 by about 2 miles. BLUE 1 saw three HI0->17s attacking from the west head- ing 090*> and alerted the flight. The MIOs came out of the sun and two attacked BLUE 3 from his 6 o'clock and 9 o'clock while the third attacked BLUE 4. Vfhen the MIOs were observed the flight was In the vicinity of 21"»20'N/106«'10 'E heading 090" and BLUE 1, 3 and 4 were at 4500 ft and 550 KTAS. BLUE 2 was about 800-1000 ft AOL. The KIGa were at approximately the same altitude as BLUE flight. The KIOs were also seen by BLUE 2 who was trailing the rest of the flight at BOO-IOOO ft AOL. He called them out but the rest of the flight had already seen the MIOs. BLUE 1 kept the MIQs and the rest of the flight in sight, while egresslng. The egress was made at low altitude and high speed with horizontal Jinking, BLUE 1 observed the two MIOs break off BLUE 3. BLUE 1 also observed the NIO break off from BLUE 4. BLUE 2, after calling the NIQs and seeing none on himself, cleaned off the In-board pylons and accelerated In afterburner in an attempt to attack one of the MIQs that was at s o'clock high on BLUE 3, and about one mile away from BLUE 3. BLUE 2 started to close on the MIO which was at about 5000 ft altitude (about 1000 ft higher than BLUE 3) and about 2 miles away. BLUE 2 climbed and closed on the NIO until the range was about a mile. The NIO then started a left hand hard turn (not a break) . BLUE 2 who had came out of burner at this time had a good closure rate and started to turn with the MIO. The MIO waa about 5000 to 6000 ft out and BLUE 2 was turning left at about 3 gs. The NIG turned rapidly. BLUE 2 ended up at about 110 degress angle off from the MIO. It became evident that the MIO and BLUE 2 would end up in a h«ad on pass, so BLUE 2 broke off to the right. BLUE 2 had passed Just ahead of BLUE 3 since BLUE 2 had used afterburner. BLUE 3 waa at this time descending In a slight left turn. BLUE 2, in turning right, went under BLUE 3*a nose at a track crossing angle of 90^, about 300U ft in front. As soon as BLUE 2 crossed under BLUE 3*s nose he reversed and climbed back to the left bleeding off airspeed to sandwich the remaining MIO on CLUE 3. As BLUE 2 picked up BLUE 3, he saw that the NIQ-17 had broken off and was headed back toward Kep. BLUE 3 heard BLUE I's Initial call. As BLUE 3 looked back to pick up BLUE 4, he saw a MIO at 6 o'clock to himself at a slightly lower altitude and about 4000 ft range. BLUE 3 accelerated slightly. BT "E 3 also saw BLUE 4 with a KIQ-17 at BLUE 4*8 6 o'clock. The MO was a mile or so aft o' )LU£ 4. BLUE 3 had been looking aft to observe BLUE 4 and on looking right he saw a silver MIO-17 at his 3 o'clock. The NIO Is 4000 to 5000 ft out and within 1000 ft of BLUE 3*8 altitude. BLUE 3 turned slightly into the NIO and when the NIO responded BLUE 3 dived away Jinking to the left In afterburner. BLUE 3 at this time atlll retained two pylons and a eenterllne tank. During the acceleration and descent ta 2000 ft» BLUE 3 crossed BLUE 2*0 path, but never saw the Mia-17 which BLUE 2 waa engaging. BLUE 3* despite hla 1 i i |-|^ J 1 i Hi 158 y Bv«nt 11-42 . flent toitftrom dlstanc** BLOB 3 went back to 5000 ft end continued to egress. The MIO on BLUE d was a mile or more away, sliding into a 6 o'clock position. BLOB 4 was Instructed to break right and descend In afterburner, continuously Jinking. BLOE 4 did this and after traveling some distance lost the NIQ while heading in a southeast direction. BLUE 4 >as directed hy BLUE 1 to turn baek to the northwest In order to rejoin the rest of the flight. BLUE 1, 2t and 3 Joined and about half way to the coast they made a 360 orbit to pick up BLUE 4. Due to the speed of BLUE 4, he passed the rest of the flight so that when contacted on the radio, a DP reading put him east of the rest of the flight. BLUE 1, 2 and 3 then ellDbed and also started egreeslng at 600 kts to eateh BLUE 4. BLUE 4 pulled up Just before reaching the coast and BLUE 1 saw hla get hit by flak (57mm). Half of BLUE 4*8 right wing was knocked off and the engine was danaged. BLUE 4 ejected in the water close to land and the rest of the flight provided RBSCAP. BLUE 4 was subsequently recovered. BLUE 1 noticed that the flak stopped Just as he was rolling 1a on the tact«t although it waa suraiaed that this was due to the presence of NIQs. 159 RED BARON EWE WT 11.41 %tmnkM TiM Mtrk Action Aircraft (BLUE T, 3. 4) Status S50K 61, 3. 4 «t 4500' B2 It 800-1000' F11«ht In right turn . Acti on BLUE Flight starts to accelerate and descend with constant S turns to keep the NIGS froia tracking. 81 continues to egress 82 acceltretes In A/B after the Nlfi at 8 o'clock high to 83 B3 accelerates slightly B4 divet away in A/B Othar FrUndly n sees NIGS and calls to tho flight. 12 alto tees the nGS and calls to the flight. M Is called to descend and accelerate. CoMunlcatlons Cnosy Actions (MIG 1,2) 3 MIG-17S attack BLUE Flight. HIGs coning fron out of the Sun, heading East It about 5000* NIGS are abnut 1 mile away froia 84 and 83. 1 HI6 Stayed with B4 and 2 NIGs go after 83. One at 8 o'clock at one at 6 o'clock about I wHa away. Raaarks All noMbtrs of the flight saw tho NIfi& B3 eoox 5000' B2 abOHt 4500* aboot 600 K 83 soos a NIG at 3 o'clock. 5000' out. 8 3 turns In toward the MIG and when the KIG reacts, divas away. N2 at about 5000' alt. 82 closes to within 1 nlle of Ml cones out of A/B and starts a 3g turn to track Nl. Ml starts a kard loft hand turn I riBP ifiP tii"^ «E0 BARON CVEKT 11-42 SUHMAKt N«rk Action Aircraft (BLUE U 3. 4) Communication! Cneay Actions (NI6 1.2) Remarks Statui Action Other Friendly B2 It 39 B3 was 110* an9le off froa HIG. Bt broaks right and descends away fraa HI. Ml has turned until he Is heading back toward B2. B3 dtictndlng away fvMM 111 In a/M Tr9a HI ir h/v* B2 dtsccntflna away froa N2 In A/B. B2 passes In front of B) CQMtlniits on. B2 pulls Up to B1 observes Hi and 2 break off. H2 breaks off. B1 , 2, S egrotting to Join up. n calls B4 f at PI3 has broken off and for B4 to turn to MM heading. s 1 Aircraft Involved: Pour ?-10Ss vs ttro MI0-17a Result: Sighting only Vlclnitj of Encounter: 21**20'N/106*'*5'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 14 September I966/I638H This was a strike mission. Pour P-105a (BLUE Plight was Inbound to the target Chiang Mai petrol storage.) The IROH HAND support aircraft Has leaving the area so BLUE Flight aborted at Zl'^lZ 'N/lOe^SO'E. 2. MISSION ROUTE Unknown 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS BLUE 1. 2, 3 and 4 carried iron bombs. One Xligbt oeiBber had two CBU-24S. 4. FLIGitr CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Haze, with thunderstorms. BLUE Plight - 9000 ft AGL at 360° 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE Uad sighted two NIOs at 12 o'clock high (15,000 ft). HIQs were in a hard right turn. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight Jettisoned ordnance and evaded. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE Plight position now 2 1**20' N/1 07*^00 •£ at 4000 ft, heading 122®, whan HIOs were again spotted at flight's B o'clock position, 5000 AOL. Plight passed through thunder- Btorns and exited area. 11. DATA SOURCES Mesa a ^e 9 , Reports : 388th Wing, OPREP '•/313, 14 Sept 1966 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was inbound to the target. The setting sun in haze dropped visibility, and the IRON HAHD support was leaving the target area so Lead decided to abort the mission at 21"12'N/106''50'E. The Plight turned right and at 21°20'N/106°45'E, heading 360 degrees, and at 90OO feet AGL, Lead observed two MIG-17s. The KIOs were at BLUE Lead's 12 o'clock position in the vicinity of 21"30'H/106^45'e, at 15.000 feet, in a hard right descending turn. The KIG wlngman was sliding to the outside of the turn. BLUE 1 called KIOs at 12 o'clock, and the Flight went to afterburner and began a tighter descending right turn. The MIQs were' lost tnomentarily but were sighted again by BLUE 1 Innedlately before going through a southern fringe of a thunderstorm. BLUE Plight's position was then at 21''20'N/107''00*£ and BLUE Plight was 4000 ft AOL heading 122 degrees. The MIQs were at BLUE Plight's 8 o'clock position at approximately 5000 ft AOL. BLUE flight passed through the thunderstorm. Jettisoned ordnance (iron bonbs and ceua) and returned to post-strike tankers. 16T Event 11-44 Aircraft Involved: Three P-105s vs ttfo NIOs Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 1. PitlHAftV MISSION AND TACTUAL SITUATION Date/TlM: IS September 1966/15S5H 2. MISSION ROUTE Unknown i. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS UnknoHn 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather; Unknown 2l*'OO'll/l07 37*B Altitude : Heading ? Speed ; Fuel State : Plight Formation ! Finger tip BLUE 1. 3 13>flOO ft 360* 450 kt UnVnowtt 1 o T I ir 5. INITIAL DETECTION Waa ;:iade on their vector box gear which Indicated X*band radar at tbelr 12 o'clock position. 6. ACTIO" TNITIATEO None 7. SZTUATION DEVELOPMENT Unidentified aircraft flaw by BLUB Flight and turned to tbelr 6 o'clock position. BLUB night then broke right and observed two aircraft two* nautical miles behind. BLUB flight continued turn Into possible moa and MIQs went Into a dsscendlng left turn and were lost In tlw hase at about 2,000 ft AOL. 8. ORDNANCE Unknown mas Unknowi f. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS Hone to. AIRCREW COMMENTS Bi perlence Unknown Co misenta on this Encounter BfUE 1: HIQa could have been P-4s. Cpgiaents from Overall Experience BLUE 1: P-48 should be briefed on routes to be flown by P-lOSs and that they eall y-105a If they are naklng identification paases. n. DATA SOURCES Ev.nt MM88£e3: OPREP-V237 388TPV 15 Sep I966 12. NARRATIVf DESCRIPTION madf i i:jd desc;2S?ng"eft ?S™ ^ SZjriuJS^'jLfJJufd"? ^''f**? '"''"'"^ them, they continued descending left tu'r?; aSroxliitSL § mS 55 Jftf" *£I'° PO"lble MlOa. and MIG» Possible «1G5 not seen awin Th. f^T^K^l^Jj ^ t^^* An haxo. I Aircraft Involved: ?our P-lOSs vs four IIXG-21a Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21«09*N/106«'45'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION DateAlme: 16 September 1966/l6ii5H Pour F-1058 were on a strike mlaslon on the Dap Cau Railroad and Highway Bridge (21»12'M/106*06'E). 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS BLUE 1, 2, 3. 4 20ms. Cannon (1,029 rounds) Resw of ordnance unknown 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER W eather ; Unknown Altitude ; 1»0Q0 ft AOL Heading ; 092° Speed : 551 ktas Fuel State : Unknown Plight Formation ; ^ q MOO* Mi 5. INITIAL DETECTION ^ BLUE-3 visually observed four NI0<-2l8, 4000 ft to hla right and 4000 ft ftbov* hla In a left turn passing through 060 heading. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLI;l-3 went into aiterbumer. and afraaaad orM. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLIP Plight egressed without further incident. II. DATA SOURCE TAP, OPREP 3 1619'»72 Sept 1966 DOCO 25603 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight wa» outbound from the target area heading 092^ at 1000 ft AOL, at 550 KTAS. BLUE 3 was 5000 ft behind BLUE 4 when he eaw four MIG 2Is 4000 ft to hla right and 4000 ft . higher than BLUE 3 in a left turn, passing 060 . BLUE 3 then selected afterburner and egreesed the area Jinking at 650 KTAS- MIG-Zls did not engage nor follow BLUE 3. No damage to the aircraft or encounter logged and aircraft retreated safely to hone atatlon. I 1 "» r 1 i i i Aircraft Involved: Pour P«105Da vs tfwo HI0-17s Result: No dajuge Vlemity of Encounter: 21**18*M/106»17*E 1. PRIMRr MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/TUne: 16 September 1966/1650H H^AA ^-"5Da (BLUE Plight) on a strike target {JCS #16 - Dap Cau railroad and hl«hii» tl ift "^H^" ^^^o'^^^S^- Aircraft were In a Pluld-J. with BtUE 2 p?obabiron tSe Slht ISoSo^nJJJt^So'I:^^^ aioiS'N/ios-SS^E and an EB^66B SS In SltSfii *" 2. HISStON ROUTE 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION P-105D BLUE 1. 2, H 2 - ISO-gal wing tanks • - CBUa (1 each wing station, 2 center line) 1 - gun MIQ«173 MIC 1. 2 Ohknown 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather; 7-nlle visibility, scattered clouds. BLUE 12 3 (I Altitude; _ _ 6000 ft 5500 ft Unknown Heading ; Speed ; gJtel State ; Piight Pormatlon ! 270* 5*0 KTAS Unknown 270« 540 KTAS Unknown Unknown Probably the same 270" 270* SUO KTA3 5*0 KTAS Unknown tftUcnown 1 1 I i i i I I I o o 5. INITIAL DETECTION 270« ^tlla'^Vt "1.1^^^^^°^ ^"!!? " ^^*5H. At l6ft8H at 21«10'N/106«»15'E. heading ?J2«-e5SXS iSAv^Jt'^iJ oS "it'iioT8.sj;sJo^j7?E°f rnj; lai ?;;'ss5-i7rs?^is^s'r3\ 5J0 KTAS, 6000 ft alt. MZOs observed vlaually and called out by fiiiht Uad (BLUE iJ 2lbS2 ainhrHJoS!*^* through 330* at 4000 ft altliiS!;: All mSt 6. ACTION INITIATED acended slowly, were. BLUE 2 followed lead. It i5''unknown''aB"to*wharBLOE*3 aS"5*s"aetlona 7. SITUATION OEVELOPNCNT . . o*t» ^^^^ 2 broke hard into MIO 1 and 2 who were in a ri«ht bank nasainB ^^Q* 173 IP- (No. ftred/No. hUa) 20m Oun 1/0 Remarks No hits were recorded by BLUE 1. fired. 66 rounds Event II.«6 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 BLUE 2, 3. 1 None I. 2 None 10. AIRCREH COHNENTS Coaireenta on Thla Encounter '^iS-^* Caged his gun alght when he flrat vlauall* sDOtted HIQa H« ata nn^ BLUE 2: I could have gotten a ahot at KIG l if I'd lust be#n a hh-i. k<«. t to By right! *ln««««an pretty far out of position and he passed Conments from Overall Experience ifasn'?Thii accompllahed their mlaslon, we Jettlaoned our ordnance. It wasn t a bad decision, we had to be able to turn or they would have eotten a ahofc a« bLS £3 tS« ?f dumping their tanks to make it look iiki they dumped th!l? bomba, and then go on to their targets. Tanks are usually empty by then. ™^ n. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : Heasagegj Reports : BLUE 1 (Lead), 13 Bar 67; BLUB 2, 13 Mar 67 DTO 162356Z Sep 66 7AF Tan Son Nhut AB DIO 3OU56 Sep 66 Cont. No. C215«2/l/N? 1619472 Sep 66 7AF Tan Son Nhut DOCO 25603 Sep 66 Letter from BLUE 2 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION separation. BLUE 2 then would have had a wrn 1 k.,^ ^* <. f wixn agoo « approximate right .ing fnd out of position. Both BLUE 1 and I «0. ooM?„S%Ji?- , f" ;i?s:^s;rfc^i ?Knr2ioS??N?iS?-i5?Hr "^^^^^^^^^'-^^^^^ *S3rn;":L"c:oa«!'*'''' "nsldenng the location. «id Int.rvl.ws, a northarl, 174 REO BARO>f EVEMT 11-46 SUMMARY T1«t Kirk Action Aircraft (eiUC 1.2) Other Friendly Connunlcatlons Enemy Actions (MIG 1,2) Remarks stati't Action T* Alt 6000 ft Hdg 270* Speed SOO KTAS 81 sees two NIGs at 10:30 o'clock, 1 to 2 ■lies away. 83, 4 on left. Hies called by Bl Two MIG'17s (Ml .2) in right turn passing through 330 to 300 degrees. One MIG slightly high and another 1 ow . Lower MIG In lead. MIGs about 4000 ft altitude. 82 saw only one MIG-17. The lower MIG Is cllabing slightly. Tl Alt 6000 ft Speed - Increasing Breaking loft SLUE Flight Jettisoned tanks and ordnance and went to afterburner; B2 sees eecond NIG (HZ) high and to the right less than a alio froa m. B1 calls Jettison ordnance and break left. Continue to turn right. Alt 5000 ft Speed - Increasing LH bank B1 fires at Ml, range 2S00 to 2000 ft. quar- tering head-on pass. B2 does not fire. Ntfi passes. 81 fired 66 rounds. u Alt 5000 ft B1 passes MT with about 3000 ft lateral separa- tion. Ml then passes below B2 about 530 ft vertical and 200 ft horizontal, head on. Flight breaks right. 82 then sees N2. M2 off to the right 45* fron 82. 1 «11e away and 1000 ft above 62. Alt 5000 ft BLUE Flight exits NIGs roll out of turn on e norther- ly heading. . * * y Event lI-*7 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105Ds t« four MXO-lTDs Result: No daoage Vicinity of Encounter: 21^08 'N/lOfi^SS'S ' 1. PftlHARf NISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/TlOM: 16 Septenber 1966/1647H BLUE Plight (four P-1050a) were^on a strike mission against JC3 16.00 (the Dap Cau Inland hlghvay bridge) 21°12 angU off. VatocUy 540 KTAS 81 starts left descend- ing turn starts to light afterberner and then does net. 81. 82 83, 84 Jettison bombs at start of turn. 81 dfd fiol £l#an nff pylons. 82 tries to light afterburner and It Hill not light. 83 and 84 stay with 81 and 82. R1 f a 1 1 c #nv» hv>AAk wj iignis aTier- burner and breaks back Into the flight. M4 at 3000 ft and 4 o'clock. HI and M2 go Into turn. H4 stays Inside turn for few seconds and then breaks off. Descending H • 3000 ft S^ed S40 kt 81, 82. 83. 8-4 lose sight of MIGs. Flight returns to coast as they entered Flak. 37Mi, bursts at 3000 ft I 1 q;=7 BvMt 11-08 Aircraft Involved: Three P-1058 v» one 100-19 wid three MlO-t Result: Ho danage 1. PRIHARf KISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Time:' 17 Septeober 1966/0927H . p.lOSa on a strike ml»elon, target being railroad bridge (21-33'M/106«30'E). 2. HIS5I0N ROUTE * Departed Korat for Broim Anchor refueling over Gulf of Tonkin, banker drop off direct 21«06'M/107»27'E. Direct 2l«37'N/106n5'E direct target. Egrese by reverae route. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS ?-10S BLUE 2. 3. ^ 1 gun (1029 rounds full) ICQ 2 unknown 1 KIG-19 Silver In color 4. FLI6HT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Clear, visibility 7 miles, and haie. BLUE BLUE 1 — n Altitude : 9000 ft 15.000 ft Heading : ~i^2 T Speed ; -9 Mach -.9 Haeh- FUiT'State : Onknowi Plight Forwation ! Unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION . ' . BLUE 2 saw a MIO-19 with a Red Star on tall at his 5 o'clock position. BWE 3 vls«aUjr sighted three KIGs at 5000 ft AOL heading 180°. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 2 executed a Split-S to 2000 ft, BLUE 3 and BLUE » selected afterburner and dove to the deck. 7. SITUATIOM DEVELOPMENT BLUE 2- While in split, MIO fired at BLUE 2 who saw cannon fire P«"^nS ^Y*; ^iJll*^, •ides^Sr^f^e. wien leJSl at 2000 ft and .95 «ach WO made another pas. at BWE 2, firing his cannon. BLUE .2 lit afterburner and egressed area. B^UE end H Egressed the area without contact. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 2, 3, * cannon. Hone ICO -19 Cannon, 2/0 Hxos ? Unknown 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS Horisontal situation indicator was inoperative. U, DATA SOURCES Massages. Reports : . . ■ - OPREP-3 2171355Z Sept St DOCO 25648 CCMUSMACV MACOl Soe Z P17 12522 Sept 66 FBIS OKINAWA P172»l5s Sept 66 • 12. WUiUTIVE DESCRIPTION . Event XI-48 BLIB Plight was outbound fron th« target when BLUE 1 was hit and BLOE 2, 3, and 4 orbited to follow BLUS 2 who Inqiaeted the ground. BLUE 3 and 4 then headed toward the eoast and lost eight of BLUE 2 whom they, tliought was follOMlne then. BLUE 2 lost BLUE 3 and * and was following an Inaccurate heading. BLUE 2 was at approximately 15,000 ft and .<( Hacth Nhen be saw a WO-19 at his 5 o'clock position. BLUE 2 then went Into a Spllt-S WMvmv, The Mia fired at BLUE 2 during this maneuver and BLUE 2 saw cannon fire tcolng over hla left and right wing. aLUE 2 recovered at 2000 ft at .95 Mach. He asked for a LV steer which be received and headed again approxlMtely ISO*, 2000 ft and .95 Mach when the KIO again mad« another firing pass. BLUE 2 then selected afterburner and egreaaed the area. No damage to the aircraft. '^SS'^i^ ' spotted three "10a of unknown aodel and type heading 180*» at 5000 ft AOL. BLUE 3 and » hit afterburner and accelerated away from tba area at l.S.Maoh. No damans to the aircraft was recorded and no encounter logged. 184 I Ev«nt II-*I9 Three P-lOSDs va three MI0-17a Aircraft Involved: Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 2l'39*N/106*37«e t. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL jITUATION Oate/Tliue: 18 September 1966/0931H Three P-105DS (BLUE Plight) departed Korat AS on a mission into Route Package Vl-A. Their target was the southwest Oao Quan POL storage. 2. MISSION Roure See Event 11-52 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-lQjP BLUE 1. 2. i Unknown external stores ««.IG-17 MIG 1. 2. ^ External fuel tanks 4. FLIGHT C0N01TI0N3 PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Clear, visibility 5-6 ml In haze. BLUE 1. 2. 1 Altitude : 7-8.000 ft Heading; : 290 Speed : J»80 let Fuel State : Unknown Plight Farmatlon Unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION at abSif 6^7;JSo'f?.'!;e";i!;";6o5.***' " ««• ^--^ 6. ACTION INITIATED 7. ■ SITUATION DEVELOPMENT saw a?SV}ih?*iif^^^*°"*'*.*^^ external stores and turned Into the MIOs. When the HlOa Sfrnr Jllfht Jettison ordnance the MICs executed a Spllt-S and departed the area. St?! rj^5^ jUght of the HlGs and continued in a 3600 turn. BLUE Lead sighed the HIGs ahead approximately *l-5 miles. In full A/B, the flight accelerated to 1.1 Mach The WI05 were low 2-3.000 ft, while the P-105b were at 5-6.000 ft. As BLUE Plight oass^d 1 ^"^y although the MIQs were only aboSt l^^S 1-1/2 nlles ahead, BLUE Plight broke off the chaae and headed fo^the coast There wa. Se"Io«K «o5^:ei'j;'thI^Si5"" '"^ •^•^'^•^ ^" tSe vlclnuy orSJsowiSI-S^E. Tne Closest approach of the HIQs was approalmateJy one mile. 8. ORDNANCE None expended. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None reported. to. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience BLUE 1 (Uad) Total Hours 1750 P-I05 Hours 950 Combat Missions 70 I85 . 'Event lI-*9 CoaMcntg on this Encounter BLUE 1 (Lead) eipressed his opinion that the HICs w«re highly successful In making P-105 flights Jettlstn thelp ordnance prior to roachlns their target. The NZOs would then depart the 6 and 7< See also Events ZI>SO. 11-51* and 11-52. 186 Aircraft Involved Iteiultt No duiag« Vicinity of Encounter; Event 11-50 Two F-105D8 va four HIQ^lTs 1. PRlNARt MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: IB September 1966/I6I8H BLUE Plight, two P-105D aircraft, were en route on a strike mission against the Dap Cau Highway/Railroad Bridge In Route Package VI-A. Prior to reaching the target the flight encountered four HIO-17 aircraft and Jettisoned all external stores as the NIOs attacked. 2. mSSIOII ROUTE After departing Korat the route of the flight is unknown. The encounter occurred In tbe vicinity of 2in2*N/106°19'B. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-105P BLUE 1. 2 Unknown ordnance load, reference waa oade to external stores. iao.17 HIQ 1. 2. 3. 1 External fuel tanks. Quns. 4. FLI6HT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather t Unknown BLUE 1. 2 Altitude: 1,500 ft Heading : 25* Speed : 5*0 kt Puel State ; Unknown Flight Formation ; . . ... Unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION Four Nia-17 aircraft were sighted in the 9 o'clock position of BLUE Plight. The nOB were on an easterly heading In a loose echelon formation at about 2,000 ft, 3-k miles away. 6. ACTION INITIATED The NIQa Jettisoned their external fuel tanks and 61 gun with full anno <1029 rd 20nm) BLUE 2 * - CBU-27 1 - 650 gal eenterline tank 1 - 11-61 gun with full annto 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Unknown BLUE 1. 2. 3. 1 Altitude : 6OOO ft S£ce-_; 550 kt Fuel State : Unknown, eenterline tanks had been Jettisoned 30 ml from target area^ Inbound Plight Poraation : O 5. INITIAL DETECTION Two MlC-17 flehtera were sighted by BLUE 2 in the 9 o'clock position of the flight at a range of approximately 6 miles, level' in altitude. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight engaged afterburners and continued to the target aooelerating to 675 KCAS. 7. SITUATIOR DEVELOPMENT Aa BLUE Plight accelerated, the NZOs were no threat. Heavy iSm AA gunfire was en- countered so the flight descended to minimum altitude, approainately 50 ft. 8. ORDNANCE Hone expended. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None reported. 10. AtRCREU COMMENTS No specific connents. 11 . DATA SOURCES Project Intervlgwg: BLUE 2, 15 March 1967 Messages. Reports ; 7AP/DAI/182319Z Sep 1966/ DIO 30«l79 Event IX-51 12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOH BLUE Flight «a9 Inbound to the target when BLUE 2 sighted two MIOb at 9 o*clock from the flight. Immediately the flight engaged afterburner and accelerated In a shallow de- scent. The mos were easily outdistanced. Heavy AA fire In the target area probably cai!«ed the KIOs not to follow the F-105b. Ko specific markings were Identified on the Mids and they were not sighted again. 1 r I I I i I i I I •••1 I I I I I I I I I BT«nt 11-52 Aircraft Involvctd: Four P-lOSDs 7S four NZa-17a Result: Ko dwwg* Vicinity of Encounter: 21*08 'N/106*17*B 1. PRIMRV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Dat«/Tlme: IB September 1966/1645H Pour P-105DS (BLUE Plight) were the last of approximately eight fllghte striking the Dap Cau bridge In Route Package VLA (21'>12*N/106O05*E> . BLUE Plight had split Into tvo elements, and was aoecleratlng for their bomb run. 2. MISSION ROUTE Plight departed Korat^ refueled on the Bro«n Anchor tracks then headed north up the Ouir of Tonkin, and west Into the target area, Egresa was oade on the same general route. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P»105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4 Onknown - Oeneral purpose bombs 2 - continued their egression heading 050®. The MIGs. unable to close, gave up the chase and turned off tOHai*d the south. BLUE 1 and 2 were unable to close within firing range before they lost vlsuml eontset with the MZO flight. .BLUE Flight rejoined and returned hone safely. 8. OROMANCE mOs 1 and 2 fired their cannons, but made no hits. 10. MICREH COmCHTS g»perlence Co w ae nt s on this Encounter BLOB 1 expressed the need for an aircraft with a much greater turn capability than the P-105. He also stated a dealre for greater acceleration, rate of climb, and endurance under combat conditions. Ke believes the P-105 needs better cockpit visibility, especially Between 5 and 7 o'clock. Once again swltchology was a factor In the difficulty In chang- ing the PCS froa the ooiab mode to the alr-to-alr mode. BLUB 1 also feels there must be a reduction of the radio chatter In the combat area. An l^»roveaent In our own OCX to facilitate a better and more specific KIQ warning system Is required. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUB 1, 5 Jan 1967 Wessages. ReportTT 7tb AP OPREP-3, 181737Z Sept 66, OOCO 2^699 388th TPV OPREP-4/297. l8 Sept 66 (ReauM) . 12. lARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Items 4-7 adequately describe the narrative of this event; however, a question aa to relative positions of all aircraft at initial sighting should be mentioned at this point. This outline generally follows the Information contained In the interview with BLUE 1. The OPBEP-3 differs In the following manner: BLUE 3 and 4 made Initial sighting when on a heading of C500, altitude 3 to 4,000 feet. MIOs were heading approximately 240^ and co-altlt;ide. BLUE 3 and 4 were supposedly In a 360° turn taking spacing from other flights already on the target. The possibility exists that BLUE 3 and 4 were actually taking spacing on the lead element (BLUE 1 and 2), as confirmed by BLUE I's statement that be had split his elements. The OFREP could then be picking up this event as the MIOo were already rolling In on 3 and 4 since all following Information la In correlation. See also Events XI-50 and ZI-51. BLUE 1 Total Hours 6100 P-105 Hours 500« Combat Missions (560 hours) 192 % RED BARON tVEWT 11-5? SUNNAfiV I Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 3, 4) CoMunlcatlons Eneny Actions (HIG 1.2} Rcaarks Status Action Other Friendly \ BLUE Flight Alt. 6 - 7.000 ft SCO-SSO kts Heading 280o Full Ordnance loid and 10,000 lb of fuel. er and 2 accelerating Just prior, to pop-up •aneuvtr. B3 and 4 sighted 4 MIR. 175 In loose R echelon at 9 o'clocic, level . 400 kt. B3 and 4 called HIGs at 9 o'clock. MIGs were In loose right ec he 1 on heading 090* at about 7000 ft. Speed about 400 kt. • h Sane as Tn Bl and 2 pop-up to IZ.OOO ft but drop short of target when they hear M16 call. 63 and 4 observe HIGs turning In on then. 3 and 4 Jettison ordnance dunp the nose, AS, accelerate, and begin hard left turn to heading OSO^. B3 and 4 call HIGs rolling Into their 6 o'clock. HIGs peel off and roll in behind B3 and 4. Unknown Both flights dcscendlna and accalaratiag. 81 (L) acquire visual contact with NI6s chasing 3 and 4. BLUE 1 and 2 re)1 In trail Mith Nlfis at approjt. 7 n Hi rang* B3 and 4 hold heading 050° and attenpt to outrun the HIGs. HIGs 1 and 2 fire cannons at B3 and 4. The HIGs are out of range and B3 and 4 receive no hits. BLUE 3 and 4 are accelerating on the deck and observe ordnance from HIG 1 and 2 splashing Into ^ the paddies S below then. [J h 550 kt 3.000 ft ilt. 6.500 - 7.000 lb of fuel. 81 and 2 are In trail and closing on NIGs, however NIGs turn off to the south and are lost In the haze. B3 and 4 continue, egression on 050" heading. HIGs break off attack and turn off toward the south. HIGs could not ^ close on B3 and 4.3 I Event II-S3 I I I I I Aircraft Involved: Eleven P-lOSs va four MIO-178 Result: No daaaee Vicinity of Encounter: Approximately , ai'SO'K/lOS" 30»B* 1. priharv hissior and tactical situation Date/Time: 20 September 1966/I6U5H OREEN Flight (three P-lOSDs) and BLUE Flight (four F-lOSDa) bombed a highway bridge fifteen Biles northeast of Thai Nguyen. (JCS 78.62 at 2X*>kH' 30^*11/106^ O^i' 16"E) PURPLE Plight (t«o P-105Dg and two P-105P Wild Weasel) was an IRON HAND Plight supporting GREEN Plight, BLUE Plight aiid a flight of three P-UCa on strllte/CAP. BLUE Plight was 3-5 minutes (approximately 30 miles) behind OREEN Plight and PURPLE Plight was 8-10 minutes behind GREEN Plight crossing the Red River near Yen Bal. The flight of three P-DC aircraft were assigned strlke/CAP with their primary tarf St in the sane area and at approximately th6 same TOT as the P^lOSs. 2. MISSION ROUTE GREEN and BLUE Flights departed Taktili about the time PORPLE Plight departed Korat. PURPLE 1 was delayed ten minutes at takeoff after aborting his first aircraft. All flights refueled on their scheduled tankers and proceeded north-northwest to cross the Red River in the vicinity of Yen Bal. OREEN 3 aborted while attempting to refuel and GREEN then moved up to fill In as GREEN 3. The flights flew east from Yen Bal passing north of Thai Nguyen and then southwest to the target. Egress was via the reverse route to post-strike tankers and then recovery at their respective bases. OREEN Plight descended to 8 to 10,000 ft altitude after crossing the Red River while BLUE Plight descended to tree-top level (approximately 3500 ft NSL). PURPLE Fli^t alao descended to 8 to 10,000 . ft. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F-.105D OREEN I. 3 5 * 1000 lb bombs 2 - 450 gal drop tanks 20mm ammo (1029 rounds saeh) P-105D GREEN 2 4 - CBU-248 (flak suppression) IFF. TACAN, and radar-off camouflage' paint 20mm ammo (1029 rounds) P-105D BLUE 1. 3. 1 5 - 1000 lb bombs 2-450 gal drop tanks 20011 ammo (1029 rounds each) P»105D BLUE 2 4 - CBU-2i(8 (flak suppression) IFF. TACAN, and radar-off, camouflage paint 20mm ammo (1029 rounds) F»105F/F-10SD PURPLE 1. 2. 3. t 2 . AGM-458 (SHRIKE mlssllss) 2 - LAU-3 (rocket pods) 20mn ammo (1029 rounds) 1 • 630 gal centerline tank IFF, radar, and TACAN-off, camouflage paint i mO-17 RED 1. 2. 3. 1 Not given - but only gunfire was observed. Silver color on right wing perpendicular to leading eoge (as reported by OREEN 3)« One MIO was light gray-blue in color with RVN ■axiangs. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Clear with haze layer up to 10,000 feet Altitude: BLUE 1. 2. 3. » 100/150 ft AOL (Grd. level approx. 3?00 ft) OREEM 1. 8-9000 ft left orbit ^ee teat for locations of specif le encounters. .ev«nt ZI-53 peed ; Fuel; Plight Pormatlorn BLOE 1. 2. 3. 0 300" 500 KCAS-plus 10-11,000 lb Defensive spread GREEN 1. 2. 3 300* 450 KCAS 10<>11,000 lb In trail (rejoining) PURPLE 1. 2. 3. 1 090" 450-480 KCAS 9»000 lb Fluid- four (fighting) Second element 2- 3000 ft lower than lead and 4-5 miles In trail S. niTIAL DETECTION Area MIQ warnings had been transmitted while GREEN Flight was inbound to the target. After pulling off of his dive boab run* GREEN 1 orbited the target one time in order to cheek BOA and then departed on a 300** heading at about 5500 ft NSL as BLUE night approached the target. GREEN 3 delayed his dive bomb run for better position and after completing the run pulled up Into a left orbit to rejoin bis flight at alrrut 8000 ft, 350 KCAS, west of the target and was turning from west to south when he first saw a flignt of four MIO-lTs passing few hundred feet below hloat his 3 o'clock beam position. apparently headed northwest in a left turn. GREEN 3 lost the four MIOs In the sun and haze as he attempted to turn and accelerated after them. Very shortly there- after. GREEN 2 called that GREEN Plight was being bounced by MIGs and GREEN 1 acquired the NIGs at his 7 o'clock high, 2 miles back in a left turn, with one element peeling off for attack. BLUE Flight is on target and PURPLE Flight is about thirty miles west of GREEN Pllgbt at this time. The P-4C flight position Is unknown but in the area. (No P.4C/MI0 encooBters were reported In this area on this date. Thus It Is assumed that the F-4C fliglkt was unable to establish contact with the enemy after cleaning their aircraft off.) ACTION INITIATED GREEN Flight Jettisoned pylons and tanks. GREEN 1 held course after sighting two of the four NIGs peeling off for attack. GREEN 2 initiated an attack on the high MIQ element. OAEEN 3 Is approximately six miles behind his flight. BLUE Lead eoalns off of target is made aware that he has a hung 1000-lb bomb on an outboard station and will be unable to maneuver In a turning engagement. Me elected to egress on tbe deck and attempt to avoid the MIOs. BLUE 1 ordered his flight to remain with him and egress. PURPLE Flight, coming Into the area. Jettisoned fuel tanks and turned to mid OBEEN -Pllgbt. 7. SITUATIOM OEVELOPMENT SREEN 1 waited until the two MIG-17s were close to firing range ('vSOOO ft) with a high overtake speed, and then performed a high-g roll to the right followed immediately by a hlgh-<-c reverse roll back to the left. At least one of the MIGs fired a cannon burst at OREES 1 as he broke right. The MIGs are at GREEN l>s 11 o'clock position in a tight left turn as GREEN 1 completes his high-g break and reversal, but the NIOs dive for the deck and EM 1 cannot track them in the turn or accelerate fast enough to close on them. GREEN 1, and 3 elect to egress at high speed and rejoin on the south side of the Red River. BLUE I sees F-105s and MIGs hasseling overhead but elects to egress on the deck supersonic becaoM of the hung bomb on BLUE 1. One MIG dives after BLUE Plight but cannot close due to BUBS Plight's high speed. PURPLE 1 sees two NIOs at his 12 o'clock and engages. PURPLE 1, 3, and 4 fire their cannon at NIGs and three MIOs fire at PURPLE Flight members with no apparent nits. . PURPLE Plight terminated the engagement by JettiSMtlng ordnance and aeeeleratlng to supersonic speed. 8. MONANCE _ t un OREEa 1. 2, 3 BLUE 1, 2, 3, 4 PURPLE 1 PURPLE 2 PURPLE 3 PURPLE « NIG 1 HIO 2 NIO 3 mo « Wo. flred/Mo. hits (CANNON) 0/0 0/0 460/0 0/0 150/0 200/0 Twlce/0 ?/0 • Twlee/O Onoe/D Remarks At OREEN 1 and PURPLE 2 At PURPLE 1 and PURpLC 3 Event 11-53 9. CQUIPHCNT PROBLEMS GREEN 3 - Could not complete refueling inbound. tnoB,^ r bolt failed in outboard wing pylon etiwlng 1000 lb bomb to hans up. ;»nor^ \ * P«^ayed ten minutes at take-off after aborting first aircraft. PURPLE « - No sight reticle during flight. 10. AIRCREW CONHENTS Total F-105 Combat Hours Hours Missions Remarks GREEN \ 1600 100 8 2-1/2 yrs ADC In P-101 , and P>102, no missile firing* fired at DART two times. BLUE 1 Unknown Unknown Unknown Previous P-105 Instruc- tor at NelUs PURPLE 1 4000 1100 57 Vlld Weasel School, PURPLE 3 P-105 IP at Nellia Unknown Unknown Unknown TAC background, much P-IOS time. Wild Weasel School PURPLE 5 n1 . H* %m»< that tt iw m MI&-17. PI then saw another NI6-I7 below. Pl-4 drop tanks and 90 to afterburner. P3 and 4 following a bit lower and 4-5 Allies back In trail. PI has NIGa 12 o'clock. Two NIG-17S In a gentle left turn heading south at 5000 ft. PI looks down ao- oentarlly to set up sight. Gets only rockets, with a fixed 40 nil sight depression. He did not want radar ranging due to low alt. The sight makes PI shoot too high. PURPLE closed from MIG'S 4 to 6 o'clock. \ ■ PI 2 to 3000 ft behind Hlfi-i Hdg: 120* Speed: 550 KCAS Alt; 8000 ft Closing rapidly PI opens fire on lead MU P2 following P). P3 and 4. In trail. HIGs continue on. H2 Is wlngman and U on the right. PI fires 2 long bursts of 20aiai. No hits. PI closing rapidly on M2. Alt: 8000 ft Speed; 600 KCAS PI switched his attack froa Ml to M2. flongt ISOO ft down to 500 ft. Rest of P-Flight following. H2 now on the right side of PI (at About PI'S 1 o'clock). HI started a slow right turn. PI fired one long burst at N2. No hits. 1 KED BAROW CVgilT Il>5> SUHHAWY Action Aircraft (PURPLE 1. 2. 3. 4) Other Friendly CofliRunlcatlons En«ny Actions (NIG 1.2) Remarks TUe Nark Status Action < PI still closing. P3 and 4 about Mach 1.0. PI Starts to fire egain at M2 but MI6 breaks atnay before he can. P2, 3. 4 still f0l< lowing P4 about 1 alle In trail of P3. P2 and 3 call a third HIG trying to close on PI. H2 breaks straight up and over the top to th(i rear of PI. A third KI6-17 (N3) at 4 o'clock to P2 and 3, diving at 40", alt 7000 ft. Third NIG Is pale blue-color and Is hard to sec PI at 700 KCAS. The action from thi PI Jettisoned ordnance, breaks for the deck, and then departs the area. On departure PI had bingo fuel. ; point on describes only P3 starts to attack H3. P2 follOMlng PI also drops ord- nance. the P3 end P4 eirci P1 Indicates to P2 that H3 cannot close on thea. aft. M3 closes to 2000 ft of P2 but could not Zitch him, N3 continues right turn \ P3 and 4 In right turn slightly descending. P3 fires at K3 fron 2000 ft range. Wh2n fired at N3 pulls up hard with high g. P3 fired ISO rounds. J. P4 - 20 to 30* nose high In full After- burner. P4 fired at the NIG. Range 200 ft. P4 bed 2000 knots overtake on the MIG. N3 pulled up end then rolled off left behind P3. P4 fired 200 to 300 rounds.' No hits. ( P4 passed 200 ft to MIG*s left as he over- sum r^ jinKtiiy owajr. H3 fires at P3 at 2000 ft range. Ho hits. ^8 ®P P4 does a barrel -rol 1 but the HIG breaks off end Is lost fro* sight. P3 and 4 rejoin and egress . I Event II-5» Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105B two IIIQ-21s Result: No damase Vicinity of Encounter: 21*15'N/106««I5»E 1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 Septenber 1966/1027H* Three P-105Ds and one F-105P WILD WEASEL aircraft on an IRON HAND support flight for strike aircraft In Route Package VI-A. 2. MISSION ROUTE Departed Korat then direct to Brown Anchor Tanker direct to 21"*12'N/107"»3'''E, direct to 21«15'N/l06«'i<5'E. Egress generally the aaoe route. Altitude 8,000 ft, 150 kta. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION P-105P BtlJE 1. P-105D BLUE 2 2 AGM-45 2 LAU-3 650-gal centerllne tank ZObd amno BLUE 1 IPP operating: TACAN, radar » and doppler standby Camouflage paint P.105D BLUE 3 ^ LAU-3 650-gai centerllne tank 20mm aouno P-105D BLUE 1 U CBU-2'l 2 450wgal tanks on wing pylons 20aun ammo KIC-21 MIG 1 Silver Color MO-21 MIG 2 2 AAH Silver Color 4. FLI6MT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EMCOUMTER Weather: Clear; visibility 3 ml. in hase. BLUE r T 8,000 ft 260« 450 kts Pull Internal (10,000 lb) OREEH J 6,000 ft 04 0* 550 kts Uhknown Altitude: Speed : Fuel' State : l ^Tl,' : Pormatlon : Normal tactical formation with element almost line abreast 1000 ft to 1500 ft to the rear and 2500 ft to the right. 5. INITIAL DETECTION; A NTO call was received from another P-105 flight while BLUE flight was inbound to . the target ar*a. HIOs were sighted by BLU^ 1, 12 o'clock low, 2 to 3 ml. flying from left to right at 1027H. ma warnings had been received, prior to sighting. 7. ACTION INITIATED BLUE flight Jettisoned stores and started right turn falling in trail with MTO 1. SITUATION OEVeLOPMENT NIO 1 made a hard l80* turn passing BLUE flight almost head on. BLOE 1 flrea 100 rounds of 20 n.m. HEI in front of NIO 1 with no apparent hits. BLUE 4 observed HIQ 2 at 3 o'clock high 1000 ft out armed with missUes, attacking BLUE 3* On BLUE 4*a call, •NOTE: Tine in OPREPS given as 0927H. Event II-5* BLUE 3 broke hard right Into MIO 2 and down, and then reversed. BLUE 4 and NIC 2 Jockeyed for position In a brief semi-scissors maneuver^ with neither adversary being able to gain a tactical advantage. BLUE 4 broke off the encounter by breaking hard left and down, and accelerated to 740 kta CAS at 500 ft AOL. BLUE 1, 2 and 3 pursued MIO I for about 4 ■lnute« and broke off with NIG 1 two to three miles In front of thm opening range. B. ORBMNCE BLUE 1 BLUE 2 BLUE 3 BLUE 4 MIG 1 MIG 2 (No. flred/No. hits) 20mra 0/0 0/0 0/0 None observed None observed 9. EOnPRECT PROBLENS BLUE 1 — Gun Jaa at 120 rounds BLUE 3 - Had difficulty seeing RlC 2 due to vapor from canopy at high air speed and g loads, BLUE 4 « Has unable to outnaneuver HIO 2. 10. AUCREH COMMENTS Ejtpertewee : BLUE 3 Total Hours 3400 ?-l05 Combat Hours Missions 780 80 TAC recorded and TAC FTR background hard to tell what la Comments on this Encounter ; BLDE 1 EHO rear cockpit, poor visibility, fron aft cockpit going OB. 11. MTA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUE 1 (rear cockpit EWO) Messages. Reports ; OPREP-3 2114332, September 1966 fTMl JAP DOCO 25835. September 1966 QPREP 4/359, 21 September 1966 from 388 FTR Vlng Korat Letterss BLUE 4 12. HMRATIVE DESCRIPTION BZSE flight, consisting of one P-105P WILD WEASEL In lead position and three P-lOSDa. was on an IRON HAND mission In Route Package VIA, Inbound to the target area in the vicin- ity of 21'15'BI/106»45'E. BLUE flight heard another P-105 flight call MIOs. BLUE flight was at B,0OO ft altitude, heading 260 at 425 KCAS when two P-105Ds were observed at 12 o'clock 2,000 ft low heading northeast with a MIO-21 about 2,000 ft behind them. A third P-103D * waa observed about one mile behind the MIG-21. BLUE flight Jettisoned ordnance and tanks and started a right diving turn to break up the MM attack and pursued the HIO about fif- "F^S.^L**** vicinity of 21024'N/106«58'E. BLUE lead was closing on a heading of 040* , 6.000 ft, 550-600 KTAS at the MIG-21 'a 4-5 o'clock position ranae 10-14 000 ffc ih*n SJ^'siJ?'^ ^ • "'^ BLuJ°ni?St hiaS-oJ!^* siSi l«2°i"a''*''" slight left turn, still heading about 04 0« fired 100 rounds of 20 m.m. at the MIO with no SJSS ?" «0^««j:n«<» through 270* in a shallow climb. The MIO was 1500-2000 ft ?K*JT2'*!'?L^**Ll!***"J?li^i:***- • «0» whiff eiMll turn and pupsuad tha :ntt to ttaa north northweat toward Kap Airfield. 'SC?****" **? 7*000 " and between aircraft about 4.000 ft. After tbe turn, BLUE 3 sighted a silver colored object at his 3 o'clock a few thousand ft high. BLUE 3 broke into the object and identified it as a drop taSk floitlSj doS!! ^^^J ^'^^^ rejoin the pursuit of MIO 1, as BLUE 4 sighted a second 1110-21. 1000 ft off of his right wing and high. The element waa in tha vioinltv of 21«:!9»H^06''52'E, with MIO 2 attacking BLUE 3 from 5 o'clock high. vioi"«y or «r.- M« 4 called the break and BLUE 3 broke right and down forcing MIO 2 to overshoot. BLUE 4 tried to get behind MIO 2 and both Jockeyed for firing position in three or four 'S^«f- "ith neither being able to attain a firing position, BLUE 3 lost sight of BLUB « and instructed him to depart the area. BLUE 4 then broke left and down and ^^"^ 2i<'30'N/106«49'E to 2ini'N/107"'30»E in afterburner at .740 Neaaiwhile BLUE 3, after evading MIO 2, rejoined BLUE 1 and 2 at 21«34»M/lo6«44«E ab they punued " "^1" ^» Of BLUE 1 when BLUE 1 broke off the chase at 21"»35'H/106»42»E and exited with a right turn direct to 21»ll«N/l07«>30'E BLUE *««lted Route Package VI approximately two minutes ahead of the reat of BLUE Plight and reiolnad during randasvoua with the poat-strlke tanker. 'iign* Artnt IX-55 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105 vb one MIO-IT Reaults: One KIQ^ danaged Vicinity of Encounter: 21'>12*N/106<*ll3*B 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlae: 21 September 1966/1015H BLUE Plight was one of several 7-105 fllghte in a etrlke againat JCS 16, a railroad/ hlghMay bridge 17 miles northeast of Hanoi, There vera alao two fllghta of P-M oi^itina east of the target area as NIC CAP. 2. MISSION ROUTE Aircraft departed Takhli, Thailand, direct alr-to-alr refueling out over the Oulf of Tonkin, north to 21«»13'N/107'*2U'E, nest along the ridge line to the target. Bgreaa route was the reverse course. 3. AIRCRAfT CONFIGURATION P-105 BLUE 1. 3. < 5 • lOOO-lb bombs 2 - 450-gallon wing tanka 1029 rounds 20niffl P-105 BLUE 2 4 - CBU-248 2 - 450-gallon wing tanks 1029 rounds 20mm All P-105 aircraft canouflaged. MIQ.17 Ordnance unknown. Camouflaged. 4. FLIfiHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Scattered- clouds 3-5 miles in-hase. Han layer- to- 6000 ft, clear above hase. BLUE 1. 2. 3. » Altitude ; 4000-5000 ft HeadlnR :" 080* Speed ; 460-500 kt Plight Formation ; Plight in process of Joining up after bomb run. BLUE 2 1500 ft back on the left aide of BLUE 1. BLUE 3 4000 ft behind lead and BLUE 4 1000 ft behind BLUE 3 on right aide. S. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 3 calls bogeys at 10 o'clock. Lead logers the call and identifies the bogeya as a MIC In trail of a F-4 approximately 2000 ft back. (See Event 46» Volume Z.) MIO calls had been heard in the area prior to this eight ing. Also BLUE Plight sighted two fllghta of four MIQs each, earlier, as they were eomlng Into the target. C. ACTION INITIATED The MIO rolled out of its turn almoat directly in front of BLUE 1. BLOB 1 moved up to 2000 ft and began to fire. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT The P-4 was in a left turn when sighted at 10 o'clock. The P-4 rolled out almost directly In front of BLUE Plight. BLUE 1 Just moved up into the MIQ'a 6 O'clock and at 2000 ft out began firing. At approximately 300 ft range the MIQ broke hard left and down. BLUE Plight lest sight of the MIO in the hase near the ground. - Event II-S5 8. ORDNANCE BtUB 1 $68 Rounds 20nm expended. HXG-IT Hot obsenred to fire. fl. CQUIPNEHT PROBLEMS The only problem aMa noted during this encounter vas: BVSE 1 did not appear to cause the damage expected from 568 rounds of 20mm - possible sight problem. . 10. AIRCREW COMNERTS Experience REmarke These figures are estimated. BLUE 1 vas not Interviewed. He did have considerable fighter experience. BLUE 2 was a Junior officer* approximately 500 hrs total flying time. This was. his first unit assignment out of Hellls Gunnary School. Tighter experience HOO hrs P-100 and approximately 350 hrs P-86. Ccnanents : BLUE 2 •> remarked that a AAM probably would not have been a good weapon to use during this encounter. The MZO was quite eloae and the proximity of the P-4 would hav« restricted using a missile. BLUE 3 - the turning capability of the MIO 17 made following him during his break almost Impossible. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUB 2, 13 Hareh 1967°. BLUE 3, 13 March 1967. BLUE 4, 6 Pebruary 1967. Heaaages. Reports : 7AP OPREP-3 258 2? September 1966. 7AP 0212352Z, DOI 30492 September 1966. 12. MARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Pli^t had just completed Its bombing run on the Dau Cau highway and rail bridge and was In the process of Joining up. The flight had Just rolled out on a head- ing of approximately 080^ altitude 4-5000 ft airspeed 500 kt. BLUE 3 called bogeys at 10 o'clock. BLUE 1 Identified the bogeys as a MIO chasing an P-4. The P-4 and HIQ were in a left turn at this time so that their bellies were up to BLUE Plight and they could not see tUem. It Is believed that the P-'l did not know the KIO was at his 6 o'clock position. The NIO was 2000 ft behind the P-4 and In a very good attack position. The left turn carried the HIG almost directly in front of BLUE 1, about 2000 ft. BLUE 1 moved into position and began firing, and continued firing down to 300 ft at which time the no broke hard left In what amounted to a Spllt-S and dove to the deck. BLUE Plight turned left, attempting to keep the MIO in sight but lost sight of him in the haze aa he Reared the ground. The flight then turned back right and continued to egress the area. BLUE 1 fired 566 Rounds of 20mm at the MIO. He and BLUE 3 saw hits Tflaahea) on the mo 'a right wing. The MIG was camouflaged - black, green, and red. Total P-105 Combat Hours Hours Missions •BLUE 1 4000 800 70 •BLUB 2 500 - - BLUB 3 ——— '-^Unknown——" SBLOB 4 3000 375 60 • Batlmated from author's personal knowledge. ■vMit 11-56 "'^ Alreraft Involved: Vour P-105> vs two MIO-lTs ^..^-•^ " Reiult: On* MIQ-17 destroyed ^ Vicinity of Encounter: 21«20*N/106*17'B 1. JtMX^Sxt MISSION MO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 September 1 966/1 OOOH One P-105F and three P-105D9 (BLUE Plight) were on an IRON HAND nlsaion with an initial orbit point at Zloiii'N/loe^ZS'E. The IRON HAND Plight Mas to attack SAN sites in support of the strike group consisting of a total force of forty P^lOSs and eight P-4ca. The target was JCS l6. the Dap Cau HW/RR bridge. 2. HISSIQR ROUTE Departed Korat on • northeast headlrs to the Gulf of Tonkin for an air-to-air refuol- Ins with Brown Anchor. Entered NVN Just northeaat of Can Pha Harbor on a heading of 275* altitude 6-9000 ft. and speed of 520 kt. Then proceeded to aatiffied orbit point. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION F-105P BLUE 1, F-105D BLUE 2 2 - SHRIKE (AGM-US) 2 - Rocket pods (2.75") UU-3A 1 - 650 gal eenterllne tank Pull 20mm annunltion - 1029 rounds BLOE 1 had IPP - on, TACAN - off, doppler - on» radar - atandbr All P-I05 aircraft eaaeuflaged g^l05D BLUE 3 and U 1 - Rocket Pods (2.75") LAU-3A 1 - 650 gal eenterllne tank Pull 20ffls ammunition - 1029 rounds ICC^IT • ■ Ouns probably Silver In color No external stores 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; mm - Speed ; Puei: Ghe>elght scattered clouds with hast below 6000 ft. 6000 ft. 4-5 miles in the haxe. Vlatblllty unUaitad abov* BLUE 1 ? — — 7000 ft 110* to 120»— — — 10,000 lbs approx. (B-1) Fllitht Ponnatlon BLDE 3 T —6000 ft— -110* to 120* — ttikn own— - -Tank* eipty- AimuH 5. WITIAL KTEaiOB Event 11-56 "^S* sighted visually by B*,UE H at HOOO ft. In BLUE l«a and 2'b 6 o'clock pool- the"encounter 1 and 2 »•« In a right turn. BIQ EYE gave MM warnings during 6. ACTION INITIATED A ^ *® *® *® afterburner and go Into an easy right turn". BLOE 1 com- piled and departed the area. 7. SITIATIOH DEVELOPED ^^^^^ * turned Into MXQs vho irent Into a left turn after not beln« able to overtak. BLUE l and 2. BLUE 3 got angle off on MIG-1 and flredhlttlng h?». iSn'i tfh I "5"* * shallow right turn. MIO-2 broke left and in front of BLUE 3 and J. BLUE 4 fired a burst at «0-2 but stayed with BLUE 3- BLUE 3 again got anile off and distance on Hia-l. fired and knocked a part off the right winrtlp! JSo-i Diiot :i!ci'?,^Vr"l ^ * '*J^5J:S? V""^ f""*^*- 3 aid 4 thin swlJ;SeJ lelll at rjhi> i?^ r^iJ**" ^2°?/* (5000?). ami 5 o'clock to BLUE 3 and 4. blS 3 «d n than lit bumera and egreasad the area. B. OROSmICC BLOE U 2 BLUE 3 ELL'S 4 MIO-l, 2 9. Oun fired/hit 0/0 1029/yes 150/0 VO EqUIFNENT PROBLEMS IPLOB 1 - Did not load tape recorder. BLOB 3 - Could not Jattiaon esnterllne tank. BLUE 4 - Oun camera was not 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience . • Total Hours BLUE 1 Front 3800 BLUE 2 IftUonuMn BLUE 3 600 aLOE 4 3500 Conaents on this Encounter P-105 Hours 30 400 Cooibat Missions about 75 about 50 Raaarka P-80. 86, 100, 105 (in Oeraany) Fighter Weapon School Instructor B * ? would have had a pretty fair chance of getting Mia-2 if ha had a mi>« lift Diio* lilt, riios ejects « Httlt after. 84 does not see \ pilot eject. He Is looking it other NIG and clearing B3't fio'clock. 6 Alt IBOn #* B3 and 4 follow NIG down to crash point In a right descending turn. 84 8000 ft back. Coaes MP on the right and assuaoi Lead. "OK, you have oe. Roger." says 83. 'B4 "Roger." 83. "All right, ay gun Is eapty at this tiao. ay gun Is •■pty. You take the Lead." B4, "Aog. I'M cooe Dy on your right." NIG 1 crashoi. ■ 1 T, 7 Alt. A/S In afttrburnor B3 and 4 see a NIG at 5000 ft and closing froa their 5 o'clock position B3 and 4 light after- burner and egress area. 84 to B3: "All right, let's light burners. Let's Just unload It and 10.* — Hi LOW on TUftI « ^ flejotfl with B1 and 2 before reaching coast. I 7. SnUATIOH DEVELOPHEKT Event 11-58 BLUE 3 opened fire on MIO 1 but mlaaed. Mia 1 slid out, then back in behind BLUE 3. BLUE 3 headed for the deck with HIO 1 In trail and firing. Meantrtille MIO 2 was 2- 3000 ft behind MIO 1 and 7-8000 ft In front of BLUE k. BLUE >^ pulled hla noae through MIG 2 and fired 125 rounds before his gun Jarased. After his gun quit firing, he broke down and right and when he pulled out, he did not see any HlOa on BLUE 3* a tall. Before breaking, BLUE 4 saw a possible hit on the belly of the MIO and a definite hit approxi- mately 6-7 ft behind the canopy on the fuselage. As elements, BLUE Flight remained in the area looking for MIOs but without further HIQ encounters. BLUE Plight then rejoined and exited the area. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1, 2 BLUE 3 BLOE 4 (No. fired/No. hits) Cannon 0/0 200/0 125/1 NZG 1 MIQ 2 MIO-17 Flight 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 1 Hone BLUE 2 None yewarica BLUE 4 got a positive hit on the fuselage of MIO <>. t/0 0/0 0/0 BLUE 3 None BLOE 4 Qun quit firing after 125 rounds (possible burst limiter Installed). 10. AIRCREU COMMENTS Experience No aircrew experience data available. Copwents on this Encounte r The flight felt that excessive UHP radio chatter greatly hampered the flight's effectiveness when jumped by MIGs. So much chatter on the radio makes It difficult to Mlntaln flight Integrity. Comments fron Overall Experience BLUE 1: The big problem encountered was the haze which restricted the visibility to a maximum of four miles slant range. This Is a definite reason for having an aircraft with a perr-nent-mounted gun. You would have to Identify the target visually prior to firing and would probably be too close to the test for alr/alr missiles. 11. DATA SOU^tCES fTO^ect Intervtewa ; BLUE 1, letter 3 Mar 1967. Kesaages . ReportT * Resumft of 388TFW PASTEL DOZ>03103, September and OPREP 4/358 7AP 211U32Z Sept 66 DOCO 25846 7AP 211053Z Sept 66 DOGO 25833 7AF 2I2352Z Sept 66 DIG 30492 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was Inbound to the target on a flak auypresslon mission to support a force of about 48 P-105 and P-4 fighters attacking the Dap Cau RR/Highway Bridge, seven- teen miles northeast of Hanoi. Ttila was about the third day In a row that this bridge vas put under attack. The entire force was eoaposed of twelve flights of four aircraft each with Individual flight times-on-target spread over a period of about one hour. Thus, the flights were attacking in trail with spacing of 3-5 minutes between flights. Two of the flights were flak suppression, two flights were IRON HAND support and two flights of F-4c aircraft were assigned strlke/CAP. BLUE Plight was about mid-8tr«aa In the flow of attack flights at 21*14?ea MIQ warnings had been received preT(|tt^|^gfi^||^the picket radars and Event 11-57 Aircraft Involved: Poup P-105D* ra tmo HIO-lTs Result: One MIQ destroyed. Vicinity of Encounter: 21»15'N/106"22'E 1. PSIHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 September 1966/1015H . Pour F-1C5D3, strike aircraft Inbound to JOS l6, rallroad/hlghiiay bridge at Zl"!!*:*/ 106^05 ■£. Several KIO warnings had been given. Could hear other flights engaging MIJs In the target area. Numerous other flights (P-Dc and P-IOS) striking in the same area. 2. niSSION ROUTE Departed Takhli refueling over the Gulf of Tonkin with coasting In due neat of the target area to take advantage of the mountainous terrain. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-105 BLUE 1. 2. 3. 1 6 - 750-lb bombs (or 5 - ICOQ-lb bombs) 2 " J(50-gal wing tanks Canouflage paint, IFP off HIG~17 MIG 1. 2 Both clean KIO 1 - silver color with red star. HIO 2 - Camouflaged. Lighter tans and greens than U.S. aircraft. No insignia markings noted. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weat her : Clear with visibility 5 to 6 miles in haxe. BLUE 1, 2 BLUE 3. H Altitude : 5000 ft 6000 ft Heading ; 270» 270' Speed ; t'uel. State: 500 XTAS 500 XTAS Pull Internal plus some in wing tanks. 5. INITIAL DETECTION Numerous MIG warnings had been received and ELUE Plight heard other flights calling out MIG sightings and engagements. Approximately 1015H, BLUE 1 saw a HIG-17 low at his 12 o'clock heading south in a right turn. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 called out the MIG and descended to the 6 o'clock position In afterburner with BLUE 2 on his left wing leaving BLUE 3 and 4 as high cover. All aircraft retained their external stores. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 1 came out of afterburner, closed In to 1500 to 2500 ft at 6 o'eloek and fired one burst of 15" rounds. BLUE 1 and 2 observed hits in MIO's left wing. BLUE 1 passed MIO »n left side ana broke hard left, descending, In afterburner while Jettisoning exter- nal stores. BLUE 2 saw MIG light afterburner, pull up and roll left behind BLUE 1 as BLUE 2 started shooting from MIG's 6 o'clock position f28o rounds) observing a fragment leave MIG's aft section. BLUE 2 broke hard left, saw BLUE 1, then observed an explosion in the area where MIG 1 could have hit If It continued the right descending break it entered as BLUE 2 shot. BLUE 3» witn H on his wing, at 5000 ft altitude trailing BLUE 1 and 2, spotted Kia 2 at 12 o'eloek, 4000 ft range In a shallow left turn as BLUE 2 Jettisoned external stores and accelerated to Join BLUE 1. BLUE 3 (and i(> Jettisoned external stores and started to close on MIO 2 as he decided to shoot from that range. BLUE 3 fired 135 rounds as the gun Jamned and HIG 2 broke hard left dov,nward at the start of BLUE 3*8 firing. Ho hits observed. BLUE 3 and 4 continued left descending turn and egressed. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 BLUE 2 BLUE 3 BLUE 4 MIO 1,2 - Clean Rounda Fired 154 280 135 0 Result MIG 1 danaged HIO 1 destroyed Probable miss Rewarfcs Oun Jam Oun Jan No attempt 9. CqUIPHENT PROBLEMS BLUE 1 - Cun Jam, suspected cycle delay timer prevent rapid second burst. BLUE 2 > Gun sight reset for alr-to>air too time consuming and distracting. Shot •blindly" at MIG. . BLUE 3 - Gun Jam. Suspected burst limiter installed. Should have been removed. BLUE 4 > No malfunctions. 10. AIRCREU COHMENTS Experience BLUE 1 BLUE _2 BLUE BLUE 4 Total F-105 Combat Hours Hours Nlsalons No data 300 86 5000 200 20 No data Conments on This Encounter BLUE 1 and 2 reel they would have each scored a kill if the suns had continued to function as they expected. TY,c switch repositioning for change over from air-to-ground and alr-to-alr weuona system employment Is too involved, time consuming, and diatraetlng of vision and thousht at a nost critical time. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interview s; BLUE 1, 15 Har 67; BLUE 2, 14 Mar 67; BLUE 3, 17 7eb 67 Message a : 7AP OPREP-3 211041Z Sep 66 DOCO 25627 Sep 66 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION «... ^b.!^ Plight was in Pluid-4 formation with BLUE 3 and U to the right side, 500 kts CAS, 500 ft, heading west inbound to target when BLUE 1 saw MIQ 1 12 o'clock low. souther- ly heading and a gentle right turn, BLUE I called out the KIG as BLUE 1 and 2 selected afterburner In the descending turn to position for a gun attack. Everyone kept their external stores with intentions of striking target after the engagement. BLUE 1 reposi- tioned all necessary switches while descending and came out of afterburner when his over- i*"^*"?' BJ-^ 2 stayed with 1 In a fighting wing position but did not set up his switches for air attack (sight set for dive bombing). ,1?^°/ appeared to be below ridge tops (maybe 500 ft AOL) with 300 to 350 KTAS and i^^- U *nfri*i?: , Numerous MiG warnings had been broadcast and scvral flights bad engaged MICs as BLUE Plight entered North Vietnam. ..t.. ^ closed on MIO 1 with about 575 kts CAS in perfect position at 6 o'clock, with cue MIO in a 15 to 20* banked right turn. He fired one burst (154 rounds) at 2500 ft estlra^ed range and BLUE 1 and 2 observed th. hits on «I0 I's left wing. BLUE 1 repoai- Si?il ^K*"'; P""* t"™- BLUE 1 brought the power to idle to reduce overtake miiP i^^i f ^! ^l^H^^ eun again. Unable to atop the overtake. SSLLfn:^ !nrf^^L^° "5° f"^" *he MIO and then breaks c.wn left 'in' afterburner and Jettisons external stores. MIC 1 pulls up as BLUE I breaks and BLUE 3 positions to shoot from probably 1000 ft in trail. »"» « .t «So ^^'^^Jnr^S'*!^''^"^^''"'*t,?^r^,^ shooting (280 rounds), BLUE 3 and 4 were still at 4500 clearing the area when BLUE 3 saw MIG- 2 at 12 o'clock, 4000 ft range. BLUE 3 ??.nS"^ external stores, reset the switches for alr-to-alr and observed a radar lock-on ?MlS?2-'?»,J"«T?"f'*^"/° • lock-on as he estimated HOOO ft range. Thinking the MIO may start maneuvering at any movement. BLUE 3 decided to shoot immedl- jtely even with the aim point slightly off. As BLUE 3 opened fire, MIO 2 InltlaS a hard i5f iJttS^^^i'T' lY'^ 3's gun stopped after shoSting 135 wunds! BlS 3 obteJSJS his jetti3onea bombs explodi ig as MIO 2 broke and thinks that caused the break or that Event 11-57 12. RARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOH (Continued) KIC 2 was observing KIQ 1 an'.1C 1 and started shooting, observing a piece cf the aft section departing KIG 1. HIG 1 rolled right and BLUE 2 continued the left turn into a hard break to rejoin BLUE 1 as both BLUE I and 2 saw an explosion In the vicinity of where MIO 1 was foundering. Ok WED BAROW eVEHT 11-57 SUHHARY Hirk Action Aircraft (BLUE 1» 2, 3. 4) Connunlcatlens Eneay Actions (NIG 1.2) Remarks Status Action Other Friendly T» ) Heading- west. SOOO ft, In F1u1d-4. U9 1 V ro p vAn K fuel. 6 - 750 lb bo«bt ei spots HI 12 o'clock low oolhg south. Takes sz, leaves B3 and 4 high, starts in after- burner to position for ■ gun attack. Rone b: calls "HIG at 12 low," B2, 3 acknow- ledge and spot HI . B3 and 4 to look Tor otner higs. In gentle right turn at approxl- nately SOD ft. Estlnated 300 to 500 KTAS. Clean - silver color. 81 and 2 In de- scending left turn closing rapidly on HI . Come out of afterburner during descent. Everyone retains external stores. 61 sets up for atr-to-alr. Tj Est. 1500 ft 93U to a #3 CAS NIMtarjr pwr. Bl opens fire at estl- nated 2500 to 1S00 ft range. B2 1000 ft behind Bl. Bl calls MIG hit. B2 conflms hits In left wing. Hit on nld-portlon of left wing. No lamedlate reaction. Bl can't get gun to shoot again, overtakes HIG to the left and breaks hard left as Ml pulls t:p and rolls left. Ti SI clean aircraft, oz. J Mftn storos. B2 shoots at N1 In left turn. BJ and 84 Jetti- son stores and 83 re- positions switches for gun attack. 61 calls "Jettison- ing stores." B3 calls M2 at his 1 9 M* *lM*k 12 0 ClOCR. Hi receives fire from 62 and rolls right. 112 at 4000 AAA a_A^ ft. est. 400 kts heading west In gentle left turn from 83. B2 sees HI lose piece of aft sec- tlon. 63 tries radar lock-on but ^ thinks 7000 ft Is ground. Estimate H2 at 4000 ft range. T| AU cteaii. Bl and 2 see snoke on ground where Ml should nflvv Dwn« opens fire at est. 4000 ft. Bun Jaa after 13S rnds. B4 files Ming on B3. 81 and 2 call HI crashed. HI assumed de- stroyed. HZ starts hard left break at start of B3's 1 1 n ng . Bl and 2 egres- sing. 63 Starts to follow H2 but gun Inoperative, continues left turn to egress with 61 and 2. All BLUE aircraft egressing cast. H2 at tree top. level heading northwest for Kep. 63 and 4 observed smoke In area of HI cngageaient. m I t • I i i I I i I I 1 I t i i i Event II-5B Aircraft Involved: Pour P-IOSP va four ICIO-17 and tMo na-21 Result: One Hia-2l damaged Vicinity of Encounter: 21*1105 nose up throu^ KZQ 2 firing 125 rounds of 20aa before hla cannon quit firing. When hla cannon quit firing* BLUE 4 broke down and right and as he pulled out he observed that both MTOs had broke off from BLtB J's 6 o'oloek. BLOB * ob- served one possible hit on the belly of MI 0 2 and a definite hit about two-thlrdo of the way up the fuselage, 6-7 feet behind the canopy. BLUE Plight remained together In elements and started looking for other NIQs that were apparently in the area at the same time. Uie flight was unsuccessful In ttwir hunt, then rejoined and returned hone. ■ Fifteen miles from the target appears »ore climbed, up from below the flight and would position. reasonable* The Nia-2l8 are reported to have not have tJkA maneuvering room in the first v' Bvant 11-59 « Alreraf'. Involved: Pour P-105b vs three RIQ-IT* Result: One NIO daaagedi Vicinity of Encounter: 21*11 •H/106«i:": 1. PftlNAftY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Dftte/TlM: 21 Septenber 1966/103211. Pour pwiOSs (BLUE Pll^t) were one fUsht of a twelve flight force Attseklns JCS 16, « rallroad/hlghway bridge at 21*11'II/106»05E. As BLUE Plight was enroute to the target, three MIG^lTe Jumped them In the vicinity of 21*U'N/106*l6'B. 2. HISSION ROUTE BLUE Plight departed Korat, refueled over the Qulf of Tonkin, proceeded North and then turned West to enter Route Package IV about 12 nllea North of Can Pha Harbor. The flight then flew West to 21*l4'N/106«25'E and turned Southweet Into the Delta where they were attacked by a flight of Nia-17s. Return route was the reverse of above. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION y-105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. » . 2 • 3000 lb bombs 1 - center line 650 gallon fuel tank 1 - 20mm cannon (1029 Rounds) All F<-lQ5a were camouflaged. WIQ-17 MIO 1. 2. 3 1 HIO-IT appeared canovflaged. 2 MIO-lTs were grey silver In color. 4. FLICHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Hase layer from surface to 6000 ft. Visibility In hase «as attacked by HIQs as well as about four other flights in front of BLUE Pligtjt^ The NIOs in this evsnt were Initially observed in the 6 o'clock high poslt^AiT. 6. ACTION INITIATED ^ BLUE Flight Immediately Jettisoned. srdnanoe and tanks and broke hard right. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE lead passed wlthljv^O ft of one MIO, head-on. Neither fired. BLOB 1, 2, and 3 beaded for the eoast^t a high airspeed. BLUE 4 was forced to modify his break with a momentary turp'to the left and then back to the right in or-' r to avoid a collision with BLVE' 3*9 eenterllne tank. As BLUE 4 came back to t right a NIO-17 was at his 6p>iflock firing. BLUE 4 broke left and down and shook ^he MIO. BLUE 4 again turpeoeast to rejoin his flight, saw a MIO-17 in front of hlc and fired, obsery^-ng hits on the MIO. The MIO broke left and down with BLUE 4 passing 2-300 ft ov^r ^a. BLUE 4 continued to the coast to rejoin his flight. 8. OROHAMCE Ev«nt 11-59 (No. flred/No. hlta) BLUE 1, 2, 3 BLUE k Mia 1 nxa 2. 3 n. DATA SOURCES Project Intervlewa ! tietterg : Noim Hesgawe. Reoorta : Cannon 0/0" 300/Yes T«a/Ho t/Mo Bamarka Sparkles on wing and fuaelaga Fired at BLUE 4. no hlta. None Mama 388TPM DOI 03098 Sept 66. 3PltEP-3» 7AP DOCO 25836 Septfift-,' 7AD DOI 20H92 gapt"^ 12. NARRATIVE OESCR fll»h?!:^^fiif^^T^c°V^ ^-^°5Ds was about the eighth flight In a atream of ten atrlke JiJU It " i;^ii!:°f^/hl«hway bridge located 16 miles northeasrof Je^fsiHL^'^^^^^^ ''f? "^^*: ""■ '"Bet "hlle BLOB FUtht «*« *t 3000 ft sso Icta i<.>d17 nia 1. 2. 3. » Unknown 2 - CBU 27 2 - ^^50 gal drop tanks Camouflage paint Vector equipment 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Unknown BLUE 1. 2 WIQ 1. 2 ^0 3. » 12.000 ft 270" 500* unknown Altitude : 3,000 ft 2,500 ft Heading ; 25** 270* Speed ; • 475 KTAS SOO^ ruel State ; unknown unknown Plight Permation : Hide fighting wing with #2 on leader's right side. S. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 2 sighted ..w MIQ-178 rolling Into his 6 o'clock position level at il>6.000 ft range. He also spotted two more MI0-i7s at 6 o'clock high (spproxlmstsly 12.000 ft). TIm was 1030H, approximately two minutes prior to TOT. NlOs. ACTION INITIATED BLUB Flight jettisoned external tanks, lit afterburners, and broke hard left into the 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE Flight made a hard left break Into the attacking MIOs. The MIOs overshot and zoomed up and over the top of BLUE 1. BLUE 1 reversed back Into the MIO flight and picked them up out front at approximately >i,aoo ft range. The MIOs were cllmbinic out through 6- 8.000 ft in a gentle left turn at high airspeed. The MIGs held their high mach (In after* burner), and SLUE 1 was unable to set up for a gun shot before the MIOs went out of range. BLUE Plight was now over the target area, and receiving 85 am AA fire, so BLUE 1 continued his right turn back around to an easterly heading and cgressed the area. The total engage- ment time was approximately one minute. The high element of MIOs (at 12,000 ft) never descended to Join the encounter. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 2 had one 4 50 gal drop tank which did not feed. It was Jettisoned full prior to the engagement. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Comments on This Encounter BLUB 1 felt the HIQs had no Intention of continuing the engagement after he and number 2 Jettisoned their ordnance. The HIOs came in at a relatively high airspeed using their altitude to gain overtake and angle off. When the HIOs overshot, they made no attompt to ass event 11-60 yoyo or gftln lateral separation. They merely cllobed away at high alrapeed probably figuring their mlaslon was eoaqplete when they forced the P-105» to Jettison their ordnance short of tha target. Swltehology entered this engagement when BLUE 1 reversed and got behind the MIOs. He atated he did not have sufficient time to reset his sight for an alr-to-alr mode before the NIOs wera out pf range and pulling away. He felt that he might have been able to get a kill if he had beeen carrying a QAR-8 type missile. BLOB 1 waa also disappointed in the extremaly rapid airspeed loss of the r-105 when It la racked into hard turns. BLUE 2 had high praise for the P-105 eleotronlc eountenseasure equipment (warning sys- tems, etc.) and felt that they should be In all aircraft. Comments from Overall Experience BLUE 2 sees no advantage In trying to make one single airplane a J ack-of-all- trades. Pelt each different aircraft should be designed for a speeifio Job. He also sees only a limited value for an aircraft with a two-man crew. 11. DATA SOURCES ?ro*«ct Interviews : BLOB 1, 4 Jan 67j BLD8 2, 15 Mar 67 Meaaases. Reports ; 7thAP OPREP-U/HyD Z11930Z Sep 66 DOCO 25857 388th TPW, OPREP-V355 21 Sep 66 001-0310 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was the first of five P-105D attack flights from Korat. Their target was JCS 16, the Dap Cau railroad/highway bridge located at 21<»11'M/106«>05'E about 16 miles northeast of Hanoi, The Korat force followed a force from Takhll on this date and this was the second or third consecutive day that this bridge was under attack. Each flight was fragged in with a TOT separation of 3-5 minutes, so that the target was subjected to waves of attack for a period of 15 minutes to an hour. BLUE Plight departed Korat, refueled over the Oulf of Tonkin, proceeded north and then turned east to enter RP VI about twelve miles north of Cam Pha Harbor. BLUE 3 ground aborted for oil pressure malfunction and BLUE ^ aborted for radio malfunction. Thus, BLUB Plight waa redtteed to two aircraft* one carrying two 3iOOO pound bombs and tne other carrying four CBU-25il #'««»-r°"''.^'T^°?' ^^b^^ Plight) were escorting and providing SAM coverage for F-105 strike ^ aircraft airborne, through tankers, and In target area on time. Weett.er was 1500 ft operating standards over the target area. Visibility 2-1/2 miles at 2. MISSION ROUTE Bro«.«SlI5 liifll^..?*?*^*^? Korat and rendeavoused with tanker (Orange Anchor) and then KSm 3*2?hii J«.?'J 5?nr%??^5"J° J*'* crossing the*north end of Thud . f ^ : B^**^^*^ forced BLOE Plight back out of target area. BLUE Pllaht set ud orbit '^^^ iff" for SAM^slte? while the si ??Je"or«s SSiJed 5?rShS hoL^S^'^''^"?;'^ ^'^^ "^l"** foi-«8 completed bomblngrBLra ' 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F-1Q5 BLUE L (P-IQ'^F). 2 (F-IOSD^ 2 - SHRIKE (AGM-iJ5) 2 o Rocket pods (LA(J-3) 2 * 450 gal. wing tanks 20ns (M.61 gun) F-105 BLUE 3 and it (P-105D ^ 6 - 750-lb bombs, 2 - ftSO gal. wing tanks (M-61 cannon) 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather; Clear - 3-mlle visibility In hase Altitude: 9000 ft Heading !" 18O* Speed : H^O kt PueTT 5-6000 lb Plight Pormatlon : ' To ± ■ 5. INITIAL DETECTION left ?i?S/to;irt%!i?^" ' «• -••e.ndln, la 6. ACTION INITIATED 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT .Sf .if ijjM i'lAi; ;j2.'o"j j^hJS is jii. s'?.i/?jhJU";h:?r"k5s Plight continued right turn and BLUE 1 observed an airplane high 5-10 000 ft? and n. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews; Statement by BLUB Lead pilot, U Mar 1967. Message Reports ; Incident Summary from OPREP-VPII»ACtE/377 (388TFW) 22 Sept 1966 12. iARRATlVE See Sections S, 6 and 7. / BT«nt 11-62 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105e va one HIO-21 (possible} Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21»*0»H/10105s (BLUE ?llgnt) egresslng froa unknown type mission In NVN. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ! Unknown BLUE ^ 2, 3. 9.000 ft 210" ISO XTAS Unknown Unknown Altitude : HeadlnaT Speed ; Fuel State : Plight Formation ; 5. INITIAL DETECTION ph^k!^!!^^* ?«^!!*?** delta-wlng aircraft (probably MIQ-21) directly above BLUE f"*?^?"'* fl^Shtly off BLUE I'a left wing. Unidentified aircraft was In left turn, bead- !I^oSJ.*2h!rJ?*5?J.*"""J',*'f ^Z'*^°° ^K*' Observation for oily 10 to 15 seconds when It disappeared Into haze. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight kept constant cheek of 6 o'clock position, but bogey was not seen again. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; rtesaat^es. Reports : None 386TFW, OPREP 4/il66 1. Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105D5 ara four HI0-21S Result: Slghtlne only. Vicinity of Encouiiter; ai-55'N/lOUno'E PRIKARY HISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Time: 28 September 1966/1725H A fllRht of four p.-iOSOa (BLUE Plight) h«l Just crossed the Red River Inoound. Type mission IB unknoMn. 2. MISSION ROUTE / Qidoioim. 3. AIRCRAFT C0NFI6URATI0HS P-105P B LUE 1. 2. 3. >i Unknown MM 1. 2. 3. » Silver color 4. FLI6HT CONDITIONS PRTOR TO ENCOUNTER Unknown (possibly undereast with hase) BLOB 1. 2. 3. 1 13,000 ft 030* He? kt unknown unknown Weather ; Altitude ; Headin g: Speed ; Puel State : Hi^t Poraatlon : 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLL-S Plight sighted four HIO-218 in modified fo'"?***'" f *J?jLi^S'Sl2*^^^ tlon. MI08 wire 10 to 20 nml awav, heading approximately 220», and altitude 10,000 ft. Time of sighting was 1725H. 6. ACTION INITIATED No attempt to engage was ewcuj-e* «>y o"5«f_"}f;*; and apparently never had visual contact with BLUE Plight, they went down into clouds and haze layer. 11. DATA SOURCES None 388TPW, OPREP «/*78 mos were headed Into the sun, . They disappeared from sight when J J Event 11-64 Involved: Pour P-105« v» two MI0-17S P«j Reaults: No dosage L vicinity of Encounter: 2l»13'N/105**l2'E a 1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION SD«te/Tlcje: 8 October 1566/1585H Pour P'l05s {Bl,\}Z Flight] on strike nlsslon tgalnst a targec between Hanoi and Phue Ten.* 2. MISSION fiQti'ic p BLUE Plight departed Takhlii route unknown. m 3, AIRCRAFT CON F I5URAT lOHS ■ F-105 1. 2. 3. H p B03D», external tanks, QBC-160 pod on left outboard station. B 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER i" Weather ; VPR, but clouds topping higher peaks along Thud Ridge. St'JS 1. 2. 3. " I Altitude : 2-5,000 ft AOL Headli^: 315' ^ ^peed : 525 KTAS li f\iel State : Unknown R PUeht Poraatlon i Unknown * 5. INITIAL DETECTION L^' One minute out from target, BLUE Plight saw two MIG-17b at 2 o'clock. 2000 ft AGL, B turning Into their flight. p 6. ACTION INITIATED I BLUE Flight went afterburner and used speed to outrun the HIQs. 7, SITUATION DEYELOPKENT SBLUE Plight continued and hit the target. As th«y came off the target heading 315« at 2 to 5,000 ft they were engaged by two more MIO-lTs (possibly same aircraft). One HIO aade a head-on firing pass (cannon) at BLUE 3, and the other a 6 o'clock firing pass (can- non) at BLUE '4. Neither aircraft received any hits, but low fuel prevented BLUE Plight i, from engaging the MIGs. BLUE Flight's high airspeed enabled them to break the contact and i egress Che area. [ 8. ORDNANCE BLUE Plight - no ordnance fired n MIO-1 - or.e gun pass/no hits W MIG-2 - one gun pass/no hits * 9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS fNone reported. 10. AIRCREM COMMENTS None m It. DATA SOURCES W, Project Incervlews ! BLUE 1 (Lead) Messages, Reports ;* Q 7AP 08lii3ez Oct 66, DOCK) 26722 FT 7AF 082232Z Oct 66, DIO 30617 * U. NARRATIVt DESCRIPTION f> BLUE Plight's first MIC sighting was while inbcuiid to the target on heading 135« at • r 2,000 ft AOL. BLUE Plight observed two MIQ-Zls heading KE at 21*26'N/105«»U5'E. These MIGs S« Biade no attempt to engage flight. BLUE Plight continued toward target at satae altitude and heading. As the flight passed 2nml SE of Phuc Ten airfield, they noticed several HIGs orblt- ing the runway. The MIGs appeared to be meeting the P-105 strike flights head-on about one M and a half nmi out, then atcer.ptlng to turn In and fall into a 6 o'clock position on the W P-1Q53. BLUE Pllg:nt slrhted two .MIG-173 at t heir 2 o'clock position going to 3 o'clock OPREP 08H382 gives target as JCS 71 jMfil^Aapparently garbled. ' »• E»«nt 11-6* level, turning Into their flight at 6 nral range, BLUB Plight aelectcd afterburner and Irw ereased their airspeed to 550 RTAS, the KlOe fell Into trail, but were well out of conbat r«nft and unable to close. BLUE Plight continued on the aave heading and altitude for 60 aec, executed a pop-up maneuver, and delivered their bomba on the designated target. The flight pulled off target end picked up a reciprocal heading of 315* at 2,000 to S.OOO ft altitude. At Zl^li'M/lOS'SO'E two MIG-I7e (possibly the sane aircraft sighted prior to pop^up) engaged BLUE Plight. One MIO got well lined up, and executed a heed-o n firing paa* (cannon) against BLUB 3» while the other made a firing pass (cannon) at 5LUS i> from his 6 o'clock position. BLUE 1 stated that the rounda came cloae to BLUE 3, but neither aircraft received a hit. BLUE Pllghv was low on fuel due to afterburner operation, and could not remain In an engagemnt with tho HlOa. BLUE Plight was still carrying a high airspeed and used thla advahtase to break contact and continue straight out on their egresslofi. * BIG BTS BC-121 on station at 20*00 'N/lOT'OO'E had given eight MIQ warnings between 15*0H and 161TH during the tine of this engagement. However, &ht MlOa encountered bjr bLUE Plight wer** not apoolflcally oorrolated with theae wamlnga. ^ / E»«nt 11-65 \ ^ Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs four KXQ-21S IteBult: No danag* eonflrmd (on« NIO, possible damage) Vlcirtlty of Encounter; 21*10'H/105*50*E 1. PRIMARY Mission AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 8 OetoHpr 1966/I5*5Ii Pour P-105S (BLUE Plight) on an armed reconnaissance and flak suppression mission In Package VI-A vere esreasing from target JCS 51< Multiple strike flights were deployed . ag&lnst this target. No nentlon la made of BLUE 3 anJ 4 after start of this engagement. 2. MISSION ROUTE Unknown - Pll^t had approached target area heading SB along the SV edge at Itiud Ridge (approximately Sl'lO 'N/105*36'E) . 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-105P BLUE l.a.S.H Jl - CBU-2* each aircraft 2 - liSO-gal fuel tanks (in^oaz^ stations) 1 > QRC-I60 ECH pod (BLUE 1»3, and 4 only) IPP and camouflage paint (all aircraft) HIQ-21 MIQ 1 and 2 Silver color (shiny) No notleeabis external tanks or ordnance No Identifying Insignia 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Clear, sods low haze along Red River and around Hanoi area. BLUE I ? Altitude ! 7000 ft 6000 ft Heading :. Southerly, In a left turn coining off target Speed : ^50 KIAS i'uel State: Unknown (BLUE 2 had 5000 lb at termination r !> [. ^ or attack.) ; I t |i ii 'I I I Plight Pormatlon : BLU.'? 2 was in a left elldblng turn approximately 2 n mi behind BLUE l, and cutting him off In the turn for a rejoin. They had Just pulled off a CBU drop on target. 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE Plight had been receiving MIQ and SAM alerts froa IRON HAND flights, and HIO warnings from BIG EYE, EC-121 stationed at 20"00'N/107"*O0'E. BLUE 2 sighted four KZO-218 In elements of two at 9 o'clock high (2 to 3 n nl range). The MTQs were in a descending pursuit curve heading 270" at a speed of approximately 550 kts. The MIO elements were In a close fighting wing position with about 500 ft linear aeparatlon between leader and. wlngman, and the wlngaian 50-60 degrees behind the lead. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 and 2 Jettisoned their external tanks and HER racks, lit afterburner, and continued In the left climbing tuni. BLUE 3 and 4 slid out wide about 2 n sd behind BLUE 2. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT no 1 pressed attack on BLUE 1 and rolled out In front of BLUE 2. NIQ 2 passed under BLUE 2's nose and was not seen again. NIC 3 and 4 overshot a pass at BLUE 2 and reinitiated, but fell way back in trail and high. BLUE 2 fired 20 mm burst at MIO 1 (no visible damage). NIQ I broke off attack on. BLUE 1, but BLUE 1 was hit by AA fire and flamed out. BLUE 2 broke off attack on HIO 1 to assist his leader. BLUE 1 made a successful alrstart, and BLUE Plight rejoined and egresaed the area. 8. ORDNANCE (No. flred/No. hits) 20 mm (HEI) Remarks BLUE 2 1/0 BLUE 2 thinks he may possibly have hit MIO, but. he saw no visual evidence. 235 rounds fired. 21)5 Bvrnt II-6S Kta 1 23»ngi Cartnon 2/0 He mark 8 BLUB 1 atated HIG nay have fired severU bursts at him. 9. CQUIPNEIIT PROBLEMS BLUE 2*8 gua camera did not work. 10. AIURCV COfmENTS Experience BLOE 2 Total Hours 5000 P-I05 Hours 200 Conbat Missions 20 Remarks BLUE 2 had previous ali^to-alr experience In Korea; 66 missions air** to-ground In P-86; 35 missions air-to-air In the P-86. BLUE 2 estlniated he had 10-12 encounters and 5 or 6 engagements with NIGb during Korean conflict. Cpmwenta on this Encounter a. BLUE 2 had no trouble turning with and tracking the MIO. He was able to hold lead» but. initial range was too far out to fire. At 600 KIAS» holding 5 to 6 "g's", he was unable to get a raold rate of closure even In afterburner. BLUE 2 felt MIO may have bad control problems due to high airspeed. He was sure MIQ could have turned tighter at a slower speed. MIQ appeared to be executing a Jinking maneuver dur5ng the left turn. All of a sudden his right wing would tip down and he would make a quick motion to the right. BLUE 2 originally thought this maneuver to be some sort of evasive action, but finally decided the MIO was having control difficulties. BLUB 2 tracked MIC for approxlnately 30 seconds, and felt he could have gotten a kill eventually if he had not been forced to break off and help his leader. b. BLOB 2 stated he thought our pilot skill and capability were far superior to thOM of the MIO pilots. Pelt MIQ pilots to be somewhat timid in their attack - as though they wanted to make one quick hl^ speed pass, and then get out. c. Jud^ng by the type Intercept {pursuit curve) and relative position at Initial Sigbtlng, BLUE 2 felt that the MIOs were under QCI control throughout the engagement. d. BLUE 2 did not have time to reset his switches for "guns air" during his firing paaa. Stated he was forced to put his head In the cockpit as he was trying to aat up fposi bombing switch configuration to alr-to-alr configuration. e. BLOE 2 stated all flights had a great deal of communications problems coming off target. This was due to saturation of the radio frequency rather than being an equlpoient reliability factor. •* 11. DATA SOUKCCS Project Interview ; Hes»«g!ss~ BLUE 2, 2 Feb 1967. 7AP 7*P 0000 26723 DIG 30617 08lil36z 0822 32Z Oct 1966 Oct 1966 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION a Plight had just expended ordnance on the target and was pulling out at about 8,000 ft. altitude and turning left. BLUE 2 saw two HI0-21s and called out "21 attacking at 9 o'clock high." He first saw two and when he looked back there were two more behind. The mos were in elements of two. strung out with 500 ft. linear separation, but in a fighting wing, 50-60 degrees back from the leader. Ae the first two MI0-2ls came In, they singled out BLUE I. The lead MIO, in a 90* bank, atten^ted to pull lead on BLUE 1 and passed in front of BLUE 2. The MIQ closed to within 3000-6000 ft of BLUE 1. with about 100 kts overtake. BLUE 2 did not have aufneient tine to set up his gunsii^t, and with t fixed plpper, depressed for bombing, fired a 2 1/2 see burst. BLUB 2 pointed the .nose and visually estimated the lead but no hits were observed. The mo then broke off his attack on BLUE I and continued 1/2 turn with afterburner going. The trailing two MIOs passed behind BLUE 2 in an overshoot, went high, and were not seen again. The second MIG of the first section also passed out of sirttt below and in front of BLUE 2. Although BLUE 1 was not able to turn with the KIG, BLUE 2 could do so, Afl the first MIO broke off from BLUE 1, BLUE 2 cleaned off his aircraft snd lit the afterburner, and followed the MIO. He then configured the weapon system for guns air and set the radar up. AlthougTi BLUE 2 Is not positive that he obtained a radar lock, the analO0ie was in the 4-5 position which indicated radar lock-on but that the target was out Bv«nt IZ-65 of ran^. BtUE 7. contlnu«d to track the KIO and closed on tiln. BLUE ? was at 8,000- 10,000 ft altitude, 600 KIAS and was pulling about A g's. The NIO appeared to be jlnklnc In front of BLUE 2 but he felt that the KIO was r«ftlly having control dlf fieultles. After the HIQ had broken off froa BLUE 1, BLUB 1 and BLUE 2 were fired on by 85 mm flak. As BLUE 2 closed on the HIC, ne heard BLUE 1 call that BLUE 1 had been hit by flak so BLUE 2 broke off to Join rn BLUE 1. BLUE 1 Mas hit by flak and at 15S0K, 16,000 ft, heading 270* and the damage caused the engine to flame out. Vhlle attempting an air start at 10.000 ft at 21*09 *N/105*35 'E he observed a SAM from & site at 210 12'N/105*3')'E on a beading of l8o degrees clinblng . past and about 1,000 ft froa the aircraft. BLUE 1 did not see the nisslle detonate, and no evasive action was taken due to the flaneout. Subsequent air start was successful. BLUE 2 felt that either GCI or the second HQ element had warned NXQ-1 that BLUE 2 was closing on him. BLUE 2 made a OP rejoin on SLUE 1 and the flight e greased. RED BAHOM EyENT 11-65 50HMARY Nark Action Aircraft (BlUC 1. 9, 4) Cowaynlcatlens Cneoy Actions (MIG 1.2) Reurki Statu! Actloe Other Fri.endly To 4 to 5 g pull-up 450 KIAS 6>?000 ft ■f terburnar BLUE 2 was cutting off BLUE 1 In a left turn for Join uD Aft#r honh* Ing run. BLUE 2 sighted 4 HIG-2lt Initiating attack froai hit 9 o'clock high position (2 to 3 n k1 range). BLUE 1 and 2 Jettisoned tanks anc! KER. lighted afterburner and con- tinued turn. BLUE 1 (L) in a left turn cllMbIng out froa target. BLUE 3 and 4 went wide 2 n «1 behind BLUE 2. BLUE 2 called leader to Increase his turn. BLUE 2 called Vis attacki Ing at 9 o'clock high.' NIGs wort In a descending pursuit curve passing through heading of south. E>ti» ■ated 550 to 600 kt airspeed and descending through 8-9000 ft altitude Attacking bogles were Inedlately recognlted at NI6-21 type aircraft. 4S0 KIAS 6-7000 ft altitude. Accelerating in afterburner. BLUE 2 rolled wings level and fired one 2-1/2 sec burst at MIG 1 at he passed in front. After firing BLUE 2 ude slight right turn and then back hard left (6 or 6 g's) to keep in trail with the HIG. SLUE 2 tost Sight of lead when he rolled level to fire. NIG 1 rolled In trail with BLUE 1. NIG 2 passed un<1er SLUE ?*s nose and was not seen again NIG 3.4 fell behind as BLUE 2 accel erated. BLUE 2 fired without sight • he did not have tine to set up the sight for air-to-aIr operation. Descending tiire 5000 ft altitude 600 KIAS S to 6 0*1 SLUE 2 traUetf NIG 1 In a hard left descending turn. BLUE 1 (L) was bit by 8Sm AA fire. Hit caused SLUE 1 (L) to f1aMe*out. BlUE 1 asked for BLUE 2's position - BLUE 2 replied "behind a NIG" BLUE 2 asked leader to transolt for OF steer. NIG 1 was In a 5 to 6 g hard left descending turn it 600 KIAS. After- burner on. MIG 3. 4 seen again brief 1y by BLUE 2. BLUE 2 was In trail with NIG. He could hold lead for firing but his range was too far out (about 1 n mi). BLUE 2 slowly began to accel- erate and close on the NIG. ^1 sobo ft 600 KIAS BLUE t broke off to the right and dtsenrsged froa the NIG. SLUE 2 got a OF stoor to rejoin BLUE BLUE 1 flancd out. but finally oade a successful air- start. BLUE 1 called out "SAH nlssllcs launch* HIG 1 disappeared when BLUE 2 broke off. SAN was launched at BLUE 1 while ho was flaaed out. SAN did not guide and alssed BLUE 1 by 1000 ft. 8LU* 2 rejoined BLUE 1 Just short of Red River, heading 270*. crj era csa> cat E#«nt XI- 66 Aircraft Involwd; Pour P-105a ve threa NI0-17a and ttfo fiza-21a Raault: No Oanage Vicinity of Eneountar: 21»13*K/105**7'B . . 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOB \ Date/Tlae: 8 October igSe/XSilSH 2. MISSION ROUTE Ihiknown 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS BLUE 1. 2. 3. » Bitemal tanks (typs and sits unknom) mo-17 MIQ 1. 2. 3 External tanks 4. PLI6KT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather; High cirrus, 5 raiie visibility In hase. BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4 Altitude ; 1,000 ft AOL Heading; 135a Speed ; gHo kts Puel State ; Unknown Plight Formation ; Unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION «™.®^?^ observed three MIO-lTs dinp their external tanks and turn In on then fron BLOB'S * o'clock high position at a range of 6-6,000 ft. w »n«i iron 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight went afterburner and accelerated to 6OO kts. 7.. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT K*"°* r!*"? '^1°^ ""^ ^'^'^^ ^" ^ o'clock position. BLUE Plight popped up and began their dive bonb run. During the dive run, BLUE Plight sighted two MIO-218 at 3 o Clock, apparently initiating an attack cn BLUE Leader. After bomb release. BLUE Plinht jettisoned their external tanks and turned in behind the MIQs. The MIOs were In a loose fc^Sii formation, and slightly offset to the side. As BLUE Plight closed in at 6 o'clock Ji'?!2/l.r?"5*' MIQs broke up and left towards the south. No engagement followed. BLL-E thi aieS ' 500 ft AOL, accelerated to 755 kta, and egressed 8. ORDNANCE None 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None reported 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience ; Onknown Consents on this Eneeuntei attack node. He felt the NIOs may hsve had a radar warning syatem, IK DATA SOURCES Project Interyjewa i None Messages. ReportiT Letter from BLOB 2 TAP Message 082232Z Oct 66 DIO 30617 Event 11-67 Aircraft Involved: Four P-lOSs vb four HQ-lTs Result: Ho Diunage Vielnltj of Encounter: 21'»11'N/105*'S0*E 1. PBINARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Dete/Tlise: 8 October 1965/15'»1H A flight of four P-105a (BLUE Flight) were on a multiple flight etrlke mission agUnst JCS Target #51, at 2X«10'M/105'*50»B. Plight was making a final test on the QRC.160 EON pods. 2. NISSIOR ROUTE The overall route is unknotm; however, th» flight made Its ingress and egress to target along the N. side of Thud Ridge. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F-IOS BLUB 1. 2. 3. » ' 6 - 500- lb bombs 2 - il50-gal drop tanks 1 - QRC-160 GCM pod 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Unknown BLUE 1. 2. 3. » Altitude : 12,000 ft Heading ; Approx. SB Speed ; 500 kt Fuel State ; Otaknowa Wight Formation : Unknown on Inbound leg. Loose extended trail (coming off target) with a alight lateral separation between the wingman and leader of each element. 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 3 made the first sighting. Inbound, when he spotted two HZQ-lTs at their 3 o'eloek position at approximately 6000 ft altitude. These MIGs approached BLUE Flight, but either did not see them or elected not to give chase because of the P-105 speed advantage. As the flight came off target (right turn out), BLUE 2 sighted two bogeys at their 7 o'clock position, 3 to 4 miles. Seconds later BLUE li called two more NIOs at his 6 o'clock closing. S. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight proceeded on in to the target after the first sighting as the MZOs made no attempt to engage. BLUE Plight went afterburner when BLUE 2 called out aecond sighting. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT Nothing occurred during the first sighting as the MIOs made no attempt to engage. BLUE Plight went Into afterburner when BLUE 2 called second sighting. Shortly after BLUE 2 called bogey's range decreasing to 2 to 3 miles, BLUE ft called out two more MIOs in his 6 o'clock position. BLUE Plight continued straight outbound for approximately two minutes when BLUE 2 Initiated a cross-over on lead to check position of the HlCs. BLUE 2 observed a MIO-17 at BLUE ii*s 6 o'clock, range 6000 ft. During the cross-over, the Nia broke off the engagement, pulling up and heading back towards Phuc Yen. BLUE Plight was low on fuel, and the leader decided to proceed home rather than turn back and engage the MIOs. 8. ORDNANCE None expended 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS H«ie 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience : Unknown Comments on this Encounter: BL'bE 2 feeia that the fighting wing position (500 to 1000 ft behind lead within a 60* cone) in the P-105 is not conducive to mutual support. Due to the reduced visibility in the P-105, he felt that a wider spread formation, stacked either level or slightly low was far preferable to the fighting wing position in a defensive environment. BLUB 2 E»«nt 11-67 «a. unabl. to th« «0a In trtll with BLOE U until he actually turned and creased from one side of BLUE leader to the other. mt.-ii*- they orobably BLOE 2 stated that If the MlGs had been equipped »^"""; S PllSht had nlsslle firing range. , n. DATA SOURCES Prolect interviews ; BLOE 2, 3 February 1967. Sasiagea : TAP 2232 Z Octobar 1966, 010 30617. 12. NAflRATIVE DESCRIPTION Sea Iteics 17 and #10. Event XI- 66 Aircraft Involved: Four P-105a vb one RIQ-19 and one HZd-lS or -17 Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21*15 *N/104«00*E 1. PRIMARY HtSSlON AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tiae: October 1966/Selieved to be daylight, p.m. Pour P-lOSs (BLUE Plight) on atrlke nlaslon against highitay bridge (Route Package V). Nlaslon was ore of several In general area and along Red River. 2. MISSION ROUTE , Departed Korati then to unknotm refueling track, thence via TACAN Channel 79. via TACAN Channel 97 to target (approx. 21«15'N/10it<*08'E}. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS p. 105 BLUE 1. 2. 3. ft 6 - 7$0»lb bombs (Hkii.?) outboard emd 4 centerline) 2 - 450-gal fuel tanks - inboard 1029 rounds 20autt (HEI) TACAN operating - IPP standby - radar standby Camouflage paint BLUE 1 and 3 only - ECN vector equipoent MIQ 1. 2 Unknown 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather t Scattered cirrus at various levels over Laos - broken layer at 10,000 ft W of target - patchy scattered clouds in target area with visibility 50 Biles plus. BLUE I 5 3 Altitude: 13K 13K 15K 15K Heading ! , NNE Speed ! 480- kt Fuel State ; 11,000 lb ^^^^ Plight Porreation ; Fluid-Four. o 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE Plight received MIQ warnings fron IRON HAND flight In area. BLUE 3 saw two bogles in close formation at 2 o'clock position high. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight was nearing target and elected to continue straight on in Mftlls kMplag the unidentified aircraft under observation. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPHENT The bogies paralleled BLUE Flight's course for a few minutes, then turned into them with a gentle turn. BLUE 3 identified them as MlO-type aircraft and chilled for flight to turn right. BLUE Plight made a 360 degree turn, passing approximately 5000 ft below the HIOb. hIGs did not engage, rolled out ..eading W and egresned the area. a. ORONAKCE No ordnance expended. 9. CQUtPHCNT PROBLEMS Wen* reported. I I Event 11-68 10. AIRCREW COMMC:US EKperlgnee ' BLUE Total Hourt; 4900 ?-105 Hours 350 Combat Ula along 80 ReiiarkB Had received P>105 ACM training >tt Yokota, Japan. BLUE 2, BLUE 3, 15 Ptebruary 1967. Copg»at8 on ithl8 Encounter a. BLUE I 3 felt F-105 needed better turning capability. «:o — J'^'^'iL^ mentioned need for slapler giinslght control (too many switch operations targeS; f^S^t^e'e'Sf r«S^r':hS'Jnrre3u' aPP«ached^ 11. &ATA SOURCE Pr2,i et Intervlpw i i^eg; Hone 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION When BLUE 3 first called bogles, he could see only two dark soeeks in the akv is^^a"„^s?j;n^^jur?;sJ! .r / 5!?'!^ 5 ^"'^f appeared to be a MIG-15 or -17. and the other a HiallQ blue • eal ed for a right turn, and BLUE Plight .rade a right descendlL ^eo' 4 J,'.^ ' afri^rbumer; passing 5000 ft below and underneath the MiSJ? MlL'made^o a^emSt 5Lu''f%'UteS'S:'feit"?2/?"?r^; ?^!:^ "^^•^'^ resui.3 oSursflnd p^o^eeSeS tfJ^J^et. sSie^t'iSftS: KiSslooiSfJS: ^^^^^ • '^^^ ln.cructor%Uot showing a' -4 256 / Event 11-69 Aircraft Involved: Pqur P-105* V8 tvo NXO-Zls Result: Slitting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21*13* N/106* «2*E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/TlBe: 3 November I966/1556H A flight of four P-IOS* (BMIE Plight) was proceeding outbound from a target In North Vietnam. 2. MISSION ROUTE Dnknown. 3! AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS Unknown . 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Unknown* 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE Plight Sighted two NZQ-Sls, heading north, approximately 3 n nl away, at 3000 ft AOL. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight gave chase on the MICs, and accelerated to 650 kt. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT Blue Plight chased the MIGs north, but could not close the distance between flights. Blue broke off the chase at 21*>29'N/106oU0 'E. The NlOa had been in a gradual clijnb» and continued out of sight toward China. 8. ORDNANCE Unknown. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS Unknown. 10. AIRCREU COHNENTS Unknown. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; None Heaaanes. Reports ; 7AF, 03232ilZ Nov 66, DID 07ol 12. .NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION See Items 5-7 • « Bvvnt II-71 Aircraft Involved: Poup P-105S ont NIO-Zl Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: Approi luately 1. PRINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Tine: November 1966/unknoHn A flight of four P-ioSs (BLUE Plight) were on a multiple flight strike alaalon against the Phuc Yen POL (JCS Target 51.10). BLUE Plight had Juat entered the target area and reached a point 10 ml NW of Fhuc Yen airport. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE Flight took the normal overland route via Yen Bal. and then SE doim Thud Ridge to the target. Point of origin la unknown. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS 3LUE 1. 2. 3. ^» 1 - QRC . 160 ECN pod WO Unknown 4. FLISHT CONPITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Heather: Unknown BLUE 1. 2. 3. > Altitude: 2500 ft Heading: S£ Speed: Unknown inbound* 650 kt during egression Fuel State: Unknown Flight Ponaatlon: Unknowi 5. INITIAL DETECTION HtUB 2 sighted a Mia-21 rolling in and paralleling BLUE Plight's dlreetion. The MIO held at their 9 o'clock position, level, at 4000 ft range. 6. ACTION INITIATED Aa the MIG posed no Innediate threat, BLUE Plight took no evasive action, and - continued on their bonb run* 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT The Mia-21 followed BLUE Plight Into the target. When BLUE popped up to 10,000 feet for their bomb delivery, the MIG remained at 2500 feet and made a level 180* turn. The MIC made no attempt to engage. BLUE Plight came off the target, and made their egression on a reciprocal heading to the Inboard leg, increasing their airspeed to 650 kt. The MIO was last observed breaking off, and turning back towards Phuo Yen. 8. ORDNANCE None to. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience : Unknown CoKments on this Encounter: BLUE 1 felt the MIO pilots were not at all aggressive. He spotted several more HIOS in the area during their egress, but none of then bothered hla flight. BLUE 1 eomnented that the MIGa over Fhuc Yen didn't, venture over 6 n ni from their own hone base on that particular day. Comments from Overall Experience : Starting in the middle of November as the chances of being shot at by a SAH on a given day decreased, the probability of being sttaeked by HXQa increased. V Event Il-n n. DATA SOURCES Pro4«ct Interview : BLUE 1 ttessagea. Reports : None U. RAftftATlVC DESCRIPTION S*« ItVBS 5-7 k 10 'I i i i :l| I il ! I 1 I I I I I I I I I Btrmit ll'U Alrertft IitTolnd: Pour P-105Da vt thrt« flZ0-2U Result: Sighting only Vlfllnlty of EncountAr: Onknown I. PRINART NISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/Tlae: November 1966/unknOMn A night of four P-l05Da (BLUE Plight) on * strike mlsslOR In North Vietnam. II. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; None M essages. Reports ;' Letter froa neaber of BLUB Plight 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight saw three MIQ-2la high at 9 o'clock while inbound to the target. BLUB JSUH?^!?^*'* *■ they were pulling off the bomb run, the MIQs turned into the flight. BLUB flight accelerated and the NIQa turned away. Event 11-73 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-l05Ds vs one MIQ 21 Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: Unknown I. PRIIIART NISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: November 1966/unknown A flight of four P-105D8 {BLUE Plight) on a strike mission In North Vletnaa. II. DATA SOURCES Wessages. Reports ; Letter from BLUE 1, 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLOB 1 sighted a MO-Zl at 9 o'clock high, 3 to « ml away. The MIO turned away. i i i 263 Event IX>74 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105» vb two HIO-lTs Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: SW side of Thud Ridge 1. PRIMRT niSSlON AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: November 1966/unlcnown Pour P-1058 ai»out routing to avoid overflying the Phuc Yen area defenses. 10. AIRCREW COMHENTS Etperience P-105 Hours 800 Combat Missions Unknown Remarks None BLUE 1 Unknown Comments on This Encounter ; None Comments from Overall Experience BLUE 1 made the following comment concerning MIO tactics In the vicinity of Thud Ridge. He felt the MIOs and their QCI network had a very well coordinated effort, and good communications. He described the following tactic which was used continually when- ever there was a thin cloud deck In the area X2-Z000 feet). The MIOs would position themselves on the opposite side of the cloud deck from the attacking strike flights; then allow GCI to vector them into the strike aircraft's 6 o'clock position. When approximately 1 to 2 nml In trail, they would pop either up or down through the cloud layer and right Into shooting position. Such a maneuver gave the strike flights little or no time to acquire the attacking HIGs before they were in a firing position. The MIOs would also use a staggered trail formation (possibly 1 nml apart) during this tactic; then If you made a hard break to avoid one,- you might be setting yourself up right In front of another as he popped through the clouds. BLUE 1 stated this tactic was normally employed using three KIGs rather than four. n. DATA SOURCES Project Interview : BLUE 1 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION See I tens 5-7. Brent 11-75 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-X05« va four MI0-2aa Result; No Damage Vicinity of Encounter: 2i»l8'H/105»*9*E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: ? December :966/lil?5H Bombing strike on the POL storage area at the end of Thud Ridge (JCS 51.10). BLUE Flight was one of several F-105 nights In on the target. As the flight came off their bonb run, they were attacked by two MIG<-21s. 2. NISStOK ROUTE The aircraft departed Takhll direct to Oreen anchor* direct to Channel 97, direct to Red River, direct to Thud Ridge, down Thud Ridge to the target. Egress the reverse route. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION P-IOSD BLUE 1. It 6 - 750-lb bonbs • 1 - AIM-9B missile 1 - QRC-160 ECM pod 2 - wing tanks 1029 rnds 20jja aruno. BLUE 1 had IFF on, rest of flight had TACAN receive only, doppler on, radar in standby and IFF standby. P-105D BLUE g. 1 6 • 750<-lb bombs 2 _ ti^o-gal. wing tanks 1 > QRC-160 ECH pod 1029 rnds 20in.D anno. All F-10^8 camouflaged. HIC-21 2 > AA missiles NlOs were not camouflaged 23 or 37mm cannons unknown 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; 8000 ft overcast 2-3 miles in haze below clouds. Cloud tops 9-10,000 ft clear above. Cloud cover extended from the Red River Valley down Thud Ridge to Just short of the target. The target Itself waa open. Altitude ; 8000 ft lieadlnK : 310« ^0" dive Speed : 550 KCAS Fuel Sta te: 9000 lb FllFiht Formation ; BLUE Plight was In its bomb run at the time the MIGs were sighted. BLUE i ft 2 had dropped their bombs and were heading up the north side of Thud Ridge. BLUE 3 was in the bomb run Just prior to drop, and BLUE- 4 bad rolled in and was in his dive. 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 3 In the bomb run sighted two HIQ 2l8 at his 2 o'clock position, two to three miles away. BLUE Plight had heard HIO calls from Big Eye all the way down Thud Ridge. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 3 dropped bombs on target, engaged afterburner, end Jettisoned the HER raeli» turning slightly left into the MlGa 8 o'clock position. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPHENT As BLUE 3 pulled off the dive bomb run, he saw two MIO 21b. attacking BLUE 2. BLUB 3 called a break as the MIG fired a A AM at BLUE 2 from range of about 1 mile. BLUE 3 again called break as the MIG fired a second AAM; by this tine BLUE 3 Mas abreast of the NIQ end as he turned Into the MIG, the MIGs broke off to the right. Five to six miles further up the Ridge. BLUE Flight was again Jumped by two MI0-21S attacking from 9 o'clock. The MICs overshot BLUE 4. BLUE Plight waa at a high speed by this tine and were able to outrun the NICs In afterburner. 1 261 Evfnt U-Ti a. SRONAflCC (No. MIG 1 fl red/No. hits) Soviet *AH 2/0 Rem grka • • The 2 AANs fired could only be seen by BLUE j iS long as the rocket motor burned. He was unable to tell if they g^ulded or not. It is assuraed that the violent maneuvtjrlng by Bi-U5 2 when the mlsalles were fired caused the nlaslle to miss. Plred at BLUE 2. 9. CQUIPMERT PROBLEMS BLOK 3 was not able to complete the switch changes necessary to change from a ground attack mode to either missile or gun's air. Recommends a more simple arrangement. BLUE 4 alao commented on the switch problem. There are too many steps Involved and It requires that you take your eyes off the target and look In the cockpit. The rearward vlsablllty In the P-105 is very poor. It requires excessive maneuvering of the aircraft to clear your 6 o'clock. 10. AIRCREV COmENTS Experience BLUB 1. 2 BLUE 3 BLUE 4 Total F-105 Hours Hours Unknown 250 1700 2600 600 Combat Missions 48 35 Remarks BLUE 3 gun and missile firing experience lioated. He had fired one missile in AOC, some air gunnery during transition training. Pilot had fired the AIN-9 and the M>61 cannon during gunnery training at Nellis APB, Nevada, lie had flown several air tactics flights in his permanent organieatlon, Yokota AS, Japan. Comments on this Encounter BLUE 3 overshot a good firing position and was up line abreast of the MIQ. A reason for this was his preoecupaticn with trying to set switches for missiles air. He never did get bis *swltehe8 set properly to fire a missile or the gun. BLUE 3 could not yo-yo to get on the lead HIO due to the cloud deck. BLUE H did not have an AIM-9i he did have an opportunity to fire one on one of the Mias as It pulled up high on an overshoot. BLUE 4 reeomnends a low drag AAM for external carry on the 105- Possibly an AZN-9B. The high speed capability of the P-105 to outrun the mcs at low altitude was the big factor In this engagement. BLUE 4 - The HIO warnings past the first one were not useful since specific informa- tion about the NIGs altitude and flight direction were not given. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; Hessane Report s: BLUE 3 (4 Peb 1967). BLUE 4 (2 Dee 1966) TAP OPREP-tt TAP OPREP-4 7AP OPREP-3 7AF DIA DOCO 296^6 DOCO 29688 DOCO 2967t DIA 002 021630Z Dec 66 O30835Z Dec 66 O302OIIZ Dec 66 022247Z Dec 66 12. MRRATIVE DCSCRIPTICN BLUE Plight was In the process of bombing JCS Target 51.10, an oil storage area at the aouth end of Thud Ridge. BLUE 1 and 2 had bombed and were pulling off the target- BUB 3 alghted two HIG-21s at his 2 o'eloek position in a diving turn In pursuit of BLUE 2. BLUE 3 was in his bomb run and dropped his bombs, engaged afterburner, Jettisoned the MER rack and turned slightly left to engage the MICs. BLUE 3 called BLUE 2, advising him that he had two MIG-21S at 6 o'clock. The MIGa were now in position on BLUE 2 and MIO 1 fired an AAM. BLUE 3 called "break left, break, break." 3LUE 2 broke left, then right, and the missile nlased. BLUE 3 was able to see the missile as long as the rocket, motor was burning, but lost sight of it at motor burnout. BLUE 3 was overtaking the MICa at a high rate of elosare; he came out of aftert)umer. As he came line abreast of MIG 2. the MIO broke hard righA away from BLUE 3 and out of the fight. HIS 1 fired a second AAK at BLUE 2 BLUE 3 called break, missile away. BLUE 2 made a hard turn and the missile went past behind his aircraft and hit In the hills. BLUE 3 was now closing rapidly on HXQ 1, trying to chanae switch settings In the cockpit to missiles-air. BLUE 3 pulled up on the left side of the HIO approximately 200 ft off his left wing. BLUE 3 turned into the HIO and the HIG broke hard right and out of the engagement. BLUE Plight continued NW up Thud Ridge; app'ioximarttly ^ , Event "-75 ^'Sfrn:^^"^ 3 spotted 2 MlO-218 at hie u o'clock In a left diving turn on tJalf JoJi;f (Z) Remarks Ttnf Hark Status Action T.. 310-320' Lead 5000 to 4500 ft Both aircraft went afterburner. B3 spotteiJ two more MIGs 11 o'clock. '2-3 utiles. Aircraft accelerated to 600 - 650 kt. OZ leading egress. B2 one quarter to one half mile ahead of B3. B3 called "B2 we have two more coming In on us - push It up." Two MIGs co-alt to maybe 500 ft higher. HIGs In pursuit turn on F-105S only about 30' of bank. The MIGs are flying about 2000 ft apart. U i B3 fuel st«te about 6000 tb. B3 lost Sight of HIGs at about 8 o'clock - 500 ft above and still turning. B4 behind B3 about 3000 ft makes a level break Into the MI6s . The HIGs over- shoot and go high. B4 goes back right and egresssts Mith the flight. This Is the last B3 saw of HIGs. These MIGs made about a 90* pass on B4. {They nay have actually been In this path at this time - that Is not In an attack on B2 and 63. B4 felt he could have pulled up and f 1 red a missi le when the MIG went high during the overshoot but he was not configured with an AIM>9. I I I I I I I I Event 11-76 Aircraft Involved: Four P-105» v» one MIO-21 Result: No demage Vicinity ftf Encounter: 21«»17'N/105»12'E t. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 2 December 1966/1*1 30H BLUE Flight of four P-105Ds on a bombing strike against JCS 51.10, a POL fjorage area at the South ind Ir Thud Ridge. There were several other flights in the area at the time, with a total strike force of approxlnately 18 aircraft. 2. MISSION ROUTE TakbU, direct to Green Anchor extend, direct to north station, direct to Bed Jlw, • - -- - — .-.^ J- — 1. •- Reverse route on tne egress > direct to 2l»H6'N/105''l3'E direct Thud Ridge, direct target 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS y-'iob atUE 1 ai 3 6 _ 750-lb bombs ] - AIM-9 nlaalle 1 - QRC-160 rod 2 . ti50-sal wing tanks 1029 rnda 20inni amino F-105 BLUE 2 t 1 6 - 750-lb bonbs 1 - QRC-160 pod 2 - 450-gal wing tanks 1029 rnda 20nun amnio All aircraft camouflaged. MI3-21 Configuration unknown Not 'zamouflaged 4. KlGHf CGHOlTiUnS rklGk TO LNCOUMUR Weather: Solid undercpst clear above with good visibility. AltUucie He adlncT Itt.OOO ft 090« 500 KCAS 10,500 lb Modified Pluld-Pour. The wlngmen 1500 ft out and 500 ft high or low to SpeeU ; fuel State : Flight I^or.natlon provide a good &CM area of coverage. 5. INITIAL DETECTION MIO sighted at 2 o'clock high 2-300O ft approximately 5 miles out. Heading In the opposite direction. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Flight engaged afterburner and continued straight ahead descending and accelerating. 7. SITUATION OEVELOPHEKT The MIO-21 made a slight descending pursuit curve as he approached 5 o'clock and 2000 ft out. BLUE Plight made a hard right break into the MIO. The MIO broke off left and disengaged. No nisslles or gun firings observed. 8. 10. ORDNANCE No ordnance expended by either the P-lOSs or the KIO-21. AiRCRCw cohhe:nts BLUE 1 was a former B-52 pilot, 250 hr in the P-105. No other Information on pilot experience available on this event. BLUE 1 felt that since all he saw was one HIO and that the MIO broke off the engage* ment as soon as he overshot when the flight broke into him that It waa probably a single and that he did not want to tangle with a flight of four. n. DATA SOURCE Project Interview! BLUE 1 (Mar 1967) 275 Evvnt II«76 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was on top on an undercast flying lU^OOO ft altitude, 500 KCAS heading 090» approximately 15 miles NW of Thud aidge. BLUE 1 sights a single MIO at 2 o'clock, 2-3000 ft high, 5 miles out heading approximately 270*. The MIG started a right turn in on BLUE Plight and made a pass from out of the sun. BLUE 1 called for afterburners and accelerated straight ahead in a slight descent. As the MIO approached 5 o'clock, 2000 ft out, BLUE 1 called a right break into the MIO while retaining ordnance. The HIQ waa Identic fled aa a IIIQ-21, silver In color. The MIO overshot in the turn, he evidently continued up north because he was not sighted again. BLUE Plight rolled out after approximately 90* of turn, checked th; area visually for MIGs, then did a 180' left turn back up to Thud Bidge and continued on into the target. There were no other MIO engagements during this flight. BLUE 1 felt that he did see another flight of MIGs on Thud Ridge, but he was not sure their relative position could be ascertained; consequently, they are not entered in this report. In reflecting back on the attack by the Nia-21, BLUE 1 felt that it was probably a single NIG, he made one high side pursuit pass on the flight. When the flight broke into the MIO, the MIO did not continue the attack. Xt Is felt that this confirms the fact It was • single and did not want to tangle with a flight of four. The MIG was not observed to fire either missile or guns. BLUE Flight had seen two P-^Cs hit by SAMs jMst before they reached the turning point «t the HV end of Thus Ridge. Only three flights were able to hit the target on this strike aa the remaining flights had to Jettison ordnbnoe due to NXOs. Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105s va two NZa-31s Results: No damage. Vicinity of Encounter: 21050'N 10^I''25'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AMD TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 3 Dcce-^ber 1965/1220il BLUE Plight was on an armed reconnaissance mission in Route Package V. (We&t northwest of Hanoi 30 to 100 n ml) The flight was inbound to the target area ^outh of the Rnd River, at 15,000 ft, when two HIG-Sls attacked the flight. 2. MISSION ROUTE Korat direct to Oreen Anchor, direct to north station, direct to Red River, direct to target area (Route Package V). Return, reverse course, 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS 6 - 7S0 lb bombs 2 - 450 gal tanks 1029 Rounds 20niia All aircraft camouflaged. MIC-21 Ordnance unkno'«n. Silver (not cainonf laged) . 4. FLIGHT C0*JOITI0N5 PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Solid undereaat top* 6-8,000 ft, good vlBlbllity above the clouds. Altitude : 15,000 ft Heablnp. : 032« Speed : U80 KTAS Fuel State : 12,000 lb Plight l^oBnatlon ; Tactical spread vlth element on the left. b, INITIAL UtrECTlON Blue Flicht received Big Eye warnirigs of MIGs in the Hanoi area, but were not expecting enemy aircraft in iJunediate area. At 1220H Blue Plight received MIG warning from another U. S. flight in the area concurrent with a MIG sighting by Blue 1. Blue 1 reported two KlQs at 10 o'clock, SOOO ft high and 3 Mies out. 6. ACTION INITIATED Blue Flight continued on heading of 032". The MIGs passed on the left descending from 20,000 ft maintaining 210* heading. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT Blue Plight turned to 360* heading to keep MIGs in eight. MlOa observed to br>.«ak hard left and position themselves at 7 o'clock and 5 miles aft of Blue Plight. 10. AIRCREW COHHCNTS Blue 3 stated that sighting KIGs "that far south and west of Hanoi came as a surprise." In general the MIGs never operated that far from the Hanoi area. The MIGs appeared to be under OCI control and were vectored to Blue Plight. Blue 3 believed the MIGs accomplished their nisslon when Blue Plight Jettisoned ordnance. n. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BtUE 3, 16 February 1967 Wettsajre P*port3 : 7AP 0PREP~3 DOCO 290708 0313112 Dec 66 7AP OPREP-H DOCO 29712 031550Z Dec 66 TAP OPREP-3 DOCO 29727 032210Z Dec C6 7AP DIA DIA 003 OHOOIOZ Dec 66 ii*4jLi^im!ii L.: Bv«nt 11-77 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE PliKht of four F-lOSDs Inbound on armed reconnalasance to Route Package V, western section of N. Vietnam, altitude 15.000 ft, airspeed «l80 KTAS. Juat aouth of the Red River, heading 032". BLUE 1 called MlQa at 10 o'clock hlch. They irer« two K:c-21a. approximately 5Q00 feet high heading In the opposite direction. As the MIOs passed to the left. BLUE Plight turned left to a heading of 360 to keep the WQs m sight. As BLUE Flight turned the MIGs started a left diving turn to BLUt Plight's 7 o'clock position. The MICa were about 3 miles In trail. BLUE 1 called to Jettison ordnance and to go afterburner. BLUE Plight made a left break Into the BXM. The MICs nade a right turn breaking off the attack, rolling out on a approximately UC" . BLUE Plight rolled out of Ita left break on a headins of Zio and egressed the target area. 27a RED BAION EVENT tl-77 SU?s turnino Into the flight. Hiti Started a lef descending turn Into BLUE Flight. i Heading 360", 480 KTAS. Alt. 15.000 ft. HIGs «t 7 o'clock n ml aft BLUE Flight Jettisoned ordnance. Engaged afterburners. Started a left break Into the HIGs. BLUE 1 called .]evCiso«^ ororiantc. Afterburner left break . HtGs at BLUf Fllqht's 7 o'clock 3 n ml af t . After BLUE Fl Ight broke MICs turn rt. roll out on a heading o 130' . HIGs saw BLUE Flight Jettison ordnance. This may have been their prloary r mission since they did not press the attack. Heading 210*. 12.000 ft. SCO XCAS. 8LUC Flight egressed the area. No other encounters. Heading 130*. did not fire. BLUE 3 suspected thtt the HiGs were 6CI control led. Aircraft Involved Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: fvent 11-78 Four P-105* v» two MIO- 17b or 19a 1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 3 December 1966/12'lOH BLUE Plight attacking JCS 19.000 at 21'05'M/105'55'E. 2. MISSION ROUTE Korat, Thailand, directly to air refueling area, Vhlte» Orange or Red Anchor. Directly north station directly to target, Ariaed reconnaissance In Route Package V after hitting target, return route directly Udorn, directly Korat. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION 6 - TSO-lb bombs, 1020 mda 20nm 2 * k^O gal fuel tanks 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS Weathe r; Unknown Altitude : Heading: BLUE 1, apeeq Fuel i State; 15.000 ft 230° 440 KTAS 10,000 lb HIO 1 25,000 ft SIS'* S. INITIAL DETECTION No HIG warning for this area from Big Eye. BLUE 3 called bogies at 4 o*elcok high* BLUE 1 sighted the bogles, two* silver aircraft, heading northwest. Aircraft appeared to be MIO-17 or -19 type. C. ACTICK l;;iTUTLd BLUE Flight began right turn, keeping MIQs in sight. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE Plight continued in turn, completely 360<*. NIQs continued on northwest heading dlaappearing from sight. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE Flight - 6 750-lb bombs/'1029 rnds amuo MXO - Unknown - silver color 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience BLUE 1 Total Hours 4200 P-105 Hours 500 Combat Missions 40 Hemarks Pilot background primary fighter test-pilot level. Korean War experience in F~80. Had com- • plated a short refresher course at Nellis in the P-105 prior to arriving in SEA. BLUE 4 2400 ISO Unknown Pilot background noatly ADC F-94C and P-102. Comments on TMs Encounter BLUE 1 - A low-drag missile to be carried by the F-IO? would have been useful In this case. BLUE 1 did not want to Jettison ordnance and chase after the MIQs for two reasons: (1) thr primary mission was to deliver bombs and (2) the MIG-17 can out-turn and out-maneuver the P-105. BLUE 1 did not feel he had a good chance of a kill with th* M-61 gun only. r Bvent 11-76 10. AiRCRCW CONNEHTS (Continued) • The gun alr-to-alr node requires too many switching operations ehanges when changing from ground-te-air oode. The present radar for air-to-air la inadequate for a faat- deve loping haasei close to the ground. It Is unreliable for lock-on and requires too much In the way of avitches and controls. The ECM capability of the CRC-I60 Is good but the drag and reliability at high speed, and low altitude la questionable. Recommend an Internally mounted ECM capability.. The rearward visibility In the P-IOS is very poor. 11. DATA SOURCES Pro ;|eet Interviews ; BLUE 1 and 1-15 February 1967 HesaaKea .Reports : TAP OPREP-1 DOCO 29697 031014Z Dec 66 TAP OPREP-3 DOCO 29720 03195SZ Dee 66 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION See Items 5 and 7. No additional details. Event 11-79' Aircraft Involved: Four F-lO^e vs one lfIO-21 Result: Sighting only. Vicinity of Encounter: 21*42*N/101*53'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tltne: 3 December 1966/1213H BLUE Plight on ROLLING THUNDER Interdiction nlealon. JC3 19.00 target. 2. MISSION ROUTE Korat, Thailand, directly to air refueling area. White, Orange or Red Anchor, Directly north, station directly to target. Arraed reconnalaaance In Route Package V after hitting target, return route directly Udorn, directly Korat. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION F-105 BLUE I. 2, 3. ij 6 - 750 ib bor.Ls, 2 ~ ftSC gal fuel tanks 1029 rds 20nin ammo 4. FLIGHT CUNOITIONS Weather: Unknown BLUE 1. 2. 3. » HIO 1 AllUude.: 17,000 ft 20.000 ft HSLaOinfc: 230* lao* Speed : HkO KTAS Fuel State : 10,000 lb 5. INITIAL DETECTION i5no ^I'l'^/lie^t sighted one MIG-21 at 12 o'clock position, 3 to 5 miles distant on 120«» heading. MIQa above P-lOSs at 20,000 feet. No hostile action. *»» 11. DATA SOURCE TAP orhrr-o rcc? 29720 0:13552 doc €6 ' TAP OPREP-il DOCO 29697 0310JfJZ Dec 66 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION See Item 5 Event 11-80 Aircraft Involved: Pour P~105a v» one MIQ-17 Results: Sighting Only Vleinity of Encounter: 21«23*II/10l|"19E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 4 December I966/IOOOH 2. MISSION ROUTE Plight departed Korat to strike JCS Target 19.00. 11. DATA SOURCES 7th AP 0122502 Dec 66 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE flight, on a strike at JCS 19.00, heading 360* at 16,000 ft. observed a MIQ-l? estimated altitude 30.000 ft, heading I80«*pas8 overhead. The MIO turned Ml i„i from sight. I I i i i I I ! I E t I Ky • Event 11-81 Alx*crart Involved: Four F-IOSDa vs one NIO 7 Result: Sighting only W Vicinity of Encounter: 21*00 doHn the western side of the ridge on a ttoulhubst Ituiidlng bo lUa lai-gut uma* Z^waa waa iwaJe on n norlhweei heading up Thud Ridge and then to the west across the Red River. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F.105 BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4 6 " 750-lb GP bombs I - 20mni Cannon 1 - QRC-160 {ECM pod) 2 - JJSO Gallon tank (BLUE 1 carried a strike oanera pod) MIO-17 ALL MIQs carried an unknown mix of alr-to-8lr nlsslles (probably Atolls) and cannons. All KIGs were silver In color and no external tanks were observed. At least one KIG was configured with afterburner, 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER y'f.iyi*!:- f'*"'" 'XPunrt l«»vel to 7000 ft with vjni.biuty 3-5 miles into the eun and •7 nlles away from the sun. Scattered cumulus clouds, oottoms at 3000 ft, 2/8 coverage, and clear visibility above the haze. Altitude ; Head In gT Speed ': Fuel State ; Flight Formation ; BLUE 1. 2, 3. t 8-10,000 ft AOL 100-^50 KCA3 10,000+ lb iaG-17 CO 10-15,000 ft AOL sso^-sfio* Unknown Unknown g & s Pop-up: BLUE 1 rolling In over the top BLUE 2 and 3 spacing for roll In BLUE 4 sliding Inside BLUB 3 S. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE Plight was alerted to the presence of MIOs while on their Inbound leg approximately 2 minutes prior to TOT when the preceilng flight In the strike force was engaged by MICs at the target (see Event IJ-84). Shortly thereafter, BLUE 2 saw a single HIO-17 that was turning back toward the target area from a northwerterly heading along the south side of Thud Ridge; however, this HIG did not attack or follow BLUE Flight. This Event occurred subsequent to Event ZI-84, however, this time (as reported In the OPREp) Is the best available from official sources. The Event actually occurred at about 1611 - 1617H. 289 ■ j. ■ n f art Vs»i* I • life Event 11-83 A5 the flight approached the pop-up ^o^nt 3WE 2 an"rnl"8;) . ^^"JJ could not turn with the MlOs and lost sight of then as they "all passed on by him In their dive. BLUE 3 then rolled out and delivered his bombs on the target. Jettisoning his HJO-gallon drop tanks right after boir.b release as did the other wmbers of the flight . BLUE did not encounter HIGs In his dive bomb run; however, he was hit by automatic weapons fire In the pull out and lost his Pi hydraulic system. BLUE PllRht pulled off the target and started a low-altitude egress northwest alonE Thud Ridge. BLUE 1 was In the lead with a «ia-17 on his tall, which was tttnl pursued by BLUE 2. BLUE 2 also had a MIO-17 on hl» tall that. MS being fired on by BLUE 3. BLUE sighted a MIO coming straight Into him from 12:30 o'clock at an estimated range of ^lOOO ft, 2-5 degrees deflection. (BLUE H was at 560 KCAS, 5000 ft altitude, heading northwest up Thud Ridge) BLUE 4 cranked his flx2d reticle to 20 mils, pulled up for an estimated sight picture, and fired 95 rounds from 2000 ft range until the MIu passed over his left wing. Because of the high closure rate, BLUE 1 estimated the rounds went low and behind the MIO. The MIG did not fire but banked away from BLUE 4. BLUE 4 banked to hold a head on firing pass until the MIG went by and then BLUE * continued a northwest egress up Thud Ridge. During the above sequence of events, BLUE '2 unaware that the HIO under attack by BLUE 3 was behind him, was closing on a MIG-lT that he had "called out* at 5-6 o'clock, approximately 2-3000 feet behind BLUE Lead, (BLUE ?. was accelerating from 550-600 KCAS at about 2000 ft AGL. Although he tried to crank his depression to the caged position, he had no reticle for aiming.) BLUE 2 began firing at an estimated 1500 ft range as he closed on this MIG. However, Just after BLUE 2 began firing, BLUE 3 saw a flash of a missile being fired off to his right by still another MIC-17 at his 2 to 2:30 o'clock position, 2-3 miles out. BLUE 3 called for a "BLUB break" since he didn't know If the missile had been launched at BLUE Lead or BLUE 2. BLUE Lead broke right Immediately and BLUE 2 hesitated since he had a good flr.''.ng pass going and the break call did not specifically' identify hlra. After BLUE 2 had fired approximately 100 rounds of 20mm cannon the MIG-17 lit his afterburner and made a hard right break Juat as 2 Atolls, ripple- fired, passed within 10 to 20 feet of BLUE 2's canopy, — smoking with motors still burning. BLUE 2 did a hard left I20o roll, breaking down Into the ground. The missiles detonated at an estimated 2000 feet and 150 ft, respectively, ahead of BLUE 2. BLUE Plight continued northwest up Thud River at about 1.1 Mach at low altituda and the MIOs disengaged. The flight Joined at the north end of the Ridge with approximately 7000 lb fuel remaining and egressed for an uneventful post-strike refueling and recovery at Takhll. The flight did sight two additional MIOs, southbound, low at approximately 2-3000 ft AOL in a valley as they crossed the north end of Thud Ridge; however, no hostile action was initiated by either adversary. I Event 11-84 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105p va sixteen HIG-lTs Result: One NIG7I7 probably destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: Pl^lU'N/lOS'Sl'E 1. PRIHARV MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: H December 1966/1642H P-105S) was the first flight of a five-flight strike force fragged T? t\ tZ^ ir at 1^^* fwP*!r°^*!!J" •to«'a6« ""^^ northeast of Phuc Yen airfield. Events ii-tf3 and 11-85 describe the HIG encounters for other flights In this same strike force. 2. MISSION ROUTE BI-UE Plight departed from Takhll, refueled en route, then flew from Laos across the Red River to the northern edge of Thud Ridge and down the western side of the rld« on a southeast heading to the tar-et area. BLUE Lead egrcssed to the southwest directly towards Laos while the other flight members departed northwest up Thud Ridge and then to zno vrest across the Rod Klver. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-105 BLUE 1. 2. 3. k 6 - 750- lb CP bonbs 2 - 150-gal tanks 1 « QRC-160 (ECM pod) 1 - SOnsn cannon (BLUE 3 and 4 were camouflaged ) MIC- 17 All 16 MlGs sliver i.n color. North Vietnamese markings observed on bottom side of wings of several HIGs (broken yellow bar with yellow star In center, all outlined in red, covered approximately I/3 of bottom wing). No missiles observed. Several MiGs used afterburners. Several fired 23mm cannons. No external configurations reported. 4. FLIGHT COKDITIONS PRIOR TO. ENCOUNTER Weather: Haze from ground level to 7000 ft with visibility 3 to 5 miles into the sun and 7 miles away from the sun. Scattered cuinuloua clouds, bottoms 3000 ft 2/6 coverage, and clear visibility above the haze. Altitude ; fepced : Fut:l State : Flight Formation BLUE 1. 2. 3. k 12,000 ft 14S« to HE 400 KCAS 10,000+ lb MIO-178 (I-I6) Est, 7,000 ft NorthwQst Est. 450 kt as Unknown Wingmen; Elements : Flights: 1500 ft out, 25»-30'' back 1/2 mile spacing 1-1/2 mile spacing Pop-up In afterburner, 20* to climb angle, 400-450 KCAS, elinblng through 8-10,000 ft AOL. S. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE Flight popped up from 7000 ft AOL to 12,000 ft AOL for a left roll in to dive bomb the target on a northeast heading. As BLUE Lead was rolling over the top with hla S:a%%JrSoJ?Sieft^T.£Lrmo"« '^'"^ ''^'"^"8 293 Evsnt 11-64 S. ACTION IHITIATEO BLUE tead calleu ciit the MIGs; howyer. the flight «°"tlnued the bombing attack. As BLUE Lead pulled off the target he made a left ^00 ft to aeek out^^^^ engage the MIQs. Since BLUE PUsht had not seen the MIGs and "^J a left intended to attack the MIGy , they nade a pre-brlefed right Jinx off the target with a left turn to depart northwest up Thud Ridge. 7. SITUATIOH OEVCLOPHENT The MIQ8 had continued on ccurae as BLUE Lead turned from a *° northern or northeasterly heading to atart a diving attack ^^^^ coVJJnued second flleht of MIOa. This MIG started a right turn while the rest of the «IGs cor.tlnuea "^ri" BlS "ead closed with an estimated 150 to 200 U overtake, opening fire at isOO feet and stopped firing at approximately 200 ["^ * J^J'^.JJJS^ ^LhJ rlKht BLUE Lead lost sight of this MIG as he went over the top of him In a »ii8«* Sis; cllmting in afterburner keeping his airspeed up. A. he Jooked back and down for the first MIG. he saw two other KIOs in fighting wing formation atj» o'^^o^k, 1800 ft range, beclnnlna to pull lead on hln. There iere two other «Gs further bac*. straggling behind wJth^bSSt 1/2 mile separation between tnerr,. BLUE Lead tightened hl« '^Kj;?/,^^" llillait diftoMd hta nose and used hard right rudder to cause the two threatening HIGs to overshoot oStSlSe Of ?Se ?:;n SSsriSg about 3-500 feet above him BLUE Lead J^- J^<»«^ • ahoved the nose down and reversed into a gentle turn to the left back over tj» n«tin» that these «IGa were no longer a threat as they were going away from hlc his ?o-J!ocS UuJon iS a JShS bink! BLUE Lead saw numerous «IG-17s a. he ^^n^lnued chls ?u?n, tut kll were too well protected to attscl:. Although the ^'^f "%fj;o" ^JJ? P?i^^ " thTAext encounter are somewhat ha^y. BLUE Lead was ^hreatened by two additional MICs senewhere In this turn. As he maneuvered for separation In a dive a^ ^''O"^ .7°$*^^^"^ thTtarget, he spotted a single MIG-17 about 2000 feet below hln coming head on about one mile away flying straight and level. As BLUE Lead turned in and cent inuel his dive SlO'a lS "clock position, the MIQ otarted a climbing turn into BLUE Load BlS Lead opened fire at about 1500 roet with 20min shells lnpa«"ng from low on the left Sdi if the'^MIO'a noae up across the cockpit and to the tall when B^'f^^ead stopped firing and pulled up over him. Although the WIG was firing at BLU.. Lead he was in*^"««J'* BlncS BIUE L?ad was approaching the MIG from his 11 o'clock to l^-*30 o'clock position for ?Ms pass. Looking bk?k from a right cllnblng turn, BLUE Lead -J" ^Gentle descending turn with pieces coning off the aircraft. H» also saw "little flashes gclng Ml. canonv and diverted hla attention to three Mlir-lTs at 4:30 to 5 c'clocK, two or SiShinSS ?«t in -nici wJng- formation. As BLUK Lead tightened his turn the MOB both fir me. slid toward 6 o'clock with the wlngman crossing to his leader's left "Se! Sl5e LelS^^oSunueS Vn a slight diving turn using alternate 1*;* J^JJ" to SDOll the KIOs' aim. After three or fjur Jinks, he realized he was the H?Gs '"and rolled level and dived to tree-top alMtude as the last cannon balls passed hlgh^ove his canopy. As he crossed the Red River outrunning the MIQa at 1.15 toch on the deck, he turned southwesterly to egress the area When BLUE 3 had realized that BLUE Lead was engag?1 with MIOa, he reversed turn towarTthe target area (BLUE 2 and k made a confused high speed departure northwest up S^ldS SSh BlS£ S atiemptlng K-j Join on BLUE 2 who was trying to outrun BLUE M as a auipected ICQ.) As BLUE 3 turned through a southern heading at an estimated 9000 ft AOL. he saw a flight of four MIG-17s about 2000 to 3000 feet below hln In a tight orbit over t«rJ-t He also saw another flight of two unit? ent If led MIOs going away froa him at 5 ?'c?of; ^o-altJJSSe! uTsUghi dfscent. The four-ship flight split Into two element, and BLU? 3 lost sight of one element as he tried to drop down In trail the other element. However. BLUE 3 did not maneuver Into firing range since he could not match thJlr tim? He broke off this attempt to engage these MIQr. when BLUE L«ad advlaed that S wla dllingajlnrand departing the target area. The MTOs did "ot attempt to engaBa BLUE 3 as he departed northwest up Thud Ridge without further Incident. S. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 Ist MIG Attack (Single MIQ) 2nd HIO Attack (3 or 3 KIOs) (No. flred/No. hita) Cannon 2/1 I/O I/O Caoh Remarks Ho hits observed during the first firing attack on the #2 MIQ in the second flight of the four- flight formation. Estimated 15 to 25 hits (probably kill) on the aceond MIO attacked head-cn over target. KO hit by BLUE 1 on haad-on pass. I I I I I t I I I I » I i I t I I E E Event 11-84 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 1 — cunslght would not operate properly. The reticle sight picture would disappear when the "act'lon reject" button was actuated for radar lock-on. 10. AIRCREW COHKCNTS Experience Total P-105 Combat Hours Hours Missions Remarks 1000 800 55 Extensive air-to-air gunnery training and ACM. 3000 250 28 Mostly ADC, P-102 time. BLUE 1 (5 Feb 67) and 3 (3 Feb 67) BLUE 1 dluh: 3 Conrients on This Er.aounter BLUE 1: "1 was quite confident of my airplane, my equlpmen*^ , and myself, frankly, .... The frame of mind that I was in was that if J. ever got the chance, I was defi- nitely going to have a KIG .... I Just flat wanted to mix it up with a MIO.'- Coninentlng on the F-lOb, BLUE 1 would like better naneuverabillty , more acceleration, nore time In afterburner, better visibility, digital rather than analog gunslght readouts, a simpler switching system going fron ground attack to air-to-air mode, and a better radar lock-on and performance capability. BLUE 3 ' Cockpit set up Is completely Inadequate, Too many manual operations required to change attack modes. The dual role concept comprc-nlses the capabilities for both missions. You can't aggressively pursue a target while looking into the cockpit or worry- ing about getting the right switch settlnc^s. Need a missile with a bigger firing envelope. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; 0ill505Z Dec 66, SECRET, 7AP 29772 Dec 66. 0109123 Dec 66, SECRET, 7Ay, DOCO 29751 Dec 66. 010920Z Dec 66, SECRET, 7AF. OOCO 29752 Dec 66. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE night descended from cruise altitude as they crossed the Red River inbound toward the northern ed^e of Thud Rldgu for a strike on JCS 51.10, a POL storage area near Phuc Yen airfield. The flight proceeded down the western side of Thud Ridge toward the target on a southeastern heading at 7000 ft AGL, The flight popped up from 7000 ft AGL to 12,000 ft AGL "fanning out" to gain spacing for a left roll in to dive bomb the target on a northeastern heading. (In the pop-up, BLUE 1 slid Inside of BLUE 3, which delayed BLUE 3's roll In and eventually resulted in BLUii 1 coming off of the target ahead of BLUE 3. As BLUB Lead was rolling over the top of the pop-up with his nose coming down (1Q«) starting the dive bomb run, he sighted four flights of four sliver HIC-178 co.-aing from his right heading northwest at about 70U0 ft ACL. (The MIGs were In trail with approximately 1/2-Mlle spacing between elements and 1-1/2-nlle suaclna; between fllehts. The nearest flight was at BLUE Lead's 9 o'clock low position, approximately 1/1 to 1/2 mile out.} BLUE Lead continued his bomb run advising the flight that therfc were "MICs under us and AA fire around us." (It was later deter- mined at debriaflng that the other flight members, who had not seen the airborne MlGs, thought BLUE Lead was referring to the HIQs that could be seen taxiing for takeoff at Phuc Yen airfield during the pop-up.) As BLUE Lead pulled off of the target in a left 1-1/2 to 2 g's climbing turn at 600 KCAS, he selected afterburner and Jettisoned all of his external stores except his QRC-16O pod and selected "guns air" and "radar search and attack". (BLUE Lead had a full internal fuel load at tills time.) BLUE Lead continued the left climb to about 12,000 ft AOL on a westerly heading whin he again spotted the MIGs at his 9:30 to 1:00 o'clock low position, 3-mlle range, 7000 ft AGL and still continuing northwest In level formation at an estimated I50 kl, (HLUE Lead believed the MIGs had not seen BLUE Flight and were apparently under OCI control being vectored to intercept the rest of the Inbound strike force.) Meanwhile, BLUE ?, 3, and 1, unaware that BLUE Lead had broken left in pursuit of the MIGs, continued with the prebrlefed right break off of the target and a left turn to depart northwest up Thud Rldgc. BLUE 2 was In the lead with BLUE 1 attempting to Join with him, having assumed that BLUE 2 was BLUE 3. BLUE 3 was actually back off of BLUE ft'a right wing and had both BLUE 2 and BLUE 4 in sight. BLUE Lead continued to close on the KIGs at 60O KCAS and apparently crossed high above the MIGs since he made a diving turn from "a west-.-rly heading" to attack the number two y.lO Ir. the second flight "from the southwest." BLir; Lead estimated that he start-d the attack from the HIG3 ' 7:30 to 8:00 o'clock position, high, 5OOO fcc-t behind with 150 to 200 kt overtake. The MIO apparently saw BLUE Lead and started a right turn while the 295 Event II-8* remainder of the HICs continued strilght ahead. BLtlE Lead was trying to get a radar lock-on; however, every time he would hit "action reject" the reticle would disappear. As BLUE Lead closed In a right turn he used an imaginary sight picture on the combining glass to track the KIG and began firing at an estimated 15C0 ft range. The MIQ made a hard rlgnt break after BLUE Lead began firing. BLUL Lead stopped firing at 200 ft, relaxed the 3-1/2 to ^ g's held during the attack, and passed over the top of the MIG In a alight right-banked cllssblng turn at 600 KCAS In afterburner. No hits were observed. As BLUE Lead looked back and down for the first KIG, ha saw two other MIC-17a inside of his turn at * to k'.^o c'clock, "Inside of 2000 ft, stllX outside of 1500 ft" range, beginning to pull lead on him. The wlngMn was flying a nice lighting wing position. A third KIG-17 was "on back out quite a ways" with a fourth MIG an additional 1/2 mile back. BLUE Lead tightened his turn slightly with aileron, dropped his nose down, and used hard right rudder which caused the two threatening MXGs to overshoot to the outside of the turn crossing 3-500 feet above BLUE Lead's canopy. BLUE Lead, now doing 500 KCAS, relaxed rudder, shoved his nose further down to gain airspeed, and reversed into a gentle left turn back towards the target area. BLUE Lead discounted any further Imnedlate thrrat from these two MICs as they continued In a right turn going away from his 2 o'clock position. BLUE Lead saw numerous HIG-17s as he continued Jils left turn; however, all were too well covered by other MIGs to attempt another attack. BLUE Lead was still observing heavy AA flak around him at this time. Althouch the details from this point to the next encounter are somewhat hazy, BLUE Lead was threatened by two additional .^Gs in this turn. (NOTE: possibly the third and fourth MIG from the previous encounter.) However, he was able to maneuver to keep them from reaching a firing position. As he maneuvered for separation from these KIGs In a 600 KCAS dive at about 7000 feet over the target, ha spotted a single KIO-17 about 2OC0 feet below him, coming head on from 10:30 o'clock about one mile away, flying straight and level. As BLUE Lecd turned in and continued his dive towards the MIO's 10 o'clock posi- tion, the KIG started a. left climbing turn into BLUE Lead. (On the pass, BLUE Lead held down the "electrical cage" on the sight to obtain .^n approximate 1000 ft fixed ranging reticle which he placed ahead of the MIG and then pulled through the HZG as hL was firing.} BLUE Lead opened fire at 1500 to 2000 ft range and continued firing until the "bullets were obviously going behind him." BLUE Lead observed 15 to 25 20mm shells Impacting about a foot and a half apart starting low on the left side of the MIG's nose and continuing up across the cockpit and through the tail. The MIG was firing at BLUE Lead from 3 guns on the bottom of the aircraft; however, the HIQ's fire was ineffective since the BLUE Lead was approaching from the MIO's 11:00 to 11:30 o'clock position on the pass. BLUE Lead pulled up over the KIG to look back from his right climbing turn and • observe the HIQ In a gentle descending turn with pieces coming off of the aircraft. He also saw "little flashes" going past his canopy and diverted his attention to three MIG-17s .at lliio to 5:00 o'clock, two of them within 2000 ft and another further back. Again, the wingman was flying a "nice fon&ation". BLUE Lead could see Islands in the HIQ Intakes and fences on the wings. He could see the guns flashing and could hear and see the "little vhlte" cannon balls going past the cockpit. As BLUE Lead tightened hla right turn, the KIGs, both firing, slid toward 6 o'clock with the wlngnan crossing to his leader's left side. BLUE Lead continued in a slight diving turn using alternate left and right rudder to spoil the KIG's aim. After 3 or Jinks, he no longer could see the KIG intakes and realized that he was pulling away from the MIGs in his afterburner dive. (BLUE Lead was indicating 630 to 6'*0 KCAS at about 3000 ft ACL.) BLUE Lead rolled level and dived to treetop altitude as the last observed cannon balls passed high above his canopy. As he crossed the Red River outrunning the KlOa at 1.15 Maeh on the deck, he turned aouthwesterly to egress the area. (BLUE Lead had 6000 lb fuel remalnlns as he crossed the Red River.) Vhen BLUE 3 had realized that BLUE Lead was engaged with NIQa In the target area, he called the flight for a right turn and immediately reversed direction toward the target area. It is not clear whether or not BLUE 2 and •» heard this call; however, BLUE 2 and * did continue on a high speed egress to the north out of the area with BLUE 4 attempting to ioln on BLUE 2 who was trying to outrun BLUE 4 as a suspected attacking MIG. (BLUE 2 and discovered each other's identity after or 5 minutes; however, they had expended so much fuel that they reached the refueling tanker with only 600 lb and 800 lb of fuel, respectively.} As BLUE 3 turned right through a aoutherly heading at an estimated 9000 ft AOL, he saw a flight of four MI0-17s at hla 10:00 - 11:00 o'clock position, 2-3000 feet below him in a tight left orbit over the target at 2000 ft horizontal range. He also saw another flight of two unidentified KIGs going away from him at 3:00 o'clock", co-altltude. In a slight descent. (BLUE 3 was at itCO KCAS accelerating In full military power with his nose down. BLUE 3 carried a center^lnc KER, two USO-gallon external fuel tanks, a QRC-160 pod on his right wing. He had about 7000 lb of fuel remaining.) BLUE 3 asked BLUE lead's position and found out he was now approaching the Black River on the deck for a southwest egress from the area. The four-ship NIG flight split with "number 3 and 4 break- ing right and away from 1 and 2 at high speed." BLUE 3 lost sight of the second element as he entered a to 5 g descending turn from 9000 ft ACL to 6000 ft AGL trying to drop into a trail position on the lead element. At this point BLUE Lead called, "Hey BLUE Plight, :>>t*5 get out of here:" Since BLUE 3 saw that he could not match the KIGs turn or have enj^i^h overtake to maneuver into firing range, he brcke it off and egreaaed northwest up niud Bidge and out of the area. The MIGa did not attevpt to engage BLUE 3 during this tlae; however, there waa a considerable amount of AA flak seen, aome bursting behind the KZOs. 296 01 i [i; 0 Ql i 'i i i i y Event X1-B5 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105» vi Xvo MIO-17* and two niQ^-Zlu Reault: No danaee Vicinity of Encounter: 21 ll'H/105 SX'E 1. PRIHARY HISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/Tine: l» December 1966/l6t5H BLUE Plleht (four F-105s) was one of five flights fragRed to attack JCS 51.10, a petroleliJ^ a?!! Soi?h«»t of Phuc Yen Airfield. Event* 11-83 and ll-S^i de.crlbe the wa tncountera for other fllKhta In thla suae atrlke force. 2. MISSION ROUTE Not glvan. See Events 11-83 and II-8ft for route flown by other flights In this sane strike force. 3. AIRCRAFT CONPlGURATtONS 6 - 750-lb GP bombs 1 - QRC-160 (ECM pod) 1 - ZOnun cannon MlO^n (1. 2) Gray color, used afterburner^ fired 2Ztm cannon. HI 0-?1 (1. 2) AAKs (Type unknown) 4. FLIGHT CONOITIOHS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Not plvfn. See Events 11-83 and H-B*. (?-105« were In pop-up for dive bomb attack on JCS 51.10.) 5. INITIAL DETECTION As BLUE 2 was following lead in the pop-up, he sighted two MIO-lTs at 12 **«iof^»,_- 7 n wl rnn?e, PT»pmyi«iMit.ply Jioop ft, tuminn: throui;h north from eaat, cloalng on blue beaa, 6. ACTION INITIATED One mO-17 maneuvered Into a position 500 to 1000 feet behind BLUE Lead, which also placed this HIO at 9 o'clock to BLUE 2. BLUE t Jettisoned his bombs and external stores and turned in to attack this MIC causing him to break off from BLUE Lead's tall position. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE U closed on this HIG-17 and fired ^UO rounds of 20irjn cannon at a range of 800 to 1000 ft with no apparent hits. This HIG broke and was not seen again. The second HIO-17 maneuvered from BLUE iJ's 9 o'clock position into a position "very close to his tall* and made an unsuccessful 23rara cannon firing pass on BLUE BLUE ll dove and Jinked away from the MIC who disengaged and was not seen again. The MZG-17a were observed using after- burner during this encounter. Meanwhile, two MIG-21s slid In behind BLUE Lead and BLUE 2. As the MIG-21 behind BLUE Lead passed BLUE 2*s 9 o'clock position, BLUE 2 saw the apparent flash of an AAM launch at BLUE Lead; however, BLUE 2 did not see a missile in flight. BLUE 2 Jettisoned his ordnance armed and turned Into the Kia-21 on BLUE Lead's tail. The MIOs disengaged and were not seen again. BLUE 3 had seen a gray colored MIO-17 sliding from his 2 o'clock to his 5:30 or 6 o'clock position as he was going through the top of his pop-up; however, since he was rolling away from the HIO and would pick up adequate (teparatlon speed in the dive, he ignored this HIG and continued his bombing attack. [NOTE: Ho further account was given of this MIG-17 which could have disengaged or perhaps been one of the KI0-17s that were engaged by BLUE t.] BLUE Lead and BLUE 3 successfully delivered ordnance on the target although BLUE 3 was hit by ground fire during this attack. 8. ORDNANCE BLUB k MIQ-17 llIC-21 (NO. flred/No. hits) Cannon I/O Soviet AAM Rer^rks 440 rounds 20mm Probable firing 297 1 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS Bv«nt IX-65 P % l!^! ^^A^^ doppler navigation by ground fire. He lost his r-i and utility hydrauilc systems , radio communications, DC electrical power and fuel transfer system. (Although he hod a fire lyid a cut control cable In the «hMl nell, he Mdo a successful emergency landing at Udorn Alrbaae, Thailand.) 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS E»perlence Unknown Cotnents • i^rJr^* /!^f*-,'T2" **** inherent perforunce llnltatlona of the P-105. Inadequate ^^ training and the ceapllcated switch-setting problema are the major reasons why Ic5 St R?u**^Sliif?i"^ ^omblt m the P-IO?. The flvr?Ueh?J in iSi «J,m^fT™J?f^r"' ^""W ••'<=conneU are net adequate and because of fuel SC? «i ACM training cannot be accomplished In SEA. Many of l«k oJ In flight Integrity which can be directly related to i!?in «r ^hi J?ft\.?f' a BUltl-oiaslon aircraft should also include a conelder- s:L^d?nVfy%Ji"if'i}«i%ii\5?X iJii:"" • "^"^ n. DATA SOURCES Project I nterviews ; BLUE 3 (17 Kar 196?) Meaaagea; 0423392 Dec 66 DOCO 29795 Dee 66 0SC253Z Dec 66 DOCC 29604 Dee 66 0422422 Dee 66 DOCO 29792 Dec 66 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION tlon Su'J:"JSiJeS":r'?Jt.':eSnJ?''"*'"' therefor., no n«T.tl« deacrlp- 298 0 il 0 0 i f 5 I I I I I Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSDa Results: Sighting only four Nia-i7a zini'N/ios^sa'E vicinity of Encounter: 1. PRIMARY HISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: l» iJeceraber 1966/17O6H BLUE Plight (four F-ioSDs) was on a strike mission against JCS 19.OO, a railroad yard 2-1/2 n ml north of Hanoi. The strike force consisted of '♦O P-105s. The first wave of righters assigned to strike this target llC aircraft), aborted the mission due to weather in the target area,* BLUE Flight waa one of the flights in the second wave of fighters aaalgned to hit the target. BLUE Flight sighted two KIG-lTa as it approached the target, two unidentified KIGa orbiting over Fhuc Yen airfield, and two MIQ-17S orbiting over the target. BLUE Flight did not engage the MIGa, however. 2. HISSION ROUTE Korat, Vhalland, directly to tne Rad Anchor extended, directly to the Bad River, directly to Thud Ridge, directly to the target. Return route reversed. 3. AIRCRAFT COKFIGURATIONS F-105D BLUE Flight Jj - CBU-S^l" 2 - k^O gal wlngtanks 2 - QRC-160 ECM pods 1029 rounds 20nsa ammo All aircraft camouflaged 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Prom over the Red River, to the north and down Thud Ridge, scattered to clear. Juai off the end of Thud Ridge, 10,000 feet overcast with five n oi viaibility in haae. BLUE 1. 2. 3. ft Altitude ; 10, goo ft ^peed : $40 KTAS Flight Formation ; Modified Fluid-Four. The wlngmen in to 1,000 to 1,500 ft to provide a better ECN . coverage. The element on the left at this time. 5. INITIAL DETECTION Vhile inbound to the target Just off the end of Thud Hidge, BLUE 1 sighted two KIG>17a at 1 o'clock low In a left turn, § to 8,000 ft altitude and 2 n ml range. 6. ACTION INITIATED The HlOa did not pose a threat at this time. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE Plight continued on and bombed their designated target. The flight egressed the target area at high speed (auperaoni.:) at an altitude of 6 to 8,000 ft on a southwest heading. The flight did not engage the HIQs. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE Flight 12 - CBU-2'l8 on target, 20miD expended BLUE Flight continued on to the target. NIG-17 < • Not observed to expend - silver In color 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total Hours P-105D Combat Hours Missions Remarks BLUE 2 3300 *i50 11 Pilot background primarily TAG, P-100 and P-105. P-86. BLUE 4 2900 ISO Pilot background primarily AOC, and 102. P-86 'The firat wave hit the alternate target, JCS 51 ,10 (see XZ-a3 to 11-85). 299 ''* Event 11-46 Too many switch changes are required to change from the ground attack to the air attack oode. The pilot must take hie eyes off the target and look In the cockpit to make the proper switch settings. The QRC-160 pod adds considerable drag at high speeds. Reconnend Internally mounted ECN equlpraent. An loproved bombing system designed to reduce exposure time to flak and SAKs would be desirable. }}, DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE 2, * Dec 66, and BLUE 4, 17 Feb 67 Messages. Reports ; 7AP 0U22502 Dee 66 U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION AS BLUE Flight departed Thud Ridge on a »:eadlng of 130** at 10 to 11.000 ft altitude and "^tiO kr.ota, BLUE 1 sighted a flight of two r.IC-178 at 1 o'clock low <5 to 8,00C ft) in a left turn 2 n ml out. The KlGa continued in a left turn and ELUE Plight continued or. to the target. The MJCs passed BLUE Flight'- 9 o'clock position heading northwest and were not seen again. As BLUE Plight rolled in on the target, heading southwest, two unidenti- fied MIGs were seen orbiting Phuc Yen airfield and two mere KIC-178 were seen orbiting the target area at approximately 6,000 ft. BLUE Flight, after completing ita bOKb run, egressed the area on a southwest heading at high speed (supersonic in afterburner). There vaa no atteapt to engage the KlOs and they were not seen again ae the flight egre&sed tr.e area. Bvant H-8T Aircraft Involved: Pour ?-105» va four HI0-17a Reault: One MI0*17 destroyed Vicinity Pf Encounter: 21*11 'H/lOS'Sft'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AHO TACTICAL SITOATIOK Date/Time: 1 December 1966/1705H BLUE night (four P-IOSD.) «aa on a atrlke "{"iSV/jJ"!* J" "^SJ-ftr""!?:' o? 2-1/2 n ml no?th uf Hanoi. p« atrlke for« con.lated of flghtera In on the target {16 »ircraft) abwted tt« olaaion aue " aaalgned to strike arSa. BLUE flight «as one of the fllghta in *he ajeond «ve of JJSJJJ'^JiJJJJ*;^. off It. this target. The flak In the target area vaa extremely heavy, as iaib"* boob run, it waa Jumped by four MIC-l7a. 2. MISSION ROUTE ^ Korat, Thailand, direct to Red An.hor extended, direct to the Red River, direct to Thud Ridge I and direct to the target. Return route reveree. 3. AIRCRAFT COHFIGUKATIONS y-lOS BLU E 1. 2. 3. t 6 - 750 lb bombs 2 . QRC-160 poda 2 - »t50-gal. wing tanks 1 - 20mm cannon All P-lOSa camouflaKed. HlG-17 23mm cannon Silver color. 4. FLIGHT COSDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUKTER weather: Prom over the Red River to the north and down Thud RJJSe. scattered to clear. jllt Irr the end of Thud Ridge and over the target, 10,000 ft scattered to broken with 5 n mi visibility base. mm i- — ■ T Altitude : *lfiS«" P^pfi^ 550 KCAS MifCate: • i^So'SS. Plight Pormatlon ; The night was Just coming off Its bomb run and was etrung ^^ii-.^JS"!-?- , was approximately 2000 ft behind BLUE 1. BLUE 3 -as approximately 5000 ft behind BLUE 1 and 2. BLUE 4 was 4000 ft behind BLUE 3< 5. IRITIAL DETECTION Hhlle the flight was Inbound to the target. MIQ ''arnlnp 5*2-S'??/S«''J?aS?.d"*'* Channel from BIO EYE. As the flight rolled in on the target. 4 MIG-17s were sighted directly over the target several thousand ft below the flight. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE flight continued with its successful bomb run. As BLUE 3 came off the ttrget, he saw MIGs 1 and 2 at his 1 o'clock position attacking BLUE 1 end 2, who were heading norJSiest toward Thud Ridge. As BLUE 4 cane off of his bomb « ""-JJ !t his 2 o'clock position attacking BLUE 3. BLUE 1 and 2 were outside of •fj«tlvs gun »nrt w«* ouiiina away from MIQs 1 and 2. BLUE 3 started to maneuver his aircraft JffL" o"c"criM?fl" Sn !SSs 1 sni IT BLUE 4 attacked MQ 3 who was attacking BLUB 3. Mia 4 was maneuvering Into position to attack BLUE 4. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 1 and 2 continued on a northwest heading toward '5'hud Bldge with MIOs 1 and 2 slowly dropping farther back out of range. BLUE 3 had closed to 1500 ft behind HIQ 2 and was Just about ready to fire when BLUE 1 called that ne was hit by ground fire. BLOB 3 • ?Sen b"ke off his attack to assist BLUE 1. BLUE 4 fired at MIO 3 who was attacking BLUE 3- MIQ 3 reversed his turn to the left, but BLUE 4 followed him and continued to track and fire until SIS ? burst into flames. BLUE 4 then broke off and discovered that MIO 4 -"^J^hlnd him firing. BLUE 4 dived to the deck and evaded WJG -» In a supersonic egress up Thud Ridge. 'The first wave hit the alternate target. JCS 51-10. 301 Ev«nt 11-87 8. ORDNANCE (No. fllTd/Mo. Hlt») Cannon Remarka BLUE ^ 1/1 700 rounds ZOnm HIO 3 1/0 23801 eannon KIO 4 1/0 2ym eannon 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEHS BLUE 1 had a pitch mechanical advantage malfunction warning light on during his supersonic low^altltude egress. 10. AIRCREH COKMENTS Ex perience t Total P-105 Combat Hours Hours Hissions Remarks BLUE H 4300 100 4 Type of fighters flown: P-86, P-86D, P-IOIB, P-102. Mostly ADC background. Completed the F~i05 fighter course at HcConnell prior to SEA. Pilot suggests a better air tactics training course. Cemaenta on this Encounter i BLUE 3 and <• both commented on the MIG orMt over the target area., It was felt that the MIGs were orbiting In a corridor that had been coordinated with the' antiaircraft flak sites. The flak was extremely intense and yet the HlOs were able to operate right under- neath without apparent danger. BLUE 3 came off the target and changed his switch settings from ground to missiles air when he saw the MIGs. He Indicated that he was able to accomplish this change before he broke off the engagement; however, it did present a problem. This switch setting only provides for an electrically caged sight for gun firing. He did not attempt to set up the guns air and radar sight mode which la the designed means of firing the gun air to air, because it la too complicated a procedure and the radar Is not reliable that, close to the ground. BLUE 4, being the last In the flight off the target, did not have time to aake awltoh changes in the cockpit. He did not change his sight setting from the manual bombing node, consequently he had 122 mils depression in his sight as he attacked the KIO. BLUE <4 simply pointed his aircraft at the MIG and started shooting. BLUE 4 recommends a simple switch arrangement for changing from ground to air attack, that would not require the pilot to look in the cockpit to make switch changes. Re also recommends a low drag AA missile, a better turning capability, and an improvement in the rear visibility. The P-105 requires excessive aircraft maneuvering to clear back at 6 o'clock. The QRC-160 is an effective ECM item buc the warning or monitor lights are on the right console and cannot be seen unless the pilot looks down over his right shoulder. The monitor and reset button should be up front so it can be seen with a glance and you don't have to look In the cockpit. The QRC-I60 is a rather high drag piece of equipment when operating supersonic at low altitudes, iibv to mention the limitations of the equipment. He reeomnwnds that this tjpe of equipDent be mounted internally. BLUE 4 also stated that the P-105 radar is Inadequate for rapid target acquisition or air-to-air use close to the ground. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE 3, 15 Pebruary 1967 BLUE 4, 16 Pebruary 1967 Weesages. rteports ; OPREP-4 041445Z, December I966, from 7AF DOCO 29770 DAI 0422502, Oeoember 1966, DIO 30926 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE flight encountered heavy AA fire as they approached the target at 10,000 ft AOL Just below a cloud layer. Rather than fly through the heavy 83->100mm flak that enshrouded BLUE 1 and 2 on roll-in, BLUE 3 and 4 pulled up and over the flak going Into the clouds as they entered their left roll-in to bomb the target on a south to north heading. (As a result, when SLUE 3 came aut of the elouds, he was 4*5000 ft behind BLUE 1 and 2 in the dive bomb run. BLUE 4 had lost sight of the flight, but was about another 4ooo ft behind BLUE 3.) As BLUE lead rolled in he called out, "MIGs over the target", having sighted a flight of four 1110-178 over the target in two-ship elements with 3-4000 ft spacing between ele- ments. BLUE 3 looked down as he started his roll-ln and saw nwo NIOs going from south to north one or tvo miles northeast of the target at an estimated 3*4000- ft AOL. Aa BLUE 4 302 ^P^vr \ Event 11-87 f?S?nJ fiJ^"*" * dive, he spotted tNo MlG-178 crossing low over the rail yard ml^t ilnl JSns! 3 and <. both lost sight of the SlGs wSuJ «Sc"iia??S ■ « , 5^V^«^ ^ '^^^ target together heading north towards Thud Rldne As BLUF Jinked left, then right, off the target at 14000 ft. 55O-.0O KCAS, looking for BLUE 1 and 2 slant range to his right at 1 o'clock, 500 ft low, pressing an attack on BLUE 1 and 2 He Jni -ffJ^^^*" r " ^^"P'^- 5 c'clock loS behind BLUE 1 and 2 ?n a flgW- ing wing formation, 200 ft apart. Since BLUE 1 and 2 were beyond the MIOs' effective aS nCSr11?0-m ?o'Sf Ts^rU^s'r accelerating. b[Se 3^5^ no? consHei'thf^: .l^Hnrfl InJ -4? « serious gun tnreat to the lead element. BLUE 3. with both an Sa^i a? tJ^?r 7 S^M^f ^''Sf initiate a gun attack on the MICs from 2000 ft their 7 o'clock poslt-.on. BLUS 3 selected missiles air and radar search and attack which provided hir, with a 150r ft fixed range "g" only computing gun sight BLUE^ wS to eniage BLUE 3.)*^ "^^ c^u.w.«d ^.u overtake. These HIGs did not atteir mr iwi«?n'^t"f! *^f"'» nust regress slightly to time phase BLUE H'b encounter with a (MIG 3) was at BLUE U's 11 o'clock position at i-Hooo ft in a right turn B^Jl ^ t^ll the deck. BLUE k ^oin*.rt hi. ri^-it *.£ * ^l: r* '^^'^ ^ again after diving for (BLUE H's) fuel tanks. ^^-"^ " ^hat MIO H may have collided with his Event 11-88 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs nine HIG-lTs Results: No Damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21*<13*N/105**29»E K P8IHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 4 December 1966/1715H BLUE Plight was part of a llB aircraft strike force assigned to strike JCS target, 19.00, a railroad yard, 2-1/2 n mi north of Hanoi. The flight was Inbound to target in a modified Pluld-Four formation at the time MICs were sighted. 2. MISSION ROUTE Korat, direct to Red Anchor extended, direct to North Station (TACAH Channel 97), direct to the Red River, direct to Thud Ridge, direct to the target. Return route re- versed . 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION P-105 BLUE 1, 2, 3. 1 6 - 750-lb bombs 2 - ftSO-gallon wing tanks 1 - QRC-160 ECM pod 1 - 20mni cannon All aircraft camouflaged MIG-17 Configuration unknown Silver color 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Scattered to clear. Oood visibility at flight level. B LUE 1. 2. 3. 1 Altitude: 15,000 ft Headlnp : O90 : jiio KTAS ■ .. - • • Fuel at ate : 9,000 lb Fllp;ht For~allon : Modified Fluid-Pour with the element on the left wlngnan 1500 ft out and slightly back. 5. INITIAL DETECTION KIG warnings had been received by the flight from BIG EYE while Inbound to the target. BLUE Flight, on a heading of 090° at the north end of Thud Ridge, sighted a flight of four M1G-17S at 5 o'clock, approxinately 8 n mi south. BLUE Plight turned on a heading of 140 down Thud Ridge and when the MIGs were line a::reast on a reciproca Ridge made a right turn into the flight. 3 to 4 n mi out . iprocal heading they The NIGs were low at approximately 13,000 ft altltuae. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight continued on to the target. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE Flight continued on to the target and the MIGs broke off to the left without an engagement. As BLUE Flight was going; oown Thud Ridge, they sighted another flight of four MICs at 9 o'cloclt, 9-10 n ml out. Again no attempt was made to engage by either side. BLUE Flight continued on to attack the target. As BLLE Flight was coining off of the target, a single MIG-17 was spotted at 7-6 o'clock low, 3 n ml out. No attempt was made to engage. BLUE Plight egressed the area. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience BLUE 1 Total Hours 3100 P-105 Hours 1000 Comoat Missions 55 Rerrarks Pilot background considerable TAC experience In P>84G and P, P-IOIA/C and P-105. He did not attend a CCVS and had limited air-to-air experience. BLUE 2 « 3 Not Interviewed BLUE 1 2500 150 20 *' Event II-6B CoBMitentg on thla Encounter BLUE 1; The P-105 mlaslon Is to deliver bombs on the target and not to engage MIOs. For thla :.:j3lon, the F-105 Is adequate In that It Is a good weapons delivery aircraft and m can outrun any of the present aircraft in uae in North Vietnam. The acceleration and turning capability of the P-lOS limits i«:a use as a fighter. Fuel Is always a problem. You are either too heavy with fuel to be naneuverable or too short on fuel at fighting weight to make It back home safely. There are too many switches Involved going from ground to air attack mode and the pilot has to look in the cockpit to make the changes. BLUE 4: The switchology problem and the cockpit visibility problem In the F-IOS are not good for day fighters using guns. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE 1 and BLUE * - 15 Feb 1967. Messages^ Reports ; TAP OPREP-4 DOCO 29774 OI11526Z Dee I966 TAP DAI DIO 30926 0422502 Deo 1966 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight, on a heading of 090° {15, 00^ ft AGL, 5*10 KTAS) at the north end of Thud Ridge, sighted a flight of four MlG-17a at 5 o'clock, approximately 8 n mi south. BLUE Plight turned down Thud Ridge on a heading of approximately lilO and started a descent because of clouds ahead. The MlOa made a right turn into the flight when they passed abreast of BLUE Flight on a reciprocal heading; however, BLUE Plight continued on to the target and the NIGs broke off to the left on a heading of 320°. The HIOs were low at approximately 13,000 ft AGL, 3 to 4 n mi out. As BLUE Flight continued Inbound to the target on a heading of 130°-lH0° down Thud Ridge, they sighted another flight of KIQ-17b at 9 o'clock, 10 to 13,000 ft, passing 6 to 10 n nl to their left on a 320*^ reciprocal heading. Neither flight deviated from their course to attempt an engagement. As BLUE Flight came off of the target heading 320° at 8 to 11,000 ft AOL, 550 to 6OO KCAS, Jhey sighted a single MIG-17 at 7-8 o'clock, slightly low, range 3 n mi, on a heading of 350 . BLUE Flight speedily out-distanced the MIQ and contact was lost. BLUE Plight also sighted a flight of two Hia-21a at this time that were heading 280° preparing to land at Phuo Yen airfield. At 1734H", when BLUE Plight was on an egress heading of 210° at 30,000 ft AQL (coordinates 21 10'N/10U"i5'E), they sighted an unidentified flight of four aircraft, assumed to be HICs, who took up a position some distance behind the flight at 8 o'clock, altitude 37,000 ft ACL, This flight made a 180° departure to the left at 20 00'M/103°30'B at 1754H without any further action. Event 11-89 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-1056 vs two MI0-21s Result: Siehtlne only Vicinity of Encounter: 21«>57'N/105*18»E 1. PftlNARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SIIUATION Date/Time: H December 1966/1713H BLUE Flight (four F-lO^s) was on s strike mission against JCS 19i a railroad yard 2-1/2 n tni north of Hanoi. BLUE Flight sighted two HIG-218 40 to 50 miles northwest of the tartlet. . ' n. DATA SOURCES Wessa^eg. Renorts i 7AF, OiJlftOHZ, December 66, DOCO 29767 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Fllcht slechted tuo RIG-Sls at 21*'B7*tI/10&<>ib>E at a range of approximately 5000 ft heading northwest. Ho additional information is available. » EDITOR'S JIOTE: ^Jio route or flight for other strike aircraft against JCS 19 indicates this should be 21»^7'N or 2l''UTH. ] 307 I I I i i I I i I Event n-90 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105DS vs two KIG-ZlS Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^ZS'N/lOS'SS'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: • 5 December 1966/1012H GREEfl Four F-mSs (BLUE Flight) returning from weather reconnaissance on JCS 19.00. Plight (Ref Event 11-91). IRON HAND support, wjs approximately 9 ml Nb riy*"8 genlrally the same heading and observed HIC« near BLUE Flight. There was no HIGCAP on this mission. 2. MISSION ROUTE Aircraft were, from TAKHLI FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER v: T:.£ v.i-i:.c;' i.w^i p.:-:-Vtj t,'"'"^ i«' '^-''^ ^^'^"^ ^^^^ cncounttsr but was poor in the target area as the strike had been celled off. Altitude : Heading ; Speed : Fuel State 2^00 ACL 328" ii50 mi Unknown Unknown Flli-nt Fo mat ion ; 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE U Observed two MIG-21S at 7 o'clock, one - two miles behind flight. 6. ACTION INITIATED Engaged afterburner BLUE 1 and 2 broke right. The element broke left. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT MlGs broke off to a northerly heading proceeding over the ridge toward GREEN mght U. DATA SOURCES None Pro , )ec£ Interviews ; Message Heoorts ; DAI-0D5 0!>2317Z Dec 66, frr»rs 7AP DID 3093'« „ . 7AF OSlKllZ Dec 66, 0PREP3 DOCO 29838 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Flight was egrossing from a weather reconnaissance for JCS target 19.00, and vere heading I'fio at 2?00 AGL^ln the vicinity of 21^ 25 ' N/IOS" 35 'E. BLUE J observed two MIG-21 aircraft at the 7 o'clock pc-ltlon apprcxlr.?.tely one to two miles behind the flight. The m:G.- were In tactical formation. BLUE Flight selected afterburner ^^UE 1 JiJ BLUE 2 broke right . number 3 and k broke left. BLUE PUcht reached speed of 550 kts and observed the MIGs turn to a northerly hearting proceeding over the ridge to CREr..l Flleht (Event 11-91). No ordnance was fired by either BLUE Might or the MIGa. Blue Plight rejoined and proceeded to Yen Bay. I I Event IZ-91 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs k WIG 21a Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: ZI'S^'N/IOS'IO'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND VACTICAl SITUATION Pate/Tlme: 5 December 1967/lOlSH Pour F-1058 (GhEEN Flight )(F-105P, 3DS} IRON HAND In route package 6A Strike Plights had aborted due to weather and all aircraft were cgresslng target area. They were sup- porting BLU!: Flight (weather reconnaissance see even'c 11-90} who was paralleling their flight path on the southwest side of Thud Ridge. All aircraft flying approxlnately 315** There were no MIOCAP aircraft on this mission. Z. . MISSION ROUTE TAKKLI had departed JCS 51>10 and were egresslng on a northwest heading fron JCS 51.10 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION F-105P BLUE 1 2 - ti^O gal tanks It - CBU 2li 2 - ACM tSA (SHRIKES) P-105D. BLUE 2. 3. ^ 2 - 450 gal tanks 6 - 500 lb bombs (HK-82) All aircraft doppler and IFP on, all other avionics passive^ camouflage paint. P~105D ORHEH 1. 2. 3. t not given MIG-21 HIG 1. 2. 3. H not given - but at least one had AAN missiles. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Bad in target area, good in vicinity of encounter. GREEN 1 5 "5 IT Altitude ; 500O ft Heading ! 317 ft Speed : 500 n m — — Pucl State : — not given — - Flight r'orniiitlon ; — — not given — « 5. INITIAL DETECTION GREEN Plight was level at U500 ft flying 317* when nuraber 1 called a MIQ had fired a mlsalle at number 3- Prior to this, GREEN Pllg^it had seen MIQs In the vicinity of BLUE Plight and were watching them for a possible chance to get a pass on them. 6. ACTION INITIATED ^ Jettisoned tanks, selected afterburner and accelerated rapidly to over 600 kt. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT NlOa were not observed after GREEN Plight accelerated. 8. ORDNANCE (No. fl red/No. hits) Soviet AAM GREEN Plight - none KIO 1 or 2 1/0 nlsQcd and ran into the grouiid 10. AIRCREW COMHCtlTS Experienc e not given Event 11-91 Comment a on this Encounter ' GREEN 1 does not think the MIQs were the sane ones who were foUowlne BLUE Plight, but two different ones due to the timing. Thinics MIO mast have fired from above and missile had picked up ground clutter. U-hen they looked back MIGs were fairly close and above GREEN Plight. Not enough time had elapsed from the time the MIGs wer* last 8«en on the other side of the ridge for then to cross o«fer and fire a missile. Comments on Overall Experience There were MIO days and SAM days. 11. DATA SOURCES Pro.lect Interviews ; OREEM 1 (Lead) 8 Feb 67 Mesaaaes . Reports ; DAI-005 052317Z Dec 66 » from TAP, DIO 3093'» OPREP-3 0507192 Dec 66, from 7AP, DOCO 29821 OPREP-3 050527Z Dec 66, front 7AP, DOC 29812 12, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION GREEN Plight, during their IRON HAND mission had observed MIG-21 aircraft near BLUE Plight (Event II-90) who was on the opposite side of Thud Ridge from OREEN. were seen on the opposite side and 2 MIO-Zls were seen on the same side as OREEN. OREEN FllKht was able to intermittently keep track of the KlOs. BLUE Plight's radio trans- missions were also monitored by OREEM Plight. GREEN Plight saw MIGs cross Thud Ridge but the MIGs were far behind the flight. OREEN Plight then lost contact with the MIOs. In a very short period of time GREEN 4 called that a HIO had fired a possible AA-2 missile at GREEN 3. GREEN 4 had seen the missile go by and hit the ground. He then detected 2 MI0-21S who were in firing position at 5 to 7,000 ft altitude, at GREEN I'a 6 o'clock high, and close range. GREEN Plight Jettisoned their J15O gallon tanks and accelerated to 650 kt at low altitude. The MIOs were lost from sight during the acceleration and not seen again. 312 3 91 i 1 \ i 0 % % 1 I I I I I i I Event Aircraft Involved: Three P-105D» va one MIO-17 Result*: No danage Vlcinltr of Encounter: 21»13'N/105»51'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAl SITUATION Datc/Tlnc: 5 Decemher 1966/1530H base, leavlnc three aircraft. . 2. MISSION ROUTE Not giver, but BLUE Flight was from Takhll. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F.'OSD BU-E 1. 2. 3 Undetermined number of CBU Z«»8; QRC-160 pod MIC-17 Silver color <. FLIGHT COHOITIOKS PRIOR TO ENCOUHTtR Weather ; Solid undercast, undetermined level. BLUE 1. 2. 3 Mtltude; Speed : Fuel State: 6-7,000 ft 340*' 1150 kt unknown Fllrht Formation ; „,mf 1 BLUE 3 1500-2000ft line abreast BLUE 2, 500- 1000 ??°o:?TnS'S?^oi? n;iinSei:t!'"lLiE 3'S» In lll'urt Of BLUE 1. BLUE 2 on the right. S INITIAL DITCC'IOK , . ^- Ir a left turn, BLUE 3 observed one KIO at about - o'clock, very high, coming out of the north, and called this to the flight. 6. ACTION INITIATED „ ^* mao Has not seen again. 8. ORDNANCE None expended. 9. rquiPNENT PROBLEHS BLUE 2 lost UrlF redlo during the flight. BLUE ft aborted on the tanker for unknown reasons. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total Hours P-105 Hours Combat Wlaslons BLUE 2 BLUE 3 — Not given - Not given - 3* Remarks Plew for 6 years; flew P-101 In TAC * ADC; came direct to SEA from P-105 school. Comments on this E ncounter None r»mrit-n ta from Overal l Experience i-k. p RA The 313 "* Event ZI-92 nose e«ar steering button to ellmlfwto tbo bomb function of tht gun sight to bring It back to an alr-to-ftir alght. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Intervlewa ; BLUE 2-16 Mar £7 BUm 3 - 16 Nar 67 WeasaKas. Rap&rts ! OPREP-3, 051H1Z Deo 66, from 7AP. DOCO Z9636 DAI.005. 092317Z Dec 66, from 7AP, DIO 3093* U. NARRATIVE OtSCRIPTION BLUE Plight who had be<:n fragged on Target JCS 19, were In a left turn at 6-7,000 ft, *50 kts after expending CBU-24a. They here turning back, becauae of bad weather on the target area. Aa they passed almoat over JCS Target 51.10 turning through about B^O*, BLUE 3 obaerved a single HIG-17 at 4 o'clock high about 2 to 3 miles away. BLUE Plight selected afterburner, broke to the left and jettisoned their 430 gal tanks b-it retained their re-> malnlng CBU-24. They rolled out on a heading of 270*-310*' and accelerated to 600 kts. The HXG now at. 6 o'clock and two miles In range was unable to close on BLUE Plight as they eon- clnued northwest to drop the ordnance on a target of opportunity. The MXO-17 although lined up on a firing pass fell behind and waver, he saw the tanks leave BLUE 1 and he did likewise. BLIT. ?. then looked over his shoulder to the right and obaerved a single M70-17* starting down from two nllea out and making a pass on the flight. 3l« Event 11-93 Aircraft Involved: Two F-105F8, two P-105D8 w. four MIG*2is Result: No dBmage Vicinity of Encounter: 2X«25'N/X05*35'E I. PRIHART MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlate: 5 December 1966/1630H Four P-1053 on IRON HAND mission In Route- Package VI -A. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; unknown BLUE 1, 2, 3* 1 Altitude ; 7,000 ft Heading : HO' ^^^T^Zi^ not plven Fuel "State : not given Plight , Formation not given 5. INITIAL DETECTION Four inG-21s observed In BLUE Plight's 2 o'clock position. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Flight selected afterburner. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUi: Flight out-accelerated the MICs, B. ORDNANCE none expended 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ! BLUE 3. 16 Mar 67 Messaccs', Reports T TAP DIA-005 052317Z Dec 66 DIG 30931 TAP 051t) Post Strike Refuel. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGUHATIONS F-105 BLUE 1 . 2 Not elven F-105D BLUE >* 2 - ttSO gal, external tanks 2 - CBU-24S F-}.05D BLUE 3 Ordnance net given. Doppler and TACAN on, radar off, IFF standby, camouflage paint on all aircraft. KIO-17 KIR 1. 2 Drop tanks on. Paint not given. 4. FLIGHT COKCITIONS PRIOR TO £NCOUKT£R Weathbr ; Clear and 10 miles visibility. BLUE 1. 2. 3> ft A ltitude ; : 0,000 ft Heading : 090 Speed : ItJO KTS Fuel State ; Not given Plight Formation ; BLUE 2 on left; BLUE 3 and * on right. 5. INITIAL DETECTION Rcceijved MIG warnings earlle'r'but not for this area. BLUE Plight was turning right when BLUE 3 called MICs at BLUE 6 o'clock. BLUE 3'3 transmission was blocked by BLUE 4 saying he was hit approximately 1651 local tine. 6. ACTION IMITIATEO BLUE 1 and 2 turned 180*^ Jettisoning stores and egressed the area. BLUE 3 and 4 turned right. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT ThehlGs over&hot che formation and started a climbing left turn. BLUE 3 maneuvered to their 6 o'clock position but BLUE 3's gun would not fire. BLUE Comaents rn this Encounter The first time BLUE i has had a gun that wouldn't fire. BLUE 3 would rather use the electrical caged sight than try to get a radar lock-on. Cojinents from Overall Experience It 13 not hard to fire the AIN-9 inadvertently during a bonb run because of the sultchology In the F-105. Poor turning rate and visibility of P-IOS. KIO pilots not very well trained. They should shoot down more aircraft but they don't seen to take advantage of the situation. They don't seem very aggressive. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE 3 (17 Feb 67) Messages. Heports : DAI'005 052317Z Dsc 66, from 7AF DIG 30931 OPREP-3 O52310Z Dec 66, from 7AP DOCO 29868 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was on an IRON HAND mission in Route Package VI A. They were making a right hand turn, heading about east. The Plight received a MIO warning at 1651K (about one minute prior to the encounter) but the MIGs were not Identified with the ai*ea of BLUE Plight. At 1652H two HIG'-lTs attacked from the direction of the sun, high and at BLUB Flight's 6 o'clock. The MIGs were not observed until they were close to BLUE Plight. BLUE 3 was looking back to check on BLUE >> , who was 500 to 600 feet behind and sliding around the turn, when he (BLUE 3) saw two MI0-17s. one of which was firing at BLUE 4. The closest HIO when seen, was 1000-2000 feet away with the second HIO about 1000 feet behind :he first in trail. BLUE 3 called for BLUE 1 to break but his transmission was blocked by BLUE ^I's eoomiunleation that he was hit. BLUE h while hit, continued a right turn and headed SV tOHard the Red River. BLUE 1 and 2 jettisoned their external stores and ordnance, and broke right and down in afterburner. After completing a l80 turn, egressed the area. BLUE 1 and 2 did not see the MIGs. BLUE 3 saw BLUE 4 take some cannon hits. BLUE 4 started to shed a few pieces, the drag chute .came out and part of his tall came off. At this tine both HIOs overshot BLUE 3 and 4 and one went Into a climbing left turn in front of BLUE 3, 500 to 1000 feet away. BLUE 3 was set up for "mlsslles-air" sight- node which gave fixed range computation. As the MIG passed in front BLUE 3 tracked the MIG and squeezed the trigger several times but the gun did not fire, due to an inoperative g\in control box. [The practice of clearing gun after take off had been diecontlnued due to malfunctions after the short clearing burst]. At firing attempt the MIG was at 12 o'clock and BLUE 4 was at the MIG's 3 o'clock and both were nose up. Event 12-91 BLUE 3 continued his right turn and Jettisoned stores. BLUE 3 sighted BLUE i) , who was burning from the side, and heard BLUE <( make several calls that he haa control of the airplane but was losing power. BLUE k crashed on a wooded hill in the vicinity of 21 35*N/10S''o6'E short of Lhe Red River at 16;>7H. Ho chute was seen or beeper heard. While following BLUE 4 out BLUE 3 observed In his mirror a KZO at his 7 to 7:30 position 3-4000 feet away, closing and firins at BLUE 3. BLUE 3 does not know whether this was one of tne orl(;lnal two HIGs or not. BLUE 3 then went to afterburner and aeeel* erated away from the KIC, losing hln. BLUE 3 passed BLUE It during the acceleration but observed BLUE 4 crash and later Joined BLUE 1 and 2 about 30 nlles south of the location of BLUE It's crash. I I i I i I i 319 REP ihm gvEHT n-9# $wnhKi Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. S. «) Other Friendly Comnurilcatlons Enemy Actions (MIG 1.2) Remarks Tint Nark StatHi Action ^0 BLUE night 10000 ft 450 kts B-4 2XCBU-24 B*1.2,3 no PATA Turning right, 6-2 left wing eleaent on right wing, e-4 is hit by cannon fire froa NI'j-17. 6-3 called MIG 6 o'clock; trans- ■lislon was blocked by B-4 saying he was hit. 2 PIIG-17 2000 ft behind B-4 and shooting; NIG-1 2000 ft back; KIG-2 In trail 1000 ft. MIGs apparently cane In from above and behind. Mere not seen until they started shooting. B-4's aircraft was coming apart. Part of the tall came off end the drag chute cane out. BLUE Flight Jtttltof storti; B-4 air- craft danage losing power} B-3 2g turn 400 ktt. 61 end 2 turned 180* and departed area; 6-4 turned right toward Red River; B-3 naneuvered behind the MI6s, who ovei shot In a left climbing turn. B-3 attempted to fire on NI6s. >_ B-4 made calls that he had control of the aircraft but was losing power. HIGs overshot 6-3, 4 and climbed to the left with B-3 behind then. When the HIGs overshot the for- natlon B-3 was 500 ft behind them. B-3 attemp- ted to fire cannon, but It would not ftre. e-l. 2 turned toward the ■ted River but direction of turn Is unknown. They did not see the M t r a HI bS • Sana B-3 cannon fnopera- tlvt; B-4 aircraft on fire. B-3 turned back to Join B-4 Mho was flying toward the Red River. B-1» 2 egressing the aree. B-4 still had control of aircraft but losing power - thinks he can aake the Red River. HIG 1, 2 turned back toward 6-3, 4; they closed the distance and fired cannon at B-3. B-3 after deter- mining that the cannon would not fire turned back to Join B-4. The HIGs turned back behind hin on an attempt to fire on B-3 j'-orlng zero hi tj. h Saiaot B-4 eraihed. 6-3 In afterburner accelerating away froa HIGs. At 1.1 Mach B-3 returned B-1»2 30 al. S. B-4 crashed Into hit. 8-1,2 agrekslng. HIG 1 ,2 were unable to keep wItMn can- non range area. 6-3 went afterburner and broke off. B-3 passed by B-4 and saw hin crash Into a wooded h11 1 - did not see a chute or hear a beeper. Event 11-95 Aircraft Involved; Pour F-lO^s vs eight unidentified aircraft Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21*50'N/10<»no«E/ 21»32'N/10*»20'E 1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time; 5 December 1966/16^5* 1710H Four P-1058 (BLUK Plight) on a strike mission to JCS Target 51.10 in Route Package VI<-A. They were 2nd or 3rd in a group of five flights. 10. AIRCREW COHMENTS Experience Total F-105 Combat Hours Hours Mlaslons Remarks BLUE 1 2800 a75 Not f;lven P-8Ua Gunner School In 1955 (No other rieured time prior to F-105 BTU. October 1966) Commenta on this Encounter .'lone Comments from over-all Experience If MiGs are observe'd soon enough it Is possible to continue on into the target area at a fast enough speed to keep out of firing range. If the tanks are Jettisoned. tht KIGs will generally break off the attack If the tanks are Jettisoned as the HIG will have trouble closing above 550 kt. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE tl6 February 1967) Messages; 7AP OPREP-3 06C013P NDEC66 DCOCO 29870 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUF Pllj^ht observed two unidentified a5rcrBft while flying at 17000 ft on a heading of 025*, position 21»50' N/10'<°'«0' E. Unidentified aircraft were at 14,000 ft on a southeasterly headlnc and passed In front of BLUE Flight 5 n ml distant, turned south and departed. Tlne"was 1655H. At 1710H BLUE Flight again observed two unidentified aircraft. BLUE Flight was at 21" 32* /Id' 25 ' , 18,000 feet altitude heading 200*. The unidentified aircraft were on a reclproc*! heading at 25i000 ft and continued on course. BLUE Flight, were about halfway down Thud Rldge^ heading southeast toward JCS 51.10 at 14,000 feet. BLUE 4 saw and called MICs to the south at 2 o'clock three to five miles away. The HIQs were heading northwest and two flights of four were seen. [Note: In his Interview, BLUE 4 only recalled the last sighting in the narrative]. ••^ • Event 11-96 Aircraft Involved: Bight P-1058 ys at leaat eight HZO-Zls* Resulta: No losses due to encounter (one P-105 lost I probably due to AAA) vicinity of Encounter: 21*33'M/105*33*E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/TiRie: 6 December 19'>6/1615H At least four flights of four F«105s each striking JCS Target 19. BtUE Pll^t (Strike Cocunander as Lead) and GRKEM Plight were the only ones who reported NIQ encounters. 2. MISSION ROUTE Launched from Takhll, refueled Inbound and outbound, approach to target was down Thud Ridge. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION V-lOb bLUiL 1, I, 2m ^ 5 - CBU-ZUs 2 - 'tSO-gal external tanka Camouflage paint 1 - QRC-160 pod P-IOS GREEN 1. 2. 3. 1 6 - 750-lb bombs 2 . iJ50-Bal external tanks 1 - QRC-160 pod Camouflcge paint Doppler on, radars standby, TACAN and IFF off. MIG-21 Missiles (Atoll) One MIQ sray camouflage paint, all others silver 4. FLIGHT CONOITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Vwavher: 1500 ft overcast, visibility unknown. BLUE J 5 5 q- Altitude ; • 12,000 ft Heading: 133'> ^peed : 550 kt y^uei . State ; 10,000 lb PllKht Formation ; Pod fomatlon with element on the left in BLUB Pllfcttt, 2-3,000 ft between elements and about 1.000 ft wlngman separation. QREEN Fllgnt about two miles behind and offset to the right. 5. INITIAL OETECTION Plight was inbound to the target and at least halfway down Thud Ridge. QREBN Plight called out two HIGs at 6 o'clock to BLUE Plight. MIGs were almultaneously In pairs attacking BLUE and GREEN Plights. MIQs were at 2-5 mile range when first sighted. (. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight Initially Jettisoned tanks; later broke to right and Jettisoned CBUa In the turn, went afterburner. GREEN Plight continued toward target, spotted MIGs on their own tall. Jettisoned tanks, then oninance, went afterburner and broke to right. GREEN 2 delayed slightly In the break aa GREEN 3 and 4 broke past hlro, then he dropped bombs and broke. 7. SITUATION oeVELOPHEHT One MIC fired a mlaslle at QREEN 2 which missed. MIG 1 fired 2 Atoll tnlBsiles at BLUE 3 which detonated 1,000 ft behind BLUE 3. BLUE 1 and 2 continued their turn toward HlOa chasing GREEN Plight and the MIGs broke off and went Into the overcast. GREEN Plight continued right turn to attack MIGs chasing BLUE 3 ar.d 4, these MIQa broke off into the overcast also. GREEN I 5 T 11,000 ft 133» 550 kt 10,000 lb 'Reports also indicated encounter of 2 Mia-17s by CRfEN Plight but this did not speci- fically appear In the interview data. These could have been the MIGs attended to by 04. Evant 11-96 6. tlONMCC (Ho. ftMd/No. Mts) SoTlat AAN (Probaoly AA-2} NIO 3 2/0 NIQ 5 1/0 Hwiarke Detonated 1,000 ft behind BLUE 3 - no danage. Plred at QREEH 2, no damage. 9. COUIPME^i' PROBLEMS BLUE 3 - Radio Inoperative, could not b« contacted. 10. AIRCREM CONHEMTS Eiperlence Total ?-lD5 Houra Hours BLOg X 5500 200 Receiver may have been working. Combat Bleslona 30 2750 750 35 80 Remark B Plew all fighters from P-l»7 through P-106 except F-g't - led THUNDBRBIRDS for three yefcra. Inatruetor FWS Nellia APB. Flew 114 Bisalona and had HIO encounter In Korea (P*60, P-84). Fighter Weapons School, P-XOO, P-105. P-81b TAC 6 yecrs. P-101 In TAC, ADC. P-105 since March 1966. BLQg 2 BLUB H aVEBM 2 Comiwmta on Thla Encounter ^ " seemed very well organlred, coordinating their nan-uv*™ .r Z ^t^S shades of Navy grey, scalloped In lines from nose to tall *«tP««lil» flcult to pick out against a cloud background. This MIC hv h?m«.ii i-5 .r^T^i'* i" directing the reat. Looked like the mI^IS^ RuiJJan £AS"n^^r«S^" ^ BeUved KIOs were out of range when they fired at BLUE 3. Did not think Conmenta from Overall Experience an aiS^i^;: *ff ■•ttlnga to change to go from a bombing mode to an alr-to-alr node. Likes the QRC-160, seems to be effective if used orooePl» Sauid in r^ SJTi^^JJii'*^ '° "5^^ ^ alr-to-alr mlssJli JaiJwwS.*"??: Sloti S"lng i?J!r^«J 5fS4iI^.°i^*f adapting to the mission very well. The young meS liS£ ; SaSJeJ JiS.JoS°«in*h??.^° ^'"'^ It'''' ^•'•^ the best wlngSenr P^lSI ■ ?S •»»*I>»i|«* capability, something you don't have to track a long tine The BLUE 2 - Would like to oarry the AIM-9. Believes fighters should have two enginea. There la no need for a two-pilot fighter. Future fighters need better visibility to the rear than the P-105. SLOB % - F-105 does a very good Job as a strike fighter. It does an outstanding Job in this typ* envlroniDent. However, It is really not an alr-to>alr fighter. 2-1 big problem is In the switch changes to change alght settings. In other aircraft, when you punch the electrical cage button, you get a caged sight. In the F-105, you have to change two switches to get the sight change plus hit the electrical cage and this cannot be done without distracting your eyes from outside the aircraft. If you could hit a button, get the sight to Jump Into cage position, hit the button again and have the sight go back to the previous mil setting you wouldn't have to switch your eyea Into the cockpit. The alr-to-alr radar lock-on warning device in the P-105 l» cut off because the other aembers of the flight have their own radar on. It Interferes with your vector, and it's ■ore of a dlatrartlon than an aid. I suggest we put in a change that will strobe In the direction of a OCI radar locked onto the flight. i»omethlng a little extra to go along with this would be separate little black box in the rear of the aircraft that will detect any radar algnals from any -un radar likely to be carried in an aircraft, that will liluBinate a separate lig; or other device on the panel near the canopy line to catch your eye while looking ou-:..da the aircraft. QREEN « - The best flying Job In the world today Is flying Mia-21s out of Phuc Yen. Their advantagea on us are that they have turning radlua, vlalbllity, and a hlgh- 'perfanuuie* airplane that can aoeelerate real weji. I I I t Event 11-96 The thlnss In th& F-105 that limit us are the turning radius, a result of too much airplane. An air-to-air conbat is still a turning game - the airplane that turns has the. advanJSee In ?he future we need a big power plant, an airplane that can t"^" ^"J,, J'J^ SnS Scce?;rat? well and that can carry ordnance all the way from short to several miles range Also both high and low altitude capabilities at the same time. 11, DATA SOURCES ppolect Interviews; BLUE 1 (Lead - BLUE 2 ■ - BLUE l» GREEN 2 CREEtl t 6 Feb 67 2 Feb 67 16 Mar 67 5 Feb 67 15 Mar 67 Ke ssaees. Reoerta : 7AF OBlO'iSZ DOCO 30009 Dec 66 7AF 03l3U|jZ DOCC 30018 Dec 06 7AF DIO 30961 Dec 66. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Flieht was the lead flight and PLUE 1 the "l = slon Cor.mander for a on JCS Target 19. Thev were flylns down the ridge line at 21"33'yi05^33'E heading 133 , 12.000 ft ind about 350 V.t In pod fortnatlon. GREEN Plight was a few miles behind them going to the sane tar-et GRE^N ^'lUnt observed four KIG-21a attacking simultaneously in pairs, JSo S!S!25rin OREElff igit and two MIC-21. on BLUE Flight The MICs were called out and BLUE and OKEEN Flights jettisoned the HSO-gal tanks in an effort to increase airspeed in order to get to tht target. However, BLUE n observed the MIGs to be clo3l"5 f^^^^^. °^ 5 o'clocic BLUE 1 called for a right turn and then to Jettison the of^nance through a hole in the undercast. Sor.ewhere during this tur.n or ^''^"t t5K-,''p?!.hJ*^ ?hi SsaUea V.IGS fired two AAMa at BLUE 3. ^he firing was observed by GRLL.J Flight. The talsslies detonatH aSJut 1 000 ft behind SLUE 3, GREEN Pllpht =aUed out the firing about the sanie tine BLUE U saw a m:g-21 pop out of the undereast behind GEibN Flight. BLUE called out the MIC. At- about this saice time GREEN Flight saw two MIGs approaching them and dropped tanks; the HICs dlsensa^fld. GREEM nicr.t saw other MICs and lead called J°^^J"PPi"S • afterburners, and a RTCHT break. As GREEN 3 and ^ crossed behind GHEEN 2, GREEN J tOid OREE;i 2 to hold his fiorr.bs to avoid collision. GREEN 2 held mo,7;entarily, then plcklett, then broke. Just as he broke, slightly behind the others, MIG 5 launched a missile at • CHEEM 2 which [T.issed. BLUE 1 and 2 turned Into the MIO «»>o was attacking GREEN Flight. When the HIC saw BLUE 1 and 2 turninE irto him. he broke off. Meanwhile BLUE 3 turned to the west. At this tine BLUE 5 had UHF transmitter trouble, because no tra..s- missions were heard from him. BLUE 3 broke left and down through a hole In the undereast and Jettisoned his MER. BLUE 0 also Jettisoned his MLR and followed BLUE 3, flyi-"6 * normal flcl>Ung wing- BLUE told BLUE 3 that he was at BLUE 3' s ^ o'cjo^"* P^i^Jon*,..!! because BLUE 3 n:ay have mistaken BLUE U to be a MIG. BLUE 3 did not acknowledge f-he call, but did discontinue the hard left turn and continued normal Jinking while heading west, below the overcast. B3 was supersonic. BLUE «i moved up and flew In his 9 °' « tion maintaining enough lateral separation to clear the 6 o'clock PO»J"°"- . J^^" una'Jle to keep in- visual contact with BLUE 3. They were flyi"B into the afternoon sun which was reflecting off the rice paddles. BLUE 4 lost sight of BLUE 3 when they flew into this area of gi?re. They passed through the Blare at supersonic 8P«<>». fHj f*^/ was unable to pick up BLUE 3 again. About this time BLUE J heard • «P«'-ug^i"|j,* "J* up an orbit west of the Red River and alerted rescue. During the egress BLUE « observed some 37mm flak but had no indication BLUE 3 had been hit. After the MIGs disengaged from GREEN PllKht , BLUE 1 observed a lone camouflaged HIC-21 dive past BLUE 1 and 2, at a hlc;h rate of speed, through the same hole BLUE 3 and * had flown. BLUE 1. not being sure where BLUE 3 and 6 were called, "Two F-1058 who Just went into the hcle In the clouds, you have a MIO on your t-^^^ ' „^ of here". BLUE 1 and 2 followed the MTG. The same MIG then popped back up on top making a 90° left climbing turn. GREEN Flight unloaded and tgressed to the northwest. BLUE 1 and 2 turned toward the MIG, who turned 130«> and went back Into the clouds on a ««terly heading. BLUE 1 and 2 cgressed the area and Joined BLUE and then returned to base. I 327 ififni III - -^-------^^^^■-^^^'^^-^^^^'^^-^^ " - '-^^ - - -• ■-■ -■■^ - y ^ Event 11-97 Aircraft Involved: ?our F-105a vb one MI 0-21 Result: Sishttng only Vicinity of Encounter: ai'SS'N/lOS^ZO'E 1. PRIMARY Mission AMD TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 13 Deceniber 1966/I6IOH Brown Flight (4 F-IO53) were on an Iron Hand mission scheduled to operate up and down the east side of Thud Ridge. Concurrently there waa a strike on JCS-19-00 which encountered nueierous MIGa. (See Event 11-98)* 2. MISSION ROUTE Korat. Red Anchor, vicinity Zl'SS'M/lOl'SS'E, vicinity 21«50'N/105«»2O'E to 21»25*M/ lOS^HO'E to 21"'03*M/10*l'''»3'E, Red Anchor to Base. P-ICSD Bi'own 2 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-105P Brown 1 2 AOM ^5 2 AQM J>5 2 CBU-21 2 CBU-24 2 Wins tanks 2 Wing tanks Ho QRC-160^ 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Scattered low clouds becoming overcast In the east, the weather as poor. 6 500 lb bombs 2 Vlng tanks Pilot Interview rated Altitude: Heading ;' Spee d ! Puel State: BLUE FUOHT 12,000 feet 220* 525 kts Unknown 5. 6. 7. 8. See Narrative Description 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS Brown 2 had l/CBU-2ll that would not jettison. 10. AIRCREU COMMENTS Experience Tot Houra Brown Brown 11 3500 P-105 Hours 1100 CMBT Missions approx. 65 Remarks All time In single engine jet DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; Brown 3-16 February 1967 Messages. Reports, etc . TAP 1322052 0PREP3 TAP 1316I6Z 0PREP1 TAP 1322312 DOCO30317 DOCO30309 CIO 30996 December 1966 December I966 December 1966 12, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Brown flight - an Iron Kand fllpht-was In spread formation making a right turn when a MIC-21 passed through the formation. The MIG came through at a high angle off in a right climbing turn from ^ o'clock toward 10 o'clock at an estimated airspeed of 500 kts. The NIG-21 then made a descending turn back toward the flight. At this point Brown 2 and 4 jettisoned their ordnance (number 2 had a CBU-21 thit would not jettison) and Brown flight made a max power right descending turn to heading 330 and out ran the MIOs. IPllot reported that S£M pod was not carried, 0X0 messaga indicated that flight was QRC equipped. Event 11-98 Aircraft Involved: 16 P-105D8 vs numerous MIO-Zls and MIG-17S Result : No daJnage Vicinity of Encounter: See (1) below 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 13 December 1966/1600-1620K The flights were a strike force briefed to hit JCS 19.00 (Yen Vlen RR Classification yard). There were 5 individual encounters, as listed below: Vicinity of Encounter it F-105D3 V8 2 MIG-21S 20"55'N/105*37'E H P-105D3 vs it HIO-218 _ » k k MI0-17S Sl^SS'M/lOS'ZS'E 1 F-105Da vs 2 KIG-21a ^ ^ , 4 3 HIO-178 2055N/105'25E (H-17) H P-105DS vs 2 HlO-218 gl-SZN/XOS'^O 'E * P-105DS vs 2 MIC-21S 20'55N/105*37E BLUE. CREEir. YELLOW, and ORANGE Plights constituted the force of four strike flights proceeding to th? target. They wore preceded by PURPLE Plight (^,P-i05Ds) which was in a flak suppression role. PURPLE did not see any vaOs, but PURPLE 3 was downed by a SAM prior to the MIC -ncounters. BPOWH Plight was on an IHON HAflD mission In the target area (see Event 11-97 for details of BHOWN's MIG encounter). 2. MISSION ROUTE Plights departed Korat , Thailvid, refueled, proceeded via Channel 97 TACAH and then down east side of Thud Ridge to the target. (Part 1) (Part 2} BLUE Plight GREEN Plight (Part 3} YELLOW Plight (Part i» (Pfcrt 5) ORANGE Plight BLUE Plight 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION P-105D BLUE 1,2,3." YELLOW 1.2,3»^ 6 2 1 GREEN 1.2,3,0 ORANGE 1.2.3.t 750 lb bombs 450 Rallon wing tanks QKC-160 ECH pod Camouflage paint NIG>21 Silver color Missile equipped 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Scattered clouds west of target and over target, overcast east of Hanoi. Vlsibility->good. Part 1 Part 2 Part..! Part 0 Part ? BLUE GREEN YELLOW ORANOE BLUE 1.2.3,1 1.2.3,0 1.2,3,0 1,2,3,0 1.2.3,0 14,000 ft 12-16 ,000 16,000 ft 16,000 ft 16,000 ft ft 26O'»-270» 138» 135* 135' 530 kts 5tO kts S'lO kts 600 kts less than est . full 10,000 lb internal Altitude s Heading : Speed : Puel State; Plight Portnatlon ; Plights ware In pod formation. 5. INITIAL DETECTION Part 1: While inbound, BLUE «! saw 2 MIG-218 pass at 3 o'-slock with opposite heading to mght. Part 2 ; ORKEH flight sighted 0 ^Q0-21s at 11 o'clock and 0 NlC-178 at 1 o'clock at an approximate range of six n ml with opposite heading to flight. Part 3 : YKLLOW 3 sighted MIGS, approximate range of 3 1/2 to 0 n mi heading of 2/0* approximately co-altltude, quurterln? on YELLOW Plifcht. MIOS turned and ended up approximately 6 n ml In trail of flight. After leaving target, YELLOW 3 saw group of probable HIQ-L78 orbiting beloti and turning towards Hanoi. Event 11-98 Part 0 : ORANCE Pllgnt algiited 2 M1Q-21S on a reciprocal heading about 3-* n nl omet, tiiey tu rned l80« and ended up approxlnately 3 n ml In trail of cranOE Plight. Part 5 ; After pulling off target. BLUE 1 (L) sighted 2 MIO-SIb at 5 ,000 ft heading 90* f?^l8 10 O'clock position at a range eatlmated to be approximately 3 n ml. 8. ORMANCL EKPCNOEO AAM 175 Cannon mo-i KXC-2 2/0 No alr-to-alr ordnanee Mas expended by U.S. flislits. 10. AIRCRCU COHNENTS Experience ; Remarks Hlaaed. detonated 300-100 ft behind ORANCE 1 and 3 Pired 2 bursta» both missed. Total hours 7-105 hours Combat Missions Remarks 1150 750 Unknown All TAG fighter background Unknom) 63 All TAC fighter background 3700 130 20 Mostly ADC experience 1200 160 30 All but P-105 tlBB is KC-135 and student tine 3700 1500 13 4300 100 15 BLUE 1 BLUE 4 GREEN 3 GREEN < TELLOU 3 ORANGE 3 Cocmenta on this Encounter ; BLUE (Part 5) was surprised that the MIO-21 would attack because of altitude advantage (approximate 10,000 ft) of P-105. Q ppFM ant. zed at nsaneuverablllty of HIG-21. ' Comnents from Overall Experience ; BLUE 1 felt that aircraft aodlf ications (e.g.. SAFETY PACK II, Ca.aera8, Vector Gear, etc.) bad compromised aircraft capability by Increasing drag. YELLOW 3 felt that P-IOS was an excellent airplane for the Job due to Its superior airspeed capability and because of Its ruggedness. Switching from air-to-ground to air-to-air mode Is too conplieated, should be able to d3 this with a single switch. QRC-160 switches and indicator ll^ts are In an inconvenient position. ORAHQE 2. The only maneuver for the P-X05 against the KIO-21 is to head for the deck in maxim > power. The P-105 cannot out-tum or out-ellnb the KIQ-21. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interview ; BLUE 1 BLOB « ORANGE ORANGE 16 February 1967, 18 February 1967, 15 February 1967 » 4 February 1967 • Neaeaaea. Reports t TAP OPlffiP-3 , 7AF 7AF 7AP 7AF TAP TAP TAP OPREP-H, m I Intell.* BsBsagei 130925Z. 131628Z, 132205Z, I316I62, 1316512, I3I6SIZ. 132231Z. 1512152, DOCO-30291, DO CO- 30307, DOCO-30317, DOCO-30309, DOCO-30310, DOCO-30311, DIO-30996 , 0X0-3 1005 f GREEN 3 GREEN 4 lELLOW 1 TELLCH 3 Deeeaber 1966 15 February 1967 « 15 February 196T* letter, 18 February 1967 > SECRET m (X}NFZDENTIAL H M SECHBT/NOFORH i I I I I 1 I I Bv«nt II-9S U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION This event represented the second time since 2 December 1966 that there was an integration of SAHs and laCs In the NVN Air Defense systeci. ' Between 1606H and l62kH in approximately an 18x26 n ml rectangular area WSW of Hanoi, the following activity was i-oported: 6 KIC-213, 9 MlG-lTs , 17 SAYs fired, four AAA reactions, 16 F-1053 anJ 19 Navy aircraft. One K-105 was dr>wned by a SAM (PURPLE 3) and 3 Navy aircraft were hit by SAKs. The P-1053 were reported egresslng at between 15-16.000 ft, KICs were reported at 6,000 ft, 9,000 ft, and 7.8,000 ft. SAKs were sighted before and during MIG activity by BLUE, GREEN, and YELLOW flights . BLUE, GREEN, YELLOW and ORANGE Plights were flying In a group forrnatlon proceeding to the assigned target {JCS 19.00 Yen Vlen Railroad Classification Yard). BLUE Plight wRs the lead flight followed by GREEN' and YELLOW with ORAIJCE Plight being the trailing night. YELLOW Flight was to the left of GREEN Plight. In case of MIG attack, ORANGE Plight was to drop ordnance and screen the rear of the strike force. Part 1 ; While inbound to the target BLUE Plight spotted two MICs approximately 10,000 ft below thea flying in opposite heading to the flight. They were seen at 3 o* clock and were then observed to turn oehlnd the last fli^t (ORANGE Plight). The strike force had already Jettisoned Khelr tanks prior to going Into the target. Part 2 : GREEM Flight was about halfway down Thud Ridge, inbound to the target, when GREEN k sighted it MlC-21s at 11 o'clock on a reciprocal heading and offset about 6 n ml. GREEN 2 sighted 1 MIG-173 at 1 o'clock very low. Identification was readily made due to the delta wings and silver color of the airplane. The MIC-lTs pressed on without attacking anyone. The MIG-21s started on a left turn to attack the trailing flight behind GREEN. GRKEN Flight was not engaged by MIGs and struck the target as briefed. Part 3 : YELLOW Flight sighted 2 MIG-213 at 1 o'clock on a westerly heading. At the time, YELLOW Plight was on a heading of a 135°, and approxlr.ately 15 miles from the target area. As the MIGs passed YELLOW'S 3 o'clock position they started to turn in. YELLOW Plight did not take any evasive action and shortly thereafter YELLOW 4 called out the MIGs apprsxinately six miles In trail. The KICs were positively Identified by their silver color. Y'iLLOW Plight then rolled Into the target In almost a spllt-S naneuver her.dlnc glrtcst west. In the pulJout fror. the target , YELLOW *i had becone separated from the rest of the flight, and shortly thereafter, he (YELLOW U) called out that he had two MIG-213 on him and that he was cleanln; off the racks and Rcceleratlng out. YELLOW ft exited to the west at Kr.ch 1.3 at about 5,000 ft and successfully outran the KICs. Njeanwhlle the remainder of YELLOW Plight climbed out together at Kach 1.15 also exiting to the west. Gn the way out they saw numerous SAHs in the area as well as numerous KI0-17s orbiting low, none of *.'hlch pursued YELLOW Plight. They also saw the MIGs that were chasing YELLOW give up and turn back towards their -^j^ home base. Nuirjber 1 rejoined the flight over Laos. .5 Part ORANGE Flight was about halfway down Thud Ridge when 2 MI0-21s approached on a reciprocal heading, displaced approximately thi*ee miles to the right of the Flight. The KICs executed a right 180** turn to fall In trail approximately three miles behind ORANGE Plight. The KICs closed rapidly In loose formation and at a range of about a half-mile* one MIG (the one on the right) lined up between ORANGE 1 and 3* and launched an air-to-air missile. At the tine, ORAKGE Plight was in pod formation with the second element on the .left. GRANGE li saw the missile being launched and called for a right break. All aircraft In ORANGE Flight Jettisoned their tanks and ordnance before and during the break which was dov;n an6 to the right. ORA.^IGE 4 observed the enemy missile explode approximately 300 to »IC0 ft behind #3. The second KIG, which was on the left wing of the first one, pressed In on ORAMGE << and fired his cannon as ORANGE >( forced him to overshoot. KIO 1 followed up his ml&slle attack by firing his cannon at ORANGE i|. ORAt.'GE 1 in maximum power executed a 160° turn down to the cloud tops. MIG 1 Btarted to follow and then stopped about two-thirds of the way around the I80' break as ORAtiOE Plight was moving back into defensive formation. At this point ORANGE 3 called out a KIG crossing from left to right In his 6 o'clock position. All members of the riisht then lost sight of this KXG. In the meantinc^, another MIG closed In on ORAtiCE 4 in his 7 o'clock position, snapped off a burst and then broke away. This NIG was seen by ORANGE 3 before it fired &t ORA.\'CE ^i; however, it wus originally ml s Identified as a friendly aircraft. When ORAI.'GE 3 ivalized that it was a MIO It was too late to call a break. Two PiIGs continued to shadow the flight until egress from Route Package VI. Part 5 ; After pulling off the target 3L0E Pllf^it saw 2 MIG-21S on a reciprocal 1 heading below them at 5,000 ft. They were sighted In BLUE*s 10 o'clock position at ^ a range of about 3 miles . As the MIGs passed abeam of BLUE Plight they attempted to c."- rndelle up to then. However, they were too far away and too low to be able to co-plete the attack so the MIGs broke off and headect back towards Hanoi. BLUE Flight recovered without engaging any MIG aircraft. Source: DIO 31005, December 1966 (see Item 11) SECRET/NOPORN. 333 NOfORN I Event ZZ-99 Aircraft Involved: Four P-IOSD vb at leMt six MX 0-2 la Result: One P-IOSD lost Vicinity of Encounter: 2l»05'»/105*55*B. 1. PRIMARY mSSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 11 December 1966/162SH Four F-105D (BLUE Plight) aircraft were on a strike mission. The flight was par>-of"i total force attacking JCS 19.00 (2l'05'25"N/l05»55'15''E) . Plights originating from.*Takhll were to strike the target first followed by those from Korat. The IRON HAND Pllg^its (Events 11-103 and II-IQIJ) preceeded the strike forces. The Takhll forces (In cwder of y' striking the target) were composed of the aircraft In Events 11-105 (TOT 08l6Z>i 11-100' (TOT 0817Z}, 11-99 (TOT 0619Z) and 11-102. The Korat forces were - composed of/the aircraft In Event 11-106 and Event 11-101. which was the last strike flight on the target. Also in the area were EC-121 aircraft waiting in the vicinity of 20/107 and 20/103 iind EB-66B's ^ and C'a orbiting in the vicinity of 22»10'N/105»20'B and 21«»15'H/10l«»25*E/ The USN was •Iso conducting studies in the same general area. 2. HISSIOK ROUTE / From Takhll AD direct to Green Anchor for refueling direct to 21.^55 'N/lOl'SB'E, direct to Zl'S^'N/lOS^lS 'E, direct to ZlosS'N/IOS'SS'E direct to 21*Z6 •N/105''l2 'E direct to 21*l6'N/105*56'E direct to the target (JCS 19-00) and egrpss to 20«57'N/ 105*27*E then direct to 20^'(6*N/105"05'E direct to Green Anchor to/ post strike refuel. BLUB 1 and 2 recovered at Takhll but due to fuel BLUE 4 recovered/at UDORK. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION / P>-105D BLUE 1.2.H 6 750 lb bombs ** 2 450 gal. tanks 1 QRC-160 POD P-105D BLUE 3 6 500 lb bombs 2 ^^0 gal. tanks • 1 QRC-160 POD . KIO-21 HIO 1 .2,3.<».5.6 All Aircraft Silver Missiles carried by at least one KIO. No other information available. Those KtOs Identified as having the large radome (PZSKBED D) are so specified in the narrative. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Low broken to overcast deck, bases 3-'»,000 feet, tops 8,000-10,000 feet -5 mllea vTslblllty with haze. i Altitude ; Heading T Speed ; Fuel State ; Formation: 5. BLUE (1,2. 3. Don ingress to target 2,000 feet AOL 135* 550 kts Plus 10.000 lbs Pod Fomtion INITIAL DETECTION After crossing the RED RIVER, while on their Ingress to the target, BLUE Flight continuously observed MIC-21 aircraft In the area. However, the first HIOs to threaten the flight were seen by BLUE 2 prior to pop-up. Two KIG-21B were seen at 2 o'clock, co-altitude, 3,000-4,000 feet range. BLUE Plight was at the HIOs 2 o'clock, as the KIGs. In a hard turn, atteavted to turn in behind the flight. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Flight continued on the mission as the two HIOs overshot. 7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT BLUE Plight made their bomb run and popped up and during the dive to the target two Pi^TC MI0-21S passed through the flight , but no firing was observed. A'ter ellmblng throu&»i the clouds, BLUE 2 saw a single MI 0-21 at 9 o'clock, then two more, silver HIC-21s 335 i Mm ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ' Event 11-99 he e.cJpn^by*5S;rnr?i;i|i.^rJHr " *t BLUE K's 9 o'clock which down with a missile, and he broke off Thf .? and one attacked BLUE 3 and shot him attacked by BLUE 2 Cho fired « the Sic I? h.^i^%'' ^'i"""?.!^"^ ^ '"'^ subsequently Joined the rest of the fir^t JeJ eg^J;! ^''"^ ^ ^ cr«h wd then 8. OADMANCE (No. Plred/No. Hlta) BLUE 2 ^ pdQ ' 350 rounds - no sight. Nana a<> ^"^^ destroyed BLUE 3 10. AIRCREW COHMENTS Cowment s on this Encounter Never attack a Mio. unless i to o < ... OAT«SOU,«S ° ™ P... »a ..C.P.. Project InterviPwj,- BLUE 2 (5 Feb 1967) Keaaages. Reports .' " ?« SSS HH532Z Dee 66 52^° ^51 211905Z Dec 66 7AF TOCO 30371 OPREP-* 1'<1312Z Dec 66 TAP DOCO 31359 OPREP-3 12l5 as well as the others In the area. Due to his position, BLUE 2 observed the two vacs to be at 6 o' clock high and diving into position behind about 6,000 feet away. The HICs were silver. BLUE 1 called "burner" and the flight descended into the clouds to evade the MZGs. On descending through the clouds the flight began to receive Intense flak. After Jinking for sev-iral seconds (no more than ZO) and reaching the mountains Southwest of Hanoi, the flight again climbed on top of the clouds and although no MICs were Immediately seen, the flight had some SAMs fired at then. A short time later (estimated kQ seconds) another HIG-21 (MIQ-8) was seen by BLUE 2. This MIC was close to BLUE 4. The KIG was at BLUE it's 9 o'clock, about 1,500 to 2,000 feet away from SLUE H and turning into BLUE k from a line abreast position. BLUE 2 saw ttie MIC-21 outlined against a cloud, as both the MIG and BLUE 1 acknowledged and broke down into the clouds with the MIG after him. Just before BLUE 4 dived into the clouds, rallffl "BTUK ft vnu h(»v«» two Vina p>t vnur 6 o'clock." fwhat was meant to be transmitted was "BLUE 1 and 2 there are MICs at your 6 o'clock."] The two MIGs approaching the flight were unseen by BLUE 1,2, and 3. A short time later, BLUE 1 peeped back through the clouds without the HIO. The flight began to climb, and a target report was given, BLUE 3 called BLUE 1 to "pull It up" and then BLUE 1 called for a shift In frequency from channel 2 to channel I to give the code words that the target had been hit. At this point the SAM activity (as Indicated by vector strobes) had subsided and little flak was present. The flight at this tine was spread out with BLUE 1 in the lead and BLUE 2 on the left. BLUE 3 was about even with BLUE 2 to the right of BLUE 1 and out a bit farther than BLUE 2. BLUE H was very far out to the right and behind the flight. As they climbed through^ 10,000-11,000 feet and at a speed In the category of J»00 KIAS, heading between 230" to 260° degrees In the vicinity of 20»H7'N/105°08'E, time 1625H. BLUE 2 in looking back to clear the other flight members, saw 2 MIG-21b (MIG 9, 10)2 (piSHBED D) BLUE 2's wing and another KIG-21 off to the right of closest MIG-21. One MIC-21 was In the 6 o'clock position of BLUE 1 and the other was In the 6 o'clock position of BLUE 3. The HIO on BLUE 1 appeared to be inside missile range. As BLUE 2 noticed the MIG-21D behind BLUE. 3, that HIO launched an air-to-air missile (DLUZ 2 sa;; the Ldssllc Icuvc the VIQ) which hit SLUE 3, blowing the aft end off of the F-IOS before a warning could be given. Immediately after missile launch the HIC-21 broke off and was not seen again. This was the first U.S. aircraft to be ahot down by an air-to-air missile over North Vietnam. BLUE 2 broke into the ffitO that was on the tail of BLUE 1. BLUE 2 simultaneously called for BLUE 3 to eject, which he did in the area of 20*>'46 'N/IOSOOS'E. BLUE 2 was canopy to canopy with the HIO but the KIQ broke away and BLUE 2 dived with the MIG down to the ground. BLUE 2 still had his sight set up for the air-to-ground mode with a depressed piper for bombing. He fired 350 rounds of 20 mm In a single burst at a few hundred feet range, diving, but observed no hits. BLUE 2, In afterburner, broke off from the MIG as they neared the ground, BLUE 2 saw the chute of BLUE 3 and another parachute about 3 miles apart (suspected to be the drag chute of BLUE 3s aircraft) 3. He reversed to go back after the other parachute and while in a left bank 500 to 5S0 knots, BLUE 2 saw another silver MIG-21 (either HIG-9, or 10) in a right bank, turning toward him 2,000-3,000 feet range, canopy to canopy. BLUE 2 rolled back to the right an(* apIit-S'ed down to the deck and barrel-rolled In afterburner and went down Into the Black River Valley and lost the MIG. ] After BLUE 1 and 3 were Jumped, another MIG-21 (KZG-ll) maneuvered behind BLUE 4 at hla 7 o'clock but BLUE 4 escaped by going to afterburner and diving through the cloud deck. BLUE 1 reversed and saw BLUE 3*8 aircraft going down in flames. He then picked up a MT.C-2\ at hla 7 o'clock so he dlaengased and egressed. BLUE 1 and 2 and 1| egreaaed. BLUE 2 had 1,800 Iba of fuel when he reached the tanker. Search and rescue forces picked up BLUE 3 at about 17'>3H (location was 251* magnetic heading, 43 n mi from Hanoi), despite ground fire. At 1745H all aircraft had departed the area. The only MIG warnings that the flight received were communication from other flights that these other flights had been Jumped by KIGs and one broadcast from the picket ships of "MIGS AlP.BORtJE. " ^OPREP quotes 6,000-8,000 feet but this la low -considering the weather. However, In both cases, the MIQs Jumped the F-105s shortly after the 105s emerged from the cloud layer. It was surmized by BLUE 2 that KIGs 6 and 7 were the same as MIG 9 and 10, with the MlOa j executing a Yo-Yo to get back on top of the clouds ^BLUE 2 thought he saw a man In the 337 REP BAROW EVENT IN99 SUMMARY Tim Mark '0 Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2. 3. «) Status BLUE Flight In Pod Fora. At 2-3000 ft and 550 kts. 600 kts In aftvr- burner. 550-600 ktt 1«v«1 8000 lb fu*1. BLUE back Action BLUE Flight sees Ml at 3 o'clock •tteiapting to attack. BLUE presses on, popping up and striking the target. BLUE pressing out froA target - comes out of burner. B2 sights M5 at 9 o'clock 2 nlles out at co-a1t1tude straight and level at high speed. B1 , 2 . and 3 1 f ne abreast with B4 back and right 1 mite. B2 and 3 set H6 and 7 coving In from 6 o'clock high closing rapidly. BLUE selects afterburner and orops through clouds. B2 sees MB on 84 and warns 4. B4 goes Into clouds Hi th H8 chasing. About a minute later he climbs b4ck up without MB. B4 sees H9 and 10 at 6 o'clock to B1. 2, 3 and wartis theai B1 , 2, 3 do not see M9 and 10. Other Friendly Communications B2 warned B4 of Ml 82 calls "Kie at 9 o'clock" hut call delayed due to traffic on the radio. B3 calls MIGs at 6 o'clock-. B2 calls MIS at 9 o'clock on BLUE. B4 calls "BLUE 4 you have 2 HIG-21$ at 6 o'clock" - meanl ng B1 and .2 instead of B4. Enemy Actions (MIG 1,2) RED 1 and 2 attempted to attack BLUE Flight but could not catch them and when BLUE came Into the flak at the target they broke off. HS do«s not attempt to attack BLUE. M6 and 7 attacking from 6 o'c'ijck high - abodt 8000 ft out when BLUE went into clouds. 86 was 2000 ft at 9 o'clock to 84 turning In. He chased 84 Into clouds and then broke away. M6 and 7 possibly yo-yo'ed up when BLUE night went lito clouds and are now coning back in Remarks MIGs silver - Immediately Identified by delta wing. BLUE drops out under clouds but due to flak and luwerlng ceiling they cllnb back on top. I 82 saw the NIG from about 2 ml les away against the clouds. BLUE Flight has several SAMs fired at then - none hitting. t^3a cz3m csa RED BAROW EVEBT 11-99 SOMHART Time . Hark Action Aircract (BLUE 1. ^, 3. 4} Other Friendly Communications Enemy Actions (MIG 1 .2} Remarks Status Action U BLUE on top of Claud deck. BLUE Lead not getting any more SAM activity and feeling safe from MIGs due to dis- tance away slows to climb speed - in « climb - and goes to different frequency to make . strike report. J BLUE Flight climbing at 400 kt fu!l - SOOO ft B2 sees M9 and 10 at 3 o'clock and sees H10 shoot down B3 with missi le. 82 breaks Into H9. 61 on different frequency Is unaware of MIG activity. B2 switches over to guard and tells 83 to eject. M3 fires a missile Into t3. then breaks away. M9 break: down to evad3 82. B3 shot dt. 82 chasing N9. B1 reversing. B2 chAses H9 to the deck firing but nisslng. 82 pul 1 s up and reverses back tohard B3. Ql reverses to see B3 In flames and MIO attacking. He runs to evade MIO. HIO attacking 81. H9 Turning from 82. 82 fires 350 rounds at close range but missfS - no gunsight. Did not have time to set sw i tches • Just pulled nose through M9 while firing. B1 and 4 departing area. 82 turning toward 83. 1 B2 sees two chutes comi ng down . As he reverses to check the second chute he sees M9 coming In. b4 makes a maximum speed dash south - loses M9 and then recovers Udorn. HIO disengages and departs. K9 was at 82' . 9 o'clock, 2-3, 0;0 ft out when B2 started high speed escape. SLUE 2 says 'Never attack a KIG unless 9 to 3 o'clock low - so you can make one pass and escape.* Il ! I f f s I I I Event 11-100. Result: Ho damage Viclnit, or Encounter: ll^OJ'.iJ/JJi:^^:! 1 PRIMARY HISSIOH AND TACTlCAt SITUATIOH Daf/Tl»e: 1" December 1966/approx. 1630H ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ Pour F-105D3 (BLUE Flight ) strike on target In Route t^acK.s * u^o-gal tank hang. «; ?oSpo.ed of th. aircraft in Ev.nt> '^/S^tw .Ircr.ft In Event Jtrlke"golng at the same time. 2. HISSIOH ROUTE In over the Red Siri'turnad around at 5l5 SKert then aouthwest to poat atrlke BLUE 1 and 3 fxew west from vl.e .arget refueling. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS p ^nc^n RriiP 1, 2. 3 t 2 JJ50-6al tanks $ 750 (M117) 1 QRC~l60 pod Camouflage palnt Receive Only, Doppler silent, IPP standby ^ns, :r.Si:prs«°-"^o^f rxH.9"s%BL.. i ana 3 o„., ,. FLIGHT COKDITIOHS nm TO ENCOUNTER BLUE T T Altitude ; Heading ^ Speech : Fuel State ; Plight Formation : 7000 ft 3HO 175 6000 ft 6000 ft 7000 ft SE SE 3*^0 550 550 '•TS BLUE J» m ^«latlon to BLUE 3 Jf-^^he time of their first flying above and behind BLJ& i th. tareet BLUE 2 came off illhtfng after BWE i,^"S.^Jr'5KJt J/^ «l' fr^S of BLUE 1. first and during egress »»« wa» aj^^J at the tl«e of their second alghtlng. 5. INITIAL DETECTION . ^ ^he area, on the .a, to the "rset received "^"„|"f ^^.^i? \l\tT^'. »• BI."| ' » BLUE J Observed six brown jnoUe trails S""f,'"",Jter bomblne the tarjet, BLUE 2 S.s".'r.c.^s'ifi;^t ir;oii"Kior.:"i^"o'cio;^ lo.. .bo^t ^.v. .i. n,in. .o..r* «d . <.aa s.P=""d fro. tbe Lead ele..ntj^..r.^m 3«0.__.t^«.00^rt .^^^^^ ?s%Lftnrro'r"?b^^riu.°tUi t:'ir.!;;wrSpJ-i..t.i; i«oh 3*3 I ,,- Event 11-100 8. ACTION INITIATED th. V"?w^ ^^^""'^ sighting). Selected max power. Made attempt to close behind foSr MIGs sighting SLUE Plight turned In to the approaching flight of BLUE 3 and t turned Into the NlOa, which they encountered. 7, SITUATION DEVELOPMENT away lo^lhl Vltt\ni°lniir°^ "^^'jS 5"^ achieving range the WOs hroke up Sifip ; . ^? , ! SLUE 1 and 2 proceeded on to the target. On the second observation m^ll^l IZ^'tVnVrtX'' " approached. T^e KIOs started to tXriJ^JJSJnd ^h.nrf?nf J^*!?^*'*'/^****^*?''^"^ * °" P*"" '° '^^i* the MlQs did a semi- 8. ORDNANCE None expended. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 3 was unable to Jettison the right (I50>gal fuel tank, was reported not operational. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience ; The QRC-160 pod on BLOE 1 BLUE 2 Total Hours 600 P-105 Hours 350 Combat Missions 62 Remarica Oradueted from flying school. Oct 1965* direct to P-105 school and then to SEA. Had fired 1 AIM-9 in training and fired gun on the dart. * . 2290 KOO Firat MIO engagement. Cocments on this Encounter ; «n»*.^yfh5;«.^*'**S!5**^ '"i" "^^^ *° set a kill with an AlM-9 on their BLuS pfiSJ ?Si„.r??L''£?5 ^''SJ?* "^""^'^ ^^'^"Se m targets. All of SSeSliS iSijJjtr^iS SJg:*"* blue 2 thmk. there ls%oordln*tlo« contrSi^SaJ JSJtrgSSi? •'"h hung tank above 500 kt. Below 500 kt far oS^f*;osmSJf ^" Coaments on Overall Experience ; ♦■K- ^ ^^^J^. too difficult to go from bombing mode to alr-to-alr mode. It reoulrea SLi°, VoL'C r"'"''):' *° '^^^^ 80od intelligence available and SSJ BM PVP ?«%^*;Sn?»,''[!°T^*^^:?v.°^ capabilities, but w, need better target photography. ?I w clutter up the strike freq. with long MIQ calls™ CanS should be brief. I.e.. "KIOs Thud Ridge- and get off the air. pas. ft^the-flJgJrhS'Sar'lS?"'""" * 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; Messages. Reports ; BLUE 2 (« Feb 67) BLUE 3 (15 Mar 67) BLUE 4 (3 Feb 67) TAP lil2201 Dec 66 DIO 3100Z TAP 141850 Dec 66 OPREP 3 DOCO 30393 TAP 111357 Dec 66 OPREP H DOCO 30375 341 Event 11.100 «^ 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight Ingressed to the target, and after starting down Thud Ridge, the flight prepared to Jettison tanks, In an anticipation of potential MIG encounters. They had had a MIQ warnlns from BIO EYK of MICs in the area. The left tank of BLUE 3 would not Jetti- son, so BLUE 3 and H separated from BLUE 1 and 2 at 21»30'N/105"30'1£. BLUE 3 and « began to proceed outbound, hit a target of opportunity and return home. BLUE 1 and 2 proceeded on to the primary target. BLUE I and 2 continued on' toward the target encountering heavy riak but few SAMs. About 7 ml. from the IP BLUE 2 caw 6 black smoke trails and MIOs about 3000 ft above at 12 o'clock ft ml. away. The aircraft were not Immediately Identified, and were not positively Identified by BLUE 2 as MIG-17s until the MIGs turned. There were a >ircup cf four MIGs parallel to two others who were separated out several thousand feet. BLUE 2 called the MIGs, but BLUE 1 did not see them immediately. The MICs were golns away and since BLUE 1 and 2 were closing they tried to attack the MIGs. BLUE 1 and 2 accelerated In afterburner and approached to within 1 to 1-1/2 mi. when the MIGs broke up and to the left. The MICs were lost from view In the haze as they passed off to 9 o'clock. BLUE 1 and 2 continued on and hit the target. As they were egresslng In the vicinity of :i''QZ'"/'-'''''-Z'T' - '-|-t,-j- ui. 1- o'clock af.J 2-1/2 ;:iil'i3 range on un opposite heading. The bogeys in two elements and 1000 ft low. BLUE 2 turned to go after the MICa, and notified BLUE 1 of his intent. BLUE 2 was set up at this time with a non- eonputlng gunslGht (fixed plpper at zero depression). The MIGs saw BLUE 2 and turned to climb, passing behind BLUE 2 In a YoYo, but broke away Just prior to BLUE 1 and 2 being threatened by a SAM. BLUE 2 made no positive Identification but tentatively classified the MICs as 178 or 21s. BLUE 1 and 2 were somewhat separated at this time and continued to egress, on egress BLUE 2 saw a four-ship flight of bogeys in a right turn at about 3 ml. range. BLUE 2 turned toward the bogeys and closed to about 2000 ft and started pulling lead on a bogey which was now at 11 o'clock. At this time BLUE 2 identified the aircraft as Kavy F-8, so he made a hard right break to a heading of 3'»0'» and stirted to egrees. BLUE 2 continued on out when he saw two unidentified aircraft at 10,000 ft altitude 5 mi. away at his 6 o'clock. The aircraft were in close formation. BLUE 2 called that if they came at him he was going to turn into them despite 'his fuel state* but the bogeys turned away and were lost fron view. BLUE 1 and 2 noted SAMs during Ingress and egress. On egress BLUE 2 noted a SAM detonate 1/1 to 1/2 ml. b^^hlnd the element at 21*10'!i75 KIAS. BLUE 1 was almost line abreast to BLUE 3'3 right when he saw two KIG-21S at 2 o'clock low, right on the top of the overcast at a range of 2-3 mi. Pue to the cloud backgro'ind the MIGs ^h«re was easily discerned and Identification was immediate. BLUE 1 called BLUE 3 and alerted him to the MICs. BLUE 3 looked up and saw two MIC-213 high and at 2 o'clock. Although initially BLUE 3 and 4 each saw only two MIGs, the MIOs were In a fllghv of four with the lead element nigh and the low element about one mile in trail. The MIGs were initially orbit* ing in the vicinity of 21*ii5'M/105^32'E and approached the flight on a heading of 195 degrees with the high element at 6-10*000 ft. altitude. BLUE 3 called to Jettison all ordnance and go to afterburner and turned left into the high element of MIG-21s in an attempt to make a gun attack. The high section of MIGs turned Into BLUE 3 and H In a descending pass. Due to the closing velocity, the lead (high) element of two HI0-21a passed BLUE 3 and 4 head-on about 50-100 yards away and a bit lower than the P-105s and were first seen by BLUE at this time. The lower element climbed and crossed at about 6000 ft range. As the HIGs p-issed without firing they were identified as MI0-21D with the large radome. They were clean except for missile launchers on pylons, but no missiles were seen. BLUE ti broke right to keep track of the MIOs as the lead element passed by and attempted to get on the tall of BLUE 3 and 1. BLUE 3 and d out behind BLUE Flight trying to catch then. B3 expericr.ced difficulty jr. lateral control •Dovc nacn i wicn hung 450-gal tank. In A.B. .Approx. 700 kt Flying nin. alt. Gaining separation on HIGs. Crossed Red River 1000 ft alt. 1.3 Mach. NIGs disengaged as ttjey were 1osin< distence on BLUE Flight. The last MIG to break off kept trying to get his nose down to gain possibly to fire a missile but kept losing out and f Inal ly ga«« up the cftast. Event 11-101 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs two KlO-lTs Revult: No coming from the west, out of the sun, and turning In behind them. The HIGs were at 7 going to 5 o'clock about 6000 ft range and ?00 ft higher than the flight. The flight had heard BIG EYE KIG warnings at the tanker but nothing specific. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight Jettisoned their bombs, descended to 10,000 ft In naxifflum power, and at Hach 1,1, out ran the Hias. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPNCNT See Item 12. 10. AIRCREH COKHENTS Experience Total P-105 Combat Hours Hours Hiagjons BLOB 1 3600 1000 25 Remarks Highly qualified flgbter pilot. ponments on this Encounter BLUE 1 felt that BIO EYE was useless* Comments froiti Overall Experience BLUE 1 ; 1. Pelt that the peace time operational outfits were negligent in air-to-air training. i. Pelt that the double canopy and accumulated scratches on the canopy caused a glare problem which restricted visibility. 3> Felt that too many switches were Involved in changing weapon delivery modes. 4. Pelt that a two pilot concept Just wasted one pilot. n. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE 1, 15 Peb 6? Measagss. Reports ; 7AP DIG 31002 142204 pee 66 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Ab blue Plight turned over the target, aborting the drop dui; to weather, they saw two MIG-173 at 6000 ft back at the 7 o'clock position, th-; flight wai at the MIO'a 10 o'clock. BLUE Plight Jettisoned their ordnance and dived down to 10,000 ft at Mach 1.1 to evade the MIQii. The NIOs were in a fighting wing with No. 2 MIO on I.eft. Shortly thereafter all members of BLUE Flight got launch lights on their vector gear so they disregarded the l-ilGs to prepare for the SAM attack. The SAMs were not seen nor were the KIQs seen again as BUIE Plight returned home. Plight cgresaed without further Incident. i i i iB-4 reportedly saw two more. Ik w w I I i i i 1 i 1 I I I Event ll'lOl Aircraft Involved: Pour P-1058 V8 two III0-178 Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21»32'N/105«*0»E 1. PRIKARY MISSION AltD TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: V\ Deceraber I966/I707H BLUE Plight was scheduled to strike the Yen Vlen RR classification yard. Upon reach- ing the target they found It obscured by weather. They were turning over the target to the egfuss heading when this event occurred. The flight was part of a total force attack- ing JCS 19.00 (21*O5'25"N/105''55' l'j"E) . The flights originating from Takhli were to strike the target first followed by those frori Korat . The IROW HAND Fllfsht Events 11-103 and Il-lOit preceded the strike forces. The Takhli forces (In order of striking the target) Mas composed of the aircraft In Events II-IOS(TOT 08l6Z), II-100(TOT 08l7Z), 11-99 (TOT OSIQZ), and 11-102. The Korat force was ccaposed of the aircraft In Event 11-106 and Event 11-101 which was the last strike flight on the target. 2. KISSION ROUTE See Event XI-99. BLUE Plight, from Korat, was refueled inbound and outbound. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F-105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. ^ 6 - 750 lb bombs 2 - Ii50 gal canks 1 - QRC-160 Pod All avionics standby/off except doppler Camouglage paint KIG-17 WIG 1. 2 Configuration unknown Silver colored 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Vppfher : Broken elsuds and hase at lover levels, clear above. ^'■•v BLUE Altitude ; Heading : Speed : ^uel State : FllKht Formation 135 16,000 ft Inbound, about 250" outbound —5^0 kt G.S. ... 10,000 lb Pod i'ornation 500* f- \m 1500*' tSOO' soo* 4 1500' 353 5. tHITlAL DETECTION Event 11-101 BLUE Plight on a heading of 135« was turning right to a westerly J"f^8 Jj''^ *J«J saw two HIC-I73I coming from the west, out of the sun, Jj^^n}''-*, J" J^JJ^ JSi fllSt. MiCa were at 7 going to 5 o'clock about 6000 ft range and 500 ft higher than the m«ht. The flight had heard BIO EYE KLQ warnings at the tanker but nothing apeelfic. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight Jettisoned their bombs, deacended to 10,000 ft in naxiam po^er* Nach 1.1* out ran the MIQs. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT See Item 12. «ttd ftt Reaarka Highly qualified fighter pilot. 10. AIRCREM COMMENTS Experience Total P-105 Conbat Hours Houra Mia 5 ions BLUE 1 3600 1000 25 Commenta on thia Encounter BLUE 1 felt that BIO EYE was uaeleas. Commenta from Overall Experience BLUE 1 : 1. Pelt that the peace time operational outflta were negligent In 2. Pelt that the double canopy and accumulated aoratehea on the canopy cauaad a glare problem which restricted visibility. 3. Pelt that too many switches were Involved in changing weapon delivery aodoa. 4. ?elt that a two pilot concept just waated one pilot. i A 11. DATA SOURCES Projec t Interviews ; Messagea. Reports ! 7AF DID 31002 BLUE 1» 15 Fob 67 1422011 Dae 66 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION AS BLUE Plight turned over the target, aborting the drop due to "father, they saw two IOO-ItJ at 6000 ft back at the 7 o'clock position, the fUsht was at BLUE Plight jettlaoned their ordnanea and dived down to 10,000 ft at Mach 1.1 to evade the m08. The MIGs were in a fighting wing with Mo. 2 ^ao on left, fjo'-tly thereafter all flwttbers of BLUE Plight got launch lights on their vector gear so they disregarded the HM8 to prepare for the SAM attack. The SAMa were not seen nor were the MIGs seen again aa BLUE Plight returned hone. Flight egreaaed without further incident. iB«4 reportedly saw two more. 35* I I t • 1 I I i i i i i 1 1 I I i i f I • Bv«nt 11.102 Aircraft Involved: Pour P* 109ft v« t«9 NlO-Sla* Results: No Danase Vicinity of Encounter: 2I"28'N/104««8*E 1. PRIHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: lH December 1 966/16 15H BLUE Plight (four P-105a) were enroute to JCS-19. The flight was part of a total force attacking JCS 19-00 (Sl^OS ' ZSN/IOS'SS' 15E) . The flights originating from Taichll were to strike the target first followed by those from Korat. The IRON HAND flights Events 11-103 and 11-10'* preceded the strike forces. The Takhll forces (in order of striking thtf target) was composed of the aircraft In Events 1I-105C and 20<*N/103''F-. EB 66Bs and Ca were orbiting at 22»10«N/105^20«E and 21<'15'N/1021 HIO 1. 2 *Alr'to-air missiles Silver paint " no markings Cannons One of the KZQ-218 was identified as a Pishbed D. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Veather t One check at 1000-8000 ft broken and another at 5000 ft overcaat visibility unknown. BLUE Altitude : Headlng T Speed : Puel State ; Plight Formation ; 11,000 ft (about halfway between closed layers) 050° 500 Pull internal plus (about 11,000 Iba) Elements aLuost line abreast G O INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 2 called, "MIGs at 6 o'clock." The MIGs at that tine were coning down from a eloud deck which was at 15,000 ft and the only reason they were seen was the vapor trails - water vapor coming off the wing tips. The Kris were 1 1/2 miles away and closing. Although the flight had head MIQ warnings, none was given for the area in which they were flying. ' The OPREP messages cite two MI0-17s, however, the aircraft doscrlbed and identified in the Interviews are NiO-Sls. Also annotated mission tape Blue 2 of Event 11-99 also indicated that the MIGs were 2l8. 355 Event XI-102 6. ACTIOH INITIATED the H?SJ?"':t%'wr?rmr''52ul'J5f:!:t^t'v.} • ^^-^ ^ confirmed started ; left brJa" ' Jettisoned ordnance and tank., went burner and 7. SITUATION DEVELOPHENT in an easy left turn ftnrf Rr tif% !«; S f ^ " "O damage. With BLUE 1 and 2 3 and S! JuUed yo-yo Met Jn Sn%ES^^**r^S; ?iS2n^""? ^ closed In on BLUE the cannons. By this time BLUE FliirJ? h»H i*?! 4 ? "^''^^ }^°° " started firing Md had selected mail mu« power B^UE ? Jnd*'; ii^.^** f'^S'"" '^^^ ^"'^ P^^* out running the MICs. Meanwhile blSe i ^rH o^'^'* accelerated to Mach 1.1 and were A» BLUt 1 dropped bJ^k anHeiersef ^hi S?fl. t° Pos^^on behind the MIOs, lower cloud dbck. Durlnrthrhn!?; BLU? ?*hfJ"S25*^*5 5' dropping down into the i?Mnd^J.%%^- H-i? K*otSir^ia.';er ' 8. OROtlANCe (No. flred/No. hits) BLUE Plight No ordnance expended Ca""0" Soviet AAMUTQLL' HIC 1 1/0 2/0 Remarks Detonated behind BLUE 3 and No damage P-105 Hours Combat Missions Remarks 1150 600 55 All TAC PTR background Pirst MIO engagement 11 All TAC FTR background Pirst HIO engagement 10. AIRCREW COKHENTS Total Hours BLUE 1 3500 BLUE 4 1100 Conmientg on -this Encounter BLUE 1: :;o"lI E VtHT 11-1 Of syitMtav Alt 11,000 Hdg 043-050* about 500 KTAS 10.500 lb of fuel. S«ne at T, 82 saw 2 Mifis (Mt, 2) closing on the flight, BLUE rllght Jettisons Stores and tanks and goes to afterburner* B3 anft 4 start a left break and nose over rapidly after gilsslU launch. B1 and 2 start a left. B1 sets switches for AIN>9B and sights In alr-tO'alr'node. B3 and 4 descending In a left turn 4.5 g 525 KTAS. B1 and B2 In 4g turn at higher altitude. B3 and 4 at COO KTAS. stin in hard turn to keep airspeed up. Altltuds 6-70C0 ft B1 and 2 at about 9500 ft. BlUE Flight B2 called HIS at eienents separated 6 o'clock 1-1/2 by about 2000 ft. miles from Bl - "Old you say BLUE Flight" 82 conflrns From Bl "Jettison bombs and stores. HIGs In tight fighting wing, M2 about 40-60* back, 300-1000 ft out fron HI. HIOs had good overtake. Ml fired tMO AAHs at B3 and 64. The two Atolls alss. 84 saw two silver aircraft and was> able to Identify by color only. HIGs seem to have contrails from the wing tips. HI6s g/> after 83 and B4. start to cut Inside cf B3 and 84s turn. MIGs In tight formation to pre- vent 'overshoot » the KIGs execute a yo-yo. MIG at BOO-OOO ft from 84, an • fires cannon. Nissi les explode at about 5 o'clock at about 50 yards range, somewhere beyond closest point of approach. Bl has no plan to use radar lock for radar ranging. To-yo Is perfectly timed and executed. B4 saw white puffs of smoke from underside of air- craft. Inter- mittent puffs from lead NIG only. RED BAROM EVEHT 1I-1P2 SOHHARV TiM H«rk Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 3. 4) Status Action Othtr Fritndly CoMMunlcatlons Eneny Actions (HI6 1,2) RtBtrfcf 81. 2 at 9500 ft 3-4 g tiirn 81 and BZ start to rtvtrst to the right. Coae out of afterburner B3 go«s Into clouds. B4 reverses to right and Joins 81 and 82. 81. 2 and 4 set up an orbit at 10-11.000 ft. n called "Where a 4IGS" 14 answered that 4I6s had gone Into ctouds. Lead tells 83 to go hone. niGS reverse and dive Into the clouds. Event 11-103 Aircraft Involved: Tko P-105» vb two poaslble NIO-178 Result : No damaga ■Vicinity of Encounter; 20»llO«M/105«05»E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 14 December 1966/17i»OH flights (Events 11-10^ and Il!ioi4[*orL;H;H ^ ?, ^^'^'^ ^"0^ «AND (TOT 0817Z). II-99(TOT 08"z) and ?hJ JoJ:rf«;ioL'"'= "-^^CTCT -^162). II-IOO In Event 11-106 and Event 11-101 which Jaa thJ fSI? fof«s were composed cf the aircraft 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS No Information except that BLUE 1 and 2 carried tanks. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER 5. INITIAL DETECTION 6. ACTION INITIATED Jettison his tanKs but one^^ouW nit of? Bl5e Jl?i^h? ^iLl'f " ^^"^^ atter.pted to 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT This event terminated when the HIOs disengaged and disappeared. 9. IQUIPHENT PROBLEMS BLUE X had one Hgo-gal tank that he could not Jettison. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience : Unknown Conunents on This Encounter the alifieid"'?).""' '^^^ the, vera ao far from 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interview i BLUE 1, H Mar 1967. 7AP DIO 31002 ll;220ilZ Dec 66 7AP mesoz Dec 66 OPREp-3 doco 30393 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION in the area and *-1059 Event 11-103 12. NARKATIVE DeSCRlPTION (Continued) At this time BLUE 2 called bogeya at 7:30 o»clock. BLUE 1 never saw the bogeys but Khen BLUE 2 called that they were shiny, BLUE FllKht punched tanks and broke left and down. BLUE 2*a tanks came off but only one of BLUE I'a jettisoned. The HIGs were coming from the 8 o'clock position sliding Into the 6 o'clock and were 2-3 mllea out when first detected. As BLUE Plight broke into the MIGs, they executed a hard climbing turn and headed back towards Hanoi. No firing was observed and the NIGs never dosed to less than 3000 ft. Aircraft Involved: Pour F-lC5s vs two HI0-21b Result : Sighting Vicinity or Encounter: 21«55'N/105'"»0'E The 1. PRIMARY MISSION AtiO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 14 December 1966/1650H BLUE PUBht (one F-IOSF and 3 F-105Ds) fro. Korat -as on an^ fVtlixtL the taret t . There were KC-121 aircrdTt orbiting at ZO^N/ICT'E and 20 N/lOi t. as I"l « S8-6f9s"Sd'6s o?5itlne at 22- 10 ' fV105<' 20 'E and 2invK/10UO25-E, The Navy «a also conducting' strikes in the Immediate vicinity of JCS 19.00. 2. HISSION ROUTE Generally followed the other flight routes (see Event 11-99) 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIOt: Unknown - ordnance on SLUE ^ was bombs. BLUE Flight had no AIK-9Ba. MIOs were sliver. 4. FLIGHT COHOITIOHS PRIOR TO EMCOUMTER Weather: Unknown, but In this rase not a factor. BLUE Plight Altitude : IM.OOO ft Speeci : «80 kt ;?ueT_ ?^tate : Unknovn Formation " Unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE H looked overnead and saw two possible MIG-Zls passing over the formation at 6 o'clock hlffh. BIO EYE had called out MlOa In the arta ahead of BLUE Flight. The KIGS wore on tne same heudlng as BLUE Plight a.nd were at 23,000 ft eltitude. 6. ACTtON INITIATED The MICs were about 0.2 PTach faster. As they passed overhead and for about three minutes after, BLUE watched the MIGs press away. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE did not attack and the MIOs soon disappeared in the distance. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Eiperlence — Total r-l05 Combat Hours .lours Missions Remarks BLUE 1 2800 Unknown Unknown Mostly ADC experience. BLUE H 1300 100 15 Comments on This Encounter BLUE 1 felt that If ne had a SIDEUT»DER he oould have killed these NIOs. Comments from Overall ExperienCfe n . DATA SOURCES Pr otect Interview BLUE 2, 2 Feb 67; BLUE U,'* Feb 67 Me saages ; TIP DID :iO02 1'1220*«Z Qec 66 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION £ : as Item 7. 363 I •I f If f f Event 11-105 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105» vb nuinroua MlOa Result: No damage Vlclnltj of Encounter: 2l»l5'»/X05*«0»E 1. . PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: l** December 1956/1613H BLUE Plight (four P-1058> waa the lead flight with flak auppreeslon responBlbllltles for JCS target 19.00. BLUE 1 waa the force commander for this strike. The flight waa part of a tStal force attacking JCS 19.00 (21«05' 25"N/105''55' 15"E) . The "l«ht« originat- ing from Takhll were to strike the target first followed by those from Ko»;a.t',^™« HAND flights (Events 11-103 and II-IO) preceded the strike forces. The J*^*^}! order of striking the target) were composed of the aircraft In Events 11-105 (TOT OOlBZ), 11-100 (TOT 0817Z), 11-99 (TOT 08IQZ) and 11-102. The Korat force was composed of the air- craft In Event II-I06 and Event II-lOl which was the last strike flight on the target. On station were EC-121 aircraft orbiting In the vicinity of 20"N/123*E wjd 20«N/10rE also m the area were EB-66B8 and Ca in the vicinity of 52*'10'H/105'20'E and 21»15'M/105* 25'E. The Navy was also conducting strikes In the vicinity of JCS-19.00, 2. MISSION ROUTE BLVE Plight departed Takhll, refueled, flew to the north tip of Thud Ridge, and then down the west side of the ridge to the target. (See Event 11-99)- 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS BLUE 1. 2. 3. 1 5 - 750 lb bonbs 2 - 150-gal tanks H-61 cannon/1029 rounds All aircraft had QRC-160 pods MlOa Unknown 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Overcast - Bases 1,500 ft and tops 5,000 ft, heavy rain and bad visibility un3ecneath. • These conditions prevailed except right over the target where the sky Condi- tion was clear. Altitude ! Heading ; Speed ; Puel State ; PllKht Pormatlon ; Unknown BLUE 1. 2. 3. 3,000 ft (approx) Approximately 138" 580 kt Pull Internal plus 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 1 had Just descended through the cloud layer when he got a HIQ call putting NIGs at his 3 o'clocic. The flight waa in the vicinity of 21"15'N/105''»0*E. 6. ACTION INITIATED As the MIC (type unknown) passed to 5 o'clock, BLUE Flight lit afterburner and climbed back on top of the cloud layer. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT As BLUE Plight came up above the clouds, a SAM waa fired at them. MlOa were also seen, -80 BLUE uent back down under the clouds. And as they passed Phuc Yen they saw several MIOs taking off to the north. MIO-21 followed BLUE 1 until he pulled up for bomb delivery. BLUE Plight popped up into a l*Jft, approximately 270" turn, delivered their boobs on the target, and departed for home. Outbound at l6l7H two unidentified aircraft were observed In formation at 20*55 *N/105'*0iiJ??I"FT^°^SH.^?i'"^'"^*^*'fr* * olMlon against JCS 51.10 (21*l6«00"M/ frL Jiikhif^;^ Itl of the strike force was from Korat and preceded the foree from Takhll to the target in s "gaKle" with the five strike flights Ir. a dlaoond forma- I?!!! . "P*^^- ^^le force was led by a flak suppreJ- ^''•"S 11-108 (TOT 08002). followed by the flights In Event II-U2 Event II- 110 (dropped at 08052), Event II-lll ^TOT 08062) and Event II-IO? (TOT 08082) * ri» "•'Tw**?JS°Ii.!il""^ flights (one each for Korat and Takhll) In the area, but no CAP flights. The IROM HAND flights did not encounter MIQs. (It Is assumed that the auo- noJ iJallaSlo!)" on atation although apeolflc OPRBP reformeo waa t. MISSION ROUTE ♦K. . J«P"f*«'l„Kfrat refueling en route to "T" in the Red River then down Thud Ridge to 2f.*; k ^f^"*^ reverse route. The mission route was slaillar to tha Takhll flight route. Refueling was on Qreen Anchor « «A*Bn» 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIfiURATIONS P-105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. » 6 750-lb bonbs 1 SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B) on B-l, 2 and 3 1 QRC-160 2 4S0-gal droptanka MIQ-IT and 21 MQ 1. 2. 3. » Silver color 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Wififiep: Scattered clouds with tops estimated 8,000 ft. Visibility 3 to 5 miles In low altitude hase with good visibility at altitude. *n Altitude ; IJJ.OOO ft keaainB ; 135* Speed ; 540 lets 0.8. Fuel State : Unknown aifih^ gormation; Finger tip with element on left side 1,000 to 1,500 feet out. BLUE flight trailing one mile and to the left of lead flight (Event ii— 113). 5. INITIAL DETECTION °' ^» «*^«' BLOB flight was in straight and level fJi^^^r^? ^^"^^ f'L^f^ ^ o'clock, low. BLUE 3 Mtiaated them to br?. 000 feet low, climbing and starting to turn In behind BLUE flight. When first seen, the HIQs vera at a range of 4 to 5 oiies. The four HlOa were in two elements. 6. ACTION INITIATED « K ^ l^^^^ 3 o'clock low. range 6.000-7,000 feet starting to turn St?!SJ!fd'2Ji?!^i?2p^i"^/^J«5'/*' jettison extemS* sto«s aAd break.* bS5e l! i? ^^^4 32'N/105«»23'E 1. PRINASY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 19 December 1966/1605H ^^^^ Flight) were on a strike mission against JCS 51.10 (zme-OO-N/lO^oSO'Sft-E). The first part of the strike foJce wa. froJ Korat and fr^f. M t ^°^ff f»'o™,'''a>thH to the targfet In a "gaggle" with the five strike flights J^iiT"'* r°"??"'>"- ^105Ds vs sis MI0-17a Results: Ko damage Vicinity: 21»25'00"N/105"'»l*iO"E 1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 19 0«cember 1966/1603H Pour F-105DS (&LUE Plight) were 3n a strike mission against JCS 51-10 (21*16 'OO'N/ 105*50'2U*E) . The first part or the strike force was from Korat and preceded the lorce from Takhll to the target In a "gaggle" with the five strike flights In a diamond forma- tion. (Events 11-113, -107. -116, -115, -111.) The force from Takhll followed In a trail formation with the flights about two minutes apart. The force was led by a flak suoprea- slon flight. Event II-108 (TOT O8OOZ) followed by the flights in Event 11-112, Event 11-110 (dropped at 08057), Event 11-111 (TOT 0806Z). and Event II-IO9 (TOT O808Z). There were two IRON HAND flights (one each for Korat and Takhll) In the area, but no CAP flights. The IRON HAND flights did not encounter HIOs. (It Is asauined that the supporting B-66 and BIO EYE aircraft were on sti)tlon although specli'lc OPREP reference wj-3 not availiibl-'. J 2. MISSION ROUTE The mission route was from Takhll direct to Red Anchor extended, direct to SO^SS'N/ l03'*'i3'B. at 15,000 feet; direct to 21*32'N/105"27'E at 65OO feet; direct to the target at 1*000 to 8,000 feet. Ingress was on the southwest side of Thud Ridge and roll-In was on s generally northerly heading. Egress was the reverse route at 6,000 feet altitude to the Red River then at 3.')00 feet Co White Anchor Post-strike refueling. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-I05D BLUE 1. 3 - 750 lb bombs • 450 gtil tanks gun (20mm) QRC-160 pod AIM-9B P-105D BLUE 2. t 6 - 500 lb bombs 2 - 4^0 gal tanks 1 - M-61 (20mm) 1 - QRC-I60 pod 1 - Camera pod (BLUE 2 only) TACAN in rec only, radar off Silver 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Clouds at 600 feet, scattered k,000 to 6,000, broken 5 miles in hasa. BLUE Flight Altitude: 1500 feet AOL (apprpx. 3300 feet indicated) Heading ; SpMd: "state; southerly 550 kt 9000 lb approx., external tanks empty S. INITIAL DETECTION Initial detection was made by BLUE 1 at his 11 o'clock position, level two miles out. Warnings by BIO EYE of MIGs being all over t*ie area were given throughout the flight. HIOs were heading northerly approximately I60* to BLUE Plight. They were Identified as MXGs initially by the sliver color. Positive ID a« HIO-lT occurred as the MIGs rolled up to turn In behind BLUE Flight, «. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Flight had already dropped Its tanks earlier. When MIOs turned Into flight at 1 1/2 miles from BLUE k at BLUE t's 8:30 o'clock position, BLUE Plight engaged afterburner •nd accelerated away, 7. SITUATION DEVELOPHENT None. 8. ORDNANCE None . f. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS IIP 375 4 it Total P-IOS 270 375 Mission s 61 17 irvent ZI-llO j» 10. AIRCREW CONKcNTS E»pertence Total Hours BLUE 2 3000 BLUE 4 ilOOO Comments on this Encountc-r BLUE 2: Never saw then turn Inso flight. Would have seen them even If they had been camouflaged. Didn't sec any external stores. Just noticed a plain Red Star on the air- craft. Didn't notice any afterburnor. BLUE When they went afterburner, he dlJn't worry about IR mlaallea because HIG3 were too far back. No KIGCAP in area. Only saw two HIGs conlnp; after flight. Even if HICs camouflaged, he still woula have seen then as soon as we did, maybe sooner. No indi- cation of GCI control. MICs move in without wlngman falling out. Didn't see any markings on MIGs. Comments from Overall Experience BLUE 2: Rather than sullt the flight and Jettison their bombs and get Into a turning contest, they Just kept rignt on going. Traininr. was not adequate for the engat^ement. Never had the opportunity to do visual laydown or radar deliveries. With mora training could get better at dive bombing. Enough information displayed to use guns. Bcllex'e In leas automation in Jettisoning equipment because there are tlrries when one wisher, to keep things on the aircraft. Peels he doesn't have tc throw very 7>any switches. Had no prior knowledge of enemy weapon system capability and learned most of it from older heads. Assesses enemy pilot's capabilities by saying they are undertralned. Are getting more aggressive though. Once we Jettison our ordnance, the mission is shot and HIO accomplishes hla objective. BLUE 4: Generally with a MZO there won't be a SAM day; not a hard and fast rule though. It is possible that tanks could hit slab and cause control problems. Good idea to put charges in tanks, so when they come off, they would explode and give an enemy some- thing to think about. Sufficient Information available to use gun. Usually cages his sight when he uses gun. Would rather use a depressed sight. When carrying a GAR-8 (AIH-9) bombs cone first, then after leaving target he sets uo for alr-to-alr. At low altitude radar Is not the answer to firing the gun. Can't see in a 30* cone behind aircraft - mirrors help some. The only answer to the 6 o'clock coverage is you cover the other element, the other element covers you. n. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE 2, ^ Feb 67; BLUE «l, 8 Feb 6? Measapies . Reports : 7AF OPREP-3 19.H1BZ Dec 66 DOCC 28235 355TPW OPREP-'* 191022Z Dec 66 DDI 5121 7AP 1922t8Z Dec 66 DIG 310ai 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION While Inbound to target, BLUE 4 observed a flight of four shiny silver HZGs at 11 o'clock two miles low altitude with the flight. One more KIG 2000 feet higher wis anead of this flight of MIGs, ell of which were in trail with an outbound flight of P-lOSs. The HICs were falling tehlnd as the F-105s were doing about 600 knots. BLUE >i observed two MIO-lTs out of the flight of four turn Into flight as the MIGs passed hi 3 8:30 o'clock position approximately 1 1/2 miles out. The MIGs were eo-altltude. The MIGs were lost from view as they passed to 6 o'clock. SLUE 2 got a glimpse of two MIGs before they passed out of his vision. BLUE Plight had already Jettisoned their tanks so all they did was light afterburner and head straight to the target at 1500 feet. They dropped their ordnance on the target in area B-2 at 0805Z and Jettisoned. BLUE Plight saw no HIGs uhile outbound. I 376 ^ Event i:-llJ Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSDs vs four NIG-2ls Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21*30*M/105»Xf 'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Time: 19 Seceiaber 1966/1600H Four P-105D3 (r.LUE flight) were on a strike Mlatlcn against JCS 51.10 (21*16' OCN/ 105'50'2'»"S). The first part of the strike fore- was from Korat and proceeded the force from Takhll to the target l;i a "gaggle" w3th the flv« .itrik- flights in « diamond forma- tion. (Events II-113» -107, -115, -115, -11')). The force from Takhll followed In a trail formation with the flights about two minutes apart. The force was ltd by a flak siippres- alon flight. Event II-iC8 (TOT 0800Z) followed by the flights in Event ir-l.l2, Ever;t 11-110 (dropped at 0805Z>, Ev»nt 7.1-111 (TOT 080J2).and Event 11-109 (TOT 0808z). lUere were two I?.ON HAND flights (one each for Korat and Takhll) in the area, but no CAP flights. The IRON .HAIJD flights dl4 not encounter MlGs. (It Is assumed that the sup- porting B-66 and BIG EYE aircraft were on station although specific OPREP reference vas rot "vjif lahJe, > 2. MISSION ROUTE The mission rovte was from Takhll (take off 0615Z) direct to Red Anchor extended, direct to 20«28'N/1G3"'U3'E at 15,000 feet; direct to 21«'30'N/105«'»O«E at 15.000 feet; direct to 21«>32'N/105°2?'E at 6,500 feet; direct to the target at IJ.OOO to 8,000 ftet. Ingress was on the SW side of Thud Ridge and roll In was on a generally northerly heading. Egress was the reverse route at 6,000 feet altitude to the Red River then at 30.000 feet to White Anchor post strike refu^linK. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION BLUE (1. 3) 6 750-lb bombs 2 tso-gal tanks 1 QR(M60 pod 1 AIM-9B KIO-21 Silver BLUE (2, 4) 6 750-lb bombs 2 450-gal tanks 1 QRC»160 pod TACAN receive only standby on radar and IFF 4. FII6HT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Broken clouds at about 3,500 feet haze. BLUE 1, 2, 3, H 3.000 ft AOL (6,000-7»000 ft indicated) Altitude ; Heading ; ^peed ; ^uel State : formation: 135' 500 kts 500-700 lbs in external tanka Unknown — probably in pod forBiatlon S. INITIAL DETICTION BLUE flight heard calls from BIO EYE and from the preceding flights who saw MIOa. BLUE u and another flight member saw four silver aircraft at 11 to 10 o'clock, range 5 miles ^^^^ at 10.000 ft altltucs and were on an opposite heading 'to the flight. The MIQs were spotted by the silver color shining in the sun. BLUE 1 identified i^r/nnJ^S"^i^. ^" elements With the Second about one mile in trail! and 2,000 feet higher than the lead. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE flight continued on past the NIOs. 7. SITUATION OtVElOPHENT the MIOs passed to 9 o'clock !{ to 5 miles out, the first, and then the second. MIO ?i!'!r? '"eht. 2LUS 1 tnen- called to Jettison bombs and engage J^oSn'aSS'?^; a?l"\J"§?5.'"'^T'^\*' "0-575 knots and went down into the SlJf at . B,,.; o ' £ ? ^^^^ *» ^he flight popped up over Phuc Yen. under BLUE ij the MIO turned away and was not seen again. 8. ORDNANCE None. Event 11-111 EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS Mom. 10. AIRCREU COMMENTS ? Tot3il unknown BLUE « 1,200 new SSSriheS SSniSid."' »l.lblllty sine. MIO. «re l«t f«» P-105 675 Ml a 8 Ion 13 11. 12. DATA SOURCES Interview: BLUE 355TPW 7th AF «l (1 February 1967). BLUE 2 (ft February 1967). 191113Z 1922482 December 1966 Oeeember 1966 OPflEP-3 DOCC 28235 DIO 319*1 NARRATIVc See Items 5. 6, and 7. i 378 I Event 11-112 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105» vs two KCG'-irs ftnd two HIOs (typ* unknown) Results: He damage Vicinity: 21»2H 'N/lOS^ag'E 1. PRINARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/Tine: 19 December 1966/1603H Pour P-lOSDs (BLUE flight) were on a strike mission against JCS 51.10 {21«l6*00"N/ 105*50 •2'«"E). The first part of the strike force was from Korat and proceeded the force from Takhli to the target in a "gaggle" with the five strike flights in a diamond forma- tion. (Events 11-113, -107, -116, -115, -111). The force from Takhli followed in a trail formation with the flights about two minutes apart. The force was led by a flak suppres- sion flight. Event 11-108 (TOT 0800Z) followed by the flights in Event 11-112, Event 11-110 (dropped at O805Z), Event II-lll (TOT 08062) and Event 11-109 (TOT OSOfiZ), There were two IRON HAND flights (one each for Korat and Takhli) in the area, but no CAP flights . The inON HAIID fllshts did not encounter MIGs. (It is assumed that the sup- porting B-66 and BIO EYB aircraft kere on station although specific OPREP reference was not available.) 2. MISSION ROUTE The mission route was from Takhli direct to Red Anchor extended, direct to 20*'28'N/ lOS'tJS'E at 15,000 feeti direct to 21*30'N/105*E at 15,000 feet; direct to 21«32»M/105'27'E at 6,500 feet; direct to the target at 4,000 to 8,000 feet. Egress was the reverse route, at 6,000 feet to Red River then at 30,000 feet to White Anchor post strike refueling. Ingress was on the southwest side of Thud Ridge and roll in to the target was aade on a northerly heading. BLUB 2 and 4 6 750-lb bombs 2 150-gal tanks 1 QRC-160 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS BLUE 1 and 3 6 750-lb bombs 2 4 50- gal tanks ] QRC-160 1 AH 9B camouflage NIQs Silver color 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Scattered to clear, haze up to 5000 ft; visibility 3 to 5 miles. BLUE HlQs Altitude ; Heading ; Speed : 5. 8.000 ft l45" SlO kts about 5,000 ft about 325" Unknom INITIAL DETECTION At approximately 1603H. when BLUE flight was at 21*2U 'N/lOS'Sg 'E, Inbound BLUE 2 saw two MIGs (type not known) at 12:30 o'clock low pass under BLUE flight as BLUE flight pro- ceeded down Thud Ridge toward the target. The MlCs were 2,000 feet under the flight, and were following a flight of P-lOSs. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 2 called MIGs and received a reply from the flight, and BLUB flight continued to the target. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT The flight proceeded on the bomb run. Within 2 miles of the target, as BLUE fli^t started a poo-up, two HIG-17s (BLUE 4 identified them as MI3-198) were seen orbiting the target. The" MIGs were about 4,000 feet above and 2,000-3,000 feet out. BLUE 4 recognized it first as a MIG due to the silver color. The tentative Identification was made later by referring to photographs. The MIGs ma(3e a feint toward BLUE flight but did not follow, BLUE flight continued on the bomb run and was near supersonic speed as they left the target and exited up the NE side of Thud Ridge. During roll In on the target one SAM was seen one mile south on an apparent ballistic trajectory, neadlng west. 379 ■■w■♦•lif^^fr•^ilfl>a* 8. ORBKANCe Hons* 9. EQSIPHCNT PROBLEMS ■one Bentlwwd. 10. AIICREU COHKENTS BLOE 3, 70th miss ion, 300 bours* F-105. 11. MTA SOURCES Project Interviews: BLUE 3 (6 February 1967) and BLUE 4 (5 Pobpuary 1967). Hessaces, Reports: 7AF 192248Z December 1966 010 31041 12. IMRATIVE DESCRIPTION y Event 11-113 Aircraft Involved: Four F-105I>s va Two HIQ-Zla Reault: No demage Vicinity of Encounter: ZlozS'N/lOS^tg •£ \. PSIMASV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 19 December 1966/15U9H Poup P-105DS (BLUE Flight) were on a strike mission against JCS 51.10 (21«16 •00''N/ 105*'50»2i>"E). The first part of the strike force was from Korat and preceded the force from Takhll to the target In a "gaggle" with the five strike flights in a diamond forma- tion. (Events 11-113, -107, -116, -115, -ll*)). The force from Takhll followed In a trail formation with the flights about two minutes apart. The force was led by a flak auppres* slon flight. Event 11-108 (TOT O6OOZ) followed by the flights In Event 11*112, Event 11-110, (dropped at 0805Z} Event 11-111 (TOT OSO6Z) and Event 11-109 (TOT O8O8Z) . There were two IRON HAND fllehts (one each for Korat and Takhll) In the area, but no CAP flights. The IRON HAND flights did not encounter MIGa. (It la aaaumed that the supporting B-66 and Big Eye aircraft were on station although specific OFREP reference was not available). 2. HISSION ROUTE Departed Korat, refueling enroute to "Y" In the Red River, then down "Thud Ridge" to the target. Return by reverse route. The route waa approximately the same aa that of the Takhll flights. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. ft U - CBU-21S 1 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B) 1 - QRC-160 pod 2 - 450-gal wing tanka IFF and radar standby TACAN - Receive only Doppler - on MIO-Zl MIO 1. g Silver (no markings oUserved) 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Estimated 2/10 coverage with tops up to 8OOO ft.. Visibility S to 7 miles above 8000 ft. Altitude ! — 17,000 ft Headlng T ikO" — -«"" Speed : 520 kt Fue;l Stat e : Unknown t'li'eK't'yonnation : elesMnt on left side - almost line abreast 5. INITIAL DETECTION Had recelvisd warnings of MIOs in the area. Plight waa in straight and level flight when BLUE 1 spotted two MIG-218 at 1 o'clock level, about IS'JSH. HIQs were at 17,000 ft, heading 320" and were about 5 miles away and offset k-^ miles away. MIOs were in element with wlngman, approximately lOOO feet to the outside. The MIOs were Immediately identi- fied due to color and then by the wing planform. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Flight observed NIOs Jettison tanka and turn right when passing 3 o'clock position. KZOs turned thru 5 Into 6 o'clock position as BLUE Plight started a right turn, then broke hard right, descending aa BLUE 1 called to Jettison everything and break. 7. SITUATION OEVELOPMENT After approximately I80* of turn MIOS were met head-on and observed to be reversing to the left. BLUE Plight had selected afterburner and descended to 6000 ft altitude for separation as contact was lost. At 21<'55'N/10')*50*E during egress, BLUE Plight was climbing thru 17,000 feet heading 272o , and 520 kt nhen BLUE 1 spotted what he thought to be a HIO-19' at 21*55 'N/lOU' 38 T., altitude 3 to ftOOO AGL. (5000 to 8000 ft true altitude) >ltSG 1922462 and 1914132 cites it aa HIO-17. Event 11-113 heading .ppro.l-afly 210- making gentle left and right tume. Ho other flight »e»beni could eonrirn this elehtlng. 10. AIRCREW COmCNTS Ex perience BLUE a BLUE 4 Total Houra 6200 2600 F-105 Hours 120 Eat. 150 Combat Missions jRemarks Interceptor background Bomber background Approx. 20 Approx. 35 Conmenta o " Encounter BLUB ? - NIGs appeared to be from Phuc Yen and under GCI control Zl I . Did noJ^hlnk a KI0.21 could turn so rapidly, .elt that the HIOs h. saw -re HIO 3 *n4 ''^ 11. DATA SOURCES P^n^.nt: Interviewe : BLUE 3, l6 Feb 67; BLUE 4. l8 Feb 67. ^..L..^. ReoortT T 7AF DAI-01'. igSS^SZ Dec. 66 piO noi^l^Decje SflBTPH Korst OPhEP-3 191'»13 Dec 66 DOI 01721 12. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTIOK the target BLUE Flight w« one of five strike flights Ingresslnj do^ Thud Ridge to the t at the end of%he ridge line- ^.fS^ ^ were »PO«ed by BLUE J f ^i>„ ^is position, level heading opposite to 8^^^ Flight. BLUE 1 caiieaou ^^^^ Of Mia 1 and 2. , ^ „w«i« In the turn BLUE * attempted to set ^Pjls sight _but was unable to do JJ^Jhlle Jettisoning his stores at the same "ne- The Jlrst went past in an axm ^^^^ Jass. wl.h *-?oo"" JSS fee?^way TrJ^ ?lSe ^ canSpy to clnopy. BLUE "i^ in Tturi II 500 jSotf! AuSJu^^he secoAd KlG passed head-on. the iio t^ iitcheS^vfr III Mght shouldeTand "w the intake lip as the «G "urnod^IxT tl^tly behind BLUE 4. BLUE 4 accelerated «ay and lost the MIQ. At 21-55»N/10i>-50'E climbing thru 17,000 ft heading 272% 520 |ct, BLUE J "JJ jjjj J? this sighting. ^ ^ vans snr„j wu»iT»^M^^sjj»^^ altitude is BLUE Flight. These MTOs made no pass at BLUB Flight nor were they seen oy any neaber of BLUE Flight. WED BKMH mm 11-113 SUMMARY Tine Nark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 3, 4) CoMiunI cat Ions Enemy Actions (HI6 1.2) Remark I Status Action utner rrienaiy Heading SC 520 kt See 2 HIG-21S at about 4 «1 Alt 17,000 ft Tried to maintain Integrity. Just Matched HIGs irhlle pressing In Two friendly flight! 3f 4 each close to 41GS There were two ather strike flights astern 83 and others called out KIGs Opposite course. 2 o'clock, low; climbing at high rate of speed about 2000 ft lower than F-105s One of the first big formation gaggles. (5 flights) " Continued i3 cal led turn. Lead said keep your iyes on them. 83 :aned HIGs In B3s i o'clock petition MIGs turned 160° to right and ended up on SLUE'S 5 o'clock Co-altitude h Seat altltudt Started turn right and dropped tanks and bonbs. Nent to afterburners. Hade hard right 4 g descending turn. Lost sight of HIGs for a wnife. Mttenpted to pull up .ead called break right. Jettison :>oBbs and tanks. r 1 ne f fia At K o'clock in trail formation. Remain co-altitude h B3 and B4 sighted HIGs again "canopy- to-canopy". Both still turning right BLUE elemnts split diving. 83 and 04 about 14.000 ft Garbage on the radio Climbing attitude. HIGs apparently reverse course after passing canopy-to-canopy. CI Inblng and turntd In «t. wlcal Only one MI6 seen 3-5 ft on oppo- site head1n<). Lost sight of him again when HIG went up over B3. V ■ vm 2 O 0 c 3 « z •J m « z « -I O 1 -o C O *1 I 3 fW M M a o I a CI o n I o >- w s. O 9 <» o n 1* Is o C M 09 > cr f» 3" et tD -< «» o tr a » 3 a > o cr w fl> O P> M C 3 u» r- O r* O. ae » — » » fn o *-> —1 —1 m M O 3 C m < > M m •-» o m -♦ o t- o -t r— O m - n Lo c Cj a on ^ o ■o 1- o z HE » 9 O o B0 as n C M M JC ct M CJ — < »* 3 1 • ■ » 1 ►-3 a» ff M ^ »-< o O P CI ct >-> M » m »» O 3" A • r» O « « M » O O m o *^ • ? "S « » 9- pi 9 n t> rr m »-« M » o 3 B • 9 *^ :3« n 9 o M M. 3 O 9 cm u ft n cr * S » o ^ •>(:■« OCT •ft I" PS®, ^ ST Jr » IT rr OB •<: a J-" O t>0* » o c» OS O 3 ■-» • o t«|ft o 3 to ae M r* m O «COv e n o« O o ■•^ fu o K 3E 9 9 O 9 M -1 CO c M 9 o o ft l> i/l 1 a ■w fi 3e a ct O 30 _ RED BAWOW EVENT I Nil 3 SUMHARY TUt Nark Action Aircraft (BLUE 1» 3. 4) Status Action Other Friendly Communications {neny Actlonf (MIG 1.2) RtBirkt PuUlft) up. Pick up MIG 4 o'clock high. 5000 ft, 2 ■lies tmtf In food poiUlon. B3 ond B4 St 10.000 ft. Tightening turn and pulling up, then he saw MIGs higher and gttting good position. F-105 lost fir speed. Broke hard left and down. Stayed In after- burner accelerating rapidly. Disengaged Mith spted. This flight did no communicate until trying to reform on way out. Had speed advan* tage getting In good position. Objective seemed to break up forma- tion and cause Jettison. Then they trere Just harassing. QRC Horktd througl^ out. Lead three flights all Jettisoned. No F4 CAP this day Last tMO flights got to target. I i iTiiiffiilii I Til if rr? I ffn?! I ^.-^.:Cai._..ca^-^ca- ,ca7^ tS3vl.ca.^,c=3.... c=3.... ca ca,.. .cr 3 cs ... C3. ..c£ • Bvtnt 11*114 Aircraft InTolved; Pour P-lOSn va Ik HIQ-lTa Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21«»47*N/105*lB'E to 21»25^N/105'*8'E 1. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 19 December 1966/15'»5H Pour P-105D5 (BLUE Flight) were on a strike mission against JCS 51-10 {21»l6*00"N/ 105*50 ' 2U"E) . The first part of the strike force was from Korat and preceded the force from Takhll to the target In a "gaggle" with the five strike flights In a diamond formation (Events 11-113. -107. -116, -115. -11«). The force from Takhll followed in a trail forma- tion with the flights about two minutes apart. The force was led by a flak suppresalon flight. Event 11-108 (TOT 08C0Z) followed by the flights in Event 11-112, Event 11-110 (dropped at 0805Z), Event 11-111 (TOT 06062) and Event 11-109 (TOT 0808Z}. There were two IRON HAND flights (one for Xorat and Takhll) In the area» but no CAP flights. The IRON HAND flights did not encounter KIOs. (It Is assumed that the supporting B-66 and 310 EYE aircraft were on station although specific OPREP reference was not available.) 2. MISSION ROUTE Korat, Thailand direct to Red Anchor extended, direct to North Station, direct to the Red River, direct to 21*'5'»'N/105*12'E, southeast down Thud Ridge to target. Return route reverse. The flight followed the same general path as those from Takhll. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIOMS P-105 BLUE 1. 2. 3 6 - 750 lb borabs^ 1 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B) 1 - QRC-160 ECM pod 2 " ^iJ?S^^^**'^^°"* traumg the preceding flights ir?!;i"MM;'J?;ei;ine"She"?ilIi'?oJS:!'^"'°"" cs^e ?^o"s rijf?%'^^cis p:s!t5rit'?:sorrt":!?;!i;je°''ijA5s?':^i?r^ obaarved. BLJ'E Plight continued on down the ridge and lost sight of thJ MlS. Approximately one minute later, at 07I6Z, BLUE 1 observed four Mia-17a at 3' 10 5;6 nml out heading 200\ 10.000 ft. but lost'slght of the^lftej^ust a flw Jewnds tS2 * vicinity of 21»30'N/105«30'E. Approximately 30 sJSSndJ lI?e"?SJje*weS four MI0-17a flying parallel to the flight at thel? 4 o'clock posJuon 1-3 nS? out although Che MICE had good speed they were not eloalns rapidly. BLUE Plight lettlaoned their boobs, m the vicinity of 21»30'N/105«35*E at 07«9Z and turned Into the SlOa'rJe NIOb overshot and then broke off. Ho firing ms observed. BLUE Plight followed the rest of the strike force down the rldae and ni>o<<«*ii«ri f« make a left descending 180« turn, when BLUE U observed fSu? MM-f?. coSSg^^SJ^oJ from 1 O'clock high and to the right, pass over and slide into BLUE PlUhS^rS^'Soiroom^ ^^'T 'Ititude, heading 300*. No firing w2 obwJwd wd thrfuSi eoavletad the turn and egressed back up the ridga. The NIOi wire not leen agSn ^- Event 11-115 Aircraft Involved: Po'ir P-105D» V8 nine Hia-17s Result: Sightings only Vicinity of Encounter: 21»31'N/105'35*E and as noted t. PRIHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 19 December 1966/1S<>7H and as noted Pour P-105DS (BLUE Plight) were on a strike mission against JCS 51,10 (Jl^ie'CCH/ 105*50'2*"E) . The first part of the strike force was from Korat and preceded the force from Takhll to the target in a "gaggle" with the five strike flights in a diamond forma- tion. (Events 11-113, -107, -116, -115, -H"*). The force from Takhli followed in a trail formation with Che flights about two minutes apart. The force was led by a fl«^ »"PP^5"7,,» slon flight. Event 11-108 (TOT 0600Z) followed by the flights tn Event 11-112, Event II-llO, (dropped at 0805Z) Event 11-111 (TOT 0806Z} and Event IX-109 (TOT 0808Z}. There were two IRON HAND flights (one each for Korat and Takhll) In the area, but no CAP flights. The IRON HAND Plights did not encounter KIOs. (It is assumed that the suDportlntt B-66 and Big Eye aircraft were on station although specific OPREP reference vas not available). 2. NISSION ROUTE The flight departed Korat and took what Is referred to as the mandatory route. This route followed the Takhll force route which was described In Event 11-99 • 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-IOSD BLUE 1. 2. 3. J> * - 750-lb bombs— 1 - SIDEWINDER {AIM-9B) 1 - QRC-160 ECM pod 2 - 450 gal external tanks WO- 178 Unknown 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Clouds 3- when BLUE 1 sighted two NIO-lTs 1-1/4 n nl to the SE. BLUE continued the strike and lost the MiGs as they passed through a cloud layer on the dive bomb run. The MIOs were not seen again. c. (Third sighting) During BLUE Plight's egress at 21»40 'N/105''27'E. time 1555H, they observed three MI0.178 at their 9 o'clock position, 3-4 n ml away, at 3 to 4,000 ft ACL. The MIGs were on approxloately the aame heading as BLUE Plight, and paralleled BLUE Plight's path for 1 to 1-1/2 mln. until they disappeared In the weather. *io markings were seen on the MIQ aircraft. 6. ACTION INITIATED See Item No. 5< 7. SITUATION DEVCLOmNT See Item No. 5* 8. OROHAMCE Event 11-115 None expended. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 4 stated that when operating the QRC-160 ECM pod, the only feature of the vector gear that remained reliable waa the launch light. 10. AIRCREW COHMENTS Experience ; unknown Cowmenta on this Encounter : BLUE 3 commented that their flight waa the last of approxi- mateiy five to go Into the target. Only the last two flighta actually hit the target, because MI0-21a making head-on passes had forced the first flighta to Jettiscn their ordnance and abort the strike. Comments from Overall Experience : BLOE 3 mentioned the rollowlng shortcomings on the P-105: a. Ho need for an Internal bomb bay as all ordnance could be carried on an external station. b. If bomb bay Is retained, then the several vhousand pound plunger should be removed. This would either reduce weight, or space could be used to enlarge the internal fuel tanks. c. He feels that all aircraft should carry an AIM-9 type missile. d. Effective range of the guns should be increased, e. He feels the aircraft control system is too stiff and heavy, and also that aircraft is difficult to trim. f . Peels that "toss bomb computer" is an excellent piece of equipment, but that it should be designed for greater accuracy. g. He wo'jid like to see a combination doppler and inertlal avionics system inatalled in the aircraft. BLUE t stated that most people fly with the X-band pickup of the vector gear turned off, because radar from our own aircraft causes excessive chatter and blocks out other returns. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUE 3, 15 Peb 67 and BLUE 4, l6 Feb 67 Hessagea. Reports ; 386TFW. CPREP-3. 1911112 Dec 66 DDI 04719 7AF, MSO 192248Z Dec 66 DIG 310ill 12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOK See Item No. 5 for details. Of the nine MI0-17s sighted, there were no repeata. Of the first flight of MIQs, one pilot saw only one, two pilots saw two, and one pilot aaw all four. The second and third flights were seen by all members. 390 ^- Event 11-116 Aircraft Involved: Four P-IOSE** v» four Klg-2l8 he suit: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21»31*H/105»'»1 1. PRINAilV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 19 December 1966/15*>5K Pour P-105DS (BLUE Plight) were on a strike nlsslon against JCS 51.10 {21«16*0Q"N/ 105''50'2*l"E) . The first part of t^e strike force van from Korat and preceded the force from Takhll to the target in a "gaggle" with the five strike flights in a diamond forma- tion. (Events 11-113, -107, -ll6, -115, -ll'i). The force from Takhll followed In a trail formation with the flights about two minutes apart. The force was led by a flak suppres- sion flight. Event 11-108 (TOT OSOOZ) followed by the flights In Event 11-112, Event 11-110, (dropped at 08052) Event II-lll (TOT 080£Z) and Event II-109 2. 3. 1 6 - 750 lb bombs 1 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B) 1 - QRC-160 2 - ^50 gal ECN pod drop tanks HIC-2I HIG 1. 2. 3. *» Silver 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNieR Weather ;' Scattered to broken with tops of cumulus type clouds at 8,000 feet HSL. Altitude ; 10-12,000 feet HSL. Heading : lao* Spged : Estimated 520 kt Flight Formation ; r'ourth of five flights, in a pod formation. 5. INITtAL DETECTION Had received MIQ and SAM warnings fron BIQ EYE and previous flights. BLUE 1 spotted 4 HIG-21S at 10 o'clock on a reciprocal heading, k to 5,000 ft high at approximately I545H. The NIOs were 2 to 3 miles out. BLUE 2 did not see the MIOs until they «ei3 abreast of BLUE flight. They were identified by their silver color. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE flight observed MIOs starting a descending turn behind then well out of range. The closest approach was eatinated to be no closer thrn 2 ndles. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 1 kept his formation intact while descending and weaving through the cumulus clouds Into the target area. MIGs were no longer observed to be a threat. The flight hit the target (areas C and B-1) and egressed. After leaving the target BLUE 2 at 7,000- 8,000 feet and 600 kt, saw a single MIG-21 at 12 o'clock high. The MIC was in the vicinity of 21*10'N/105"'»0'E heading 170* at an altitude of 9-10,000 feet. The MIC made a descending Split-S and was lost from view as he moved to 6 o'clock on BLUE Plight. 8. ORDNANCE None expended 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None 1100 Est. 90 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Erierlenca Total Hours B1.UE 1 2950 BLUE 2 3100 Cg moenta on thla encounter tarce?^"^ ^ *^ allowed BLOE Plight to hit the BLUE 2 first miasicn In Route Package VI-A and first JIIO eneounter. Cc BJttenta fr^m Qyerall Experience b:llt?''o? IL^f'-IIs^.'"'' ^"'^ the lo« altitude speed capa- U. DATA SOURCES P roject Interviews Meaaagea. Reports : 7jFTJXTtoT3ri922li8z Dec 66 DIO 310«H Dec 66 388TPW OPREP-3 191120Z Dec 66 DIO oinl '2, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIOH (See Items 5. 6, and 7). BLUE I, £17 Feb 1967), BLUE 2 (17 Feb 1967) 392 ••^ Event 11-127 > Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSDs vs two Hia-2l8 Result: No (lamae« Vicinity: Qnknoim 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: December 1966/Unknoi*n Strike mission In North Vietnam 5. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION BLUE 1. g. ^ and U I M-61 (full - 1,029 rounds) 1 QRC-160 MlOa Silver In color 4. FLIGHT COliUniONS »hIOK TO tNCOUNIEH Weather: Clear BLUE 1. 2. 1. H Altitude; 18,000 and climbing Heading ; jiiQo Speed ; Unknown Fuel State; Unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION fllBht was at 18,000 ft heading 2<*0* after dropplna their ordnance on tai.ff#t 6. ACTION INITIATED tumeJ^?n^I!^?h ^^f"*"* f"!"'^^?? "^^ht 8:30 o'clOCk position. BLUE flight iJtraSaJ from ni3a? ^ ^"'^ '° ''"^ ^" "^S^t and ac'celerated dJwn 7. SrrUATIDN OEVELOPHENT None, no encounter. B. ORDNANCE None expected. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total F-105 Combat BLUE 2 1200 Unknown Comments from Overall Experience tl:^J: ^^"Vlng mt one SIDEWINDER la not really a waste of time but carrying two "srii wjij fi^i s?!EiiiJjind!" "-"^ ^'^'^ ^'^^ co^rorTisiSet ^ 11. DATA SOURCE Project Interview - BLUE 2 (16 Pebmary 1967) 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION „w ^"'^5 r^?^^ *'ter striking target heading 21l0« at 18.000 ft and «n«,hir,- a%\"a%; Vn^ ITn^tlH Tell JL^ltJJeJy^ldlSJJh^d^is^^Sia ^KS^ ^ n\ , I I I I i i i i i i I Two P-lOSDa and, two P-105Fa vs ttfo Nia-2ls SX^OO'N/IOS^OO'B AlrerAft Involved: Ito8ult:| Slghtlnis only Vicinity of Encounter; 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/Time: 2 January 1967/1 51 OH 2. MISSION ROUTE th. ,ufSuT=m!l"b;,%°""»*' " ' •""".bin* l.ft-l«M orbit, in 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS uLUb' 1 and j 2 - AGH-«I5 I 2 - AIM>9B 1 - 650 gal round eenterllr^ tank 1 - M-61 OatUng gun (1029 rounda) y-lQ5D. BLUE ? and t i H - CBU-248 (centerllna station) 2 - t50 gal wing tanks i 2 - A0M-15S ■ 1 ~ Qun I No QRC equipment MIQ-21S Unknown 4. FLIfiHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Heather;. Overcast, 3 to 4.000 feet broken, tops at 9,000 feet. BLUE 1. 2 BLUE 3.4 15.000 ft 18,000 ft 270* 270*1 Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Altitude ; Headinn ; Speed ! I'uel State : PltKht Formation ! 15,000* 18,000* 3000 5. INITIAL DETECTION 6. ACTION INITIATED i BLUE Plight continued to turn left, engaged afterburner and deacendedto 10.000 feet. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT 8. ORDNANCE alr-to-alr ordnance ezpende • 355TFW 021345Z Jan 67. PASTEL DOl" 0028 12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOII at^O.OoS reel In I J^"?, ^"r"i..^"««« BLUE 2 (16 June 67) and BLUE 3 (17 Peb 67) 330" to 270» when BT MP » l"^! 000 feet. BLUE Flight ^^l\r, L 3. 000 feet BLUE 3 called Jn" ! * observed two MIC-2ls at 5o nnn ? ^urn. headlr )96 Event 11-119 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs one MIC-Zl Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 20''l3'N/1010>, back to Red River (vicinity Yen Bal). Strike force egresaed to poat-strlke refueling (Orange Anchor) and tc home base. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS H F-1058 BLUE I. 2. 3. k Not given, but bombs were carried by BLUE Flight. HIG-21a 1. 2> 3. 1 Not given. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Broken to overcast below 9*000 ft. Visibility good above clouds. 1 BLUE T Altitude : Heading : Speed ; Fuel State : 15,000 ft In orbit vicinity Yen Bal not given not given 0 'ORG 160 formation 1500/2000 ft horizontal separation 500 ft vertical separation 5. INITIAL DETECTION No MIG warnings were called by ELINT aircraft. HIQ-215 were first sighted by member of BLUE Plight (BLUE 3) 10 to 12 niles off to the right of BLUE Plight. MIO-218 were low approximately 10,000 ft (heading 020«, speed not given). NIOs were positively identified as they closed to within 5 miles. * 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Flight started a right turn to keep the MIOs in sight. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT As BLUE Plight started a right turn, the MI0.218 broke off by pulling up and started down after the IRON HAND flight but broke off all together and left the area. The MiQa were not seen again by BLUE Flight. 8. ORDNANCE None fired by either side. 9. EqUIPNENT PROBLEMS ' None 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience : Total Hours BLUE 1 4,300 BLUE 3 not given ?~105 Hours 100 not given Total Missions 20 80 399 CoBuaentB on thla Encaunt*.* 11-120 BLUE 1 f-JOS can't out>nwneuver NIQs. BLUE i «fnc«lty i„ Changing fro« one firing »od. to ««,th.r. It doe. is clutter !p ?S SdlS" «*rnlnge on Guard channel. All 11. DATA SOURCES JnJ*''''J*'' ll'^l ^' ^5 February 1967 Pilot Interview BLUE 3. i8 February 1967 Pilot interview BLUE 2, 3 OctoSS; 1967 U. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTION J^f5t'?^r^""i"% Off aa BLUE Pii,.t started a P-105S that were in the same areiTaB BLUE PllSS^ s.J 1° 5° ^V'^'' mother flight of four the area completely. "'"^ Plight but broke off before closing and left 10. AIRCREW COKNENTS Experience Total Hours BLUE 1 BLUE 4 11. P-105 Hours Combat Missions 80 50 Event 11-121 Remarks Swltehology Is bad In P-105 for SNlteh- Ing to alr-to-alr. DATA SOURCES Interviews: EIUE 1, 14 March 1967 BLUE *, 7 January 1967 12. HAWATIVE DESCRIPTION S-"M^tLTSf s[5r?}??st'j„rbi- S E^O -J^F «c"i: "siJ<.".'r turn Into the MlC-ils. ™ *" BLUE Plight started to identlff theS" "* ^'^^'^^ then could not positively 0 D Event 11-122 Aircraft Involved: Twenty P-105s vs two MIO-218 Result: Ko danage Vicinity of Encounter: 21"35*N/105*OO'B 1. PRIKARy HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Time: 7 January 1967/083OZ 2. MISSION ROUTE #97 tSS*n*? "T** *? tfnlce" for refueling continued north to TACAN station f97 tnen east to Red Hiver and on to target, north of Hanoi. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS BLUE 1 and 2 2 CBU-Z^JS 20nun ammo 1 630>gal centerline drop tank BLUE 3 and H 6 500olb bombs MER plU8/20imii 1 SIDEWINDER AIK-9B 1 'jRC.l60 pod 2 1150-gal drop tanks All Aircraft Camouflaged color IFF. radar, TACAN (0?P in target area) MIG-21a Not given 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather. ; Not given, except there was a low undcrcast and a haxe In the area of operation, r BLUE T Altitude: Speec ■ Fuel State; 17,000 ft East Not given Not given Plight Formation QRC-I60 pod formation (star gaggle). 5. INITIAL DETECTION at 1:30 o'clock to formation, 3 to 5 miles a«ay. The MlOs were at 12.000 ft. The SlOe were easily Identified by their shape and shiny silver color. t. ACTION INITIATED r.r^^V:^! lli^^l the MIGa. The MIO-218 turned left and flew parallel to the JlJiJda further left and flew away from the formation, going down into the 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT Flight mistakenly made an attack pass on a flight of P-105 that was flying fSi^^rV* f?'''«»"0'» " the MIO-218 flew away. BLUE Plight broke off the attack if Sr Identification was made. BLUE Plight dodged a non-existent SA-2 missile then brought up E»ent 11-122 a treawndous amount of flak (37/57Mm) by flying low (2*000 ft). It waa a wuapeeted "dry* launch since they got a launch light on the WILD WEASEL gear but never aav a SAN. 8. 9. ORONANCC None fired by either aldei eqUIPMENT PftO&LEMS >oae given. 10. AIRCREH CONNCNTS Experience BLUE a All others not given. Total Hourj 2.000 P-105 Hours 800 Combat Mlaalons 10 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLDE 2. 15 February 1967 BLUE 3» 16 February 1967 40« ^- Evant 11-123 ■ ' Aircraft Involved: Four P-105D» va four NIO-Zls Reeultfl: Sighting only Vicinity: 21°30'N/10«»°27'E 1. PRIHARV KISSION 4llD TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 8 January 1967/0825H Four F-105DS (BLUE flight), part of a strike force operating out of Korat, Thailand, was to hit a prebrlefed target In Route Package VI>A. Weather prevented entry Into Route Package VI- A and BLUE flight was looking for a target of opportunity along the west side of the Red River. 2. Missiui; Roun BLUE flight departed Korat, proceeded north to the tanker, then ME to the Be* River, 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS BLUE 1. ?. 3. 'i 6 - 500-lb bor^bs 1 - AIt-:-93 (SIDEWiriDEH) 1 - QflC-160 ECM Pod 2 - il50-gal wing tanks 1 - Mk«6l Gatllng Gun (1026 rounds) KIC-21 (1. 2. 3. ") Sllvfr Color 4. FLIGHT COrtOlTIONS PRIOR TO eNCOUHTER Weather Low overcast condition In primary target aren. blllty above clouds. BLUE Plight Clear, with unrestricted vlai- MICs Altitude ; headlng T Speed ; Fuel State: 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS 13-10*000 ft NW along Thud Ridge 480 Kt Unknown Wunbe r of Hours total 3100 150 21-22,000 ft Opposite heading Unknown Unknown Combat Missions approx. 30 BLUE 2 General Coinments BLUE 2 - Unable to use X-band warning gear when using QHC-160 pods. Turned off IFP and TACAN to minimize electronic enlsalons vlien over North Vietnam. Would prefer better geographical reference when receiving MIG warnings. F-105 doesn't have sufficient wing area to permit turning with NXOa. n. DATA SOURCtS. Project Interview : BLUE 2 (undated) 12. hARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE flight (vicinity of 21*'30=N/10l°27'E) was heading NW along Thud Ridge when they observed a flight of four HIGs at a range of 6-8 n mi heading In the opposite direction. When the KIGs passed aoeam (BLUE'S 3 o'clock) at 3-* n mi, the MICs turned left towards BLUE flight In an attempt to get into the 6 o'clock position. BLUE flight made a descend- ing left turn In order to pick up airspeed; they did not Jettison ordnance. Aa the flight went through l80° they looked to the left and noted that the MIGs had made a turn in the other direction and were departing the area. The MIGs were never any closer than approxi- mately 2-1/2 n ml. Identification was easy even at 5 n ml because when the NIO pulled up, the top to bottom profile clearly showed the delta wing. E E i 5 J Evmt 11-124 Aircraft Involved: Bight P-lOSs ve four MIG->21s Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 2O°tO'N/10^°30 'E and 1. PRIMARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 15 January 1967/1615H and 1617H Four P-105S (BLUE Flight) and four F-105S (GREEN Plight) were part of a strike force bombing a railroad bridge S.E. of Thai Ngyen BLUE Flight and CREEH Plight had hit the target and were out-bound when the MIG sighting occurred. 2. NISSION ROUTE Departed Korat headed north to rendezvous with tankers, then northeast to the Black River then east to the Red River arl target (vicinity of Thai Ngyen). Egress by same route to post strike tankers. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS Weather: Clear, 2-ii mile visibility In haze. AltUude ; heading" Speed : Position: BLUE 1, 2. 3, k 11. goo ft 210^ ^500 Kts ^ 20°40'N/10Jl°30'E GREEN 1, 15,000 ft 195^ „5*0 Kts ^ 21°15*N/10JI°U2»E Pod (QRC-160) MIQ 1, 2, 3^ 20,000 ft 030« WIG ^. 6. 7. 8 22,000 ft 030* _ _ Unknown _ 2O*'40'N/10'»*'30'E 21°l5'N/10l**ft2»E Approx. finger tip elements In trail Plight _ Forr.at Ion : Pod (QRC-160) 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE Plight sighted a flight of four MIG-218 at 1615K. The nZQ-2l8 w«r« at 1 o'clock high on a reciprocal heading to BLUE Flight. GREEN Plight sighted a flight of four MIG>2:s at iSnH. The HIG-21a were at 22,000 to 23,000 feet, 8 o'clock to GREEN Plight heading C-30 . b. actio:: i::itiatlu BLUE Flight continued on course and lost sight of the MIG-?ls. CREEM Plight observed MIO-21'3 move behind them to within 2 nl. GREEN Plight lit afterburners and descended to the mountain tops losing sight of the MIGs. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT No further action on either side no engagement resulted. 6. ORDNAhCE None expended. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS SLUE Flight: None GREEK Flight: None 10. AIRCRiH COMMENTS Total Hours 650 Hot Interviewed Hot Interviewed P-IOS 600 Combat Missions 17 BLUt 2 bLU£ 1, 3, <) GREEN 1, 2, 3. t n. DATA SOURCES OPREP-il RT 0«I9 - SeSTPW 151310Z Jan 67 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight (four P-lOSs) sighted a flight of four MI0>21s at 1615H. BLUE Plight position 20<*40*N/10?ls. »07 y Event II-W5 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105Ds v« one KIG*2I Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: North Laos I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 15 January 1967/1615H Pour P-105S (BLUE Flight) outbound for the target. II. DATA SOURCES Project IntervleK : BLUE 3, l6 Peb 67 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION SLUE 2 sighted an aircraft believed to be a MIO-21. There la some doubt whether It Mas an P-^i or a HIO-21, since BLUE Plight was in North Laos and MIGs were not known to operate in that area. BLUE 3 felt that the single SIDEWINDER armament In the P-105 la inaufflclent. Event 11-126 Aircraft involved: Pour P->105s vs probable four NIOs Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 20"57'N/105*'0**E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 16 January 1967/0818H Mission and tactical situation not contained In data available. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS HICa Silver color. 4. FLIGHT C0NOITI0t:S PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER BLUE Flight MIPS Altitude ; 18,000 ft 35,000 ft 56'£ then to 21«34 'N/105^33*E. The MIC sighting occurred at 2l*36*H/10*«57'E. Return of the flight was by reverse route with air refueling prior to return to base. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS £:1P" BLtE Jj_2,_3, J 2 - il50-gal external fuel tankc 1 - H-61 Gun (1«029 rd 20ffln ammo) BLUE 1 and } (F>10^F) 2 - SHRIKE (AGM-li5) 't - CBU-2tl BLUE 2 (F-105F) 2 - SHRIKE (AGM-'*5) 6 - 500-16 bombs BLUE ft (F-105D) 6 - 500-lb bombs BLUE 3 , » , ft TACAH/Off; Radar, IFP/Stby; Doppler/On MIG-21 HIC I. 2 ?llvor ccZor 4. ELIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Low stratus cf heavy haze which restricted visibility to the eaat to 1-2 miles and to the west to 3-ft miles. . BLUE 1 . 2 . 3 . II • ISk® Altitude : 16,000 ft Heading ; Southeasterly Speed : 550 kt ^8f^5^ Fuel: 12,000 lb Plight Formation : 5. INITIAL DETECTION ® BLUE 4 first .sighted two MIGs at 7 o'clock at a range of approximately 1/2 mile diving toward the flight In a descending turn and approximately 2,000 ft above the flight. An area MIG warning had been heard by BLUE 4. «. ACTION INITIATED BLUE ft Jettisoned his wing tanks as he called a break. BLUE 3 broke hard right and down as he Jettisoned external fuel tanks. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 1 and 2 Jettisoned external stores and maneuvered to counter the MIQ attack. Aa BLUE 3 and 4 entered the haze, where visibility was approximately one mile, they lost sight of the MIG and of BLUE 1 and 2. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE ft was having difficulty with one of the bayonet fittings on his oxygen nask allowing the mask to fall away from his face with mcveoents or from g forces. 10. AIRCREW COHHSNTS Ewnt 11-129 Total Ho ur 8 1,700 2»290 P-105 Houra Conbat Mlaalona 50 75 Remark a BLUE 3 BLUE 4 1,000 400 TAC background B-ii7 background Comments on this Encounter BLUE 3 - The MIOs were not very aggressive . Generally the MlOa go after the Wild Weasel and know which airplane In Che flight is the Wild Weasel. BLUE it - Could not stay with BLUE 3 In the defensive naneuverlng. CoBunents from Overall Experience BLLrE 3 - The EMO in the F-105P Is very helpful as a lookout because of the poor visibility to the rear. . The MIGa can out-turn the F-105 so it is a difficult situation with a MIC at 6 o'clock. BLUE t - BIG EYE area warnings Just clutter the radio. Heed coordination anong the different types of aircraft and missions- When using QRC poda, the SAM doesn't appear to guide and AA doesn't follow a flight aa effectively. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUE 3 6 Feb 1967 BLUE « 3 Feb 1967 Messages. Reports ; 355TFW OPREP-3 1602152 Jan 67 DOI 0218 355TFW OPREP-3 160515Z Jan 67 OOTO-0 10176 Jan 67 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was flying down the south aide of Thud Ridge at an altitude of 16*000 ft maintaining 550 kt. BLUE 3 and H were approximately one mile behind BLUE 1 and 2 with BLJE 4 trailing BLUE 3 by 500-1,000 ft. BLUE 4 sighted two MICs at his 7 o'clock in an attack. The flight was alerted to the presence of MIGs by BLUE H, The lead section, BLUE 1 and 2, jiettlsoned all external stores and dove into the haze layer in a descending right turn leveling out at 6,000 ft and egreasing from the area. BLUE 3 broke right in a descending turn and jettisoned his external tanks. As he tried to follow, BLUE 4 Jettisoned hla tanks, engaged afterburner, and then Jettisoned hia bombs. When BLUE 3 entered the haze, while reversing his turn, BLUE t lost sight of BLUE 3 and the HIQs. BLUE 4 executed a modified Spllt-S and leveled out at J4,00C ft in the haze and departed the area. BLUE 3 continued into the target area but when he discovered he was alone he returned to base. BLUE 1, 2 and 4 rejoined in the refueling area and returned to base. y Event 11-130 Aircraft Involved: Poup F-IOS0 vs Four NI0-21b Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter; 2l®36'M/lO**55*E I. .PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: I? January 1967/0759H (or 23592 on 16 Jan 1967) Pour P-105 aircraft (BLUE flight) froa Korat on a strike mission. II. DATA SOURCE RED BARON MIG Incident Summary (Reference PACAP CP31). 12. RARRATUt OkSCRIPTION BLUE flight was engaged Mlth four MG-218, no damage. &rentii-i3i Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s va one IIIQ-21 Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21"22*li/105"03*E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOK Date/Time: 16 January I967/1538H Pour P-105 aircraft on an IRON HAND mission. II. DATA SOURCES RED BARON HZO Incident Summary 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION This was a sighting only. No other data available. Event ZI-132 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSe va two NIO-21* Result: Ho danaga Vlelnlty of Encounter: Approx. 2l°50»H/105*50»E K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 17 January 1967/O838H ing outbouna co noSe oaaeT * «/l05"51'03"E) by Thai Nguyen and were proceed- 2. MISSION ROUTE north?:irJo^If 5iie;'^^%':' Lt'^lL^nS i** J*"*^*" ^S' P^^-^nke refueimg. then AT»eB«fr*coiirTRijimTToi« B LUE 1. 2. 1. ft 1 - QRC-160 pod 1029 rounds 20miD 2 - use gal wing tanlca Centerllne tank ^ iKo2??a|e*S*2or5?'J^fnt"''* '^^PPl*^ o"- . _6 - 750 lb bomba y-105 BLUE 1 and } 1 - AIK-9 MIC-21 MIQ 1. 2 2 * AAH nl as ilea Sliver color 4. FtlGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER W*ainS£: Clear, vlalblllty one to two milea in haze layer up to 60OO ft. ^ B LUE HI 0-21 pSedT- -North- ruel State : 9000 lb-— 5. INITIAL DETECTION Kach Sf tSifSS SSn^^ri^fpSHed'r^o «l'cs 'S^SeiTS V'.Vr' ''^ ^'^ at an altitude 5f 10.000 ft. Thev weri !l u?«°^?"^°''^ poalt on, one mile out their ahape aa seen Ciien tSiy jCJ^rS. " ' -''•<»l«tely. du, to S. ACTION INITIATED tiiiS'T'J?n:2,.%SSt"«!!" 1" »•"■«' BUS 7, SITUATION DEVELOPMENT « t.-sii? r»%-JL%'M'ci;.*:^S";s:«j^? „«ti„u. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total P-105 Combat Houra Houra Hiasions Remarka V""^ \ '•SO 200 20 very experienced pilot. Commenta on this Encountef factor?n"^M3 ZTou'llr: "Sey'^SSS 'flS? i'go'Sr^*' low altitude waa the saving turn capability. * cannot fight a HIO alr-to-alr due to the MlO'a auperlor Comment s from Overiii] Rirperlence help rJi}ii;%io;s2-x?"s^/LK"s.::stJi:%?r,js; £:Su^^^"fir-^^-s^^- n. DATA SOURCES Event 11-132 Pro ject Intervlgw : BLUE .4, 6 Feb I967. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Flight was the last one In ffon Takhll, It was about eight alnutes late and KLtrtll !°V*^ °" f^ftfon the second wave which was from Korat. Flight M^T.^r ^ schedule^ to come in approximately 10 minutes after the flight from Takhll * congestion in the taxiway that morning and the airplanes n^iii !J ^"^.f^^/"* i!!^ ^""^ ^° planned airspeed it was difficult L L ««?ther -as clear with about two miles visibility through a haze is rMShi?„*?«*Jii*li'**.'' ^"S*'^ Sighted the target by the 85mm that I« !!^« * barrage that was Impossible to miss. Very little fire was jn«ountered coming in. When moving out from the target, and making a turn at about ^Ll ^J^rrl f^UE U spotted two MIGs at 9 o'clock and a range of one or possibly two a i?!;^ u started to turn in behind tUe BLUE Plight. BLUE k called two bogeys at 90 clock and turning m. At this point. BLUE 2 punched his tanks off. BLUE Plight «Tf«7''^TTJ!?*iL*lf''" "1°*' lo»^"« any airspeed, and no break or heavy r iTJ^^ ^t"-*" '*11 ^" "^^l^'^ «t 7 o'clock. The Mias lilTi «rJ i^f mlssHe range but they weren't within the angle off. The mcs had a range problem and couldn't close in on BLUE Plltfit. The MIOs dropi.*d back and BLUE Plight continued up the hlU where a SAM was uSnched at them. but r!IIl*fn?^!S/ii*?^iT"K'L'''* 5°** "*^«' turning they sighted two more MIOs, .•' Event 11-133 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs HIOs Result: Ho dlaoage Vicinity of Encounter: Approx. 21^30 'N/IOS^IO'B 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 17 January 1967/25 minutes after sunrise (approx. 08l5H) Poup P-105S were on a strike mission to JCS 21.11 (21°33'*l"N/105''51'O3'*E) when they sighted MIGs. BLUE Plight was preceeded by a flak^suppresslon flight and another strike flight. 2. MISSION ROUTE Departed Takhli, refueled and headed northeast until reaching the Red River where It crosses the 105° longitude. Then proceeded southeast to target. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS NIOS * Silver 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Cloudy with an overcast over the mountains to the west and scattered Into the valley leading Into Hanoi with 1 mile visibility to the east and 3 miles to the west. BLUE I 5 g r- Alt itude : 8,000 feet Reading : Northeast Airspeed : Not reported Fuel ^tate ; Not repoi'ted Plight Formation ; Unknown 5. INITIAL UETECTION BL'JE Plight initially acquired sun glints at his 10:3C o'eloek position, a few miles probably from MTns m an orbit. 6. ACTION INITIATED KIQs Started a turn toward, descended and paralleled BLUE Flight's courses then BLUE Plight descended into the haze. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPED The KIQs followed BLUE Plight for 3 or 4 minutes. As BLUE Flight descended, BLUE 2 lost sight of the MIQs and they were no longer a threat. 8. ORDNANCE None expended. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None 10. . AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total P-105 Combat Hours Hours Hiss ions BLUE 3 4000 37S 17 Comments on this Encounter BLUE 3: NIOs seemed to be under OCX control and were directed on another flight. 11. DATA SOURCE Project Interview: BLUE 3 (B Feb 67) ET«nt 11-133 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was separated from the other flights since they were 2 miles to the right of course and the others were 2 miles to the left. BLUE Plight was Inbound to the target at 8,000 when BLUE 3 saw .>oiRe flashes of sunlight to the northwest at about his 10:30 o'clock position. The HIGs seemed to be In an orbit and then started to turn and descent Into BLUE Flight at first but then continued on around to parallel BLUE Plight's course. BLUE 2 kept them In- sight and the MIGs stayed with the flight for about 3 minutes, 3 to 4 miles outside of BLUE Flight's position. During this time BLUE 1 was In a descent into the haze layer which when reached all sight of the HlQa vanished. BLUE Flight continued on to Che target and then home. The HIQs were never Identified as to type. i «22 ft i f. i I I I I i I r' E»«nt H-131 Aircraft Involved: Three P-J.05s vs one NIO Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 2l»35*N/10li'**6*E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOB Date/Time: 17 January I967/I609H IRON HAND mission for strike on railroad yard at 21®33'M/105°51'E. 2. MISSION ROUTE . Plight from Korat flew over Red River and egressed with strike force from target. Thai Nguyen. o » 3. AIRCRAFT C0NFI6URAT IONS P-lOSr BLUE 1 2 SHRIKE nlsslles 2 CBUs on wing P-105D BLUE ?. i\ b 500-lb bombs 2 450-gal tanks SIDEWINDER QRC-I60 NIG Silver In color 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather; Altitude : Headlnj^T Air Speed ; hiel State . PHrht Forma 1 1 on S. Not reported 9000 ft Not reported 580-600 kts Not reported Net reported INITIAL DETECTION »i« K??^* by unknown member of BLUE flight at the same altitude, 2 or 4 o'clock from night's position at a distance of 5 n ml. Unidentified aircraft thought to be a HIG, 6. ACTION INITIATED MIC trailed BLUE flight for a short distance and then BLUE flight lost sight of it. , 7. SITUATION DEVELOPNENT The aircraft took no aggressive action and disappeared into the clouds. e. ORD.^ANCE None expended. 9. EQUrPHENT PROBLEMS ^^^S^^^"^*^ warfare operator's vector gear. (BLUE 1) BLUE 3 aborted on tanker. BLUE I's heading indicator. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience : Unknown Comments on this Encounter ; h.^ .IHifJ**'*^^*'"^*** * WEASEL and two wlngmen due to the fact that Number 3 had aborted, so we were Just more or less staying back in a fighting wing poaltlon! n. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE 2, 15 February 1967 Hessage: 0PRf;p-3 0-1716592. 17 January 1967 from 388 TPW for DGCO »23 » Event 11-135 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs two MIG-17s Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'ST'N/lOH^SS'E 1. PRtKAftV MISSION AKD TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 17 January- 1967/0820H A strike mission of four P-105S. (BLUE Plight) from Korat* 2. MISSION ROUTE Not reported. ). AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS Not reported. «. FMfiHT CONOITIOHS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Not reported. BLUE I S 5 y Altitude ; 15,000 ft Hc adinfi T Not reported S£eea: 5^*0 kts Fuel State ; Not reported Plight Ponnatlon ; Not reported 5. INITIAL OET£CTION Made by BLUE 2 at his 10 o'clock position, 1 miles distant. 6. ACTION INITIATED None 7. SITUATIPH'n?VP!.ePKO Sighting only. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None . TO. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total P~105 Combat Hours Hours Miss i o n s BLUE 2 1200 200 20 Coaments from Overall Experience BLUE 2 woulc} not want to give up speed for turning capability. If he fought would want to be low, never high, and In the 6 o'clock position. Would never turn with any MIG. Training was not adequate in alr-to-alr tactics to cope with MIOa. The lights which operate off the pod are in the wrong place, and one has to look back and down to see them. The radio is in the wrong place. Would like to see the guns checked out Mith boreslghting . High speed at low altitude is an advantage. If we pull i* Q's, we have defeated hla weapon Byatems . 11. DATA SOURCE Project Interview ; BLUE 2, 15 February 1967 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE 2 saw a MID at his 10 o'eloek position, 4 nllea distant and level with his flight just as they were about to roll In on the target. BLUE Plight was at 15»000 ft and about 5*0 kt ground speed. When sighted, the HtQs were turning. No action was Initiated, flight dropped bombs on target and returned safely to home base. BLUE 2 did not Identify the aircraft. It Mas not until later that It was positively Identified by other members of the flight and correlated by another flight in the gaggle. Aircraft Involved: 7our P-1Q50» VB four iua-21s Result: No damage Vicinity or Encounter: 21*06 'N/105*05*E 1. PRIHARY HISSIOK AND TACTICAL SITUATION ■ Date/Tine: 21 January 67/081411 Strike Diaslon by four F<-105Ds (BLUE Plight) on the Viet Trl RR yard at 21«17'56"M/ 105*26 'lO^E. There was a MIOCAP on this olsalon. The strike flights which encountered the MIOs were those In Events 11-136, 11-137, 11-139 and Il-m. The aircraft in Event 11-136 was the lead flight. 2. MISSION ROUTE Departed Korat , Thailand to tanker (refueled on Red Anchor), direct to Channel 97, direct to target (21oia'N/105*>26^E) and returned the same route. 3. AHCP*FT f(»«>mimTO«l F^XOSD BLUE 1. 2. 3. ft 4 - CBU-2US 1 - qRC-160 (on B-4 for certain) 1 - AIM-9B 2 - 06 -N/IOS^OS 'E) keeping their AIM-9Bs. BLUE Plight then eiecuJeS SrlS'tJ 5* turn, then reversed back with a Spllt-S. The MIOs were seen to overshoot BLUE Plight and climb sharply out of sight and BLUE 4 observed white smoke streaming from one of the MIOs, assumed to be cannon fire. BLUE Plight did a iSo* and returned to base safely with no damage to any aircraft. Th« .?i:I!Ji'*J!*'5^T!? ;-«>an'» /Isnal on his vector gear immediately after the encounter. The signal »aa 2-1/2 to 3 rings at ti o'clock, and could have some from either the HIOs or ;;°B?Si JiJ:iS^i:,fi^S*'-TS!/i'r* ^tf^^^r* warnings. There wai no co™uni2at?on by BLUE Plight with the HIQCAP before the sighting or after. *Sl"artic!lilS''fllJhtr"''" ^^"^^ 'owees as to time and place, depending on ^ Event 11-137 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105D8 vs three NIG-218 Result: No Jamage Vicinity of Qficounter: 20 miles from target (approx. 21*'27'M/i05 07'E) 1. PRINARr NISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 January 1967/0812H Mission was a strike mission on the Viet Trl Rfl yard (2l'*17*56"N/105**26'10''B) . The strike nights which encountered KIGs were those in Events II-13fii II'l'il, II>139 and 11-137. Here MICCAP aircraft In support of this mission. 2. HI:>$ION ROUTE Departed Korat Air Base, Thailand for Red Anchor to Channel 97 • then direct to target. i, AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION P-lCSDa BLUE 1 . P, ? , J* 6 - 750-lb bombs 2 - 'JSO-gal tanks 1 - SIDEWINDEK (AIK-9B) 1 - Cun (1,029 rounds) MIO-21 Unknown 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ! 8000 ft undereast BLUE 1. 2. 3. H Altitude: 14,000 Reading ; 062° Spee d: Unknown Fuel State : Unknown Plight Pornatlon: Pod Pomatlon S. INITIAL DETECTION I 9 o'clock position, in trail formation* high, wj l-l/2-:> Biles out, heading 100°, flying straight positive overtake of approximately 1-1/2-2 miles out, heading 100 , flying straight and level. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight turned hard left Into NIQs but MIGs did not follow or flra at BLUE Plight. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT MIGs were then seen at 11 o'clock and diving on the flight in front of BLUE Plight who went intc a sharp right turn Jettisoning their ordnance. [This flight was the flight of Event I I- 111.} BLUE flight also Jettisoned ordnance and followed the turn. 8. ORDNANCE 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None reported 10.. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience : Unknown Comaients on this Encounter ; Hone Comments from Overall Experience BLUE 1: It would be Ideal if we had one switch that we could throw that would make us able to fire the AIH-9 after being In an air-to-ground mode. r,. DATA SOURCE P roject Tntervlews : BLUE 1, 10 Feb 67 Ressages: OPREP-3 Z 210505Z Jan 6Y, from 380TPW Kera^ 001 0211 Event U-137 12. NA.TRATIVE DESCRIPTION . The flights In EventsII- 1 36 , 11-137, 11-139. and II-li;i were procccdlnR to the target In a bo« formation. Each flight was In a pod ffcrraatlon, and the box formation had two flights In the lead, line abreast, follOMed by two more flights, line abreast, about one mile to the rear and about 1,000 ft higher. Tne flights flying line abreast were 1,500 to 2,000 ft apart, with the ali-craft In Event II-I36 (the mission commander) on the right front, and those of Event II-lUl jn the left front. Following were the aircraft in Event 11-137 and 11-139, "1th the aircraft of Event 11-139 on the right. The placement of the elements within each flight is unknown. At least two flights of KIG-21s (probably 3-1 aircraft each) made a pass on the for- matlor., one descended from 9 o'clock and very hl^n, passing through the formation In a steep dive, between the leading and following flights. The other MlGs were able to attack the lead two flights closing within one-half mile. The action occurred at sometime between OSliOH and 08'4'iH^ and lasted about I.5 minutes. When first attacked the formation was in the general vicinity of 21'07'N/105'05'E. * While Che action was restricted in time and place, the accounts are such that corre- lation of sightings cannot be accomplished precisely. Moreover, the flights did not main- tain continuous visual contact with each other; therefore, the reconstruction of the action cf each flight has been documented separately. The flight was in the pod formation with other flights. Inbound to the target. At about 20 miles out from the target the flight saw three M10-2ls at their 9 o'clock posi- tion in a positive overtake, high, one and one-half miles out, heading 100°. BLUE Plight was at It, 000 ft, heading 062°. BLUE Flight then turned left into MIGs but they did not turn into BLUE Plight, attack, or fire their cannons. BLUE Flight rolled out 0700. ^t in Bllea out BLUE 2 called out MIGs at 11 o'clock at which time BLUE 1 looked up and saw what he thought was an afterburner igniting^ from a diving aircraft. BLUE Fllsht then heard BLUE 2 and k of this flight call MIGs at 6 o'clock. Shortly after the MIGs passed through the formation (these MIGs were not seen by BLUE Plight, only inferred from calls from other flights), BLfE Plight heard a call from an IBOM HAND Plight that there were SAMs launched. Three SAMs were then observed to come out of the oversast. BLUE 1 estimated only 30 seconds elapsed between the MIGs and the SAM attack. The flight directly in front of BLUE Flight broke left, the flight on the right broke right and up, and the flight out in front broke right and down. Jettisonlns ordnance. ^ With the weather conditions compounded by SAHa and MIQa, the decision was nad* to abort, so the bombs and tanks were Jettisoned at 21009 ' N/I05015 » e at OSftSH, altitude 13,000 ft, speed HOO kt , heading 020 deg. The AIM-9Bs were retained. BLUE Plight then proceeded outbound to Channel 97- During egress BLUE 2 and t called out MIO-215 behind the fli^t and on a reciprocal heading. BLUE 1 did not see these, only the afterburner light as the HIGs engaged afterburner. •There are minor differences in the OPREP sources as to time and place, depending on the particular flight. ^ 2BLUE 1 did not see any MIGs in this instance, only the afterburner light. All flieht members saw the initial three MIG-21s. **s««.. lAigni Hi I I t I 1 I I I I I Event 11-136 Alrerairt Involved: Pour P-lQSs v."* eight , NZO-lTs and two NIO-218 Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: I 21»25'N/106»27'B 1. PRINARr NISSIOK AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 January 1967/1605H Four P-105B (BLUE Flight) waai one of a group of flights on a Strike mission on a railroad yard 15 miles north of Xep airfield. 2. MISSION ROUTE ' The flight was from Korat but the route la unknown, 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS BLUE 1. 2. 3. 1 (Drop oraiiancc unknown) 1 - AIM-9B 1 - QRC-160 ; 1 - Gun (1,029 rounds) 2 - 450-gal fuel tanks HIO-17 (MlOa 1 to 8) Crey in color HIG-21 (MIO 9. 10) Silver * • 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; 10,000 ft. overcast > . BLUE 1. 2. 3. ft 9,000 ft ' Passing through 135* 150 kt Unknown Unkniowi Altitude: Heading: Speed : Fuel: Plight formation: 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 1 saw the MlOa low while In a left turn at his 1 to 2 o'clock position* about it, 000 ft altitude ehaaing lanother flight, of P-lOSs. 6. ACTION INITIATED t BLUE Plight Jettisoned their ordnance and' set up for air missiles. By this time. BLUE Flight had overtaken the MlQa so that the MZQs were at S o'clock and were lost from sight. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPED Tne flight continued, and sighted more HIfr-17a and MI0-21S, but no engageDent evolved. 10. AIRCREM COMMENTS .. I Experience Total ij P-105 Combat Hours ' Hours Missions BLUE 1 3.300 450 15 Comments on this Encounter BLUE 1: MlGs were lost visually partly because he had to aet up missiles and take his eye off them. Takes tjoo much time. Comments from Overall Experience BLUE 1: When carrying QP.C;-160, Z have noticed the 85mm flak is quite inaeeurate and obviously visually fired. n. DATA SOURCE Project Interviews ; BLUE 1, 15 Feb 67 Messages: 6^^£P-J| ROLLIHG THUilDER O86, 21 Jan 67 fron 388TPW «31 Event 11-138 12. MARRATIVC DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was the lead flight of a four-flight gaggle (Including GREEN Plight) attacklHK a railroad yard on the northeast railway about 15 miles north of Kep airfield. The strike force encountered very heavy and accurate 85mn flak from 21'*30'N/106»?7'E to the target (approximate location 21<*37'N/1C6»3«'E). The weather was restricting the operation since clouds were at 10,000-12,000 feet. Two aircraft in the number two strike flight collided while dodging the flak, bursting at the flight's altitude, which was about" 1,000 feet below the overcast. When the flleht got to the vicinity of the target an unidentified voice called "there are MlOa back there," BLUE Plight turned left to check, but .10 MIGs were observed. The distraction, combined with the flak, caused BLUE Plight to overfly the target and so the flight started a left turn. In the left turn, when passing through a heading of 135-100 degrees BLUE 1 saw a niRt.t of F-105S (CREEIJ Flight) paralleling BLUE Plight's course about a mile out and belo«. BLUE Plight was at 9-10,000 feet at the tine, and GREEN PllRht {one of the strike flights with BLUE Flights) was at about C,000 feet. BLUE 1 also observed two gray Hia-»7» at 1-2 o'clock, which were chasing the OREEN Flight. The MIGs were at about *,0OO ft altitude at GREEN'S 1-5 o'clock position about 2 miles behind GREEN Plight. Blue Plight was going faster than GREEN Plight and by the time BLUE Plight set up the switches for clssiles air and Jettisoned ordnance, the MIGs were at 5 o'clock. BLUE Flight turned to the left to cone back on the HIGs but BLUE « turned right. By the tiae the remaining three membera of BLUE Plight had joined, the MIGs and P-1058 were lost from view. BLUE Plight (BLUE 1, 2, 3) then returned to the target area to provide coverage for possible separated aircraft, while BLUE U exited. BLUE Flight made two 360 degree turns before exiting. At approximately I6IOH (it is not known whether BLUE Flight was orbiting or egressing at this time) when at 21«25'N/106°30'E, heading 075* at 8,000 ft altitude and 500 kt, BLUE 3 saw six gray MIG-17s Immediately below the flight in a left hand race- track orbit at 3,000 ft altitude. At the same time, BLUE 2 saw two silver MIG-2I3 at 4,000 ft altitude heading 210 degrees. All of the fllgi.ta with BLUE Plight Jettisoned ordnance without striking the target. However, one other fll^t of another group did hit the target. B II II S I »3Z y Event 11-139 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-lOSs va one NIG-21 Reault: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 20 mllcB from 21»l9'N/ 105*26 *E (approxlofttely 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oat«j/Tlir.e : 21 January 1967/08'JtH Four F-105S (BLUE Plight) in a pod formation were to strike the. Viet Trl RR yard (21«18'N/105'*26'E). BLUE Flight was part of the strike force consisting of the aircraft In Events II.136i 11*141, 11*139. and 11-137. There was a KIQCAP for this mission. 2. MISSION ROUTE Departed Korat and refueled » then direct to Channel 97 « and from there direct to the target . 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS BLUE 1. 2. 3. 1 1 - 6lmr\ gur. (1 ,029 rounds) 2 - 450 gal tanks 1 - AIM-9B Unknown bomb stores (probably six 7S0 lb) KIC Unknown 4. FLI6KT COKOITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ! Overcast with minimal visibility. Altitude ; Speed ; f uel State ; WiKht Formation : BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4 15.000 ft 062» Unknown Unknown Unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION The MIO was seen at 9 o'clock by BLUE Plight at 35,000 ft displaced out to the side a 1-2 Qlles. The MIO was seen only by BLUE 1 who saw a NIO-21 high, in a deaoendlng spilt S, but Immediately lost the HIO agalnat the sky background. «. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight continued on until NlOa rolled In and went below flight. Plight then Jettisoned ordnance when the other members of the formation Jettisoned and turned to south. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPED Flight egressed without further Incident. 8. ORDNANCE None 9. CQUIPNENT PROBLEMS None TO. AIRCRCU COMMENTS Experience Total Hours P-105 Hours ISO 175 Combat Missions 67 Unknown BLUE 1 Unknown BLUE 3 2800 Conmen ta_ o n This Encounter BLUE 3: Apparently the MIQs knew we always seen to go up to the targets this way, and they were up there that day and waiting for us. I think they were so steep that they couldn't have fired at this point. The HlQa made a very aggressive attack. Event 11-139 r' 10. AIR CREW COMMENTS (Continued) Coowents from Overall Experience BLUE 4: On break-up flights flew through each other, Cftualng some confusion. n. DATA SOURCES Pro/.-'ct Interviews : BLUE 1, 18 Feb 68 j BLUE 3, 16 Feb 68 Kessagesl 388 TPW OPREP-4 ROLLING THUNDER 03* 21 Jan 67 12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOK The flights m Events 11-136, 11-137, 11-139, and Il-lUl were proceeding to the tarcec In ? box formation. Each flight was In a pod formation, end the box formation had two nights in the lead, line abreast, followed by two more flights, line abreast, about one mll'j to the rear and about lOQO feet higher. The flights flying line abreast were 150C to 1000 feet apart, with the aircraft in Event II-I36 (the mission eontnander) on the rl^l.t frcnt, and those of Event II-lll on the left front. Following were the aircraft in Events 11-137 and ZI-139, with the aircraft of Event 11-139 on the right. The place- 7.<»iit of elenents within each flight Is unkno%m. At least two flights of MIC-21s (probably 3 to ^ aircraft each) made a rass on the formation; one descended from 9 o'clock and very high, passing through the formation In a steep dive, tetween the lead and following flights. The other MICa were able to attack the lead two flights closing to within 1/2 mile. The action occurred at some time between OSiJOH and 0894H and lasted about 1.5 minutes. When first attacked the formation was In the general vicinity of 2l*'07'N/ lOS'OS'E. (Thire are minor differences in the 0?REP sources as to time and place, deper.dlng on the flight.) While the action was restricted In time and place, the accounts are such that cor- relation of sightings cannot be accomplished precisely. Moreover, the flights did not maintain continuous visual contact with each other; therefore, the reconstruction of the action of each flight has teen documented separately. Plight was Inbound to the target when someone called out MICa at 9 o'clock high to BLUE Flight who was heading 062°. BLUE 3 looked up and saw a flight of F-ts go by on a reciprocal heading, slightly high. BLUE 1 saw them also but looked up higher to see some MIG-21S In a spllt-S maneuver from 35,000 ft but then lost them In the blue. BLUE Flight never saw them but It Is thought that the MIGs rolled out beneath BLUE Flight and pulled up In front of them and fired at the lead flight In front of BT.UE Plight. BLUE Flight Jettisoned It's crinance when it was called by the mission cor nder. The lead flight (who had made a IbO" turn) flew through BLUE I's formation. ' Plight then turned to the south, asking the lead flight for DF steer but could not see the MZOs though BLUE Plight was behind the flight being hounded bv NIOs. BLUE Flight then made a few 360" turns, during the first of which BLUE 3 and 4, become separated from all BLUE 1 and 2. •3« Evrnt 1I-1»0 Aircraft InvolvQd: Pour P-lOSs vn two HZ0-17N Reault: No danage Vicinity of EfMounter: Bpproximately 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 January 1967/Approxlaately 1525H Pllght\"ve^t7l.l\^"''' suppreaaion by four P-lOSa (BLUE Plight) preceded by an IRON HAND Z. MISSION ROUTE Departed Takhll for the Gulf of Tonkin for air refuelliw then waai:m»^ i>a and returned same route. BLUE Plight waa SeSJxJd bHh SJjS^d «S ^"KSS. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS hLljsL 1 utio 3 BLUE 1. 2. 3. H } " ?T5*i«° 5 - CBU-ZHa 1 - AIM-9B 2 - «50 gal tanka BLUE had a QRC-I60 1 - gun (1,029 round.) pod radar standby, TACON-on IPF-on (lead only) Doppler-on BLUE 1, 3. K had QRC.160 pod a MIG5 - unknown 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Ondereaat. acattered to broken above 20,000 ft; 5 mlXea. vlalblllty In hate. BLUE 1. 2. 3. » Altitude ; 6,000 ft j>cdali. e.; We»;,efly (270*) A/S: 525 - 550 KCAS Puei: 10,000 lb Plight Ponnatlon ; Pod 5. INITIAL DETECTION »if4tf!Ji^^^ waa heading westerly when BLUE 2 observed 2 M10-17s heading easterly. CO- altitude, 1 to 1-1/2 mllea out, 80- off the right wing (about 2-2:30 o'clock)". 6. ACTION INITIATED 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE Plight continued on and the NlOa ware loat froa sight. 8. ORDNANCE None. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS Nona. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total p-i05a Combat BLUE 2 1,100 700 30 Comments on This Encounter BLUE 2: It looked like they still had a lot of fuel In their tanks for they aarked real well when they got rid of them. Didn't appear to be OCI controlled. Bv«nt 11-140 ^* Ccaaaenta on Overall Experience BI^ 2: If we see a MIQ carrying an IR missile we drop It down and get out of hla envelope in the ground noise. If we see him in time we can out run him. If you see the HIQ first, press a high speed attack, hit hln, and get out. 11. DATA SOURCE Project Interview - BLUE 2 (3 Peb 67) BLUE 3 and < interviewed on U Peb 67 but could not add to the data on this avtnt. 12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTtON BLUE Plight was inbound to the target at 6»000» on wasterly heading at 525 to 550 kt. BLUE 2 then saw 2 MIOs (either 15 or 17a) 80» off his right wing heading easterly - I- 1/2 miles out, at approxlnately the same altitude. BLUE 2 called It to the other nenAiers of BLUE Plight, and saw the MIGa fly to the line abreast, when they then dropped their tanks and turned Into BLUE Plight. BLUE Plight then dropped their tanks and In- creased their airspeed to 575 KCAS. MIGs dropped back at BLUE'S t:3Q position and BLUE Plight Just outran thetn. BLUE Flight t^sn hit target and on egress from area never did see KIQs again. All aircraft returned safely to home base. Shortly after crossing the coast line BLUE Plight heard the IROK HAND Plight {Event II- 141) encounter MIGs and although the radio transmissions were Bonitored inbound and outbound the flight never saw the aircraft Involved. y tvent ii-m Aircraft Involved: Poup P-105Da va nine or ten MI0*-21ft Result: No damftKe Vicinity of Encounter: 21*07'N/105*05*E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 January igeT/OS^OH P ioJ^fSrnp%^''^n'** !!Iw^*i?!? **** "^^^ y***** (21«17'56"N/105»26'10"E) by 4 F-l05a (BLUL Plight). . The flights In Events II-136, -141, -I39. and -137 were also ttmrt of the strike force. There was MIOCAP for this Blaslon. 2. MISSION ROUTE 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION BLUE 1. 2. 3. 6 - 750-lb bombs 2 - tanks 1 - QRC-I60 I - AIM-9B 1 - 20mn cannon (1,029 rounds) MlO-21 Unknown «. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER BLUE 1. 2. 3. k Altitude : 16,000 ft Heading: 050 o Air speed ; 480 KTAS Kue 1 :. Unknown mght formation ; Pod formation with 1,000 ft vertical and horisontal separation. 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE ? and 3 simultaneously saw and called out three Kia-21a at thm rifirhft. 6. ACTION INITIATED 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT Someone then called MIGs at 3 o'clock And nrtiir dh.w* , ^ , ^ BLUE Plight then reversed the ?urn, aSd Sin Se SiSs lilSS Vmrl if*?h^ position to down below the flight. Tanks were i.itJ.^SlS !!- ?* * o'clock ^they're coming «p from helo'iJSliuE^JJJlhrSni'SiJrS?^ t'CJn^a'S SJJiSc.. 9, EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS rid o?"Ee^.'''"""'* Jettison bombs normally so had to Jettison MER rack also to get TO. AIRCREW COHHCNTS Experience Total P-105 Combat Hours Hours Missions 2 3^500 no 15 approx. ^ Event 11-141 Comioepta on thla Encounter ' BLUE 2: The MIC appeared unable to track during his attack and did not attempt to , salvas* his run by turning Into BLUE Plight. Cowmenta on Overall Experlencg BLUE 2: We have a good system (F-105) as It la right now if we had a tetter power«-to-wel^t ratio. 11. DATA SOURCE Project Intei-vlgw : BLUE 2, 17 Jan 67 Messatres : 38BTFW OPREP-3 210525Z Jan 67 DOI 0206 12. MftRATIVE DESCRIPTION Tlie flights m Events 11-136, 11-137, 11-139, and II-lUl were proceeding to the target in a box formation. Each flight was In a pod forraation, and the box formation had 2 fllriits in the lead, line abreast, followed by 2 more flights, line abreast, about one mile to the rear and about 1000 feet higher. The flights flying line abreast were 150 to 2000 feet aoart, with the aircraft In Event 11-136 (the mission eononander) on the right front and these of Event 1I-1»1 on the left front. Following were the aircraft In Events 11-137 and 11-139 with the aircraft of Event 11-139 on the right. The placement of the elements within each flight is unknown. At least two flights of MIG-21s (probably 3-'' aircraft each) made a pass on the formation, one descended from 9 o'clock and very high, passing through the formation In a ateep dive, between the lead and following flights.- The other MIGs were able to attack the lead two flights closing to within 1/2 mile. The action occurred at some time between 0640H and 08<(4H^ and lasted about 1.5 minutes. .When first attacked the formation was In the general vicinity of 21^07'H/ 105°O5*E.^ While the action was restricted in time and place, the accounts are such that correlation of sightings cannot be acconpllshed precisely. Moreover, the flights did not maintain continuous visual contact with each other, therefore, the reconstruction of the action of each flight had been documented separately. BLUE Plight was Inbound to the target at 16,000 ft heading 060" at HBO let when SLUE 2 and 3 saw a flight of aircraft at their B o'clock position at 35,000 ft altitude 2 nmi out. At first, BLUE 2 thought they were P-iis but then they dove on the flight and sooeone called out "they're Hia-21s." lead then went into a shallow left turn. BLUE 3 and 4 called out MI :1s at 3 o'clock high and lead turned to the right. HZOs at 8 o'clock were now 1 nml behind, however, the NIGs on the rl;ht appeared to be diving on another flight and Lead reversed back to the left, descending in time for BLUE 2 to see Mics dive below the flight's 6 o'clock position 1/2 nai out and low. These NIGs were not seen again. As BLUE Plight reversed, BLUE 2 heard other flights call MIGs at 6 o'clock and shooting. BLUE Flight then saw the other flights Jettison their tanks and they did the saate. Then s«neone from another flight called out "they're coming up from 6 o'clock low." At this point everyone started a hard turn to the left in after- burner at which time BLUE 1 called for Jettlaonlng of the ordnance In the vicinity of 21*X2»K/105'*12'r BLUE Plight was now at 12,000 ft 420 KTAS, heading 010" at 21"12*II/105"12*E, 0841H, in a left turn and descending through a cloud layer. While descending BLUE 3 observed 3 BK>re NIC'-21s' immediately below then at 3,000 ft altitude heading approxi- mately ISO". BLUE Flight continued In left turn to the west and egrosaed the area. Plight returned safely home. During ittgreaa BLUE Plight experienced moderate flak exploding about 1,000 feet below them, starting about 30 miles out from the target. After the flight's iSO** turn, and during egress, very little flak waa seen, and It was not in their Imnediata vicinity. ^There are minor differences In the OPREP sources as to time and place, depending on the pmrtlcular flight. ^Of the 24 boMba in BLUE Plight l8 were dropped armed. BLUE 3 Jettisoned safe due to failure of normal release. Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105Ds w flw MM-lTa Re»ult: No dainage Vicinity of Encounter: 21*1X*«/106'»46'B 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Time: 21 January 1967/15J2H «r. iTe Xoi,'Z,u''lif;^i,'llU!iA fi'JiS '^t" «S 18.23. Th.r. 2. HISSION ROUTE to 21*J?'J/l"7'58'E'5l'Jeit'?S 5^'u?^/IS2^J;.^°!:,"'J^•il"f Bro«n Anchor then direct Egreee was the reverse of iSouid ro!!u? 21-WN/106»12'E to tarje?. 3. AIRCRAFT C0NFI6URATI0HS * ?-10S BLUE 1, ^ ? - 3.000 lb bombs 1 - QRC-160 1 - 650 gal t»nJcs 1 - «un (1.029 rounds) P^IOS BLUE h 6 - 750 lb bombs 1 - QRC-160 2 - t50 sal tanks 1 - gun (1,029 rounds) MIQ>17 Mia 1, p, „^ ^ Sliver in color 4. fLUHT CONOITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER !M= Cloud. X200 ft scattered to bro ken; visibility 3 mile. In base at 6000 ft. I 5 3 7 —1500 ft AOL-- Headlnp;: j^^o Fuel State ! Uhknom Plight F ormation : Tactical 5. INITIAL DETECTION ?':'5V^;„L%^nSS!.°^&'»'^"S.»J,«;»4 contact .a. „ lUGs were low, on the deck. was at ^500 ft altitude heading 276® and 6. ACTION INITIATED lit *S!JbSMr^S^Jc«llrated''iiaJ.°'^ ^' «»n«-*>»l' mie. back, BLUE Plight 7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT .galn^S!? Jii'^iei?'^ .gain .a. tto.. this time at 10 o'clock but 9. EQUIPHE.'fT PROBLEMS BLUB 2, 3, 4 QRc Pod didn't work * Had ft compressor stall and had to divert Into Danang. Unable to refuel alno. BLUE 1 Overload on battery - had to shut It down. 10. AIRCREW PROBLEMS Experience : BLUE H about his 52 mission. Comments on this Encounfc*!* ! control"^ecauai SriSe'SiirLj;?."'"' '^"^ 3 or 4. n,e Hio. must have been under OCX 439 y Event 11-144 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105s vs five to eight MIG-17a Results: One P-I05 damaged Vicinity of Encounter: 21^13 'N/106**2«*E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND* TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 January 1967/approxlmately I62OH Four F-1055 on a Sah suppression nlsslon in support of a strike In the Hanoi Delta region. The strike force was to hit the Bac Olang railroad and highway bridge (JCS 18.23), 2. MISSION ROUTE Takhll to air refueling over the Oulf of Tonkin, then north to the coast at 21*00 »M/ 107'21'E. Direct to 2I''13'N/106*24'E. The egress route was the reverse. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F -lCiF BLU^ 1 and | 2 - ACH-1*5 2 - CBU-2II 2 - i*50-gal tanks 1029 rounds 20min atr.110 P-IO5D BLUE 2 and ll ^ 6 - "jOO-lb bombs 2 - 'JSO-gal wing tanks 1029 rounds 20rBn amcio All aircraft camouflaged MIG-17 Dull sliver with Red Star Armament unknown Had afterburners Drop tanks were seen as they were jettisoned 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Clear 3 to !> miles visibility below 7000 ft. BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4 Altitude : 2500 ft Heading: 090 Speed : 500 KTAS Fuel State : 10,000 lb Flight Forr.atlon The flight had just fired a SHRIKE at an altitude of 6000 ft on a heading of about 300 degrees and had completed a right diving turn to a heading of east. BLUE 1 in front and BLUE 3 and k off to his left 2-3000 ft out. BLUE 2 was Inside the turn and 6-7000 ft back. BLUE 2*3 burner went out in the turn. 5. INITIAL DETECTION MIO warnings had been received by the flight prior to entering the target area froa BIO EYE. But none were received for this specific encounter. BLUE Plight heading east, 2500 ft altitude, and 500 knots. BLUE 4 called two MIO-lTs at 10 o'clock, 500 to 1500 ft high and parallel to the flight's direction, about 1 mile away. Three to four seconds later BLUE 2 called HIGs at 3 o'clock high. The MIGs at 3 o'clock were at close range, but opening on BLUE 2. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight jettisoned tanks and ordnance; lit afterburners and attempted to outrun the MIOa. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT The MICs at 10 o'clock attacked BLUE 3 and 4 causing then to break left and separate fro« the rest of the flight. Tlie MIGs inflicted two hits on BLUE 4 before BLUE 3 and 4 were able to accelerate away from them. Tr»e MiOs calle-l at 3 o'clock, dropped In on BLUE 1*8 6 o'clock position and fired at BLUE 1. BLUE 2 called a break md fired at the HIGs. The MIOa broke left as BLUE 1 broke right. Then two other MIGs attacked BLUE 2 ani chased him for several nilea firing several rounds of anno. BLUE 2's afterburner was ln.)peratlve consequently he was unable to outrun or maneuver away from the KIGs. Finally t.y HIGs broke off and SLUE 2 egreased the area. pi:*' ' •. --Si.-*^ «3 Event 11-144 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1. 3, and 1 BLUE 2 HIGs At least four HIGs fired at the flight NIG 2(one of the about .'"'^^^f ee^'ess. BLUE U , at 5000 ft altitude and 600 knots saw one M1G.17 at 12 o clock low 1.1/2 to 2 Riles away. The HIC was at 500 ft altitude on a reciprocal course. No action was taken by either the HIC or BLUE ft, and BLUE H continued to egress to the tanker. y. Event 11-115 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105B v» four Mia-17» Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^lT'H/lOS'SB'E 1. PRINARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlrae: 22 January 1967/0936H Four F-105S were on a strike mission. The target was a group of railroad tracks at Thang Quang siding. The flight was one of four In a gaggle fomation and was last flight in on target. 2. HISSION ROUTE Departed Korat and refueled. Then proceeded ME to the upper end of Thud Ridge to pick ;*p F-i* escort. Then do*m SE to target. Came off target In Boutherly heading and vent into right turn to proceed up Thud Ridge. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION F-105 BLUE 1. a. 3. 1 6 - 730 Ih OP bombs 2-430 sal tanks 1 - QRC - 160 POD 1 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9) TACAH - Rec. only; Radar, Stby, IPP/Stby, Pod/On, Doppler/Off MIO-17 mo 1. 2. 3. 1 Armament unknown Silver color 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Broken variable scatter, tops at 5,000 ft. Visibility 10 ni in hate. 3 t 1 BLUE 1 i 2 AltltuJe : KeadlngT Fuel State; 7,000 ft 290' 550 kt Unknown 4,000 ft Unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION MICs first seen by BLUE 1 while in a left turn at his 8 o'clock position 5-6,000 ft out at 4,030 ft altitude at 0936K. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 stayed in his slight left turn and continued ahead. He was already in front of MIQ3 and his speed was up. BLUE 2 want high. BLUE 3 and 4 turned and closed on MIQs. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPED BLUE 3 and 4 closed In on MIO 1 and 2. BLUE 3 went after MIO 1 who never got any closer than 3,000 ft on BLUE 1. BLUE 3 fired his missile which seamed to be at good range whereupon BLUE 1 broke hard right and downward and HIO 1 broke very hard left and deseeded very rapidly. Missile did not appear to guide due to high g load. All air« craft continued up Thud Ridge. S. ORDNANCE BLUE 1, 2, 4 BLUE 3 MIO 1. 2, 3. t Mo. flred/No. hits SIdewIKdES AIM-9B None VO Remarks Did not guide. Unknown Event II.l«5 9. EQUIPNCNT PROBLMS BLUE 3 had two bombs hung up and also a missile that appeared not to guide during HIO hlgli g turn. 10. AiRCRCH COHHEHTS E«perienee Total Combat Hours Hours His a ions BLUE 3 2600 70 50 CoBMcnts on This Encounter : BLUE 1 MIGs possibly Just came out of Phuc Yen talcing off to the SE and making a 180* turn to the left. They already had tne speed advantage and didn't want to alow dom. Didn't feel it was wise to chase them down to the middle of Hanoi. BLUii 2 Missiles did not perform the g load required tc take it. BLUE 3 As he set up for the missile, he thought that he heard the missile tone and eveiything appeared perfect. The visibility was bad that day and so it could have been that because of the haze layer that the SIDEWINDER did not track properly. NIGa mad* no attempt to follow the BLUE Plight. Conments irom Overall Experience : BLUE 1 The F-105 system Is an air-to-ground weapon system. Therefore* it is not as agile as a pure fighter system. It should not be required to do so much maneuvering In order to defend itself in the air superiority role. The P-IOS should have a weapon system that can work around the clock. BLUE 2 Thla la probably the flrat firing of a missile from a Thud so it might have surprised the NIQa quite a bit. BLUE 3 To go from a bombing mode to an air-to-air mode requires at least four steps In tbe fire control system. Heed more SIDEHINDER firings in training. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE 2 and 3, 16 Feb 67 Measages. Reports s saamr 220600 jan 67 » oprep 3. doi 1225 12. NARRATIVE OESCRXPTtON The flight cane off the target In a right turn through a southerly heading. BLUE 2 was Joining on BLUE 1 who had gone into a left shallow turn and was 2,000 ft back. BLUE 3 did some S-turns off so that he and BLUE ^ could rejoin as BLUE 3 had hung ordnance and wanted It confirmed by BLUE U. BLUE 3 Jettisoned the ordnance armed in the vicinity of Sl'SO'S/lOS'lO'E after the encounter. BLUE 1 heading 290*. 7000 ft altitude, and 350 kts CA5 observed four MIGs at his 8 o'clock position climbing in a left 10*> bank turn out of 4,000 ft In an element of two, heading 300^. He called the MIOs out to the rest of the flight at which time he observed the MIOs turning into him and closing to within 3,000 ft. This is as close as the two MIGs ever got. No one else in the formation ever saw MIC 3 and * and BLUE 1 lost sight of them after the initial sighting. Meanwhile, BLUE 2 high speed yo-yo'ed on the MIGs in an attempt to get into the 6 o'clock. BLUE 3 and 4 also saw the MIGs at their 9 o'clock, turned into them to engage, rolling out at their 6 o'clock 7,000 ft behind with a positive overtake, BLUE 1 then called for the fllSht to set up their missile switches which BLUE 2 and 3 acknowledged. BLUE 1 then saw the HIGs approaching the 6 o'clock and began Jinking. The HIGs stayed with them. By this tine BLUE 2 Is line abreast with the MIOs and is about to turn Into them when BLUE 3 calls that he is about to launch the mlsslJe. BLUE 2 then calls out that he will stay out of the way and BLUE 3 closes to within 3,000 ft of MIO 1. MIQ 2 meantime, is on the left wing of his leader following him and BLUE U is on the right of BLUB 3< BLUE 3 then calla Diaalle away, Alt 7.000 ft, speed 530 kt and BLUE 1 goes into a hard turn to the right and down. HIO 1 simultaneously goes into a very hard, steep descending turn to the left after the missile Is fired. Missile seems as though It is unable to keep up with the g loads of the MIC. BLUE 3 at this point cannot see MIG 2 since he has overflown him and la under his aircraft's nose. So BLUE 3 does an S-turn to the right and BLUE 1 pe^'forma a turn to the left. Both see the two MIGs in a descending turn to the south towards Hanoi. BLUE 2 then rejoins with BLUE 1, with BLUE 3 and It 3 to 5 miles behind, and all four aircraft fly up the ridge and head home. They do not follow the MIOs due to a high SAM threat In Hanoi area. fi^mi ffiiSf ggp BARON 1^.145 SUMMART — Tine - . Action Alrcraf ' Status t (BLUE 1, 3, 4) Ac 1 1 on Other Friendly Comnunicatlons Eneiiy Actions (MI6 1.2) ftenarks K}t: 7.000 ft c1 ioblng Speed: SSO kt Head: 290* Bl sees MIGs at 8 o'cloc i S-6.000 ft back 4.000 ft alt at approxinately 4S0 kt. 83 & 4 had re- i joined off target i AS 63 had hun^ < ordnance and ^ad i to jettison tUm. 83 sees MIGs et 9 o'clock. J1 called out 4 MIGj It 8 o'clock. 83 rails B4 "Those are I16s." 84 "Roger". >iI6s \r, left turn 10* head 300*. Sees 81 roll right to engage. me appear to be In traffic pattern and Just taking off froi Phuc Ven. 83 jettisoned the ordnance after the encounter. h AU: 7. SCO ft Speed: SSO lit 81 begins scissors. Call 63 to set up switches 92 goes high trying to get behind HISs 83 t 4 turn Into HIGs and roll out 7,000 ft behind M lU 1 » O O C 1 K • B4 on wing of 3. Bl calls 83 to set lip switches. 83 calls setting up switches as does B2 13 in afterburner. 83 calls ready to fire nisslle. HIG date to within 3.000 ft of 61 's 6 o'clock position and Jinx with Bl . AU: Descending Speed: increasing Bl breaks downward to thi right. B2 line abreast with H16s and stays high and out of the way. > B3 fires Missile at 3,000 ft. Loses sight of HI6 2. Begins an S-turn to to the right. 83 calls missile away. 62 calls staying out of way and high. MIGs break hard to the le^'t and down. After being in a right 20* break to the right when nisslle fired. Missile appears to track at first but doesn't seen to be able to withstand high g's forced on it by MIGs tight turn . Bl goes Into left turn and sees Ntfi descending left. 83 sees NIGs in descending left turn . Event II-lW Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSa vs four HI0-17S Result! No Daaase Vicinity of Encounter; Approximately 21*10«N/ 106<»3O'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATtON Oate/Tlme: 27 January 1967/Unknown Pour P*1058 on a Btrlke alaelon agalnat a railroad yard northeaat of Kep* 2. MISSION ROUTE Departed Korat RTAPB for the Qulf of Tonkin for air refueling, then direct to 20«08*N/107<>43*E, direct to 21*10*N/107*3t*E, directly west to target. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS e-lOji iilbL 1. i, j. H 1 - AIM-98 (SIDEWINDER) 1 - Gun (1,029 rounds) Other armaaent unknown MIQ-178 Unknown 4. FLIfiHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Overcast with tops at 5*000 ft. Visibility was good above the clouds. Target only area open. Area south Of target 6xoUd ooverda. BLUE 1. 2. 3. < Altitude : 15,000 ft Heading : Westerly Speed : 500-520 KTAS Fuel State ; Unknown Plight Pcrmation : Pod 5. IHITIAL CONTACT BLUE 3 initially sighted the HTGs at 10 o'clock position, low and cllnblng at about 12 nllea. Clear silhouette of MIQ-r.Ta. 6. ACTION INITIATED When niOs turned Into flight, BLUE Plight turned left into MIQs. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT HIGs broke off and continued reciprocal heading. No engagement. 8. ORDNANCE Hone expended. 10. AIRCREW COHNENTS Experience Total P-105 Conbat Hours Hours msaiona BLUE 3 1200 TOO 67 BLUE 1 4300 100 30 BLUE 2 and 4 Not Interviewed Ceaments on This Encounter BLUE 3 - MIQs were probably QCI controlled. Comments from Overall Experience BLUE 3 - P-105 needs more wing area and more power. One Improvement to our training would be to practice against other aircraft, such as an P-102 which la highly maneuver- able. Enough Information is displayed for the guns out range should be digital readouts and not analogue. "Terrible visibility from the 4 to 8 o'clock position" In the P-105 and mirrora are useless for other than watching wlngaan during taxiing. Seems that MXO pilots aren't very experienced. Event 11. H6 n. DATA SOURCES Project Intervlewa ; BLUE 1 and BLUE 3 U. HAKftATlVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was Inbound to the target at 15,000 ft, heading westerly at 500 to 520 knots when BLUE 3 spotted two MIG-lTs at 10 o'clock position and low. (Other members of flight reported total of four HIOs.) It appeared as though the MIGa had Just taken off. The NIGs turned Into the flight as if to engage, and BLUE flight turned left into then. The HICs then broke off the engagement and continued In an easterly direction and cUnbing. After 30* of turn, BLUE Flight headed toward the target, dropped ordnance and egressed the area returning safely to home station, tto damage or encounter l^-^ini^l^ 11.-1*7 Alrcran invoXve'.:' Pj-,[;^°5D. v. three • Reault: No damage -.icn.u/ Viclnit, Of Encounter: JPgroxljately 21 20 M/ , PRIMART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 29 January 1967/Unknown Northeast Railroad. Pour P-l05Da (BLUE Flight) -ere on a strike mls.lon ag U. DATA SOURCES • ... .... interview : Member of BLUE Plight. 15 Feb 67 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ^.h*.»,t Railroad. They Ingreseed to the BLUE PllKht was on a strike against the Northeast Rallroaa. :^ ^^^^ IFilHi ^^^^^ - ..... Event 11-148 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-l05s vs four HI0-21b Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 22*00 'N/l 05*^35 •£ 1. PRIMARY MISSION AKO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 4 February igeT/oStieH faetoJr2r«Jh«Ii*?^*'Jhf Pfi«»«-y target, the strike group was diverted due to unsatls- iBctory weather In the target area. 2. MISSION ROUTE Unknoim 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS Unknown 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER BLUE 1. 2. ^. 4 MIQ 1. 2 MIQ 3. 4 iiS^iHde: 14,000 ft 25,000 ft 28,000 ft Heading: 270** li6'» oSO^ 5. INITIAL DETECTION the initial detection are unknown. Pour MIG-21 airplanes were sighted In flights of two airplanes each. Both flights quickly disappeared to the southeast Closest approach or the MiGs wasj estimated to be five miles. ^pp""" " southeast. Closest fi. ACTION INITIATED Ko action 'cy either sld*. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT None. Sighting only. 8. ORDNANCE Noi\!e 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None reported. 10. AIRCREU COMMENTS No data. 11 . DATA SOURCES Messages: 338TFW OPREP-3 040355Z Feb 67 PASTEL DOI 156 Feb 67 388TPW OPREP-3 0405 OZ Feb 67 DOI 0357 Feb 67 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION * initial detection are unknown. Pour MIG-21 airplanes were sishted in flights of two airplanes each. Both flights quickly disappeared to the southeast Closest approach of the MIOs was estimated to be five miles. soumeast. ^ " ^ '"^ Event 11-119 Aircraft Invplved: Pour P-I05s va six HIO-218 Result: SlgJ^tlng only Vicinity .of Encounter: Zi^lS •N/10l"20*E \. fRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/Tine: «l Pebruary 1967/0730H 2. MISSION ROUTE Unknown 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-105 BLUE 1. 2. 3. » (Ordnance load estimated from limited available data) 1 - AIM-9B 4 - CBU-24 pods 2 - ^50 g:i1 external fuel tank-. 1 - N-61 Bun (1029 rd mno) MIOs - Unknown 4. f LIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER BLUE 1. 2, 3> 1 Altitude ; 18,000 ft He ading ; Unknown Speed ; tOO KIAS 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 2 first sighted two MIOs at 2 o'clock, high, at three miles. 6. ACTION INITIATED P-105B engaged afterburner and maneuvered mildly to keep the MIQs In sight. 7. siTL'ftTior. :evelop;i:;;t ' ^ , . Two Mias were approaching head-on with two additional "IQ^ approximately 6 000 ft in trail. The first two MIGs pulled up Into a steep wingover and dropped In at 5 o clock, then the MIGs broke away. 8. ORDNANCE None expended. 9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS None reported. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS ^^S^S£l£BS£, ^^^^^ • Hours Hours Missions BLUE 2 150 200 20 BLUE 2 was very impressed with the turning ability of the MIO-21. 11. DATA SOURCE Project Interviews : BLUE 2, 6 Peb 1967. 12. MARRATIV )E::RIPT10N BLUE Plight was enroute to the target, at 18.000 ft, HOO KIAS, when BLUE 2 sighted two MIOs at 2 o'clock,%lgh, at approximately three nlles. BLUE 1 (lead) then saw two more approach head-oi? co.altl?ude. BLUE 3 saw another section of MIGs 'J?"* ^'^OO ft. i«w in-trail with this lead section. As the MIOs passed head-on they pulled up into a s?e;p ilngiier anS d^Spirinto the 5 o'clock position on BLUE Plight. The MIOs suddenly broke away and dis*»ppeared . No ordnance was fired. Event 11-150 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105b vs three unl'lentl fled aircraft Result: Sighting only Vicinity or Encounter: 21^30 *N/10l|«30*E I. PRIMARr HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/Time: 4 February I967/O859H dlverferfroi^th^^^^J""" * S**"^ ' S^oup. The group had been aiverted from the primary target due to adverse weather in the area. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-105 BLUE 1.2 , U 2 - 3,000-lb bombs 1 - AIM-9B SIDEWINDER 1 - M«6l Gun (full 20nni asuso) 5. INITIAL litTECTION 6, ACTION INITIATED The flight Jettisoned bonbs. II. DATA SOURCES Hesaagea : 388TPM/OPREP-3/01I03552 Peb 67/DOI I56 Peb 67. Other: RED BARON MIO Incident Summary. •53l^65WEar^ Even*; 11-151 Aircraft involved: Pour P-IOS* vs two ;iia-17» Result: No danaee Vicinity of Encounter: ZO'ze'N/lOS'lS'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 1 February 196V/i.600H Four P-105 airplanes had completed an attack and were departing the target area. 2. KISSIOK ROUTE Unknown 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F-105 Bl. g. 3. t 1 - N-61 gun 1 . SIDEWINDER (AIH>9B} 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Visibility leas than five miles In haze and SDoke. 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 3 sighted two MIG-l? airplanes on a heading of 220° In a descending, right turn. The HICs leveled off approxinately 1/2 to 1 n mi, 20o to the right of the nose of BLUE 3, and 500 ft above BLUE Flight. 6. ACTION INITIATED The MIGa limnediately pulled up into a steep, climbing, right turn and disappeared into the haze. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT Just before the MIGs disappeared BLUE 3 launched a SIDEWINDER that appeared to follow the MIGs into the haze. Ho detonation of the missile was observed. BLUE 3 engaged after- burner in an attempt to regain contact with the HIOs. 8. ORDNANCE (No. rired/No. hits) SIDEWINDER AIH-9B BLUE 3 1/0 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None reported. 10. AIRCREW COHHENTS No data. n. DATA SOURCES Message ; 355TFW/OPRE?-3/c ;i320Z Feb 1967 DOTO-0-10l»36 Feb 67. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight had cortplcted an attack and was egrensing from the area when BLUE 3 sighted two MIG-17 airplanes. No previous MIG warning had been received when BLUE 3 called a warning. The MIGs were on a heading of 220o in a descending, right turn. After leveling off approximately 1/2 to I n ml , 20«» to the right of BLUE 2, and 500 ft above BLUE Flight, the MIGs pulled up Into a steep, climbing, right turn. Just before the HIGs disappeared into the haze, BLUE 3 launched a SiDc^WINDEn toward tne NlSs. The mis- siles appeared to track but no detonation was observed. BLUE 3 engaged afterburner in an attempt to recain contact with the MIGs. There were no further MIC sightings as BLUE Flight returned to base undaraaged. Remarks Results unobserved. Lost Sight of the missile and the MIG in the haze. SECRET Technical Report distributed by Defense Technical Information Center Dm, /Acquiring Information- Imparting Knowledge Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145 (This cover sheet is unclassified when separated from classified documents) SECRET Policy on the Redistribution of DTIC-Supplied Information As a conditioiji for obtaining DTIC services, all Information received from DTIC that Is not clearly marked for public release will be used only to bid or perform work under ^ U.S. Government contract or grant or for purposes specifically authorized b>j the U.S. Government agency that is sponsoring access. 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The acquisition of technical reports, notes, memorandums, etc., is an active, ongoing program at the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) that depends, in part, on the efforts and interest of users and contributors. Therefore, if you know of the existence of any significant reports, etc., that are not in the DTIC collection, we would appreciate receiving copies or information related to their sources and availability. The appropriate regulations are Department of Defense Directive 3200.12, DoD Scientific and Technical Information Program; Department of Defense Directive 5230.24, Distribution Statements on Technical Documents; American National Standard Institute (ANSI) Standard Z39.18-1987, Scientific and Technical Reports- Organi2ation,Preparation,and Production;Department of Defense 5200. 1-R, Information Security Program Regulation. Our Programs Management Branch, DTIC-OCP, will assist in resolving any questions you may have concerning documents to be submitted. Telephone numbers for that office are (703) 274-6847, or DSN 284-6847. The Reference Services Branch, DTIC-BCR, will assist in document identification, ordering and related questions. Telephone numbers for that office are (703) 274-7633 or DSN 284-7633. DO NOT RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO DTIC I EACH ACTIVITY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DESTRUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT ACCORDING TO APPLICABLE REGULATIONS. (This cover sheet is unclassified when separated from classified documents) I Copy 7? cf IB Copies CO WSEG REPORT 116 AIR-TO-AIR ENCOUNTERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (U) Volume. IJI: Events from 1 M.irch 1967 to 1 August 19<>'^ and Misccliancous EvCiits February 1969 i' c it IN f . 1 I Comprising IDA IU:P0 H.T R-{:s •/ John S. Artin'.'l:o. Pry'ic: LijJtr O- o OCT 24 1975 D IDA • . ;.'~f I i INSTITI.TH FOR DEFENSE AN.U.V5FS SVSTi-MS EVALUATION DIVISION .... "EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECUSSIFI CATION schedule;^ PRESCRIBED BY L 0. 1165Z/ 'X' i: A C N i i Y : T L- V. S L V A L r A T 1 0 N G S. ( ; [ : 5 0 li /. Pv :,l Y ■ N A V Y D R P; E . A Iv ! N G TO X . \' DDC CQI'ITR I (Thto page to u n cle— tflagg D D C OCT 24 1975 "EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL D EC USSIFI CATION SCHEDULE." .. PaESCRIBED BY L 0. 11652^ t - I J 0 0 B s 0 0 I 0 i .1 AIR.TO-AIR ENCOUNTERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA^^g^ Volume riTWjvcncs from I March 1967 to I August 1967 and J^isccllancous Events ^^/^ '^^^^ February 1969 ^ i^jM^ Thil raport Kn been prepored by the Systetm Evaluotion Dtvtiien of . th« IratiHite for Deferwe Anolyies in re«pon>e to the V/eopoin Syttetitt ' Evoluotion Group Task Order SD-0AHCI5 67 C 0OI2-T-IO4A doted 6 December 1966. r' " . — , /. In the work under this Tojk Order, the Imtitute Koi^.?een cusisted fay militor/ personnel anigned by WSEG. , _ _ •HAIIOHtt SECURinr IBFOmUTIOH-K '"^ ~ ^ ID/I OCT 24 »75 INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES " SYSTEMS EVALUATION DIVISION 400 ArmyrNavy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202 "EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION cv^urnHi r ti PDro^rRIRPn RV F 0. W(\W> ^ IDA Log No. HQ 69-9621 36 1 UNCLASSiFlEa FORlWORO This report Is a product of the Systems Evaluation Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses In conjunction with the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group in response to WSEG Task Order SD-35-T-10il, as modified In a memorandum for Director, WSED, troa Director s WSEG, dated k August 1966. The memorandum re- sulted from a request by the Deputy Director, Tactical Warfare Programs, ODDR&E. The Task was coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (J-3 and J-5). Hie RED BARON Project produced four volumes. Those mem- bers who made primary contribution to Volume II were as follows: John S. Attlnello Howard IC. Hostler. MaJ . , USA Velma M. Archer Ralph L. Kuster, Jr., MaJ., USAP Douglas N. Beatty Richard C. Stewart, Capt., USN John W. Rublno John W. Walden, Cdr., USN Charles W. Gardner David D. Young, LCol., USAF Earl A. Thomas Charles R. Shaw, Col., USA At its inception (October I966) the RED BARON Project team consisted of: uJ John S. Attlnello, Project Leader Douglas N. Beatty, Ass*t Project Leader •V/j John W. Walden, Cdr., USN, Senior Navy vj^ llalcolm J. Agnew, LCol., USAF, Senior Air Force Phillip J. Conley, Jr., LCol., USAP, and Thomas J. Hughes, Capt., USK, also worked part time on the project from its inception, primarily acting as an interview-debrief team. LCol. Agnew and •V^ Cdr. Walden were the other team. In November John Rublno, Charles Tiffin, William Eason, Capt., USN, and Charles R. Shaw, Col., USA, Joined the project. UNCLASSIFIED m UNCUSSIFIED 1 In December. Robert J. Lynch. Jr.. Cel., USMC. Joined, and Philip Brooks. Col.. USAP. became Senior Air Force representative. ■ Richard C. Stewart. Capt.. USN, was assigned in February 1967- These later military arrivals shared their time with other WSBG projects. While developing interview methods and techniques, the project was valuably assisted by two psychologists from IDA/RESD, ¥• Slnalko and W, Richard Kite. Par Interviews in the U.S., teams consisting of military and civilian project members supplemented the two teams designat- ed initially to collect data in the combat theater. In the SEA theater, two Navy-Air Force teams (Conley-Hughes and Agnew-Walden) conducted the Interviews. LCol. Agnew and Cdr. Walden also Inter- viewed SEA returnees at European bases. As Interviews were conducted. It became apparent that much more data were being collected than had been Initially estimated traoL official reports. lUerefore, a rapid Increase In qualified personnel wis needed to collate the data for publication. Roy a. Anderson, Rear Admiral. USN, Senior Navy Member of WSEG, through appropriate channels, obtained the services of four Mavy fighter pilots for a period of two weeks. The assist- ance to the RED BARON Project of the following Navy pilots is acknowledged: Dennis E. Becker, Lt., USN Benjanln Cloud, LCdr., USN Samuel C. Plynn, LCdr.. USN William D. Kiper, LCdr., USN A. J. Beck. Major General. USAP, Senior Air Force Member of WSEq'" with the cooperation of Headquarters. USAP, obtained the services of nine tactical fighter pilots for a thirty-day period. The assistance to the RED BARON Project of the following Air Force pilots is acknowledged: 5^ 1, l^rXLASSlFlED UNCLASSIFIED Thomas H. Curtis, MaJ., USAP Leslie C. Long, Capt., USAP Robert S. Maxwell, Capt., USAP R. P. Moore, MaJ., USAF Sam P. Morgan, Jr., Capt., USAP Michael G. Pennacchio, Capt., USAP William P. Robinson, Ma j . , USAP Ronald W. Scott, Capt., USAP Ronald J. Ward, Ma J., USAP The project also acknowledges the assistance of the follow- ing individuals who assisted the interview teams In the data collection phase: J. J. Berkow, Col., USAP, ARPA RiD Pleld Unit, Bangkok, Thailand R. Hiller, Assistant for Operations Analysis, CINCPACAF Staff E, Kapos, OEG Representative, CINCPACPLT Staff G. Koy lades, COMNAVOCEWJO R. Llnsenmeyer, Chief, Scientific Research Advisory Group, CINCPAC Staff J, V. Patterson, Col., USAP, ARPA R&D Field Unit, Saigon, Vietnam B. Powers, OEG Representative, CINCPACPLT Staff H. L. Wood, Col., USAP, Headquarters, 7th AP D. a. Lynch, LCol, USMC, OPNAV Hie commands, whose cooperation. made It possible to reach the participants of alr-to-alr engagements, are also acknowledged. COMMANDS Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Pleet Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces Commander, Seventh Air Force, Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam Commander, Task Force Seventy-Seven Deputy Commander, 7/1 3th Air Forces, Udorn Airfield, Thailand Commander, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TPW), Ubon Airfield, Thailand Commander, 366th TFW, Danang AB, Vistnam Commander, 355th TFW, Takhll AB, Thailand Commander, 388th TFW, Korat AB, Thailand UNCUSSIFIED V UNCLASSIFIED Commander, ^32nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Udom Airfield, Thailand Coonnandlng Officer, USS KITTY HAWK (CVA-63) Commanding Officer, USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-41) Commanding Officer, USS BON H0t^4E RICHARD (CVA-3X) Commanding Officer, USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)-65) Commanding Officer, USS HANCOCK (CVA-19} Director, ARPA R&D Field Unit, Saigon, Vietnam Director, ARPA R&D Field Unit, Bangkolc, Thailand Commander, 4 1st Air Division, Yakota AB, Japan Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Forces, Europe Commander, Seventeenth Air Force, Ramstein Afl, Germany Commander, 6lst TFW RAF, Bentwaters, England Commander, 36th TFW, Bit burg AB, Germany Commander, 50th TFW, Hahn AB, Germany. Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, Fleet Air, Miramar, California Commander, Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellls AFB, Nevada Commander, 13th TFW, HcDill AFB, Florida Commander, 831st Air Division (TAG), George AFB, California Commander, 835th Air Division, McConnell AFB, Kansas Commander, 3525th PT\'/, Williams AFB, Arizona Commander, ^5 31st TFW, Homestead AFB, Florida Commander, A 5 3rd Combat Crew Training Wing, Davls-Monthan AFB, Arizona UHCLASSiFIED uNcusimnp CONTENTS INTRODUCTION Data Sources Data Presentation DATA DEFINITION AND COLLECTION . . . Background - Goals and Limitations Approach Description of Interview Procedure General Comments on Data .... EVENT RECONSTRUCTIONS UNClllSSRKD mm I I 4» I. INTRODUCTION At the request of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group has undertaken a study of air-to-air encounters in Southeast Asia. The project code name is RED BARON. Data that have been collected on approximately 400 such encounters through 1 August 1967 will be analyzed primarily to assist in the selection of suitable research and development programs for future high-performance fighter aircraft. A secondary purpose of the study was to pro- vide data for use by the military services and of the scientific conanunity. This volume is a partial documentation for the secondary purpose, A.. DATA SOURCES Data contained in this report were taken from two sources: the official reporting media and personal interviews with par- ticipants. Past IDA/WSEG experience in collecting combat dataW^ has shown that the official reporting media, which are designed primarily for military operational and statistical needs, are inadequate for many analytic purposes. The projtct groups con- ducting these earlier studies found that personal interviews with participants were necessary for R&D analyses. In Project RED BARON, interviews were considered the primary data source, supplemented, where available, by official reports. iWSEG Staff Study 13^ Adequacy of Data from Southeast Asia r.nm h^t Air operations for Research and Development Analyse. HFAlFc^ft Losses and Danages CUK SECRET, February l967. 2WSEG Report 101, Requirements of Defense R&D fo.r_ Data from Combat Air Operations in Sout heast Asia. SECRET, August 19bb. For purposes of this study, encounters that were investi- gated were defined to include the following types: • Sighting of enemy- aircraft (either visually or by radar) , • Either U.S. or oneny aircraft Initiating hostile or e vas i ve maneu ve rs , • Either U.S. or enemy aircraft expending ordnance, and • Loss or damage in combat cf either U.S. or enemy air- craft. During the data collection phase, an effort was made to assure the exhaus tiveness cf the information contained in this report. However, it was established that certain aspects of alr-to-alr combat could not be included. For example, during the conduct of CAP and escort missions, frequently it was neces- sai'y for the fighter force to intercept radar contacts which proved to be friendly aircraft. Also, during the course of missions, aircraft sighted were initially identified and called as enemy, only to be recognized later as friendly. These occur- rances were not reported and therefore are not documented in this volume. While numerous sightings of enemy aircraft are contained in this volume, it is believed, that there are many other sight- ings which were not documented (and therefore not included). This is partially substantiated by the numerous instances which were mentioned during interviews for which no date or location was recalled and which were not correlated with reported sight- ings. The first type was considered in detail only if the sight- ing was of R&D interest, e.g., if a U.S. aircraft made no attempt to engage enemy aircraft because of Inferior or malfunc- tioning U.S. equipment. Where no R&D implications were indl- 'cated, sightings were noted to record the information collected for potential use for other analyses. since "test type" Instrumental; ion does not exist on nost combat aircraft, the validity and quality of data are limited to the tolerances of human senses and recollections (aided where possible by official and personal records » notes, tapes, etc.). A decailed account of the precautions taken to insure the validity and quality of data gathered In such interviews is presented In Section II. Originally the data sample oc .listed of 2U8 encounters through 1 March I967. However, from this date through 22 May, 65 mort enc ^;inters were identifU-d (not including "sightings"). In the 23-[r;-.nth period from first encounter to 1 March, 4? "confirmed plus probable" MIC ;cills were reported. In the six- week perJc: in April-May 1967, the 65 engagements resulted In 37 "conflrr^d plus probable" MIQ kills. ^ B. DATA PRESENTATION Thcugii the analyses to be conducted in the RED BARON study were to be limited to exposing problems for R&D considerations. Interest in the basic data was expressed in maiiy areas of the mllltatf'y and scientific communities . To satisfy these needs the data nave been formalized and are published in three volumes as follov.'s: Volune T: Account of F-U and F-8 Events Prior to 1 March 1967 (U) (WSEG Log Wo. 126571) No. of Encounters q.S. Aircraft Involved to 1 March 1967 F-^C 55 P-8 8 P-IOM 1 U-2 1 Total Events Reported Volume I "fB Concurrently, there was a shift In targeting policy (NVN air- fields were bombed by U.S. aircraft from 23 April) and the in- troduction of new equipment (e.g., SUU-16A guns installed in some F-4C aircraft). Because of these factors the additional engagements were included in the RED BARON data base. Volume II: Account of F-105 Events Prior to 1 Rarch 1967 ( No. of Encounters U.S. Aircraft Involved to 1 March 1967 F-105 151 Voluiae III: Account of Air-to-Air Events from 1 March 1967 to 1 August 1967, and All Miscellaneous Events (U). Total number of events, 3l6. For ease of study and analysis, the available Information has been summarized under the following headings: •Primary Mission and Tactical Situation •Mission Route •Aircraft Configurations • •Flight Conditions Prior to Encounter •Initial Detection •Action Initiated •Situation Development • Ordnance • Equipment Problems • Aircrew Comments • Data Sources Following the above, an edited narrative Is presented which Integrates all the information -sources pertaining to the desig- nated air-to-air engagement. The names and official call signs of the participants have been replaced by standardized nomenclature to give anonymity to the interviewees. This precaution was followed throughout to encourage frank and honest answers to all questions posed by the interview teams. UNCLASSIFIED II. DATA DEFINITION AND COLUaiON A. BACKGROUND - GOALS AND LIMITATIONS The broad goal formulated for the data definition/collec- tion effort was to obtain sufficient data to enable reconstruc- tion of the various alr-to-alr encounters In appropriate detail with maximum accuracy and completeness ("reconstruction" being the key word) . The scope and degree of detail was not simply defined. It revolved around the needs of the R&D community and the limitations of the available data. The primary limitation was human ability to sense and recall. There were no recording devices in U.S. aircraft, and, therefore, with few exceptions (such as taped communications and photographs), all data had to be extracted from the minds of participants and observers. There was also the question of the adequacy, for event re- construction, of data reported from Southeast Asia through the standard reporting systems, IDA/WSEG experience ^ showed that while these systems offered certain worthwhile Information for R&D purposes, they were far from adequate for the purposes of this specific study. It was decided that IDA/WSEG would interview participants in air-to-air encounters as the principal source of data. WSEG Report 101, Requirements of Defense R&D Agencies for Data from Combat Air Ocerations In Southeast Asia (U), July 1966, (SECRET). WSEG Staff Study 13^ > Adequacy of Data from Southeast Asia Combat Air Operations for Research and Develop - ment Analyses of Aircraft Loss and Damage (U), February 1967^ (SECRET). UNCLASSIFIED 5 UNCLASSIFIED B. APPROACH The data collection program Involved several interrelated areas of operations. They were: 1. Identification of air-to-air encounters and the participants. 2. Development of more specific data needs and resolution of needs with limitations. 3. ' Collection of appropriate documentary information on Southeast Asia air-to-air encounters. ^, Development of optimum Interview techniques. 5. Location of and arrangements for interviewing participants . These operations were not necessarily sequential and were continued throughout the data collection phase. Items 1 and 3 initially were interrelated, i.e., the means of identifying encounters was through search of existing docu- mentation — various formally and informally maintained "box scores'* and other files. Early information was gained from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the USAF Air Staff. Additional basic documentation came from the USAP Tactical Fighter Weapons Cen- ter, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, COMNAVAIRPAC , and the Commander, 7th Air Force. It was quickly determined that the various "box scores" did not agree. This was attributed to a variance in definition of what constituted an air-to-air encounter/ engagement and possibly administrative or communications failures within the commands. Additionally, early in the study, the CNO and the Chief of Staff, USAP, were advised of Project RED BARON and requested to provide reference to appropriate documencat? on . Numerous replies were received from various offices within the Services. 6 UtlCLASSlFiED UNCLASSIFIED Gradually, sources of documented Information were In- creased until they included: standard reporting system (OPREPs, COACT, Navy 3^*80 Reports, Guided Missile Performance Reports); various reports of associated studies made by OEG representa* tives and other analytical groups; letters from pilots who could not be Interviewed; various records kept at all levels of command; gun-camera films; tapes of communications made by pilots; and miscellaneous message traffic among military commands. Identification of participants was a particular problem since there is no existing mechanism for providing this infor- mation. With a relatively few exceptions, names of partici- pants were not included In reports. However, names were gradually acquired through informal communications with USN and USAP pilots and, as the interview program proceeded, other persons were identified by the interviewees. Some specific items of data desired were defined by visits to various Service RiD and training organizations and through meetings with representatives of various industrial organiza- tions concerned with components of U.S. fighter weapons systems. (These visits and conferences also provided information on the technical and operational aspects of the weapons systems con- cerned.) Eventually, a categorized list of data specifically desired from each encounter was formulated. Having established the data requirements, an intervle;? program was desired which would: • Allow the greatest number of interviews, while • Maximizing the quality, depth, and scope of informa- tion obtained from each interview. There were uncertainties about the interview program, however. They involved such considerations as the human ability to recall stressful incidents and the effect of elapsed time between the event and attempt to recount it. Large numbers UNCLASSIFIED 7 UNCUSSIFIED of people throughout the world had to be Interviewed, great quantities of interview data had to be reduced, and time and manpower had to be considered. With the assistance of IDA psychologists, H. W. Sinalko and W. R. Kite, basic interview concepts were delineated. These concepts stressed unhurried informality, anonymity of the interviewee, a chronological approach to the entire flight In question (not Just the air-to-air encounter period of it), and much use of visual aids — maps, sketches, airplane models — to reconstruct events. A systematic program was developed to interview a maximum number of participants in the combat theater and throughout CONUS and Europe. There was little chance to control the elapsed time between events and interview. As a result, the elapsed time varied from days to more than one year. Efficiency- of operation was approached in various ways. Several levels of encounter were defined according to their complexity and Intensity, ^ and the basic interview procedure was somewhat expanded or abbreviated according to the level of encounter and the knowledge of the Interviewee. Data formats were devised which attempted to facilitate the recording (and subsequent reduction) of informartlon while stimulating the memory of the Interviewee. A total of ten persons were trained as interviewers. Where It was possible to communicate with a participant but not practical or possible to interview him, he was contacted by mall. While there was the desire to interview a maximum number of pilots, it was superseded by a desire to maximize coverage over the largest number of encounters. Consequently, where a ^Sighting only (visual or radar); either side taking hostile or evasive action; expenditure of ordnanca by either side; loss or damage by either side. 8 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Choice had to be made as to whom to interview, breadth of coverage was the first consideration. At the start, various test interviews were conducted, their results evaluated, and improvements made before a large scale program was undertaken. Minor changes in procedure were made throughout the program. C. DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEW PROCEDURE^ In spite of the small changes that evolved and flexibility Included to accommodate each situation, the basic interview procedure remained largely constant after the early test cases. Ideally, the interviewee was given advance notice and. a general Idea of what would be discussed. The interview team consisted of two persons, one a military pilot with a signifi- cant amount of flying experience and the second person a mili- tary officer or civilian. The team would meet with one crew- man at a time in a closed room, with minimum distraction, and with what was intended to be more than ample time allotted for the meeting. The team attempted to create an air of relaxed Informality. The interviewee was given an explanation of the study, how it came about, what it hoped to accomplish, and what his role was. It was emphasized that his name would not appear in print and that, in general, attempts would be made to pre- serve the anonymity of the persons interviewed. This was done to encourage frank and honest answers. The complete interview procedure was explained in detail. Next, the pilot was asked to give an uninterrupted narra- tive of the encounter in question. He was asked to start from planning for the mission and discuss all aspects through the flight's return to base. He was first given examples of the kind of detail desired. Early in the project it became stan- d ard for the interviewers to u se a tape recorder for the *A more detailed discussion is presented in Volume XV of this report . UNCLASSIFIED 9 UNCLASSIFIED narrative phase. This, of course, depended upon the Inter- viewee's consent and he was always free to go back and erase anything he wished from the tape. He was assured that the tape was only for the use of the Interviewers In gaining com- plete, accurate Information from the meeting and Its use was limited to the project. Next, depending on the Intensity and complexity of the encounter, a sketch of the action was made. Again, the sketch covered a greater part of the mission than Just the air-to-air encounter, dealing with ingress and egress as well. The technique was to put a transparent paper overlay on a large scale map and trace the paths, in plan view, of the various aircraft known to have been present (as fchey were believed to be) relative to known geographical points. The third dimension to the picture was introduced by means of a keyed time-sequence vs. altitude plot at the top of the overlay. With regard to time, early in the study it became clear that the air-to-air combatant rarely had any reasonable concept of the time duration of events or phases of the combat. He could, however, recall well the sequence of events. This caused the Injecting of time-sequences into the interview process. The procedure was for the interviewer to "stop the action" at a point where something significant was occurring and try to elicit a detailed account of the scene at that Instant — the location and altitude of each participant; status of the interviewee U aircraft in the way of speed, g»s, fuel state, avionics modes, etc.; action by the individual and his reasons therefor; communications which took place; enemy actions; etc. After such a stop the description would continue until the next significant event occurred at which point the action would be stopped again. These stops correspond with the "T" (or "Time") marks in events and pictures. While one team member 10 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED worked with the pilot In making the sketch, the other kept notes on a specially designed note pad. Upon completion of this step-by-stap microscopic phase, the interviewers consulted their checklist on data items and asked specific questions about points which had not come out. Finally, the interviewee was encouraged to comment on the whole range of considerations which might be of interest to the study — comments derived from his experience in this specific encounter as well as from his overall experience. The duration of an interview was from minutes to several hours, depending on the significance and complexity of the encounter and the knowledge of the Interviewee. 0. GENERAL COMMENTS ON DATA The Project identified 2^8 air-to-air encounters that occurred prior to 1 March I967. Participants In 164 of these encounters were Interviewed, with a total of 331 Interviews conducted.^ In addition, 37 written accounts of engagements were received. In general « priority was given to the more com- plex encounters; events for which no Interviews were conducted were usually a sighting only, with no R&D significance. The study group found that human ability to recall the details of incidents stressful to them Is sometimes quite remarkable. With regard to the validity of recall, various comparisons were made between OPREP reports of the encounter and interviews and between interviews of various participants in the same encounter. There was generally good agreement. Where significant discrepancies appeared, they could usually be traced to the confusion of a fast moving, complex situation If an individual was interviewed in connection with two or more different enccu.iters, this would be considered as two or more interviews. UNCLASSIFIED 11 UNCLASSIFIED rather than memory failure or some psychological phenomena. (Discrepancies between various accounts of the same event did cause some difficulty in the final reconstruction process. In almost all cases, discrepancies were resolved through repeated study of the data, use of logical deductions, and/or relnterview. ) Intuitively, It might appear that the best Information would be obtained by minimizing the time lapse between encoun- ter and interview. However, there are opinions and illustra- tions which counter this. The thought cannot be proved or disproved at this time. As noted earlier, elapsed time between encounter and Interview ran from a period of days to more than a year. Dates of events and interviews have been included in the published data. The interview techniques, in general, were highly regarded by Interviewees for effectiveness in stimulating accurate, detailed recall. In some cases, through the procedures used, interviewees were able to correct and clarify their concep- tions of events. E, EVENT RECONSTRUCTIONS The account of each event Is presented in at least two basic parts: (1) An outline which gives an abbreviated pres- entation of the highlights of the event, and (2) A narrative of the encounter. All of the events contained in this Volume are summarized in the following tabulation. A Glossary of Terms was devel- oped to aid in the interpretation of the events. The glossary also contains descriptions and Illustrations of the more common aircraft maneuvers. The events In Volume III describe encounters with enemy aircraft which occurred during the period 1 March 1967 to 1 August 1967. In addition, other encounters which occurred 12 UNCLASSIFIED ONCUSSmED In the time period covered by Volume I and Volume II are also described. These events. Involving aircraft which rarely encountered MIGs or about which little is known, are Included since a knowledge of their occurrence Is important for a com- plete picture of the alr-to-alr war. For this same reason, also Included are those events with suspected MIGs, whose presence was only surmised from electronic contacts. It Is felt that this comprehensive coverage Is prerequisite for total undex- standlng of the alr-to-alr operations In Southeast Asia. UNCLASSIFIED ^3 LIST OF EVENTS I 1 4 -4^ J** I I Ev«nt tn-1 mo III -4 Ilt-S in-7 1II-9 111-12 llt-U H1*M ni-is iu>it 111-18 111-19 111-20 111-21 111-22 111-23 111-24 in-25 in>26 111-27 Ilt-28 111-29 III-30 111-31 111-32 ni-33 III-34 111-3$ lIt-36 ni-37 111-38 111-39 111-40 111-4) 111-42 111-43 III-44 11I-4S 111-46 111-47 Ilt-48 111-49 III-SO Ill-Si IIt-52 111-53 tll-54 111-55 111-56 111-57 111-58 UI-S9 Oate/T1«t 3 Apr" 4 »pr' 4 Apr' 14 ntf' 20 H«y* 20 May' 20 Jin' 12 Oct' 15 No»' 16 Now' 25 NOV' 6S/inoK 6f/nS0H 6&/'jnknown 6S/123SH 65/nOOM 65/183SH 6b/66/1349H 12 F«t>'66/144CH 20 Ftb'66/Utilino«ii IS Mir* 17 N»r' 8 Apr' 12 Apr' 27 Apr* 28 Apr' 29 Apr' 12 Jul' 66/n21H 6(/1222K 66/0906H C6/Unkno«n 66/UnkftOMn 66/UOSH 66/1 745H 66/n3SH 24 Jur66/1805H 29 J«1'66/1610H 16 Aug*66/--56H 23 Aug'66/n35H 10 Stp'66/0830H 10 Slp'66/0941H 10 Stp' 24 Stp' 5 Oct' 6 Oct' 9 Oct' 10 Oct' 10 Oct' Now' 28 Nov' 2B Nov' 66/2020H 66/2020H 66/023SH 66/O026H 66/1013H 66/Unknuwn 66/U50H 66/UnknoMn 66/1 1 55H 66/1412H 2 D»C'66/1420H 4 0tc'66/0818H 4 Dtc'66/n3aH 5 0«c'66/1057H 14 DlC'66/1602H 1 J*n'67/1545H 2 J«n*67/1315H 3 Jin'67/0734H 6 Jon*67/0919H 1$ Jin'67/0905K 16 J«n'67/1035H 16 Jifi'67/1555H 16 J«n'67/ieSSH 17 J«ii'67/1539K Entay Results Lo«t/O67/0902H 22 Fflb'67/162«H 23 Feb'67/I500K 23 Ftb>67/1S32H 25 Ftb*67/0948H 25 F«b'67/t105K 5 M4r'67/0703H S Nir'67/161SH 7 ll«r*67/1618N 8 Mir'67/14O0H 8 Mar'67/1603H 9 H4r*67/03S1H 10 Hir'67/1S53H 10 Har'67/1556H 10 Mar'67/15S6H 10 Mir'67/Antr. noon 10 Har'67/15S8H 11 Mar'67/Unkno«n 12 Kar'67/ 16 Mar'67/15S0H 26 ll«r'67/1616H 26 N«r*67/1613tl 26 f1ar'67/10l7H 26 Har'67/1620H 26 Mar'67/1645H 26 Har'67/1620H 26 Mar'67/UnknoHn 26 Mar>67/161SH 27 Nar'67/1617H 29 Nar'67/1641H 29 Nar'67/Unfcnown 30 ltar'67/094SH 30 Mar*67/1641H 8 Apr'67/U10H B Apr'67/1635H 11 Apr'67/1325H 11 Apr'87/1615H 12 Apr'67/1239H 13 Apr'67/141SH 19 A0r'67/16S5H 19 Apr'67/UnknoHn 19 Apr'67/US8H 19 Apr'67/1702H 3 Unidentified 2 MIG 7 4 MIG-21 2 NlGs 1 NlG-21 2 Unidentified 2 unidtntlfltd 7 MIG 1 MIG-1S 2 NIG-17 (Poss) n HlG-17 14 unidentified 2 NIG-21 1 NIG (Pots) 1 HIG-21 3 NI6-17 12 NIG-21 14 NIG-170 4 H1G.21 1 N16-17 1 NIG 2 HIG-17 1 Nre-n 14 NlG-17 )1 NIG-21 1 HI6-i7 2 unidentified 1 NIG-21 I NIG-17 3 NIG-17 8 MIG-17 1 MIG-21 2 unidentified Unidentified 3 NIG-2t 2 HI6-21 2 HIG-21 2 MIG-21 1 NIG 3 MIG-21 2 Unidentified 1 NIG 8-10 ^.IG-17 2 NIG II NtG-17 11 N16-17 Sighting 0/0 Sighting Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 Rtdar 0/0 Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting Sighting Sighting 0/0 Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting 0/0 Sighting Sighting 0/0 Sighting Sighting 0/0 Sighting 0/0 1/0 (Prab) 0/0 0/1 1/0 0/0 G/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 Q/0 0/0 2/1 0/0 0/0 1/C 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 2/0 111-116 19 A»r'67/I700H 2 NIG-17 0/0 0/0 LIST OF EVENTS III<]I9 III. 120 111-121 III-)22 ni023 III-t24 ni-i2s [[I-i26 (U-127 in>)28 IIIIS3 III-1S4 ni-1S5 ni.is6 I1I-1S7 111*158 111-159 III-IGO 111-161 III-ie2 1 11-163 IM.IS4 III-I6S I1I-I66 lll-t67 [11-168 111-169 1 11- 170 111-17) 111-172 D«te/riiie Atrcrart InvoUtA U.S. Creny «9 Apf'67/1700M 19 *pr*67/l70iH 20 *pr67/0856M 20 Apr'6r/091]H 21 *pr'67/1629H 21 *pr'67/1653H 22 Apr'67/J534H 22 Apr'57/!63SH 22 *pr'67/1542M 22 Apr'67/1635M 22 Apr'67/)638H 23 apr*67/1622H 23 *pr'67/1623H 23 Apr'67/16S5H 23 Apr'67/1652H 24 Apr'fi7/094SH 24 Apr>67/161SH 24 A»r*67/16t2H 24 Apr'«7/I64SH 24 Apr'67/1619H 24 Apr'67/1700H 24 Apr'67/I700H 25 Apr*67/1002H 25 Apr'67/!005H 25 Apr'57/1002H 25 Apr'67/IOOOH 25 Apr'67/1005M 25 App'67/1005H 25 Apr'67/n09H 2S Apr'67/1000H 25 Apr'67/I017H 25 Apr'67/ni2H 25 Apr'67/I006H 26 Apr'67/]616H 26 Apr'67/16I7H 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 AT>r 26 Apr 28 Apr 28 Apr 28 Apr 28 Apr 28 Apr 28 Apr 28 Apr 28 Apr '67/I620H 67/1620H '67/1620H '67/1624H '67/!640H '67/I630H '67/16S3H '67/1630H '6//1635H '67/I636H '67/I636H '67/)648H 28 Apr * 67/unknowo | 28 Apr*67/)653H ! 28 Apr'67/J/OOH t 29 Apr' 67/ 1 nOH ! 29 Apr'67/1615H 29 Apr'67/I615H 29 Apr'67/]615H F-1050 ■4C •4C ■4C 4 f-105 4 F-105 4 F-IOS j4 {4 U F-4 F-105 f-105 RF-4C r-105 F-1Q5 F-105 F-105 F-105 3 F-4C 4 F-4C 1 F-4C 4 F.I95 j2 F-IOSO 12 F-105F 2 F.4B 4 f-105 4 F.4C I A.6A 4 F-1Q5 4 4 4 3 4 2 il 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Z 4 4 \l 4 4 4 1 4 F-105 F-IOS F-105 F-105 F-IOS F-8E f-105 ES-622 RF-4C A-4C F.105D F-105 F-lOS 1050 105 1050 4C 4C 105 105 105 1050 1050 105. 105F 1O50 105 105 105 -101 105 4 F-IOS 4 F-IOS 7 MIG-17 4 NlC-17 (POSS) 2 MIG-17 2 NIG-W 1 MIC-17 I HlG-21 7 2 HIC 2 MIC-W 1 HIG-21 2 M(G-17 NIG-)7 1 M1G.2I 4 MIC-17 2 UnUentl fled 1 MIG-21 2 MIG-21 6 K[G-21 3 Unldenttfled 4 MIG.21 1 MI6-17 1 NIG-21 1 MIC-17 6 MI6.21 4 ttlG-17 J HI6-I7 is MI6-21 11 M1G.17 3 MIG-17 1 M[G .10 MIG-J7 1 2 HIG-21 I MIG-17 1 HIG-17 MIGs 3 MIG-17 2 MIG-W 2 NIG-17D 3 HIG-17 3 NIG.2) 2 MIG-17 4 MIG-17 4 MIG'17 fS MI6-17 11 MIG-21 8 MIG-17 2 MIG-21 2 MIG.21 10 MtG-21 2 HIG-21 8 MIG-17 2 HIG-1 7 8 MIG-17 9 MIG-17 1 M1G.I7 1 MIG-i; 5 HIG-17 1 MIG-J7 I KIG-17 1 NIG-17 ) HtG-21 12 MIG-21 U MIG-17 i MIG.I7 I HIG-17 Rtsul tt lO»t/D«iinq«d U.S. C/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 sighting Sighting 0/e 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 sighting 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 Sighting 0/0 S< ghting 0/0 Sighting 0/0 O/O 0/0 1/0 Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sighting 0/0 Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sighting 0/0 Sighting Sighting Sighting Sighting Sighting Enemy 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/0 (Prgb) 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/1 {?9St) 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 LIST OF EVENTS Event 0«te/lt«e IM-P] 29 *pr'67/l6)2H 111-174 29 Apr'67/WOON 29 «pr'67/1615H 3C Apr'67/0226M 3V Apr'67/09OON 30 At(r'67/0900N JO Apr'67/090$H .0 Apr'67/0926H ?a A3p'i7/09?3-. ":0 Apr'67/)52»H 30 Apr-67/1648H 31 Apr'67/I«24H 30 Apr'S7/]7}SH 3J App'67/1713M 1 >4«y'67/1015H ^ H«y'67/1250H I Niy'f7/1008H ) Nty'67/I021H 1 M«y'57/10nH I M«y '67/Unkn»Mn I Niy'67/UnknoMn I Niv'67/124SH 1 M|y'67/I248H 1 H«y-67/12S6H 1 M»y'67/1255H 1 May'fi7/1244H I W*y'67/1710H 1 Hly'67/1718H t tt«y'67/Unlino«>n 1 f'«y* 67/ 1 725H Z H«y'67/0951H 2 Hay'67/09I7H 3 Miy'67/U30H 3 Hay'67M705H 3 Nay'67/143SH Atrcrift Involved lo . -Type U.S. 3 M«y'67/1710H 4 H«y'67/U25K 4 N«y'67/1433H 4 N«y'67/1435H May Hiy May May Hay H«y May 8 May 12 May 12 May 12 May* 12 May' 12 May* 12 May' 12 May' 12 May' 12 May' 13 May' 12 May* 13 May* 13 «ay' 13 May' 13 May' ■67/1435H '67/1615H ■67/1441H 67/14S3H 67/1730H 67/14S3H 67/Unl(noMn 67/0343H 67/1636H 67/1638H 67/I644H 67/I642H 67/I642H 67/I643H 67/164SH 67/1755H 67/1618H 67/1610H 67/1623H 6//)623H 67/16I0H 67/I620H 67/16;iH »-4C r-io$ F-IOS F-105 RF-4C f.105 f-105 r-ios F-10$ KF-4C F-IOS F-IOS F-t05 F.IOS F-IOS F-4e f-4C F.4C F-105 F-105 F-)0$ f-K F.8C A.4C A-4C A-4E a.4c a F-505 7 F-4 F-4C F-IOS F-ias aF-iQi RF.4C F-4C 4 F-4C 4 F-4C 4 F.4C 4 F.105 4 F-105 2 RF-4C 4 F-105 1 E8-66C 4 F-IOS 8 F-105 B F-IOS 1 RF-4C 4 F-4C 12 F-IOS F-4C F-105 F-105 F-IOS F-IOS F-105 F-105 RF-4C I F-IOS 4 F-105 4 F.4C F-105 A F.4C cfitay 13 NIG-17 2 MIG-17 I MIG-21 1 MtG-!7 1 HIG 4 NIG-17 2 MI6 12 HIGl 2 MIC-17 1 Untdentlfled MIG Untdentiried MIGl MIG-21 NtG-21 MIC-17 MI&.17 i NI6-17 8 1116-17 MIC-17 HIC-17 NiG-17 NIG-17 NI6-17 MtG-i;« MIC-17 NIG-17 Unldtntlfltd NIG-17 7 MICs 1 MIG-17 1 HtG.21 (Pass) 2 MIG-17 1 MtG 1 MIG-21 2 NI6-21 NIC-17 Unidentified Unidentified H MI6-17 14 NI6-21 [] NIG-21 [2 NI6-17 1 MIC-21 2 N(G.|7 1 N16-21 1 unidentified 2 NIC-21 1 Nia-21 2 MIG-21 unidentified MIG-21 MIG-21 HlG-17 NIG-17 NIG-17 NIG-17 MIC-17 MIG-17 1 MtG-21 6 MIC-17 1 MIG-21 1 MIG-17 4 N{G-17 9 m;g-17 3 MIC-17 to MIG-17 )S 2-3 2 Reiul ts Lost/Da»aqed U.S. 0/3 1/1 0/0 Rader Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 Sighting 0/0 Sighting 2/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting Sighting 0/0 Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting 0/0 sighting 0/0 sighting 0/0 Sighting sighting '/O 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0^0 0/0 8 I I I I I I t»«nt ni-?38 111-239 111-240 lH-2<2 Ml-243 III-244 II1-24S III-246 III-247 111-248 III -249 1 11-250 111-251 III-2S2 (tI-2S3 !n-2$4 III-2S« (11-257 111-258 III-2S9 III-260 II1-261 II 1-262 in-263 tIl-264 in-2u5 III-266 III-267 III-26B 111-269 II 1-270 III>271 III-272 ni-273 111-274 11I-27S 111-276 m-277 111-278 111-279 III-280 !tl-28) III-282 Itl-283 111-284 in-23S III-286 111-287 111-288 111-289 111-290 111-291 111-292 LIST OF EVENTS Dit«/Tiat 13 M*, 13 M«y 13 Hiy n H«y' 14 ffjy' 14 Way' 14 K4y' 14 Hay' 14 H«y< 67/}621H 67/i622ri 67/1617H 67/16nH 6;/l605H 67/161 IH 67/I600M 67/1600H 67/ISTlH 14 N«y'67/1614M 19 Miy 19 M»y 19 May 19 May 19 May 19 May 19 May 20 Ma/ 20 May ' 67/Unknowfl *67/Unknown '67/A.H. '67/n40H '67/1530H '67/1630H '67/1641H ■67/1629!1 '67/1610H 20 May<67/1630M 20 May'67/lB30H 20 Hay*67/}630H 20 May*67/1630H 20 May'«7/1625M 20 H«y'67/162BH 20 Nay'67/I630H 21 May*67/0853M 21 M>y'67/OaS6M 21 nay 21 ray 21 Hay 21 May 21 Ma> 21 May 21 May 22 Hay 22 May 21 May '67/0900M '67/090$H •67,1420H '67/16I6H '67/1620H '67/1Q34H * 6 7/UnknoMn '6;/09O3H '67/1351H '67/lSOOH 22 May'67/1445H 22 May'67/1527K ?2 M*y'67/1527M 22 Nay'67/160SH 22 Niy 22 May 22 May 22 Ma, 24 May 25 Mjy 30 May 30 May 30 May 20 Mdy 30 May 30 May 30 May 30 May •67/1605H '67/1606H '67/1611M '67/Unknown '67/171SH 'C7/0858H '67/1610H '67/1516H •67/1612H '67/1616H '67/1616H '67/16I6H '67/163SH '67/16S6rf 31 May*67/155IH 31 May'67/]610H Aircraft ln«o1vt4 Wo.-Typt U.S. F-IOS F-IOS F-IOSO F.t05 F-4C F-4C F-10SD F-10SD F-1050 F-IOSF F-10SD F-8E F-8C F-8C A-6A A-4C F-4C F-IOS F.4C F.4C E8-66 F-IOS F-4C F-IOSO F-1050 F-IC F-I05 F-105D F.105 F.4C f-105 F-4C F-105 RF-4C F-IOS F-4C EB-66 A-4 F-4C flF-101 A-4E 2 IIF-4C 4 F-105 4 F-4C 4 F-lOS F-4C F-105 F-t05 F-tOS F-105 F-4C F.4C F-105 F-105 F-105 F-lOS F-IOS F-4C F.4C Cncny 4 F-4C 4 F.4C 5 NIG-17 3 KI6-17 6 NIG- 1 7 7 MIC-17 16 MIG-17 10 NtG-17 2 MIG-17 6 MIG-17 /: HIG-21 14 NI6-17 4-5 HI6-17 2 NIG-17 1 MI6-17 2 MIG-17 3 MIG-21 5 HIGs 1 Untdantlfltd 4 MIG-17 12-15 MrG-17 1 Unidtntlfltd 7 NI6-17 n NIG 11 Unidentified 2 MIG-17 8 MIG.17 4-5 MIG-21 3 MIG-21 1 MIG-17 1 Unidantlfied /I MIC-17 (2 Unidcfttlflcd 2 Unidentified 2 Unidentified Unidentified 2 MIG-17 2 MIG-17 1 HIG 3 Un Identified 3 MIG-17 2 MIG (l»rob) 12 MIG ? II NIG-17 3 Unidentified 2 MIG-17 2 MIG-17 n MIG-21 )1 MIG ? 4 HIG-2tO 2 NIG-21 2 MIG-21 1 MIG-21 1 MIG-17 1 Unidentified 2 Unidentified 4 NI6-17 4 NIG-17 4 MIG-17 4 MIG-17 1 MIG-17 7 unidentified /6 NIG-17 U MIG-21 4 HIG-17 1 MIG-17 Results Lost/Pawaged U.S. 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 :/o Sight in9 Sishttng 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting Sighting 1/0 Sighting 0/0 Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting Sighting Sighting 0/0 Sighting 0/0 Sighting 0/0 0/0 Sighting 0/0 0/0 Si>)h(ing 0/u Sighting Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 Sighting 0/0 0/0 Sighting 1/0 0/0 Enemy 0/0 2/0 0/2 0/0 2/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 2/0 1/0 1/0 0/0 4/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 19 nwsMHnqae' LIST OF EVENTS Atrcrtft Involvttf Wo. -Typt U.S. Eneuy Rm ults U.S. 31 n*y' 31 ntf' 31 Hay' 31 M*/' 31 nty' 2 Jiin' 2 Jufl' Z Jun' 2 Jwn' 2 Jun* 2 awn' 3 J«n' 67/164eH 67/16S0H 67/16S0H 67/1650H 67/1 700H 67/093QH 67/1S28H 67/I01SH 67/1630H 67/1633H 67/1«28M 67/I640H 9 Jm<67/1<50N 3 Juil'S7/165IH 3 JlM*C7/1653H 3 Jun*67/1CS2N S Juii'67/163SH S Jufl'67/1«43H S JHn'67/1646M S Jun'67/17«2H S Jun'67/1S4SH 5 JiM*67/1S3SH 6 Jyn'67/04)2H 6 Jun'67/1S40H 7 Jun'67/2137H 11 Jun'67/0900H 10 Jun*67/M12H 11 Jun'67/0909H J4C 1 F-IOS 4 F.IOS 1 RF-tai 4 F-105 F-IOS F.ias F-105 F-t05 F-IOS RF-4C F-IOS F-105 F-4C F-105 F-105 F-105 f-4C 1 F-4C 7 F-lOS ? F-4C-0 2 EA-IF A-4 F-a A-4e A-4E F-40 F-4C A.4C F-8C F.4C 2 NI6.21 4 NI6-17 2 MIG-17 6 HIG-17 1 NIG-W (Post) 2 NI6-21 8-10 N[G-17 2 MIG-21 1 HIG-17 4 NIG-17 8*10 Nt6.17 5 NI6*I7 2 NIS-17 1 MtG-21 2 MIC-17 '2 MIG-21 )1 MIG-17 3 NIG-17 iS HIC-17 (3 NIG*21 6 MIG'21 (3 NIG-21 U NIG- 17 6-7 MtG-17 4 NIG-17 8-12 ni6-17 1 MtO (Poss) 1 MIG-17 1 umccnttffed 1 NI6.21 1 HI6-21 2 NIG 12 MIG-17 12 HI6-21 1 MI6.2I 3 unidtntlfltd 2 NI6-17 2 Un.1dtRtirfi« ? 10-11 I MIG-21 MIG MIG-21 1 HIG-17 1 HIG-21 2 MIG-21 2 Unidentified 2 HIG 1 HIG 1 Unldtfftirtdd 1 MIG-21 1 Unidtntlfltd 2 KI6-17 2 HI6-17 2 unidtntlfltd S HI6-2I 2 MIG-21 4 HIG-21 a MtG-17 1 MIG-21 a HIG-170 2 HI&-21 0/0 Slghtlnt Sl9ht1n9 Slgbttflg Slghtlna 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 Stgiiting Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 Radar Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 . Sighting Sighting 0/0 0/0 Sighting Sighting Sighting Sighting Sighting Sighting Sighting Sighting Sighting Sighting Sighting 0/0 Sighting I/O Sighting 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/2 C/0 UHCUSSIFIED GLOSSARY OP TERMS (All Terms Unclassified Unless Otherwise Stated) AA - air-to-air weapon AAA - antiaircraft artillery AAM - air-to-air missile AAWC - Ant 1-Alr-War fare Commander AB - afterburner ACM - air combat maneuvering ACT - air combat tactics ADF - automatic direction finder AEW - airborne early warning AGL - above ground level AIM-7 (DiE models) (SPARROW) - semiactive radar type, air-to- air missile AIM-9 (B&D models) (SIDEWINDER) - passive IR type, alr-to-alr missile AIM-9C (SIDEWINDER) - Radar guided air-to-air missile AI radar - airborne intercept radar Aircraft commander - a pilot designated pilot-in-command of a given aircraft (Air Force name for front seater in F-4) ALKALI - Soviet air-to-air missile - radar beam rider type ALQ-51 - Broadband deception ECM system ALQ-71 - Noise Jamming ECM pod (production model of QRC-160-1) ANCHOR (Various colors) - see Figure 9 on page 3H - code names for specific refueling tracks AN/APA-157 - CW radar illuminator and fire control computer for SPARROW missile system Angle-off - angular position off the tail of the reference aircraft APQ-72 - airborne intercept radar In F-^tB aircraft UNCLASSIFIED 21 UNCUSSIFIED break X - minimum range indication for missile launch. X ap- pears in the radar scope at minimum range. I I I I APQ-91* - airborne intercept radar in P-8E aircraft APQ-10 0/109 - airborne intercept radar in F^UC/D aircraft^ | 0 APR-2S - vector homing and warning system - P^o^^^^^K ; APR-25 - ^^^*°^iSnal warning of threat signals in certain bands ; with instantaneous bearing to radiating source. | . APB.26 - crystal video airborne warning receiver to detect SA-2 guidance signals APR-27 - airborne radar warning receiver an... reconnalasanee - ^^^/^^'^^^iT^^^^^^^^^^ I of ooportunity, i.e., enemy materiel, 0 personnel, and facilities in assigned general areas or along assigned ground ^ communications routes, and not for the ■ purpose of attacking specific briefed targets. ^ ASE circle - allowable steering error - circle on radar display g provided by fire control computer. ATOLL - Soviet air-to-air missile, infrared seeker type m autotrack - automatic tracking in which a servo mechanism keeps ■ the radar beam trained on the target. Back - the individual occupying the *^ack seat of the F-U; in g JIavy called RIO, in Air Force called pilot or «IB. • BARCAP - Barrier combat air patrol - a MIGSCREEN for one or more missions barrel roll - See Figure 2 (page 27) - a 360« ^^^^^''^ '"^"^^^TLo barrel roii ^^^s^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^.^^'^^^Eh? I a helix about the intended direction of the flight. | BDA - bomb damage assessment j | BINGO (fuel) - minimum fuel quantity reserve established for a I j given geographical point to permit aircraft to 9 < • . return safely to home base or aerial refueling j point. 8 t bogey - unidentified aircraft i ! boresight mode - in the boreslght mode the radar antenna is ' , *^ aligned and locked to the roll axis of the ■ r aircraft . i 1 break - an emergency turn in which maximum performance is desired - ! j instantly to destroy an attackers tracking solution. ■ ^ I I "i 22 ORCLASSinED . | 1 CAP - combat air patrol - an aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, over the force protected, over the critical area of a combat zone, or over an air defense area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their target. (NAVY) Condition I CAP (Standby): aircraft ready for immediat.e (maximum delay of two (2) minutes) takeoff. Aircraft with engine not running (starter batteries plugged in) will be positioned for take-off. Pilots in cockpit and deck drew on alert . CAS - calibrated air speed (knots) CBU-214 - canister dispensed air-to-ground bomblet type munition; the canister is carried externally on the aircraft and opens after release at a preset altitude. centerline tank - a fuel tank carried externally on centerline of aircraft. chaff - a type of confusion reflector, which consist of thin, narrow metallic strips of various lengths to provide different responses, used to create false signals on radarscope . Channel 97 - A TACAN station located during the period of the study at 20® 27 ' M/103° ^3 *E used for navigational aids. (SECRET) chandelle - a maximum performance climbing turn in which speed is converted to altitude while reversing direction. ^ CMR-312 (Little Ears) - aural radar warning receiver CROWN - call-sign for rescue force commander CRT - Combat Rated Thrust - maximum augmented thrust condition of engine DP - direction finder DfE - distance measuring equipment dot - (aim dot, steering dot) - electronic dot appearing In radar scope when radar is locked on providing computed steering vector information element - Air Force term for the basic fighting unit (two air- craft) EWO - electronic warfare officer PANSONG - tracking radar for Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile system (CONFIDENTIAL) fighting ( wing) position - an area for the wingman in which optl mum coverage and maneuverability is achieved in maximum performance maneuvers. finger-four formation - see Figure 6 (page 29) - also fingertip formation - a four-plane formation in which the aircraft occupy positions ^ suggested by the four finger tips of V either hand, the fingers being held together in a horizontal plane, flak - antiaircraft fire fluid element - the second or supporting element in fluid four formation, flying In a high or low element position. fluid- four - see Figure 5 (page 29) - a tactical formation having the second element spread In both the vertical and horizontal planes to enhance maneuverability, mutual support and look-out ability. fragged - mission directed by fragmentary operational order from higher headquarters. Front - the individual in the front seat in the F-4 aircraft; in the Navy called the pilot, in the Air Force called the aircraft commander. g - unit of acceleration (32.2 ft/sec*^) gaggle - slang for a number of aircraft operating in close proximity, not necessarily In any semblance of formation. GAM-83 - BULLPUP; air-to-ground guided missile GEOREF - See Figure 11 GCI - ground control intercept GUARD - emergency UHF radio channel usually monitored by all aircraft and ground stations as a secondary frequency. Hard turn - a planned turn in which the intensity of the turn is governed by the angle-off and range of the attacking aircraft, HEAT - armament switch setting for using Infrared missiles hot mike Intercom - intercommunication system continuously active (hot) IAS - Indicated air speed ICS - Intercommunication system ID - Identification; to make Identification IFF - identification, friend or foe; aircraft transpondlng beacon received by radar distinguishing friend from foe. Iramelmann - see Figure 8 (page 30) - maneuver In which the air- craft completes the first half of a loop and then rolls over to an upright position thus changing di- rection 180<> with a simultaneous gain in altitude. IMN - Indicated Mach number 21 CONFIDENTIAL IP - initial point; a well-defined point, easily distinguish- able visually and/or by radar, used as a starting point for a bomb run to the target. IR missi?e - an infrared or heat-seeking missile IRON HAND - a code name for a flight with special ordnance and avionics equipment whose mission is to seek and destroy enemy surface-to-air missile sites. JCS target - a target appearing on the JCS target list Jinking - constant maneuvering in both the horizontal and vertical planes to present difficult target to enemy defenses by spoiling the tracking solution. Bank, pitch and velocity are all simultaneously changed in this maneuver. karst - a limestone outcropping or ridge KIAS - knots indicated air speed let - abbreviation for knot (nautical miles/hour) KTAS - knots true air speed LAU-3 - a rocket launcher adaptable to external bomb racks holding 19 2.75 inch air-to-ground folding fin rockets LAU-17 adapters - stub pylon on P-^ loose deuce - a term to describe fighter tactics in which two to four airplanes maneuver to provide mutual support and increased fire power. Lufberry circle - a circular tail chase, ascending or descending M - abbreviation for Mach number MER - multiple ejection rack mi - nautical mile, as used in. this report NIGCAP - combat air patrol mission whose actions are directed against KIG aircraft HIG SCREEN - mission wherein protecting fighters are placed between the threat and the protected force In a specific area military power - maximum unaugmeuted thi'ust condition of engine missile free - authority is granted to fire unless target is identified as friendly missile tone - audio signal indicating AIM-9 is locked on to an IR source MRT - military rated thrust - see military power MSL - altitude referenced to mean sea level OPRHP - message report in joint operational reporting system PANAMA - call sign for GCI site located near Danang CONFIOENm 25 CONFIDENTIAL Ant nf llitht within plpper - aircraft weapon sight indicator dot pipp«r ^ lighted ring) fo^.ation A^l|^ or^^-rflr'^S^Ur l^^se^^er MXO threat. (See Fig. 9) PRP - pulse recurrence frequency QRC-160 • noise Jamming ECM pod RAG - replacement air group , use ^ RED CROWN - voice call for USS LONG BEACH (CLN-9) RESCAP - rescue combat air patrol RHAV - radar homing and warning RIO - radar Intercept officer RO - abbreviated form of RIO interdiction - - vent ^or^hin.^ ROLLIMO THUNDER - code name for air strikes against North Vietnam in«ire 9 - eeographloal division of North Route Package - ««,^^"^^/p„,^osf s of air strike targeting ,«,.er reversal - l^ll^t^ll^^^,^^^ ^^^^^ craft's vertical axis SA-2 - soviet surface-to-air missile system SAM - surface-to-air missile t^^slorr-leellg^ri (page 27) - a f^-fJ'.^ftraS 'aSt^mpt' to'tclltlvf offrnsrvrrft^r fn%S:t the attacker. — - ^airr^af^^^s^U^V ^^'^^l^f^ - flights of four , SHRIKE (AGM-itS) - air-to-surface radar seeking missile : SIDEWINDER - see AIM-9 " SIDEWINDER tone - see missile tone COHFiDENTIAL 26 SIP - selective Identification feature - electronic device with variable codes for Identification SILVER DAWN - a code name for an '.ntelllgence collecting air- craft (SECRET) "S** maneuver - a weave in a horizontal plane Snap-up - a rapid pullup to establish a climb in order to launch a weapon SPARROW - see AIM-7 ••Spllt-S" maneuver - see Figure 7 (page 30) - I80*' rotation about the aircraft longitudinal axis followed by a 180 3 change of heading in a vertical plane (half loop starting from top) STBY - standby steering dot - see dot Swltchology - a coined word addressing the human engineering considerations of switch arrangements TACAN -> tactical air navigation • an active electronic naviga- tional system which locates the aircraft with respect to another installation TARCAP - target combat air patrol - aircraft assigned the alr- to-alr defense role in the target area TAS - true air speed in knots TCA - track crossing angle - the angle between flight paths measured from the tail of the reference aircraft Thud Ridge - A nickname given to a prominent geographical fea- ture in North Vietnam, If. is a ridge running in a general NW-SE direction frou 21®'*0'N/105*'25E to 21*20 'N/lOS^^ia'E. TOT - time over target TRACK (various colors) - see Figure 9 - code names for specific refueling tracks TROJAN HORSE - a code name of a U-2 air reconnaissance program (SECRET) unit (of turn) - divisions on an angle-of-attack indicator on P-U aircraft UHT - unit horizontal tall (applied to F-8 aircraft) - a tail design whereby the whole surface rotates about a pivot point unloading - decreasing g's V - closing velocity (relative) c vector box - see APR-25 WILD WEASEL - F-105F soecially equipp-sd for locating and attack- ing SA-2 sites (employeil on IRON HAND missions) m 27 yo-yo - See Figures 3 and k (page 29) High speed - an offensive tactic in which the attacker maneuvers through both vertical and hori- zontal planes to prevent an overahoot In the plane of the defender's turn. Low speed - a dive for airspeed and a pull up for position closure. ZUNI - five inch air-to-ground ungulded rocket. FIGURE \ . Scissors As Portrayed in Perspective Sketch FIGURE 2. Bgrrel Roll A 1 1 \ ^ PH ^ OH AH mm B • NC / > PC OG AC HANOI* BG CC PF"-' o) AF HMtNOM BF r CF - V r — ? OF AE ( f OD • \ A 1 ' AD \ BD 1 1 2 1 — p:c — 4 1 3 1 \ / / V AC \ B CC V^OfMAtCATION IIN( THt COOftOIN AS / ^TES ARE GIVEN | / , ate. 1 ^ FIGURE 1 1 . Map of North Vietnam Showing GEOREF Coordinates 4 % Event XII-1 Aircraft Involved: Pour A-UCa v« one MIO-17 Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: ig'Sfl^N/lOS'Sl'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Time; 3 April 1965/UlOH ^ , _ . r . iif. fp- 'F PM-v-t) were oart of a atrllce force (nine A-*iEs, ten Two elements of A-«Cs i3-vE f-it,-^* were P°*^ "» _ ^ suooort was by a A-UC5 and el£ht F-eta) attacking the Thanh Hoa ^rldee. Part of the J^PPo^^ j^^g night of fJs (Se. Lvor.t I.l) l-<=i-fi 1" |?A??o5i*SSd !2o ^iSESlMolRs/ At the tl»e were to provide TAKCAP and were arnel with two ^PARP.Wfs ana two aiw*. * of the event, the F-HB9 were In the target area. 2. MISSION ROUTE 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS Unknown 4. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER , . . levels at tioes reduced to a mile. BLUE 1. 2 BLUE 3 Altitude- 10,000 ft 15,000 ft &lilnlr oSo-090- about 090« 5. IHITIAL DETECTION ,^„«.,fi,d 6 o'clock. , rf 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 2 called the «I0 and both BLUE I and 2 started to break. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 1 and £ turned and the HIG closed, shooting. After turning almost 120 the HIO broke off. ws?o5r.fr? isii s-xo^ssM^tss M ssn^ s«Sn! the MIO broke off. a. ORDNANCE Mo. fl red/No. hit Cannon HIG-17 1''° 11. DATA SOURCES Hessaees. Reports: Air Combat Report 3 "80 from the USS HANCOCK Hessap i esi nepor^a p^^^^.^, statements. BLUE 2 and BLUE 3 CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67 CTO 77.7 OPREP I* 031'<5iZ April t'5 CTC 77.7 MSG 0U0202Z A^rll ^5 CTG 77.7 MSG Of022lZ April 65 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION The strike force from the HANCOCK followed a strike by a force from the Coral Sea, who attacked the target at 1035H. The HANCOCK attack elements (19 A-Ws Including the JLUE elements) cruised In a Event in-l Sea strike elements were detected about 10 degrees left of track and 30 "11" ahead on AI radar and were Initially called as bogeys but later Identified as frlendlles. the target by divisions, on a neaaing oi ii» aeereeB, i;xi.«.ux..6 ""^-"^ '-"-Z^" Fifteen A-* (BLUE elements) remained over the target completing the final l»o««»l"«,fM" BLUE 1 was the strike leader. Four F-8E aircraft (Event I-l) preceded them for riax suppression. BLUE elements struck the target and rejoined as separate elements. Vhen the F-8 cf Event I-l reported being hit (at this time It was not <*«terrained to be by MlGs) his call was received by the BLUE elements and the A-Us proceeded outbound to rendezvous with hia. Since BLUE 1 and 2 were separated from BLUE 3 and *, the actions of each element will be described separately. BLUE 1 and 2 BLOZ 1 and 2 were unaware of «IOa in the area and on hearing the report of the P-8 iged, they Ji kgree headlni o'clock from BLUE 1). They were climbing through about 10,000 feet, still in the haze layer as they crossed the coast. BLUE 2 saw two contrails ccnlr.g from the south over the coast at 3 o clock, and also saw two A-^Cs in a left turn at 10 o'clock, 3 miles away and slightly higher. As BLUB 2 looked back he saw a single MIO-17 at 7:30 o'clock going to 6^0' clock two miles away, level, and closing in a pursuit turn. BLUE 2 called "MIC at 6. BLUE 1 break left now.* This was the first time that any call had been made concerning enemy aircraft. BLUE 2 Jettisoned his tanks as BLUE 1 and 2 started to break left and down. After about 120 degrees of turn BLUE 2 saw tracers off of his right wing and could hear cannon fire. As the turn continued and BLUE 1 and 2 passed through a heading toward Hanoi, the KIO broke off. BLUE 36 I I The HANCOCK strike force attacked the target commencing at 10!j2H and retired frd« Q the target by divisions, on a heading of Up degrees, cltmblng_toJ2,^^^ e Q e belng"da«aged','"therjolnerir20M to~rende*vousT climbing out on a m 0»0-090 degree heading. BLUE 2 was flying tactical wing to the right (500 feet at 5 H I I i e BLUE 1 also observed the attack and breakoff. He called the HIO disengaging and 2 saw the MIC going from U:30 to 6 o'clock with distance increasing. BLUE I and 2 then rolled out on a heading of 130 degrees and egressed. BLUE 3 and 0 After their last bombing run, when about two miles south of the target, BLUE 3 heard Nj the P-89 call that he had been hit, and was proceeding outbound. BLUE 3 then decided to ■ follow innedlately in an effort to Join, as the P-8 Indicated he was alone. ^ A short time later, BLUE 3 heard BLUE 2 make the call of a MIO on BLUE I and 2's tall. BUR 3 continued toward the P-S and as he crossed the coastline east of the target, he saw three aircraft at 10:30 o'clock about 3 to U miles away and below him 2000 to 3000 fee«. BLUB 3 was at about 15.000 feet altitude at this time. At first BLUE 3 thought they were A-'tCs; however, as the group closed, he realized that the last aircraft was a MIO-17. About at this point, the MIC was observed to fire (Irevldenced by smoke puffs). BLUE 3. with a full load of 20rm, was two miles abeam at this DOlnt and broke left into the MIC. Before he could obtalr. a firing position, the m KIG broke off and headed north, climbing. BLUE 3 called the MIG breaking off. but only M BLUE 2 heard it. BLUE 3 then proceeded to the carrier on heading of 130 degrees. All Of the foregoing events took place In a period of thout 3 to 1 minutes. The P-U TABCAP from the Coral Sea were assigned an altitude of 25,000 feet. The \ TARCAP leader checked in with BLUE 1 Just prior to the HANCOCK attack on the target, and _ Indicated he was back overhead. (The F-^s had provided TARCAP for the Coral Sea strike B iSd Sad re?Ir^d some 7? miles for aerial refueling.) All HIG action occurred after thi Q ?Sr«twn attacked and occurred below 16.000 feet altitude. After the MIQ action had IrXn o??. B^Se 1 aSIised the TARCAP thai there was a reported r4IG in the area that was • ^ possibly aA A-i*. that HANCOCK forces were clear of the area, ard TARCA? was cleared to n . ^ retire. g | i 1 I Event III-2 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOODs V8. MIO-17 Result: One MIG-17 probably destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: 19»00'N/105»«»8'E 1, PRIMARY MISSION *H0 TACTICAL SITUATION of a larpe force of F-iOSCs f ^ ^"J^^* '^f Jji^of t Hoa Bridge, and to nigrit was instructed to orbit Ju3c off f ""5""!%2LAran^ then to work with Search minltor the prlr.ary nisslon froruency "J^J^ "J^J'^tt ?8.?00 ft lultSSe. 325 KCAS. with the and Rescue. Th.- flU;ht was r> a left-hand °f sone of the F-105 flights were •eaternrost portion of the "U-.n path 2-3 Jj^j^f ' ^ ?he flights were briefed by }St2I?}U:To :nec?VlS ^:t5?^ir.icaise"tfis^iL^?Sf^5ay .fter the first niO encounter In Southeast Asia. Teplrteroanan, Air Base. S'^^^and proceeded dlrectly^to the^ JJMJeiiiS Sni then returned directly to Danang AB. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION P-iooD gp '^g" 1- 2- 3. t 2 - 335 gal ext fuel tanks 2 - LAU-3 2.75 FFAR PODS (19 Rocket Pods) r the MIC passed behln-l CP.EEN 2, [;ircaU:d''?;ar1ho'°S5GVarno-;%rh;J!"SS^lN 2*re-4aed and fired a burst of 20^. out Event tZI-2 of range at HIC 2 who pronptly aplit-S atraluht down. CREEH 2 followed him, ring a second burst and then at IO.OOCj rt rired a Ion*; burst and noted a hit on the right hori- zontal stabilizer of MIG 2. GREEN 2 started his pullout at 7000 ft, pulUn?; enough g to ■grey out" and recovered Just above the wave tops. Other sources Inolcate a HIG loss on this date, Kost probably the MIC described above.. CRfiEN 2 and 3 rendezvoused, refueled, and flew search and BESCAP In eonpany with. an. HU-17 helicopter for cne of the downed P-105 aircrew (see Event II-l) until almost out of fuel. They recovered at Oanang. 8. OROKANCC eXPENOCO CREEN 1, 3. - No att».'r.pt QREEM 2 - iJOO-StiO rounds ^0^^^n NIG 1 - One burst at GHEFN 3 Other burst at GREEN 1 and ^ likely 9. EQ'JIPKENT PROBLEMS QREEN I - Both rocket pods failed to jettison electrically on first attempt. (Old Jettison manually under fire) OHEEH - Could not Jettison stores. GREEN 2 - Plio pack had stripped sprocket holes - did not obtain flln of Incident. 10. AIRCREW CONNENTS Expertenee This squadron had one of the highest levels of tactical aircraft experience In SEA. All pilots had nany F-lOO hours (up to 2,500) and about 20 combat nlsslons In SEA (escort and R^/N close air support). Comment S i P-100 could not satch KIC turn. Plight members were expecting MIO activity since they had talked to the F-6 pilot who had been hit by MlOa the previous day and had examined his aircraft. GREEN 2 - The haze complicated Join up. Found GREEN 3 quickly. CREEIJ li eilted area with all stores and CREEN Lead atter.pted to find and accompany J flight -was to orbit Just off 3hore an the P-105 egress route and to monitor the strike frequency until needed, at v-hlch time they were to switch to the rescue frequency and aid in any rescue attempt with search for the aircrew and CAP for the rescue aircraft. The southwestern anchor point of the orbit was at 19*00* H/105* 'E, with the flight passing about 3 ml off shore on the western side oT the left-hand orbit. Orbit altitude was 18,500 ft for the lead elenent and about 20,000 ft for the second element which was flying Just below a 20,000 ft thin cirrus overcast. The flight was at loltexr- speed of 300-350 KCAS and attempted to fly a fluid four formation as much as possible within the confines Imposed by the orbit. The weather In the area was generally hazy with 3-5 mi visibility in the haze layer which extended from the surface up to 12,000 ft. A broken layer at 3*000 ft and a thin layer at 12,000 and 20,000 ft completed the picture, but the aircrews reported that they could see the water and the shoreline through the haze. When GREEN flight switched over to strike frequency, they noticed a great deal of radio chatter. About 70 aircraft were on the frequency inclualng both Air Force and Navy mission and direct mission support aircraft. Event III-2 GREFN fllPht was Just entcrlnR the second orb.t at abuut 1150H when they heard the P-100 MICCAP nisrht (see :;vent 111-3) call MIGs and the enaulna; calls confl rnin;i; that the MlCs were In fact "IGs. At alnoat tho same clr.e as the lead element of GHEEfJ fllPiht passed throurh a westerly h..'3illnr;, the rilpht saw a Doii:ey at Lead's 1230 position aboui 2 1/2 to 3 ml ranJC, sllrhily hl.^h, and clostnj; alnost head-on. Two of the fllRht neisbers CAlled the bogey as It flacriefl out of the haze and passed In front of the lead element. The bogey was^de'lnltely Identified as a ::I0-17 by tJRBEH 2 as he observed the KI'l roll Into a 70*-80* left bank 'urn into the fllttht fror. his, GREEH 2's, 9 o'clock position. The mo was turnlns; sllr'itly nose low, so OREEfJ Lchd an^ 2 tlt^htened the left turn, enter-ed a shallow climb, rin Meanwhile, the first MIG overshot GREEN Lead and 2 and attacked GREEN 3 and U . .1 GREEN 3 and ft also broke hard left into the attack and attempted to clear off their alr- i craft but were unable to electrically Jettison their external stores. GREEN 3 was able to manually Jettison his external stores as the MIG fired at him from a 90* angle off de- flection. The MIC then pulled in behind GREEN a vt.o could not Jettison his stores. ! " GREEN ii broke harder and was able to dive away fron the MIG and accelerate away from him in afterburner. The flight attemcted to rejoin after the encasement but was hampered by the haze. GREEN 2 and 3 were able to get together quickly; ar.d t.'ien, GREEN Lead, noting that 2 and 3 were together, elected to follow GREEH ft and provice cover for hlra as he egressed the area with all external stores. GREEN 2 and 3 set up a search pattern for the downed P-105 pilot (see Event II-l) until they reached Bingo fuel. They then returned to the tanker, refueled, and returned to the search area to continue searching for the dcwned aircrew and CAP the rescue heli- copter. At th-* second Bingo fuel, GREEJI 2 ar.d 3 returned to Danang and recovered. The fillet time was 3 hr and 35 Kin, and no fnember of GREEN flight received any damage. m Event III-3 Aircraft Involved: Four P-lOODs vs two MIG-178 Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 20*00 • N/105* 50 'B 1. PRIIUaV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION 0«t«/Tiqie: 4 April 1965/1 150H PURPLE flight (four P-lOODa) was fpagjred to fly MICCAP support for a fopcc of P-105» attaeklntK the Than Hoa Bpldw at 19**50'N/l65*'>8'E. Their aaslF.ned orbit was north of the target between the IfIC airfields near Hanoi and the target . At least one flight of four F-lOOi vma in th* area to fly RESCAP for the same mission (See Event ZXI-2). 2. NISSIOH ROUTE PURPLE :iiait departed Oanang« proceeded to rendezvous with a i(C*135 tanker and than paralleled the eoaatlln* ahout 10 ml off shore to the orbit area. 3. lIRCkAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-IOOD PURPLE 1. 2. -j. H 2 " AIM-9B IB SIDEWINDER misalles (at least one on each Inboard pylon) 2 - 335 gal eitemai fuel tanks * - K-39 internally mounted 20mm cannons. 200 rds HEI for each cannon HIC^IT WIG ip 2 4. FLIGMT COROITtONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weathers 3000 ft scattered, 12,000 ft scattered, 20,000 ft thin cirrus overcast with 3-5 ml vifliblllty in a haze layer extending from the surface up to 12,000 ft. PURPLE MIQ I a — 3 — IT I — 7 . Altitude s 18,500-20,000 ft About 17,000 ft Heading : Southerly About 225* Spggd : 300-35- KCAS About 450 KCAS Fuel State : ' Fuel In drops Unknown Plight Pprmation : Fluid Pour Echelon 5. INITIAL DETECTION The lead element was tuminR through an easterly heading In a loose right orbit at 18,500 ft when PURPLE 2, flying on lead's right wing, ele:nent high left, saw two MIC-lTa at his 9 o'clock about 3 ml away, 1000-2000 ft low on a southeast heading. Just prior to the HIO sighting, PURPLE 2 observed a flight of two F-105Ds at his 1 to 2 o'clock position about 5 ml away and about 2000 ft low in a left orbit passing through a southerly heading. PURPLE 2 felt that the MIGs were being vectored under OCI control toward the P-105s. 6. ACTION INITIATED PUIIFU 2 called the MIGs to PURPLE Lead and started looking for the MIQ alert code word to warn the P-1058. PURPLE Lead saw some P-8s at his 10 o'clock high and thinking theae were the aircraft PURPLE 2 was calling, he continued che loose right turn and called back, "Negative - friendly aircraft", attempting to keep radio chatter to a minimum. 7. SITUATION OEVELOPNERT PURPLE 2 replied that there were confirmed MIG-17s now at 11 o'clock low, and crossing, and PURPLE Lead acknowledged with a quick reversal to the left and called, "Let's have at them." PURPLE 2 vectored lead back to the right . In c descending turn In afterburner and the element was able to close on the MIGs, but not "jefore the lead MIC shot and critically dastai^ed the lead F-105. PURPLE Lead fired a nlfisils that passed over the NIQ*s rlj^t wing without detonating and PURPLE 2 followe'1 the second MIO up Into the top half of a loop. PURPLE 2 yo-yoed over the top as the second MIG cosnoleted his loop and started a second loop. PURPLE 2 then dove to the right and net the MIC head-on firing- 280 rds of 20mm from about 1500 ft down to 800 ft wltn no observed results. The first HIO broke left and up hard, then yo-yoed back down on the second P-105 critically enough that the pilot was forced to ball out near Danang. PURPLE Lead and 2 rejoined and resumed MICCAP with 3 and t*. Evenc XIZ-3 OKDMKCE (No. flred/No. hit) Hls5lle» Cannons PURPLE 1 PURPLE 2 PURPLE 9 PURPLE k MC-17 1/0 1/0 2/2 1/0 2/2 Remarlts 280 rds HEI No target Hit two P*105DS EQUIPKHT PROBLEMS ittioned. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total Hours P-100 Time Combat Missions Remarks PURPLE 1 7000 700 20 Sqd CO., ADC background P-40, P-51 in WW IX PURPLE 2 2600 1800 30 PURPLE 3 Unknown —Very experienced in tactical fighters PURPLE U Unknown —Very experienced in tactical fighters — - Comments on this Encounter PURPLE 1 and 2 - Too much chatter on primary frequency. Plights were attempting to practice radio silence &ut Just too rany aircraft on one frequency. PURPLE 1 - Day flehters not too effective over enemy CCI environment. MIOs easily slipped around small number of MICCAP aircraft. PURPLE 1 - Mavy aircraft passing through the target area added to the location, idbntlfieatlon, and discriminative task. , , PURPLE 1 - P-1058 orbiting on Ingress and egress were very iiazardous. PURPLE 1 - Peels his flight of P-lOOa did a poor Job of maintaining flight integrity. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : PURPLE 1-6 November 1968, and PURPLE 2 - U November and 6 November 1968. Messages. Reports : 2 AD 0607*0, April 1965- 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION PURPLE flight, consisting of four P-lOODs piloted by four very experienced tactical fighter pilots, was assigned a XICCAP mission in support of a force of P-105s attacking the Than Koa Bridge at 19*50 ' N/105'''»e 'E In North "letnam. These aircrews had an oppor- tunity to view the damage to an ?-8 Crusader that recovered at Danang AB on the previous day, the first U.S. aircraft damaged as a result of air-to-air conflict in SEA. PURPLE flight departed Danang, proceeded to take on a full load of fuel from a KC-135 tanker and then paralleled the coastline about 10 ml off shore to their orbit area Just north of Than Hoa. The flight established a figure eight orbit at 18,500 ft for the first element, about 20,0C0 ft for the second element, and were attempting to hold fluid four position at 300-350 KCAS. The orbit was mostly over land with hazy weather conditions limiting vlaiblUty, a broken cloud layer at 15,000 ft and thin overcast at 20,000 ft further restrlctea vlsl- Snity over enemy territory where the enemy had a CCI capability U.S. Navy r-^i and P-fl strike and BABCAP aircraft were in the area. U.S. Air Force P-105s were orbi-lng prior to being called into the target, were shuttling In and out from the target, and t^ien were orbltlS over the water for rejoin which further complicated the task of acquiring Identi- fwlM and stopping MIG aircraft vectored Into the area by GCI radar. Another complication wasthe need for atrlct discipline in reducing the use of the single mission frequency used by about 70 aircraft. PURPLE Plight was instructed to call out only positively confirmed MIG aircraft. However, the radio chatter between the mission coordinator and P-105 flights under his direction ralrly blocked the frequency. When the action started, PURPLE Lead was turning through an easterly heading In a ,- shallow rlKht turn at 18,500 ft with PURPLE 2 on his right side and the second element was ball II thf left and Just under the overcast at 20.000 ft. PURPLE Lead had Just observed Event III-3 a fllRht of Navy P-8 aircraft at his 10 c'clock, a llttU hU.t,, far out when J Identified two KlC-17s In close formation at hla 9 o'^lo^l^ai-out 2,000 ft Jo*. J Jl ranej m a looie left turn. The HICs were oovln«: faster tnan PUPPI.fc flight and the MlCa south- east heading would take thera In fronc of PU!?P!.E fllRMt toward a fUtjht of F-lO^a that. PURPLE. 2 had Just seen at h!3 1 o'clock position about 5 nl range. * "J* /"i^^' left orbit turning frsn we?t to south and a few thousand feet below PUIIFL& observed 5n night* probably at about 300- KCAS (see Event II-I). When fURPLE 2 aircraft and '.n an friendly aircraft called effort "Let's have at them", and the MIG alert and called PUHPLB In front of the P-lOOs by thla a rlKht descending turn that A few more vectors from the MIG-17S, PURPLE Ltad thought he was referring to the Navy to reduce radio chatter replied, "negative PURPLE fllffht, . . PURPLE 2 also saw the Havy aircraft and replied that they wer« con- firmed MICj-lTs passln^ under PURPLE flight's 11 o'clock low, on a ft5* an^le. At this time P'JRPLE 2 was looking for the KIG alert code word to relay the warning to other aircraft In the area. At the second call from PURPLE 2. PURPLE Lead called, racked the P- 100 up on the left win;;. PURPLE 2 transmitted Lead to a rifcht descending break since the MIGs had passed time. PURPLE Lead and 2 lit afterburner and reversed into eventually put the MIGs at 11 o'clock about 10,000 ft rar.ge PURPLE 2 put the :iIGs at the lead element's 12 o'clock position. The ?-100s were initially falling further behind, but were able to accelerate In the afterburner descent to .9 to »95 Mach ttSO to SCO KCAS) and close on the MIGs as the MIGs closed on the P-lOSs. which were still In a loose left orbit. PURPLE Lead and 2 saw the lead KIG-IT fire on the lead F-105- PURPLE 2 saw hits on the P-105 with debris coning off the P-105. The llujober 2 MIG aalntalned cloao forma- «tlon on the lead HIO's right wing and was not observed to fire. PURPLE Lead hesitated to fire an AI.M-9B IR r.lsslle at the rilG because of the proxlr-.ity of the P-i05 ar.-J by the time he was sure the MIG was the target, he had closed to within 3000 ft of the :;IG. PURPLE Lead fired the SIDEWINDER as PURPLE 2 was calling that "He had his pipper on a MIG - Was he clear to fire?** The SIDEWINDER missile passed 10 ft over the right wing of the lead SIO, but now the P-105 was in afterburner. PURPLE Lead elected not to fire the second missile for fear of ' hitting the P-105 and decided to close for a gun attack. He cleared PURPLE 2 to fire and glanced over his shoulder to verify the position of PURPLE 2. The two MIGs broke hard up when the first missile passed thera, MIG 1 turning a little to the left and «IQ 2 a little to t:.e right, both flight paths about 20" off the vertical. The P-105 went Into a sharp descending spiral so that when PURPLE Lead again looked for- ward, there were no MIGs or F-105s, The first KIG is reported tr have yo-yoed onto the second P-105 and danaj^ed that aircraft enough that the pilot could not attempt a landing and on bailout, experienced a chute malfunction. Both F-105 aircrews were lost. PURPLE 2 followed the second MIG into the vertical but could not match the rate of turn and overshot the KIG's flight path. The MIG contl.nued over the top pulling Into a tight off vertical loop ind continued up In a second loop which would put him behind PURPLE 2. However, PURPLE 2 pulled up Into a sort of high-speed yo-yo rather than the loop and when the MIG started back up into the second loop, PURPLE 2 whipped his F-lOO Into a right descending turn and cut Into the top of the '110 's projected flight path. PURPLE 2 put his pipper on the Min and fired 280 rounds of ZOirjn HEX in a 35° to «0* dive at the MIO with about '«00 KCAS fron a rant^e of 1500 ft down to about 800 ft but did not observe any hits. The HIO was inverted and PURPLE 2 was rlrht side up. PURPLE 2 had good tracking with his sight set on alr-to-alr, uncaged and rnanually ranged to 1500 ft. PURPLE 2 passed over the KIG, belly to belly, passed through the MIO flight path with a bit of turbulence and banked to look for the MlO. The HIO went down into the cloud deck and was not seen again. PURPLE Lead called the flight together so that they could be reformed and ready for additional MIC attacks. PURPLE 3 had Jettisoned all stores including his missiles with the enernency Jettison button and PURPLE ^ had Jettisoned his tanks on the initial MIC break PURPLE Lead and 2 Jettisoned their tanks after rejoin to be ready for the next attack. PURPLE U fired an AIM-9a missile without a target, apparently to confirm Its operational capability. Event I I 1-3 PURPLE Lead reportd that a nlaaile passed tetwecn nls aircraft and the MIG when he was Initially about 10,000 rt behind the MIG. PURFLE Lead does not think that the missile Mas that of PURPLti l» but rather a rnlsslie fror a »avy Crusader. PURPLE friKht did not see any additional MIQa and returned to Danang with no further incidents. 'i3 \ I -i i /I t "; ,1 J Event IIX-4 z Aircraft Involved: P-IOls vs MIGa Results: So damage Vicinity or Encounter: Unknown 11. 12. PRIMAIIY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Data/Tine: 14 Hay 1965/Unknown. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67. KAmnvC DESCRIPTION No other Information la available except that the MZOa Involved were from Hlnan Island. Event Aircraft Involved: One RB-66 vs HIO Reaulta: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 19*13*N/105"55'E K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 20 Kay 196S/1235H. 11. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION A B-66 saw an unidentified type MIO at 20 lallea. The unidentified aircraft was at 2S»000 foot altitude and was turning away. » ♦ Event ZII-6 Aircraft Involved: MIQCAP Flight vs two NlOa Results: No danage Vicinity of Encounter: 20**20'N/105*^44( o'clock low. Either BLUE 3 or 4 got Into a gun tracking position but his guns would not fire. SLUE 3 and 4 then continued on and bombed the target, having received no damage from the MIG attack. As GREEN 3 and 4 acproached the bomb release point, they were attacked by two HIQ-lTs which fired cannon. GREEN 3 and 4 were at 6000 ft and 450 KIAS and the MIO attacked from 3000 ft altitude at 6 o'clock low. BLUE 3 and 4 jettisoned their tanks and one of the A-4s was hit by a single 23mm round. He retired from the scene at 1415H and recovered without further incident. The other A-4C was repeatedly engaged by three .<*IC-17s at 3000-5000 ft altitude Jfuat east of the target area for about 5 mln (he disengaged at 1653H). This A-4 encountered MIGs a total of rive times. Although the MIGs, In five separote passes, fired canr.on, no damage was sustained. The flrct encounter wns ty a slnp;le MIG-17 who made a flat pass from 9 o'clock, firln?; cannon from 3000 ft range. S^th the^MIC and the k-H were at 3000-5000 ft. and the A-4 was at 500 KiAS. The second encounter was an attack by two HIG-17S, one from 7 o'clock and another from 4 o'clock In flat passes. The MIGs were at i I Event III^H UOOO ft altitude and fired cannon from a range of °[^i"5c.nr-ho*n«!di f pSJ" w.re It 3000-5000 ft and tr.e A-^^ -as at 500 KIAS. dLeiaaaed from 1 r.ssT..tusr?ir s;? ;t?,i'jiro=.4r.^^s%?^i'^/ni?^!.^^^^ yellow border. Event III-X2 Aircraft Involved; Two RP-0A» ve two Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 20»08'N/107«ft2»E K PRiHARY 'mission AHO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 25 Noveaber 1965/1510H. 11. DATA SOURCE Prelect Interviews ; None. Messages , Reports: CINCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67. Mho apparently did not see BLUE Plight. I B B B B a B I B I 3 I Aircraft Involved: Two RP^lOls vs four to six HICs Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21" 7 ♦N/104*' 59 'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 26 >.Vve!nber 1965/1123H Plight of two HP-lOls {BLUE Plight) in MVTI. 5. INITIAL OETECTION and oble^J^gun' ?[ishw! ^^"^ attacking 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight executed a left break In afterburner and descended to 200 ft AOI,. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT No hits were sustained by BLUE Plight, and the HICs made no further pursuit. 8. ORDNANCE Cannon HZOs No hits n. DATA SOURCES Wesaages. Reports ! CPP 26230 IZ Nov 65, (Navy Msg) CINCPARPLT Staff Study 3-67 Event III-14 Aircraft Involved: One RF-8a and one F-BC vs one MIG-21 (probable) Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 19»ftO'?I/107"30'E I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 15 January 1966/1200H th. pK?o';?^[j„'i': t"i%",i.?v,'';???„r«° ««???'• """" «• 5. INITIAL DETECTION ig^iJO-wI^foP^O'E li'^TlLlJ^l^'t wing sliver aircraft on a westerly heading at dlreetl^ oJer BLul K^^h?^!."! ^ (probable MIC-21). The unidentified Slrcraft passed 7«r^^:Lf r 5^^^ flight at an estlnated altitude of HO, 000 ft. The bogey made no hHS Ing change, and no engagement followed. «a8ey maae no head- 11. DATA SOURCES CTG 77.3, OPREP-V068, 150658Z Jan 66 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION See Item 5. 51 Event 111*15 1. PRIMARY HISSION AND Aircraft Involved: Two P-ftBs and one EA-3B va Radar Contact Results: Radar contact Vicinity of Encounter: 19»1I5'N/107®20»E 12. TACTICAL SITUATIOH Oate/TlBie: 19 Jan'uary 1966/0950H Two P-4B8 (BLUE Pl'lgtlt) were on BIG LOOK CAP. DATA SOURCES | CTO 77.6 190420Z Jan 1966 OPREP-3 NARRAnVE OESCRIPyiON BLOR Plight held two targets on airborne Intercept gear at 50 ml at approximately 0950H. The estimated position of the targets was 30 ml southeast of Kalphong with an estimated speed of 350^375 kts and estl.-nated altitude of 25,000 ft on a northerly course. The SAH DD could not cbnflrra targets and directed BLUE Plight to remain with BIG LOOK EC-121 in the vicinity of 19n5'N/107«20'E. Event III -16 1. Aircraft Involved: One EA-3B vs Radar Gontaet Results: Radar contact only Vlolnlty of Encounter: 20«30'N/1D8»18*E PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 19 /anuary 1966/0953H An EA-SB (GREEN Plight) from the Kitty Hawk was on ELINT mission over the Gulf of Tonkin. 11. DATA sources CTO 77.6 190420^ Jan 1966 OPREP-3 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION GREEN Plight » In position 20«30*H/108»l8*E, altitude 30,000 ft, called HIG attack imnlnent at 0953H wh,'en a steady, apparent lock-on from a SCAN ODD signal was received from a bearing of 300T. GREEN Flight broke away from signal and accelerated. The signal ahlfted to search mode and the lock-on was not re-acqulred. GREEN Plight returned to the carrier without further Incident. No visual contiet was made at any time. event III-I7 Aircraft Involved: One F-iiB and or* EA-^B vs Unidentified contact Kesults: .la^^tr contact Vicinity of Encounter: 19" 12. NARRATIVE Qreen flight had received and held an ECW contact evaluated as SCAM ODD radar (carr^n Sy MIo!:i7Srsigndl. QREEN flight estimated ,that the «IG was 1",^ .JJ^^^P* iSn oMltlon and irjnedlately Initiated evasive action, and called for BLUE f light SSSp??? fioS bEuE TrIe mlSslon escort. BLUE flight made radar contact and Initiated an ?itS?ceDt The bogey turiied and headed for the shoreline In the Thanh af"^** pCJs"? WM broken off du! to the SAM envelope and no visual contact was made. Radar contact was lost when the bogey crossed the beach. Event I 11-22 Aircraft IiivolveU: Two RF-lOls va one MIO Results: niRhtlng Vicinity of Encounter: 20»50*M/105*00 'S 1. PtlHAUT mSSlOII AND TACTICAL SITUATION Dat«/Tlne: 15 March 1966/1121H BLUB Pll^tt was on a reccnnalasance r.lsslon. 4. FLIGHT COKOITIOMS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Al titude : Heading: BLUF I ? 15,000 ft Unknc-i'n UnknoMn ao,ooo ft 225" 600-600 kts INITIAL oeTECTIOR BLUE 1 and 2 sl»:hted bogey above. 6. ACTION INITIATED None 7. SITUATION DEVELOPKENT Bosty made a 1B0« turn 25 nl after being slRhted. Ho incidenta. 8. ORDNANCE None 11. DATA SOURCES 160833Z, 2nd Air Division, ;OCO-0 15359. Mar 1966 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTTON B»,fc. I 3 v.f* 20 n -nl nort^ cf Sam Meua at l'«,000 ft. They sighted a bogey at 20»50'Hno -;S•E^b:^eved^o^^^MIO b^^use of his flight pattern) at ^0 000 ft head- ing 225-Aner iicut 25 n nl, tne MIG nade a l80» turn toward Hanoi at point 20«25'M/ioH«i5'E and contact was lost. There was no further sighting. 57 Event IXZ>23 ■i Aircraft Involved: Two RP-lOls vs eiehC NIGs Results: Slg^itin,; Vicinity of Encounter: Near Hanoi 1. KIHART NISSIOII AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 17 Karch 1966/1222H A rilEht of RF-lo!ls (BLUE Plight) on a reconnaissance mission near Hanoi, NVN. 5. IHITIAL OCTECTION BLUE Plight sighted four nights of two NICs each. 6. ACTION miTIATED ■one 7. SITUATION OCVELOPNENT First MIC niRht ,was seen at 1222H. The MIGs approached to 5 n ml, oade a l80«» turn, and headed toward the (Hanoi area at 1229H. The -•cond and third flights of MIGs approached to within 20-25 n nl, imade a 180' turn, and deputed. The fourth flight closed to within 10 n al, broke off south as If to set up for an Intercept, but then departed toward Hanoi. All NIC nights were dstiaiated to be at 30»000 ft altitude. 11. DATA SOURCES CINCPACAP, 18003^Z 12. MRRATIVE DESCRIPTI Sm Itema S and Mar 66. DIE 20481 ON Event III-24 11. Aircraft Involved: Two P-ftCs vs Bogey Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 2l"15'II/107''30*E PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 8 A|lril 1966/0906H Two F-iJCs OLUElpllght) were on a SILVER DAWN/BIO EYE Escort mlsalon. DATA SOURCES 35 TFtf Danang pAsTSL at 1510Z 8 April 1966 -12. iARRATIVE OCSCftimON ... At 0906H, BLUE Plight, while flying a SILVER DAWM/BIO BYE mission at 30.000 ft altitude, 510 KTAS on a heading of 0U0» TRUE, and at a location of 20»15'N/1G7«30'E received a call from Ethan Alpha that he had a radar lock on a bogey. * Ethan Alpha vectored BLUE 1 ano 2 on a heading of 360" and at that time DLUE Flight picked up a radar lobk. The bogey was heading 270". The radar contact was acquired at 10« right and 15 cl pange. BLUE Flight descended to 7000 ft altitude and the bogey was painted on radar above then, ° ' BLUE Pli.3ht elinbed to 10,000 ft altitude and closed to within 3 nl of the botrev and lost radar contact. Visual contact was not made due to heavy haze. The weather- was heavy haze belowj 10,000 ft with visibility 2-3 n ml. weaxner BLUE Plight started a search orbit at this tine but broke off the search when thev discovered they were; over land. At 0910K, BLUE Flight turned to a heading of 120» to depart the area. Ethan Alpha lost contact with the bogey before BLUE Plight lost "ontact Event III-2S Aircraft Involved: KA-3D va MIGa Results: One KA-38 lost Vicinity of Encounter: 21**IJ/110*E I. rRINARV NISStON AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 12 April 1966/Unknown A KA-3B was enroute fron Cubl Point to USS Kitty Hawk. II. MTA SOURCES mCSD Listing of US Aircraft downed by MIGs OP*05U Box Score 12. URRATIVE DESCRIPTION The KA-3B was tracked northeast of Hlnan Island to Chinese coastline. Was downed by C8IC0K mo cannon fire. Suspect crew oxygen system r.alfunct^.n was contributing cause to loss. Event III-26 Aircraft Involved: Two ?-UCs vs Bogeys Results: Radar contact Vicinity of Enc^^unter: Unknown K fllKART MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Dattt/nne: 27 April 1966/Unknown 11. DATA SOURCES DIA Intelligence Sur-nary '<-?6-66 12. JIARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Two USAP P-^C aircraft at 26,000 ft iltltude, on a MICCAP mission for a B-52 strike at Mu Ola Pass, picked up two bogeys on radar approximately 25 mi southwest of VINU. Event III-27 Aircraft Involved: Two P-IBs vs Bogey Results: Radar contact Vicinity of Encounter: — I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 28 April 1966/1'405H Two P-4BS (BLUE Flight) were on BARCAP. II. OATA SOURCES CTO 77.7 2810372 April 1966 OPREP-* 12. MRRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight, from VF-96, were vectored on a bogoy by an E-IB and a SAR destroyer. The bogey began to retreat toward Hanoi at this tine (I'lOSH) at an altitude of MOOO ft. BLUE Plight broke off the chase when they crossed the coast. They could not close less than 15 lai *.irge and achieved no visual contact. Event I II -2 8 Aircraft Involvcl: One A-IE vs >tIC Results: A- IE lost probably to MIC Vicinity of Encounter: 21*30'H/10't"'i5'E. I. PRIMARY HISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlrae: 29 April 1966/17it5H Two A-lEs (BLUE Plight) were on a RESCAP nlsslon for a downed RP-101. II. DATA SOURCES CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67 7th AP 292155Z April 1966 OrRE?-3 0000-0-1865* KKCSD Listing of US aircraft downed by NIGs 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE 1 and 2 from Udorn were on a RSSCAP mlaalcn. They were In the area of the donned RP-lOl when a «IC alert was received. BLUE 1 and 2 then Ismedlately dep«irted the area but became separated. When MIGCAP was re-establlnhed, BL'JS 1 proceeded baclc to the orbit area and at this time noticed chat BLUE 2 was tnlcsing. Radio contact was attempted without success. BLUE 2 had sufficient *\iel to reaaln airborne until 2030H, Event III-29 Aircraft Involved: Two A*JtCs and one A-4E vs one NIO-15 and one MIO-15/17 Results: Sightings Vicinity cf Encounter: 20*55 ' H/IOS* 50 'E and 21«02'«/105''35'E I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 12 July 1966/1135H Two A-JJCs (BLUE Fll?ht) were part of a force attacking the Co Tral railroad orldges. (2i«ii2»N/i05'55'E. ) The strike force also Included some A-^Es, II. DATA SOURCES CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67 CTQ 77.8 1206502 Jul 66 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION An IRON KAKD elenent BLUE Plight reported one MIG-15/17 taking off from Haiphong- Oal-Lan airfield (21''02»N/105''35'E) at il35H. An A-1E also sighted one MIC-15 flying at 20*55*N/105"5B'E heading 120*. The MIGs avoided contact in both sightings. Event III-30 Aircraft Iiivolved: Cne EC>121H vs one KI':-21 Results: Ladar contact only Vicinity of Encounter: 19*15*H/106«»53'E t. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 2li July 1966/I9C5H An EC>121 frcn Dananc was on a BIG LOOK mission over the Gulf of Tonkin. n. OATA SOURCES CINCPACPLT Corputer Listing of KIG Events VQ-1 S'liS'ts: July 1966 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION An EC-121 BIG LOOK aircraft Intercepted a CROSS-UP IF? algnal at a range of n ml. The contact appeared to be a nakln?: a low level Intercept. As the contact was ml away, the EC-121 ccm.-.enzed a dlvln;; right turn and headed for the SAR destroyer. Two P*2567 > Description of alr-to-alr losses MMCSD listing of US aircraft lost to MICs DIA Intellige:.ce suranary of I'JQ events CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67 12. NARRATIVE OE.'JCR I PTI ON An on a combat support mission was hetrd to transmit that he was under attack by hostile fighters. The call was Intercepted by A-IE3 in an orbit south of the C-47 and relayed. SAR and RESCAP aircraft were scrambled but the C-47 did not return to base. The C-47 was downed by MIG cannon fire and the crew Is missing. Event III-32 Alrcrart Involvec: Pour A-fts vb two HIG-17s Result: No daciage Vicinity of Encounter: 20«06»H/lO5'51'E J r| 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND ACTUAL SITUATIO.1 Oate/Tlia«: l6 August 1966/O656H BLUE Flleht (four A-iJEs) and GREEN FllRht (two A-^iEa) on a search and destroy mission had located a train. BLUE 3 and ^ had expended all weapons and departed. BLUE 1 and 2 had also expt.'nd-»d all weapons but were renalnlnK in the target area to assist GREEN Plight (on an IROi: KMIO nlsslon) that was inbound to help BLUE Plight destroy the train. There was a BARCAP ril£r:t over the target. 2. MISSION ROUTE Unknown 3. AIRCRAFT CO»F[GUftATIONS I Pour A-^E5 3L'JE Fltyht 6 - KK-31 bonbs 6 - MK-82 bombs 400 tank 20mn cannon {port gun not armed) Two k^^Zz OREEN Flight U - MK-81 bombs 2 . SHRIKE missiles MIC-17 Silver External tanks 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Scattered clouds at 2000>30ca ft. BLUE GREEH T ? I ? Altitude ; 5000 ft Unknown Heading : Approx. 30O* Approx. I60* Spee d: 30 0 kts Unknown Fuel State ; Unknown Unknown Flight Formation : Element Element 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 1 saw the MIGs ecme across target low and fast on a reciprocal heading. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Flight executed a left 270* turn to a heading of approximately east* In this turn the MIGs yo-yoed up and left and landed up at 6 o'clock to BLUE Plight. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT GREEN Flight was coming up to Join BLUE Plight. The HIOs started firing 37mm at BLUE. BLUE 2 did a hard right 3oO* turr. and as he did this, the MIGs broke off and de- parted. a: ORDNANCE (No. flred/No. hits) Cannon Remarks HIO 1 and 2 Unknown/O Pired 37inn only 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total Hour'i A-'J Hours Remar k s BLUE 1 3600 3200 Second Combat Cruise No other experience Information available. 62 I I d I I I I a 8 I e a Q Event III-32 Comments on This Eneountep BLUE 1 - Recoranends saving 20mm any time striking north of Thanh Hoa In case MICa attack. The KIG acquisition of the A-*i8 should have been easy. KIC shooting was poor. Comments on Overall Experience BLUE 1 . Likes gun In fighter. Want» a "super SPARROW" that can hit any target as long as the target la In the trinasereen at launch. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; SLUE 1, 3 Kay 1967 Jtessages. Recorts ; CTC 77.6 i6l222Z Aug 66 OPREP-3 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight of four A-^JEs was on an early morning nlsslon and had arrived at the coast before sun-up. They crossed the coast near the hour glass rivers and turned south towards Thanh Hoa. At about 0628H they saw a train at 2O»05'H/lO5»52«E and began to at- tack it with both bomos and ^uns. They made runs expending all cf their ordnance and then called in an IHON HAND filjht (GREE:: Flight) which was ortlting off the coast. BLUE 3 and departed at this time. The IRON HAND came In and attacked the train and BLUE I and 2 stayed to provide direction for the attack. After the IRON HAND flight had attacked, the force had made between 20 and 3C passes on the train. At this time they had been on the target about a half hour. BLUE I and 2 were at 5000 ft altitude, at 300 KIAS, east of the target, heading approximately northwest when 5LUE 1 saw an aircraft coming off of the target . The range was about 3 ml at 9 o'clock at SLUE 1. It was seen against the dark background and BLUE 1 recognized It as a KIO-17. The MIC was heading southeast and was pulling up at 2000 ft altitude. The MIQ, at ^50 kts, was observed to drop his tanks and light his afterburner. BLUE 1 then called MICs ar.d instructed the necbers of CHEEN Flight who had Just pulled off the target to egress. ^-rr...^^""- ^ ^ turned 270« Into the KICs. at 5 "g" In buffet, and Joined on GREEN 1 and 2 In a line abreast formation. During the turn, BLUE 1 saw a second MIG trailing the first. As BLUE 1 and 2 made their turn, the MIGs executed a high speed yo-yo and ended up at 6 o'clock, pulling lead and firing their 37r-"n cannon. It was observed to fire slowly and the shells were seen to detonate in front of the A-^^a. The MICs were 2000 ft away and at co-altitude (about lOCO ft ACL). BLUE 1 felt that the situation was not too critical so he did not Jettison his tanka. At this, BLUE 1 switched to guard and called HIGs and his position. At this tine, the four A-^is (BLUE 1 and 2, and GREEN 1 and 2) were egresslng to the east. BLUE 2 at this time broke off to the right and the KIGs broke off and departed the area toward the northwest. sLUE 2 completed a 360** turn and joined the rest of the A-4s for egress. The BAHCAP did not hear the A- it's HIG call. t Event in-33 Aircraft Involved: Two A-^ia v« three MI0-17» Results: SlEhtlngs only Vicinity of Encounter: ZO'SO'N/IOT'OS'E I. PRINAtlY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION tat*/Tlaa: 23 August 1966/113SH. II. DATA SOURCE Project Interviewa i None » Heaaages. Reporta : CIMCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION No vaminss ware heard by BLUE Flight. Event III-I** Aircraft Involved: EC-121 vs one HIO-17 Reaulta: No danage Vlpinlty of Encounter: 19"»7*N/107'00*E i 8 e i i NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIQN g Two A-»JEa (BLUE Plight) observed MIC-17s on two individual encountera aeparated by B 10 nlnuf^a. In the first encounter, BLUE Plight observed two MIG-lTs heading aoutheaat to lie do Cac Ba at 3000 feet altitude. These MIGs were observed to turn 180 degrees and return to g the vicinity of Haiphong. At the point of closest approach the MIGs were flva Biles away. H A third HIO-17 was sighted as BLUE Flight was outbound from the target. This HIG was at 25,000 feet, heading west. The MIG turned toward 2LUE Flight and then proceeded w«8t again and disappeared. m 1 I g I i 1. PRtHARY KISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Dato/Tlm: 10 September 1966/Q830H It. OATA SOURCE CIMCPACPLT Computer Run Listing NIO Events 7 AF 1122 320Z Sept 1966 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION g A BIO LOOK aircraft detected a conical scan, SCAN ODD airborne Intercept radar slg- ■ nal. The signal strength was 5^ decibels at a bearing of 265° from BIG ^-00^. At 0827H, ■ BIO LOOK issued a MIO warning based on a bearing cutting the coastline at GEOREF ca-*» (area northeast of Haiphong}. ^ Shortly after the warning, the PIRAZ ship (Red Crown) directed BIO LOOK to turn H south. A turn was made to a heading of l8o» true; the bogey pUtforra was estimated to p be within 5-10 ml range in lock-on aiodo (conical scan). At 0811H a rapid bearing charge of 300* In 1.5 ain occurred counled with a signal strength of 64 decibels indicating that the MIG circled BIG LOOK as BIG LOOK completed ■ a turn descending into the clouds at 8000 ft. Q The SCAN ODD signal faded at 0832H on a bearing of 330" as the BARCAP alrcra.^-t were vectored In pursuit. BARCAP Intercept was broken off as the MIG approached lani and no visual sightings K were obtained. H Kote: This is the second attempted Intercept of BIG LOOK aircraft (see Event III-lSA) The ECM data from this Intercept Indicated that the MIG circled the EC-121 as the m EC-121 descended Into a cloud bank. Q ^ \ The MIG aircraft was tracked by the PIRAZ ship which vectored the CAP toward the NIC. The HIG ran for the beach and r.o visual sighting was ever held as the BARCAP intercept was broken off as the MIG approacned land. 4 64 0 1 •I; ^ Event III-35 Aircraft Ir.volved: One EB-66B and four F-»C5 V8 two HIG-Zls Results: Sightings Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'ttj'N/lOU'lft'E K PRIMARY HI'iSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 10 September igee/OP'HH Pour P-UC3 {BL'JE Flight) were escorting two EB-66 (CBEEH Plisht) aircraft who were on an ECM nl:»slon. 11. DATA SOURCES CiriCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67 k60 TRW lOO^tiHZ Jeotenber 1966 CCE 11306 7th AP 112320 September 1966 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION The B-663 were in their orfclt pattern between 22»15'H/10liO06'E and 21'52'N/10j;02'E from about 09 35H until 1013H. The lead EB-66C (GREEM 1) was at JO .000-32 ,000 ft altitude aSrthe E3-66B (GHEESJ 2) was at 28.000 ft altitude trailing GREEN 1 by 15 ml. At 09UH -REEtl 2 observed two MI0-21S at 21 000 ft heading 050*. G«E2N 1 was at ai'^S'N/int'll'E at 23,000 ft altitude heading 24C». The MIGs passed below OREEIi 2. They were in sight 5 sec. Three nin later, BLUE Flight reported lock-on with the same HlGs but had lero over- take. BLUE Plight then broke off the chase and continued escort. OREEM Plight had received three MIG alerts prior to the sighting but none were In the Issnedlate vicinity. Event III-36 Aircraft Involved: Two P-ftBa vs HIOs Results: Radar contact Vicinity of Encounter: 20''25'M/107''20*E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 10 September 1966/2020H Two P-*Bs from the USS COKSTELLATION were cn a night escort mission over the Gulf of Tonkin. II. DATA SOURCES 7th AP Computer Listing of MIG Incidents 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION TWO P-«B aircraft rade radar contact with MIG-lTs after being warned of the MIOs presence by the agencies. 65 ^ event Iir-37 Aircraft Involvec:: Two P-4B9 vs Bogey Results: Radar contact only Vicinity of Encounter: 20*0O»N/106»a5»E I. PKINABV HtSSIOX AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 2« September 1966/2020H II. OATA SOUUES CTG 77.8 24I530Z September 1966 OPREP-U 12. MRRATIVE OtSCRIPTION TWO BARCAP aircraft, BLUE 1 and 2, were vectored by Red Crown to Investldate a con- ib'Sit*?OoTfrSl?Jt'i;de°f 20O00.N/106O2..E. The tl.e was^020H and th^ co"^ic"\": lt°°" tr-^f^yS!;! ^? 30 BLUE Flight was Instructed to break off the intercept vector due to tentative assessment of the contact as a possible friendly ilrcraS! on tte^!!L;"fl!^JJ*''*?? t°«^sune normal BARCAP station but were reeosmitted at 2030H si^j «?rir?;rnciStrof"is?So?;/i52S2^?s!'^" w -i th. co^t a r.oJ^.tlry cS^ic't^irnis'^adar' """"^ ^^"^ ^ «^°»«^ *° »^ overlJid?'^^* contact turned inland and accelerated from 250-500 lets and was lost BLUE 1 and 2 broke off the run about 10 ml from the beach. Bwnt ZIZ-38 Aircraft Involved; p-liB vs Contact Results: Radar contact only Vlqlnlty of Encounter: 20"35'!I/107»26'E I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time t 5 October 1966/0 2 3iH» II. DATA SOURCES CTO 77.6 0423052 October 1966 OFREP-i| 12. RARRATIVE DESCRIPTION 20«35»SAS746TJt\?35J'™L%ijS'^^^^^^ in the vicinity of m the area and one possible SnSnSn! SontLS iL b?oJeS SJ^ia^rSur? f^^"'" identification. v«ni.«ct was orojcen at I83iiz due to no positive ^Or 4 October » 183S2. Event III-39 Aircraft Involved. E-IB vs Contacts Results: Radar e-mtact only Vicinity of Encouiter: 20" 35' N/107' 20 •£ I. PRIHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION rate/Time: 6 October 1966/0026Ht II. DATA SOURCES CTO 77.6 052136Z October 1966 OPREP-4 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION An E-IB aircraft held an unidentified high speed air contact In the vicinity of 20*35*N/107*20*E at 0035H, heading 200«. The BARCAP was vectored to intercept » however, the bogey turned north and disappeared from the E-IB scope In the vicinity of 20*50'N/107*00'E at 0030H. The BARCAP did not acquire the bogey on A I radar. or 5 October I966/I626Z Event III-OO Aircraft Involved: Pour A-lHs vs four MIG-I7s* Results: One HIG-I7 destroyed and one NIC-17 dansKed Vicinity of Encounter: 20» 32' N/105" ^i^'E 1. PRIKARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 9 October 1966/1013H Pour A-lHs were orbltinis with a helicopter at 19*U5'N/106"»10'E In a SAR position for a possible RESCAP for a downed strike aircraft. 2. MISSION ROUTE The route was from the ship to 19""»5'N/106«10'E, Then when called, entered coast heading 295* to 19*53'M/105"57'E for 15 olles, then JSO" for 25 mlloa, then 030" for 12 nlles and then vectors to 21"32'N/105"''6*E. Egress was via the same route. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFICmTIONS BLUE 1. 2. 3. 1 2 LAU 10 rocket packs 20mm cannon (800 rounds} MIGs Guns Blue-s^'ay with red stars 4. FLIGHT CONOITIONS PRIOR TO EKCOUNTER Weather : Scattered to broken cXouds at ^iOOO feet with tops to 6000 to 7000 feet. Visibility restricted by haze. dLUE 1 and 2 BLUE 3 and U Altitude : 500 ft 1500 ft Heading :' Unknown Unknown ITr Speed : Unknown 260 kts Fuel : ~ Unknown Unknown Plight Formation r Unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION Warning was given by an E-2A aircraft of bogeys approaching from the north. BLUE 2 then observed tracers going by BLUE I's wing from 6 o'clock high. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 and 2 then broke and descended Into valley with the HICs following. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 2 saw two MIGs follow BLUE 1 so he broke left takii g two MIOs with hla. He flew in and out of valleys which placed the attacking aircraft in difficult situations. The HICs then attacked BLUE 2 but on thetr attack passed in front of hln at which time he fiped cannon and rockets at them, achieving cannon hits on one aircraft. By this time, BLUE 3 and H arrived with the helicopter and attacked the KiGs. BLUE 3 saw two HIGs on BLUE 2*8 tall and naf.e two passes iit them. BLUE 1 saw a MIG on his right, rolled In and destroyed the MIG. 8. ORDNANCE Mo. fired/r.'o. hits 20mm ZWII Cannon Remarks BLUE 2 '''7/1 Several/0 One HIO damaged orntr 3 3/0 Two beam, one head-on BLUE U l/l destroyed ^^Q, Many/0 Once at BLUE 3 and many times at BLUE 1 and 2 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None. ^There were initial reports that these were SU-7 Event IlI-HO 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience : Unknown ■ Cofaincnta an this Encounter ; BLUE 3 - Observed open In-take cn head-on puss. BLUE (t - Aircrart had or.e Urge tailpipe. All BLUEa: Delta wln£s, wine .nounted on fuselage with wing root guns. Comments fron Overall Experience ; BLUE Pll.ht: Ccnsltier rou?h terrain and low altitude as a major factor In their safety. Success:ul flight due to E-2A calling and bocey* and radar vectors to search area. n. DATA SOURCES Ke asaaies. Reports ; 0PHi;P-3 ZOSCHZBZ October 66 from CTG 77.5 — OPREP-3 Z0907!»5Z October 66 fron CTG 77-5 OPREP-3 Z091719Z October 66 from CTG 77.5 OPREP-3 Z091'Jiez October 66 from CTG 77.5 Recos-xiendatlcn for Awards F 100108Z October 66 from Intrepid 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Flight of Cour A-lHs launched from the Intrepid at 0700H from a position of 19*17 'N/lOb^jl'E as tar.-et R£i-CA? for Phu Ly strike. The flight arrived on station at 19*«>5'M/106*10'£ orbltlns over z*\e rescue helicopter. At 0922H the flight was advised that an ?~>*a was dowi. ind their assistance required at 20**32'tl/105'*''6'E. BLUE 1 and 2 proceeded to the SAR scene with BLUE 3 and U remaining to escort the helicopter. The flight crossed the coast at 19°53 ' rVlOS"?? ' E on a vector of 295' for 15 miles, then they proceeded on a vector of 350 degrees for 25 miles, then 030 degrees for 12 miles as dir-cted bv the E-2A aircraft. BLUE 1 a.nd 2 crossed the coast at 0925H at UOOO feet altitude, cli^nbinE- to 6500 feet. BLUE 3 and U followed by about 10 minutes at altitudes between 6C00 and 9000 feet. Both sections encountered moderate, Inaccurate 37tna flak, concentrated r.ainly on the helicopter. Flak became very light after crossing the Song Ma River at SCOO*?!. BLUE 1 and 2 arrived =n the rescue scene at 0953H and descended to »»500 feet for search. At lOlOH SLUE Flight was warned by E-2A aircraft of bogeys approaching from the north at 27 miles. BLUE 1 and 2 headed for the mountains 8 miles away to get cloud cover, descending to SOO feet above the terrain. Shortly thereafter (about 1013H), BLUE 2 observed tracers f r. m 6 o'clock hich going below and ahead of BLUE 1 ind called a break. BLUE 1 broke right descending further into valleys tc reciain below the ridge lines. BLUE 2 saw two aircraft follow BLUE 1 in a climbing turn and then he broke left. BLUE 1 saw two other aircraft follow BLUE 2. BLUE 1 made no attack runs and had no firing opportunities. ' BLUE 1 and 2 then lost contact with each other and BLUE 2 soon observed himself under attack by three aircraft. BLUE 2 found several narrow valleys between ridges about 800 feet high. By flying Into the valleys and around the ridges he forced the attacking ai'-craft Into difficult r.aneuverlng situations. The three aircraft attacked successively from all aspects, beginning runs from within low clouds. During these attacks each air- craft would usually pass In front of BLUE 2. At such time BLUE 2 would fire 20mm and ZUNI rockets. He obtained no rocket hits but at one time he saw his 20mni hitting the MIG as he fired from t.*ie enemy's 9 o'clock position. He observed debris coming from the wing root and smoke or fuel trailing as the MIG retired. BLUE 2 made no attack runs but was able to fire about" 7 times. After BLUE 2 had damaged the MIG, SLUE 3 and ««, escorting the helicopter, arrived on the scene at 1025H. BLUE 3 and U were at 1500 feet and about 260 knots (as a result of en route descent) BLUE 3 saw BLUE 2 low at his 10 o'clock position and under attack by two aircraft frcn the rear. BLUE 3 rolled left Into m attack run and made two high side runs from abave, firing 20nm. After the second run 3:.UE 3 rolled out Into a head-on situation with the enemy a'.rcraft. 3oth fired at cacn other, but no hits were achieved. BLUE U, after BLUE 3 began his attack, saw an aircraft low at 2 o'clock, about 1500 feet away. BLUE '* began a high speed descent closing on the target. The enemy aircraft saw BLUE U and started a left climbing turn. BLUE tt began firing at 300 feet and closed to 200 feet observing 20mn hitting the tailpipe section. The enemy aircraft then dropped sharply on Its right wing and dove thrcuijh the clouds followed by BLUE H. Beneath the clouds BLUE 1 saw the aircraft and the pilot ejected and the seat separated from the pilot. The enemy aircraft disengaged at 1035H. BLUE Flight continued the SAR mission until 1015H when BLUE 3 and J? departed with the helicopter. BLUE l and 2 departed at 3105H, and crossed the coast at 1120H. _ i Event navigation vectors was also a sUnlflcant factor. based on the crew's description of th* fuselage* wing anu a i^v^ on the fuselage. BLUE 1 and 2 landed on the carrier with about 300 pounds of fuel. Event I II -41 /.Irerart Involvnd: EA-3B va Bogey Results: Radar contact only Vicinity of Encounter: 20«»08*K/107*'l6*E I. PRIMRr MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 10 October 1966/UnknoHn II. DATA SOURCES Meaaares. Reports : FEC 13C055Z October 66 PECPOC FAIHECOHRON One 121500Z October 66 TAP 152237 October 66 DIG 30666 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTrON «<«*.^lII.^f"P "^^il? Gulf of Tonkin reported Intercepting a SPIN SCAN B .-l-?r^ intercept radar. The intercept frequency was 9320 «CS and was received In both searen ana track mode. .SS.?' 330* true from ZO'OS'H/IOTOU'E was reported. This bearing Indicates the signal source was in the Cat Bl - Haiphong area. K«-^i'"^?w'^^?^^'"*^.-^^!''* conflmed bv analysis as belonging to a MI0-21D equipped to SSirt missiles. However, no quadrant marker pulses which would Indicate missile guidance were observed during this intercept. This was the first confirmed SPIN SCAN Intercept In HVH. Event III-J42 Aircraft Involved: Four F-<»Cs vs Unidentified Result: Radar contact only Vicinity of Encounter: 20 nral from NVN coast 1. PRIHARr MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 10 October 1966/lft50H n. DATA SOURCES Messages. Reports ; CINCPACFLT Computer listing of MM Events. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION h.iH initiated a flight of P-4C to intercept an unidentified aircraft. PIRAZ 2m b«;eJ"o?f M JSJ JSii'^Ji""** monitored the progress. The Intercept China. • " unldentlfltd aircraft faded over southern for GESREJ*cJ-Jrc"?or!'" * ^"l*""" broadcast on the air Event III-'»3 Aircraft Involved: Two RF-lOla V8 two HIG-Wa Results: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter; Unknown I. PRIMARY HI5SI01 AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/rime: November or December 1966 Two RF-lOla (BLUE Plight) on a photo reconnaissance mission in KW, II. DATA SOURCES Letter from BLUE 1. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLrrs Plight saw two XIC-l9s at 6 o'clock about 5 ■! away. The R?-10l8 accelerated and left the MICs. Event III-Kt Aircraft Involved: Two P-8Bs vs possible MM Results: Radar contact Vicinity of Encounter: 26«39'K/106''09'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 28 November I966/1155H IK DATA SOURCES CTQ 77.4 280848Z November 66 OPHEP-3/OOli 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Just prior to 1155H» two F-SEs fron the USS TICONDEROGA , who were on a BARCAP mis- sion, were vectored by PIRAZ (Red Crown) to Intercept one possible MIO aircraft. At approximately liSSH when the two F-SEs (BLUE 1 and 2) were at 20»39'N/106«09 'E, they were fired uoon by six SA-2 nlasiles. At this tine the ?-8Es were heading 300 at 7500 ft MSL above a solid cloud layer with tops at 5000 ft wh-sn a missiles away t-ans- nisalon was heard on guard channel. BLUE 2 Immediately reoorted a flashing red APR-27 light. BLUE 1 saw a SAM at BLUE 2's 6 o'clock about 1000 yd away and called a hard right break. This SAM detonated 500 ft from BLUE 2 and a second detonated 1500 ft from BLUE 2. BLUE 2 then saw a thli-d missile at BLUE I's 6 o'clock and called a left break. Thlc SAM detonated about 1*00 ft above BLUE 1. BLUE 1 then reversed and a fourth SAM detonated about 1000 ft at 10 o'clock. Two more SAMs passed between BLUE 1 and 2 and detonated 2500-3000 ft above the flight. The hard break evasion tactics were successful in avoiding the missiles and the lowest altitude reached by BLUE Plight was 5500 ft. After the SA-2 firings, PIRAZ observed fo-ar additional possible MIGs on radar which were trailing the original single bogey. BLUE 1 and 2 were then vectored clear of the area. It was believed that this was a trap to lure the BARCAP Into a SAM envelope. However, no damage was sustained. 1 Kvunt III-U3 Aircraft Involved: ?ou.- ?-HC3 and one E3-66C v:: possible MIG Results: Hadar contact Vtclnlty of Encounter; 20"35'M/10'»'02'E 1. PRIMARY HISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATIOM nate/Tlrrt?: 28 ::ove:T:l;er 1566/ltl2H 11 12 DATA SOURCES 't3? TRW 28l.1i;r)2 I.'ov-niLer 1966 CFP.EP-'* CCE 18915 RARRATIVE DESCRIPTION One ED-'i'^C (G?^EEH 1) ar.^l Its Ji!r.h cover of i--lCs (BLUE Plight) were on an ELINT collection mission In "lorth Vler.nan and Laos. GR^Zti 1 d»rirted Takhll at 12!*0K and was on watch 1312H at a position of i7«>tt?«M7ini-o?-^ -^^e l-'''a^ oolnt was at 20«03'M/10a<»t0'E. The route continued iL^LK ^l•^.2•"/i03-«^^■■ -4^1 t^rSurh 21<'««2'!}/10a«»30'E; then throueh 21«33'H/103*'^8'E (;ri!52H): tJ;en to I J'^O v:/lOi**S'E ' (at' lU?ftKj -nd w*..l off -atch at 1^32 at 18»12'H/103'*'"«'E- At IKQQH G^iEE'I 1 picked ur ar. A! radar In sear=h r^ode dt H o'clock position. At this Jini I was a? lo=:^'l:/lor59'E heading l£5° and at 27 .000 ft. GREEN 1 was in JSe cleSJ above ar 9000:i:,0 C ft broken deck. GP.E-N 1 Inquired of BLUE Flight If they i!?e JaJStJ^B InythSne a^ that tearing. BLUE Flight confirmed a single return at 1^ nl range with a speed of 50 J kts. At li^lOH when at 20<'^1 ':;/lD3°59 'E, CIREE:! 1 reported that he was lock-on by an AI radar aL'J^ "llrh- roocrt.i the Ccrey at 3 nl -an?e frori 'JREEN 1 and closing, "either See- " or BMF -.erb-:-: =av; tne bcrey at any tin- during the l.ntercept. As the bogey passed [bove or belcw ohll:: 1 the AI fadar returned to search. The fly-by occurred at in2H at a Iscation of 20°35'-'/lOH°m'E. OCI radars were unusuaily active and ?TrECAII signals strong all during the Incident. 7t 's bellevei that the octjev could have been lockec on chaff which had been dispensed by GREEN 1 (both RR-1»» and P.R-59 were beinr droppsd at this time). Although the Intercepted AI radar signals were siollar to that of the F-^C AI radan (APQ -72), the presence of a single F-UC In this area was highly unusual. 73 Event III-116 Aircraft Involved: Four F-tBs vs Bogeys Result: Radar contact Vicinity of Encounter: ZO^BO'N/XOT'fO'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/71ne: 2 December I966/l'i20H Four F-UBs (BLUE Flleht) frora the Coral Sea were on a frik suppression aisslon for a ROLLING THlNDER 52A strlk*. The target was at approximately 2i»23'«/106»l6'E. II. DATA SOURCES Coral Sea Report Ho. 016 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight, amed with MK-82 bonsbs, perfcmed a flak suppression function on active flak sites located .near 21°23 '.V106^I6'E, between 1351H and 1358H. SAM guidance radar was detected by th« APR-27 at 1400H and chaff was drcpped froiR 12,000 ft altitude. The weather was clear, with i*-5 mile visibility in haze. At 1112CH, BLUE Flight detected two possible bogeys at 20^ 'N/107*'»0'E. These bogeys were detected on radar and were at 15 nlles rsnge , lew and cioslni? at a rate of 600 kts. At this tine BLUE Fll?h: was at 25,000 ft altitude, r.eadlng 18O deg at 1*50 kts. ^ The bogeys turned to a heading of 090 and the closing rate dropped to 50 kts, with BLUE Flis.ht m a 0.8 n !sl trail position. Since It was determined that BLUE Flight couid. not overtake, due to fuel state, the Incident was reported to RED CROWN, Thtt P-ts were soon thereafter diverted for a SAR mission. Event IH-«7 Aircraft Involved: EB-66C va two KIG-218 Result : Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: 22«25'N/105'*22'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: December 1966/08iaH Two £3-66, one B and one C, (Blue Flight) were on an ECK nlsslon. II. DATA SOURCES Messages p Reports : U32 TRW OJ*I900Z Dec 66, MSG 19992 7th AP 0i*225t)Z :ec 66, MSG DIO 30926 CINCPACPLT Staff Study 3-6? 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE 1 sighted two MIG-21s flying north at 11 o'clock position, approximately eltcht miles away. At the time of sighting, SLUE 1 was flying west on the first orbit at 0318K, position was 22<'23*N/10.^^22'E. Both MIOs made left descending turns to the clouds and were lost from sight. Iinmedlately after, fighter bonbers telow were heard to call alerts for HIGs. Some fighter (no call sign heard) was heard to say, "Who got hin'" Response was, "Nuaber 3 or number 4 got him." This was believed to nean one of the HIGs was shot down. (Note: Possibly refers to Event 7t), Vol. II.) Q Aircraft Involved: & Q Q a a Q Q Q i B Q 0 Q a g' S F.vtnt III-18 Two P-1C8 V9 two unidentified aircraft Result: Radar contact Vicinity of Encounter: a'OS^H/loe^lS'E I. PRIHARV HISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlrae: '* Decenber 1966/1I30H Two P-ttCs (BLUE FllGht) were on CAP over the Gulf of Tonkin, under the 'direction of RED CROWN. II. DATA SOURCES Meaaages. Reports ; 7th AP OK3230Z Dee 66, DXO 30926 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION At RED CRO'^J called MIG alert for area AF-2. and ^Smlnutea later BLUE I and 2 were vectored toward two bogeys orbiting at ^500 ft in area M-^i. B^^^^ towaroa BLUE Flight but turned hack at approximately 21°0^'"^J0^;''5'E- J^JE ^J-f^ back southeast and bogeys went Into an extended left-hand racetrack orbit. BLUE Flight was vectored toward honeys three tines between 1130H and lUSH, as the bogeys attempted to draw U.S. aircraft into SAM envelope. Each tme the boKeys turned back to west when BLUE PllKht reached the coast BLUE Fligh?'^ ei^renS position wL ao^SO'N/lOT^OO'E and mlnlnium distance to bogeys was 20 n ml. No visual contact was nsade. 75 Event IlZ-49 ^jlUPfilliHl ' Aircraft Involved: Two EB.66s vs one HIG-21 Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 2I*05'M/1Q***07*E 1. PRIMARY HISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 5 December 1966/1057H Two E3-66 aircraft orbiting between 20»3O'N/10't'»30'E and 21«20'M/10«i«30'E. They were on active/passive ECH support for armed recce mlsaions numbers PB-55«3-3 and D— 3A. 2. MISSION Roure Departed Takhll, direct to IS'JS'M/IOS'SS'E, direct to 2l»15*N/lO»»*0*E, direct orbit between 2O»30»H/10li»3O'E and 21*20'N/IOU«'30'E, direct IS'IS'M/IOJ'IO'B, direct Taalr engagements Event 111-57 Aircraft Involved: One E8-66 V8 W K1G-17S Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'SO'N/lOft^ftS'E K MIMARt Mission ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOH Data/Tina: 16 January 1967/1555H 11. DATA SOURCE RED BAHOM MO Incident SuBoary of PACAP CP Event 29 « U. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOM The ere* of the B-66 sighted two MIO-lTs. No other action occurred. Aircraft Involved: One RF-*C va two MICs Result: No daiaage Vicinity of Encounter: Approximately 2l«'0il*N/10^*'»5'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Dat*/TliM: 16 January 1967/1855H Oiw RP-4C (BLUE Plight} was on a photo reconnaissance mission. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE Plight departed Udorn and proceeded to Channel 97 at 25.000 ft; then to 20*03*N/ 105'E I. PRIMARY HISSIO« AHO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 17 January 1967/1539H II. DATA SOURCE . RED BARON MIO Incident Summary of PACAP CP Event 31. 11. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ^urrmA The cre« of the 8-66 sighted on. Mia-21. No other action occurred. Event III >6o Aircraft Involveci; Two RF-lOla « two unidentified Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 2l«»0'K/l04n7*E I. PRlHARt MISSIQH AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/TliMt U January l967/15tOH II, DATA SOURCE cmCPACPLT Staff Study 6-69. i Event I I 1-61 Aircraft Involved; Pour P-105s v» two H10-17a Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'Sfi'M/lOS^ST'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Dat«/TlRe: 20 January 1967/0955H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Armed reconnaissance fUaht at 15,000 ft saw t«o MICs at 8-9000 ft on perpendicular heading. Bvent III -62 Aircraft Involved: IWo P-4Cs va two KtO-Zls Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 22"30'N/105«15*E I. URINARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/TlBe: 21 January 1967/0825H II. 0ATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Lead of ECU escort at 31,000 ft saw two MIGs, possible Mia-21s. at 5 o'cloclcj HICa maneuvered and headed away; MIOs closest i^olnt of approach was five miles. Brent III-63 Aircraft Involved: Three P-4C8 va two unidentified Results: Ho damage Vicinity of Encounter; , also. 86 Event III-73 Aircraft involved: Four P-105s and four K-J*C» vs two H1G3 Results: Slgntlne only Vicinity of Encounter: 22«05'M/10t«30'2 I. PRIMRV NISStON ARO TACTICAL SITUATION Dat*/Tlme: l6 February 1567/l62«H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Starr study 6-68. 12. RARRATIVE DESCRIPTION P-105 IRON !1A.'.'0 rili^r.t at 12,000 ft saw two possible 'mIGs pass in front at eight miles range; six alniitea later, r-^JC night saw two unidentified aircraft at 20 miles; P-105s and P-'iCs in sane general ar«a. Event III-T* Aircraft Involved: Three P-105s vs three unidentified Results: Slanting only Vicinity of Encounter: 20«J4-H/10U«5U«E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/Tlms: 19 February 15S7/0853K II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Plight at 15,000 ft saw three silver aircraft flying ever at 36,000 ft; no attack made; unidentified aircraft may have been F-iO^a, but were headed generally for area of Event IIX-75. Event III-75 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-^Cs vs two MICs Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 20*58 •N/105" 02 'E I. PRIHART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Time: 13 February 1967/C902H II. DATA SOURCE CIMCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Escort flight at 12, COO ft saw two HIGs descending from I o'clock; flight turned Into HIGs and gq^ lock-c- %C 17 miles, but was unable to close; MIG.-t continued and flight broke off; five SA-2s tr. fired at flight. Aircraft Involved: Four F-lOSa va four KIG-Zis Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21*31*:[/105«36»e WIWRT HISSION MO TACTICAL SITUATIOH Oit«/TlM: 22 February 1967/l62f»H DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6.68. ■ARRATlve OeSCIlIPTIOIf Strike flight Bade sighting ac 6000 ft. Evtnt IH-77 Aircraft Involved: Two RF-4cs vs two NIQs (probable) Result : Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: 2l»«5*N/lO'»<»05'B 1. PRIMARr NISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 23 February 1967/1500K A flight of two RF-^Cs (BU^ Pll^tit ) were inbound on a photo reconnaissance mission of the Tung Tu (6K 1692) and Thang ^uang (6H 1836) railroad sidings. 2. NISSION ROUTE BLUE Plight departed Udorn direct to TACAN Channel 79 at 23,000 ft; then to 21'19*N/ 103«30'E at 20,000 ft; then to 20»5'»'H/10'i«H»Ej then to 22«12'N/105"06'E (abort point), and returned via sane route. 3. AIRCRAFT COKFIGURATIONS Rp.HC BLUE 1. 2 Vector equipnent MIC 1. 2 Silver color 4. FLIGHT CONOITtONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Clouds, 6,000 ft broken to overcast. Visibility 2 to 3 miles in haae. BLUE Plight Forraatlon : Unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION Both BLUE 1 and 2 picked up strong X-band strobing at 21*li5'N/10';*0S*E. Strobing had lasted for 1 1/2 minutes when BLUE Plii^ht made a visual contact on two bogeys at 9 o'clock, 1 n mi range, at 15,000 ft. Unidentified aircraft were silver in color, and were flying a looae abreast fomation. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight broke down and right, and lost contact with the unidentified aircraft. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT No engagement took place; BLUE Plight aborted their mission ana returned safely to Udorn. 8. Ordnance None 11. DATA SOURCES 432 TRW OPSEP-3, 220930Z Feb 67, PASTEL 01398 I 7 Altitude ; rieadlng : Speed ; Fuel State: 20,000 ft Generally NE Unknown Unknown Event Iir-78 Alx^iMtiNiittMN^ • PQ^J. p«x05s vs one t4IG-2I Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 2i»20'N/l03«55*E I. PRIMARY HISSIOli AMD TACTICAL SITUATIOR D«t«/TlBw: 23 February 1967/1532H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE OESCkIPTION night Joining up at 10.000 ft after target rum MG »"« « 1*-15,000 ft; no engage- sent due to low fuel. Bvant 111^79 Aircraft Involved: One RF-lOl vs two unidentl- fleu Rasttlts: no damage Vicinity of Encounter: 20-23*V10«»03*E 1. PRIMARY Mission AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/Tine: 25 February 1967/09<'8U M. DATA SOURCE CIHCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. RARRATlVe OESCRIptlOM «nd indication .lr.r.f. in turn « Zi OOO " piC.d up 5-;jn/;/-|rn S\"2-iS"«J« of lock-on for n.tt 30 ••"ndj; »« /J:"^"'" "o aircraft pulling. contrail.; .Sp«.rt o? tS unld.ntlfl.d aircraft 12 ill". Event III-80 Aircraft Involved: One P?-i«C vs two vinldentl- fled Heaults; Ho damage Vtelnlty of Encounter: 21*00 *N/102*S0'E I. PRIHARV MISSION AMD TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/Time; 25 February IroT/llOSH II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12, HARRATIwe DESCBIPTION Event IZZ~8l Aircraft Involved: One R7-UC vs ? MIO-? Reaulta: Uo dainase Vicinity of Encounter: ^J^lO^N/lOt^lS't, I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOB Date/Time: 5 Marcn 1967/0 703H n. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION and '^V.:.r;'^To^\%^^^^^^^^^ -a'-i aircraft lit afterburner overeat; ml,alon ab^r^r/^aiJli^die^r^eatSer^'afie'r ^tl SSL^''"*'"' Event III- 82 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOjs vs one HXQ-lS (probable) Reaulta: SlghtlnR only Vicinity of Encounter: i9"30'M/10*«30*E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/?lDe: 5 March 1367/16 15H II. DATA SOURCE CIMCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION 1 Event IZI-83 ^0 1. 11. 12. PRIMRf NISSIOll MO TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Time: 7 March i967/l6l8H OATA SOURCE CTN!PACPLT Staff Study 6-68. MRRATIVE DESCRIPTION Aircraft Involved: Two RP-UCs va two NIC-17s (possible) Results: Slstitlnt; only Vicinity of Encounter: 21*00 'H/IOS^SO'E no.es'lsss •t"SJv:?~;;is.n"in^;S°ai«r:?: r:ini'^''vj''''7'' '-^^^ ^'-^ clouds. uniaentiried aircraft furned right and pnoto flight broke down Into 9« B i I I I a I I B B B B 1 B B B B I } I I I I I I I i I ! Event IXI.8« Aircraft Involved: Two RP-4Cs va one MI3-17 and 4 unl dents Results: No damaise Vlemity of Encounter: 2X»X3»N/105*O0*? 1. PftlHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 8 Karch 1967/aboit li*OOH Two RP.4C8 (BLUE Plight) were on a re^onnalasance mission against the Chi Pan RR yard. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE PlJ^ht departed Udorr. ind "-.roceeded to Channel 97 at 19,000 ft. Prom there they proceeded to 21"»13';J/105°00'E at 1000 ft AOL. They then climbed to 6000 ft altitude. After encountering the MlGs they proceeded to 21024 •N/105*'09*E and then to Channel 97. 8. ORDNANCE 11. DATA SOURCES '»32 TRW 081110Z March 1967 OPREF-3 TUOC 01722 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Prom 1558H to 1602H, BLUE Flight turned fron the target area and climbed to about 6000 ft on a heading of 230". They were on this heading about 1 1/2 mln when an X-oand strong (1 ring - steady) appeared at 3 o'clock. The crew of BLUE 1 (Lead) saw .♦'our unidentified aircraft at 3 o'clock In two ele- ments of two each, In trail about 500 ft apart. The lead element was seen to move tuward the C o'clock position but visual contact was lost with both elements. The X-band strobe continued and moved to the 6 o'clock position and Increased to 3 rings. BLUE 2 then turned right acrosr 3L'JE 1*3 <:rack to check the 6 o'clock ar.i saw one swept wing, blurt-noae sliver aircraft identified as a MIO-17 about level with BLUE 1 and within 2 r.l ran^e. BLUE 1 and 2 went to afterburner and descended to about 1000 ft altitude. The signal remained on during the descent, went off at level off, and cane back on at 2 1/2 rings fr';r the 5:30 o'clock position after about 30 sec, and remained on 20-30 sec. The signal then went off and stayed cff. The flight proceeded to channel 97 and had climbed to 28,000 ft 25 ml prior to Channel 97. The weather was broken to overcast. BLUE Plight heard HIU calls for AP-3 about 1605H. Event iri-85 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs two MIG-21s Results: No damage Vleinlty of Encounter: 22"00'N/l0S«ii0*E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 6 Karch 1967/1603K n. DATA SO'JRCE CZNCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Inbound arn^ed reconnaissance flight at 8000 ft saw two MIOs approaching at 15,000 ft. MIOs passed 1 mile ahead, lit afterburner, and turr.ed, trying to get behind flleht.MIGs broke off from 3000 ft Just after completing turn and no firing was seen. 95 I. 2. Event III«86 Aircraft Involved: One RP-4C W possible MIG Results: Radar contact VXc*-Uy of Kncounter: 22*0'»*(I/IQ4''»0'E PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL jITUATION Date/TlP.e:' 9 March 1967/0351H One R?«4C (BL'JE Plight) was on a reconnaissance mission. MISSION ROUTE Departed Udorn at 0?I2H, then proeee<2ed rtlrect to Channel 97 (21'27'H/103*'»3*E) arriving at 0336H. BLUE 1 then headed to 21"»22'!;/13 3*'<»3'E at BOOO ft «SL, arriving at*^ OS'iSH. On a heading of OSC , BLUZ I then descended to 5000 ft MSL and proceeded to 22*'05'N/io»J<»3*fE. At O350H BLUE 1 turned to a heading of 117", deseendlng to 4000 ft NSL (1000 ft ACL) vlth a speed of 540 kts. 5. INITIAL DETECTION While on a heading of 117° at 22<'0i 'Jl/lOifUO 'E at 1000 ft ACL, BLUE l began to re- ceive fluctuating power and activity llp.nts for a few seconds and then launch lights at- 0351H. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 made a left turn to 080**, varying altitude and airspeed. 7. SITUATION TEVELOPHENT Thirty seconds later, BLUE 1 received a 3-rlng X-band audio strobe and light from the 6 o'clock position. At the sane tlrae he received fluctuation activity, power, ana launch lights as well as S-COflS frcn t^ie 7 o'clock position. BLUE 1 Increased h.ls sceed to 600 kts plus and turned to 300*' descending to 500 ft. AGL. He maintained that heading for 1 r.ln, then turned to 27C* heading for a few minutes, then to 230" at 22*QO'N/103''56'£ at 0357H. The 3- ring plus X-band strobe remained at 6 o'clcck for 6 mln until BLUE 1 got to the Black Mountains at Sl'^S'ii/lOS'SC '£ at O'^OOH. No further signals were received after this point. BL'JE 1 then went direct to Channel 97 and then hone. S. ORDNANCE None observed. 11. DATA SOURCES 432 TRW 082225Z March 1967 TUOC 01734 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Additional eomcients: BLUE 1 was to have oasfed near the Thai Nguyen Iron and rteel works at 21«'33'N/105*52'E, and weather points at 21*itO'rJ/105*4o«E and 2l*4o»M/l05*OO'E. This part of the nlssion was not accomplished due to the MIS encounter. During the mission* DLL'S 1 was In an overcast with tops at 8000 ft M5L, bottoms at 500 ft AOL. Visibility was 10 ir.l above the overcast and less than 1 nl below. No warnings were heard. The possible enemy tactics used were to give false SAM launch signals to make BLUE 1 turn northeast (a turn south would have placed BLUE 1 in a SA.M ring). When BLUE 1 turned, a probable NIC jumped him. >8 March 19(^7 1951Z 96 S B E 9 I I I I 1 Q D I I I B Q 0 % i n 11 event IZZ-87 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-^Cs and four P-1058 vs one MIG.21 Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21"55'N/I0l»55*E 1. PRIKARV KISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tloe: 10 Xarch 1967/1552H BLUE FllRht (four F-lO'is) was e^resslns fron a strike on Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Works (JCS 76.00). CFKKr; Kllgnt If-aa) was assUned a STRIKE-CAP mission.* The flight had completed Its scriV-e on JCS 7%i>C0 and was egresslng, trailing P-IOS flights. GREEN had rendezvoused with atrllte force over Northern Laos Inbound target and naln» talned position aDove and tenind :he last ?-i05 flight for Ingress and egress. Strike force probably consisted of IPCK HAND leading, followed by a flak suppression flight, followed by three strike flights and the F«4 STRIKE-CAP flight. 2. MISSION ROUTE Inbound unknown. Outbound, force was proceeding westerly from target toward Thud Ridge when attacked. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-105 BlOE 1. 2. 3. 1 6 750-lb bombs (Probably carrying two i50-gal. wing tanks and QRC-60 pod.) Camouflaged P-4C GREEW 1. 2. 3. ^ 6 7S0*lb bombs » SPARROW (AIM-7E) 1 370-gal. wing tank 1 'iSO-gal. centerllne tark 1 QRC-60 Camouflaged MI0»21 Sliver color Atr-to-air missileCs) 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOINTER Wegther: Scattered to broken clouds at altitudes below egress altitudes. BLUE GREEN jL 2 2 !l _1 t a 1. Altitude ; It ,000-18 ,000 ft 16,000-20,000 ft (altitudes are not clear — GREEN Plight was above BLUE Plight) Heading : 300" 300" Speed : tOO KCAS tOO KCAS Puei State : Unknown 7.500 to 8,000 lb Plight Formation : Both flights In pod formation. 5. miTIAL DETECTION BLUE Plight observed a single MIO-21 apprcachl ig from below at 6 o'clock, detection range above 5 miles or greater. GREEN 1 (front) ot served the MIG at 10 o'clock, very low (nearly underneath him) just before the MIG fired a missile at BLUE Plight. Eatinetcii altitude of the MIG was about 3000 ft. There waa no evidence of MIQ warning in this case. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight continued egress, taking evasive action when MIG was observed to fire missile at them. GREEN 1 had Inoperative radar and on sighting MIG called It out and told GREEN 3, who was on his left wing, to go after him. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE Flight observed the MIO fire a missile frtnn extreme range (several miles or m'—e) and took evasive action by turning and climbing toward the sun. The missile was ob- served to approach to about 2 miles behind the flight, then lost momentum and arched toward the ground. MIC broke off and BLUE continued egress. ■Mission carries bowbs and air-to-air missiles; assigned to strike a given target, but Jettison bombs and protects F-1053 if MiGs become a jlear threat on Ingress. Follows P-I05S out on egress to protect against MIGs. CREtIN 3 banked ahar-ply to g*t a better view and both fron*: and back sighted what appeared to be a HI<:-Ci below. At about the aar.e tline UREEN 3 '.front) observed a missile leaving: the MIG, Tollowed by a prominent white trail or sr-.&ke, GREEN 3 could not see whaf the NIG was shootlr.K: at du.? to brc>:en clouds teiwj^n the "IG and G'.'.EEli Plight. GREEN 3 then rollea Invertea, ncse town, anJ fired a SI'ARPCW, without a radar tareeti In an atteapt to divert the MU. The »IC broke right and GHEEN lost sl»:ht cf him under cXouds shortly after the r.lsslle firing. He was not detected again. CP.££!« 3*s missile followed a ballistic path, missing the MIG ty about 1/? mile. GREEN Pllriht continued egress. Lat^r, at a point on the Red River Juct below Yen Eal , with GRSE*; Plight trailing the last flight of F-1053 by 3 to miles, T-^ia and F-lOSs about lU.ooC Vt altitude, a flight of four MIG-ris was ctsi-rvt-J closing :Ke r-105s fron 5 o'clock, lev.-l. GREEH I radar was now operatlnr; anJ GREEN Flight turned toward the KlGs who then did a hard turn away and departed the area. G.KslEN continued to egress with the P-lU5s. GREEN Flight was Just about at B:;:go fuel. 8. ORONANCE GREEN 3 (No. rired/rro. hits) SPARROW I/O Remarks Fired without lock-on as a diversionary measure. Missile went ballistic. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS 10. A{RCREli CONNEMTS Experience ; Green 1 radar was inoperative part of the tine. GREEN GREEN (front) (front) Total Hours 30O0 1500 Combat Missions 55 52 Remarks 10 years In ADC. Most of time In fighters or Interceptors; ICO missions In Aorea In F-SO; AOC after Korea. Comnents on this Encounter : CREEH 3 (r.-ont) - k missile system which pemlts launch end missile guidance without fine tracking of the target would be highly desirable In a situation like this. Coamenta fron Overall Experience ! GREEN I (front) - The visual Identification requirement is necessary In the SEA environment with .-aany friendly aircraft in the air and our lack of ability to discriminate by other than visual means. The SPARROW Is basically a good missile — It Just needs better reliability. Releasing the centerllne tank offers problems In maneuvering to release and keeping the fUgbt together as well as In [r.alntalnl.«g position on the P-105s. There .laws been aircraft hit and damaged by centerllne tankb You always want more speed and maneuverability although the P-i has the speed It needs and definitely h4s the maneuyerablllty . The 7-H can dlsengajje frco a MIC-21. If you have a HIO-21 making a pass from the rear quarter (either co-altltude or diving on you) you pull a hard break and cause him to yo-yo high. If he does this Just right he's still in an awkward position. What you can do Is break Into him or. If he goes high enough, you can just unload, put the burner* In, Jink to spoil his tracking, and get out. The P-*'s ability to accelerate Is a great advantage. It can turn well, and what It does beat Is roll. You can roll the airplane all day and this makes a big difference. You absolutely have to have a pilot In the back seac of the P-U rather than an RO. It would be difficult for an RO to understand the various tactical situations, and a pilot in the back could bring the aircraft hc-ne if the front seater is hurt, GREEN 3 (front) - Two people In zhe F-H work out well. In addition to needing the other man to operate the weapon system, it's helpful to have j-.omebody else 'coking around There have been a nunber of cases where the extra set of eyes have spotted things. The practice of having an RO In the back seat rather than a pilot is sound for day work or in Just an Interceptor role, but in night air-to-grcund work it is extremely valuable to have a man to watch the instruments and this requires a pilot or a very experienced RO. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : GREEN 1 (front) 6 March 1967 CREEK 3 (front) 10 March 1967 g I I ! B B B B B B B B Messages : 38fiTrrf Korat OPREP-3 101139Z, March 1967, DOI 0750 8TPW Ubon OPREP-3 1012UQZ, March 1967, DOI 03223 7AF message 110107Z, .March 1967, DIO 32589 » 98 0- 3 I I I J2. HARRATIVC DESCRIPTION A3 Jn poracrapha 1 throuch 7 above 1. IK PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: IC ."arch 1967/1556H DATA SOURCE CINCPAC?!-T Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Event Iii-8a Aircraft Involved: F^^ur P-105a vs three Klg-I7s Results: Slehtlni; only Vicinity of Encounter: 2l"i4 •N/i05»lJ0'E Ev*nc : 11-89 Aircraft Involved: "wcive P-I058 vs two MIG-Zls. •inrt four Mia-17Cs RMult: Twc Hta-i7Ss killed, one MIC-17 damaged: Vicinity of Encount-.-r: Zl^afl'N/lOS^ttS'E PRIMAAY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oace/TlRe: lO *!arch 1967/1556H BLUE Plleht (four P-lCSa) was tne mission lead for a strike of sixteen P-tOS aircraft rro:n Takhll. The target was tne ThM Hjuyen steel mill. Primary mission of BLUE Plight sjppreaclon in and around the target area. IRON !1AKD flight, EB-fifi ECK flights. HIGCAP and other support aircraft were alrSorne In connect Ion with this nlsslon wnich took place on the sane day as the Initial strike on this target. 2. MISSION ROUTE Takhll to GREE:; anchor extended to North Star TraeklniC Station, to Red River, east to Cho Ml, then sou'.h Into *.he target. Egress west to Bed River. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P»105 BLUE 2. 3. >* * CBU-?i» (centerline) 2 150-gaI. wing tanks nboard) 1 ArM-9B (left outbo.i: ' (BLUE 1 and 3 only) 1 QRC-160 (right out c .rd) All camouflaged and carrying ZOmsi cannon. MI0.17 Cannon Silver color Not canouflaf;ed MiQ-ai AAM Sliver color Not eafflouflage4 4. PLIGHT CONOITIOKS PRtOfi TO ENCOUNTER* Weather: Clouds 3000 ft s-attered, visibility about S miles In haze over the target and In the valley around the tirget area. BLUE 1 2 2 Altitude : '',000-5,000 ft Heading ; 280*'-290« Speed : 55O KCAS ?uel State t Approx. 1000 lb above aiNGO Plight Ferret icn; Left es.'-elon alnost line abreast, BLUE 3 on the right, with 1, 4 and 2 to the left, in that order. 5. INITIAL OetECTIPN Numerous HIG warnings In the area froir BIG EYE and the preceding strike force. Coning off the target, as -.ne flight was rejoining, BLUE 1 sighted four MIG-17Da at 2 o'clock, approxlmacely 2C00 ft down, distance 1 te 2 nlles. MICs were in a 70» echelon to the right. 1500-2000 ft oetween each airplane, on a westerly course. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 and 3 rolled Into the MIG-lVs, attacking fron the MTGa 7 to 8 o'cltck position. BLUE 1 did a descending barrel -oil, rolling In behind the first two HtGs, but ahead of the second two. BLUE 3 followed BLUE 1 with a high side pass frOTTj 9 o'clock, pulling in behind the fourth MIG. SLUE 2 had lost his radio receiver when popping up to go in on the target and was not aware of the situation. He lost contact with rest of flight and egt^'ssed. SLUE U's actions are not known. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 1 rolled In between KIO 2 and 3 and tried unsuccessful 1« to fire his AXM-9B at the MICs ahead. (He had thrown the wrong switches and the missile would not fire.) BLUE 1 fired cannon and dane;;ed MIG 2. BLUE 3 fired cannon f after experiencing jw.ltching •Refers to the encounter with four MI0-i7s. inn ft. a Q a a Q s a s a a i a a Q Q a Event III-89 problerr.j In trylnc to fire his .-nUslle) at MIC U nn the MIG was firing at tUJc. 1 and downed tfie MIG. ELU:% 3 then took XI-T 1 under ciinnun fire (al-.c-r .-UG 3 ^rfht.-'Sw ^ BLUE X) and scored M',:. r-.na a procabU- kill. /UG 1 tuccesafuliy disengaged; b-Lt Flight did not f.Lve chase due to fuel ani r.lssloi consldtrrat Ions . 8. ORDNANCE BLUE I BLUE 3 MXC>17s (3. 1) 9. (No. flred/t.'o. 20san Unic/1 hits) 975 rd/dana;:lnj^; I downlnt; I Unk/O AAM I/O Remarks Tried to fire AIW-9B Out failed to throw proper switches. Wanted to fire AIM-9B but unable to tl»row proper switches In tlr.e. Did not use gunslgnt — too much switching rcqu 1 red . :o fire as a MIC-21 crossed ahead of hlsi. 'bad contact." Pilot attrl- EQUIPKENT PROBLEMS BLUE 2'3 radio receiver becar.e Inoperative as he popped up for his pass at the target. Later, his s'Jn fa lie; bu^ed the gun failure to a 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Expepience : BLUE 1 BLUE 2 BLUE 3 Comment a Total Hours F-i05 Hours Cor.bat '•missions Remarks 3277 76 TAC background. Had several MIC encounters before this one. 900 12 Completely TAC background. This was first rilsslon into Route Package VIA. •«.2650 300 79 ADC and TAC background. Had never fired a :nissiie In F-105. on this Encounter; BLUE 1 - Could not get a missile off because he missed one of five switches that must be thrown. Cculd not get the gunslghc set up l»i tL-ae to get any use out of it even though switching was practiced every day ~ in the excitement of the encounter, one switch was forgotten. BLUE 3 - There is a reed for a capability to go simply and instantaneously from air- to-ground to air-to-air T.cdes. Did not go air-to-air coming off the target because was too busy with speed brakes, afteroumer, flaps, Convnents fron Overall Experience : BLUE i - There Is always a lot of apprehension -tbout the enemy's capabilities, but once you really see what they car. do — the weaknesses and limitations of their equlp- nent and personnel — then it can be see.i that our people are more effective. BLUE 2 - No MIG-21 pilot I've ever seen Ms been very aggressive. BLUE 3 - To get an electrically caged gunsight an ?-105 will put the sight right on top of the combining glass. This is no mils depression. Everyone uses various methods to bugger the ?-105 system. The Mr0-2l8 sometimes run right through their o'./n flak. Sometimes they follow the P-105S up in the "pop" r.aneuver, through the flak, and try to attack over the target. ELUE 1, 17 March 1967 :L'JB 2, 29 May 1967 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUE 3i 17 r-'arch 1S67 M essages ; 355TrJ OPREF-3 lOli^COZ, March 1967, DOTO-0-10782 7AP message 1101072, Karch 1967, DID 2253} 355TFW OPREP-3 1109'J'»Z, March 1967 DQTO-P-S-1080'* 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Just as the flight apcroached the target he-'idln- 170°, 550-600 KCAS, altitude 3C00 i in a left echelon for a right ."oll-ir.. BLUE 3 siijhte • two MIG-21s at BLUE I't: '-i o'clock, 101 Event I 11-89 5,000-6.000 ft out. The MI33 fired a nlssil^ as SLUE 1 pulled up In his pop maneuver. BLUE 3 In his pop brcke Into the KIGs as he ma-le his rlgLl roll In on the target. The night lost sl(5ht cf '.fi« HIC-Zls at this point ar.'l, since they were in their bomb run. did net attempt to uncage. The flight car.B off the tarnct on a westerly heading. Vhlle In the process of Joining up (5 or 6 .T.lies west of the lar.-et) 3LUF. i sighted four KIC-lTs at his 2 o'clock low 1 to 2 nilea cut. The flight fcmation at; this t lr:e was eLUE 3 on the right with the flight echeloned lert. BLUE 1 calleJ tr.e MIjS; ELUE 3 ackrowledtjed the call. BLUE I initiated tne attaclc by turning rli^ht, Into the '/.IZa friklng a right hli;h-g barrel roll coning out on the first 'AZG el^.-r.«frit ' s 6 o'clock position. BLUE I tried to firs his M^-'-yb at the :'IG-175 ahead but the missile would not fire because he had not thrown tne proper switches. MIGs 1 and 2 toak evasive action with BLUE I following at speeds cf ^lOO to oOC KCAS, tjclng barrel rolls and 3-tums between the deck and about 4000 ft. fiLL'E 1 fired cannon ai MIS 2 without a sight and observed sparkles on the MIC's wing. The MIG-ITs disengia.-ed by turning sharply. BLUE 1 did not Attenpt to reengage since it was not his mission to pursue MJGs and because of being at aXNSO fuel. BLUE 3 rolled in irjnedlately after BLl^r. 1. He made a 90* high side pass on the second MIC element rolll.ig out on WIO ^»'s 6 o'clock position approxiraately 1000 ft back. BLUE 3 Jettisoned hi.-* wlrs? tanks and went aftercurrer as he started his pass. He also attempted tc set his arnanent switches for "ni^siles air" but was unable to acconipllsh this due to the tlr.e required and his proxL-nlty to the eneny. As he reversed his turn; on the KIGs, he saw two MIG-213 cor.lng toward his 5 o'clock. He disregarded these two: aircraft and pressed his attack on the MIGs In front of hin. (The MIC-21S were not sighted again.) As BLUE 3 closed on MIG U the MIG was firing cannon at BLUE 1. BLUE' 3 fired and the MIC turned right, 2LUS 3 fired again observing hits on the HIG at this time. The :4I3 then broke .»^ard left. As he passed In front -if BLUE 3 at 3,000 to ft, 000 f t » BLUE 3 fired again observing hits on t.^e aft fuaeiase, canopy and a fire starting In the left wing. T?-.e MIG rolled dow.i ar.d went strai^r.t In, exploding upon Icpact with the ground. BLLT 3 pulled off '.o the rl?ht. At tnls point MIG 3 crossed In front of him froa right to left. The ;':I3 was attacklnj BLL'E I, Tiring Its cannon. ELUE 3 pulled up and left, abreast of the MIG. The MIG. seeing BL'JE 3. turned right. Into BLUE 3> BLUE 3 fired his cannon at this tl.T.e and he thinks he hit the KIG. Then the KIG broke hard left, and 3LUE 3 fired again. The MIG ccntlr.jei left and disengaged. BLUE 3 felt he also hit the MIG In the left turn. At this point ELL'E I called to disengage and BLUE 1 and 3 egressed the area without further Incident. At no time' did BLUE 3 have a gunsight (unable to i.hange switch settings). He used the top of the eonbinlng glass and ^*ust pointed the aircraft in the general direction. Kost of his shooting was done within 600 ft or so. BLUE 3 was in afterburner moat of the tine and had observed the HI0-17s light afterburners. BLUE 2 had lost his radio receiver in his pop maneuver going in on the target. Coming off target SLUE 2 lost sight of the rest cf the flight and was not aware of contact wl'jh the MIG-17s. He Joined with the first F-105 he saw and, upon Joining, learned that It was an F-105? trying to hit a SAM site. A MIG-21 turned In on the P-105F and BLUE 2 trlea to fire his gun at the MIG, The gun v»ouid not fire. As BLUE 2 turned into the MIC, the MIG turned away. SLUE 2 was at BIKCC fuel and egressed. Actions of SLUE 4 are not known. The HIO-lTs that were engaged by BLUE Flight were also engaged by tw other flights of P-105S, GREEN and PURPLE. At 1556H GREEK Flight, on egress frora the target, was at 21«3'» ' N/105* "JO'E, heading 273* » altitude 4500 ft when GREE.V 3 observed two silver HIC-17S at his 3 o'clock position* approximately 7 miles away at the same altitude, beginning a turn to the southeast. GREEN 3 continued tc pick up speed and lost visual contact with the MICs. While near 21°H5'M/105*25'E, heading 315°, altitude 50CO ft, GREEIi ft sav. one silver NIC-17 at his 2 o'clock position 5 to 7 nlles away. The XIG was at 10,000 ft altitude and was executing a wing over. GREEN ft passed out of the area without further incident. At approximately 1556H, PURPLE Flight of four F-105s obstrved a SAM detonation directly over the target at 11,000 ft. On egress, when at apt roxlmacely 21° 35 'N/105*ftO*E, heading 270°, altlt'jie 6000 ft, PURPLE sighted a i-:iC at his 3 o'clock position about 200C ft to the right. PURPLE 4 called bogey at 3 o'clock and went to afterburner. By '.ite time the MIC-17 was able to roll in behind PURPLE Flight, they were at 580 kts and pulled away. 102 Event I I 1-90 Aircraft Involved: Two P-lOSt* vs four MIG-21a Results: No Oanage (except by ground fire) Vicinity of Encounter: Near 21»35'N/105'''i5'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 10 Karch 1967/Arternoon BLUE Flight was on an IRCM HAHD mission for a strike In the Thai TIguyen area, n. DATA souRces Heasa^es. Reports ; USAP citation quoted in AF/ Si>aee Digest I?. NAR,;ATIVE DESCRIPTION nre ^ '^^^ ^^^^ ^ withdrew due to battle damage, both caused by ground ii^i;l!L^???«^II!''«.2"ff''"'*,*'*.!''® on separate encounters, while BLUE 3 and « were attacking SAM sites in the vicinity of the target. Event III-91 Aircraft Involved: Four F-105s vs one NXO-17 Results: Mo damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21°35 'M/105*tto*2 1. PRIHA^Y MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/Tlrae: lo March 1967/1558H U. - DATA SOURCE CTKCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION rlrtit^iw*«!J*.2?/rK" liguyen at 6000 ft. BLUE H aaw MIG at 2000 ft off mfSoJiS^oJ? In. afterburners and outran HIC at 58o knots' before Event III-92 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs one KIO-17 ■ Result: Sighting Only Vicinity of Encounter: 21"31'N/iO'l*10*E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 11 March 1967/Unkr,own BLUE Plight (four P-lOSs) sighted one MIO-17. II. DATA SOURCES WESG team visit to Southeast Asia Event IZI-93 Aircraft Involved: ?our P-1Cs vs one MIG Results: Slshtlns only Vlelnlty of Encounter; Unknown I. PRIMARY MISSION AN} TACTICAL SITUATIOH Oate/Tlme: 12 Mal'ch 1967/Un^nown BLUE Plight slgh'-jed one HIO, type unidentified. There waa no naneuverlng. II. DATA SOURCES UESG team In Soutlheast Asia. Event III-9ft Aircraft Involved: Two RF-lCa va two MIQ-I7a Results: Sighting only Vlelnlty of Encounter: I. PRiNARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: i6 March 1967/1650H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Photo fllgnt at descended and acceleratsd, losing MIQs. 24,000 ft saw two XICs at 8 o'clock high, 1-2 miles rang9. Flight Event III-95 Aircraft Involved: Four P-105» v» one KIO-17 1. PRIMARY MISSION Results: Sighting only Vlelnlty of Encounter: 21*02 'R/IOS* 30 •£ AND TACTICAL SITUATION DateAlne: 26 March 1967/I6I6H 11. DATA SOURCE CZMCPACPLT Sta^f Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION when At I616H, second flis;ht (same force as Event 111-96) of P-lOSs was pulling off target Lead saw one HXG-17 maneuvering with P-HC flight (Event III-102). Event nr-o6 Aircraft" Involved: Four P-lOSs vs four HIC-lTs and one MIG-21 Result: One MIC-17 destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^Ol'H/lOS'SS'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIONS Date/Time: 26 !/several Hit MIO-17 in left wing. GREEM 2 GREEN 3 GREEN H ^ !Sc-2i ^* ^* ^* — ^^'^^ *o left of OREEN 3 and II. DATA SOURCES Messages. Reports ; OP.REP-3 261330Z r^rch 1967 from 355 TPW DOTO-0-10987 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION GREEN Flight (part of larf^er strike force) was engaged with HlGs and missiles from time over tari^et (OBl.U to 062"ZK Imedlately after GREEN Plight pulled off the target (headlnp' approximately 250 dei;rees, altitude approximately l«000 ft) GREEN Lead observed one MIG-17 taxing off from hoa Lac Airfield. Lead and GREEN 2 began a left turn to 150 degrees to follow KIG for possible enpiagement. At this time GREEN Lead observed three more KI0-17a orbit inc. the Hon Lac Airfield at approxistc.tely 300 ft in single ship :;rall with 3000 to 5C00 ft spacing. KIGs were sliver with rtd star. Lead and GREEN* 2 then eoneencrated their attention to the nearest MIG-17 and pressed the attack. As Lead and 105 Event III-96 CREEIl 2 closed on the I-!IG, thie Kia bcp;an a rl^ht turn. Lead and CREEM 2 followed, turning: Inside the MIG. Zl'.Eb'.ll Lead bp^an rirlnp; and obGcrved ordnance Inractlnf^ on left wlna;; with pieces of rraterlal tearlna; off .YIG after 27" rounds of 20an had been fired. WICJ went Into hard left descending turn. Llead and GREEN 2 over flew the MIG-l? at this tire and broke right lodin;^ sight of the NIC. Th-? altitude of the fllrht at this time was approximately 2500 ft In the vicinity of 2ll«»0l'N/105"*29'E, the tine 0820Z. At the sane tip.e BLUE Plight (Event 111-102) observed a KIjC!-I7 Ir.nict In the sane vlslnlty. GREEK Uad and GREEII 2 then turned left to heading df 190 ie;;rees then back to 3t>0 decrees to sweep target Area and to provide CAP for the remainder of the strike force. CREE!.' 3 and >i were junpJd by one protable KIG-21 Just as they pulled off the target at altitude uooo ft, alr3pee After attpck on position, GRE£;j 3 could not relight afterburner- and was forced to leave the are^ 1 4 f I Event II 1-99 Aircraft Involved: Two HP-'*C3 V9 ore HIG-21 Results: No daiaige Vlctnlty of Encounter: 20»*i3*N/l05*»05'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 26 March 1967/16U5H TVo RP-i»C» (BLUE Plight) were on a reconnaissance ralsslon against Hoa Plnh. n. DATA SOURCES 432 TRW 2611102 Marc^ 1967 OPREP-3 TUOC 021?8. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight departed Udorn and v/roceedfid to Chanr. :1 97. From Channel 97 they pro- ceeded to 21*00 'N/10U° 55 'E at 30,000 ft altitude. From there, they proceeded to 20*5O*J!/10v'*20'E descending to 15,000 ft. At uisH, when BLUE Flight -as at 20'52'N/105'»2O'E and 15.000 " altitude, they saw three SAMs at 11 o'clock. When seen, the SAKs were 2000 ft away. BLUE 1 and 2 broke left and down. BLUE 1 and : then erressed separately from the target, Jlnklnp; from 12,000-18.000 ft altitude and changing heading. When BLUE 2 was at 20°ti3'N/l05«12'E, he saw three more SAMs- one was out of control, another passed to the right, and the third exploded « 3 o'clock Wei. 1500 ft awa^. BLUE 1 saw cne MIO at 20»fi3'H/105-05 'E at 2 o clock high ibSut S nl iway'tuJning into BLUE 1. The MIO ?PP«^*J.^?'-;,i" "^Ji « and de'ta wing. BLUE 2 was about 1 al in front of SLUE 1 at this time. Tl-.e weat^ior was clear with 5-7 ml visibility. Httacroua MIC calls were heard but no SA-H calls. Event III>97 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105 vs one KIG-17 Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21»0ii'M/105«31'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 26 March 1967/10 17H II. DATA SOURCE CIMCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68, 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Plight pulling off same target as that of Events 111-95, 96, 102 saw a MIO 6000 ft below but no attempt was made by MIO to engage. MIO may have been one Involved in engage- nent In referenced events. Event III-98 Aircraft Involved: One B-66 vs two unidentified Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 19*'»5'M/106«37*E I. PRIMftY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 26 March 1967/1620H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Jamming aircraft saw two swept-wing, silver aircraft and turned 180«: no further contact. ^nSmmiMf.mm^^ H^iii^ 107 Event IIi-ioo Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs one :iia-l7 Result: No Damage Vicinity of Encounter: Weat of Hanoi 1. PRINMT MISSION AND TACTIcAl SITUATION . Date/Time: 26 March 1967/1620H I I Pour P-1059 on a strike mission vest of Hanoi. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGUftAT IONS 4. FLIGirr CONDITIOMS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Uuther: Visibility 3 miles fn hase with a broken cloud condition. BLUE 4 3.500 ft Unknown Unknown Altitudes Headlnp T jpeed ; Puel State : Pl ^Kht Poraatlon ; Trail for target engagement 5. INITIAL DETCCTION BLUB 4 obaerved a HlS-lt In ehaa* on an unknotm flight aa he was coming off the target. 6. ACTIOa INITIATED | BLUB * Jettisoned his bombs and engaged the MIG-17> 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT Aa BLUE 4 came off the target he observed one MIO-17 in chase on an unknown flight at 5 o'clock, low. 9LUE U rolled m on the HIG in a sclssor3 maneuver from 3,500 ft with the MIO at 3,000 ft. After blue made one gun-flrlng pass, the MIG broke left and away from BLUE ft and the friendly flight he has been chasing. Encounter ended at 1621H. BLUE 1 estimated no damage to HIO. B. ORONAflCE I BLUE 4 fired guns - nusber rounds unknown, ma-n - unknown. 9. EQUIPNENT PROBLEMS %JSZ 4 - bombs failed to drop during pass on target, n. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUE (Lead) Messages. Reports : OPREP-3 261330Z March 67, from 366JPW TAKHLI RTAPB OOTO-0-1097 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION See Ztema 5. 6* And 7. 4> Event Ili-ioi Aircraft Involved: Pour P-'fCs vs three MIG-17s Result: No dami^e Vicinity of Encounter: N-ar Koa Lac Airfield {2l«»01'N/105*29'E) I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 26 March 1967/unknown Pour P-^Cs on a f-TFIKE/CAP mission In the vicinity of Hoa Lac Airfield. 3. AIRCRAFT COItr tSURATIONS ?-UC BLUl I. 2. 3. " Boabs Alr-to-alF annament unknown UnknokfH 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO CI4C0UNTER Weather ; Scattered to broken clouds with haze. Alt I tilde: Unknown Keadlng; ~ Unknown Speed: Approximately S^O kts. Plight Pornation Trail for bomb dellvery 5. IHITIAL DETECTION BLUE 2 spotted three MIG-17s as he pulled off the target- Time unknown. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Lead did net spot KIGs, but Instructed flight to go get them. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE Pllsht was pulling off the target when BLUE. 2 spotted three HlC-17s on downwind . at Hoa Lac Airfield. BLUE 2 called the MIGs and Lead replied » "Rog, t don't have them; go get them." BLUE 2 rolled up, trying to get some lateral separation. At this tlm«> BLUE 2 hit BINGO fuel and troke off. Lead said to rendezvous at Alpha Point which was about midway In on the egress ana coining out of the target area. About one ninute later BLUE 2 saw a SAM hit BLUE Lead. Lead was at about 15.000 ft when he was hit. BLUB Lead called out, "We're over Alpha Point. We've been hit. We're bailing out. We're balling out." 11. DATA SOURCES Pro.1eet Interviews ; BLUE 2 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION See items 5, 6, and 7. 109 Event 111-102 t. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTI Date/Tine: 26 Karcti Aircraft Involved: Three P-*Ca v» elgiht WO-lTa Result: No damage Vicinity pf Encounter: 21»02»M/105"22'E CAL SITUATION 1967/1615H to 1627H on a STRIKE yCAP mlasion. BLUE 2 aborted in the air due to tareft was Son 7ay, the Araiy barracks Just east of Hanoi, and Three f-UCa (BLUE Plleht) the loss cf his ECX pod. The the Hoa Lac area. 2. MISSION ROUTE Cepartei Ufcon and refueled on ORANGE ANCHOR. From there to Channel 97, then direct to 21*0'*';i/lCU'» 32'E, then direct tc i:l'*C7'N/105''28'E, then dlr?ct to within 15 nlles of the target. Egress was direct to Jl'Oft'N/lOl^SZ'E then to Channel 97 and then to air-to-air refueling on ORAIiai ANCHOR. }. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS p.HC BLUE 1. 3. ^ 1* - SPAftpiJ 6 - 750 lb boRba 1 o Left outboard wing tank 1 - Centerllne tank 1 - ECM pod on right outboard station MIO-173 MIC I through 8 AAM missiles Ouna Silver color Ho AB noted 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR Weather; visibility 3 nlles 0 ENCOUNTER in haze with BLUE a broken cloud condition. Altitude ; Heading ; Speed ; Puel State: Plight Pornatlon : 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 3 sighted the HIQs: 6,000 MSL 107" 5tO kt^ Pull Internal plus some ih external tanka. Unknown at BLUE flight's 8 o'clock position at appro xlnately l6l5H. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE flight dropped external stores, lit afterburners, and went into a hard left turn. BLUE t fell out on the first turn. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE flight enroute to 15 to 20 miles southwest of from target with el^t KLQa target area broke out of weather &nd Into clear In a valley target and almost Inanedlately they spotted P>105s egressing in close pursuit and attacking the F-lOSs. The KICa spotted BLUE flight and came off th^ P-lOSs and approached BLUE flight at their 8 o'clock position. BLUE fllg.1t Jettisoned ordnance, lit afterburner and went Into a hard left turn. BLUE 1 fell out on the turn. BLUEl flight continued turning in a big horizontal circle with the MICs In pursuit firing their cannons. This engagement lasted for approximately 10 minutes, BLUE flight hit BINGO fuel bmd the AlOi departed one way and IJLUE fll-j^iit ;mother. Evidently the :iIGs were alsp low on fuel. During encounter BLUE I locked on, interlocks out and armed » but missile would not fire. Several opportunities to fire raisslles were prevented because of proxlnjlty to HZOs. BLUE flight received ground fire (37-57mm) while engaging -.hese MIGs. 8. ORONAHCE ' The only fire waa fron the KICs (cannon fire), fo hita. Event III-102 9. EQUIPHENT PROBLCMS BLUE 1 - Rissllif failed to fire. ... nisaloii BLUE 2 - Lust tcx pod and aborted early In the alsalon. 10. AIRCREW COMHENTS Experience ■ Total Hours BLUE 3 3.000 p.d Combat Hours Missions 2«0 65 and worked r.ore In the vertical. Comrents on Overall Exp erience ^^j, mig, in the area. Also flak will be 5aKs will be n.-^d at V=^**^' hetwee-> AAA SAMs and /IGs. A tactic Is fired. Ther« Is a hl?h decree of "ordination betwee^ AAA^ jaw an for a KI^i-17 to keep at low altitude, noplng to dra- you 1 . to a ii-k p have happened on 20 "ay 15t7. 11. DATA SOURCES Prn|»rt Interviews : BLUE 3, 3 June 1967 Messages, reccrts ; 8 TFW 2616 ta3Z Mar 1967 OPPEP-3 DOI 036 J9 8 S5 261220Z Mar n67 OPREP-3 DOI 03639 8 T7W 2705J40Z Mar 1967 OPREP-3 DOI 03665 1^. NARRATIVE ,,,,, ,0T was about 10 odnut.s behind the BLUE flight was on a STP.IKSl'CAP nlsslon. ineir i stning out with 2-3 n«lles e.i:.4 KIOS .t 3 o'clock. 3^„j n O-'i mile radius of Hoa Lac airfield. ^ , ^ a ntiie raoA hassled with some In the break BLUE H became separated from J- ^* of t»ie MIC-17S but then was able to disengage and egress. , ttt oAi During his fight BLUE . si^.ted a silver MIO-21 In pursuit of an P-IOS, (Event III-96) .ut only for a short tl^ and dl no. see « ^ ^^^^^ ^„ ^ Shortly after the break Into tu: ^^J-y ^J^^^J^^i and corkscrewing toward the 15 degree "^e do-jm attitude. 30.0 ft belcw^h^ y P Although BLUE « did not see ground. The altitude of the '^^^-^^/".f^rSlt thepe was no way for the MIG to recover. £he impact due to his engagement, he felt that JJ^r!/?' r right wing surface. This - ^^"^Ti^^^ s.„rx-aio-;.i''t.r«vis. --'^ -^^^.^ BLUE . wa, fired on »y cannon I" «o airf.rjnt h.ad-^ tlm. n. »aa fired on at vne ff?"„Ji|'' '■zii ma overshot and at this time BLUE « 'rJ:rl.'oH±ll° 1t5^ 3°«, aM, t. a., the tracer, fired at tne. ^ D„. to tne S.« actlvlt, that day Cone aircraft 5J?,^ral'°The"fo*r^ VLS'l^aSd^l In the encounter) BLUE 1 elected not to operate f (sevcMl thousand h^^r^'i:^^'^'^^'!^^^^^^ -^riSlS? Lad on eUE 3 -ho ... outsld. of BLUE 1. interlocks out and nlsslles .r™.d°".tlJip»°d trS' a SrB.Owr°°!io'',»;jxe U .h. aln.l». • A ^-o-* »' 1X1 Event iri-102 the aircraft had ne,?atlve results. Th« system and "lilies ^'^^^f J.^^ ue^'to^lelU!" 5tlU on the aircraft, but no reason w« found for J^^,"'* 2^^;i^"fo;nd IHA The missiles were r««.vf.d and c^heckt-d and althoufrh a "•■»"°[„J^'*;^^"^J^*^hl'ch «uld have snd a slight pildance problen was found In another, no reason «a5 found which wouio nave prevented the missiles fro.-n fliflng. In several other opportunities, missiles were unable to be fired because BLUE I was voo close to the HIG. After a short period (BLUE 3 estimates 10 minutes) the '1°^ '"^Jf^J' **|l?KeS'*al50 At this tine BLUE l and J were at dINCO fuel, and It was '"f-fj/'f f ?^ Sid prohnbly out of fuel or aruaunltlon so they broke off. Previous to this BLUE l ana i nau not been In a position to disengage. BLUE flight received 37/57mn flak throughout the engagement. 11. 12. Event I II -10 3 Aircraft Involved: One S-66 vs one HIG -21 Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 20°50'tl/10fl«lO'E PRIHART NISSIOM AMO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 27 Kareh 1967/1617H DATA SOURCE CIKCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Aircraft on SCM orbit was not seen by 3-66 escorts. at 23.000 ft saw HIO pass 2 miles ahead. MIO turned away and I I « I 1 I 4 I I Event III-i05 Aircraft Involved: Four E-UCs v» Unknown Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21^26 *M/iq6*5S*E I. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 29 March 1967/Unknown CINCPACPLT Starr Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Inbound strike flight Jettisoned ordnance when MIC call was received. I I I I S Plight concluding armed reconnaissance siw slnrle MIO at 3 o'clock high. KIC was Joined by two others to rear of flight but no engagement ensued. MIQs were probably on defensive yatrol. *^ ' Event III-106 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s va three HIG-21s Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Enwounter: 21'»10»M/10'i«08'E t. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlae: 30 March 1967/0945H 11. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Starr Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Event riI-101 Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s vs two unldenll- ! fled I 4 Results: Sighting only ! f Vicinity of Encounter: 21«20'.V108»00'E ! I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION j Date/Tliae: 29 r^rch 1967/I6UIH ' \ II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARPATIVE DESCRIPTION Inbound iRC;i HAND flight at 16,000 ft saw two contrails above 35,000 ft. MIG warn- ings had been heard. I Date/Time: 29 March 1967/Unknown i im I 11. DATA SOURCE J [ i CINCPACPLT Staff Studv 6-68. i Event III-1G7 Aircraft Involved: Four F-105S va two WIC-219 Results: Slghtms only Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^OO'H/lOS'OO'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 50 K^rcti 1967/1600H n. DATA SOURCE ClKCl*ACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION P 101 flight at 'C.OOO ft 8a« two MICs at •>* o'llock high and 4-5 mile a ran«e; no •ngager^i?! SlJf ieJe ipiarentlly patrolUng Hoa Lac Airfield defensively. I. Aircraft Involved Results: Mo damage Vicinity of Encounter Event IXI-lOa Two RP-*Cs vs two MIG-21S 21«20"S/103«5'»'£ •ruoc 02500 PRIMARY MISSlOr; AHC TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlae: 8 ArrJl 19B7/1610H Two RP-ftCa (BLUE Pllgl^t) were on a reconnaissance nlsslon asalnat the Yen 9al air- fields. n. DATA SOURCES U32 TRM 08103'»2 r.pSEPj3 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION . . ^ BLUE Plight proceeded fron Udorn to Channel 97 and then headed direct towaro Yen BaI The visibility was 2,' ml in haze. . w^,J<«., f^r mic at 10 000 ft altitude saw two m:o-213 below them at 21-2o'NAOr ."Tn/f«3rSe?: JJiutnoJS'JJ'bfiow BLUE Plight at 3 o'cloc. and were In "right climbing turn towird BLUE Fllgnfs 6 o'clock. BLUE Plight went to ifterourner and broke down and to the right. Jettisoning tan«, and departed the area. ^ ^ » w j The MIGs were lost fUn sight after the turn. The R?-««C8 had been receiving X-hand strob^ 0? tio rTn.3 IntemltteStly icr 1 :.ln prior to the sighting. After 4-5 min frcn. tke abort. BLUE Plight heard MIQ calls In AC-1 and then in AG-tt. 114 8 B 1 I B B E B B S B a B 1 0 s i 3' Event 1 1 1-109 Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s vs two KIG-21s Results: Slghtlns only Vicinity of Encounter: 2l°25'H/10'««02'E 1. PRIMARY NISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 8 April 1987/16 35H BLUE PllRht was to strike Rt. 601 Highway Bridge. n. DATA SOURCES Meaaaaiea. Reports TAP 0821132 DIG 22856 April 1967 12. NARRATIVE OCSCRIPTION At BLUE Plight was at 21° 25 'N/IOH'OS 'E rolllnjr In on target (Rt. 601 "iej;"*^ Bridr*) rrcn 17.000 Vt 5h«n ?wo iUG-21 aircraft were sl.n.ed The -J^^^ were at 30.000 ft in level fllrht at a headinr. of 280", 10 o'clock high with respect to BLUE. The /ICs B^de one wide Srhutapparently at same 'altitude. They then rolled out on a heading of 45" an.', disappeared. Event III-llO Aircraft Involved: Two P-IO* vs one MIC Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 19*'«7':«V106'»29'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 11 April i967/1325H II. DATA SOURCE CXNCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Tumlng P-10*ts saw silver colored aircraft and contrail at SS-'fO.OOO ft heading west over iSulf of Tonkin; unldent reversed direction and headed for Hainan; although may have been a friendly (DD held friendly track In area), other similar activity occurred in days following. I I Event ni-lU 'Aircraft Involved: Four P-lOSDs vs three MIC-21s Result : No danag-; Vicinity of Encounter: 20"50'ri/10'»'*00*E K PRIMRY NISSIOrilAND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: U April 1967/1615H «pnent"?t''a?S8'S/p?iS.?^''''^* '"^"^*>" Package VI. Target hit -as road' 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIgIjrATIONS P-IOSD BUIF ^ i and U 6 - M117 bombs 1 - AJH-9B (carried by 3 aircraft only) I - M6J Cannon I ' Anonle» - Unknown {probably had QRC-160 ECM pods) 4. FLifiHT CONOITIO.IS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER BLUE 1. 3. ^, Altitude: Headlnt^ : Speed ; Fuel State 18,000 ft Unknown Unknown 5. IKITIAL DETECTIpN on a SelSlJ/Sr^o?/''" approximately 10 .lies away at 20.000 to 22.000 ft, n. DATA SOURCES Messages. Reports 388TPW liuiofe PASTEL DDI 1735. for DOCO. April I967. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION 20-50^lMo%o'SS?E"r3bE^?e%ro^*^en\?J.l''.e°%^- ^-^^r^ ^'^O-, at vicinity 270° turn on an attack heading on BLUZ -liJ^- l-r-- -^rV'" 'md -xecute 3 executed a 37C° turh for eventual head-en for;^»oK ^.'""t2 '"T" afterburner and approxl=iately 500 KCAS nnd 'till -aJ^vlnS ^l^^ltl^ ^^^^ -"^l^?"^ at speed of BLUE -light observeb the MlSs break liav^-or J* ^P->^l»«te ran^e of 7 :nlles. Off the cha,.. 'blSe ^lUhtl^^n^C^n^^lI^Crta^g^t^Snf J^;^- ..JJ^if t leader broke Event riI-H2 Aircraft Involved; Pour P-I05s vs two Props Basults: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 17«<:4'K/zo6«30'E 1. PRtNARY MISSION Date/Mae: 12 kprll 1967/1239H 11. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Sta^f Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION One of P-1C53 ;aw two silver colored low wm^ ™^ too snkll to be A-la and «««b^^d ^21^."°"°-^^°^ P^»"" « 3500 ft; unldents were 116 I j Etent 111-113 Alrercft Involved: Two P«AB vs one niQ Results: No Damage Vicinity of Encounter: 19*'52 •H/lOfi^'JS 'E I. PRINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Pftte/Tlme: 13 April 1967/H15H II. DATA SOU«CE CINCPACPLT Starr study 6-68. 12. KARRATIVe DESCRIPTION o.e./.»o^*'*^*' under E-2A control » made radar contact on unldent at 12 miles; both BAKCAF turned to Investigate and wln^nan briefly saw what appeared to be a MIG>17 tyoe aircraft i unldent dived into clouds and contact not regained. 1^ t Event III-llU Aircraft Involved: Four F-I05a vs eight to ten . NIG-17S Result: F-105F Xoas to a MIG,* one MIC-I7 shot down Vicinity of Encounter: 20«»53'M/105»25'E 1. PRIMARY Mission AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/Tin'?: 19 April 1967/1655H BLUE flight (ccnalstl'ng of four F-105F WILD WKASEL aircraft) was fragged to 5"PP«=3 SAM acMvlty wM le a force of 16 ?-10533 anJ 8 F-UCs attarke-l JCS 22.00. the Xuan to 1 Army Barracks at 23'": 3 •:.V105'' 35 ' E^- The F-«C aircraft w*re assigned strlktf/cap which gave then the secondary nlsslon of ilr super" orlty. Six other flights nad :«C encounters In this area. (See Events 1I1-U«, -UT. -llB, -U9, -120.) MISSION ROUTE BLL*E flight departed ->.K Takll AS, flew to CREEK ANCHOR for refueling, direct: to Channel 97, and direct to the Blatk River at J0»58 'JI/lOS'^l'S. Their fVlrMry target -as a series of SAH sites atcut 5 ail sputhwest of Hanoi. This route would pass a few nlles north of Hoa Blnh but the IHOK HAND flight route would vary as they pr-pared to attacK known SA -2 sites The first '^IG encbunter cc.-?urred Jujt north of Hoa Blnh. Return route was direct to GREEN refueling anchor]' and frcn there dependent on the aircraft. BLUE 2 was shot down in the vicinity of 20»»H»'|K/105"32'E.' 3. AIRCRArT CONFIGURATIONS h - F-I05F3 ^ I 1 - 650 gal centerllne tank 2 - C&U-2'BLUE 1 carried 2 AGmL^S missiles and no Qf\C-l60 118 i B B I fi B i fl B B fl B B B B B B g B a e I a a a a a a a a a a Event 111-114 5H 6 o'clock position When BLUE b saw el?ht MIC-17s In two fllt^hts of four aircraft. The MI3s were attac'M'Zs and were completely i^efrect.ve. The r^rst mght of MI3S overshot I but the second flight of m:-.? turned Into BLUE 3 and A^out thirtlBC. BLUE i»'s afterburner failed to light and BLUE 3. m afterburner. Pa««J BLUE J ^.d thej became separated for the rest of this flight. BLUE 1 anj ? JJ* ""JjJ JJ^J'^* KIC attack at this tine and were able to continue the attack on the SA-2 site. Jhe MSt S this reconstruction LiU cover each nenber of the flight "Pa^«*;ij; /J^SJ^J SirJnS Se BLUE 3, and then BLUE ll and 2, although all three entitles were engaged by HIQa during the sane time period. I BLUE U. attempting to get his afterburner lit. unloaded his " down from 5 000 ft to |aln some airspeed. He was only able to „^ feet becausi of the ooUntalnous terrain but increased his almpeed to about tt50 kts. He turned fron his easterly heading to 2K0« ani headed back across the Black RJver. The MIOs SSSked BLUE 4 during Ihls naneuvor and one car.e Into BLUE view a, he turned BLUE k fired U7 rounds of 20mm HEI at the MIG as he passed the nose of the F-105, and BLJE « estimates that the MIC was damaged. The MIQ continued away froia BLUE 4 and was observed pulling out Just above the treetops. In the vicinity ot 21»50*N/105«12'E. two more MIGs rolle'1 in behind BLUE 1 and BLUE Jl was forced into a scissormi engagement lasting about k nln. BLUE ft Ji^JiUS h.7n^ * stabilized tarKet for the repeated firing oasaes and Jettisoned his ordnance as he SIrlssed' fiJs? Jhef centeJuSe fuJl tank and then the CBU.2«.s. Before BLUE Jettisoned th. JS-Jl one silver-colored HIO-17 with a red star on the side flew up to a position ISS n ^0 thflefi o?>£Sl ISd sat there for 3-^ sec looking over at the ACM-JS Shrike Sasne on the outboaid wing pylon. The MIC broke away when HLUE H turned Into him. BLUE a continued to fly the mountainous terrain contour attempting to unload, dive. Mid increase airspeed when the terrain pennltted. But due to the rising feature of the ?Sj^i?n " ?hJ aJea (a rlJe from about 2.000 ft to almost 10.000 ft) he war unable to -trr^iUat^ an al-s5eed over U50 kts. With each hard Jinit to avoid a MIO pass, his aJrsoeef 3ould faniff ?o abLt\2^ kts. The Electronic. Warfare Officer (EWO) In ?ir^!!S ^nrknlt was idvlslrg the pilot as the MIGs were coming in, relaying the enemy the rear =°^^PiJ„^".f^^J^'n*triink In order to avoid the MIO fire. As BLUE 4 crossed position, and -J^J J^gf^J^"" J^i^Hn ^ Send Of the Black River Valley between 3,500 ft nHkarthrr" wjje ?Srfee Sr^?ouJ M?Gs\?tacSl^ but the 37nm antiaircraft batteries peaks) there were tnree w Hcw^ver, the V.IG:: lonttnued the attack zs BLUE Jth JjlJ'JJ^ jnd jhe MIGs . ,hase one at a ll^l^nllt lVJi\ll%f oll M?G'!^ft. aSd this 5ia turned b.-.ck at about 20">i.5.N/105-OO.E. Event III-UK BLUE U heard BLUF 1 call i.hat BLUE 2 had balled out. BLUE ft reversed course and re- turne?'^ ra'r'as'h^a'r.d .nowlnr. t.at he could -t engare any threats without ordnance. He was able to relay radio calls to ^^%^"f "* i.roost- regained In the area until his fuel ran lovi. He then ecrcssed to GREh.i ANCHOR To. post strike refuellnic and returned to Takhll APB. c limbed away. BLUE 1 then turned In an -.ttenpt to return to the target area but observed another MICI? on his tall but couLi not ,et thl= MIG to fjershoot. BLUE 3 ",^^*,2^^J,S%o tween the hill: accelerating as he dove and J^'st the MIG. BLUE 3 once a|^^^ Biol r.T.l'Tor -"att^f.-op eVia thln.ln. that the attacK ""*,^^'7" , hin A short time later, the RWO infonned BLUE 3 that JSS SeniS oi'the'^r tal? B^rat'th^s tlr.e. BLUE 3 'was below 31n.o fuel He went to !?ril^^urne- accelerated away frcn the MIG on the deck, and eK™sied. BLUE 3 did n. - SiU enoSs^'rS" to at?er.pt a' rendezvous with a tanker and elected to recover at Udorn APB. Return aKaln to the Initial encounter to reconstruct the fUtrht path JJ;"^,^ A, ni^;5ou"l? ttateS. 3LUE 1 and 2 were not under Imnedlate MIG attacK when BLUE 3 and H lLa«d ?"e for" of elr.ht m:g.17s. BLUE 1 continued to prepare for an attack on the ?lu%t raSara? their i2 o'clock position, and both BLUE 1 and 2 launched an AGM-45 shrike missile Jt a SAM site In the vicinity of 20'>52'N/105''*5 'L. BLUE 1 and 2 prot^ably swun? ri^ht In a southerljr heading while waiting for the missile ^ .1 l.lv rt^ kill s^'l a-d *^en swung back around to their right in the pop-up for liml Seme^v %eUverrJ»ad?ng !4 «ihe'north with release at J.OOa ft BLUE 1 ob- sSr^ed a ciupli of 5lG-17s atte=:ptln« to get into his 6 o'clock as they ,?PPJ°f J^^^ servca a woJH* ^ .„„ close and were not a .hreat at -nac SA-2 site J"f./PP*^*f r^^'/*" he picked up a MIG-17 low at his 9 o'clock posl- l\Tn'i L^ l u^re5 ?o get tehJnd l'l M G and paralleled his course. Tho MIO turned Si?Jh- tofafd : A rfeld and BLUE -oUed In from above and fired J -st^of^.Omn.^ J'J.?? n^the Ml5 iVthe lefi winS. bJSS I observed the left wing start tc dlsinte- butst hitting '^JJinHon wlih the MIO, and watched it crash in a rice pr.ddy. Spring ?S"l?t«k Sn'^Ms 5?G. ILSS fuSht moved*5-10 mi from the target toward the west/ southwest. , Durlnff the tine that BLUE 1 was shooting at the MIG-17. he thought that BLUE 2 w^d «i«f hut in the nrocess of coming off of the target, BLUE 2 apparently becamt froi BLU'' 1 aS cane Snder atfack of another ilC . BLUE 2 called that he had a 25Sr!?J Lf^e Overheat ?1«S? on" and shortly thereafter repeated the first njessage with In L5}?lon2l wlrSnf ll'-K on and that he would have to get out. BLUE 1 advised BLUE 2 Jha? Se ias iot In sfght and to head southwest. BL'JE I headed in that direction and picked uS Jwo ciJuUS in the Vicinity of 20«4i.'N/105«»32'E. Two good beepers were also heard. See Event III-116 for more mfomatlon on BLUE 2. RLtiE 1 orbited the area attempting to locate and talk to the downed Pllo*",''l*hout his fuel vfarrunni^ he observed a MIQ-17 at his 6; 30 o'clock poal- ??«n He lU af?e^SSini"aSng!lssed the area to GREEN ANCHOR to refuel. Prior to leav- ii^";he"?escap arek! TreqSested aid until the choppers could effect a pickup. The P-105S m Event 111-117 and two A-ls responded (see Event III-117). . J^^lit^nS «uJS 15ld^:Jr?es*^u: 'frrle%f JSenSS^^riJrrvtnrJn^tS? lUT^LUE 1 caU^S S"S5iRr?ha"i? iSf hiI?dT5Sy bJief beeper ?n response. BLUE ^^^^^^^^ -P^^^^^^^^ M GUARD Channel for the next 7 aln but. received no further response fror.> the ground. - . . 'There is a disparity between the action reported by the 'J32TRW OPREP-3 and the Infcma- tlon relayed to the interviewers by BLUE «» and his backseater. BLUE 4 states, "I dis- cussed the incident with riajor (BLUE 1) in detail, later, After we «e^f„?",^^'Vf Md I'll try to explain exactly what he told me". The above follows BLUE Vs narration, however, accordlni; to the OPREP, the reader Is led to believe tnat BLOE ^ ^^o*^^^-,;;^;:, . SSirSfter BLUE 2 balled out and was ^n the ground with the MIG heading 090° when Initial- Iv seen by BLUE 1. The OPREP appears to compress the action as reported by BLLE i ana reduces the number of MIO encounters to a total of two MIG-17s. The correct story cannot Se determined because BLUE 1 was lost to possible MO action about 10 days after thls_ occurrence. 121 Event III-llU BLUE I objervcd four more MI0-17s orbiting the area and pul!ed In on one and fired. The nia dropped hl3 fuel tanks but did not fso down. BLUE 1 thought that he had hit this MIG but had to let hln go asl two more MIGs were nanwuverlng cn hlra. BLUE 1 went to arterhurner and exited the area to ai position about 20 ml west of the downed crewnen. BLUE 1 madj one Dore pass througn the area as the F-105s In Event III-117 arrived, but observed nothing and was forced to depart] by low fuel. BLUE 1 recovered at Udom AB. BLUE 1 fli'ed a total of 700 rounds of COmn HEI on the three passes. BLUE 1 and his EVO jreported a red star with a yellow border outline on the top of the wing on the MIGs which they engaged. Event ni-115 1. PRIMARY KISSION AND Date/Tlp.e: 19 Apr^l Aircraft Involved: Two RP-4C5 v» two MI6» Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: ai^OS'H/lOl^ST'E TACTICAL SITUATION 1 1967/Unknown Two RP-UCs (BLUE Plight) were on a reconnaissance mission against the Son Tan amy supply depot an^ alrfle'ld" located near 21''05'N/105'30*E. At 20'''*5'H/10l»*04*E It was determined that the weather would preclude the mission acconpllahment so BLUE Plight started a left turn to proceed to Channel 97. 11. oAfA soui^ces 432 TRW 19133CZ Ajiril 1967 OPREP-3 TUO? 02773 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was a^ 21"'Q5'N/10i*<'57*E at an altitude of 19,000 ft In a left turn to a heaeif.s of 210" when Ing to BLOX Flight '3 7 SLUE 2 sighted t-rfo unidentified aircraft. The aircraft were turn- o'clock position, 3000-'»000 ft above and 1 1/2 ml behind. BLUE Plight lit the afterbufners and' 'Outdistanced the unidentified aircraft. No further contact was made. Numerous MIC calls were received throughout the mission. The weather was coverage with tops at 12,000 ft and bases at 6000 ft. 122 Event IXI-116 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs eleven MIC-lTs Results: Two ecnflmed MZG-17 kills One P-105D slightly 6arzfied Vicinity of Encounter: 20«i's 11 o'clock position li a cllmblrip; left turn with a 'MG-ll on his tall firing. The F-I05F was climbing In a 2D°-30° left climbing turn and passed within 3000 ft of the flight before It exited at Lh» 3 o'clock position. ORANGE 3 observed the MIO-17 firing and saw smoke trailing from the F-105F. Two beepers were heard shortly Event III-116 arte-. After the MIG fired ai^d hit the P-105P, he «"fj|irj«i:fJ^J^t"'*»,J"H"sn..ed*''' on ORAMCE flight but was no threat because of the range and OKAHCE night's high speed. ORANOE flight was at 6000 ft, 1 550-600 KCAS. headed east. Aa the P-105P and MIQ were pacslng, ORANGE Lead and 2 saw fo"** colored and one silver) approaching fron the opposite direction with two "f^* ^^OO rt a. above ORANGE flight and two m£cs 1500 ft below. The MtOs apparently In J^e right front quadrant because the twp low MIGs pulled up In a wing over and s"^ted to come in at ORANGE Lead's 5 o'clock wh,lle the two high HIGs nade a sweeping turn ^S*' J*«2ttl!on attetrpted to come In behind OP.AMGE 3 and At this time, 0^*^-0^: Lead called «o Jettison and lead; 2 and H cleaned off the bomb racks and tanks retaining the JC«pods and SIDE WINDERS. ORANGE 3 and u did not see the four rtlCs and c:^«:GE 3. thinfl"? havl'tL was talking about the lone MEG chasing the F.105F, atterr.pted to "11 lead and have the flight retain the ordnance since this lone MIG wa-, no longer a ^J^^f^t the airspeed of 550-600 kts. ORANGE 3 also Jeared for the safety of the aircraft since the f"e^l^^^» almost 200 kts over safe Jettison speed. He elected to retain the ordnance and proceed to the target. ORANGE Lead and 2 broke right Into the MIGs and narrowly missed having a ■Id-alr collision with 3. The MIGs broke off the attack when ORANGE Lead and 2 turned in- to the pop and bombed the target. ORANGE a stayed on ORANGE 3*s wing. ORANGE Lead and 2 reversed back to the left to cover 3 and ^ P°P; ^JL^JfJ. turned from south to northeakt at 6000 ft 550 kts. Lead saw ^wo «10-1J» in looae foraat^^^^ at about 2000 ft altitude In his 10 o'clock position ^"ded 080- . ORA .OE Jjad reengaged afterburner and broke Into a' right descending turn to attack the lead MI 0 who aade a hard right break. ORANGE Lead cut the MIG off In the turn, obtained a good firing tone, ana filed the AIM-98 at about 2000 ft range. The MIG continued the tight turn paaaed about 200 ft astern without detonating. The 'MO then reversed back J°the right and ORAMCE Lead broke contact, orange 2 attempted to bre«k right with the MIG but was unable to turn with him and broke off to rejoin Lead. During this t'.rcefrane, ORANGE 3 and H went through the pop up. ORANGE 3 selected a building and released his ordnance on the target. He then saw ORAfjGE 1 f"^^ 2 attacking the two MIGs and a third lor^e MIG-17 pull Into their 6 o'clock. ORANGE 3 J'"^*'^"*^ S?* fuel tanks and empty MER rack as he pulled out In a shallow right turn to As ORANGE 3 pulled Into the came In behind ORA.VGE 3 and MlC's 6 o'clock, the MIG broke Into a hard right turn and vw ^- ^ GRANGE 3 called «» to afterburner, entered a right turn toward the hills, and the MIG fell behind and broke off. The flight rejoined ovLr the hills and decided to cone back Into the area to look for other MIGs while the rest of the strike force attacked the target. As they were maneuver- ing In the target area. ORANGE Lead saw a MIG-17 (dark cclcr with Star) turning from a heading of north toward elast at 2000 ft. ORANGE Lead made a hard right turn to position SlS!?If ?nslde of the yiC's turn, closed to 600 ft at the :.:iG's 5 o <: lock and fired about 200 rounds of 20 at the HIG. He did net observe any ordnance Impact but did the WC was damaged. OPANqE Lead overtook the MIC and passed 75 ft over the MIG's canopy and broke away from the MIC which was no longer observed. As ORANGE Lead was closing on the above MIO-17, ORAJIGE 3 observed a second MIG-17 climb up from below ORANGElLead and pull into his 6 o'clock. ORf^E 3 rolled over and_ started to drop In behind the MIC but the MIG reversed hard to the right and down. ORAMCE 3 ?S^ed hard ?lght to sta^ inside of hln but the MIC came back at ORAKGE 3 In a quarter- ing head-on turn! ORANGE 3 turned the M-61 cannon on at 150C ft range and fired 500-600 raSnda down to 100 ft range. The MIG new through the scream 20mm shells and 0RAHCE^3 •an aany hits on the wing and along the fuselage with decrls ^o^^lng off of the J^e MO passed over the canopy smoking and was lost in the large blind «P0* i^*^;-*?? » „ 6 o'clock at about 2000 ft altitude. ORANGE t reports that he -as attempting to maintain position on 3 during the series of high "g" turns and maneuvers and was unable to keep track of the MIGs after the first encounter. However, other sources Xlat this aa a con- flmed kill. ORANGE 3 Immediately turn to keep his airspeed 1500 ft headed northwest. 6 o'clock and closed uslni NIC up for a missile shot dropped his nose In afterburner and went into a awirging right up and saw another MIG two miles to his left and going a«ay at f-om 2500 ft. ORANGE 3 and u dove to the treetops at the Mia s intermittent afterburner. GRANGE 3 was attempting to set tne -rr- un .op a a.^Ja/alnst a Sky background. At this nlme , ORANGE saw another ntll {;?nlng in from left and called 3 to break hard. nRANGE 3 did not hear the Vjn due to the confuslon|on the channel and U again called for a break as the MIG selected / for a ta-eet and closed inside of 3000 ft. ORANGE n called once more for a break aa .. MIG was oreoarlna to iflre, and when no response came from 3, broke to the left. '>i;ANM U fu^anerJSJner Lnd ias able to accelerate away from the MIC. ORANGE 4 could not contact ORANGE 3 to afrange a rendezvous so he headed west: and departed the *^ Grange 3 closed to about [3000 ft on the MIG he was pursuing. •:he MIG broke hard left as If lltlmA bv radar or anothe'r MIC of ORANGE 3's approach. O.^ANGE 3 broke left with the MIG noS ?? range attempted to fire the ca.nnot but could only get about 10 sporatlc -ounSs to fire as he Jiggled the stick and recycled the trl^-r until at about 1000 ft A--t i?-h 50- angle cf? and 500 kts. OHAIIGE 3 saw a puff on the right wing about midway ■ thi center of the wing. There was no flash. Just a puff. As ORANGE 3 overshot the IKJ's flight trajectory, he dumped the nose In afterburner and accelerated away, rfhen he 12 > a : 3 i 3 ■a 3 3 B 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Event III-I16 unjui'.a to the left to reenter the area. v,..rf,„, ORANGE Leaa and ^ n.neuverln. J;,^;;:,-7„f,--;,-r.!SoS ?rartrtidS!*'reld at 5.000 rt and 500 kt3. ORAN'ir. f */:^^^:fi:^i?''Jehtnd the MIC. But the MIG entered ft..jde a har.: ^eft turn and descen'i..a P<^* *^ J J. ^^g^ to 3,000 ft and aated that the MIG was probably destroyed, -^ter this rfas cnan^.u j^^^ Incidents. While o» It, and hit th. Mr, «Uh snoke cosine rrcm t.-.e «I0. . „ „,„k. „. r.^rr„t-t^rr£ T^pp^v fron under nose an^ In a^ast atte.„^^ ^^^^^ observed as ORANGE range hoping tr.at the "b- v-g«s let-wash. The turbulence created by Lead overshot the r-f^^J^'S- of Ihl "sUck S th^ed his head down, causing him the Jet-wash tore Oa^-wo 3 s ^jan^ o.. 01 L.je recovered In a descent at 500 ft AGL and 52aT?S"?' ? - VhtTau'a^^lc^e It' 3 o'cioc^-lo" Believing that was the last P-105 IriA ^l:L^T^^^r^i^^r:^ ^ri;;^^/li Ta.h!l with no further problems. ^„ VH* ►-ini^-" '^.^AWE 3 r.oclced a deep oval shaped gouge In the bottor. While enroute to the wanKe. , 3 r.o^. extending from a few Inches from left corner of the fc-^ll«'^-P^°°V''^^t^"^3i^,wi**f J in ionf iTs In wide, and at leart 1/k the bottc.. of the pane toward the ,JS,i«?f;ei'?ro. one of the MIGs but in deep. ORANGE 3 fe" that Ris -as a c * jiigaj,,nt. More probably the gouge was 2iSsed\;'5;i;it cf^lnS^r? cniVr^he^SlSs. on Return to TaKhll, ORANGE 3 observed that his cannon was con^pletely fired out. ORANGE flight returned to base -1th no other da.-nage than the windPhleld. 5i» Aircraft Involved: Ewent III-H7 Four F- 1059s and two A'-lEs vs elRven HIS-lTs Results: Ore A-IE lost to KXS-17 One'NIG>17 killed by Pour NIG- 17s damaged Vicinity of Encounter: SO'SS'N/lOS^aS'E (1st Encounter) I 20« 37 '11/105' 18 'E (Znd Encounter) I. PRINARr MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Cate/Tlme: 19 April |l967/1702H (1st Encounter); 1718H (2nd Encounter) BUPP flig^.t (four P-105DS) was the second strike flight fragged to attack JCS 22.00, the Xuan Mai Amy Barracks at ZO'SS'N/IOS'SS'E, The force consisted of four F-105D strike flights, two F-i*C strike/cap flights, and one P-105P WILD WEASEL fllgnt. The WILD WEASEL flight arrived In the target area first and was Jumped by MIG-lTs while Infiound. The first strike flight (Event III-llo was at.acked by MIG-lZs In the target area. BUFF fi:.ght did not see any .^ICs until they were outbound after bombing the target. BUFF iiter occurred after post strike refueling when BU?? flight re- fer rescap of BLUE 3 In Event III-llO. SANDY flight (two A-lEs) fllgnt's second MIS encou turned to the target area responded to a downed pilot call and proceeded to the area of BLUE 2 in Event XII-I14, where they were Jumped by 2. MISSION ROUTE BUFF fllfsht departed Ing, direct to Channel 97, four Mia-17s. Takhll RTAF9 and proceeded directly to GREEII ANCHOR for refuel- at 19"»28'NV103'''3'E, direct to the Black River at 20°53'N/105*35'E. Egress was over the reverpe route with a MIG encounter In the vicinity of 20° 53 •'1/105" 35 "E and then direct tc Channel 97 and GPECJ AKCHGR. BUFF flight refueled and returned direct to 20''37'N/l05'l9'E where! a second MIS encounter occurred. The flight again egressed di 'eetly to !3REEr: ANCHOR and subsequently recovered at Takhll. SANDY 01 and 02 departed Udorn RTAF3, flew direct jto Channel 97, and orbited east of Channel 97 u.ntll called by RED CROWN to croceed to the 089 radial at 103 i^-l from Channel 97, The flight was Jumped by four MIG-i7s In that vlsijnlty, ZG'' ^0 ■ N/105° 30 'E , anil SAfiDY 01 was lost to HIC fire. SANDY 02 egressed direct to Channel 97 and recovered back at Udorn RTAFB. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F-105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. t | 6 - MT,17 bombs on c^nterllne >ER 2 - 'J50 gal fuel tanks on Inbd wlnj stations 1 - QRC-160 ECM pod 1 - m61 20rjn cannon A- IE on outboard station 1029 rd3 BLUE 1 and 3 carried one AIM-9B IR missile on other outboard station. SANDY 01 and 02 2 - CBU-22 5 - LAU-32 1 - LAU-32 WP 4 - mi l| • 20an M3 cannon 1 - SUU-11 (7.62mm) HIC»17 Unknown 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS Weather t ^ittx 200 rds each 1600 rds PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Clear near the layer starting the south and refueling". target with 10-15 ml visibility. SANDY 02 reported a 300 ft cloud •jo ml west oi Hanoi to Channel 97. BUFF 1 stated broken cover to west because "we were in the clouds on the way to 97 and during re- Encounter 1 BUFF Altitude: Heading : Speed ; Fuel State : Plight ^orr.ation ; 126 T IT 5,000 ft 25C« 500 KCAS 6000 lbs Fluid 4 with element on right aide Encounter 2 BUFF — 2 3 T 5.000 ft OflO° about 700 KTAS 8.000 lbs Element 1.5 n ml In traf.l SAWPY W. — (S? 2,000 ft Turning from W to N 150 KTAS Unknown Vlng Event III-117 INITIAL OETCCTION Encounter 1 - BUFF fllpht had been alerted to y.TZa In the area by radio calls from other rilji:.':t3. ^7hey Ccrb*-! the target anl were ej^resolnR on a headlntr of 270' at U^OOO ft NSL altitude, 50n KCAS when 5JF? Lead siw two MIG-173 at his 2 o'clock position; he headed south at about 2,000 ft altitude, 3,000-1^,000 range. Encourter 3 - BUFP fUf^ht ujed tne UH?/CF to heme In on SANDY 02. The mos were o6- servcd about 2 o'clock at several nlles ranpe with the elements making butterfly fasaes on SAm 02. SANDY 02 was right on the deck. 6. ACTION INITIATED Encounter I - BUFF Lead called the two MIGa cfos.'-.lns at 12 clock and his Intent to attack. He entered a lazy left wing over descending to 1.500 ft with BUFF 2 crossing to his right side. Encounter 2 - BUFF Lead and 2 flew through the middle of the flight of MTGs causing them to scatter. BUFF 3 and swunt? in behind one elenent of the MIGs and engaged In a Lufberry chase. BUFF Lead and 2 then entere^l a wide turn and reengaged. SANDY' 02 eace under attack a few more tines and then managed to duck under a 300 ft cloud layer and egress. 7. SITUATION DEVFLOPMFNT Encounter 1 - BUFF 1 and 2 each Jettisoned the empty MER rack and the two errpty ^50 gal fuel tanks, lit afterburner, and went Into a nedlun bank, 2-3 "g's", descending turn and leveled our at 1500 ft about 3, COO ft behind the MIGs, closlnp; at 600+ kts. BUFF 3 and ^ stayed high In trail and covereu the leaj ele.Tient. The two MIG3, unaw- "e that BUFF was behind the.itj nade a left 90° turn to"^:a the target area as BUFF Lead e .ed to 1500 ft range and prepared to fire. Just as B'JFF Lead started to fire, he saw a I'llght of P-I05s head-on and about 200 ft above hl.-n (see Ev^nt III-119). This diverted hla attention and he momentarily lost track of the .11 3s, The "lIGs were reacquired over the town of Koa Blnh In a left turn. BUFF I closed to an estlTiated 80C ft, tracked one of the MIGs, and opened fire with the 20nn ca.'-.non. He Irrnedlately saw sparkles In the left wing root area. BUFF 1 also saw sparkles on the other KIG ar>d realized that BUFF 2 was firing. The MIGs snapped into a hard left nose down spiral fron about 1,000 to 1,500 ft, right over Hoa Blnh. BUFF 1 and 2 could not begin to match the turn so they rolled wings level and started back. to Channel 97. The MIGs were not observed again. As BUFF 1 and 2 broke off from the two MIGs, 3'j?F 3 saw a lone .IIG at his 9 o'clock position about 1,000 ft low headed toward hi.?!. BUFF flight was In a left turn through north at 5.000-6,000 ft, 500 kts. The MIG "nade an Instantaneous turn into our 6 o'clock position'*, in "perfect gun range". BUFF 3 and 1 Increased the rate of turn and BUFF 3 told >i to "slide to the out.ilde cf the turn and high", and to Jettison the tanks and go afterburner. The MIC, Initially at 1,000-1,500 ft, had opened to about 2,500 ft, broke off rapidly to avoid the tanks and .MER from the second element. The flight then rejoined and egressed to OHEEN ANCHGR for post-strike refueling. Encounter 2 - BUFF 1 and 2 attacked a MIG and fired an AIM-9B with gooa tore but probably Inside r.ir.lnum range. The rlsslle tiassed ibout 5 ft under the KIG without detonating. SUFF 3 broke into the lead MIG that hal gene back after SAfJDY 02. The se- quence of alr-jraft was >;IG 1, 5V"F 3, ■•■I'^ 2i BUFF 1, and two .Tiore MIGs behind BUF? tt. SAHDY 02 was observed depar-.lnr the area. "IG 1 and observed hits on the left wing and fuselage (also after firing the missile), BUFF 1 called, "BUFF 3, break - break right now; 173 firing on you". BUFF 3 observed the - the r'tlG 2, 500 ft behind him. BUFF 1 was firing on MIG 2 off but missed. BUFF 3 at about 275 KCAS, was able to wallow udder and used full forward stick to drop the nose and dive hin and escape the MXG. , attacked MIG 3 behind BUFF t and forced MIG 3 to break off Igh speed yo-yo and rjattacked, firing at the MIG fron about straight away. With the pipper on top of the canopy, area was observed imrnediately . BUFF Lead pulled up to KIQ blew up underneath him slamming his head down on his As BUFF 3 opened fire on observed by 3UTF 1 immediately right, 3 - break right, F-105 "big red balls" going past frc from 200 ft with a high angle into a right turn using" full r Into a cloud in a valley below BUFF 1 with 2 on his wlnr to the right. BUFF I nade a h 1,000 ft range as the MIG flew "Sparkling" behind the cockpit avoid ramning the MIQ, and the chest . BUFF 3 returned to the engagement and caw an F-105 firing on a MIG with two MIGs behind him. One of these two MIGs was flrir.f; on th'? F-105. BUFF 3 attacked the two rear MIGs as he observed the F-105 l-.lttlng the 'AlZ in front of him. BUFF 3 fired his Xiy[~9B and observed it turn directly for the MIG but was forced into a scissor maneuver with the second MIG and could not observe the results. During one of the crossovers, SUFF 3 fired at the niG but missed and then dove for separation. BUFF 1 called for egress and Bl'FF flight rende ::voused with the tankers. The tankers pretty far north to pick up the fighters who w.»re extremely low on fuel, BUFF 127 1 m mmgmmmm wsmmmm. Event IXI-1X7 flight returned to Takhll RTAPB with no further prcblerr.a. Thf second MIG eneaeement lasted about 6 nln with an overall f light time of about 5 hrs. 8. ORDNANCE 1/0 1/0 (t.o. flred/No. hits) Cannon Missiles 3/2 2/1 2/1 l/l I/O 1/0 Unknown Ren» i 'k9 926 rds 20mffl total. One MIO kill; 1 damage Damage observed Extensive rianage observed Damage observed BUPP BUPP BUT? BUTP MIO 1 NIQ 2 MIO 3 HIO 1-8 HIQ firing dees not Inelilde at least eight firing passes on SATOY 02 (the A-IH) or the MIG firing pasj on SANDY Lead which resulted In a hit and loss. 9. EQUtPNENT PROBLEMS BUF? I - Gun camera film did not work BUT? 3 - Strike camera was inoperative 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Einerlenee P-105 NVN Hojirs Missions 61 900 r 900 35 Reaiarkg BUPP 1 1300 900 61 All TAC background BUPP 2 . BUF? 3 1200 900 35 All TAC background BUPP * SANOT 01 SAMOT 02 Comments on this Encounter BUPP 1 - Plight felt MI3 pilots were very aggressive and made no mistakes. BUPP 1 - After refuelllig. the flight returned to the target area at 30,000 ft because ''it waa obviously a NIG day|'. BUPP 1 and 3 - Need better turn cepablllcy in P-105. BUPP 3 ' Played their slow-speed game because of situation with SAHDY 02 demanded It. SANDY 02 - Missiles ard P-Us would be no good In this "on deck hassle". Thankfu:. for the P-105 gun. SANDY 02 - Pelt that as long as he could see the MIGs initiate their pa»« or Jut p-lor to firing, he could ifvold them by maneuvering In the c^^S^/"^/*;^'?' ?J Sountalnous terrain. He does not feel that he could have crossed the 10 ml JJJij;^ successfully while under attack and that the MIGs could have hit him in the karst forma- tlon where he stayed if they had teaned up on him from opposite sides. Comments from Overall Experience BUPP 3 - Don't ever, lever attempt to stay at low airspeed and turn with a MIO-IT. BUPP 1 - Mlaslte shovlld arm immediately after leaving the rail even if we lose a few aircraft in training. I SAMDY 02 - A-IH has much better visibility than A-IS. Had to lean way forward and toward the right to see MIGs coming In from that direction. SANDY 02 does not think the MIGs were very proficient. BUPP 1, 31 May 1967; BT..'F 3, 29 May 1967; SAKDY 02, 21 October 1968 U. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews Messages, rieacr-.s : j OPREP-3 - 355Trrf, DOTO- "-11274 , 191757Z, April 1967 OPREP-3 - tt32TRW, Tl'Ct 2776. 191 3102, April 1967' Combat Less Report r A-xE. l8tt5H, 19 April 1967, 128 a 3 3 3 3 i 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 i I i Event I I I- 117 4 »- r ' I. [ ;• [ r • 1, » - ; c ■ b i; 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Encounter 1 BUFP fii(?ht was ihi? second strike flight of F-105s frasged to attack JCS 22.00, the Xuan r'al Amy Barrackn, located at the foot of the mountains about 12 ni west/southwest of Hanoi. Time on tar.'-t was scac-d about 2-3 nln aoart so that the nif^hts were si.«ced about 20 ml In trail of each ether. BUFF flight was about 'l ml to the rl^ht (3outh) of the fllr.ht m front of hlm (see Event III-X16) and to the rear when that flight called they wer'e unaer MI-T attack. The ner-.bers of H'J^'^ fllj;ht strained to acquire the MIG tar- gets but wer" unatlf to see tnen - orL-sarlly because the action approached the other flight :rori tr.it fUi-nfa 12 o'clock. BUFF Lead deternlned that t.nere waa no threat to hls^fllr:;t and proceeded to the tarset . After bombing the target, 3';?? flight was caressing to t.ie west crossing the Black River for the first tlr.e north of Hca Blnn, when they heard a second flight call that they were und»^r attack. The flight proceeded to the second cneck point on the Black River Juat to the east of Hoa Slnh at about «,000 ft, 500 KCAS, when BUFF Lead saw two MIC-lTs at his 2 o'clock at about S.COC ft altitude headed south. The MICs proceeded south pass- ing about 11,000 ft In front of HUFF fllgn: whc lit afterburner and executed a wlngover to a left descendint: turn wnlcn xas :onpleted at about 1,500 ft, 3,000 ft behind the M"3-17s. BUFF "I'rht was flying: fluid ft-ur ftrT.atlon v.lth the element on the right sp*. ead beyond norinai pod rorr.at Ion distance fcr tetter MIG lookout. BUFF Lead was able to Identify the HICs by their shape ar,d color. Apparently the MIQs did rot know that BUFF flight was behind them because they entered at lis* bank burn and turned to a heading of about 090®. BUFF Lead thought that the MIQs had seen the Thuds behind then and that the MIGs were turning to engage so BUFF Lead and 2 Jettisoned the eianty MSR rack and the two er.pty J*50 gal fuel tanks, retaining the QSC-160 and ArK-9B on the outboard ststlcns. BUFF 3 and- J* turned with the lead element but stayed 2|000 ft high and to the rear for cover but did not clean their aircraft off at this time. BUFF Lead with 2 sn his rlrht wing (BUFF 2 crossed over during the initial turn), closed at 500 to 600 KCAS, and just started to squeeze the trigger when his attention was diverted to a flight of F-lCf^ ccnlnr head-on 200 ft above him (see Event III-119) . BUFF did not have encuj-h tine to break ?ro^. his course; tut when he attempted to reacquire the MIGs, he' could' not sick then cut of the ground clutter. The MIGs were silver with red stars on the tail and red flaps ar.d ailerons. The next tine he saw them they were In a 2 "g" "left tu-n rl^ht over the zovn cf Koa Blnn, BUFF Lead elcsed to 800 ft, put the plpper*on the" noae^of the and fired a 2 sec burst. He Ininedlately saw the left wing and wine root area start scarklir.s from the hits. BUFF Lead also saw sparkles on the Number Two MIO frcm cannon hits a^ 3UF? 2 fired at VIC 2. BUFF Lead's sight was set at "guns air" with the radar set in "search and attack standby" which ::hould have given him about 1^500 ft fixed ranre ccrputlng only". BUFF 2'3 sl^ht setting is unknown. The MIGs were in a loose echelon formation with SO'-IS" of bank and snapped into a staep nose- down spiral as they were hit. They were last observed In the spiral at abrut 1,000 ft altitude over the town of Hoa Blnh. BUFF Lead stated, "It was absolutely Impossible for us to follow then through that turn". Mo smoke or debris was seen coming off of the MIG. Shortly after the lead elenent passed over the MIGs, BUFF 3, turning through north ordnance, and go cfterburner. At this time, the second element Jettisoned the empty HH.R rack and the empty fuel tanks right In the HI3 pilot's face. The MIG apparently lost some speed In the turn because his ran.re had opened to about 2,500 ft; and at the last time he was seen, the tanlfs were headed right for hln. BUFF 3 Jlnxed back and forth a couple of times to make sure there were no nore enemy fighters and then rejoined the lead element, and the entire flight headed for Channel 97 and then to OREEN ANCHOR for post strike re- fueling. On the way to the oost strike refueling tankers, BUT'P heard that a WILD WEASEL P-105 was down (Event Ill-ll't) but did not hear RED CROVN direct any support flights In to assist In the rescue attempt. BUFF flight volunteered to return to the area but RED CROWN was reluctant to grant permission because of the lack of external fuel tanks and tiie resulting short time on station. However, since no other aircraft w-re available to return to the area BUFF was (rranted permission to take on a full internal load of fuel and return. When'the night comcleted refueli.ig, they were about 200 ml southwest of the downed air- crew. BUFF Lead took the flight back Into the area at 30,000 ft altitude to conserve fuel and because "it was obviously a "W day". DLUE Lead (Event III-ll'*) was just arriving back in the area of the downed aircrew as BU'^'F fljght was coming off the tanker. BUFF flight and BLUE Lead were In contact with each other and BUFF flight knew that BLUE Lead was under MIC attack. As BUFF flight was l-ttin? down about 20 ml west of the area, SLUE Leac called a.id said there were MIGs all over the area, and he cound not raise either of t.'-ie aircrew on the radio. F was out of gas and would have to depart the area. i: 129 Evmt III-117 As BOFP flight descended throuph 10,000 ft, SAIIDY 02 (A-IE wlnetaan) called that four HIO-173 had Jumped the flight and tJ;at SANDY 01 had been hit and was jjolng In. He rather excitedly requested the|F-1053 to "come back and help me". At this point the story will digress and cover the actions of the A-IE flight which led up to this situation. SANDY was a flight of four A-lEs which departed Udorn RTAFB and fie* direct to their orbit position a few inliea from Channel 97. Their arrival at thla orbit cosltlon was timed with the air strikes further north so that they would be In the cost cptlrzua posi- tion to assist In any riscue attenpi-s. Briefly stated, their nlsslor. was to proceed to the position of a downejl aircrew l.-r.edlately upon notification by CHcm (the rescue co- ordinator) ami »ake charge of the rescue attempt, determining whether the position and enemy defenses were ar.eh-ible to rescue attempt. Cn the scene they would vector the Jolly Greens" In and cpordlnate ener.y anti-rescue fire suppression U3lilK both their ord- nance and that of any available jets In the area. On this date, SAHDY flij^ht was orbiting east of Channel 97 when CSOm called the aircrew down at 20«»«Hj'f.yio5''3<»'E and for SAWDY 01 and 02 to head toward the border and hold there a couple of mlnutej.. Enroute, CROWN called and directed SAIIDT 01 and 02 to proceed to the 089* rad|lal of Channel 97 frr a distance of 103 ml (20*>30'rr/105''^2'E) , about 32 ml southwest of Hanoi and to hold west of t>ie downed aircrew until aom» fighters arrived. SANDY 01 and |02 flew into the area at 11,000 ft, liio-l60 KCAS, with SANDY 02 flying echelon fomatlon about 100 ft left of 3AHDY 31. With the arrival of BLUE 1 (Event III-lli*), the A-lEa prorceeded up to the area of the downed aircrew at 11.000 ft MSL. SANDY 02 saw the Thud burning and had located the position of one of ths downed aircrew when BLUE 1, orbiting In the area, was Ju.T.ped by MICs . The SANDIES returned across a snail valley to their position at 20''30'N/105*32'E (aoout 15 ml) and arrived at 1,000 ft AOL, about 2,500 ft 'ASL. They made a iSO** turn to the right and were Just rolling wings level headed .north when SANDY 02 saw four MlG-173 at hla 5 o'clock position, 3,OC0 ft high. The EI:SE«"5r? ^? »l«">enta of two with one element attacking each A-lE. SANDY 02 was on SANDY 01*3 left wing, level In altitude and about line abreast at a dlstan':e of 100 ft. The NIGs started flrlnrt 2-3 sec after 02 pick^jd them up. SANDT 02 called, '|3reak right" as he broke right over SANDY 01 Into tie HXCs. As 02 passed over 01, he observed 01 In a 15* right bank roll rapidly to the left: with pieces of aircraft (or poasltly but not likely ordnance) coming off of SANDY 0l*s left w+ng from about halfway out to the wing tip. The MIGs missed and overshot SANDY 02 and as he com- pleted 180" of turn heided for the weeds, he saw SANDY 01 In a 120* banked spiral hit f-e top of a piece of karsif. At this tine he was calling CROWN appraising then of the situa- tion and urgently requested help. CROWN called back and said, "They rfould send someone up", SANDY 02 did not observe a chute or beeper from 01. As SANDY 02 rollecf out on a southerly heading, the MIGs started making Individual passes from the four cardinal compass points and appeared to be well disciplined in not Interfering with each ^ther's pass. They appeared to favor a quartering stern attack but did not let this interfere with their turn. SANDY 02, at about 100 ft AGL, Jettisoned all of his ordnance except the 3UU-11 after the second MIQ piss and with full power maneuvered around the Karst formation at a inax airspeed of lUO kta slowing to 90 kti In the hard breaks. He was able to observe the MIOs as they started their Individual passes and followed the policy of tlghte'ilng the turn Into the MIG as the MIG approached firing position. Upcn rolling wings level after one of these passes, SANDY 02 saw a MIG approaching head-on, slightly above hln, firing from 500 ft range. SANDY 02 cla.-aped down on the trigger and fired the SUU-11 at the MIG without aiming but did kick the rudder back and forth hoping that the dispersion would jcet the MIO. However, no damage was observed. The WIGs made at least five firing passes be- fore the P-105 flight arrived. I As BUPP flight returned to the areia of the downed P-105F aircrew, they were In radio contact with BLUE LeadI on GUARD Channel and learned that the SANDY flight was In the area and waiting for the arrival of the rescue choppers. BUPP 3 reported that ha. "Thowtht he heard something to the effect -SANDY 01. I*m hit; they're killing me; SANDY 01 is going in**. No other flight Members report hearing this. Shortly after, SANDY 02, who had been operating on the rescue frequency, cane up on GUARD Channel and said that SASDY 01 had been shot down by MIGs| and that at least four MIGs were attenptlng to shoot hln down SANDY 02 naturally sounded pretty excited. BLUE 1, the WILD WEASEL leader, ansuered'hlm with, "Get the .... down on the ground, down on the deck and keep U covins. Just start turning and keep It r.dvlng". Sandy 02 replied, "I can't get away". BUPP Lead told SAN'DY 02 to stay on the deok and keep turning, that the MIGs could not match his turn and to transmit for a DF. Both BUFF Lead and 3 were checklna for the F.I!!!*^ indicated th4 l»-5 o'clock position.' At this time. BUFF flight was down to about 5,000 ft traveling at [about 700 kts In an attempt to close on SANDY 02. EU^s" m^^ht swuna . into a steep right turn with the D!?3 continuing to Indicate right. After about 2 mln SANDY 02 saw the four [F- 105s at his 2 o'clock position at about 3.5 ml range, headed about ^ west/northwest and called, "F-105s, I'm at your 3 o'clocV:; ct.me right, cccc rlg.ht» cone ■r right". SANDY 02 wasjheaded south/southeast but had to take Im-Tiediate evasive action and V rolled out headed northwest. At this time, SANDY 02 saw the Thuds due west of him, about Event IXI-117 one mile anay and a little high In a tight right turn through T^«^5^"^ /"^^^s were in loose trail with a KIG-17 behind them. SAHDY 02 called, "F-1055 drealc; one of those are on your tall." . At the tine of the first call in the above parar.raph BUFF 3 sa« the <'l"_f''^;;^SANnV Ol's aircraft and then SASDY 02 right on the treetos Jlnxin? In/iard turns with the four MICs naklnr. r.unnorv-type pasae:* on hln. fUeht -as perpendicular " J^^^" Ing aa they tjrck^ rlcht !nto thf; MIGa with the second F-105 elerent "^"J^., eU«-.ent by about a r.Ue on -he outside of the turn. bUFP Lead did not ^2*" he was relat^v^ly cloae to then and rather than pull of to attack a • ^1'"!°. the night for tne center of the MTG formation in an atter.rjt to divert the MIGs fro^ tne A-1. The MIOs scattered as BUFF 1 and 2 went thron-^h their formation but one 0^ recovered and was rolling cack In on SAMDY 02. Bt>..- 3 aaw this r^IG and elected to rack the P-105 into a hard l^ft t::rn to attack this MIO ana itnmedlately got into a ^o'^.a^JJi"'** left handed Luffberry at an airspeed below 300 ktr.. The order of aircraft -as MIO. BUPP 3. HIO, BUFF 1, and two more :iIGs, BUFF Lead made a wide sweeping turn back and saw a Mia turn and head north toward Hoa Lac Airfield. The MIC was flying straight away as bUFP Lead pulled Into the Mi-G s 6 o'clock position and fired an AIM-9B at an eatlnated range of 1, faster than the SuFP 3 and then turned ^'ack tp the right But BUFF 3 was sl^ ^^g ^^^^ a«"burner. MIO; and as the MiG cane back to the J;Sht. BU^J 3 Q continued to descend to the Bingo established on the way In. J^w^i l^^n at 1.000 lbs of fuel, not enough to Sufman at 2.Q0Q J^* °^^rifef'?!n5eriOO ?he taAker "ported at Channel 97 and return to Udorn and the relltef tanner ^""^ faster the tanker said he had It fire- ;Sen BUFF Lead asked if the |;S^*[ea5 estimates 'thlf the 'tanker probably pl«>*«'» ^heni up rvii"Soifh^?!^?n^r^BJS-3 iestina^fe^ started taking on fuel with less than 30 sec of fuel left. BUFF 3 refueled first. hmfp 3 started to overshoot AS the flight closed aJ high =P«d,^°"?^l,Ji%Jriir'iurt LLlnfunSer t tanker and uJed all avlllable ^ragldevlces JI^, to iSi rlscue ^l"'^-? <=^^;«:i?e as the tanker entered a cloi^d. *r„°°°?Sp L"«* "I Ltl vectors to BUFF 3 for hook-yp. .h.s time, Burr u ^^^^ ^^^^ rhraSSM^JnVlSJfn: iiirJ'SSP^S ZlZ^ on SA«DV 02 aircraft eith.r. Event III-118 1. Aircraft Involved: Pour P-X05D8 vs two MIC-lTs Result : No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 20»56 'N/105*20 ' E PRIHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 19 April 1967, 1700H PURPLE fllKht (four P-105D8) was the third strike flight fragged to attack JCS 22.00. See Event III-116 for further details. 2. MISSION RO'.'TE Same as Event III-llS. 3. AIRCRAFT CnNF I GURATIONS 7-105 /URPLE 1. 1. 1 Same as Event III-116. MIO-17 1. 2 Silver MIO-17 3 Olive Orab 4. FLICHT CONDITIONS PPlCR TO CNCOUNTER Head in.- ; Speed : Fuel State; tt.OOO ft Unknown Cnknown Unknown to. AIRCRIU COHMENTS Experlenc? PURPLE (Lead) Total Hours 5650 P-105 Combat Hours Missions 370 Approximately 75 11. DATA SOURCES Messages. Reports 355TPV, 201121Z. DOTO-0, 11296, April 1967 SECRET" 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION PURPLE flight on Ingress to the target spotted two silver HIG-17s at 20*56 'M/lOS'aO 'E at an altitude of 7,000-8,000 ft. At the time PURPLS flight was crossing the Black River at 2O"»56'H/105"*2O'E, the MICs were in a left hand turn and attenpted to roll In behind PURPLE; however, PURPLE flight continued to the targ-st and the MIGa broke off. On egress fron the target, PURPLE ^ spotted one camouflaged MIG-17, olive drab In color. He was sighted at PURPLE 1's 8 o'clock position, approximately 3.000-i**,00C ft behind PURPLE Lefld, PURPLE 2 and 3 attempted to move Into firing position but the NIG broke right and disappeared from view as he passed to the left of PURPLE 2 and 3. There Here no further sightings and the flight returned to Takhll. Event III- 119 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-l05Ds va seven Mia- 17 Result: Ho danage Vicinity of Encounter: ZCJJS'N/IOS^OS'E jrht was one of approximately ten flights striking JCS 22.00, the Xuan Kal Army 20*53'N/lO5*35'E, aoout 15 ml southwest of Hanoi. Encounters by Other fllehts 1. PRIMARY HISStON ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 19 April iUt/ITOOH. » TAN flljrht was one Barraclcs at 20*53 'N/105 ^> i-, -- - are described In Events ILI-114, -116. -117, - 118, -120. 2, MISSION ROUTE The rlssion route was not given but appears to be from Takhll RTAPB, to rttfueling rendecvous, to Chanr^el 97 ft 20«28 'N/lOS'^S'E, and then direct to the target with rTanned egress over the reverse route. I. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS Not slven but most probaMy 6 x 750 bombs centerllne, 2 x 450 gal fuel taiiks on the Inboard pylons with TAN Lead and TAN 3 carrying 1 x AIH-9B and 1 QRC-160, and TAN 2 and « carrying 2 x CRC-160. | 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Clear but reduced visibility (approximately 5 ml) In haze at the lower altitudes. TAN ! 3 Altitude: Heading : Speed : Fuel 5*- a te: FllKh'; f^'rnatlon: TT 5,000 ft 066' SftO kts Unknown Line abreast fomation. No. 3 on the right. S. OVDNANCE (No. flred/Ko. hits) Cannon TAN 1 2/0 9. EQUIPMENT PROUEHS None reported. Remarks Fired two bursts; both were too far out; no hits 10. AIRCREU COMMENTS Experience Total I F-105 Hour a Hours TAN 1 TAN 2 TAN 3 TAN 4 approx 1200 approx 5000 Combat Missions 825 71 not ln«.ervlewed - - - 850 not given Remarks All TAG background Most of time In fighters. P-80 icisslona In Korea. Plew 105 not Interviewed -------- but was an ex- perienced P-105 pilot from Qemany Conmenta on this Encoui^ter TAN 3 - Because ofl the MIG activity, there was a lot of talking on the radio and TAN 3 had difficulty In warning rest of flight on presence o: MIGs, As a result, when he broke to engage a MIG that was attacking another F-105. he became separated from the rest of his flight, tncludinp; his wlngman No. who did not see him break away. Thus, No. 3 did not drop his ordnance on target but was forced to Jettison it when he discovered that he was without a wlngman and could net continue to the target alone. One of the earlier flights (ORANGE flight) had Jettisoned their ordnance load (see Event III-11&) and did most of the radio calling thus, in effect, Jamning the channel. iTlne estimated. Event III. 119 Conents rrom Ovgrall Expgrlenee TAN 1 - Normally has seen MIOs In a low position waiting on a known Ingress op eeress route OP at least In an area where they can cover one or more of these. Generally two to four MIOs ape orbiting. This type of activity has Increased since the U.S. has started to bomb airfields. When the MlGs see the ordnance drop, they disengage. Occasionally the P-lOSs have been anle to fool then tiy dropping the wlncitanks . The P-lOSs like to keep their tanks in case a RESCAP situation develops since the wlnptanks provldt additional •nduranee on station. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : TAN 1, 29 May 1967; TAN 3, 29 '^ay 1967 Messages . Reports : 355TF'*/ 20 1121Z April 67 OPREP 3 DOTO-0 11296 SECRET. 12, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION TAM flight was the last flight of the strike force and had been alerted to the presence of MIGs 1 1 the tarpet area by MI3 warnings and radio chatter c*" other flights engaged with r^IGs. TAN flight Initially sighted four MI0-17s at 3 o'clock low while in- bound to the target. TA;J Lead told everyone to hold their ordnance and continue In to the trareet. The MICs were at a range of about 1 n nl and, although they started to turn Into TAK night, tt was core or less as a token try since TAN flight ■♦as inbound at high speed and the MIGs were positioned f:r the egress route rather than ingress. The MIOs could not press the attack and TAN flight continued In and all aircraft except TAN 3 dropped ordnance on the target. (TAN 3 separated from the flight .lubsequent to this sighting and rejoined on egress. TAN 3*8 Individual HIC encounter follows this flight narrative. ) TAN flight came off the target slightly south of ingress route (near Hoa Binh). As they came back to the pldge line, they encountered several MIG-17a. TAN 1 pursued a MIO at his 2 o'clock position thinking he was In a tall chase on this MIO. TAN 1 began firing "way too far out"; and when he aulckly realized that the HIG was approaching head-on rather than going away on the sa.Tie heading, he stopped firing and broke off this encounter. Then a second MIG came across TAN I's nose. TAN 1 did not sight hi.r. until he started crossing his nose and then fired a ihort burst, hoping to hit him but does not believe he did. MIG 2 continued on his way and TAN flight continued their egress. 'a third MIO was approaching TAN 1 head-on and he relied Inverted and started "coming down" to fire and stopped when he saw P-105s right in trail in the way (BUFF flight - see Event 1X1-117 prior to RESCA?;. TAK flight disengaged and proceeded to Channel 97. (All three of the above encounters nappened In about a minute and a half period of tine.) TAN 3's Individual Encounter TAN 3 reported that while Inbound to the target after the Initial sighting, he saw an P-105 with two MIG-17s chasing hln (later identified as BLUE U - see Event III-ll'i. They were coming from above and went down past TAN 3's 6 o'clock position. TAN 3 was at S.OOO ft; the MICa were very close to SLUE 4 and the forr.ation passed TAK 3 within 2,000- 3,000 ft. "There was so lauch chatter on the radio at the time," that TAN 3 was unable to call out the MIGs or cill for a break, but he pullei straight up and finally was able to get off a call that there was an F-105 behind them In trouble with MIGs. TAN 1 and 2 did not see TAN 3 break and , unknown to TAN 3, TAIJ k also failed to see the break. TAN 3 pulled behind the MIGs and they broke off BLUE Cs vs two MIG->17s Result : No damage Vicinity: 1) 2) 3) 20*55'N/105**22*E 2O»HO'N/105*30'E 20«53'N/105'' 35 'E K PRIMARY HISStON AND TAtTICAl SITUATION Date/Time: 19 April [l967/1709H, ITl^H, 1715H BLUE Plight and GREEM Plight consisting of four F-UC aircraft each attacked target JCS 22.00 at 20*51 'M/105''^'»'E. BLUE Flight preceded GREEN Plight by approximately 1,000 ft. They were part of a larger strike force, which Included eight flights ?f ^-105a, of which four had MIG encounfiers (see Events III-116, -117, -118, 119. and an IROM HAND flight (see Event Ill-llt 2. NISSION ROUTE Danang to WHITE ANCHOR, to Channel 97, to 20«53'N/105'21'E to target. Return to 20»30»N/105*25'E to 20«»10 ~ hung ordnance Jettisoned tanker and before retumlhg to Danang. H/IOU^SU'E to WHITE ANCHOR to Dananu;. BLUE Flight which had ;.t In Ordnance Jettison area 16«05 'N/loS" 3B'E after leaving 3. AIRCRAFT COKFIGURAT IONS p-llC BLUE 1. 2. 3. q / CR^N 1. 2. 3. ^ 6 - H-117 bombs 4 - AIM- 7 (SPARROW) 1 - ALQ-71 2 - 370 gal wing tanks 1 - 600 gal centerll'ne tank TACAN on, IFF (GFEEM 3) off MIG-17 Part I - 'silver color, no marking Part 2 - silver color, one with stars on wings, one - no markir^ 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PrJoR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Clear (Part 1 unknown) Part 2»3 Altitude ; Headlng T Speed ; Fuel State ; Plight Formation ; Part 1 BLUE; Part 2 BLUE: Part 3 GREEK: BLUE 10,000 ft 200* 500 ms unknown GREEN r~ 5,000 ft 185* 520 KTAS 8-9,000 lb Pod formation Pllgiht had Just eonre off the target, formation unknown Egre'sslng target - GREEN 3 and >i about 4,000 ft behind lead element straight and level - not yet In Pod formation. 5. INITIAL OETECTIOH Part 1 Just prior to .striking target, BLUE Plight sighted four silver aircraft , .possible HI0-17S, approximately f miles abeam on reciprocal heading, low. Estimated position of suspected MIG: 20»55'N>fl05*22'E. Part 2 BLUE Plight sighted one MIG-17, silver, no markings, at flight's 4 o'clock position, low, and MIG 2 at 9 o'clock position, 2,000 ft from BLUE 2. MIG altitude estimated as 2,000 ft AGL, heading ojf 202'* true. Part 3 CRE^N 3 encounter<;d a MIG-17 at his 10 o'clock position, low, at a range of U.OOO ft. The^HIC was flying at '-iOO kts at an altitude of 2,000 to 3,CC0 ft ACL on a heading ofSfiO* in a left turn. Event III-120 6. ACTION INITIATED ^lon ws ta..n b, either BLUE Fllr^t or the .liver aircraft. 7. SITUATION OEVeiOPHeNT Part hit targets. 8. ORDNANCE GREEN 3 (No, flred/Mo. hits) Renartcs Mi««ilea rired In boreslght mode. Interlocks SiJUt Jas iraiS ft AGl! Missiles fell shcrt and Impacted ground, as expended. No other ordnance EQUIPMENT PPOBLEMS . There was friqnency . 10. AIRCREW COHHENTS Experience Total Back Hours 3,015 616 768 330 Combat Missions 115 95 Remarks Instructor at McDlll for two yrs teaching AIM-7. Participated in "Charging SPARROW" program. Participated in "Charging SPARROW* program . Cf^mmmnts on «-hi« Encounter ""^P.!.' 'r»PQ-100 «. poor r.dar ror ""'^r.^f/r ,°4uS~r."?urn!%.tn.r- S„r,ln. ««-9 or »an »ouU «ave ».n J,, p u ^^^^ ^^^^^ n. DATA SOURCES CPEEH 3 (Front), 22 June 67 366TPy 23C500Z DOC 00121, 7AP 2016072 DIO 22957 April 1967 (superseded by message 1 above) 137 Ev«nt XlI-120 12. NARRATIVe OESCRtPTION Part I : See Iten 5. Part 2 ; BLUE PUrht. at 12,000 ft. heading 100". 500 KTAS, slehted the target. BLUE lead roll4 in on target at k U5« dive armle. At B.OOO. ft altitude, heading ijj'. i-:.--! " iV7« H» was followed by BL'JE 2, 3, ar.d U, each drocplng six bonbs n :S?'roJ-BL>,?":ho "r v-UtJ. Vlnl^u. Tue r» fi-iUht ro-a^n^d at "5 000 ft for a tine then cllir.ted on new heading of 235 • ^mie 5;in"if 1- 5bo*?t t?e filrht oMerved two MIG-Hs with no Tiarklnga, silver In color. Ji? fl^'^nt's 5 o'clock P03-.lon and y.lG 2 at flight's 9 o'clock position. lo« at 2 000 ?J ^iSs JeJe flylSz a? unknown speed on a heading of ?02« . MIQs appeared to be Ik'lMleo San^ ^"10^?^ clbU on BLUE 5. but ro'^f-^; ^i^SeiTreHrSSS 'ToO then ipxiediately broke rljtht and back Into the heavily defended area of J" -Z.oo. ror thlS reason! BLUE Plight did not offer pursuit. No ordnance was expended by either aide. Part 3 ; G^EE^J ^li;rht while flying at 14.000 ft altitude, airspeed ii 80 kts, heading 100 , at 20»51' Uo^^sS-E/slghted target JCS 22.00. Lead and -^REEN 2 rolled In on "'f^* *fiT dive angle. At 8,000|rt altitude heading l80« , Lead and caEEN 2 released Jl« K-llT hn!h, rRr^N ^and u folloled. using .same tacTilcs, releasing five bonbs each. Minimum alfi?ude attained 2as S^oSSf ft It this point, GREES 3. on ^ heading of 185» .encountered 5 MQ 17. The enernj alrcrak was 10 o'clock low, in level flight approximately U.OOO ft awav The MIO wis flylnfe ac a speed of ^oo kts ac an altitude of approxinately 2 000 " ]yo'0 fJ l^L on I headiril of 36o' in a left turn. This jjas about 5 -^1? taraet and GREIN Flts;ht -as Just be3lnr.ing to refortn. GRE^N 3 noticed ^hf* "JJ^**" "ticking GREEN U. He called QREEH <» to advise hi.-n that .-.e was under attack and did an oU?-the!too barr;i roll to the left. The HIO reversed to the right and rolled of hjjj- ?ng north. Apoarently CRE?:i ^ did not receive the MIG call and Proceeded straight ahead. H. «M called araln. but aks:.' 3 still received no response from GREEN H , CHEtJl ft Sr^^HdSd trthroS^t-Str'ke Icln-up point. GREEK 3 deEcended to the MIG's 6 o'clock SSH'on s^lgf-tiriow" ^han tiS MIg' who was then at ab=ut 5.000 ft altitude and n«r» 5? iess stra 'ht-and-levelf .He obtained a full syster lock-on at ^-y^ miies «lth approximately 'an 30 kt rat,e of closure. At this time an F-105 closed in ^^ont of CBEEM 3 III Ar^ at the f^IG, striking the «IO'a left wing with cannon fire. Event Ill-Uft) The MIG was observed to make hard roll and descended In a hard turn to the rlp-ht. The SS'! amIudS .«r2pp?oximately 2.000 ft AOL when descent was ^^i^J^t***,?2^S?i'-°SES' Mde at about 200 ft ACL In a right hand turn. The F-105 disengaged to the left. GREEN r?on?5nSeS backing anS ittenptld to fire a missile but the AIH-7 did not fire as the Jadar broke lock at^hat i>olnt. The MIO regained on the dectc and was orbiting at an altitude of about 100-200] ft ACL. GREEN 3 set up a highspeed yo-yo on him and tried to Sreak him ouf of the ground return .ith the radar, but could not do It . OREEN 3 njcurned ?o b5res?gSt and Interlocks out. Two r.ore lock-ons were sade, but l.-n«edl at ely broke lock:. CFEeS' 3 fired without a ibck-on In borealght as minimum range was very close ^ "oj already exceeded. The AIM-7 went down and left. The MIG reversed and started a hard left tirn. still at 200 dt AGL. To prevent an overshoot, GREEN 3 nosed into the rflCs 6 "clock position with l'-l/2 miles separatlcr. at 5,000 ft. He then started down, going to idle t-ylng to lock-dn from boresight. Again, the radar would try to lock-on tut iouJd contlnie^o cycle to a break lock. GREEN 3 ^"cended to the fO'! •""J'*?' J^JJi"* to about one inlle. At tbls point, tracking In boresight he *IJ-7j^88lle. The AlM-7 was observed to strike the ground and explode between 200 to WO ft to the left and behind the MIO. ThefMIG made a hard turn to the right and as OREEH 3 waa about to overshoot, he started another high-speed yo-yo reversing right. At this point, another MIG-17 entered the encounter at 3REEM 3*a 2 o'clock position, mo 1 reversed back to the left, remaining at 200 ft. MIG 2 went over t.^e top of the first MIC at about IBO' !out of phase. At the top of GREEN 3'3 high-speed yo-yo. he reversed -0 the left and Into the first i^IG's 6' o'clock position with 1-1/2 alles of seoaratlon. GREEN 3 started down very steeoly in idle and nulled out at the :iIG s altitude He made anotKer lock-on at one mile and closing and fired a third AIM-7. which ?moac?ed the ground but|dld net explode. HIG 2 waa maneuvering towards GP.EE.J 3's 7 o clock oMlJlon. Whereupon GRE^N 3 executed a.nother yo-yo and continued a hard right turn, closing Sn MIO 1 GpIIn 3 descended toward the second MIG, because MIG 2 was higher (approximately ?on ft AGL and In a better position to attack). MIG 2 was at 90« to GREEN 3'3 course in a rlKht hand turn. GREEN 3 made a bores Izht lock-on but by then the KIC was head-on. He' » fourth AIM-7 atfa ranee of one mile. Almost Irrjnediately , the radar again broke lock CR°EM 3 contmue'd tracking with his reticle, but the .•nisslle went left and short. GREEN 3 then reversed t'o the right, pulled up In a steep clif*"^ disengaged, Jo in^ the remainder of the flight and returned to base. At no time did the HICs fire any ordnM«. GREED 3 had tS disengage at this point, because he had exhausted his ordnance. Event III-120 Miss He Firing Parametgrr. Airspeed at launch, KTAS Altitude at launch, rt ACL G-loading at launch Aircraft target altitudes Overtake velocity, kts Relative an^le of attacking Aircraft to target fit path Range and angle-off of target Mlsa Distance and direction Radar lock-on Launch node MIO warning retjelved Method or Acquisition Cdr evaluation HlBslle 1 2 3 k 150 500 500 500 200 200 500 1 1 I 1 level level level left turn left turn so 100 100 901 io» 10* 0» 00' ,10" lO^/l 1/t 10»/6 0' headon o'clock nm cloek/1 nm 1 nm « - - yea- broka lock Interlocks out, boreslght mode, kept enemy in gunalght reticle to missile impact OCI OCT OCI OCX Visual ' Visual Visual Visual AIM-7E does not htve a capability against targets in described envlronnent. Ground return presented n APC-lOO radar negates lock-on capability at low a.titude. The MIO-17 »as easily out -maneuvered using high-speed yo-yo tactics. Event III-121 Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s va three HIG-17s Reaults: Mo Damage Vicinity of Encounter: Unknown I. PRIMARY MISSION AWO TACTICAL SlTUATIOM Date/Time: 20 April 1967/0856H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68, 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION PllKht Inbound to ALFA target saw two MIGs at 3 miles range; MIGs went into afterburner, benan roll-in. and disappeared; fllfht saw another MIG while egressing; MIG passed 3000 ft overhead without hostile action. Event XIX-122 Four P-1058 vs one MIG-21 Aircraft Involved: Results: Ho Damage Vicinity of Encounter: Unknown K PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SlTUATIOM Date/Time: 20 April 1967/09 13H IK DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION MIO observed ct U.COG ft. 6 miles range; ::iC! began attack, but P-105s turned Into it; MIO broke off; point of closest approach was « xlles. Event III-1Z3 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-1053 vs two MIGa, two MIG->173 and one Mir:->21 Kesults: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21«»22.'K/107»02 'E I. PRtHARY HtSStON AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 April 1967/1629H II. OATA SOURCE CZKCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIve OCSCRIPTIOII Strike night saw two MiCs while Inbound before cloud Intervened; Two mlnutea later* two MIO-lTs 8e«n at 10 miles; (flight continued on course and lead saw one MZG-21 Inverted before cloud Intervened. Event III-12U Aircraft Involvd: Po"r P-105. v» two MIG-17* Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 20-28 •M/107»26'E I. PRIMARY Mission AMD TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 April 1967/1653H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. RARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Plight egressms at 19.000 ft saw t-o .liver HICa headed north froB the vicinity of orbiting tanker; no hostile actions. Event III-125 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-I05a va six MIC-lTa Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: fio miles ME of Hanoi I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/Tlme: 22 Anrll 1967/153*" II. DATA SOURCES Messages. Peoorts : DIA Summary of Air Ensagementa over North Vietnam, 2 May 1967 12. NARRATIVE DESCHIPTION P-105 attacked by MIC. Mp ordnance expendltura reported. Event III-126 Aircraft Involved: Two BF-^Cs vs one NIC-21 Raaulta: No Damage Vicinity of Encounter: 20»25'N/103'"i8»E I. PRINAftV MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 22 April 1967/1635H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIOK Photo flight at 30,000 ft saw MIO at 3 miles range; MIO made several attempts to gain position, but was outmaneuvered and finally broke off j X-band strobing received throu^out encounter* Event in -127 Aircrart Involved: Four P-105* vs four MIC-17s Results: "o dasiage Vicinity of Encounter: Hon Cay I. PRtHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION D*te/71r.e: 22 kpr^l/liiiZH * II. DATA SOURCES ; 12. NARRATIVE OESCAIPTION P-lOSs attacked Ly Mia DIA Sur.nary of Air Eng igenenta over North VIetnan, 2 May 1967 I. ."-lOSs evaded attack. Ho ordnance expenditures reported. a 3 D 3 3 3 0fl J 9 a 3 Event III-128 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105a vb two unldentB Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21»13'N/107«25'C I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 22 April 1967/1635K II. OATA SOURCE CIMCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike flight at 17»000 ft saw two silver unldents at 3 o'clock; no attempt at engagement. Event 1 11-12 9 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOgs vs one MIO-21 Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 20°08'N/107*25'E K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 22 April 196 7/16 38H 11. OATA SOURCE • CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike night Inbound over Gulf of Tonkin at 16,000 ft saw NIC 1 o'clock hl^; HIQ passed above and behind; KIG silver. Event III-130 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105s vs two MIG-21S Results: Ho Damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21" 6«M/10««55*E I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 23 April 1967/1622H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Plak suppression fUffht Inbound to ALFA target saw two MIGs 9:30 O'clock high; MlOa dived toward flight, but were engaged by MIG CAP flight Event 118. Event III-13i Aircraft Involved: Eight P-105s vs six MI0-21s and three unldcnts Results: tio Damage Vicinity of Encounter: Zl-IS'M/XOS^SO'E I U PRIMARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION DBte/TlMt aj April 1967/1623H 11. MTA SOimCE CUCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. MCRATIVE OCSCRIPTION Tmo fll^ta inbound to same ALFA target Incident of Event 647; one flight observed naneuvers of other! with NIGs; flight which maneuvered was Inbound at 20,000 ft when two MICs seen at 8 mllbs; HIC CAP In Event ll3 engaged these MICs, which were the same HIGs . seen In Svent 6k7il 2 minutes later, flight saw a lone MIG which began tall attacK. but broke off when F-lO^s punched tanks; a single NIG was seen three nlnutes later; MIO did not BanBuver; thr«;o unldenta seen 10 minutes later beneath flight; two HIGs seen 15 minutes later; flight began climb to engage, but broke off due to low fuel. Event I I 1-132 Aircraft Invclved: Three P-^JCs vs four KIG-21S Result: One MIO destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: 22»05'N/105'05*E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 23 April 1967/1635H BLUE flight on a CAP/STRIKE mission cook the place of a F-105 f iigl^.^^^^Jf f aborted due to poJ loss to strike target. While Ingresslng to target BLUE flight encountered two flifihta of two HICs each. 2. MISSION ROUTE Proa Danang refueling In and out and back to Danang. 3. AIRCRAFT COKFIGURATIQNS P-4C BLUE 1. 2. 3 6 M117 bombs Ulng tanks 4 AIM-7 nlsslles «. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Generally clear, one cirrus trailing a cunulua-nlmbua thundarhead to the waat 0/ ThTa Nguyen Steel Mill. Altitude : 15,000 to 18,000 ft Speed : 1*50 kts Pviei~State : Full internal Plight Ponaatlon ; 3-shlp formation 5. INITIAL DETECTION Plrst flight of two HIG3 sighted after several warnings. In addition to general Geo-Re? warnlri=. other fllghta preceding BLUE flU^-t called MIOa. JJ-^E J/'PjrSl^*^''* the first two MIGs crossed in front in a zoom type cilsib from right to left. blue, j reported that the two y.ZZs were crnlng In^from the ^';'V^Sl''i?*^^^"^i^?^thS°i^ter reported that she second flight of two MIGs came In irom the right. It is the latter two with which this event Is prlciarlly concerned. 6. ACTION INITIATED Raveraed to attenpt engagement. 7. SITUATION DEVEIOPHENT After detecting the first flight of two MIGs. BLUE flight Jettisoned boobs and wlnff tank and started "left turn to pursue." (BLUE I's statement). The MIGs apparently saw BLUE flight and "started a dlvln? turn back to our left" and having higher air soeed at the time were able to separate on a heading of approximately l80» from that of BLUE flleht. BLUE fllzht reversed to the rlg.ht to rejoin strike force and detected ttfo more MIGs "passing off our right wing" about 3.000 to 1,000 ft. At the time of the second acquisition BLUE flight was at approximately Zl.OOO ft, about Mach .9, heading Mat with about 9500 ib fuel. BLUE flight turned to engage MIGs. BLUE 1 was able to obtain full lock-on against HIG 3 losing sight of MIG H. BLUE 1 fired an AIM-7 at MIO 3 which guided and followed MIG 3 Into thin cirrus-type clouds. BLUE 1 did not follow with fllKht Into the clouds because of the presence of activity and the high altitude. BLUE 3 crossing back of BLUE I, detected MIG H above at about 32,000 to 3^,000 ft, pull- Ini? contrails In a left turn toward the north at about 10 or II o'clock position. BLUE 3 pursued MIC 4 achieving full system lock and fired one AIM-7 which Impacted on the rieht aft fuselage and detonated causing at least severe aircraft atructural damage. Enemy aircraft slowed, turning over from about 30,000 to 32,000 ft and descended Impact- ing ground. No chute was observed. B. ORDNANCE 100 and F-^C School. Conm ents on this E ncounter; BLU^ 1- "At the alr-to-alr ranges we were working thla day the SPARROW was best weapolrS^don't think SIDEWINDERS would have dene any better for »»• ^ |hoatlng awlnst a blue sky and good radar. We've had other engagements pointing down at low altltud*. The SPARROWS ljust ain't any good down there. BLUE 1: -The one thing 1 learned Is that you can't afford to be "">P^«»"* there ToH" have to keeo looking around. He (MIO «i) thought he was out of the fight, hoS free. He made no 2vasive maneuvers. I don't think he ever saw me or knew what hit hlB." 11. DATA SOURCES PT»o, |eet Interviews : BLUE I and BLUE 3 (front) MeaaaEes- OPPEP-3 366Trrf PASTEL 705 April 1967 Hessafies . j^^^jy p^jTEL 711 April 1967 12. HARRATIVE OESCRIPtIoH „ . arfw rno-ht of three P-UCs were on a CAP/STRIKE mission against JCS 76.00. Prior to ^"L^liSL^ flight o" 105 3 aborted and BLUE flight took their place. While channel 97 another fllsht o. . io^|aDor^eaj ^ .izhted two HIOs. ingressing to target a sighting they had heard strike force. There Is or vice versa. Howev la not too pertinent, pursue HIQs. Lead was about 22«05'N/105'05'E BLUE fUcht sighted two JJO*- P'J-J^ \l 1^1 several MIC warnings from central Geo-Ref and ^^if^" J" here Is sor.e inconalstancy as to whether the P"«Vm?S/JK d?5Ll!fon However, since BLUE flight was unable to engage these two RIGS the direction BLUE flight Jettisoned bombs and tanks and started a turn -o MTr« caa was cassed t5 BLUE 3 who was on the left. "The HIGs saw us. They ?;i^!^LS5^ataJ?edTJl"nrtu?n back to the left; in other words, it made our turn so JSfiS SiJen'? going to Ske any ncney on them at all because they had more ape^d than we 5^5 ?^*n^?r,i " The ImiCs ended up heading ISO" from BLUE flight. BLUE 1 resumed the did at the tine. ^^J'H^i'^J-^J^oinPjJ^ike force and sighted two raore MGs passing off tSe'rJ^St'wiig SZ tiol iere Je^rJbei as Sing a loSg cylindrical fu»elage and delta the I'ieJJ. «f2nkei" on the leading edge. The vertical stabilizer was wide with a lu.fl III tSI ho?;^oSta? sJaSiuters werf swept back. The canopy resembled an F-100. 5^SS.M^rld«!llnr;ah Sown the spine of the fuselage. T^..y were bright silver In color. J« iiSwi If any tJS were observed. The aircraft were MIC-21S. At the time of sight- No markings or any typp "^r niKht was now at about 2<«,C00 ft and at approximately Bwi 5 ?ed turn pirfSmrMiS 3 which was niw about 1-1/2 to 2 miles ahead Minh In turning to pursue! the MICs went afterburner and MIC 3's wingman began and in a climb. ^" Jg"^"^;* J^aSg^t of MM 4. BLUE 1 maintained near level flight in order Sliding outside. ^Jf5J:.^?"%gj°'^to reduce t^^ argle-off and obtain a boresight lock- II "^"ScKS ur»5Sed1S;h i??erbirnfr!%IuE 1 started'cllmblng also and -as able to pull -id iSt his olopjr on the HIG, who apparently did not see him and continued in at t ^*?Jo^Snk climSiSi BLUE 1 began to pull up on the MIG a.nd after obtaining a bo - lillt J^Lon swUch^Ho full systeS and maintained the lock-on. The "nge gates were sight 10^''-°" pi-ht the m-range light on, I hai Interlocks In and we had a "■'StN^rclJsSrrrate tS if kt^on hii!"' BL^ 1 noticed that with the negative closure ^ffhrwas Ipppoathlig inaSlSum range and "squeezed the trigger." After a nomenta^ delay lkSn°hed so the Interlocks had been satisfied. The missile was 2^f"^f^ ^° ^iliiit aSSd bulidlrg up speed apparently locked onto the MIC which at this tine was go straight ahead J^^JJJ^^^P^^Piij, ^^luE 1 fired at about 27,000 ft with 20* noseup high enough to be pulling ^concraiis^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ pulling approximately (BLUE I's estimate), cirrus cloud with the 1-1/2 g' 3 at speed of about Hach .95. The MI3 was doing about l.l The missile apparently tracked well and followed ^^e HIQ Into a . ^i«„rt «ith tna missile about 1500 to 2000 ft behind and closing. BLUE I took i?Mo^ nlss the cloud and lead his flight down to an altitude where they could evasive action to miss -ne ciou ^^^^ 2, «ho was on the out« "f^^^^hL ?2?lin SeM^d S trail estimated to be 6 or 7 miles. BLUE 3 crossing back over ^^f.^l^^ lifi SlnS liSked up to foUow the missile and sighted MIG 4 In a gradual turn at !i! .inJrill- iJv I. IBLUE 3 went afterburner and closed rapidly obtaining a radar lock-on. the contrail lev i. \duu^ locked on. BLUE 3 "pulled up Just on a simulated perch position, iJ5aJe?lrs m.c'-l ni f ?e5 an S M-7 which^nltlaliy appeared to be going to the right if MllTbit maSe ; ild!course correction, detonating on the right aft fuselage. The hit Event IZI-132 was also observed by BLUE 1. The MIG slowed rapidly, turned over and descended to Impact on the ground. BLUE 3 followed it down and did not 8«c the pilot eject, but the canopy was turned away from him most of the time. 1»>7 1. Event m-l33 Aircraft Involved: Kour P-*C8 vs one MIG-17 R«8ult: No engas*>nent Vicinity of Encounter: 21«33'N/105"51'e PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 23 Aprllj 1967/1652H BLUE Plight of four iP-4C8 from 366TPW on Strike Hisalon JCS 76.00 (Thai N«uy«n Iron and Steel Complex) 2. MISSION ROUTE Depart Danang, refuel prior. to target area. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F«8 16 - AIM -7 2 - External fuel banks 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PrIiOR TO EHCOUNTER BLUE PllUt Altitude : Heading: Speed: 5. 14,000 I^t ACL 060« I 500 KIAS WIG 17 1000 ft ACL 170» INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 3 prior to roil In on target sighted one allver KIG-17 at his 9 o'clock poaition low with approximately a reciprocal heading. 6. ACTION INITIATED | Since MIQ had approximately a Z mile vertical separation with reciprocal heading, BLUE 3 elected -to strike target rrther than attempt to engage MIG. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE Plight polled! Into target. MIG was lost to view almost Immediately. MIG exhibited no hostile Iritent but seemed primarily interested in clearing target area. 8. ORDNANCE None expended. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None reported. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS No Interviews. 11. DATA SOURCES 366TPW ONO 23 April 1967, Change 1 to OPREP 3> 148 Event III-IBI Aircraft Involved: One F-««C vs one MIG-21 Results: No Damase Vicinity of Encounter: ai'OS'H/lOS^tT'E \. PftlMARV NISSION A«0 TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/Time: 2i April ly67/09i»5H 11. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. WARRATIVE DESCRIPTION in turn. Event III-135 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs one MIO-17 and six MIQ-Zls Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21*35 •M/105n5;E 21*2O'N/l0U"'15'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/Time: 2U April 1967/1615H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Armed recce flleht .ade two sightings; one MIClT and one MIG-21 seen at first coordlnlJes shown, and five HIG-21s at second. Event lli-136 Alrcrart Involved: Two P.105Dr. and t-o P-lOi.Ps vs four MIC-l/s Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21»30'"/105»00'E PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tloe: 2H April 1967/1612H BLUE Plight of four -105S was "'^"^.[[f '''''' Ridge. Flight was from iSth Squadron 3^8 Tr*< Korat . 1. NtSStON ftOUTE BLUE 3 and * recovej^ed at Udorn with low fuel. AIRCRArt CnHFIGORATIpNS 1 - AIM 9 6 - Kk-82 P-105F 1 - AGM-'*5 2 - CBU-2'* Cloud cap over end of Thud Ridge, otherwise clear. 6000 ft «. FLIGHT CONDITIONS P^IOft TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Altitude Headinc : ll**" Speed : Unkno**n 5. INITIAL DETECTION Observed "o-.r MIgJiTs in a loose fingertip formation at range of 6 to 7 miles at 9 o'clocSr The MIG-17S were lower at 3000 to UOOO ft. heading 300«. 6. ACTION INITIATED ^ »k h BLUE Plight contlkued on course and MIGa were lost to sight on other side of Thud Ridge . 7. SITUATION. DEVELOPWEHT Piakins a turn around Thud Fldge, BLLT Flight on a heading of approximately 5J!r,^5 2fl MIG-175 closing fron the 7 o'clock position at range estimated about JJSo'f? S^S? r?an?d ilOs aJd Sent afterburner, breaking up over the ridge and Into jSe oSuds in an essentially STO^ turn,_ccmlng down over^the^west^slde of_thejldge i^adJiliU^ ^JgSrinr he Jt^ir tiS^llGrxTrhearing lio- and Just'about abeam about lOCO heading ^i5..».^^B"':^'}pyj^^jj^^ p^^^ lead on MIG I but was able to on HIG 2. ft below. BLUE 1 was 8. ORDNANCE BLUE I - 337 rounds ZOicm (M-61) Sight set with 15a mils depression and not computing (air-to-ground node.) 9, EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS After 100-125 rounds, gun malfunctioned firing from one barrel only - a less effective rate of fire. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS There should bJ a simpler way to change switches when going from the atr-to-ground to alr-to-alr mode. ' n. DATA SOURCES Pro ject Interviews ; Messages . fl^pgrrsT Red Baron Interview BLUE 1, front and back OPREP 3 355 TRY Takhll D011295 24 April 1967 12. NARRATIVE ^ ^ ^ B'trr pn»h*- fi'vlne flak and SAM suppression mission up >.nd down both sides Of Thud B-UE Plight riyins ^wc ao«aT.«n-iv same MIGs resultlne In i ^"V hrii^nnrlvTctiTa and later encountered the apparen-ly same MIGs resulting In a Ridge sighted ^°"^p-^°r>4 1 RLUS 2 never did get into position to fire his AIH-9. The brief firing P^" JV/^r^ii" cosUion against BLUE Pli«h? . 3LUE 1 fired 337 rounds of ^Sfin at'S Si rargliS%?oi uSS R dS5n to 800 ft at to 90= deflection. Hew- 20mm (M61) jj:^ F^^^fl^S* iCt two-thirds of the rounds ex pended, BLUE I's ^un was ever, for approxi^f^el/ the last two tnir^^ observe the MIG to snap '^'f'^Mi^^rfhri^Jl Mif S^nt afterburner Seaded scu.h. BLUE Jettisoned tanks and • leS 3lf flight oJt of th e area as h is mission w^s completed since the strike force was also egnesslng the area. ' [ [• [ [ Event 111-137 Aircraft Involved: Two F-^Bs V8 seven MIC-178 Result: Two MIGs destroyed (probable) Vicinity of Encounter: Near Kep Airfield 1. PRIHARY MISSION ANOTACTICAL SITUATION | Date/Time: 24 April 1967/l6ii5H | Two P-KBs (QLUE fllr.ht) retiring from TARCAP Station after strike at Kep Airfield i received airborne reports of MIGs In the lirjnedlate area* ] 2. MISSION ROUTE | YAHKtt STATION to Strike Kep Airfield, JCS 9.1. I 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS | BLUE 1, 2 SIOEWIIIOERS AIN-9D f Probably SPARROWS | NIO-17 Alr-to-Alr missiles | 5. INITIAL DETECTION j After reeelvlng' airborne warning, BLUE flight reversed course and observed a flight of | four HIOs low over the ground and another flight of three HICs directly ahead, apparently ^ on reciprocal heading. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE flight made a hard reversal to reacquire M13 after It passed head on at approxi- mately 100 ft range. It was observed to be silver with a single red star on fuselage. j 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT *■ • BLUE 1 launched AIM-9D at MIG 1 fron approximately 3000 ft rar.?e, 6 o'clock position. Missile observed to detonate on MIGs rii;ht wing. MIj began smoking and descent towards K- ground. BLUE 2 called BLUE L to break Because of attack by another MIO. BLUE 1 broke j left and up. Crew ooaerved an air-to-air ttiIssIIb pass approxlraacely 500 to 1000 feet I- abeanu After BLUE 1 broke away, Bt^UE 2 was able to launch an AIM-?D at (41G 2 which had attacked BLUE 1. Missile was ocserved to enter tailpipe of MIG 2 but apparently did .not detonate. MZO 2 began sraoklng and descending toward ground. [4IC 3 (KIG 2*a. wlngroan) broke / away retiring toward the southwest at low altitude. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 t 2 each fired one AIH-9D SIDEWINDER HIG 2 fired at least 1 AA Missile . 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 2's wing fuel was observed after the engagement to be not transferring aft. 11. DATA SOURCES crG-77.5 251638Z April 67 CTQ 77.5 2110452 April 67 Letter from W. L. Kurtze Subject Missile Firing, 27 April 1967 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE flight of two F-UBs retiring from TARCAP station after a strike at Kep Airfield where heavy ground fire and SAKs were observed, received airborne warning of MIGs in the y//. immediate area. BLUE flight reversed course and observed a flight of four MIGs low against t'' the ground and another flight of tnree MIGs directly ahead. MIG 1 passed through BLUE flight approxlnately 100 ft away. It was observed tj be silver with a single red star on the fuselage. BLUE flight nade a hard reversal t? reacquire MIG and maneuvered towards fr its 6 o'clock. At approxlnately 3000 ft rar.ce BLUE 1 (Lead) launched an AIM-9D observing };/ missile detonating on MIC I's right wing. "A ball of fire and debris were seen," MIG 1 U: commenced smoKlng and descending toward the ground. Lead's wlngman called BLUE 1 to break as he was under attack by the ot^.er two MIGs. BLUE I broke left and upwards and Its crew observed an air-to-air n-.lsslia rasa about 5,000 to 10,000 ft abeam, '-.'hen Lead broke away, r~ BLUE 2 was able to launch an Ai:'-9D which guided up ;he tailpipe of MIC 2, but did not 1 ; detonate. "The KIC rolled over trailing streams of smoke and headed toward the ground." V.'- MI(3 3 broke away and retired toward the southwest at low altitude. 151 Event Hi- 1 37 BLUE 2 then observed a low-fulel warning and discovered that his wlnR fuel was not ?ansrerplng. "After a thorough Ire-check of aircraft switcher," BLUE 2 headed towards the $arest coaatout oolnt, towards Bhe tanker. Radio contact was made with the tanker but tatance and altitude separation prevented rendezvous. Prior to fuel Jected and were picked up twenty minutes later and delivered back to YAtiKtt STATIOH in ccellent condition. isa 3 11 \ 3 3 a 3 11 0 ^ 3 ' 0 1 A 0 1 •1 A 3 i Event III-13B Aircraft Involved: pour F-1055 vs six HIG-Zls and one MIC-17 Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21«>30'N/105'tO»E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOR Date/Time: April 1967/1619H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike flight saw several MIGs. but no attempts aade at engaeement ; while inbo^nj. MT? s-ii - allea alav- 5 ulnutes later, after hitting target, one MIG-X7 seen at rSlKS; inr;;o:2? «:n'IS'Ainu?« "SJer. and four more seen the following «lnate. Event III-I39 Aircraft Involved: pour P-«>Cs vs three MlC-l7s Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21'05'M/105*30*E I. PRIMARY MISSION AKO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 2ti April 1967/1700H II. DATA SOURCE CIHCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Plight saw MICa at 1000 ft when In bosftlng run; MlCs scattered from formation when ordnance hit ground. Event III-140 Aircraft Involved: One A-6A va one MO Results: Ho Oanage Vicinity of Encounter: 21»22'K/106»23'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: April 1967/170OH II. DATA SOURCE CIHCPACPLT Staff Study 6*68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Member of airfield strike flight downed by AA; wlngman orbited position of downed crewman until warned by downed 'zrewman that MIG was attacking; orbiting aircraft out- naneuvered and evaded. Aircraft InvoLved; Event tll-l"! Pour* P-IO59 vs ten MIG-I7a and I wo HI0-21s Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: ai'OS'H/XOS^Sl'E 1. ■ PRIMM HISSIOH AHO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 25" Aprl 1967/1002H Poup P-105a (BLUE nieht) were attaekln; an Alfa target, the same target are those of Events Ill-l"*!, -1«3, and -lie. B. ORDNANCE (No. rired/Ko. ZOlWB 1/0 Other aircraft striking BLUE IK hit) 200 rounds DATA SOUItCES CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE «'llicht was eniaged by four MIC-lTs (which may have? been the same " ff. Events IIl'An. --l"*af^^ on In^resc and one MIG fired from 3 o'clock but missed. BLL'E H fired 200 rounds at a passing MIG but achieved no hits. The MIGs tried to feverse and pursue but cauld not catch the P-105s as they rolled in on the target. Six more MIG-lTs akd two Mia-2l8 were seen orbiting over Phuc Yen. Evenc Ill-m? Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s V8 one MW-17 Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21"08»N/105'52»E 1. PRINART HISSICN AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 25 April 1967/Approxlnateiy 1005H .nd .3S force, to Jettison o.^nance'S'^tles ^S^/Si^JL^Sfnr JSrHr^Jt"'"^ ob.erJed'S'n't'if'farl^rarea?'''"'"" ^^e target area. No hit, .ere Nuaero^ui\s^5Jlj.r;snrth\";jcJJ(t^^^j?^^^^^ KraJ?fj:ij." 11. DATA SOURCES Messages : 355 TPW OPREP-3 2509302 April 67 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION See Events Hl-Uft and -151 Event 111-1*3 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105» va one MIG-l? Result : No damags Vicinity of Encounter: 21»08'H/10;»50' E 1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 2^ April 196|7/1002H 4. FII6HT CONDITIONS PPIOA TO ENCOUNTER BLUE T Altitude ; Heading ; Speed ; " Flight Pomatlon 6,000 ^t 320" 480 kt i. miTIAl DETECTIOn BLUE 3 sighted a sllven oately 2 miles. In a left tujrn with 30" of bank. 6. ACTION INITIATED Hia-17 at the 12:30 o'clock position at a range of approxl- As he continued his left tum Into SLUE 3, the KIG was observed to be In afterburner. At a range of approximately [750 ft, 3LUE 3 fired at the MIC which was now in a very hard left tum. Possible hits w^re reported. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 3 broke off to the right and headed for Thud Ridge. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 3 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS Hon* reported. 10. AIRCREW CONNENTS Eaoerlence Total Hours rired/No. hits} Remarks Possible hits F-105 Hours BLUD 2 1000 150 11. DATA SOURCES BLUE Combat Hissions 50 Proi ec t Interviews ; Messages : ?88 TPW OPREP-325053Z 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION See Event III-148. 2, S June 1967. Apr 67 i t I B 8 B B B 8 8 B 8 Event Ill-mu Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105s vs several MICs Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 2l*08'N/105'52'E I. PRIMART niSSICN AND TACTICAL SITUATION Datc/Tlne: 2b A^ril lCJG7/Approxinateiy lOOOH This nigf't' Of fo-r F-lOSo was part of a strike against the Hanoi tranaforiper slfsht (JCS 82.24 Strike). 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total P-lOii Coubar Hours ^9Ji:JL Wisslons BLUE 3 1200 900 UO II. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUK 2 Messages : 355 TPW OPREP-3 25O930Z April 67 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Or. the way !nto thu target 3LUE Flight encountered heavy flak. BLUE 2 was Shot down by 85niiB AAA. BLUE 3 becu::.e separated fro.T. the rest of the flight as he proceeded to the target area. While at atou^ 10.000 ft BLUE 3 sighted a ;<:iG-17 approaching his 6 o'clock position. As he broke to the right, BLUE 3 Jettisoned his bombs and headed out of the area. In the vicinity if Phac Yen he saw three or four nore MIG-17s. Continuing toward Thud Ridge, twu mere MIC-lTs approached tne 6 o'clock position on BLUE 3. He engaged afterburner and evaded i:;e aIGs. Airspeed and altitude at this time were over 500 kts and about 6,000 ft, respectively. The i^ICs were silver In color. (See Events III-l'il and 111-151.) Event Ill-ms Aircraft Involved; Three P-105a vs three MIO-lTs Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 2i»00*N/105"30'E 1. PRINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH Oate/Tlme: 25 April 1967/1005H n. DATA SOURCE CZNCPAC?LT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Plight at POOO ft aftt:r pulling off sane ALPA target as Events IlX-143, -148, -138 8Bi# three NIGs In a descending left turn; MIQs continued turn and departed. Event 111-146 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs two HIG-17s . Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21*05 'N/IOS" 53' E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/Tlme: 25 April 1967/1005K II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Plight striking same ALFA target as Event III-135 sighted two MIGs. 157 I'" ■■III -Ml ■ i« III mmmmm^m , ii n i, ip^n.^p 1. Ewent IIl-lti7 Aircraft Involved: Two P-8Es vs two or more KIG-17DS Result; Possible daniai^e to one niG Vicinity of Encounter: Haiphong PRIHARY HISSION yO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 25 April 1967/1109H BLUE 1 and 2 were one of three sections of F-Ss asdlgned the aission of flak suppres- In «.Jnr,n,.^ = strike group. slon In support of a 2. MISSION ROUTE Departed YANKKE (JCS target i*?) STATION and proceeded to the target in the vicinity of Haiphong. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F-8E BLUE 1, 2 I 8 - ZL'HI Rockets (Vt fuzed) U - KK-12 2Q:ra guns (28U rds) ALQ-51; APR-27; MIC~17D MIG 1. 2 Dull sliver colior Afterburner IFF/Stby; TACAN/On; Radar/IR mode 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Altitude: KeadingT Speed; Estate; S. r BLUE MIG 3,000 ft Northerly 350 KIAS 5,500-6,000 lb 500 ft 170» INITIAL DETECTION The HIGs were Initially sighted by the strike flight leader. BLUE 1 acquired visual contact with the' KIC at 1 o'clock, 70» down at a range of approximately 3.000 ft. The altitude of the MIG was 500 ft. 6. ACTION INITIATEp .... c*'.*^* '^^^^ * gentle left turn toward the strike group, BLUE I maneuvered Into the 6 o'clock poi.tlon on the KIG, tracked, and fired a burst of 60 rds of ZQrm This hurst was fired at [a range of 1.500 ft while In a 2 g tracking run. Sparkles, indicating hits, were observeo near the left wing root and In the left mid- fuselage. When the MIO saw the tracers he br.oke hard right. 7. SITUATION OEVEtOPHENT BLUE I closed the range to 1,100 ft but his guns would not fire. He then Increased his lead to 100 MILS and fired two VT fuzed ZUNI rockets. A second pair of rockets were fired and observed | to pass the MIG low at 6 o'clock. The «IC reversed his turn. BLUE 1 reestablished a tracking lead and fired a third pair of rockets. One rocket detonated approxlnately cne-haif wing span oi-.ince from the MIG at H o'clock. No reaction from the Irfhlle BLUE 1 was attacking MIG 1, MIG 2 was trying to maneuver behind SLUE 2 and after the second turn reversal ended up on the outside of the turn. BLUE 2 encased the mo, attained a firing position, fired aonm and six rockets with no success. 8. ORONANCC BLUE 1 BLUE 2 (No. fired/No. hits J 2 0m ni ZUWI 60 rJs/prob. 8/0 aemarks Observed probable ZOnm hits. One rocket detonated approximately 20 ft from a MIG. Unknown 6/0 9. EQUIPMENT PR08LEMS BLUE 1. Guns ja-id after firing one short burst of aomm. Posr. flight inspection revealed two extractor springs Broken, one feeder mechanism failure and ane aamo chute Jammed. 10. AIRCReU COHMCNTS Comments on this Encounter Event III-117 | i BLUE 1. P-8 had sufficient maneuverability to turn with the MIG . Estimated no more • than 1 g required in this engagement. Used afterburner fully modulated to the nlnlnum \ gut put position. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUE 1, date unknown. Messages: CTC 77.7 OPREP 3 2506K52 April 67 • ' 12. NARRATIVE OCSCRIPTION Three sections of F-8s were to provide flak suppression for a strike group of A-'is. : As the group approached the target area, the strike leader sighted the MIGs below the strike group. The F-8s engaged the HIGs allcwlng the strike group to continue to the target. i After engaging the ttlQs in close ccnbat for approximately 2 1/^ minutes, the F-8s ^ disengaged due to no usable ordnance. Upon departure, one MIG was observed to be trailing | light grey smoke from the left wing root. j During this saz-.e tlT.e, approximately 15 SAMs were fired at the strike group that was j only 2 to ^ miles away from the MIQ engagement. | See Event III- 150 • Event III-llS 1. PRIHARY KtSSION AND TAC TKAL ^ Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s vs three MIG-17a Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 2l«»03'M/l05''53'E. ITUATICN Date/Time: 25 April 1967/lOOOH Pour P-1058. BLUE Pllgit, were providing flak suppression during a strike against the Hanoi railroad yard. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-105 BLUE 1. 2. 3. » | 2 - 450 fcal external fuel tanks 1 - QRC 160 pod (B2 arid ZH had 2 pods) 1 - SIDEWINDER (AIN-9B on BI and 3) 1 <- ?X 61 20aa gun HI0«17 WIG I. 2. 3 Sliver color/M-1, 2 Camouflaged, possibly ^M-3 4. PLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Clear sky. goodlvlsiblllty , BLUE Plight MS recovering from an ordnance delivery run In which CBU-2'J/29 were dropped on flak sites. Altitude ; Approximately ^,000 ft HeadlnuT Speed; SW-W 550.600 kts t 5. INITIM. DETECTION BLUE 2 first sighted MIG 1 low at 9 o'clock st a distance of approximately I 1/2 miles. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 2 continued oul^bound to rendezvous with BLUE 1 and to establish the ECM Pod for«a?iS L Sic 1 !as Si l^Jedlate threat. At about this ;i-%t^"%SA:.3 ^^^^JJ^^^.^J^JJ 3 miles off to the left. I BLUE 2 turned rl?ht to Icok for 3LL^E 3 and u and saw two .-lIGs In ^r!" "t a raSge of aboui 1,500 ft. The lead KIG flrea at SLUE ft without success. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT The range between BLUE f and the HIGs was Increasing and they were no longer J threat. BLUE 2 resumed his outboJInd heading and reacquired a visual contact of .iO Co mments on this Encounter iZiir2. Impressed with the turning maneuverability of the HIO-17. and with the density of the flak over Hanoi. 11. DATA SOURCES Pn»l >et Interview : bLuS 2, 6 June 1967, Messages : 30H 'iT w OPhEP-3 2503'»2Z April 67. u 160 3 s Q 0 a 0 0 Q 0 0 D 1^ Event 1II-1«<8 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION of Gla Lam air base. Four 1055 were c.n a fUk suppression "l"^^" ;^•^^'JJ3Il5^y^^ters attacked the F-1055. While ricoveJm^ froa, the ordinance '■^'^livery run ^Vj^cfp^Itlofon BLUE 1. ELUE 2 turned HiS 1 was ooservea by SLUE ^ x.neuver ro a fa o jJ^^^^J'^J .hen the MIG saw accelerated ar.J outran the KIGs. See Event III*1'«3- Event II£-1^^ t 1. Aircraft Involved: Two EB-66s, and two RP-4CS vs three MIG>2Is Result: No dairage Vicinity of Encounter: 21°10'N/10I»''00*E PRINARY NISSICrit AKDITACTICAL StTUATtOK Date/Time: 25 April 19fi7/1017H Three EB-66s aircraft (GRrKU flight) with fcur P-^C escorts (BtUE flight) were on an ELI::t/ECM mission ov.-r 2. MISSION ROUTE I'JortJ. Vietnan. At the time of the encounter GPEEK 1 and BLUE I and 2 were at the northprr er.^l of a North>£outh orbit. BLUE 3 and 4 were escorting GREEK 2 and 3. rJ The time that GREE.*: flleht was «t various points In Its track are given in Table 1. TABLE t(S) LOCATICN TXMe(H) Depart Tiiiilhl 0840 i7*22'rV103°57'E 0916 l^ighter rendezvous ' jat 190:0 •N/10'*O0O»E 0936 21°U7»N/:0«i^l^J«E 0951 trblt through IF at 1 2lO08'!.Vl03°5'*'E 1015 Encounter 1017 lArrive Takhll 1121 April 1967 0PP£P-3 PASTEL 30 8 11. DATA SOURCES U32 TRW 2507302 12. NARRATIVE. At lOllH, when at 21^25 'N/lCi^lS 'E at 30.000 feet, heading I88 degrees, GREEN 2 notified BLUE 3 and his cover, to set up an orbit In a clear area while GREEN 2 and 3, In a close font00'E and the time- was 1017H. GREEN 2 saw tjhree centralis 600-700 feet above, forward and weaving as If the aircraft were attemptjlng tc slew down. GREEN 2 Identified three silver HZC-21. aircraft since they continued to turn silhouette up while weaving. The nuoiber two KIG broke down Into a right turn for spacing for a left, high side pass. Into GREEN 2'si8 o'clock position. The number three MIG brcke left and down but hazy clouds obscureij further view. Later BLUE 3 stated the third MIG attecpted a pass also. The number on^ ^10 remained weaving 600-700 feet above GREEN flight. GREEN 2 and 3 dived down in a clrru.^ cloud deck patched with cumulus dropping 200 units of RR-4tt chaff and 50 units oir RR-59. They then took up a heading cf 180-220 degrees at a^i.OOC feet and remained ln[ the clouds fcr about 20 minutes climbing gradually to 28,000 feet to maintain cloud cC|Ver. KIG warnings' were not received ncr did BLUE flight see the KIGs until after the initial encounter. I Subsequent MIC warnings were heard as shown In Table 11. TABLE II Hig Warnings (s) Origin TlmeH Location MISMATCH 1038 QG«3 MOTEL IQtib QU-3 MOTEL 10 Ue AQ-Jl r Event III-150 Aircraft Involved: Two A-4C3 va two MIG-17s Result: One A-UC lost Vicinity of Encounter: 20«48'N/106»«H'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 25 April 1967/1112H The two A-4s (BLUE 1 and 2) were part of a strike against the Haiphong ammunition depot. A total of 25 attack- aircraft participated in the strike. As the strike f.roup approached, the Er.ultiple SAr-'s were obser/ed and heavy barrai^e and tracking 37/57/85mm AA fire was encountered throu^'iouc the strike. Two niG-l? aircraft were observed to take off rroffl Kien An airfield. 2. MISSION ROUTE The strike group departed YANKEE STATION and proceeded to the target area. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS A-JlC BLUE 1. 2 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS ?RIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Clear sky with 10-ml visibility In light haze. BLUE I ? A] tltude ; 3tOQO ft (approximately)' Heading : Speed : 450 kts Fuel State ; Flight Formation Section of two airplanes 5. INITIAL DETECTION .While In his bombing run, BLUE 1 sighted two MIOs approaching the 6 o'clock position on his section. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 released his bor.bs and called a break to the right. BLUE 2 released his bombs and broke rl^ht behind hlc leader as the flight descended to 2000 ft. 7. SnUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 1 called BLUE 2 to "pull harder", tighten his turn, and he then ■ reversed his turn. After several turns the A-^s were scissoring with each other, providing rriutual defense, BLUE 2 Jettlscned his bomb racks during the defensive maneuvering. Because a fIG was ^ firing at hlci and he had to execute a hard turn, approxinately '4 g, BLUE 2 last saw SLUE 1 I trailing light grey smoke. It was estimated that the 'AlO fired three one-second bursts at I BLUE 2, after maneuvering in hlgh-g turns down to apprr>xlr.ately 1000 ft. 8. ORDNANCE The KIGs fired on both bLUE I and 2 an unknown number of rounds. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None reported 10. AIRCREH COMMENTS BLUE 2. "Could not evade the KIQ at maximum speed, no afterburner. When attack air- craft have inferior capability compared to enemy aircraft, CAP cover has to be very good." 11. OATA SOURCES Messai^eSf Reports : CTG 77.7 OPREP 3 250620Z April 67 CTG 77.7 OPREP 5 251810Z April 67/008 Modified Aircraft Combat Lnss Report (Navy) 12. ilARRATIVE As the strike croup approached the tarj^et prea. heavy AA fire and SAMs were encountered, Prior to roll- In for the bombing attack the strike leader observed four r-tlO-lTs at an alti- tude of approximately 1000 ft. While BLUE 1 and 2 were In their bombing run, BLUE 1 saw 163 I I I I r I Event I I 1-150 two «IGs maneuverlni; into ihl» 6 o'clock position. He released his bombs and called u rl^jnt break. After heavy wane uv|e rim: BLUE X an-1 2 ended up In a scissors. BLUE 2 last saw blwE 1 tralllns light snoke. Other r.e::.bcrs In the strike saw BLUE 1 burst Into flame and crash. A red star was obserJed on the winp; of the HIGs. The TARCAP was not with the strike proup but was nalntalnlnR an "on call" station just, off the coast. Alrhougn the TAF.CAP attempted to locate and enp;a«e the MIGs, f.o contact was made. See Event IXX^lXT. Event III-I51 Aircraft Involved: Four F-105Ds vs four NIG-lTs Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21»13'N/105«50»E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 25 April 1967/Approxiniatel.v I005H This fllcht of four F-105D? (fcLUE Fllcht) was part of a strike against a transformer plant tliJtJ JfSaSol Sekvydet-eises. including SAHs. flak and MIOs were encountered In the tarr.et area. 2. MISSION ROUTE The fllKht approached the r.oi-thern end of Thud Bldge from the 'west and headed south- easterly down Thud Rldee Into the target area. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-105P BLUE 1. 2. 3. t Armed with bor^bs and equipped with external fuel tanks. MIO-17 WIG 1. 2. 3. " Dull, Silver color External fuel tanks. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIOHS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Considerable bad weather enroute to the target area. In the target area the weather was clear with good visibility. BLUF. I S 3 5 Altitude : 6-7,000 ft Keadlne: Southeasterly Speed : 500 kt CAS TueTstate: 10,000 lb Plight Format Icn Approximately line abreast 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE ^ and H slighted four MIGs at aoout 9:30 o'clock at a range of approximately one „ile Jitl Ltut 5o' angle off headed towaras the F-103». MIO warnings had been received. 6. ACTION INITIATED yhiie in an echelon formation, the KlOs Jettisoned their external tanks and rolled iiirn So Close to the 6 o'clock position on BLUE Plight. When BLUE Plight saw the Hill the? SngagJi i?tirbirner and accelerated to 550 kt CAS In a shallow dive descending approximately 2000 ft. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT The P-1058 opened the range on the KICs and continued into the target area. 8. ORDNANCE No alr-to-alr ordnance fired by either the P-105s or the HlQs. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None reported. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total P-105 Ccnbat Hours Hours ^1= a Ions Remarks BLUE ft 6ftO directly to P-105 from flying school. Comments from Overal ' Experience ~ gj^yg J,. "The F-105 is a far.'-astic airplane for this mission." •On VPR strike missions ycu don't need two people." 165 Event III- 151 11. DATA SOURCES Pi-o jeet Interviews : BLUE 30 Ksy 1967. 12. MRRATIVE OESCRIPTIOM ■ As stmced in paragraphs 5. 6, 7. S«« Eventa 111-137 a^a lII-l'iU. Bven*. III-152 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105* »» four HIC-I7S Reaulta: Slanting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21'»08'H/105»51'E 1. PRIHART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tltne: 26 April I967/I6I6H 11. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Plight strllclng sarje target as Events III-157 and -153 saw MIGs orbiting north of target! il5 hivrSeSS Micl as some of those In referenced incidents. z Event 111-153 Aircraft Involved; Four P-1053 vs elijht KIG-173 and one HIC-21 Result : No damav.e Vicinity of Encounter: 21«20'N/105'*37'E \. PRINARV fllSSIOU ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time 26 April 1967/16 17H Pour P-105D3 (BM'E Flight) w'^re part of a strike force attacking the Hanoi transformer yard vJCS 82 2"^). "^fr- EtrliC ft Iz was est'.r.a::ea that the y.l'^r. w'e target the flight again refueled White Anchor. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS p.i>C BLUE 1. 2. ft 4 • AIM-TE (except for BLUE 1 who had three AIM-7E) H - AIH-9B 1 - 370 gallon external tank I - Q!IC-16Q ECH pod I ' 1 - 600 gallon centenllne tank IPP and TACAN. (Both On.} MIQ-2I3 Silver No marlcings visible Clean. 4. FLIGHT CONDITICNS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : TT.ud Ridge obscArred by cumulus clouds. Five to six-eights broken to the south. Bottonw at 5-9000 feet MSL, tops at 10-12,000 feet. Good visibility above and below the clouds. Altitude : Heading ; Speed : Fuel State ! Plight Format ion Pod elenent on the lb ft. BLUE 123'* 11-12 »000 feet MSL 1U6 degrees ftSO KTAS 12,000 pounds 5. INITIAL DETECTION While proceeding down Thud Ridge BLUE Plight heard the ISON HAWO Plight call MIQs. The first contact was i '/isual acquisition of a single MIO-21 by BLUE 3 at the flight's 9 o'clock positions. EllJE 2 (backseat) also saw the MIGs at about the sasse ticie. The NIC was at 6000 feet KSL [heading 320 degrees. There were no warnings from thr agencies. 6. ACTION INITIATED Blue lead Instruetea BLUE 3 and ft to attack the KIQ while BLUE 1 and 2 followed to provide cover. | 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMcNT The MIC -ch BLUE 3 and ft were attacking disappeared ir.to the clouds, but they saw another MlC-a. and attacked tnls MIG. At this time BLUE 1 and 2 saw a HIQ-21 chasing an P-105 and split the fllgjit to follow the MIG. Prom this point cn BLUE 1 and 2 and BLUE 3 and ^ were operating independently. BLUE 3 and ft subseQuentli? attacked other MIG-213 but were never able co achieve a firing position before the XIGsl disappeared into clouds. At BLUE Z's blnco they egressed. After the f'lG on t.^e F-i05 disappeared Into cloud cover BLUE 1 and 2 attacked other HIGs with BLUE 1 firing '2 SFARRCVs and 2 SIDCWIHCEBs at a HIC-21, all of which missed. 170 s e § a a a a I I a 8 a u I B I I I I I I I I I 8 B B i 8 0 0* 0 Event 1 1 1- 137 He then fired a single SPARROW at another HtG-21 and, although BLUE 1 did not see the missile Intercfepn, he Is credited with a Jclll. When BLUE 2 reached bingo fuel the flight egressed. While eKressing BLUE Plight saw two MtQ-Zls and one MIC-17 In the area of Phuc Yen. 8. ORONANCC (No. fired/No. hits) AIM-TE AI«-9a SPARROW SIDEWINDER BLUE 1 3/1 2/0 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total ?-U Combat Hours Hours Missions Remarks BLUE 1 Pront 3100 350 60-70 1900 hra in P-lOO, Comments on this Encounter BLUE 1 had no probl.m identifying the MIGs due to their sliver color and delta wing shape. Pelt that they coulu turn with the MIG-21, possibly due to the ability of pilot. Although the MIGs made several passes they could not turn with the P-^. The MIGs appeared to be In an orbit, operating singly. The P-tts kept turning to defeat not only the MIC-21s but also the SAHs and AAA. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE l-Pront, 23 Jure 196?. Hessaggs. Re^torts : 366TPW 261120Z April 1967 OPREP-3/OO8 PASTEL 739. 366TPW 26l8'i52 April 1967 OPREP-3 Section I Pastel 8O6 Section II Tastel 307. 366TPW 2710002 April 1967 KSC DCO 922. Raytheon Letter Subject Missile Plrlng DID 28 April 1967. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was providing MIG CAP for a force of P-105s. The F-IOS?, from KORAT wre ingresslng In a "gaggle" with BLUE Flight trailing the formation. While ingresslng at 1607K, when BLUE Flight was at aoproxlmately 21"'38'N/105*09'E, heading 082 degrees, at h'jO KTA3 and 15,0C0 feet altitudP, they observed three SAM bursts of dirty brown smoke at the same altitude at approximately 21° 32 ' N/i05°18' E. No SAM calls were heard at this time or at any other time during the mission. At 1611H. when BLUE Flight was at 21'»24 • M/IOS" 38 ' E , heading IU6 degrees at 10,000- 12,000 feet MSr. , they observed tv/o SAK detonations at approximately 3000 to 10,000 feet MSL at approximately 21">17'N/105° 38'E. About 30 seconds later, with the speed and heading the sane, BLUE Flight saw three more SAKs In flight, neaded approximately 330 degrees, at 8 nautical miles range at 2 o'clock. These SAHs were at 6000 feet HSL, and climbing at a 60 degree angle. None of the SAMs slgnted during Ingress were fired at BLUE Plight. At 1612H BLUE Flight was at approximately 21'»20':i/105'»'»3'E, at 11,000-12,000 feet MSL. heading 146 degrees; they heard the IRON HAND Flight lead call MIGs. Very shortly thereafter, BLUE 3 (as reported by OPSEP) and BLUE 2 backseat fas reported by BLUE i) saw one MIO-21 (MIO 1) at 9 o'clock. MIG 1 was at 6000 feet MSL and was heading about 320 degrees. BLUE 3 and 4 were high on the left and weri Instrueced by BLL'E lead to go after MIG 1 with BLUE l^and 2 following In trail to provide cover. BLUE Flight had Jettisoned their centerllne tank when It becatre empty (at approximately the time when the flight crossed the Red River). When the engagement starfd BLUE 1 failed to Jettison the outboard tank. However, it was eispty and was retained throughout the encounter. 171 l.il I I I JILIIJ.I,.. ui nla of BLU Event in-l57 As the elements of BLUE PUsht turned left to er-care HIG ? ». ::ah pass-.-d l^f'^^^" t*'* eletren?9 abo" 2006 feet In front of BLVE 1 and 2 , hcadlnp 3'»0 dr^-rces. Tr.e tine was ^nraJd ?hf poSSilon apJJoxlSately zme'II/lOS'SO'E. No bunt= wure observed nor did the missile appear to track. As the fltghtl continued their left descending Uivr, MIC 1 broke to the deck and disappeared Into the clouds at about 5000 feet MSL. At this time one nautical mile (161IJH) SLUE 3 and «• saw another KIQ-21 (HIO 2) at 9 o'clocl: low, distant, heading 280 decrees, and turned left Into him- 'JE 1 and 2, after corpleting about iSO degrees of turn saw a [aG--21 Meanwhile, BL'j& *. aiiu c, ww. ■^"^....0 "7 ■, j ^ a- rr (MIO 3) chaslr.s an F-105. MM 3 was below and to tho l.-ft of F...-. I and f^^^ lead «Ued BLU2 i and U and told then, he w«s breaking off fror tr..a:^a^^ "n-^ U «e^^ elenents to cover the F-105. Pron this point on BLoL 1 and 2 and BLUE 3 an- t *:er. operating separately. continued on after MIO 2, who broke down and left, disappearing Into BLUE 3 and the clouds. As BLUE 3 and t were turning right through a heading of 150 degrees to -Jf " ""^J^® other element: th'ey spotted two «ore «"-21s (MIC K 5) 8:30 o'clock low a, pr« 5 nautical miles distant, turning through 250 degrees, '^^^ i. and 5 were ["J^jJ^J^ BLUE 3 and 4 continued to turn right toward Phuc /en and spotted anct»jer MG-?i ^"^^ °' at 3 I'clock low on the downwind leg of the airfield's traffic {.attem. headlnp about 260 degrees. BLUE 3 and 4 made a descending right turn to engage but KIG 6 turned J^ft and broke ^^tr. ^in,.ri-land dlsaooeared. 3LUE ^ and U made a I80 deeree turn south of -he field SrsiC*L»oiSe^i?S-2f tSS 7) at 2 o'clock low Just north of the field heading northwest. They gave pursulK but HIG 7 broke left and down disappearing l.nto clouds. At this tlml, about 1521H. BLUE 3 and k had two SAMs In booster approximately 1-1/2 seconds apart. The closest missile passed directly above BLUE When attacked by the SAHs BLUE 3 and t were at 8000 MSL at 21-18' "105^37 'E heading 320 degrees. The SAMs were heading 330 degrees and passed close enough to jhave caused a proximity burst had they been tracking. Shortly thereafter BLUE 3 and 1* heard BLUE 2 call bingo fuel and they egressed. At no time did SLUE 3 and K achieve a position to fire on tny of the HTOs. While BLUE I 3 and k were pursuing their MIGs independently. BLUE 1 and 2 were similarly engaged As soin as the flight split into two elements. BLUE l and 2 broke Info 5lO 3 MIC 3. who was on the F-105 '8 tall. Immediately troke off from the F-105 and disappeared Into cloud cover. BLUE 1 andl 2 on looking around saw several more Mia-2l5 orbiting over Phuc Yen between fionn AnraooQ feet MSL They picked ud one (MIG 8) at 10 o'clock, heading south in traffic pa??e?f abSSS f!l)2 Sies awy and Sroice left Into him. MIG 8 turned left and BLUE I and 2 followed. j BLUE 1 held 1-1/2 mile separation on MIC 8 and went to boreslght for acquisition. After l^k on in bor^slSt the backseat went to full system. Interlocks l"" /'^J^^ P^J^^J^'" BLUE 1 flied two AIM-7E missiles in ripple. They both went out of sight beneath the nose maintaining a straight flight path in reference to launch, and one was observed to 3e?ona?i jSst ilu?h o? Phuc Yen! .vSlther missile appeared to guide and the second one appeared to barrel roll. wTr. iMsI in a leisurely left turn at 6000 feet when attacked by BLUE 1. The missile select ?lghS Us Sein on foJ « leait five minute, previously but BLUE 1 had Placed the Jtwlle o?w" Iswltch to standby after the five minute tune-up period. Upon reaching the ?i«ei he nic'ed missile power switch on once again but had It only 5 seconds prlor to pSSSg mlssule am switch to arm. The select lights were all Illuminated Just prior to arnlng the ISPARROWs . MIO 8 waJ outside of SLUE 1 at 1*5 degrees off BLUE I's flight path at If. ^'clock. At iPunch BLUE 1 was at i»OC KCAS at 6000 feet MSL pullinir 3-\e's. BLUE I had 50 knots overtake on MIG 8 and was from 30 to 15 degrees angle off at -5 n ml range. The bit theck previous to take off was satisfactory and -^n return the system was carefSly chefcked. but no explanation of the failure of the f'.rsc two ml.sUes v..as discovered, f « j BLUE 1 then pressed on after MIG 8 and fired tv.-o :iDEWI!l.-F.H3 In ripple, as :^..G 8 had i^ln^r- llll turn BLUE 1 focused on one rlsslle v.hich started tc Rulde 5;rir?io'rta- a^/louS'he'rSled'rr? Into It an. the nl.:.ile .Id not follow and missed at 6 J'clock by 100-200 feet. The otner missile was n.-l observed. BLUE 1 llad selected the SIDEWINDER due to the failure of the first tx^o SPAPROW3 and had ripple fired to increase the chance cf success. At flriilit MIC 3 was 20 degrees off the nose of R'-UE 1, ii a left turn at 60Cn feet MSL. BLUE I was at%50 CAS a? 6OOO feet MSL pulling 2-2 1/2 g's. His angle off from the 172 Q ft i § e § f j 0 i Q § i 0 B 3 3 0 i i e a a i e a a Q 0 s a a 3 > i 1 Event IZI-157 MIO was 20 degrees and the range was 1 mile. BLUE 3 .iaQRC-160 pod Silver 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Clear visibility unlimited I BLUE ■3 ^ 17,000 ft AOL 2H0» Altitude : Heading: Speea : Fuel State : Flight Formation Pod ^ 5. INITIAL DETECTION While outbound BLUE 3 saw MIQ-Zla below the flight, altitude, headlngj 2^0«, turning left towards Hanoi. 6. ACTION INITIATED Thp HIOs were at 2000 ft BLUE Plight 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT HIQs were Ipst from view. 8. ORDNANCE None EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None AIRCREU CONSENTS None Interviewed continued on, while keeping the HIGs under surveillance. 9. 10. t1. 12. DATA SOURCES 366 TFW 7813OOZ OPREP-3 PASTEL 865 NARRATIVE BLUE Pllrnt was fragged to fly HIOSCREEN for five strike force flights. (These are .K- rTi^hJinlEvents 111-161. -162, -I63. and -l6H plus one other which did not encounter iiL i SlSE ^ Hh? stayed with the'fUght' of Event 111-163 f.om rendezvous to ^ar^et and return. flight m —..J of the strike force was JCS 18.38. 17* 3LUE FllRht stayed with the riignc oi cvenv vi.i.-j.uj ; : u... i^^^^.v,-- -w ,. BLUE FUKht rendeivoused with the strike force at lt):.6H. They stayed above the 1 El;er.riII-l63 t"the target and set up an orott at 21«0VH/105«39'E. The target Kvent III-15B At 1633H, BLUE ft, while flylns at 18,000 ft AGL. and 500 KTAS, was In a left turn, turning through 360" had two SAM missiles detonate iiear the aircraft. BLUE k vaz the last aircraft In a Pod turn forriaHon. BLl'E 3 saw a SAM missile detonate at BLOS it's 6 o'clock position within 75 ft of the aircraft . Approximately 7 seconds later BLUE 3 vitv a second SAM detonate at BLUE 4'a 6 o'clock position within 75 ft. The second SAM was in booster and after the burst the crew saw the boor.t?r section continue out of the burst and go above then. The two bursts were orange in color and appeared to be the size of a dirigible. BLUE 4 had a total of 12 holes in thv stabllator, aft ruselac:'.-, and low?:- wing. BLUK t lost PC-2 hydraulic systen, but SLUE Flight was able to return to hcne base without further Incident. The missiles appeared to be trav*?lln? In a near vertical path. They were not observed prior to detonations. All Q.itC-lcJ \:ere operational. On the outbound les fron the target, BLUE 3 saw two MIC-21 aircraft below the flight. The MICs were on a heading of ZftO* turning left toward Hanoi. The MIOs stayed at 2000 ft and disappeared to the east toward Hanoi. BLUE 1 (Lead) elected to maintain flight dis- cipline and escort BLUE 4 out of eneny territory. Four crew members saw the XIOs. 1. 11. 12. Event III-I59 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs eight KIG-178 Results: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: 20»52 'N/105*20'E PRIMARY MISSION AND^ TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlno: 28 April 1967, 1630H DATA SOURCE CXNCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike flient IngresslnR to same ALFA tarwt Event III-162 saw three silver MIOs cross Its track at 1,000 • AGLj when about 2 miles away, KIOs began sweeping turn, but no further contact made; one minute later, #3 saw x'lve silver at 10,000 >-8]inll< altitude and 6- Les range. Event iri-l60 Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s vs two MIG-17S Results: No dainase Vicinity of Encounter: 20«58'«/105«2«*E I. PRIMARY KISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/Tlme: 28 April 1967, 1653H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Pll^t retiimlng from strike on target of Event 111-165 saw two MICs orbiting; tk began turn but lost sight of KIGs. Event III-I6I Aircraft Involved: Four F-105s vs eight Mia-17s In 3 separate encounters Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounters: 21«02»N/105''30'E 1, PRIHARY HISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATIOR Date/Time: 28 April 1967/1630H o - p in*;- fBLUE FlljTht) were cart of a strike force attacking JCS I8.38 Dan Phuong cause^ariri Us'SiSt oJ'iJnoir^fhrother aircraft !« this strike force including sup- port aircraft) which encountered MIGs are those of Events III-158, -162, -163, 2. HISSIOH ROUTE Departed Takhll and proceeded overland to the target. The general route after leaving Channel 97 is about the same as that described In Event III-150. J. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-105D BU IK 1. 2. 1. «» 6 - 750-lb bombs ?;L''con?28"'ation unknown, probably each had a QRC-I60 pod. caaouflaged. MIO-17 Silver Ho external stores of tanks 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION On ingress BLUE Plight saw three MIQ-178 2 to 3 miles ''ut on the right. 6. ACTION INITIATED The MIGs were no threat due to their position and the flight continued on. 7. SITUATION DEVEIOPHENT BLUE Flight delivered ordnance on the target, and on egress a flight of two MIG-I7a were out-maneuvered by BLUE 1 and 2. An additional flight of three MIG-lTs nade a head-on pass at BLUE Plight, and fired at the flight. BLUE 1 fired at these MIGs but obtained no hits. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 BLUE 2 NIO 1 KIG 2 KIC 3 9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS None reported 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total Hours BLUE 3 *2500 ;.Tti;*ed MIjs are those of Events III-I6I and -163. One other strike flight saw no SICs.The actions of IRCM HAND flight are described In Event III-16'*. The actions of the F-t support aircraft are given in Event III-158. Also, there were the norrftal aunport aircraft such as B-66 and BIG EYE, After hitting the target BLUE 1 and 2 were separated from BLUE 3 and 4. Conaeouently , most of the action Involves only BLUE 1 and BLUE 2. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE Plight left Takhli and refueled on GREEN AHCHOR. Prora aerial refueling the flight proceeded to Channel 97 and then Ingressed directly to the target on a heading of ^out 0*1 8*. * o •» P-105D BLUE 2. H 2 - 3000 lb bombs 1 - QRC-I6a Pod 650 gal eenterllne tank IFF - Sauawklng; TACAK - receive only Caffiouria^e paint 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIfiURATIONS P-105D BLUE 1. 3 2 - 3000 lb bombs 1 - Air;-9B 1 - QRC-160 Pod 650 gal eenterllne tank IFP - Squawking; 7ACAN - receive only Camouflage paint HTO-l? HIO 1-9 Silver color, no marking noteu * External tanks 4. FLIGHT CONOtTIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : VPR. Clear with 15 miles visibility Plight condltlona unknown 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE Plight saw MIG-173 on Ingress to the target. The HlOa were at * o'clock 5 to 6 miles out of the line of flight. Although MIG warnings were received, they were not correlated with the MIGs that were encountered. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Flight Increased speed and the NIOs were left behind, 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE Plight continued on and hit the target. As BLUE Plight pulled off the target, BLUE 1 and 2 pursued one MIG-17 in a turning chase, firing one AIM-9B which missed. Two more MIG-173 nade a hoad-on pass and both BLUE 1 and 2 and the MIGs fired without effect. SLUE 1 and 2 continued hard right and sighted another y.lO-lT . Both BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 fired on the MIC with BLUE 1 scoring a kill. While firing on this MIG, BLUE Plight was attacked by two more aiG-178 fron 5 o'clock firing. These MIGs broke off as BLUE 1 and 2 broke hard rlKht. While egresslng a single MIG-17 made a head-on firing pass but scored no hits. Shortly thereafter, the BLUE 1 and 2 were attacked by two more MIG-17s, one from 5 o'clock and the other from 7 o'clock; both were firing. BLUE Plight unloaded and outran the HIGs. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 BLUE 2 MIG 2,3.5,6,7,8 i 9 (No. fl red/Ho. hits) 20mm AIM-i^B Cannon 2/1 1/0 1/0 1/0 Remarks Expended 600 rounds. One HIG-17 killed by cannon fire. Expended 1000 rounds Each nade one firing pass, no hits 179 Event XII.162 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 1 - The gun cera was Inoperative, 10. AIRCREU COMttEMTS E«p>rl*nee Total Hours BLUE 1 3000 Comments on this P-105 Houits Combat Missions 78 not The sun was success . and .amlng of attacking HI^.. Thl. «a. du. to the fact that BLUt „i„tter.d ""trcro:;. i» unacc.Jt.«.. ^Xt^n„d.^t. al^unad. ™. ..it..oio„ rtvanSSe'^ni -« Stttlzc^ aucc.fully . 4.r.~. «n.«».r. Cammenta from Overa U Experience ^ :5r.'r4J?;n;"o?«ri?i r/ni°s:i.idrs%^i.5t di.ta«ca. U. DATA SOURCES pTOleet Interviews Maaaages ^ Reoorcs: 355 TFW 2912'»0Z 355 TFW 281823 355 TFW 281800 BLUE 1, 30 May 1967 Aor 67 Aoi* 67 12. Apjr 67 HARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOp OPFEP-3 OPREP-3 OPREP-3 DOTO-O DOTO-0 DOTO-0 0H'*56 011041 11«»«1 BLOE night (consisting »f/°;'/-i'>l'i.;jL ''■'1=" S^r i^aUS? ! - - , or tne Ainc <<• _ . in«t fi«oni view. On crossing 6 nlles out and the HICs fell behind BLUE Flighty hit the BLUE 3 and 4. and were lost from view. 3 and , '^nS^rd%SlWt«Kn^^^^^^ 1 Ehs! BESi"'iS3 f d!;i"n.rr.ru::t's» :JSo?rs;r a.... .... .ir.r.ft i.'r.^d^I,%:ro2.°1nt^° ran^se^f-BLU. I and 2 „ . BLUE 1 started "^.n, at 1000 t. 1300 ft r»M and .rter a^burst^of^200^to^.OO^^ round., BLUE 1 .« ;Se r;?S'e? at =u=h an anjl. that BLUE 1 felt up for manual gace. ™' I", ^ c- \ 'r«it that had the MIO heen turning S!:x.rt!;^%"r'o;.'"i«5 : c rn^r'hrvr^en'jc^ai^i;}! 'isi JS.... .u app..r.d t, ». haraer, tne proper xeau n^v,^. or i-? ka-71 strike camera. In the left wing root as recorded by BLL.C. 2 s (vA-^i sifim c«B«jro. ornc 1 «* !«;•» to 20° anzle-off ani down to 800 ft range. A.- "he MIO begin to BLOE I fired at 15 to „^"|^'' * t^chtened his turn to the left and entered AS the MIG started to out turn BLUE 1 and 2, BLUE 1 Started a high yo-yo to the outside to position for another firing pass. At thi, ti.e. BLUE 2 -"^^J-tSoiriooS-n' .' ^e iTttl 'frrS^ "*BL5ri and I ;;nra?;d v-ii^i =?j„rL:fef.?^.i .^^^i.-. t^i; ;j«.rj??!rhanh:'r.nJi-ru„. ?2?ti ;ji:j.nrierarp5?oSj/5sr;?.?°^s»t;=-..i"?hi tss^^rihia ti™. 'on emaa a .Inale MI(3-17 (MIO-7) nad. >. short head-on ineffectual firing paaa, and contlnl.5 to the north as BLUE night continued sou-.h-eat. BLOE 1. ».th BLUE 2 on the |';°;:'l[ot"*?.o''MSr«« HIO 7. BLUE 1 and 2 ""f ^^^JnJk^^f SrOa "ir. abJut 10o6 to 1500 ft rang, at 5 o'=lo«J '5?^'?" ""h^rJuSd. p«i c^e? tSe canopy and the muzzle flaahe. on u,d ..r. "--'Jf- igj"^- biXt 1 iSd" wnt to afterburner and negative g and de.c.nded to 3SS SrtoS'frah™ ih.^uid. Ti. ?llsht rapldl, ouUl.tan.ed the «IC. and ,afel, ™!".ngagement. were .11 •"«.»°J,J;,'rtC 'eSagS'nn/IEur'rtighfiS lltll 163OH and 153SH. 1. Phc Eventni-163 Aircraft rrivolVetlT" Four F-105D3 va one HIO-17 Result: One MIG-17 destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: 21»01»M/105°25'E PRIHART HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlrc: Tb April 19,67/l636H your '?-:00Lo (BLUE FUHht) were nart of a strike force attacking JCS l8.38f the Dan nn: Highway Causeway, 1? tU'-s west of Hanoi. BLUE ?li»;ht was the flak suppression fUpht and le-J. iii-: strike ftjrce to the tartr/zt. The other aircraft In the strike force which encounte-vt MIGs ionc flight did not) are those of Events II1-161 and -162, The IT.O'.l HAND su^.p'.»rt aircraft ([or this strike were those described In Event III-16r ->ake thi attack. BLUE /light did not Jet- ttaon stores, but went to afterburner to close on the r^IG . BLUE 1 closed slightly on the MIO and fired his i_DEWi:iDEH when in range. Although BLUE l had a tone for to 5 SAConds orlor to launch, the missile failed to guide, and went high and to the left. V/hen he fired, ELL^ was 1 1/2 miles* from the HIG at about 30*. anele off at the MIG's o'clock. Both BLUE 1 and the MIG were in a right turn with BLUE 1 pulling 1 1/2 g with about 10» of bank in a slight descent. BLUE 1 had about 200 kt of overtake at launch, and both aircraft were In the 6000 to 8000 ft altitude region. As the SIDEWINDER took off, BLUE 1 momentarily broke off his attack and rolled out to follow its flight. In order to assuro tha; It was not going to guide on the F-105F that the Min had been attacking. The P-105P at this tine was about ttOOO ft or more ahead of the MIO and appeared to have the MIO In sight. The P-105P was unloading and keeping the HIG at an angle off. The MIC tightened his turn slightly and slid across in front of BLUE 2. BLUE 2 went to afterburner and made a firing oass but was not In good tracking position. During this aasa BLUE 2 flr«*d 277 rounds from 1500 to 1000 ft range but observed no hits. BLUE 2 then closed further and with a good tralllns: position attempted to fire again but the gun Jammed. BLUE 2's gun car.era flln showed the ?-:iG to be In good position for the second attcmot and the plocer to be on the HIG. The sight was set for miss lles-alr, and BLUE 2 had not attempted to attain a radar lock. During the firing passes BLUE 2 pulled 2 to 3 g'sand was at about 550 kt airspeed. The overtake was between 50 and 100 kts. Du'-Ine the attack of BLUE 1 and 2, BLUE 2 had maintained position on the Inside of the rleht turn and the element (3LUE 3 and U) had automatically moved into a coverlnR nosnion. After his gun ^amned, BLUE 2 tried for a little bit longer to make the gun fire, then cane out of his right bank and moved outside to 3LUE I's left wing. Aa soon as BLUE 2 broke off, BLUE 1 came back in and closed on the MIG. 1^ *^hls e3tiT.ate is based en StUE 2«s «*000 to 5000 ft estlnate and the 1 1/2 mile firing range. ^BLUE ? estimated 1/2 mile. 1B3 Event 111-163 The Mia steepened this turn to about of bank and BLUE I closed to 1500 ft and nred^i* 'Sm^ cSnSS, BLlfE I eipended approximately 700 round, a. he cloaed from 1500 to 700 ft range, with about IC angle off. The MIO took hits in ihe left wing and erupted In a Jarge JjU of " aided the MIO chen began a slov diving right spiral with the left wing on fire. BLUE I's ttun camera did not work and he did not =ee the MIG impact the B'0"nj BLUE I iSd 3 oh«ri:rSe Impact and ail members of BLUE Flight observed the resulting «xploaion at location 21«orN/l05''25'E at l63oH. BLUE Plight took another look around for any other HIO aircraft, and not seeing any then continued to egress. EventIII.i6<> Aircraft Tr.volved: Pour P-105s V8 one MlO-17 Result : Mo danase Vicinity of Kncounter; 21-02'N/105'*30'E 1. PRtNARV RISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOK Date/Tloe: 28 April 1967/1636H Pour P-1059 (BLUE Plight) were on an IRON HAMD mission In support of the strike fore* atcactclnit JCS 16.38. 2. MISSION Roure Departed TaJchU and In^ressed overland. Se* Event HI-I58 for general route after leaving Channel 97. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS At least three of the aircraft in BLUE Plight were P-105F8, and carried AGM-ftSa. Other stores unknown. 8. ORDNANCE (No. flred/Ko. hits) 20mm Cannon BLUE 1 at least 1/0 BLUE 2 I/O 11. DATA SOURCES Hesaages. Reports : DIA Summary of Air Engagenents 355 TFW 281300 0PPS:P-3 2070-tJ ll'«39 RED BARON MIG Incident Sunnary 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLU2 Plight provided IHON HAND suDoort. Durln?. the mission ten MIG-lTs were sighted. In addition BLUE 1 and 2 engaged and fired on one MIC-17. One AGM-U5 was launched at a PANSOHG signal with unknown results. Event III-t65 nrcraft Involved: "Jj^y^ '„iG.l7r Result: »c damage .a/io5-22*E '.umlty of Encounter. 20 « tM tarc«t« carried a 9 9 I Mi^mther : Generally Clear. vUlbillty IG i8ll« State: 3: 5000 ft Unknown Unknown Unkr..-n»n 3 1 I' ^ ttTTiE 1 saw three more 5. I«TUL "^"CTIOH ; 3 - J JS?' HIO-175 at a [ ^ 3, and U broke down 6. KTIOH INniAT,£0 ^e had »^n. BLUE 2. 3, BLUE 1 »tart.^d to attack the two ^ to the left. I 7. Sni>»^TIOK OEVEUOP^HT , g,,,i„g °"„?tirdeftectlon. The lead BLUE Flight .Attacked the t« «IGs wi^ second KIG «it^^ Joii"m%or an attack. BLUS on a head-on pa»J and another^b HIGs then started MIC fl«*^»\^StirDurnSr and exlf.<» the area. Plight f^r.t to a! -erou* I a. ORDNANCE CMo. flred/«o. hits) GUH BLOE 1 ICG 1 9 EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS bLuE 1 - HO 5li^t reticle 10. AIRCREW CaMMENTS c*^«trience Total I/O BLUE 1 Hburg. 3900 P-105 Hourj 900 Combat y.l salons U8 SSS .inc. M" C0S2£n£i-2IL-^^ , th^a event .es to -^'liV^rr^^tSf from'Sni' " aide and a single from tn ^^^^^ expccte... -The aica f-rr.ed nuch more rap-ai> 186 [i Event 111-I65 11. OATA SOURCES Project Intgrvlewa ; BLUE I, 6 JtiM 1967 Messages. ri»?portg ; 388 TPV 281405 April 1967 OPREP-4 001 1367 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Pllf^hc was on an IRON HAND mission. They had Cirei once and observed the Impact or one missile and ths. Bitent III-169 Aircraft Involved: One RP-101 vs one MIG-21 Results: Sighting ^ Vicinity of Encounter: 2I'OO*N/lO5"0O*£ I. PRINARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIpN Date/Time: 29 April 1967, lllOH II. DATA SOURCE CIMCPACPIT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Photo A/C covering Hoa Lac airfield fired on by SA-2 when at 15,000*; MIO sighted at k o'clock, 6 miles at same time; MIG cllniblng; no further sighting. 1 1^ I Aircraft Involved: ev«ntIII-170 Pour P-1059 va Cmo KtG>21» and two HI 0*179 1. 12. tIct Results: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: Hanoi ICAL SITUATION 1967, 1615H PRIHAfiT MISSION AND Date/Tine: 29 April DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Starr Study 6-68. RARRATtVC OCSCRIPTIOI Plak auppreaslon night ror strike gn bridge In Hanoi saw two HIO-lTs at 8000* and two MIQ-21s at 17.000' while inbound. ffIG CAP waa aircraft of SvenelII-173' Event III-171 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105a vs one KZQ«178 Results: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: Hanoi 1. PRINART HISS ION AttO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 29 April DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Starr St\idy 6-68. U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike flight atten^ted turn, but 1967, 1615H I I i i 3 3 i n Hanoi bridge saw MIG-3 minutes before target at 8500'; KIG waa lost, MIC CAP was aircraft of Event III-173. 1. FMHARY MISSION AND Event III-172 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs one KIG* 17 Reaulta: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: Hanoi FACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 29 Apri; I967, 1615H n. d;va SOURCE C3NCPACPLT Starr study 6-68. 11. NARRATIVE OESCRtPUON 1 9 I i I Another strike flight on saine target as aircraTt Jn Events 111-170, -171, -172 and -175 saw MIO whlUe pulling ofr; no attempt to engage since ftIO CAP eeen nearby. 190 3 i: r c r i. Event IIZ-173 Aircraft Involved: Pacr P-ftCs va thirteen HIG-I7s Result: One MIG-l? destroyed Vicinity of Encounter; 20«»»9'»/l05*3^'E 1. PRIHfcRY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/TL-ne: 29 April i967/l6l2H to lo?bii Pour F-«»C5 {SLUE Plight) were on a MIGCAP nl;,slon for » strike on JCS 13.00. (There la no report of the F-105 f^rc- encounter Im", KlOa.) 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE Plight left Danana: and refueled on WHITE ANCHOR. From alr-to-alr refueling, tie flight proceeded direct to Channel 97 » and then direct to 20'*55*H/i05''37 'E. The return route was to Channel 97 and past strike refuel on WHITE ANCHOR. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS BLUE I. 2. 3. H U AIM-7E 4 AIM-9a 1 600-gal. centerllne tank 1 370-gal. outboard tank 1 QRC-160 pod mG~17 (1-13) Not MIG-17D 12 were silver I was camouflaged nottied brown/green with no narklnga. Some arred with alr-to-alr rr.lsslles 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Scattered clouds with bases at 10,000 ft. BLrtE 1 2 3 i* Visibility was 10 milea. Altitude ; HeaflingT Speed : Puel State : Plight Formation ; 5. INITIAL DETECTION 12,000-1'4 ,000 ft About 160° (In right turn) 5tlO KTAS Full Internal Pod MOTEL had called HIGs In the Incident area but therp were nc specific warnings for the MIGs engaged. BLUE Flight was at 20° 1^9 '.V105°3^ 'E when QLUE U s^hted four HIG-17s. The strike force also callecl the MIGs to BLUE Flight. The MIGs were at 20*52*30 N' 105*32'30"E heading 290° at 3,000 to 5,000 ft AGL. When seen, the MIGs were at 9 o'clock to BLUE Plight. The baekseater was the first to see the "ilfis in SLUE 3. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight turned to attack the Miaa. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT The flight of four MIGs split, with BLUE 1 and 2 going after the lead element, and BLUE 3 and spearated and engaged the trailing eleT.ent. BLUE 1 and 2 attacked the HICs and BLUE 1 fired an AIM.-9B which downed a MIG-17. BLUE 1 and 2 were subsequently attacked by numerous KlG-lTs which fired both cannon and alr-to-alr missiles. During the engagement BLUE 2 was hit and destroyed by 37/5 « AAA fire. BLUE 3 and 1 engaged several MI0-17s two elercents of which fired on BLUE 3 and « with no damage. 3. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 MIG 5 MIC 6 (Ko. flred/Ho. hits) ATM-9 B A AM Cannon 1/1 2/0 2/0 Remarks AIM-9B recorded a kill Two bursts of three seconds each Launched at DLL'E 2 191 4» (No. rir«d/No. hits) AIH-9B AAN Cannon NIG 9 NZO 11 9. CQUIPHENT PROBLEMS None. 10. AIRCREU CONNENTS Experience ; Event 1-173 Rewarka At least 1/0 fired at BL'JE 3 and K At least 1/0 fired at BLUK 3 and 4 Total Hours blOO Hours 350 Combat Missions 60-70 BLUE 3 (front) Ceaaents on this Er.countlgr ; MICs were very agrejaalve and would not fight tn the vertical. The HICs wcjld not follow the P-Ua In a climb and stayed near the deck. As the F-tts attacked, a pair cf MIGs would be vectored iinto the fllg.ht's 6 o'clock. The MIGs kept then o the defensive. A gun would have bJen of value to attack the MIG that reversed Into then (HIG-13)* but this was the only cKanee to use a gun that he had. The ability to cllrib and unload and accelerate worked well against the KIO-17. Every tine he looked back there were two MIG-lTs at 7 o'clock. 11. DATA SOURCES Project J ntervtews Messages ; BLUE 3 (front). Hay 1967 366T7W 29171^ April I967 OPREP-3 FASTEL 916 366TFW 3009302 April 1967 OPREP-3 FASTEL 933 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTjlON BLUE Plight was Inbound with the strike farce when at 161?H, while at 20«53'30"M/ 1050 m'E, BLUE ''i slshcejd a SA.^ lift off fron the vicinity of load 15 f'/^I-Cfl3) at the flight's 3 o'clock position. T?^e night was heading 07 ie?r?os at 17,000 ft AGL at 480 KTAS In Pod • foraatlbn. This SAM did not track and passed low and to the 6 o'clock position about 300C ft [awayi and was not observed to detonace. The force continued on the sane heading to 20*58 •K/105* 31 'E when at I6IIH, the entire flight observed jthree SAMs lift off. One was from Lead -^1 (V!;-002) and two others at 10 o'clock were from VN-015. When Che SAMs were launched BLUE Flight started a slightly descending right turn to put the SAMs off to the left, however, the SAMs were not observed in flight. |- In the rlyht turn! as the flight passed through a heading of l6c degrees at It, 000 ft AOL and S^JO kts, BLUE 4 sighted and called a flight of four MIC-lTs. BLUE 3 backseat sighted the MIGs alr.ost simultaneously. BLUE Flight had Jettisoned the centerline tank before entering the area, and at the call Jettisoned the outboard tank. BLUE Flight was at 20*'<9'N/105''3t'E atlthls time. The MIGs which were Just called by the strike f«rce, were headed 290 degrees, at 300 to 500 ft ACL, and at 20°5r ' 3C"ri/105'32*30"E. They were at 9 o'clock to BLUE fiighc. The MIGs appeared to be positioning themselves on the last strike flight. BLUE Flight continued their right turn and started to descend. BLUE 3 lost sight of the MIGslnicmentarlly and during this time the MIG flight split into two elements with the trailing element about 2 miles to the left and one lalle behind on a parallel course. BLUE Flight continued to turn to the right and as they turned through west BLUE 3 saw BLUE 11 and 2 start after the lead element of MICs (HIO 1 and 2), which were «t 3 o'clock. Shortly! thereafter BLUE 3 saw the second element of MIGs (KIG 3 and 4) off to their 10 o'clock abbut 5 miles, heading in the sane direction as BLUE Flight. At I6I6H the elements of BLUE Flight split with BLUE 1 and 2 continuing a right hand turn after NIG 1 and 2» while BLUE 3 and U about one mile on trail turned left to engage MIG 3 and Since trie actions of the elements occurred Independently of each other, the actions of BLUE 1 and 2 will be described first followed by those of BLUE 3 and BLUE 1 and 2 pressed in on MIG 1 and 2. BLUE 1 was unable to hold lock-on for an AIM-7 firing due to ground clutter. BLUE 1 then closed to 300J-28CO ft range, and zero angle off, and 50 kt closure fired a SIDEWiriDER at MIG 2. The time position was ai^Ol ' rJ/iOS" 19 ' ?: . 3LUE 1 had 1 g on the aircraft at firing ACL, and 5«;0 KTAS. TJp.e missile guided nicely and closed to wl:hin about MIG 2 broke hard right (estimated 5-6 g*s) following MIG 1. The missile ever the left wing anijl detonated about 100 ft forward of the MIG's nose, as a kill due In partfto the sighting of wreckage by BLUE U . iTjnpdtatoly after the missile detonation, BLUE 1 saw HIO L contlnuf to bres.'< right. BLUE 1 and 2 unloadedl and pulled up, loslnic sight of MIG 1 and 2. BLUE 1 and 2 levelec off at about 13,000 ft in' the vicinity of 21«'0U'30"N/105'*26*E; at this tlr.e (iGlEH) BLUE I 192 with was 1617H and the and was at 6OOO ft 100 ft, when passed about 50 ft This was credited 11 3 a a 3 3 (3 a 1 0 a Event III-173 observed two MIG-17 (MIC 5 and 6) closing on their 6 o'clock dosI'-Igh from 3000 ft range. At the sane tine 3LL'E 1 also saw two more KlG-lTs («XG 7 and 9) at his 1:30 o'clock P'>sltlon, BLUE 1 and 2 attempr.ed to accelerate, unload and continue theJr turn to egress from the highly coordinated and massing MIG force. At this tlsie with KIC 7 and 8 In front and MIO 5 and 6 behind BLUE I observed a SAM detonation at co-altltuie (13,000 ft ACL) at o o'clock about 250 ft range. The burst was white In color, and a sharp buffet of short duration was fen as a direct result of the blast. At this tine ?'.l*E I observed MIC 5 (the lead MIG) at 6 o'clock fire about two bursts of 3 seconds duratlsn each fpon his canncn. 7hese rounds passed about 15 ft above ana left of BLUE I's cancpy. Still unloading and accelerating BLUE 1 and 2 winged over from 13,000 ft ACL down to 6000 ft. BLUE 2 was In position on the Inalde of the turn, still attempting to disengage from the MIGs. As DLUE I and 2 bcttcntrd out, with BLUE I at 6000 ft and BLUE 2 at about USOO ft, BLUE 1 backseat cftse.-ved a heavy concentration of ground fire. BLUE Plight was at 20'*5tt 'N/IOS" 32 'E, and the AAA fire, presumably 37/57irjn, cane from 20''52' 15"N/105'' 32 ' 30"F, and alnost enveloped SLUE 2. BLUE 2 rolled over to tr.e right about 135 degrees of bank, 45 degrees nose -Icwr. , and dove towjird the ground. The time was i622H. Just prior to Impact BLUE i frcntseat observed the white part of a chute. BLUE 2 was observed to Impact at 20*54 • 30"f!/l05*3'»" lO-E. At no tlise was any beeper signal or voice conwiunlcatlon h«ard. As BLUE 2 rolled over, engulfed in heavy ground fire, BLUE 1 front observed two alr- to-elr missiles launched from the second of the two MIC-173 on the talis of BLUE 1 and 2 (MIO 6). He saw these alsslles drop, one fran each aide from the wings of MIC 6 and launch toward the spot where BLUE 2 had been. The mlssllea, unidentified as to type, went off Into space and were not observed to detonate. At l62ftH BLUE 1 accelerated to 550 KTAS at 6000 ft AGL, and reversed hla course '-o heading of 250 degrees and Joined BLUE 3 and U. BLUE 1 was unable to contact ETHAN to Initiate a SAR effort. BLUE 3 and » had followed BLUE I and 2 during their initial right descending turn after MIGs 1 and 2. Vhlle r.eadlng afc.ut 290 degrees descending through UOOO ft AGL at 550 KTAS, and following sLLE 1 and 2 by about a nlle, BLUE 3 and t^ spotted KIG 3 and «i at 10 o'clock low atiout 5 nlles distant. MIG 3 and -* were abei.m and slightly south of BLUE 1 and 2, who appeared tc be unaware of the presence of MIO 3 and k. eLUE 3 and t turned slightly left to engage MIG 3 and H. As BLUE 3 and k cane in MIC 3 and saw then and started up to the right. BLUE 3 and h overshot due to their high speed and so they pulled up. The MIGs out-turnfd BLUE 3 and '-i so BLUE 3 and H kept climbing. As they continued twg more MIC-lTs (MIG 9 and 10) closed on their 6 o'clock firing. The MIGs were In range and BLUE U saw the shells pass his aircraft. Prom that time on BLUE 3 and ^ were on the defensive. Although BLUE 3 and ti used the vertical, the MIGs would follow only a little way up and then would bi-eik off. As BLUE 3 and k would attenpt to dive to reattack, two -uore MIC-178 would attack. This happened at least one more time (MIG 11 and 12) with these MIGs also firing at BLUE li . During one of the passes that BLUE 3 and 4 made, they were coming down in a t^ght turn accelerating from UOO kts. There were two MIGs at their 6 o'clock and another MIC-17 (HIC 13) ca.T.e into view and crossed Into the inside of BLUE 3 an- 4's turn. MIO 13 then did a rudder reversal back into BLUE 3 aiid *». ending up in a head-on pass, and passed BLUE 3 about 100 ft away. » ao, BLUE 1 subsequently Joined BLUE 3 and 4, who were In a left turn. BLUE 3 and H had MIGs on their tall at this time, who broke off when BLUE 1 approached. BLUE 1 did not obaerve these MIGs. ^^"^ 3 " egresaing BLUE * saw an aircraft burning on the ground at L.i",^" vicinity of 20«55*H/:05"l8'E, which was later surmized to be the MIG 17 that BLUE 1 had downed with the missile. During their engagement with the MIGs, BLUE 3 and M's altitude varied from 200 ft AGL to 6000 ft; while their speed varied between 400 kts and Hach 1.1, Tho MIGs rntver climbed above 3000 ft. Of the returning members of BLUE Flight four crew members validated nln*» MIG-17 3 and two crew members validated an additional four MIG- 17s. One crew mensber validates the camouflaged MIC* 17. Aircraft Involved: Event III-lTft Two P-1053 V3 two HIClTs Two P-lO!is vs one NIG-31 1. PRINARY NtSSION AND Oaee/Tlae: 29 April 196T/1700H Ing Pour P-lOSs (cLUE JCS 20.00 (location Result: One P-1'15 lost/one P-IOS uoma^ed Vicinity of Encounter: 21'30'H/iOit*30'S to 2l»12*H/10H»l8'E TACTICAL SITUATION lix^it) were the flak suppression flight in the strlSt^ force attack- 21«03'N/105*'53*E). A description of the other M 10 en-ioantcrs of this strike force are contained In Events 111-165 and -166. *fter hitting the tar^^et. BLUE 1 and 2 were separated froni and behind BLUE 3 and U, Only SLUE 3 and 4 ^encountered the HIG-2i. BLUE 1 and 2 separately encountered two fiic-l7s. ?here was no CAP aircraft for this Blsslon. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE Plight departed Korat at 1505H, and had pre-strlke refueling on RED ANCHOR. Prom Channel 97 BLUE Plight then proceeded direct to the target on a heading of 010* at 16,000 ft. On egress '.fte flight proceeded to 2l'*k^'H/10U'>U6'Z, and then back to C.'iannel 97. BLUE d landed in Udom jaue to low fuel. 3. AIRCRAFT CORFIGURATlION P-1C5D : BLUE 1. 2 3-IcBU-21 l-;CBU-29 (I^rob 2-460 gal tanks and pods . ] Bl probably carried 1 AZM-9B BLUE 3 i*-C3U-2«t l-qRC-160 pods 1-AIM-9B BLUE 3 1- CBU-Zd 2- «RC-l60 pods 2- 4 SO s»X tanks HIC-21 Clean silver 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Scattered to broken clouds 10,000 to 12,000 ft Haze at lower ?ltltudes- TTslblllty was good (about 15 miles) above clouds. The weather was generally clear over the target ai^d bail out area, and broken In the incident area. BL. T 9.000 ft 34b» BLtJE 1 IT 18,000 ft 220" 450^500 CAS 9*000 lb separated from BLUE 3 and 4 with BLUE 1 and 2 about 10 miles behind. Alti tu d e: Headln*; : Speed : Fuel State : Plight Formation BLUE 1 and 2 BLUE H was on BLUE 3's' right. 5. INITIAL DETECTION j BLUE 1 and 3 headli j 3*'0* and at 9000 ft, saw two MlG-17s at 5000 ft heading l4o* and turning right. This dightliig occurred previous to that of BLUE 3 and 4. BLUE 3 and 4 in tlbe vicinity of 2X''30'N/104«30 'E saw an u.nldentlfied silver aircraft at 7 o'clock position 16 to 8 miles away. BLUE 3 and 4 were heading 220" at 18,000 ft. The unidentified aircraft was on a conversion course; BLUE 3 and 4 were alert for HIGs since they had heard ^LUE 1 and 2 call MIGa. 6. ACTION INITtATCO BLUE 1 and 2 turned to follow the HIG-17S that they had seen. BLUE 3 and 4 turned into the unidentified aircraft. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 1 and 2 lost the MIC-17s In a low deck of cloud.t over Thud Rldf;e, hase, and low setting sun. BLUE l and 2 then broke off and continued te egress. During erress they heard BLUE 3 and « encounter the MIG-21. BLUE 3 and ^ were able to force the KIG-21 Initially to tw-rshoot but the f'lG then executed a barrel rcil, xrd despite the -Ttorts of BLUE 3 and '-i to uiuocd, aai to cum and accelerate away in afterburner, the MIG gained a firing position. The i-;iG-21 shot down BLUE 3 and da.'aaged BLUE 4 before breaking off. [ ^ Even* III-17U a. OROKANCC ' (No. flred/No. hits) P robaM <' C.-if.ron *^ ^•''•'■•^ ^^2' BLUE 3 lost and I LUE H danag-d 9. EQUIPMENT PR08LEHS Ir.oporatlvi!* '° P^^P«^riy tver the target. BLUE 3 QRC-;50 pod was 10. AIRCREW COK.MEHTS Expepienee Total p. If.*; Cf.:r.l-.r SLUE /I 1000 150 50 CoTTicnta on t.v^tr Encounter preci:S:d"32cSii=r.revKl1;.. '^^'^ had . good overtake, which 11 . DATA SOURCES Protect Ir.tervi*.... 3HJE t, 9 June 6/ Messages, frescrt .t : 388 TFW ?a:3i^: O?.-!?-;, DCF 1360 Air Staff LSA.- XCX3 'S7-.-.{;7 Cc-cat Uss F-105D SK 53-1151 12. HARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOfj BLUE ?U.-},t was cn a '"'-k -.i-.. diz-ectly to tne -^ar^e. f ro~ 'c:^nn"l' 07 "r-l^fr" ^^"fu"'"'''' "^"^^ -'"''^O- "^^e ^^isf^' proceeded target. A. freJGu; thrrSfe^e^n^f of'""''J?Lr?';. = '^*= ^^^--^-^ 3ldes of t.e mllL-s when they ca.T^e off t-" 'a—eT Thl rwr^r^^*"" -eparated la'.eraily several '•''^i'''^ :n K:-cVi6:cbb ft v.-?' n attacked t:.e target frcn r. headlnir of AGL (about ?50D ft r-'-TL) ancJ recover-/ w-"4.in l^f' i?* release aitltade was 80nc ft' BLUE Plleht dropped on a ^o^Sinrcf's d?i;i'«i^J''6BU ^J'^'^'^ '"^"^^ and and were later Jettisoned. ^ failed tc release over the target ^- flight then turr.-d to a headi'>c- tldo „ ^ , 2 turned to foUaw and started to ac^a^k -h^'vr'r: \ . , ^^'^ ^'^ ^ ^^^--^ BLUE 1 an'd l l "'■''S - ^•■'^ on -.ne plT.ned cour^r 2^1,^5"^?^ arprcxlr.ately 6c .-ll.s ahead and 2 heard ELUE 1 call aLL;: ftfa?"?!:., ?~ eJ,?J2"!= I'J". (-'t abcut 1704H) BLUE i that he hit. ahd heard ELU£-r;epiJrcn„"t!ac/by" ^im^^l'^'" ''^"^ 3 f ; a, 0.?.'"Ldlaf a'd"lT.rr:r'?.?'.' cL™':i',1"'S?„ri^|-' "l-'" -^ich „aa ,ive„ L: the dowr.ed alrc-^rt cu-n'r- rn- r"2 ■ =r ^ ^ observed what was assuned to be '''T^ri::..:": r^^":"^"^^ ^^^^^^^^ f.' back tc'Iards^ChSniel $r\V^dI ■'poJI'*^!! "^f"'^ '^"^ o-'' "-'^d Rldce and started k They had >-.eard ^he -^n^ou-;, c^B'-J- / .'n. : altitude with a ^peed of 'i'^O-'^oS K^AS received no oth-ir ;;arr:?rr v-.^^ 7"'-- - "T;. for :^IGs. How^ve^. they tanecusiy observer Jn^iSlder-V'U .u'.^a'^'r^r^' ?J^30;ri/loi;=30- BLUE 3 and J^iJSul- ' ■ I -2nd >.ere in a clearln^ -Jd ^^r^r'M^'''", ".^ " '^lo"'^^ O" stratus type ciauda with to,.= at 20 COO 'r hottn^' w ^ ^^^^^ some mountain top. It ... ..ok., to ove?^S=?. ".?^??JS?Iur. "^Sfcl^ar l^^^^^ . -'^-^-^^ Sl^r^-^n^nco Lype as unknown. <:a.n.non is ir.dicH-:.d based on BLUE 195 Event III-lTt When seen, the alrcrJft -as at 7 o'clock, coaltltao- 2-3» nU" '^^ aircraft «aa on • conversion course ind had considerable overt-ike BLUE 3 and U started e loft level turn Into the an: lentl fled aircraft. JLU^J J«tt. bOned tanks and followed Mediately by BLUE 3. As t.ne *l«-'=-''art closed It -as «^CRn as a rignter-type and then a MIC-21. 7ne MIC turned wl'h nhe flUht -hlch. on recognizing the aircraft as a 'MO, 3I.UE 3 ani " unloaded to accelerite. BLUE ft was m afterbLrner -na since It «as on '.ne rlirnt started to cross ^^er behind BLUE 3 m onler ♦:c stay it.slde of the turn, Aa BLLE cro3S-*d ovei , he feU a took a hJt. (One hcle in[ speed orake petals and one cn the afterburner can.) BLUE u did not observe the MIG flrlnl.?. The MIG appeared to o/ersh Dot . with e crossing ir.gle of 30« to |«0-. The JIC ca^ hlKh (about UOOO ft abovJ the flUht) and overshot to the rir.ht. BLUE U looked to the rlKht and momentarily observed the Mn high, as If he had >xecuted a barrel roll. tfhen ne»t seen the rllG was able to reposition o^i.lnd I:LUE 3 and i« tt about 1 distancJ BLUE 3 Snd% were ftlU In an afterb.-mer iescenaln? turn. Attempting to lose rhi S?? BLUE ft ther sawTthe underside of the 3 and assMsed that the HIO was flrlr* at SS:.'!' irieSaJelS Jh^UnJr Su-E i called that he «a3 hit. (This was the only .ornunlca- tlon from BL'JE 3-) ..... ^ , descending through lO.OOO ft. BLUE 3 1'™*'*!^^^-' ^dv-fm; fire and ssioke In BLUE 3's aft section, and xt?- "^-^'ir?^- r,^-. -craft BLUE 3's aircraft started to descend and erupted In fire ■■approitlP.ately 1 silnute after initial aircraft danage. JuE ft was doing wide "S" turns In an attespt to keep both } dLUE H saw the MIG a few times during this period out the «!□ aia aLL'E ft did not observe any firing. BLUE 3 ejected at icoo ft AOL at ITOftH on z headl.v of 2ft0», at "PPfo;!"*"^^ ^1° 13' H/ lOft-lS-E? BLul ft sa- -.fo black objects separate from 3L-JE 3's aircraft and the aircraft impact. BLUE ft did a j5o» turn but was unacle to see a chute or hear a teeper. After snaylng in 'he Ir.-aedlate area for 1 t. 2 nlr.utes. SLUE « -|?,;^:"f J^^f 5*^'"' the iScItlon of the MI^ ana was unsure of nls « ^I'^ll due Jo l^^ fuel. K.trinir r»i to s e A 'Rutc or hcar a beeper. SLbs, ■» lecoveres at uaarn, aue 5; is SU!e \l r;?u^; SSe trir-sufriclent thrust, resulting In unstable airspeed. Tha cause was battle daaagej. During the e:.cou.-.tLr BLLT ft did not see the MIG fire, and observed the «1G to be clean of external stores. ^ ^ . " Although a SAR waJ initiated, it was called off at lBl8H and BLUE 3 -as listed .« Blaalns* JThen hit, BLUE 3 down, and BLUE ft coul'l ELL'S 3 to abandon the c> from the right wing ba During this tine and the MIG In sight not press the attack, TtJIToPREP-S £61205 Uves o-'a miles, but tMs appears to b.' long considering the weather description and ens :ing action. * Kvur.l iII-175 Aircraft Involved; Pour P-105s v:; one KIC-17 Results: .'lo d:ama«;e Vicinity of Encounter: ZO'SS'lViO'^^oe'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 29 April 1967, l6l5H II. ' DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTION Plight egresslng froa same as Event III-172 saw MIG at U o'clock low, went Into afterburner. Jinked, and lost MIQ. Evr>nt III-176 Aircraft Invclvt.1: One RF-tC MIG Result: .Radar contact Vicinity of E.ncounter: 20®'t7'H/10'»°55'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time': 30 April 1967/C226H Bance"misslJS."^^"" "^'^ Ingresslng to Hoa Lac airfield or. a reconnals- II. -OATA SOURCES 1*32 TRW 290011Z OPREP-3 TUOC 03020 12. NARRATIVE on a heading or 067 degrees at 500 feet AGL when he M§SiMi?i^hO-c^^^''°!;-^w^ "^"^ ctrosinp; fron 10:30 o'clock. SLCE flight was at f! nlwi^S ^r-w*"** target run was aborted at 20056 ';j/lC50l6'E ?«2? in valleys and MIG alerts being called for Q?-U and On egress, at 21°00»N/10'i°JJ8'E. on a heading of 2^^0-21*5 degrees, and 500 f^ev ACr x-b«nd strobing was again received varylnt; in intensity from 1 to 2 1/2 rinrs and moving from 5 to 7 o'clock position during Jlnklrig turns. The tir.e was O233H. in^oJ^^'^^'S^MS^rw":^""*'^ a point about 20 nlles south of channel 97 (20°20';i/ JS^fJ iii^^'' tracked through a scries of hard jinklnr turns and charE«^ in^fi'i^"'^*/"'" 2°*°°° "2^- 3LUE 1 was at 1.0 Moch throu^hcurand''?h^ audio tone (sweep) was steadily becoming more r-ipid. tnrou^ncL. atu cne Break In the intercept was abrupt with ternlnation of radar signals at 02i4^H tic visual contact was made with the other aircraft. MIG alerts were received throu^hou" J!;%he"2eTat%h;j°??^e!' ''^ ' "° '^''•"'^^^ kr.own'to be 4> I. PRIV Da*. II. 0*: 12. KA- Event III-177 Aircraft Involved: ?ocr K-lOJis vs four MIC- 175 Reoults: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: 2l«*28»M/106»23'E TACTICAL SITUATION : 1967. 0903H -fly 6-68. ;aht saw at least four sliver wiGs at 10-12,000* above ■'d Involved with other flights. I. PRir: Car-. II. OAT 12. NA^ Event III-178 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-I05a v« two HIG-? Results: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: 21«29'N/106»27'S :actical situation . 1967. 0900H -jdy 6-68. :Dfi .rs for target of Event III-17T saw two HIGs trailing an P-105 '.sly that of Event III-179. 198 V 1^ i: c [ c c c r I.. L C 1. Event III-179 Aircraft Involved: Three F-^tCs vs two MIG-^JVs and two Mia-2l3 ttt 0902H; two HI0-21s and two HlG'lJz ot 090 3H; four NIG>175 at 090Sil. Also see Event III-137. Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: - Route Package VI-A a. 21'28'30"N/106'»^l'On"E at 0902H b. c. 21«2a'N/106'»5'»'E at 0905H PRIKARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SlTUATIOfl Date/Time: 30 April 1967/0905H BLUE 4 aborted due to radio problems after Z5 minutes of flight leavln? three P-4Cs to fly MIGCAP for strike force of P-105s attacking target at 21«»26'N/106°20'E. 2. MISSION ROUTE Danan? AB direct TAM ANCHOR direct 21''0?*M.'107"38'E, direct 21*'33'N/106*2U 'E direct 21'»29*N/106»17'E direct cover over target direct 21«10 •N/107'»15'E direct 21«O8'N/107°38*E direct TAN ANCHOR direct Danang AB. 3. AIRCRAFT CnNFIGUR/TtONS P-^tC BLUE 1. 2. 3 4 - AIM-7E ft - AIM-9B SPARROW SIDEWINDER a. MIC-17 HIG 1. 2 b. All MIGs sliver color - no marklnfcs observed Cannon Mia«2I HIG 1. 2 Silver color - no nnrklngs Alr-to-alr missile e. 'MIG-17 HIO 1. 2 Silver color Cannon 4. FLIGHT CnNOITlOfS PRlOk TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Clear. Haze layer at 12,000 ft. Visibility below haze 7 miles. a. Conditions at 0902H BLUE I 2 J Visibility above haze 15 plus miles. rjic 1 Altitude : Heading :' Speed ; night Formation; 10»000 ft 280» 500 kts 'QRC fighting formation" below 10,000 ft b. Conditions at CI903H BLUE Heading : Plight Formation ; Conditions at 0905H BLUE Altitude : He'adlngT Speed : T 6000 ft 090° 460 kts MIG- 21 I f 200* Loose trail, MIO-lTs in front followed by NIG-21S. MIC-21S left niC>17s during BLUE*.^ turn and not sighted again. MIG-21 I ? (less than 460 kts} INITIAL DETECTION At 0902H ?-is trailing high and to rear of last F-105 TUvht lr>eund to tftrc.et sighted two MIG-173 at 2 o'clock, low posiwion, heading 030". 199 Event III-17V ehulng four eFtresalnT 10 o'clock low position. At 0905H, as BLUE two additional Mir.-21s headins ZOO". rr,;: rn:rr cirro "u.^ . ...... «x== attacking the P-I05a. 0905H. one of the c. BLUE ni.ht Joiaed in agaln« J"- « ^jji,"" 5 .'^.I; S| 'flJ;* « .{r-to-.lr tM mfl-21» "<>proa=>-.ini! fro. 3 o'clock J^J^SJJJ'l'J.Uted to .t£ac« th. four J"' P"; HIO-2IS and lost contact with thera. 7. SITUATIOH DEVELOPMENT ^^^^ BLUE fUBht completed ^.^^ht turn to a heading oj JJ^ Zl^ulng the --105=. Tt,. began closing i>*0 «» °'*r^''^L SlS !7rhad left t^e formation and BLUE never observe'^ MIG-215 originally Jj! "JSe iJa^^IG!l7 and when riG was at 12 o'clock. theo again. BLUE lead which went to f.ll syaten as the first depression, lead received a ^°;"ij;;_J°^;/2 5 miles. One second later » second 8. ORDNANCE (He. fired/No. hits) SPARROV AIW-7E 2/0 0/0 SIDEWINDER AIW-9B 0/0 0/0 R emarks Hired two AIM-7E "full systen" Fired cannon Plred one mlssxle (BLUE flight uwble to ascertain whether ATOLL or AU^ALIJ SUU-16 gun would have been more effective weaoon in this eneountei BLUE 1 BLUE 3, 3 Mias->17-1*2 NIG8-21-l»-> 9. COUIPMCHT PROBLEM None 10. AlRCRti CnHHEMtS * Proa BLUE lead n. DATA SOURCES Messages , Reports: 366 TPW JOPPiP OPPEP-3 366 TPW JOPR^P OPPEP-3, Raytheon Conf J ,2. riARRATIVt DESCRIPTION ^^^^^^^ ^ BLUE flight n°26%/Ic6'2o"! (k^^ «• aborted due to ^a"*!:"^ P^°^J«?» of P-105a attacking t^r^^t at trailed hlch and to rear of last ^-^Q^f^'il^* ,Uh no aiatlngulsnabl. !;ar,ilr.?! in a loo.e . a o'clock lo. fosltlon. The ;-.-0-17 ?'\i;riSrp"ont.:S l^^r-^-l^nr:'^ <.^» .t t« 7-105.. blue cane. « roll in a,ai...... '-.e «I=s. SJ|i^5n!^4rra°.ln^rn^''a,^'atrac.:'fn-iL5."?U« rr^ ... 3 o.olcc. "ASTEL 929 1200UU2 April 19^7 • OPREP-3 FASTSL 932 1200711 April 1967 Hemo R. E. Klein to C. Kaough dated 2 May 1967 f I Event IIZ-179 I Jo, -CBltlon, The MIC-21S In a pop-up sAneuver on a SOO- heading were f.?***^? *• BLUE' at apppox'tnately 15*. SLUK 3 observ.:^ an alr-to-air nlsslle approaching BLUa aight ; Mhauatmra -hlte vapor trail anci cllrnbln>: at about lb'* al:;o. Thl3 J*';^ •oiall to be confused with a ZAA t.ut BLUK 3 crew could net determine whether It was an ^ • ATOLL or ALKALI missile. Althourh the enemy alr-to-air nlsslle appeared to S^JJ* » J^"^^*' rolling maneuver '.to Begin the attack agalnct the first, Rroup of four MIGs) <»f fff ^f'*^*^* ■lasll*. BLUE moiiwntarlly lost sight of the two MIG-Zls which launched the missile and I these MXa*2l8 were never sighted again. L BLUE completed Its rl?ht turn to a heading of 090" and started closing on the two WG-lTs pursuing the P-I05s. The two H^i-l'ls originally with the HIG-17s were no longer In the area and were believed to have left '.he forrtatlon of four while BLUE was In the r turning maneuver. BLUE was at 6000 ft, uyu" heading at teo kts (dO kts overtake speed) I pulling 1 g with the trailing at if^ad's 12 o'clock position and 5" depression I- innle. BLUE lead received a boreolght look-on which went to full system as the first AlS-7E was fired. One second later the second AIM-7 was fired. Both missiles launched Gwtf appeareo to be tracking. Aa the AIM-73 closed to within 200 ft of the MIG-17, the HIO turned right and down- waf^ In a 2 1/2 g maneuver deft;?'-lng the missiles. The two missiles continued on a straight course, passing behind and to the left of the MIC. The missiles were never Conserved to detonate. BLUE flight climbed and Joined last F-105 flight egresslng the area. All aircraft and orevs recovered normally. 201 Aircraft Involved. Event Z 11-180 One P-105 va two HlG-17s; (BLUE flight of four P-lQ5s encountered seven MIC -17s in this event) AUo see Event XII-136- Result: One MIG-17 killed Vicinity of Encounter: 21«»28*M/106*31'E Route Paekage VI-A 1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAt SITUATION Date/Time: 30 April 1967/0906H t at 21*26'N/lo6'>20'E. Rail yards approxlnately 1* ml northeast of fliiht was the third flight on target. Strike on targf Bae Olang. BLUE 2. MISSION ROUTE TakhU direct to BROWN ANCHOR to middie of Gulf of Tonkin for dopplor update to tip Of the lie Bamun. direct to reservoir (2l«28'N/106''31 'E) . ). AIRCRAFT CONFIG JRATIONS F«10S DIUE 1 2 - U50 gal tanl:3 6 - 750 bombs 2 - AIM-9B (SIDEWINDER), left outboard 1 - QRC-160 Pod, right outboard' P-10? BLUE 2 2 - 450 gal tfnks 6 - 750 bombs 2 - QRC-I6O Pods P»10S BLUE 3 2 - tt50 gal tanks 6 - 750 bombs 2 - a:m-9B (SIDEWINDER), left outboard 1 - QRC-160 Pol, right outboard g-lOS BLUE ^ 2 - 450 gal tanks 6 - 750 bombs 2 - QRC-160 Pad= Silver color ttith red stars 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Plight cominJ In south of target on 2U5' heading, were pulling up sSlghtly to acquire target. Weather; Clear with scattered clouds BLUE Altitude ; Heading T Speed : Puel State; S. At last turn three HIC-17s at T T Had descended to 5000 ft and Remarks !>800 lb 4500 to 5000 ft 215' 550 kt BLUE lead had 1500 to 2000 lb ^^^...ahove 7.8 BlBgo INITIAL DETECpON point, south or target (Reservoir at 21« 28 ' N/106»31'E) BLUE * sighted iiu-*,a «u |j O'clock, level position, approximately 1 ml range. BLUE 9 called KXGs. Lead instrlucted flight to maintain position and hold ordnance. After BLUE lead dropped ordnance on target (i*?00 to 5000 ft altitude), two MIG-17a were sighted at £ o'clock high (7000 ft altitude) at 1 ml range, 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE flight continued to target as KIGs turnei into the flight at right angles (abeam) and began firing at 1500 ft range, the tracerc appearing well behind the flight since the MICs were not puUlnr, lead. BLUE flight continued to target as MICs could not make turn orjaccelerate to the ?-105 speed. Event 111-180 Still In afterburner. After attack on target, lead dropperl both USO gal tanks, set S«n slent, and f>urr.upd the MIGs at apppoxlr.ately 100 kts overtake speed (550 kts after conlni; off tar.-'Jt). 7. SITUATION OEVELOPMFHT BLUE flight continued to tarret. BLUE lead estlirated dl.it.MKes as less than 1 ml and too close for missile attack. *8 distance closed, the y.lOz t'.irhtoned their ri^ht turn and bejran descendlnjj. Lead believed .^ICa did not detect attack, but were beglnnlnf; an attack themselves. As lead tightened turn at hlRh owizaUr zptf.A, he was required to pull so much lead that the plpper disappeared froR ch-; cMsblnlng clasa ( approxlnately H g's). Uad then decided to estimate lead without sight - using the pilot boom for a reference. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1. 3. 3. a 1000 rounds iOcjn each 2 AXM*9B IR mlsitllea each MIC.17 1. 2 Cannon 9. EQUIPHENT PitOBLEHS None 10. AIRCREW COHHENTS Experience Total ?'105 Combat ] Hours Hours .^tlsslon Remarks L. BLUE Lead 1300 900 (200 Mavy hours?) Comments on this Snccur.ter ■ r The "new" orocedure for calling MIGs was In effect - Charlie Hotel - Bravo Hotel, i. etc. "Though they call then, you never know where they are. They give you what general •re» they are In and you look fcr them and get a stiff neck and never 8e« them. Then the other times when you do not hear a call, there they are." [. c r p 11. DATA SOURCES L. Project Intervie ws; BLUE lead, 29 May 1967 c 355TFW Takhll Air Base, Thailand, JOPREP/OPREP-3 , 300915 April 1967 12. RARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE flight was the third and last fllsht of F-105s striking rail yards northeast of Bae Clang (21''26»N/106«20»E) at approximately 0900 hours local time. The reservoir south of the target was the last turn point and as the flight, which had descended to 5000 ft altitude on a heading of 2U5' , began pulling up slightly to acquire the target, BLUE U called, three MIC-17s at 3 o'clock, level position, approximately I ml away. BLUE lead determined KIGs to be nc Immediate threat and Instructed flight to maintain position and hold ordnance. BLUE flight, accelerating, continued to target as MIGs turned and approached abeam (90«» to BLUE flight). When ibout 1500 ft away, MIGs began firing cannon whose tracers appeared well behind BLUE fllcht since the MTGs were not pulling lead. BLUE flight continued to target as MIGs could not turn nor accelerate to become a threat to the P-105a. BLUE flight pepped up and :-olled In to target. BLUE 3 was attacked by a MIG-17 as he came off target. BLUE 3 Jinked through flak and the MIG broke off the attack. Aa BLUE lead came off th^; ta~eet on a heading of approximately 080"* and speed of 550 kts (afterburner), lead sighted two MlC-17s at 11 o'clock, 3000 ft above and a mile r away. The iMIGs were In a nentle right turn. BLUE lead Jettisoned fuel tanks, set up j< guns for alr-to-alr and with approximately 100 kts overtake speed, closed on the HlOs. The flGs did not appear ;o be aware of BLUE lead » a attack but they began Increasing their rleiht turn and descendinc- A? ran,-- closed to approximately 1000 ft, lead required •-; SO much lead on the tar?;et that tha plpper mnved cTf the comblnlnK glass. (BLUE lead J*. estimated pulling aoprox Innately h c,'z). V.'lthcut a sight, BLUE lead sighted estimated t.', -«ad on the enemy wln£r.an vlth tho pilot boon as a reference point. Lead fired cannon ahead of the MIG and then swept the fire rtown and through the tarj^et. Lead noted impacts ■« • on KIC 2*3 left side, beglnnln£ at the nose end enillns? at the wing root. Lead had onlv fire approximately 150 rounds boff:re th<» d stance to the KIG became so short ; that it appeared he would collide. Ke broke left ?;o avoid running Into the MIG and I Climbed In a yoyo. KIG 2 slowly roiled out stralKht and level, smoke and flame pouring f i 203 . fron th? left wlnftp pha the KIG. BLUE 2, about that It Mas in a spin Bv«nt IXI-lSO alng to BLUE lead* a 5 o'clock position where lead lost slf^t of 1 mi m trail from lead, sighted the burning HIO and reported. Neither BLUE lead or BLUE 2 saw the MIG impact the ground. 3: a a a a a t 204 a a a a a 0 r?. Event III-181 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-1053 vs one unldent ResuUs: Slghtlns Vlelnlty of Encounter: 2l«»25*N/l07«»00*E I. PRINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOII Oate/Tlme: 30 April 1967, 092 3H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Plight egreaslng fion an ALFA target at ITiOOO' saw a silver unldent on reelproral heading; unldent turned and disappeared to south. Event III-I82 ' Aircraft Involved: Two RP-^Ca vs two HIOs Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: '21' 5"* M/ 10 «i»l<*'E I. PRINAPT MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION DateAlne: 30 April 1967, 1521H II. DATA SOURCE •CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Inbound photo flight received KIG warning, followed by X-band signal Increasing in Intensity; maneuvers did not decrease Intensity, so RP-ts turned and dived; ' two KtGs seen at 11 o'clock while In dive; speed Increased and HIOs not seen again. Event III-I83 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs two unldents Results: Sighting Vlelnlty of Encounter: Unknown Z 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/TUne: 30 April 1967, l6't8H 11. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Egresslng AL^A strike flight at 17,000' saw two afterburner ll^ta at 35-'tO,O00', but could not see aircraft. 205 Aircraft Involved Event III-184 Two P-105a vs unknown number of MICs. See also Event III-138 Result: Two P-I05a lost Vicinity of Encounter: 21«>20'N/10'>«56:B Route Package ? 1. PRIHARY HtSSION AN^ TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Time: 30 ApJ>ll 1967/162HH BLUE nu:t\t InRrelslnc at 8000 ft altitude at 560 icta enroute to are* of JCS 82.2* target to provide IROMj HANT support. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS Possible NX0-21S - not 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS Weather sighted PRIOR TO eNCOUNTER Pew scattered clouds, visibility T ml "down sun" and ft ral "up sun* BLUE Altitude ; Heading ; Speed; — 1 — r 80(io ft 560 kts 5. INITIAL DETECTION At 1617H BLUE fUght heard MIG-21 warnings for the { geographical) **;r«^«!;^;J;^*''» they were flying. They did not see MISa at any time though two were shot down. Plrst indication of Jn^k/'s presence- was at 162«»H when BLUE I observed BLUE 3 torching, flane out and then allrcraft go out of control. 6. ACTION INITIAUO Two "good" paradhut turns while chutes and 2 were unable to were 3 i 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 es sighted and two beepers heard. BLUE 1 and 2 sade three 360 i-B descending and established voice contact with 3LUS 3. SLUE 1 establish voice contact with BLUE U and assuraed BLUE also downed. 7. SITUATION 0EVE10?M£NT As BLUE 1 and 2 circled the two oarachutes fror. BLUE 3 (Pilot and EWO) , tracers and four puffs of 37nuTJ cknnon xere observ-d passing over the chutes but no enemy aircraft Sighted. Both chutes landed at 2in6' 3O"M/10U°59 * '*0"E. Aircraft lnP«ted at 21*17'00"N/105''01'50f'E. BLUE 1 and 2 returned to tanker then escorted Sandy_i_ana^^ back to RESCAP area to base. 'blue l"and 2 orbited area untl" 'ilngo fuel reached then returned a. ORDNANCE No US ordnance expended 9. EQUIPrtm PROBLEMS None reported 10. AIRCREU COMHENTS BLME 3 CF-105F ) Front EWO blue tj (F-105D ) Front n. DATA SOURCES Messages. Reports : S'^STFW Takhll 355TPW JOPREP Total Hours 3840 1315 573 F-105 Hours "UE"tlme 1190 318 311 Conoat Missions 93 93 dl Remarks Seven months In theater Seven months In theater Five months in theater I 3 3 3 3 RATFB 3017Q8Z April 1967 JPCCO FASTEL 355 DOTO-0 lltSI April 1967 OPPXP-3 PINHACLE 030 (AH aa«e message) 206 p Event 111-164 12, NARRATIVE DESCRl?TIO» BLUE fllfcht or four F-105S were Inbound to the area of .ICS target 82.2* In vicinity of 21»20'N/l0»»o56'E flyln? at 8000 ft altitude on a headln? of 85° at 560 kts to provide TROM HAim support. At 1617H the flight received a MIG-21 warning for the area through which they were flying. At UZHH BLUE lead observed BLUE 3 (an P-105P with a two-man crew) torching. SLUE 3 flamed out shortly afterwards, and the; aircraft was observed to go out of control. Two »ood chutes were seen and two beepers heard. BLVK 1 and 2 beKan c^^cll^E the chutes as' they descended naklng voice contact with BLUE 3 pilot but not the EWO. BLUfc i and 2 made tnree jbO" turns In the descent durlnc which thtv observed tracers and four puff^ of 37r.n cannon fire pass over the tops or the chutes. No enemy aircraft was obaerved. Both chutes fror BLUE 3 landed at 21» l8 • 30"M/10ii»59 r':-: and BLUE 3 aircraft Impacted at 21"»17'00"N/105'»Ol'5O"E. Voice contact again estab llsr,-; i with BLUE 3 but two other beepers were heard atlll transmitting. BLUE 1 and 2 attempted to contact BLUE J< but were unable to do so. BLUE lead reported downed pilots to CP.OWI, also adding that BLUE •« was also probably down, rielthc- lead nor BLUE 2 saw BLUE 5 hit or receive (messageaj. BLUii 1 and 2 returned to the tanker to refuel and then escorted two RESCAP aircraft to the area of BLUE 3. (See Event III-138). BLUE 3 pilot reported several tines that the RESCAP aircraft were directly overhead. BLUE I and 2 orbll-id the area until Bingo fuel was reached and then they returned to baae. Event III-185 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105PS v9 two «IC-21» Also see Event III-139 Result: One P-105 lost Vicinity of Encounter: 1. PRIHARY Mission AND TACT|KAL SITUATION Oate/Tlr*: 30 April 1967/1715H Strike on Hanoi Transfor«er Station, JCS target 82. reverse route. 3, AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIOIIS 6 - M<117 bombs 1 - AIM-9B 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOH TO ENCOUNTER In RE3CAP orbits BLUE Weather; 1 and 2 low. BLUE 3 and t high Scattered visibility 7 to 10 miles I BLUE T Altitude: Heaaing : r low r liow Speed : Fuel State : Plight Farmatlon ; 15-16, 000» approx 260" when hit, counterclocK- wlse orbit 15-16.000* 3 B 3 i 3 3 3 3 3 ortlt! Mgh (15-16.000 ft) OB RESCAP. 6. ACTION IHITIATEO ^ „ ,.~ BLUE 3 brok. l«ft an4 4e«i. BLUE « BLUE « instructed JLOE 3 " »'"«^J|f5-.„^S .eco^S Hla-Jl m BLUE 3 tupn^l ^*s»»y.wA Kic-21 3 o'cloik and high, bluc •» BnB«6«» J^U 5w Swch hid made the initial attack. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT ^^^^^^ »P?T?i^- „teirxl2orrt\rtrtuK."KS^ ra^d^ ?h^?. Srad^d^o. Chann.1 97 for refueling. B. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 BLUE 2 BLUE 3 BLUE U MIG 208 (Mo. I'lred/Nc. hits) 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 unknown/ 1 Remarks U.S. expended no ordnance BLUE 3 sighted bill of flam* - BLUE »» 3 3 3 3 3 c 1 Event III-185 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None reported 11. DATA SOURCES Messages. Perorts : •»32TRW fJXCC 3012 352 April 1967 12. NAPHATIVE DESCRIPTION BL'JE rUcht Df four F-10:O alrcrafl dep.irted "jl'.nJl IbO'jH, 30 April 1957 for strike on JCS B2.2ii tar^-t , .Hanoi Trinsforr.er Sta:lcn. pre-strlke refueling on GREEN ANCHOR, fll.-r^r proceeded ',o :arrec. ~.nrz,uic, Zlr'k'r "^orce Cor.-nander aborted the strike mission to aet up HE3CA? fsr a downed "-13^1-' CTet Kv-.nt III-lS'l). A good beeper signal vas heard fron the downed crew and the Strike Fore** Cor.niander bellevetii rescue possibility was high. BL'JE fll^nt set up a hl.'h cover at 16,000 to 2 7,000 ft altitude over the downed aircraft near Sl'Sl •r:/105''05' r.. When the lew ccver altitude alrcrift (GREEN 1, 2, 3, reached Bingo fuel and prcceeoed to tr>e tnr.kers fnr refucllnj;, BLUE 1 and 2 went to low cover altitude and bl.\J'£ 3 .and 1 stayed high at !Q,000 to 16,000 ft in a counterclock- wise orbit at 353 kcs. Then the second elenent cf GREEK flirnt (GREEV 3 and 4} recurned to the rescue area and directed the Incsninc: 5An alrcr&rt. At 1715K on a hea^ilni; af approxlnately 260'*, SLUE U "felt a Jolt and heard a thud" and Itrjnedlately calle-^ 3 to break left "because of MICs." As BLUE 3 broke left and down, he saw a :j!IC-21 on '-he rl^ht ro'ng out tc his 3 o'clock position and high. BLUE 3 turned int ) tne MIS as the XIG continued his left turn returning across and to the left of BLUE 3> BLUE 3 then saw a second MIC-?1 engaging BLUE <>. BLUE 3 and i» lit afterburner, accelerating to '^ach 0.95 and Jinking heacfed for the clouds at apprsxlrately the IC.CQO ft level. BLVT. Z and headed for Channel 97. Enroute BLUE 3 asked 3LJE ^ several tir.es if he "had hlr. In sioht." BLUE 1 answered affirmatively. At 1720H, acproxlniatc ly 10 iiecmds after las; trans i.iss ion, BLUE 3 looked behind and saw a ball of riar.e which he ass'aried was BLUE . BLUE; '■i went down at approximately 21<'03'M/lCi.'55'E. . BLUE 1 and 2 called to 3LUS 3 and reported slrhting BLUE k going down and that they also saw a chute with a nan waving. BLUE 3, low on fuel, continued to Channel 97 for a tanker wher* he refueled and recovered at Udorn. A cursory check of the aircraft after landing revealed no visible battle damage. Event II 1-186 Aircraft Involved: Four F-lOSs vs two MlC-?ls Results: No -4B vs two KIC-lTs Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21»25'N/ia6«25'E AND TACTICAL SITUATION lay 1967. 1250H DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Sta'ff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE OEsJrIPTION ;aw F-8E shootdoun of MIG dea^-iibed In Event III-196; leader of F-iiB TAR CAP flight then slchted another KIG at ir o'clock] low and was pursulns HIG at 200* altltudo when hit by autosatlu weapons flr«i F'^B returned to snip. TAR CAP for strike (diversionary for Kep strike) .ibed In Ev Event III-189 Aircraft Involved. Four F-UCs vs eight «IC-i7s. Result Of Kncounter: Sight Ings only Vicinity of Encounter: 20*'32'N/103®03'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION Af^U TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 1 May 1967/100S:i Plying MIG SCREEN OrOlt, .6 Mach 2. MISSION ROUTE Oanang to WHITE AMCKOH for refuel, direct to Chann-Jl 97, thence to orbit station. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS Hot stated but probably i AIH-7 and ft AIM-gB each. Absence of {5uns positively stated. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Clear 7 mile visibility. Little haze. Altitude ; .8 Mach AGL Heading ; 210° Speed ; 4^0 lets Plight Formation ; Pod 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE flight observed three to five HIG-lTs approaching from 9 o'clock to engage the night . 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE flight l.Tj;.edlately descended to engage MICs at an altitude below 1,000 ft. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT b'lUE 1 and 2 sought to maneuver to open range cut lost sight Of MIGa. Several other MIGs were subaequenrLy slanted j^ualiy very low and low heading In opposite direction. BLUE 3 and 1 attenpted to engage another raG-17 but lost it in the haze and hills. Another KIC-i7 passed across tne frcnt of BLUE 3 ana 4 but with speed and cllnb separated. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 1 lost transmitter and interphone for tanker frequency. JO. AIRCREW COMMENTS BLUE 1 and 2 said that they had about 20 seconds of close ran^e tracking and probabi- lity of a gun kill -would have been excellent. BLUE 3 and U also reportea that they would have had a good opportunity as a MIC flew close from left to rlgnt. 11. DATA SOURCE OPREP 3 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION This event is characterized by a lar^e number of friendly and hostile sightings so that it ^3 difficult to determine the exact nunber of separate hostile aircraft actually sishtPd/ Other friendly flights were simultaneously enr^^in^ MIGs in the sane vicinity, mwr r^-d 2 aft»- los'njr sight of the initial flight cf MIOs tho-j?ht they saw a SAM nvlnl wh?c.? was'!, faci^h:^^pact of a MIG-IT shot down by PURPLE fU.n:. PURPLE flight Jarre* IlO""^' cr.t another comm.- their v.-ay. BLUE rilE^^t again attenpted to engage Jur^as una-^r-o cctaln a position for r:l3slle firing. BLUE 3 and k sighted another M^C-n aS ;;nt in lo-. and rolled In but the MIG T.aUe a hard turn ana was J" ^J*..?*" ard t'-e h'lis Afte- reconolterinp, the area for ter. iT-oro minutes without additional .-ilG slghtingsi the BLUE flight egreJsed the area to Channel 97 and the tanker. Event I 11-150 Aircraft Involved: Four P-«»Cs vs eight KIC-lTs Result: One KIG destroyed VlclnUy of Encounter: 20»35'«/105''l5'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOH Datt/Tlme: 1 May 67/1021H BLtiK fiiRht was one of two flights scheduled for HICCAP Barrier with P-105 flights coverlnr a KF.SCAP miss 2. MISSION ROUTE Depfirted Danang, to MIGCAP area SCBO'l jre-strlke refuellnR with WHITE AHCHOR , proceeding vift Channel 97 IJ/105"00'E to 21°10'S/105'30'E. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS y-lIC BL-JE 1. 2. 3. 4 AIM 7-E QRC 4 AIM 9-B Lef^ MIG ITS Cannon 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS Weather Pod right outboard outboard and centerllne tanks PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER > to 10 miles, clear Visibility Altitude : 5.000 AGL Head In.- ; 030® Scead: 5C0 kts fruei S ta'-.g ; Approximately Itt.OOO lb, Centerllne Jettisoned flight tj-pfnatlon i Poid stacked left 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE 1 detected 2 or 3 bogeys approaching from 11:30 o'clock approximately BoOO ft and descendlnK. kuE i called the bogeys to BLUE flight and to the preceding fl^^h. of JC^O^rarAcI! iooS ft. ELL-E 1 then changed the call to HIGs which were closlr^ rapidly in an apparant head-on pass. 6. ACTION' INITIATED The preceding flight of P-lC5s broke . BLUE 3 iSrter position on BLUE 3 and V J"^, f 'B[iS% repS??e17s Afterburner spec iric ally mentioned several times. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO SNCOUNTER Weather : Visibility 5 to 7 miles, clear. Altitude : 5,000 - 7,000 ft Beading " Northeast ^tst.:'"5«°««:d .t l...t X-i .inuf. Mfor. BmOO. ';^rSio!"r!""Lx »..<.!«, U. 12 .-CIOO. P....* una.r fll«h.. No KIO warning received prior to this slgntlng. 6. ACTION INITIATED . , u -k. Tht 'blue rii,^-- -r-^-^f^^-^^rr.n'tt^^rirrn^^ut^iS!.' « .'"'AT' attempted a quartering ^ead-cn pass against tnis o sclssors-type r.aneuver. among those previously slehted. 7 SITUATION 0EVEL0PH2NT ■ ^ , w ^1. Qftte> 1 nriiF 2 fired an AIM-9B under difficult hign-g In the ensuing melee both BLUE 1 f^"^ BLUE 2 JJJ^J ^"^JJ^^xlmately 5000 ft when the v-rs without success. The first nlssed tne ^'^-'^y^Vl^. ^.^^ ^.^.^ „,,v. excessive maneuvers without Success. The first "issea .ne ^'^^^^^^^^^^S^;;;' ^red wU^. excessive 5?G initiated a hlgh-j turn J ^Hh^^e foCr snapJSots with 2CaT. during angle-off. BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 «ach attempted ^™ °Jj.lght lasted atout 15 minutes aftej thi dOKfUht but ;Ce! -rSSlr flSt then Increased airspeed and Which BLUE 3 and BLUE U reached BINGO fuel. Their fll| ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^.^ I'^ivTlToo llVlt r^o^Jh^ly heiSlSg as it egressed the area 8. ORDNANCE (No. flred/No. hits) AIH~9B 2Qmm gun gj^y^ ^ I/O 3 or H snapshot bursts aLus^. 2 1/0 3 or «• snapshot bursts EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS yourself before ne &u. v - maneuverability and turning radius. 215 '■^'■'fiim^^ Event III-191 11. DATA SOURCES Pro ject Intervlgwa : BLUE I He-sagea. Reports ; OPREP FASTEL 11501 Hay 6? OPREP 3 335 TFW PINNACLE 02 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Interceptlna: an offense or a defense. keep their 6 o'clock clear. BLUE ^ 'J^J*' *;*y,^|^^^-^t%^,arter of BLUE 1 cro=3lng course of the maneuvering one MIG pulled up , ^"^.J^^ ^ climb with the HIG which at about 45- Bolng a«ay to the left Torward BLUE 1 £5? i couW not immediately turned over Into a "-JiZj^lSf "w'*;iJ''i^^J;?r2frtrspU with at 5.QCG- 5tay with him m this maneuver. The fi^^J^iJ^.^; „IC low in a gentle turn. 6.000 ft." BLUE 1 coning out of this encounter '^f*--". *"":*^'^^L^^^>,i,,j. -t about 7000 ft vi,uwv BT [Tf 1 attenoted to roil In and Deffon tracKuiR »>' auu-" < Believing he was • ^J;^^. * S?; "J" a 270« turn In "oractlcally no space at all out. He then realized that the MIC had rade a 2^0 , turn i . ^^^^^ and M«8 comlne back on hlni at about J5 angle. ELU J '^^^^ ^ ^j,^ ^I„.9B tracking SSi"M;;S?:^1here7eVe on^ S^^^„r:rbs:5;e^i^^Jpo??JnUle. for fleeting snapshot, Mlthout apparent effect. i: c G c c l; [: C c ♦ Event III-X92 * Aircraft Involved: Four F-105s va four MI0-17a Result: tlo DamaRc Vicinity of Etiooiinter: 20no'N/105''lB'E I. PRiriARy HISSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 1 May 1967/unkr.own BLUE flight of four F-105s on strike mission. 4. fLIGHT CONOITIOMS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Unknown, not a factor All liuJe: 6500 ft R?adtnr: 035" ^peed: " ''50 lets Flight Fornar:lon: Pod 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE flight observed two flighta of two KIG-178 divine from hl;h out of the sun at 10 o'clock position. 6. SITUATION DEVELOPHENT BLUE flight started a turn Into the MICs when the KlGs parted a left turn to come Into the 6 o'clock position. BLUE flight went afterburner and Jettisoned bombs. '8. ORDNANCE P-105 Sot stated MIG-lTs Guns 9: EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None 11. DATA SOURCE OPREP 3/PINMACLE-COl 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Two flights of twj MTG-lTs dove out of the sun from the 10 o'clock position on BLUE «»-K» rfilS! Lns as rh-v cane. BLUE flight attemptea to turn into the MIGa but when Iil"25;, ine*a l2't 'urn"L attain a 6 o'clock position, BLUE flight Jettisoned bombs iS5 S5 mJrSuin;'."^*'^!^ flight passed ov/r BLUE fll,ht aPPrjJJJ-tely 1500 ft ana Sre then engaged by a flight of P-^a. No further contact by BLUE flight. 217 3 i a 1 i Event III-193 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-X05a vo two MTC-17s Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: Koa Lac Airfield 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SZTUATIOH Date/Time: 1 May 67/unicnown BLUE flight had Just completed a strike on Hoa Lac Airfield when It was attacked by two MIQ-17S. 2. MISSIOM ROUTE Inland route to target. 3. AIRCRAFT CONTtGURATIONS P-105 BLUE 1. 2. 3. " Vlng tanks » Fod, Guns BLUE I anJ 3 AIM-9B MIC«17a XI'^ 1 and 2 Guns 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Clear, good visibility Altitude ; 5000 ft Heading ; West Speed : 500 Kts Puel'State ; Approximately 9000 Xb n 5. INITIAL OeTECTION Coating err target BLUE ^ sighted two HIG-17s at BLUE flight's 6 o'clock, and alerted flight . 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 3 looking back on BLUE fi's warnlnjc saw two MIGs at 6 o'clock high on a tight left turn. The lead MIG appeared to be firing on BLUE flight. BLUE 3 went Afterburner, punched fuel tanks and broke left. The MIGs then reversed and departed the area. 7. SITUATION OeVELOPNENT The NIGs' apparently attempted only a single firing pass then separated without attempting to conrlnua the engagenent. 8. ORDNANCE EXPENDED {Ko. flred/No. hits) BLUE flight 0/0 MIQ lead Cannon fire 9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS None 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS "On that (fay their tactics were Just hit and run. I have seen that subsequently. They seem reluctant to engage in a prolonged battle with the 5s IK DATA SOURCE Project Intervlevs : BLUE 3 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE flight, following? a strike against Koa Lac Airfield, was regrouping and depart- ing the area at approAl.-natcly tiOOO ft, headed in a x-sterly direction. 3LUE 3 and ^ wei-e IJ almost a half mile behind BLUE 1 and 2 a.nd claslng. BLUE 4 then called NIGs at o o'clock. g BLUE 3 looked back and saw two MIG>17s at 6 o'clock, high in a tight left turn attacking w the flight. BLUE 2 punched fuel tanks and went aftorturner and could see little puffs of smoke coming from MIC lead which appeared to be gunfire. BLU-i 3 broke hard left attempting to turn Into the MiCa. BLUE i», accelerating rapidly, passed .'Ight throug.". the MIC fllsht I;^ I I i s § 218 2 Event III-193 before he could fire. BLUE 1 and 2 pulled high to the right planning to coir.e down behind the KiGs. Before any of this could be accomplished, the NICs reversed to the rlr.ht and departed the area. INTBODUCTIOM TO EVENTS 111-19^, -■19:>. -196. -1-97 and -198 On 1 May 1967, carrier aircraft from the BCN HOKM£ rtlCHArD 5t,rusk Kep Airfield (JCS 9.1 at 21*23'26"N/106»15'58"E) with the primary taipets belnr ".I'" aircraft in the rlvetted area at the northeast end of the airfield and the support iirfia south of the runway. The strike force composition by aircraft type, nurr.ber, an-l the tine on target Is given in Table 1, as well as the event in which MIC action ap:aln3'w the force la deierlbed. T«b1t 1 (S). BON HOMHE RICHARD STRIKE fQUt (U) Aircraft Ke. Typt Function Target Tine on Target Event No. Sli A-4C Str1k« jc: 9.1 1245H Tao A«4C Flak Suppression Flak sites I244H Four A*4e Flak Suppression Flak sites 1244H Four A-4C IRON HAND 1240H-1247H No MI6l Encountered Four F-8C TARCAP Four F-8E TARCAP Also airborne In support of the foreo were four,A>lK for RESCAP, two EA-IP ECN aircraft and two P-8E and two P-8C as BARCA?. The strike aircraft launched at IISOH. The target weather was clear with 5 miles visibility in haze. The strike force encountered intense AAA fire at the target although flak suppression and IRON HAND sorties had silenced several sites prior to the roll-in of strike "aircraft. Hia-17 fighters Ksre also encountered in the target area both before, during and after the attack. No SAM opposition nateriallzed, although enroute to the target, the aircraft of Event Ill-*194 saw a possible SAM explosion at very high alcltuden over the target. Only one mecber of this flight encountered ALQ-51 lights, but no APR>27 was received. All attack aircraft were equipped with APR-27/AL.Q-51 . The strike aircraft sighted a minimum of seven Mlus on the field and at least four airborne . Pour sorties dropped VT fused MK 81 bombs in the revetted area while two other sorties dropped VT fused MK 82 In the support area. Two other so.'^tles {the aircraft of Event III-195) attacked two MIG-17 aircraft on a taxiway with 29 VT fused 2UHI rockets. Post strike photography showed three Hia-178 burning. Flak suppression with CBU-24 was aceontpllshed by four IRON HAND and six other flak suppression sorties. / total of ten AGM-ttSs were fired, five against FIRECA« and five against FANSONG radars. One explosion was noted in a flak site and the site was silenced. Two sites were silenced by CBU-Zts, Although flak was generally suppressed to the south of the target* heavy 37/57/85mm fire continued to come from the northeast sector adjacent to the runway. At least four HIG-17S were airborne and the MIQs pursued their attack through areas of heavy flak. The results of the aerial battles were two confirmed kills and two HIOs damaged. All friendly aircraft returned on board with one A-4C of the strike force (Event III-196) damaged in the wing by ground fire and„another A-^C of the flak suppression (Event III-197) damaged by ground fire. Also on 1 May 1967 aircraft from the carrier ENTEHFRX5S attacked cargo ships , at 1255H (exact location of this strike is unknown). Event Aircraft Involved: Two F-8Es vs four MIC-17S Results: One MIG-17 destroyed One MIC-17 damaged Vicinity of Encounter: 21»26'N/106«»28*E 1. PRINART mSSIOH AHO TACTICAL SITUATiqH Date/Time: 1 !-'ay 1967/12'«^>H. Four F-8E (BLUE Fllfiht) was TARCAP for a strike on Kep Airfield. Although BLUE Flight Irgressed as a unit cnly BLUE 3 and * encountered MICs. The actions of BLUE 1 and 2 are unknown. 2. MISSION ROUTE Departed Yankee Station and aerial refueled just after launch, then proceeded to the target. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS 7«8E BLUE 3. 1 1 - AI«-9C 2 - AIM-9D (Dual fuselage pylons with <) LAU-7A launchers) 28'4 rounds 2Cnmi ALQ-51 - APR-27 IPP~On; TACAN-Cn; Radar-On. KOTE: Configuration of BLUE I and 2 unknown. MIC^17 MIG-17D r.odel SoM armed with AAM. ». FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Clear. Other conditions unknown. 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE Plight heard calls of MIGs from the strike leader. These HIOs were first seen when BLUE Flight observed two afterburner lights high at one o'clock. They then saw two separate groups of '^TGs In sections of two pass fron north to south. 6. ACTION INITIATED The other TARCAP flight (Event III-I96) turned after these MlOa and BLUE Flight continued to the target. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT After reaching orbit station, BLUE Plight spilt into two sections. BLUE 3 and 4 saw three MIQ-17S pass below the flight and attack the trailing MZQ, destroying him with a SIDEWINDER (AIH-9D). On egress' BLUE 3 and saw a MIG-17 chasing an A-U (BLUE 2 of Event III-19t). This MIG was attacked but BLUE 3 could not get a missile tone; however, BLUE 4 fired 120 rounds of 20trm fire ut the MIC hitting the HIG In the left wing. 8. ORDNANCE , ■ (No. flred/No. hits) SIDEWINDER AIM-9D BLUE 3 BLUE 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 3 - Pressurlzatlon turbine was running hot. The failure to achieve a tone during the second attack was caused by the fact that the second AIM-9D was fired first and that there was no automatic stepping for the next Dlsslle. A good tone was later achieved on the first AIM-9D. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience ; No data except BLUE it was an Air Cannon Remarks One MIO killed 1/1 One HIG damaged hange officer. Event lll-lSti Conunenta on this Sncounter BLUE 3 The swltcholcgy to set up the missiles for firing Mas a problem. The AIM-9DS were short &o only two were carried. The AZn-9C was loaded at the pilot's desire. BLUE U Would have preferred a Gat ling gun. The F-8 sight was poor. The sight ladder was confusing since it was highly lighted and the egro plpper passed through it, which was disconcerting. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Intervlewa ; BLUE 3 and BLUE June 1967. Messages. Reports ; CTG 77.7 011550Z May 1967 OPREP-^ RT 554. CTG 77.7 0117002 May 1967 OPREP-5 001. CTG 77.7 010655Z May 1967 OPREP-3 001. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was one of two TARCAP flights supporting a strike on JCS 9.1. On Ingres* to the target BLUE Flight heard calls of MIGs from the strike leader. Near the target, BLUE Plight observed two aircraft afterburner lights high at 1 o'clock, passing north to south. There were two separate groups of MIGs in sections of two, which were subsequently seen, for a total of four MIGs In all. The other TARCAP flight (Event II 1-198) turned to engage so BLUE Plight continued on to the target and set up a CAP station 3-5 miles northeast of Kep. At this time the actions of BLUE 1 and 2 became unclear. It is not known if they engaged MIGs although they must have sighted then, BLUE 1 and 2 are not mentioned In the accourt of BLUE 3 and 1's actions. While the strike group was on the target four MIG-17S were observed to take off from Kep and pass under the 3LUE Flight. The MIGs were heading east northeast at 1000 feet altitude In order to jusip the strike force. At this time, SLUE Flight was heading west at about UOOO feet altitude. Two MIG-17s (MIG 1, 2) were In a lead section but the second section had split and the third MIG-17 (MIG 3) was alone and about one mile behind KIG 1 and 2. BLUE 3 and H made a hard descending right turn to attack MIO 3 not using afterburner. The MIGs apparently did not see BLUE 3 and iJ's attack. BLUE 3 gained a 6 o'clock position to MIG 3 and at UooO-6000 feet range, 1000 feet altitude and Uoo knots fired an AIM-9D, Th* sdsalle was observed to fly directly up the MIG's tailpipe and explode. The HIG was net In afterburner. MIG 3 disintegrated rapidly, and MIG 1 and 2 were not seen again. With the element to echelon right, BLUE 3 and U returned to CAP altitude. Shortly thereafter while turning south BLUE >i saw another MIG-17 (HJO li) chasing an A-U. The A-4E in this case was BLUE 2 of Event III-195. BLUE 3 and k were at 300Q to 3500 feet altitude and about 350 knots. The HIO passed below BLUE 3 and k from right to left on a heading perpendicular to that of the F-88. The NIG was at about 500 feet altitude. BLUE 3 and 1 broke left and down, and called the A-U that he had a MIG on his tall. The A-4 was weaving to prevent the MIG from tracking. The MIG was in afterburner and about 2000 feet In trail of the A-J*. The A-'t headed for a hill located at 21«2U»N/106»28'E. The MIG apparently noticed BLUE 3 and ft on his tall and broke left on top of the hill. The A-'J broke right and disengaged. BLUE U first fired about 40 rounds of 20mm at 10-15 degrees angle off at the HIG 'a 7 o'clock position. BLL'E U was coaltlcude at 2000 feet rarge closing. The MIC disengaged when he saw the 2Cmra by breaking left and down. One continued to fire for a total of about 120 rounds of 20mm with the plpper tracking as the MIG broke. BLUE 4 saw numerous hits in the MIG's left wing as he closed to 1200-1500 feet range. MIO k continued the left turn with lower speed than BLUE k and BLUE H had to oull un and break off due to a hill. *^ ^ The MIG was In afterburner; however, except for an initial use to accelerate, BLUE h did not use afterburner. BLUE t had sufficient g capability to adequately lead the MIG. BLUE 3 then engaged MIC . Although he was able to attain a good position on the MIG (iiOOO to 6000 feet astern of MIQ U as MIC U made moderate to violent hlgh-g maneuvers and returned to a northwest heading at low altitude), BLUE 3 could not gee a SlDEWltlt'ER tone.* Although BLUE 3 shifted to t.he AIM-9C he was unable to obtain a radar lock due to ground clutter. a 1 0 i i I B S B a a a ■See equipment problems, paragraph 9, ^^^ig^^e cause. 222 Event III-19* MIG 4 attempted to draw BLUE 3 Into a heavy flak area ^l^sr N/106''22'E. but BLUE 3 disengaged. BLUE 3 and U rejoined ^^%gr«?irnJ?eS time 2l^25'N/106°25'E until the Enterprise group was off the target. The estlmatea time of departure from final CAP station was at 1257H. 8. Event III-195 Aircraft Involved: Four F-8Ca vs two MIG-I7s Result : No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21»15'N/X06«l6'E PRIHARY HISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 1 May 1967/12«»8H. Four P-8CS (BLUE Flight) w^re parr of a TARCAP supporting a strike on JC5 9.i. AAM 2/0 None . HIO 17 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; Messages. Reoorts : CTQ 77.7 O11550Z Hay 1967 0PREP-J4 RT55A. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION r.s?snr.^:n"« ^^^^^ T.^ aircraft. 223 V Event III-196 1. Aircraft Involved: Three A-»»Cs vs MIG-17a Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter; ana'N/lOT'OT'E PRIMARY HISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOR 0»te/Tlff.e: 1 May 1967/1256H. Three A-UCa were part of the six strike aircraft attacking JCS 9.1 <»•• Table I of the Introduction to this event). 8. QRONANCE RZQe rired cannon with no hits. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : None, Messages. Reports : CTQ 77.7 011550Z May 1967 OPREP-". CTO 77.7 011700Z May 1967 OPREP-5. 12. MARRATIVE DESCRIPTtOH AS BLUE Plight ingressed. the first lefenses encountered were two """"s which p.sse5 uSS^ tie filgSI at approximately 21" 26- N/106^26' E without atteirptlng to attack iir fire. , . . _ Sriirii. ?;c.I«<.'^ar?U "a " %SS"o .uppre..lo„ aircraft hitting th. target area first. on the bombing run or.e nenber of BLUE Plight saw four MIG-17s of the flight m Event :il-195. BLUE flight continued tn- run and egresslng they observed the F-8 of Event £11.15^ to down a MIG-17 with !,|^°^J^;"°^?-a Si MIG'f tall was blow., off and the HIO tuir.bled and Inpacted at about Zloae'N/IGS 28 E. observed the. right wing tip to be missing- All aircraft recovered on board safely. Event iri-197 Aircraft involved: Two A-tlCs vs two KIG-173 Result: One MIG destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: 21»21' N/106* 20 'E 1. PRIMAitr MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 1 May 1967/1215*E I. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIC" Date/Time: I Hay 1967/after l?MH. Pour A-HE (BLUE Plight) were part of the flak suppression support for a strike on Kep Airfield. 8. ORDNANCE (No. flred/No. hits) Cannon SSEfiEia gj^yg ^ 1/0 Estimate possible damage. MIG 2,3 At* least once/0 At BLUE 2 . II. DATA SOURCE Project Interviews ; None. Messages. Reports ; CTG 77.3 011550Z May 1967 0PREP-V007. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION During egress from the target MIGs appeared In the area. One MIG-17 (MIO 1) passed m fron""? BLUE I In a slow tu?n. BLUE I fired 20mn> at MIO 1. and MIC 1 then rolled inverted and pulled down, recovering at low altitude and departed the area. BLUE i estimates possible damage to this 'MQ. BLUE 2 was Jumped by two MIQ-175 (MIG 2. 3)» with the HIQs at 3 o'clock Position. BLUE 2 descended to extremely low altitude and /aded MIGs by a series of hlgh-g turns. Two P-eEs TARCAP (Event III-19'>) chased the MICs away. Even*. 111-199 Aircraft Involved: Two P-»iC» ve two unldenta '^■^ Results: Sight ing Vicinity of Encounter: ao-HO'H/lOTOftO'E I. PftlHARY MISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: I May 1967, 1710H IK DATA SOURC. CIMCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION TWO bogey sightings separated by 5 minutes by CAP orbiting at coastline for drone flight; bogejs above 30,000' ; distance too great for Identification. Event IIZ-20.Q Aircraft Involved: Eight ?-105» « at least three HIC-l7s Results; Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: 21-50 'M/IOS- 30 *E K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlae: 1 May 1967, I718H IK DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Plight of four P-1053, part of ALFA strike on Thai JS"!;!" JJ**i_JJSS'for saw t« Sgs at first time and position .^jljiS^'^iiS^Jip'Si b^en 15 miles until two F-J*C MIO CAP (see Event I"-"^) closed, WlO CA^ naa following strike force; while egreaalng. second P-105 flight saw two silver aircraft which turned and were lost. Event XII-201 Aircraft Involved: ? P-*? vs t KIO-? ' Results: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: Hear Chinese Border K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 1 May 1967/unknown IK DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Silver MIGs sighted by F-i* aircraft near ChlnaA"/N border. Event ni-202 Aircraft Involved: Four F-iCa v8 three MlClTs Result: Ko damaf.e Vicinity of Encounter: 21«50'N/105«30*2 1 PRIHART KISSIOK ANO TACTICAL SITUATION force . for ingress to the target down Thud Ridge. 3. AIRCRAFT CONflGURATIOMS Each F'-IC 4 - AIM 7E i| - AIM 9B ECU PoU rlKht outboard 370 F.al. tank Left outboard Center line tank WIG- 17 Silver, no marking 4 FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER weather: Scattered, broken deck of clouds. 7 miles visibility. Altitude: 11,000-12.000 ft g- oeed: " ^00 kts gSm§F;.tion : ;od°?oriatlon. stacked slightly low. 5. IKITIAL DETECTION ^^^^^ 3 ^ .ere Sfut\!SSS JJ^JSJ IKS? tSo^Jlei^aU. \he MIGs «ere silver. • Tri^FrlltTLcad) i-dlately looked at -deep 6 o^clock;^^^^ th„. Jjjta winged SM-lVJ SiSItroS^JSt^o-a^^iVtrriik^dSSS Inl-S^tS going afterburner. T'Jirto 220O diving turn BLUE 1 closed at the B o'cloc. position and r.aliMrt^.%ire°. lldl^ircllfl iSre F-.s. The MIQ, «re gone. B. ORDNANCE No firing. 9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEHS None reported 11. DATA SOURCES pgn BABOM Interview : BLUE 1 Front ito««*ires. heports; OPREP-3 011300 May 67, 8TFW - DOI 05015 19 NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Jh! « u . Of t.l. .vent 1, =a*. cl«r.r by an explanaUon ra.Her than • ;-r.ti.e. The proceaure nad been "aj 'f ^.^^J J^^^^^ 5oef So? plcS It up l^edlately, he .111 Event iri-202 17 Clean ■No afterburner Sliver 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS ►RIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Scattered clouds at 2000 to <»000 ft, visibility 15 miles, 3 LUE ^ ^ ^ jj. A ltitude : l«»,000 ft Heading : 150«» Speed : 500 kts Fuel State ; 12.000 lb flight formation : Pod Mlth BLUE 2 high on the right and the element (BLUE 3, on the left, slightly lo«» almost line abreast. 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE flight received MIG warnings and knew MIGs were In the area. They heard one of the first or second P-105 flights call HIGs . BLUE 2 saw two MIQ-21a, at U o»clock level, attacking a flight of F-105s and called them out. 6. ACTION INITIATED ^ "BLUE flight warned the F-105a and brofte Into the MIC-21s going to afterburner and Jettisoning tanks. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 1 fired three SPARROWS at one of the MIG-21s, missing with all three. He then fired four SIDEWINDERS, one of which hit the MIC-21 resulting In a kill. Outbound from the tartr'jt BLUE flight engaged five MIG-173 in the vicinity of Hoa Lac airfield. During this engagenent, BLUE 2 fired three AIM-93s without scoring a hit. BLUE fllg.1t then disengaged due to Bingo fuel and egressed. 233 L Evt 111-207 8. ORDNANCE (No. flped/No. hits) SPARROW SIDEWIHDEB BLOE 1 BLUE 2 KXQs 9. 3»/0 Non« 3/0 Remarka All fired at MIG-21. Pired at MIG-IT One HlC-21 killed. EQUIPNCNT PROBLEMS BLUE I's cockpit mounted camera did not work due to improper loading, left outboard tank would not Jettison. 10. AIRCREU COMHEKTS E«perlence Total P-tt Combat Remarks BLUE 3*8 Total Combat Houra Houra Missions BLUE 1 Front 4900 230 50 Back 350 90 86 BLUE 3 Front 4200 815 20 SLUE 2 Front 2750 430 Back 720 41C Second MZO kill, engasement . Third alr-to-alr First encounter with NtG-17 Comments on this Encounter BLUE I (Front) fired everything he had at the J1IC-21. With a gun, he would have got a couple of XIC-lTs In the second fight. He made many dry passes at them. For other cownents see Events III-102, -207, and -252). BLUE 3 - It was the first time that he had seen -.he MIC-17s get Into a tight little turn and stay there. It was amazing how the MIO-17 turned. The turns effectively negated the missile attacks . Since the P-4s hod no guns, a tight turn oroitlng xow to the ground was a successful defense. To combat the MIO's defense tactics should be to work two elements in the vertical. One keeps the MICa busy, and the other should drift off to cet separation. Whfn the aeeond element returns he should call the first element to pull up and away, leaving a SPARROW shot for the second element. BLUE I, 4 June 1967; BLUE 3, 2 June 1967 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; He^sages. Reports ; 8 TPW 0^111202 May 1967 OPREP-3 DOI 05080 8 TPW 0M1H35Z May 1967 OPREP-3 tX)I 05086 AIM 7D/E Missile Performance Reports for BLUE 1 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE flight was one of two flights of P-4Cs providing HIQCAP for a force of F-105 striking the Hanoi transformer station, JCS 32.2!J. BLUE flight rendezvoused with two fllgnts of P-1053 which was the flight of Event III-211 and one other (GREEN flight). This was accomplished at ORANCiE ANCHOR drop off and CAP position was taken Inmedlately. The force proceedei to Channel 97 and orbited waiting for the rest of the strike force. After two orbits, rendezvous was completed and the Ingress course was set. 3 3 3 <3 f 3 3 3 > Although official sources indicated BLUE 1 fired 3 AIM-7E, both BLUE I's Interview and BLUE 3'3 Interview state that BLUE I had no ordnance remaining during the en^a.-jenent with the MIC-17S. It is concluded that one A1M-7E on BLUE 1 did not tune properly and, therefore, was unable to be fired. BLUE l*a firing sequ'.-n;e tends to conflrn this. Event III-207 The force from Takhll flew flights In trail. The first escort (P-HC) fHPlht was iiear the front of the formation. That placed the IRON HAND flight out front. The strike force was led by the sjlsslon comnand'sr with the first flight of F-Us a little high and out to his right. BLUE flUht was about 1 to 1 1/2 ml In trail of the last P-105 flleht (SREEN rilpiht) and about 2030 ft higher. The flight In front of GREEN flight was the night of Event 1II-2X1. The flight Jettisoned the centerllne tank about Yen Bal. During Ingress MIG calls were he«trd for the target area via the BULLSEYE system. After hitting the turn point at 1K3?H, BLUE flight proceeded down Thud Hldge for about 3 minutes. Durln,? this tine the first or second F-105 fllpht made a call MICa at 9 o'clocJc low." This alerted BLUE flight to zhe rilGs location direction. When about 5 to 6 nl from Phuc Yen (li^SSH), Bi.UE 2 saw two HIG-21s and called them out. BLUE 1 Immediately spotted then. Instantly Identifying them as MI0-21s, and called to Jettison tanks and go to afterburner. BLUE 3's outboard tank did not Jettison. When seen, the T'lGs were at 10 to II o'clock from BLUE flight level and crossing left to rlcht angle off , They were at about the same altitude as BLUE flight and had apparently chandelied up from off the deck. The MIGs were turning in on a fllgnt of P-1058 (GREEN flight) lr.T.edlately preceding BLUE flight. The MICs were at GSEEH flight's 7 to 8 o'clock position, about 1 ml back. BLUE 1 also saw some HICs attacking the other flight In frunt of OREEM fll&iit. CThase are the F-l05s in Event III-211] and called this flight to break right. BLUE flight broke Into the two MIG-213 which were crossing rapidly from left to right. One MIC continued to turn after the GRESM fllr.ht but the second MIG broke right, going down and under BLUE flight turning 130° and diving for the deck. This MIG was not seen again. BLUE flight started after the first MIG and vector rolled for position. BLUE 1 obtained an Immediate lock-on, In boreslght. This HIO broke right and started an evasive maneuver. The MIG outturned BLUE flight but 3LUE 1 and 2 went high to stay with the MIG's turn. BLUE 3 and 'i also went high but wfre unable to match the turn and ended up high and to the ou-.slde. The MIC then reversed as BLUE 1 and 2 came over the top. As the MIG reversed to the left, BLUE 3 and 4 were looking head-on at the MIO and would have had a SPARftOW shot If BLUE 1 and 2 had not maintained position on the .MIG. However, BLUE 1 and 2 were able to reverse their turn and stay with the MIG." The HIG passed under BLUE 3 and ^ as they went high and outside of the turn again. Sometime during this turning fight BLUE 1 rlonle fired three SPARROW missiles at the KIO, according to the firing reports. There It some Inconsistencies in the data (flth OPREP 0111112 Indicating a firing Interlocks in at about a mile range. Interlocks is also supported in OPREP Oi«Iiii35. The missile firing reports give much larger firing ranges and Interlock out. Ton- slderlne the type of action encountered, the firing range of ml which was given seems large. In all cases the MIG-21 target was given at 8500 ft altitude. 0.9 T'ach and at 20* aspect to BLUE 1, who was at 8000 ft altitude and at .9 ^lach pulling >* g's with a slight overtake. The .ulsslle select ll(?ht had been on 5 minutes prior to launch. The first missile failed to guide and went ballistic and rapidly passed out of sight. The second and third missiles appeared to guide but passed behind the MIO-21 and were lost from view. One source, OPREP 0H1120Z, reported BLUE 1 firing three SPARROWS, Indicating that the third one was fired out of oaranetera at the MlC after the first three SIDEWINDERS were fired. No source Indicates more than three S?ARROWS were fired. No further SPARROW firings by BLUE 1 were Indicated In this event; however, after flrlnir the last SIDEWINDERS, DLUE 1 was reoorted as being out of ordnance. Since BLUE 1 was loaded with olght missiles, It Is concluded that one AI!^-7 must have detuned and, therefore, was not able to be fired In the fight. It Is a possibility that a fourth AIM-7E was fired by BLUE 1 and not Indicated In thJ OPREPS; but due to the consistency of the report of three SPARROWS fired, this situation Is considered unlikely. The HIG-21 continued to turn and started to climb with BLUE 1 violently maneuvering to stay behind. At about 17.000 ft the HIC-21 was a little slow and he reversed. BLUE 1 observed the MIG to be down sun and high against a clear sky. BLUE I went to HEAT and got .i good tone, then pulled lead enough to put the target on the edge of the missile field of view. BLUE 1 fired two SIDEWINDERS which passed behind the MIG. The third SIDE'rflNDER fired .BUlded , and exoloded 5 to 10 ft J^"^er tne MIGs tall at the 5 o'clock position. This missile scored the kill. A fourth SIDEWINDER was fired while the HIG was In a violent evasive mmelver and burning, but it T.lssed and Its furtner flight was unobserved. Event III-207 Por all launches a .ood tone -« ;f J^^^^red'HSlJo^K^Ss' lllT.tle prior to each launch For all jf^J^^f.J^^^^J^.^^'^^^^L^ ^^and 3?!ghtly cllAblng: with. 25» with the «l98lle which scored a hit being fired at 20 . After the third exploded, no Pl«es were objjrved to cone off JJ'/^^^f J/^J^^ the MIG »ent Into a violent maneuver, pulling hard to the IJ^^^J^^^J^J^f J^ut this IS^e-SViS UTrilk .TlZ\irii^rt^^^^^^ « th. «ia, Which did not Euide • a Th. mo kept tuning «d tn.n i.v.i.d SldS'Sln^^SnilSffJS- BLOE flight follo..- the «I0 « asout l/J -ng. '^/S^'^-'^.^IS JlS;,!*" on^nJ c",rtS^ run-ay to Impact 100 ,ard,. south of th. runMy ntar « «5«> «•» »"•• No ojectlon froni the MIC was observed. After breaking right to a heading '^"^."'S;^,?"*.*.^" ""'"inf Se««n 10.000 ft and then made a turn to th. west of Phuc Jen, „.adlng east. '^^^^^^ ±1 'tr2Trl^\Tl Jiii?J.'r:2.5!'"llJ?e%M2!%SUJL„t. t.,e flight had not bMn able to regain their pod foi-mation. Just as BLUE 3 rolled out from the turn a SJM Passed through^the flight .he^SAM passed 100 to 300 ft ""der the nose of BLUE 3. The a sa^^ ^^^^ IJorfrS^-hJirthrSiS^lrSrlgSnSiS^n^s'!;: JSflid out. alcth-r exploded 500 ft off the right wing. Th* P-105 force had by this time egressed uu Thud Ridge so BLUE flight descended and el^^ss;i out o"r tSe Jalley heading for Hoa Lac. »o flak was observed. When at about '•COO ft altitude and about 5 ml east of Hoa Lac, BLUE ^ Hia-m"i*rclfnJiheTelJ BLUE 3 and U .ere ir^^^/^^^^J-^, ^--i-.^.^SiSSirft :;^iru^e.'•s^?h^ni^i1^:5^^'iIS"bor9oo^^"li irf^ei .i. at about 550 BLUE flight had heard no MIG warnings for Hoa Lac. TeTirdU no. ..tempt to shoot at Br."^ flight as BLUE 1 and J and BL0E^3 and^,^^^ JSSrS StSSdr m.'™i«"!;.rk2E°filgJr.-^s ^itSfrlc^ =l=se^or a SP.P.ROV, shot piuinS tio nwiy COT t SIDEWXIIDER attack, oesplt. thU. BLUE a attempted to fire a SIDE.INOEH 5'-^™hSSS^. rs5 ^h^l:*lS^^K'^- s £ifj'^^^and . 000 0 30.0^^^ 2 to 3 B's. The MIC-17 was nose Jif l^" J ^rosslnran^" ISs about 30" at firing. The "r^JL^ras^'^oSo'?? S5?o°rt^ ^'"3o''UJrSfr"i:%rn «a3%ood for^U launchea. BLUE 2 JtS'So ?ldar°lock and the nlsslles were launched visually. After several turns wit. the BLUE 3,and J Pulljd ".p -J ^jlS^f.^SnhL" „1 to the east and turned to cone ^^^^^-..^LJE 3 got * jadar iock ^^^^ ^^^^^ were still under attack Jj. f^^f^J^J^^^^ier frSx bSe 1 . 3LUZ 3 faUed to connunlcate fSreiScrsiJuJu^n' SSw?"i:inrBLSS''rand% did not pun .ut Of the MlCs pattern to allow a SPARROW shot. ea.apAu ,h.M- BLUE T rressfed on in for a SIDEVIMDEH attack and. Not setting the SPARROW ^hg^, BLUE 3 pre. s fed on ^^^^ «lth a good growl "l^*®*^ JVnc uo It ?he MIG . started to close Into firing paran- .ho.t»ih°l t'aSfo! ^^^^^Vi^i'^-^^ S^iiJ-af LiSlMSS and the flight broke off and egressed. Event III-207 J . Mr IIP 7 wa-T-"! bv BLUE 1, saw a MIG-17 at hlB 7 o'clock edsas which tapered off towards the Vuselav.e . Dunns egress, SL'JE U jettlson-d four Ari'-Ss due to fuel conslderatlOM. After refuellne with ORAHCE AKCHOH, the flight returned to base. Event tir-208 - ■« J Pour "-UCa V8 two to three Aircraft Involved: Four ur>ident Results: No damge Vicinity of Encounter: 2i»32'M/l0r57'E PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOH Dat«/Ttme: 3 Kay 1967. 1710H 1. DATA SOURCE Ci:;CI'ACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 2. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ^nO CP fU^t r.r ».,A "rl^e .eld to -"^^.ro^/iS-rhf^^"-"'""""*'' four .ms UP vortex condensation "all» «^ » InTZn ", 30 «lle. from fUgMi Event 111-209 Aircraft Involved: Four P-IC v» two unldent^ Reaulta: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: 21°20'N/10U«»25'E 1 PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlr,e: 4 t-tay 1967. 1«'25H, 14lle8' to right, Event 111-210 Aircraft Involved: Pour P'^Cs vs four MM-cra*v mo- 178 and four fuO-Zia Results: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: 2in5'H/105-n'E 1 PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/Tlne: «» 1967, 1M3H 11. DATA SOURCE CIKCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68, 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION «.o a^ ifi DQO' was IneresslnR alont; Thuc. rldee when lead spotted KIG CAP flight at l6»59°^^^jTrt-i7 heading directly beneath; a cllrJulng three silver and one <:a-noanaEed '^^^'J^^^^^J^^Ji ^ics disapceared before ■ -j::;:..^!.s;.no"i a? . ^^^^^ - ( Event III-211 t % Alrcrcft Involved: Fcur P-105s vs one MIG-21 and two MIG-17S Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: Near Zl'OS^N/lOS'Sl'E 1. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Datc/ritr.c: *J May 1967/ about l'»35H Pour '■'-lO'jDa (BLUE flight) were part of a strike force from Takhll attacking JCS ?:-.2ii. Which included l6 strike aircraft (ef which BLUE flight was one and the flight of Fvent 111-212 and GREKH flight of Event III-207 wei-e also menbers). In addition, the I force Included a flak suppression flight and an IhZ'.i IIAHD flight was in the area between i n^-iH^U/UVjO^yz and 21"?1'?I/105"'>5'E. The strike force was supported by a MIGCAP of eight P-*Ca. The flight of Event III -207 was part of these. 11. DATA SOURCES ."■essages, Rororta : 355TFW QUI 3 30 Kay 67 OPP.EP-3 DOTO-01i557 12. NARRATIVE OESCPIPTION BLUE flight was warned of a ■•IIG attach: by Its P-** cover {Event III-207) and was directed to break right. The flight broke retaining ordnance but when warned a second time, dropped Its ordnance in the vicinity of phuc Yen airfield. The flight observed one HIC-21 break off after a single pass. Two HIG-17a pressed an attack on egress but the flight successfully evaded them. Event III-212 Aircraft Involved: Four F-105s vs one MIC-21 Result; No damage Vicinity of Enchanter: Wear Zl^OS'M/lOS'Sl'E I. PRIMARY NISStON AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: H May 1967/Shortly after lt35H Pour P-105a (BLUE rilsht) were part of a strike t'crce from Takhll attacking JCS 82. 2^4 , which Included 15 strike aircraft i about a t^uarter of the way up Thud .^Idge when he started an easy left turn and disappeared. Although not seen by BLUE 3, on egress a MIG-21 launched a missile at BLUE flight but the launch was out of range and the nisslle was ineffective. It was surmised that the Mia-2l seen by BLUE 3 was the same MIO who was drying to catch up with the flight for an Interception when the flight turned at the top of Thud Ridge. Event 111-213 Aircraft Involved: 'No KF-tCs vs Two HIG-17S Result: Slf.htlng Vicinity of Encounter: 21^59 •H/10'<°30'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: H May 196T/1615H I ■ II. DATA SOURC£S [ 132 TFW 0U1200 May 1967 OPREP-3 TUOC -3267 12, NARRATIVE r* Two RF-JJCs were on a mission against JCS 32.2'». The weathtr was scattered clouds with two-eightj ccverafic, with bases at U500 feet MSL. Visibility w&s 7 miles in haze. The flight departed Udorn and flew to 18*25'H/103''25'E at 20,000 T'ej;, ^5°™ they proceeded to 20°26'N/103-'»3'i then to 21°55':i/10a«lii'E and then to 21»58':J/10I.»30»E. \ Frort there, at 2000 foot altitude, they proceeded to 20«'26'H/103*13'E and then to Mom I at 29,000 feet. At i6l'iH when at ai^SO^M/LOti^SO'E tha two RF-*»Ca heard a MIC call from Red Crown of "MIGs heading 310 degrees IJorthwest. " At the same time the flight received a yellow T" border violations :all. I Descending from 20,000 feet to 2000 foot altitude, the flight did not receive any signals. At 1615H when at 21''5'«':4/10U"'30'E In a descent on a heading of 010 degrees the r • flight observed two MIG-175. The KIOs were at 10.000 foot altitude at 10 o'clock poaitlon I heading 310 degrees. ^ • The RF-14CS descended to the deck and broke left and did not notice the MIGa to make any move to engage. The .-nisslon was aborted and the flight returned to base. Ho markings were observed on the MIQs. t Event III-21J* Aircraft Involved: ?our P-I05s vs one 1110-21 Results: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter; 21»28'N/105'10'E 1. PR! HART NtSSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 1 Kay 1967, lt41H n. DATA SOURCE , CINCPACFLT ,ftmf r Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ALFA strike flight saw HIO four miles ahead; flight was descending through 10,000*; KIG made no hostile moves. Event: ZZI-215 •**lreraft Involved: One EB66C vs one unident Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21*o6 'N/loa^SS 'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Dat«/Tl«e: May 1967, lft53H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ECM flight at 32,000' escorted by the aircraft In Event III-209. observed a dark, unident A/C making a low pass, coming In to 6 miles from 1:30 o'clock and then departing. Event III-216 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs two Mia-2l8 Results: Sighting Vlelnlty of Encounter: Ten Vlen RR Yard I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 5 Hay 1967, 1730H, 17^fiH II. DATA SOURCE CIHCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ItuBiber 4 of ALFA strike flight, after completing bcmb run, saw one MIO and recovered at alternate base due low fuel; at second time shown, remainder of flight was egress Ing at 22,000* when It saw cne KIC, 20 miles away at 8 o'clock position In a eight orbit; no hostile action observed. Event rn-217 Aircraft Involved: Eight P-1058 vs one HIG-21 Results: No damage Vic m It? of Encounter: 2l»06'W/103»55'E I. PRIMARY NISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: Hay 1967, IftSJH II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Starr Study 6-68. 12, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Two fllRhts reported seelnc: one KIG-?I in the seneral vicinity of Sam Neua in Laos; yilO nade a desAcnciJnf; pnss on ^2 of one flight and came Hlthin 4.000' before broke hard left and lost sight of MIG. Event III-2I6 Aircraft Involved: Eight P-105s vs two MIC-Zls Results: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: SO^SS'N/IOS' 33 'E 1. PRINARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION C ate/Time: 5 May 1967. Unknown n. DATA SOURCE • CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike flight unable to acquire target due to poor visibility and heavy cloud cover; flight leavin? target vicinity when they heard another strike flight call two MIGs at first fil.-ht's 6 o'clock position; first flight Jettisoned ordnance safe but did not see any KIGs. Event ZII-219 Aircraft Involved: Onn RPIC vs ? Unldent Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21"20'N/104«37'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 8 Kay 1967. 03f3H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Inbound photo A/C received X-band signal ahead while at l.OOC altitude; subsequent stronger X-band signal at 6 o'clock led to nlsslon abort; photo A/C broke right and egressed, followed for 8 minutes by X-band slpnal. 243 3 Event III-22Q Ij Aircraft Involved: Pour P-«C. V3 t« MlC-Zla ReauU: Sighting oaly ■ !> Vicinity or Encounter: JPJ-^-i^i^o?"" H 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION ^ Date/Time: 12 May 1967/1638H ^„,.,«^ TaRCAP for a strike group of l6 A fllpht of four P-tCs (CRANGE flight) P';''^^'*^"* "J"! " „Ties northwest of P-lOsJ. The target »as the Ha Dong Army barracks/supply area three miles Hanoi. JCS 31.00. 5. INITIAL DETECTION T«o MIG-213 -ere observed to be In pursuit of four P-lOSa. 6. ACTION INITIATED emraaed the MIG-2la. (3 The F-1058 continued toward the target area as the P-Wa engage Va 11. DATA SOURCeS Mi.*»g gea. Reports : V^;r^E;P-3U11552 «ay 1967 OP«»V OP^ Box Scor. U. ll»«ll«tIVE OESCBIPTIOII , h,., aLUE OREEK, and BUCK tllghW fl Sixteen F-1053, m "'^•■"^f^/r'^r"",^ n™b""!cf 3i:oo"'S.-Don5/m^^ U target area. r.l05s) was briefly ^ While inbound to the target area BLUE ?,^{J^|,\Si/were engaged by ORAtlGE pursued by two KIG-21S. The MiGs broke off the r atta.K a^^^^ _ , Ingress to the Tulll Sheen night -tner ' ^ftLn ^^rengage was .-de^^^ BU« fSeh? ( 'a rlllht of f-loS) sighted four MIQ-17s while inbound to no attempt was made to engage. a 244 a 9 a a R s 3 f r: i: V I 1,. Event III-221 Aircraft Involved: Twel v F-105s vs two HIG-218 and five MIG-17s Result: Siehtlng only Vicinity of Kncounter: Approximately 3 to 13 miles northwest of Hanoi . 1. PRIMARY HISSIOH Ano TACTICAL SITUATION I Date/Time: 12 May I967/1C35H ^- northi.,t ,f Hanoi. A-r!r.eS?1r":ic= ir.^^^^ ".liL^^'n I . 2. MISSION ROUTE The strike group from Korat, approached the target area from the northwest. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATI QMS F-105 BLUE 1. ?. ^. a: ERCV ::? 1. 2. 3. ii: BLACK 1. 2. 1. »l 6 - M-117 bonbs 1 - M-61 CREL-N F-ia5 QRZEU I. 2. 1. li H - CBU-211 I - H-61 grf.e;i 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER «fc «S! '"ii"*!-?!!^^? •"cour^cered intense AW/37/57 and 85 mm AA fire from the tar- area- An extremely hostile environment of heavy flak, SAMs and HIGs prevailed In the 5. INITIAL DETECTION ... urn !!^^^* ^^'^ ^^'■5^^ ^'•'^*» ^'^''-^^ "as briefly pursued by two HIG-21s Tha i '^^^^-^ attack as tney were enrac«--d by a flight of F-^s (see Event tit 330^ f GREEN flight Observed two MIG-21S during Ingross to the tlrge? a^d one 5?C-n LJlng *5f?"; J° attempt to engage was r.ade by either side. BLACK flight sighted four MIO -17a while Inbound to the target but no attempt was inade to engage. *sn*ca ^our am xfa ' ' 6. ACTION INITIATED t. . None. 11. DATA SOURCES f - {■ • Messages: 388 tfW OPREP-3121155Z May 1967 L. CINC PACFLT staff study 6-68 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION See paragraphs 1. H and 5. 2H5 Event 111*222 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-4Cs va five MIC-ITa Result: One F-IC lost Vicinity of Encounter: 20"59' N/105* 30 'E 1. PRINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 12 May 1967/l6' 3 2 SPARROW (AXM-7E} 2 SIDEWINCEH (AIM-9B) 1 20inin Run (SU(J>16) 1 QRC>160 ECK pod P-IC BLUE 2. U 4 SPARROW (AIM.7E) « SIDEWINDER (AIH-9B) 1 QRC-160 ECM pod WlG-lTs Sliver with red star on top of wings. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Clear in the area of the encounter. BLUE I I I I J I I I T 2 3 IT Altitude ; 5000 to 7000 ft Heading : northwest Speed : llOO to 500 kts Puel State ; No external tanks Plight Forwatlon ; Fighter escort In two elements of two fighters each. 5. INITIAL DETECTION As the p-105 strike group began egress from the target area with BLUE Flight pi^o- vldlng fighter cover, the backseater In BLUE 3 called, "MIOs 11 o'clock, low." No MIG warning had been received. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 4 was told by BLUE 3 to close up the formation and BLUE 4 replied that he was experiencing difficulty with the afterburner in the left engine. BLUE I (Lead) reported contact with the KIGs at 10 o'clock low and that he waa initiating an attack. BLUE 3 acknowledged and Indicated support of the attack. 7. SITUA7I0N DEVELOPMENT Moments later BLUE 3 sighted two more KIGs at 9 o'clock and reported to BLUE 1 that ) he was terminating his support to BLUE 1 and was attacking the second section of MIGs. - While maneuvering to attack, BLUE 3 sighted a fifth KIG naklng a run on him In his 7-8 o'clock position. A SAM missile call at this time directed the attention of the crew of BLUE 3 elsewhere and the diversion waa sufficient to cause BLUE 3 to lose sight of the MIfis. In an effort to relocate the MIGs, BLUE 3 rnade a Jinking climb to approximately 9000 ft- Pron this position BLUE 3 saw a fireball at one o'clock low which was BLUE H. Prior to this, BLUE 1 and 2 pursued the first section of KIGs. BLUE 1 gained a firing position on MIG 2 and launched a SPARROW (AIM-?) rlssile in the boresight mode. As the missile war, launched, I'lO 2 tlr.hter.ed his turn. After- guidlntr directly toward the MIG, the missile detonated at approximately 100 ft, 6 o'cloci* fron MIG 2. BLUE 1, with BLUE 2 on hla wing, yo-yoed off and .naneuvered Into position again. Once again the MIG I 8 1 I i 9 OLiVs. c an ma win(^, /w-jruc;u w. i aim ^iiaiieu versa j.nbu poaib^cn again. unce again bfie niu m tightened his left turn and the SPARROW, although tracking nicely at the MIG's 6 o'clock ft position, burst approximately 100 ft short of MIG 2. Again ULUE 1 and 2 yo-yoed off high, ^ [. f: i: ; Event 111-222 1 but this tlrae a single F-itC was observed, low, on a reciprocal heading, with two HIGs slowly B^?'*^"^ ^-^^ ^ o'clock position. Repeated warnings were given over the radio but the . il> failed to take any evasive action. When finally hit, the F-^JC burst into flame. This ' P-'iC was BLUE k. ^ 8. ORDNANCE I (No. fired/No. hits) 3PARR0V Gun , AIH-7E SUO-IS Remarks 1 2/0 1/0 Qun would not fire. BLUE 2, 3 0/0 ^ One P-IC shot down. 9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS BLUE 1 - Gun would not fire. No firing pulse to the electric primer, electrical leads broken. BLUE 3 - APQ-100 failure. No SPARROW capability. Generator malfunction indicated after refueling during ingress to the target. BLUE tt - Experienced some difficulty with the afterburner on the left engine. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS BLUE 1 (Lead) - BLUE Plight was using a discreet coiwnunication channel for internal flight coouaunieatlon while monitoring the strike group frequency on an auxiliary receiver. Guard channel was also being monitored for any MIC warnings. None were received. IK DATA SOURCES Project I nterviews : BLUE 1 (Lead) front, 22 June 1967. Messages ; 366TPW OPREP-3 121330Z May 1967 366TFW OPREP-3 12?1C0Z May 1967 366TFW OPREP-3 1314252 Hay 1967 AIM-yn/E Missile Fi.'lng Report 12. .NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION A ni 5ht of four P-^Cs (BLUE Flight) wa-s provliln? MIGCAP for a strike group of F-1058 _ against target JZS 31.OO. While In the target area the flight encountered SAMs and AA fj.re. Previous to entering the area BLUE i test fired his gun, but it failed to fire. As the strike group began egress fron the target area on a northwesterly heading, BLUE Plight was provldlni; fighter cover. Four MICs were sighted at L o'clock, low, by BLUE 3 (back). When directed by BLUE 3 to close ud the formation, BLUE li advised that he was experiencing diffieulcy with the afterburner on his left engine. BLUE 3 decided at that time not to use afterburner to insure that BLUE t couid maintain a fighting wing position. Within seconds BLUE 1, with BLUE 2 In fljhtlng wing, and BLUE 3 and ft providing support, initiated an attack on MIC 2 (the second MIC of the section). A moment later BLUE 3 sighted two nore MIOs at 9 o'clock with approximately one mile separation from the lead section, BLUE 3 called BLUE 1 and reported the MICs stating that hi.i element was ^ separating from the lead element to attack this second section of MICs. BLUE 1 acknowl- edged this transmission and pressed on with his attack. The lead element, BLUE 1 and 2, made a lescending left turn in behind the lead MIG section and closed the range to about one mile for the trailing MIG, MIG 2, which was in a L gentle left climbing turn at approximately 1*500 ft AGL, 500 ft below BLUE 1, at the 12 o'clock position. KIQ 2 was acquired in the boresijht mode and BLUE 1 launched one SPARROW (AIM-7E) missile. As the missile fired, MIC 2 tightened his left turn. Although the missile appeared to be guiding directly toward the >!IG, the fuze detonated the warhead 100 ft short of the target at the MIG's 6 o'clock position. To prevent overshooting the MIC as he continued his left turn to the insidt, BLUE I and 2 pulled up Into a higher yo-yo. At this tirie BLUE 1 feels he could have nr.d? a successful gun attack against the MIC if his gun had been operating properly. As he .maneuvered down from the yo-yo, BLUE 1 (i* kept MIG 2 at his 12 o'clock and descending to eo->altitude , 5000 ft AGO. .''IIG 2 was ac- quired in the manual track node and another SPARROW was launched from a range of 1-1/2 mile. Once again MIG 2 tightened his left turn and the missile, although tracking nicely at the MIC 'a 6 o'clock position, detonated approximately 100 ft short of IMG 2. Again BLUE 1 and 2 yo-yoed off high to gain sesaratlon. At this tine BLL'E 1 saw an P-'IC at II o'clock low, on a reciprocal heading. In a slight left turn, with two MIG-I7s slowly closing fron his 7 o'clock position. It Is possible, according to BLUE I, that the two MICs were MIG I and 2. After check! th.T* BLUE 2 was still in his fight Intc wing position, 2LL'E 1 called over his radio, "Single you have two MICs on your tail I" This F-4C was BLUE 1 v/r.c had become separated from .LUE 3. BLUE 1 called several tines for the P-U to take It down and left but there was ao visible response. The single F-^ C...- continued In a slight left turn as the MIGs closed ',he range to approximately 1500 ft and L 217 Event III-222 fired two burats of what appear»M to be 37nim which missed. The F-J* then began to cllreb slightly while still In a left ivvn and the MICs contlnuefJl to close to about 1000 ft In range. BLUE 1 then called, "Ok, tnkt; It up!" hoplnsr, that the KIGs would p.iss under the P-^. But, once again the F-*» (i.LlT t) failed tc respond and continued In ^ =ll3.^t, left, cllmblnR turn. The closed to a range less than 1000 ft and fired three more bursts at BLUK a 33 the entire aft section of the al:-plane burst Into flames. After about five seconds during which t.he Liirnlt.t: ■•JnUane maintained pltcn and bank, the left bank In- creased and the airplane pltchfi :.i>5e down. As the nose of the airplane passed through the horizon, BLUE I saw one sea-, eject and saw a good chute open. BLUE 2, who was trail- ing BLUE 1 saw one crute collap'.l'.f, on or near the ground and saw another good chute approximately 2000 f; abcve it. From the point wl-.ere aL'JE 3 r.ifhted the second section of MICs the two BLUE elements separated. Because 0." a radar fftlli:re, BLUE 3 did not have a SPARROW capability but did have two sidewinders md a 2C:r.:. j:!l!i-i6 gun. As BL"E 3 maneuvered to attack it Is not definitely known wh^-th-^r BLUE 'I followed, although from his previous position, and In the absence of any radio i ransnlssic:; to the contrary, it was assumed that he did follow the maneuvers. As BLUE 3 ."^-ade a descending 3 g left turn towards the MIQs (MIG 3 anJ 1) he was attacked by a single .MIG O'.ICi ■.) from the 7-3 o'clock position. Continuing in a left descending turn, BLUE 3 lncrea3t.'i to about U g which was more than adequate to cause MIG 5 to overshoot. At this tine a SAM call directed the attention of the crew of BLUE 3 elsewhere and although the SAM was not sighted the diversion was sufficient to cause BLUE 3 to lose sight of XIG 5 as well as MIG 3 and U . A Jinklne cllnb at high speed was made to about 9000 ft in an effort to relocate rhe MIGs. The niGo were not sighted, so SLUE 3 maneuvered to position h'.a element opposite and above the lead element In an ef.ort to get a rear quartering; shot at r.ne MIG which BLUE 1 was chasing. After at least one 360 degree, low-g turn at speeds fror. t20 kts to 500 kts between altitudes of 5000 ft and 10,000 ft, all during heavy flaJc and occasional SAM calls, BLUE 3 sighted a flreoall at 3 o'clock low. His first lr.preE."«:on was that an P-105 had been hit by a SAM but a quick visual and radio check ccnflrBea iJLUE * was not with BLUE 3. Just prior tc seeing the fireball, BLUE 3 heard the transir.! scions of BLUE l. BLUE 3 observed one chute, well away from the fireball. While making a circle of the chute BLUE 1, 2 and 3 received a loud and clear signal from one emergency beeper. During the entj :reir.ely heav, ... -. , . , ^ , the area with BINGO fuel, proceeded to WHITE ANCHOR for aerial refueling, ana to a point ^0 nlles northwest of Hanoi to provide RE;S;:AP for a ?-i05 pilot whc :ire encounter, which lasted four to five minutes, BLUE Flight encoun- tered extremely heavy flat:, five :-:iG-17 enemy ^*lshters, and several SAHs.^^BL'J^^ departed returned toapoxnv-.^ ..- — - - had been shot down earlier. Intense ground fire was encountered wnlle trying to pinpoint a beeper signal. At Bi;:cO fuel, ELUE Plight proceeded to .RED AtlCHOR and aerial refueled bafore returning to base. Flight duration was 4 hours. 50 minutes. NtSltU rtaiM MUMTtHS SMMOM U1S>H) riillM IT KOC > AttMiat ITCH («T Tint OF ruma) 1 t AIlCtiFT TTPC F.«C F*4C ALriTHOI •MO rt SUO ft MCH .M .If NCMIHC ATT 1 roof Uvtl iMtl riCMTCa JlSftCT TO TAKCET 10* 0* AHfifarr TMUT TTPE Nie-17 HI6.I7 M,TtTaOE fooo rt loeo ft svcb NACH .1i MACN .11 NANEUTEI l«f tun FltmC lANCf 1.1/4 ■lit l>l/2 all* FtBIM MM ■■rttliht Htnml tr4ck r«*|« ••If rOLAItZAflDN CLUT1E« GATE SELECIieH •IT CHECK ANn AIAOT AKS SEltCT LldHT with rtnqt trict ltftt i •'clock. Siat It flrlt rlrl«f L. li: F.vent ni-223 Aircraft Ir.volved; Four F-lOSs vs five HIG-17s Result: No damage Vicinity of i-ncounter: 2lM5'N/105«'95"E 1. PRIHARt MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oaf/Tin,e: 12 May M/l^M^ suppression for a foUowlnc strike Pour F-105S (BLUE FUcht) wer« providing riaK -upprosawn flight of V-105S. (See Ever.t II1-22^J. "i^'mirL.oac... .... ..r..c .re. rn» '.^ n=rt...... r.yln, ,c„..c..terl, .lo„r the west side of Thud Ridge. 3. AIRCRAFT COtIf IGURATIONS* Fwipg BLUE 1. 3 2 U50-gal. external fuel tanks 6 75a-lb bornbs 1 sioewi:::er (ai«-93) 1 QRC-160 EC.'-: pod 1 M-61 20inni gun P,10S BLUE 2. 1 2 Ji50-gal. external fuel tanks 6 750-lb bcmbs 2 QRC»160 ECM pods 1 H-61 20n'jn gun 4 FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER JeatL- LOW. scattered clou.s at 2500 ft with good visibility under the clouds, tops BLUE ^_ Altitude : 2000 ft AGL 550"k?s Plus Plig ht Pomation ; QRC-lSo ECM Pod forrcatlon , - A night of rour MIG-17S was sighted BLUE 1 (Lead) called, "MIGs at 12 o clock. * "^f ^ °i The KIGs were at a VZ^\r.lVro\\l.^^Vx, TTo IWA .iUV front of BLUE .light heading in the opposite direction. "rpuill .rtT^rnr ^ ..n.lm.*. on c=ur« ..e «I0. ..neu-.r.. to,.r. the rear of BLUE Flight. 7, SITUATtOH DEVELOPMENT 7, siTUAiiu" Ht.ii.. rii105s vs KIG-lTs Result: H? damage Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^lS'N/lOS^IS'E t. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 12 Hay 1967/About 1642H Pour P-105S (BLUE Plight) were part of a large strike force from Takhll attacking a target near Phuc Yen aircraft. BLUE Plight was attacking with the flight of Event III- 223. The force also Included the flight of Event III-225. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS Although the AIH*9B that BLUE I earrly five WIG-17s. In trying to Intercept the 5eld fUgh? the MIGs endld up in position for BLUE Flight to attack One HIG was S^^agefand llthough not actually observed to Ixpact with the 8?;°J!"<»V»/J?SS'lir? Jhe sighted below a cloud whi=h was attributed to the crash of the MIC. The KIOs left the area and BLUE Flight continued to the tar?et without further MIQ encounters. r" ! Event III-226 t ,. Aircraft Involved: ?our P-lOSs vs two HIG»17s r - J . Results: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: 21»17'N/105'''»9 'E i' 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION L Date/Time: 12 Kay 1967, l6i 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION w.ni.«^n.p TWO RP-^CS (BLUE Flight) '^-^^-^1^^^^^^^^^^^^^ fhev then proceeded to the tareiet (Route 7, segment J) at q-q jt was The weathe? was broken clouds wUh four-elGi'ths coverage with tops -.t 12.000 ft. dear above the clouds with good visibility. At 1610H. after completion of the target run BLUE Plight cU^ Jt;.^^e»^ra of hlE rilcht at 7 o'clock, 3000 to *D00 feet back. He continued to turn and the MlGht i-cjointd. No flight member except BLUE 1 actually saw the KIG-17. licwever, when coralnr, off the tarp;et one other flight member (OPREP Indicates BLUE 3, Interview sitya bLUE 3) saw an explosion and thought that BLUE 1 had tieen hit. S'hlle scelr..:: inio, the fiight nenber was turniRR right as a pre- planned post-target Jink and whvn he turned bai;k to the left BLUE 1 came up In front. No flight member saw the MIG Impact. The whole encounter was estimated by BLl/E I to have laated 5 to 90 seconds. In all firings BLUE 1 expended a total of approximately 500 rounds of ammunition. BLUF. I fired the frun at the MIG ^ecause he was too clohs to fire the SIDEWIIJDER. By the time the MIG had gained separation, he was K«meuverlriG too mucn for BLUE 1 to use the missile . While in the target area 3Ll'E ^ saw a SAM but no eva-ive action was required. The rilSht did encounter Intense 37/57/85n.Ti AAA from the target area. Event III-231 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-1055 vs 1 M10-17s Results: No dannge Vicinity of Encounter: 21«17'»/105*35'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION ANQ TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 13 May 1967/about 1623H Four P-lOSDs (BLUE Plight} were part oC a strike Torue of l6 aircraft attacking the Vinh Yen Array Barracks (JCS 3**. 00), BLUE Filpht vras performing flak suppression for the other flight -iiembers. The actions of the other aircraft of this force are described in Events 111-230, -233 1 and -238. The probable order r,f flights striking the target were the flights of Events III-230. -231. -233> and -238. 2. MISSION ROUTE Departed Korat and after refueling proceeded overland via Channel 97, across the Red River delta direct to the target. Egress was also overland. (See also Event III-235)- 3. AI8CRAPT CONFIGURATIONS F-105D BLUE 1, 2. 3, 1 4 080-243 2 Durlnp the Ir: BLUE 3 ard H the: dlsenf^^TRed agalr.. BLUE 3 a:.d ti;fi:<- MIGs wort? firlnf. fuel, tht-y egre.-r- 8. OROKANCC Event III-232 u.ukcd the Kins that were orlRlnally sighted and fired two SPARROWS at "'?t.*S missed when fired In the boresl^ht tnode. BLUE 1 s^bseqiiently made the KIOS but could not achieve a flrlnp; position. Although ULUb i r« at hlB, BLUE 1 backseat observed one MIO-17 to fire at tnem from out lilnl turn, nuJE 3 and h were attacked by four MIG-lTs who overshot, r.fi'-ted to 'OT-e back but were fired on by two more MIC-lTs. BLUE 3 and •» rr. return ^ to the battle area, they saw four more HIC-17a, low^. As 10 attack the MlGs, they were, in turn, attacked by two "O"^ Wf°»;, ^ne C:.o of the low KIGs made a head-on pass, and when BLUE « reached BINGO (Ho, flrea/No. hits) SPARROW AIM-7E BLUE 1 MIC«17 HIG-17 MIC-17 MIG-17 MIG-17 Mia-i7 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None 10. AIRCREU COMNEUTS Experience ; BLUE 1 (Front) BLUE 2 (Front) BLUE 3 (Front) Comments on this Er.e 2/0 Cannon 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 I/O 1/0 Remarks Plred In boreslght At BLUE 2 At BLUE 1 At BLUE 3 and 4 At BLUE 3 and U At BLUE 3 and H At BLUE 3 and 4 P-4 Hours 250 200 170 Combat Missions 65 65 5* Remarks ADC experience TAC and KG- 13 5 TAG background 3 1 ! 1 1 a BLUE 1 (Front) Should have tried for more separation on the attacks. BLUE 2 (Prone) - WJirp. enRaged. his airspeed was too low. This was due In part to the requirement to stay with the F-105s. Due to the location of the encounter the P-105s had not started to increase their speed for the run into the target. It appeared that the KlCs were staying in a fixed geographical area. Therefore the tactic was to enter this at high speed and then dash out after the attack. BLUE 1 (Front) - The lack of visibility at 6 o'clock prevented BLUE 3 from knowing when ihe Mldis had alsengased . The biggest lesson learned was the experience gained for the backseater so he could know when the enemy was In a really critical position. The backseater needs to be ab^- to provide this information since he can see more to the rear than the frontseat. 11. DATA SOURCES Project In terviews : BLUE 1 (Front), 1 June 1967 BLUE 2 (Front), t June 1967 BLUE 3 (Front), June 1967 Measases. Reports: 3TFW ljl600 May 1967 OPREP-3 DOI 0523^ Wessap j es, nepor^a . ^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^ oPREP-3 DOI 05229 8TFW 1^10711 May 1967 OPREP-3 DDI 052'43 AIM-7D/E Klsslle ?erformanee Report, BLUE 1 12. NARRATIVE 0E5CRIPTI0N BLUE FllfTht v(L-. part of the MICCAP for a Strike force attacking JCS 19.00. BLUE Plight was tralUnc tV." sirlhc force about 2000 feet high and one-half to three-quarters of a mile back, and the other F-^ rilchc (Event 111-231) was about half way up the line of bombers. When the centerllne tank became dry (at near the point wh5re they crossed the Red River) it was Jettisoned. On -he way into the tarpet. Just before the flight reached Yen Bay, they heard a MIC cAvi^ith"t the KIOS w-re north and west of Hanoi. The lead F-* flight (Event in-23n also^aUe.i fsln^Ie Ki§ II 9 o'clock. Consequently, BLUE flight was looking for MICs at 9 o'clock. BLUE 1 backseat then saw four sliver MIG-173 circling low at 9 o'clock. BLUE 1 then started a left descending turn Into the MiGs. At this time BLJE 1 called the flight to make 262 Event III-232 a prebrlefv ! ;; .:inp:«? frn::i the common strike frequency to a manual frequency which would be used Just by fHi F, rili;ht (a charR^ not made by bLUE 2). As P! nu-.hz turned to attack the four low MIG-i7s, other MIG-17s made a coorrllnated allack 0!i :'r/;:: rilpht rrcr. the rlp;ht and hli^h. These latter MI3-17s were not seen by any mr-r.bpr of ; i.c .itMke force or the other fllRht of F-'»Cs. As a result of this attack, BLUE rilf.ht 3p.I*. , and the actions of the three Independent units will be described separately. bUtE 1 BLUt 1 to the left after the four low MIGs. Since he did net know that BLUE 2 was out of f-Jlo contact, he assumed all was well since no calls of KIGs at 6 o'clock was received. Af -p about 90 iegree of turn, BLUE 1 looked for BLUE 2 but could not find him. However, bl c;. 1 contlnuoo to maneuver, mostly In tho vertical, and subsequently lost con- tact with L- J and 1 also. As b;.U^ 1 continued to turn, he again saw the original four low MIC- 17s going around In a sr.all crMt. at about 2000 feet altitude. BLUE 1 was in a good position so he started an attac;?. Haw-^-.'-.r, since the aircraft he was actackina; was tall on, he was not sure If they were BLV?. 3 nnl or KIGs. At a rant;e of about 2 miles, BLUE 1 made positive Identification and obtalr.cc a lock-on In the boreslght mode. At about one and one-naif nlles, BLUE 1 fired a SPAHhOW nlsslle. When he fired, BLUE 1 was at 1j80 KTAS, and jOOO feet altitude pulling a ? J, In a slight ellnb. The MIO-17 was at about 3C0 knots. About the time BLUE 1 fired, the t<:Q-'.7 had tightened his turn and was pulling 6-8 g's in a gO degree bank. BLUE 1 kept cracking the MIO with the plpper during the missile flight. The SPARROW seeded to but did rot make the turn and missed t'le HIG by 200-300 feet, passing behind . BLUE 1 then pulled some lead on the MIC-17 and about one-half .nlle range fired the second SPARfiO'.;. PLUE 1 had pulled sufficient lead so that the MIG was Just on the radone. The nissllc v*-.-::'. ballistic and passed 100 feet In front of the MIC. When the second missile wad fired, BLUE 1 and the MIO were at about the sane altitude and airspeed as the first shot, with the HIG still In a hlgh-g turn. At the second firing the KIG was almost go degree an^le off to BLUE 1. Althoi:t;h blUE 1 thought he was firing In full svstem, interlocks our, the backseat had not switched to full system. Therefore, BLUE 1 fired in the boresi^Iit mode with a ranee lock. Before firing, the select and ready lights were Indicating satisfactory. The polari- zatloQ was linear and clutter was normal. Gate selection was wide. BLUE 1 then went Into a high speed yc-yo to reposition on the MIGs. He pulled up to 8-10,000 Cef^l altitude, clearing his 6 o'clock. The KIGs were still turning in their "wagon wheel," so BLUE 1 went ii-5 miles away and then descended low and approached the MIGs at 600 k.nots, trying to get a lock-on. BLUE 1 old not stay high for long periods due to the thre.TC of SAMs. BLUE 1 made 6 passes, similar to the one described above, and although he obtained a radar lock-on to a target on two of these, no ordnance was fired. This occurred, since that by the time acquisition and lock-on was completed, BLUE I was too close. As BLUE 1 would start his attack, the MIGs would start to turn into him and three of the attasks resulted In head-on passes. The passes were not all made on the same MIG. All of the iock-ons that BLUE 1 achieved were made In the boreslght mode. Due to the MIGs' maneuver.", BLUE 1 was unable to achieve a tall shot with a SIDEWLNDER. During the maneuvers BLUE 1 backseat was clearlr.f^ the 6 o'clock, since he was able to see MIGs closer to the 6 o'clock then BLUE I front. Although the MIGs tried to get Into a firinc position, they were unsuccessful except for one case. In this situation BLUE 1 back saw a MIG- 17 firing but the MIG was out of range. BLUE 1 called BLUE 3 and >i , and after 3-'* minutes located them. Sometime during BLUE I's passes he S2w BLUE 3 and k making a head-on pass with a MIG. BLUE 1 reached BIMGO fuel as the strike force was passing back through the area, eo he egressed. When BLUB 1 reached the tanker, the flight of Event had preceded him. BLUE 2 During Ingress BLUE 2 heard HIG calls, one for a silver airplane, but was unable to identify then as having been made by any specific flight. When BLUE Flight was several minutes prior to the turn point, BLUE 2 heard a call of MIGs at 9 o'clock. BLUE 2 tiinn saw BLUE 1 start a gradual left turn, but BLUE 2 did not see any KIGs. BLUE 2 continue'! to look for MIGs and then noticed that BLUE I had Increased his turn to the left. At this time BLUE 2 went to afterburner and executed a barrel roll ever the top to (;et on ti-.c outside of BLUE I's turn and get Into position. As BLUE 2 dropped down on BLUE I's right wing, BLUE 2 front looked to his left and saw a single MIG-J7 about 1200-1500 feet away, r.aklng a diving turn from 7-7:30 o'clock. BLUE 2 was headtr.e; abcut east and the MIC was appruachlr.i- from a southerly hendlng. BLUE 2 frcr.t had prebrlefed to have the hackneit charge radio chinnels, bu' this was not accoTiplIshfjd. Therefore, the other Tllpht me-nh.-r j d).<\ not hear BLUE 2*3 call of "HICs at 7 o'clock." Also BLUE I did not see SLUE 2' 3 situation. Event Ill-iji BLUE 2 did not realize that he was on the strike frequency so he then started to " * turn right to permit BLUE 1 to sandwich the MIG. As BLUE 2 started to turn, BLUE 2 -4 r back called for a tank arop, and since ELL'E 2 was at 3-0 l^IAS at this time, he? Jettisoned the left outboard tank. (The centerllnc tank had been previously Jettisoned.) When the tank was Jettisoned the first MIG broke off. (This was seen by BLUE 3 backseat.) As BLUE 2 continued In his right break, he was attacked by another HIC-17 who was shooting at BLUE 2. This MIC was about 750-1000 feet away. bLUE 2 backseat could se-i the underside of the HIC and the tracer arjaunltlon. BLUE 2 at this time was at 6 g In burner but at a low airspeed. With the backseat keeping track of the MIG, BLUE 2 then unloaded and tried to pick up alrspeert, and at the same time attemp-.ea tc Jink sufficiently to spoil the KIG'c tracking solution. BLUE 2 passed throui^h a cloud at about 4000 feet aM then saw the hed Hiver. He did a l80 degree turn and since neither the MIG nor the other flight membcps were seen, BLUE 2 then egressed to a position outside of SAK coverage. On Instructions, he then went to the tanker. • BLUE 3 and U BLUE : and «» heard the MIG calls from the P-1053 Indicating KICs to the left. They followed as BLUE 1 went Into a left turn, selecting afterburner to stay with him. The left turn tuok them away from the strike force and after about 20 degrees of turn BLUE 3 saw a MIG-17 off to the left, making a 90 degree, low attack on BLUE 3 and The MIG was pointed directly at BLUE 3 at this time, making It difficult to Judge the distance to the MIG. BLUE 3 continued to unload, thinking that BLUE I had seen this MIG; therefore, he did not call It. As the HIO closed, BLUE 3 and *« tightened their turn and the r4IG over- shot. There were three more MIGs behind the first one. The second two were together, followed by a single MIG at the end. During this turn BLUE 3 backseat called a HIG-17 on BLUE 2. At this time BLUE 3 and a split off from BLUE 1 and 2, turning inside from the right, and unloaded and accelerated to about 600 knots, after about l30 degrees of left turn. At this tine BLUE 3 started to pull the nose up to turn back, but the backseat called two MI0-17S at 6 o'clock shooting. Although the MIG-I7s were at about 1200 feet range, they were not visible from the front seat, and BLUE 3 felt they were not an Imredlate threat. He continued a 2 g descending turn and headed for the Red River. BLUE 3 could not tell when the MIG disengaged due to the |)Cor visibility at 6 o'clock. He also was not communicating well with the backseater (semantics confusion, not equipment problems) . BLUE i» stayed with BLUE 3 throughout the encounter. They both came under 85mm AAA fire from along the Red River. When BLUE 3 reached the Red River he came out of afterburner, turned, slowing to ^lOO knots and Jettisoned his external tank. Then BLUE 3 a.nd « selected afterburner and after contacting BLUE 1 returned to the battle area at 520 knots, and 5000 feet altitude, heading east. The fuel state at this time was about 8000 pounds.. BLUE 3 then saw four MIC-173 in a left turn at about 10 o'clock low. The MIGs were at about 3000 feet, so BLUE 3 started to execute a high speed yo-yo to 10,000 feet altitude to position for an attack. As he passed through 6000 feet, BLUE 3 backseat called two MIG-175 at 6 o'clock. These MIGs were shooting at BLUE 3 and BLUE 3 and 4 then unloaded and continued to turn. The two MIGs at 6 o'clock fell b( nd, out of position. The MIGs which were seen at low altitude reversed in a right turn, and as BLUE 1 continued his left turn at 3 g he spotted a MIG-17 in a right turn. ELL'E 1 was about degrees angle off and considered shooting, but the backseater was looking at the trailing MIGs. At this time another aircraft cane Into view. The aircraft was heading toward SLUE 3 and BLUE 3 had a shot, but hesitated for a moment to make a positive identification. By this time the aircraft, identified as a MIG, was Inside missile range and after approaching to several thousand feet, the MIG broke right. BLUE U at this time called BINGO with 6000 pounds of fuel so BLUE 3 and U egressed by unloading and accelerating to 600 knots. As they crossed the Red River they again received AAA fire and a SAM was fired, parsing between BLUE 3 and 4. BLUE 3 and U then continued to the tanker. BLUE Flight was engaged with the MIGs for about 12 to 15 minutes. It was felt that the MIC tactics in this encounter were to decoy the P-^s with the low flight of MIGs while a high flight of MI0-17s performed the attack. Event III-233 Aircraft Involved: Five P-105» v» three HIG^lTs Results: Two HIC-173 destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: ?1°28'N/105°30'E 1. PRIKARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oatc/Tlne: 13 May 196 7/ About 1620H Four F-105D5 (CREEJJ Flight) were part of a 20 aircraft strike force attacking the Yen Vlen Railroad Yard (JC3 19.00). The other flights of this force which encountered MIGs were those described In Events 1 1 1-237 "nd -238. The MICCAP for this force was provided by the aircraft of Event III-232. There was IRON HAND, and ECM (B-66 aircraft) sup{jort for this mission. 2. NISSION ROUTE GREEN Plight departed Takhli and proceeded to refuel on GREEN ANCHOR. The flight then proceeded to the Red River on a heading of 030 and then on a heading of 090 to Thud Ridge. They then proceeded down Thud Ridge to the target. Eifress was the reverse route. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS y-105D GREEN 1.3 Centerllne MER rack (Stores had already oe>.n Jettisoned on the target) 2 ii50 gal tanks (dry) I AIM-9B 1 QRC-160 POD P-'105D GREEN 2. H Carried a QRC>160 pod in place of the 1 AIM-9B. . IFF-standbyi TACAN-recelve only raG«i7 ' Dull silver One was observed to have an afterburner 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO F.NCOUNTER Weather : Scattered cumulus, clear below the clouds. GREEN 1. 2. 3. ^ 7000-7500 260^ turning from 310^ 0.9 Mach (550 knots) 8000 lb Plight Formation; Pod formation modified for MIG defense. GREEN 3 was line abreast of Flight Formation ; rod formation Lead. Element was to the right. 5. INITIAL DETECTION While egressing two MIC-l7s turned in front of GREEN Plight > about a mile away. 6. ACTION INITIATED GREEN Flight attacked the NIGs. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT GREEN fired a SIDEWINDER at a MIG, resulting m a kill. GREEN 3 attacked another .MIG and also shot him down with a SIDEWINDER. GREEN 3 v as subsequently attacked by another MIG>17 who fired at him. GREEN 3 disengaged and tht flight egressed without further encounters . 265 Event III<233 8. QRDMANCE C?£Ztt 3 MIQ-6 9. LQUIPHCtiT PROBLENS Hone , 10. AIRCREW COHHCNTS Experience GREEN 3 SIDEMIMi-ER AIK-9B 1/1 1/1 Cannon 1/0 Remarka Onr NIG destroyed One NIG destroyed At GREEH 3 Total Hours 2500 P-105 Hours 3-40C . Combat Hlaslons Remarks ADC Experience Ccniaents on this Encounter Don't try to turn with a MIG-l?. Must attack only those MICs tha: * ^ degree cone In front of the F-105, so that the speed can be kept up, and the NIG closea on rapidly. A KIG flying In between other aircraft is a difficult target. During ingress the aircraft are spaced too tightly to fire. If yea have a two mile separation of flights, the SIDEWINDER can be fired at MICa between the flights, GREEII 3 liked the SIDEWIKDER. and if the MlOs i.tayed cut in force he would propose carry * the vwo missile pylon. 11. DATA SOURCE Project Interview ; GREEM 3» June 1967. Hesaanes. Renorta ; 355 TPW ISHOOZ May 1967 OPREP-3 DOTO-0-H685 355 TW 131531Z May 1967 OPREP-3 DOTO-0-11691 12. NARRATIVE GREEN Plight was the Ifeat flight to strike the target. On Ingress, as GREEN Flight turned to go down Thud Ridge, the escort flight of F-K (Event III-232) broke off to the left and becajce engaged behind GREEH flight, to 'he east. This engagensent was still under way In the sane area some four minutes later when GREEII 3 came back up the Ridge. While -coning down Thud Ridge. GREEH 3 had seen the IRON HAHD aircraft off to the left at 10 o'clock, firing their SHRIKE mlasiles toward the target area. Durlna Jnpress MTGs were called by KIG alert, which indicated that the MIGs were at Hanoi and were moving to the northwest of Hanoi. GREEK 3 did see soiae KIG afterburner llKhts aa the MICs broke through the overcast about three minutes prior to the target. (This was at the same point at which KIOs were met on the way out.) GREEN Flight expended its ordnance on the target and started to egress up Thud Ridge. A m-nber of a previous strike flight had become separated iu-j to engine trouble, and this p-iOS (BLUE 2 of Event l62) had Joined and was flying foraation with the four merabers of GREEM Flight. CJRSEN 2 was on left of Lead, C?.EEN 3. CRSEN ^ and BLUE 2 were stacked -ip to the right of Lead. The flight of f*ve laembera proceeded up Thud RlJge at a i'.eadlng of about 310 deg. They passed through a cloud for about five seconds and on soailng out found thenselves at the turn point at the northwest end of Thud ^idge . As they started to turn to the left one, of the other flights called MICs at the turn. RSEH 3 then saw two MIC-17s (MIC 1, 2) aboi^uoa^d^ off t". the rl;tht and about a mile way GREEH 1 called for the flight to atg|^^H^|^3. a?."EH 2 lit his afterburner at GRE away this time to gain speed 266 i Event III-233 When sighted the f light was st 21°28'N/105°30 'E , heading 260 deg, at 550 knots at 7500 feet altitude. The KIGs were at about 3 o'clock to GREEN 3 and were at 7500 feet altitude, slightly descending, and turning Lo the right. This put GREEN flight at the MIG's 6 o'clock. CR£E!< 3 rolled right and selected the KIC on left of the pair (MIO 2). As soon as GREEN i centered on tne 'AIG, he received a cone from the SIDEWIflDER. GREEM 3 had be-n ore of The target for several rtlnutes and he had set up for missiles. At the sane tliae as GREEN 3*s attack. CREE» 1 selected the other MIG-17 (MIG 1} and ,;on«neiiced on attack, GREE.'I 1 fired his SIDEWINDER and the missile impacted directly on or very near the tall pipe. Pieces of MIG I tm.T'^diately began coning off of the air- craft and grey sir.oke was trailing from the aft 3ectlcr. MIO 1 immediately broke hard left and headed down. GREEN 1 followed MIG 1 down and observed its Impact at 21 33 'N/ 105 28 'E. This Impact was also observed by BLUE 1 of Event III-237. HZO 2 who was under attack by GREEN 3, started a left hand turn, however GREEN 3 had no trouble tracking the '/.IG with about 10 deg cf left bank and only 1 g on the aircraft. At 4000 feet range level, GREEN 3 fired and the missile tracked true and exploded at HIG 2's right rear quarter at t o'clock. Just after GREEN j fired, CREEIJ 1 crossed over in front, but was behind the SIDEWINDER fired by GREEN 3. When hit, fUG 2 immediately rolled up into a steep left bank to dbcut ^iS dag cf bank with oil or a light grey smoke emanating frc:n the rear. GREEN 3 lit afterburner and pulled up into a hard left turn to try to keep MIG 2 In sight. HIG 2 &t this tine was heading about 120 deg and going back to GREEN 3*s a o'clock position. GREEN 3 pulled up to 8-9COO feet and In doing sc reduced his speed considerably . Since GREEN 3 heard more calls of HIGs in the area, he continued a left turn but started down to pick up speed. At ^hls time, he lest sight of MIG 2. When last seen MIO 2 had started a right turn. BLUE 2 saw MIG 2 impact at 21°31'N/105 28'E, and observed the tail to come off previous to the crash. As GREEN 3 lowered his nose, he had co.Tpleted about l80 deg of turn from his original heading. At this time GREEN 3 picked up a HIC-17 cn the inside of GREEII 3'? turn. This MIG-17 was MIC 6 of Event 111-237. MIG 6 was above GPEEM ? and pointed at him. Although KIG 6 was shooting in the general area of GREEN 3* MZG 6 was too far away and was not pulling sufficient lead to threaten GREEN 3. GREEN 3 felt that perhaps G.^£EN >* was trailing ?nd might be under attack so he rolled up and headed down at aboun a 30 deg dive until he reached 550 knots. By this time GKSEN 3 could not see KIG 6, GREEN 3 had separated from GREEN 1 and 2 on his initial attack on MIG 2. GREEN t had remained with him throughout the engagement although he did not see GREEN 3' SIDEWINDER detonate or the attack by MIG 6. GREEN 3 and k then egressed and by the time they reached the RED RIVER they had been Joined by BLUE 2 and a single F-UC. GREEN 3 did not see GREEN 1 fire his missile. 267 Event HI-234 Combat Remarks Second Route Package VI mission All fighter experience Conurienta on this Encounter ; BLUE 1 - This was the first tine that he saw indications of coordinated tactics between two flights of MIGs. This required the F-^s to keep flight integrity and element support. The offensive split Is not any good If you are outnumbered. The MIG tactic aisplayei on this day was as follows: •There were two groups of HTG-lTs. One was a low element who stayed In a tight turn. There was also a high element of two or a flight of four, i-s the F-^s would attack the low element, the hjgh fllp;ht could achieve an attack position. As the ?'^s would dis- engage, the MIGs would switch v/lth the low element floating high, and the glgh flight staying low. BLUF 3 (Frent) - On this dcy , SAMs were fired at then, and the P-^ts dropped ch-ff. It was feit that the SAMs exploded In the chaff clouds. The Air Force and the Nuvy ha.- exper- ienced good results fron chaff aralnst SAKs. However, the F-^ts had no chaff dispenser so the chaff was carried In the speed brakes. The chaff was dropped Just before a tum since the ECM pod coverage was limited during mft:ieuvers. There should be an intergral chaff • dispenser on the aircraft. Must stay in the vertical In order to successfully fight the MIG-17. Host of the flghtSr PUO? trllnlng and experience Is to get In close for a gun klU and this has become «oS»thln« of a reflexT It will take a lot of tralnlj.s to ?du^ate pilots to keep back In |a?Lcte«. Due to the lack of experience, pilots returning with a little excess fuel were practicing air combat tactics. BLUE 3 (Back) - Even though the first lock-on failed, a second try was worthwhile since the sLonS loc k-on held. It pays to keep trying. The battle Is not over Just because you have fired. BLUE 1 (Front) - The man In the backseat was helpful due to the extra set of eyes since he could keep trac k of the KlCs. The failure of the centerllne tank to Jettison could have caused real problems if they had not dls-.ngaged when they did. The performance with the tSnk on is reduced sufficiently that BLUE ^ felt he could not successfully disengage or right the WIG- 17. The flight was prebrlefed for the wlngman not to call MIGs unless they were a real threat. It was important for the P-H to be worked in the vertical. The vertical was used for two purposes, to out-zoom an enemy and Lo help reduce your turn radius However, the maneuver was not used for both purposes at the same time (i.e., either/or). The roll axis was used (i.e., a roll about the longitudinal axis) to reduce the angle off for AIM-9 firing. When the element lead pulls out from 'a vertical naneuver. the wlngman must use a roll opposite to the leader's clJection of turn in order to stay in place. This makes the roll ?"e important, as well as slab (horUontal tall) authority, 11. DATA SOURCE Pro.lect Intervit.-..s ; BLUE 1 Front, 2 June 1967 BLUE 3 F.'-t;iit, iJ^te June 1967 BLUE 3 hack, June 19t>7 BLUE t Front, 1 June 1967 269 Event III>23tl Mgsaagca. Report a : 3TFW 1312?2 May 1967 OPHEP-3 DOI 05229 8TFW May 1967 OPRKP-3 DOI 052': 3 C.;ctlon.-: I and II 8TPW 131600Z May 1967 OPREP-B DOI 052 3'* 8TPW IH0926Z Kay 1967 CPREP-3 DOI 05?52 AIH-7D/E, MlsslXe Perfonaance Report BLUE 1 an^i 3 12. NARRAT!VC DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight was part of a NIGCAP supporting a strike force ec-Rpcs-.-d of 20 F-IOS aircraft tfhleh were attacking JCS 19*00. The first three F-105 fliiihtr. were In a "V formation; two other flights followed 2 miles back. BLUE Flight wi:s with the first three flights while the other HIGCAP flight (Event 111-233) trailed the lasv F-lf}^ flight. The centerllne tanks were Jettisoned near Yen Bay but the tank of BLUE 4 would not release. Although this could have caused an abort, it was decided to continue on with the hung tank. As the flight turned right to a heading of east» they heard HIG calls of 30 miles; 10 miles and then 50 miles northwest of Hanoi so they felt that thoy woiiid see MTGs. About halfway between the Rea River and Thud Ridge, BLUE 1 backseat saw two Hrc-178 vory low at 9 o'clock and called them out. BLl'E 1 fronn did not see these HXCs ss they passed under a cloud, but BLUE 3 did. Since the MIGs were not a threat to the strike force* BLUE flight maintained position and continued on. About one minute later, MICs started to thi-eaten the last two strike flights and the other CAP fllsht (Event III-332) went after these MIGa. BLUE 1 heard the communication from that flight that they were changing frequency and, as prebrlrfod, BLUE Flight also changed over to an auxiliary channel. At this Time the strike frequency was severely cluttered with SAM, AAA, and HIG calls from the strike and IRON HAiJD flights. As BLUE Flight started down Thud Ridge, they heard Ihe coraraunlcaticna' .resulting from the start of the engagement described In Event III<-231. BLUE 1 contacted the lead of that event and inquired If help was needed. The reply waa "I've got one" and BLUE 1 Interpreted this to mean there was one MIC, so BLUE Plight continued on with the strike force after advising the other F-** flight. As BLUE Plight continued down Thud Ridge they received and S5r3i flak from the southern part of the ridge. Also four SAMs, In trail, were fired at the flight but they did not appear to guide. As the P-105s hit the target, BLUE Flight nade a turn and positioned to escort the egressing P-105 flights back up Thud Ridge. The F-105' force was spread out as they started tack up the ridge. There were singles as well as groups of four and six; seme were going up the wes^ side, ar.d others were going up the east side of Thud Ridge. BLUE Flight elected to stay with the group on the east side. Although BLUE Plight could see the P-i05s on the west side of the ridge, they were partially obscured by the broken cloud deck. BLUE Pljght found It difficult to keep up with the egresslng force due to the F-I05's high airspeed. Also during this tine, two more SAMs were fired at BLUE Flight and BLUE Flight dropped some chaff. On the way up the rlage, BLUE U called a MIG at 10 o'clock V3ry low. BLUE 1 did not see this MIG and called BLUE U to take it. BLUE 3 then saw the mG at 12 o'clock but he, too, lost sight of the MIG as It went Into cloud. Several menbers of the flight observed the MIG at different times but they were unable to maintain contact long enough to start an attack. All durln? the egreaa, BLUE Flight had continued to monitor the conversation of those members of Event III-235, which were engaged with MIGs. The number 3 man of this event requested aid; and at the northwest of Thud Ridge, BLUE Flight turned west to assist the Other F-^is. At this time, BLUE Plight was 2-3 miles east of Thud Ridge; and as they turned to a westerly heading, BLUE Flight saw at 10 o'clock a dogfight on the west side of the ridge between four F-105s and four MIC-17S. The MIGs were first seen as flashes of silver at 5 to 10 mile range, and then were identified as enemy at 2 to 3 miles. The MICs and the F-105s appeared to be in a level left turn at about 6O0O-7COO ft altltuie in the vicinity of 21°30 'NV105'»25'E. BLUE Flight Jettisoned tanks (except BLUE ' s centerllne tank), went afterburner, and approached In two elements in trail. On reaching the are;i of the engagement, BLUE 1 and 2 broke down into the .MIGs while BLUE 3 and U crossed over to prov'lde high cover. When they reached the area of the F-lQ5a, BLUE Flight was at Hach 1.2. The elements split and the following description covers first, BLUE 1 and 2, and then BLUE 3 and . BLUE 1 and 2 As BLUE 1 and 2 started after the MIGs, they observed the F-lOSs to be scattered. BLUE 1 and 2 concentrated cn one F-105^ with two MIG-i7s about 1000 ft hehlng, firing at the P-105. BLUE 1 observed this from 2 miles out while he was ir. his descent. Since I3LUE 1 was descending in afterburner, he was overtaking these MIGs ripidly, 'Such as "You pot MIGs at To'clock"; "Little burner"; "Pull m-.ire g's"; "Get your airspeed back up." ^BLUE 1 thinks there could have been two F-105?. Event 111-234 The P-105, which was In a hard left turn, executed a 270* hlgh-g snap roll underneath ^> and headed for the deck out to the right. The MIGs were forced to overshoot anJ started to reverse to the right to go with the P-105. BLUE 1 had been In a slight left diving turn and when the HIOs reversed, he started to pull up because he no longer had a good attack pass. (BLUE I could not turn with the HIOs.} Just before the MIGs disappeared under the radome at 6000-7000 ft range, they reversed to the left; so BLUE I continued his dive, put the plpper on the second of the MIGs, and fired two SIDEWINDERS. 1 When he fired, BLUE 1 did not renember (as per Interview) having a tone, although a good tone was reported In the OPREP sources.^ He was a", about 500 kts at 6000 ft indicated altitude with the wings level In a slight dive. The MIG was in a slight left turn and (BLUE 1 was about 10" angle off. He had 200 kts overt ak? on th<» MIG. BLUE 1 had been unable to obtain a radar lock-on in this situation due to ground clutter. BLUE 1 had Just pushed the stick forward and put the plpper on the MIC. He had less than 2 g on the aircraft at firing. f After firing, SLUE 1 pulled off hard to the right and then reversed back to see the I first SIDEWINDER detonate 30 ft behind the HIG. The second SIDEWINDER was unobserved. The MIGs, when first seen, had been In afterburner and had continued so for the entire engagement . f- After the SIDEWINDER exploded, the MIG-17 continued on around to the left in a tight I diving spiral, leaving his leader. The MIC was on fire from the left wing root all the (. way down the left side of . the fuselage. Although BLUE maneuvered to try to keep contact with the MIG, the HIG was lost from BLUE I's sight as U nal.italned the diving spiral. However, BLUE 4 backseat observed the .MIG to enter a spin at 1500 ft altitude, burning p fiercely. Ho ejection was seen. Although no flight member saw the MIG impact, 3LUE 1 is I credited with a kill. Shortly after losing sight of the MIQ that he killed, SLUE 1 saw two HIG-173 high at 10 o'clock. The KIGs were in a hard left turn. BLUE 1 Immediately pulled the nose over r- and without a tone, fired one SIDEWI^IDER. The missile went ballistic, but BLUE l felt that it was fired too hastily to permit guidance and was fired outside g parameters. At this time BLUE 1 was at 12,000-15,000 ft altitude. He then saw two Mia-17s at 8-9 o'clock heading down in a st.'aisht descent toward a cloud. The clcud was at about 3000 ft altitude. When seen, the MIGs were headed in the opposite direction to BLUE 1. j BLUE 1 turned and got behind one of the MIGs, within SPARROW range and with plenty l... of overtake. BLUE 1 achieved a lock-on in the boresight mode and switched to full system, interlocks cut, although BLUE 1 was looking down on the HICJ. BLUE 1 attempted to ripple fire two SPARROWS but the first one did not leave the aircraft. I When he fired, BLUE 1 was at about UOOO ft range. The HIG was at 5000 ft altitude L. and 0.78 Mach, heading about 200*. BLUE 1 was at about 6000 ft altitude and 500 kts in a slight turn. He had first seen . . the MIO at about 2 miles range and lock-on was achieved at 1 mile. BLUE 1 fired under \ conditions of linear polarization and clutter override. I. The SPARROW seemed to be tracking and both the MIG and the missile disappeared Into the cloud at 21'»36 'N/IOS^ZS'E with the missile following by 1-1/2 to 2 seconds. BLUE 1 followed with a lock for sufficient time for missile intercept and then pulled off. Due to the size of the cloud, BLUE 1 was unable to check to see if the MIO came out of the cloud. At this time, BLUE 1 recognized that he had lost BLUE 2 and was operating alone. Therefore, he called for BLUE 2 and both egressed. BLUE 1 did not know exactly when BLUE 2 became separated; but during one turn, BLUE 1 turned hard into BLUE 2 and at the same time, BLUE 2 came very close to hitting an F-105. As BLUE 2 came over the top to dodge the F-105, he lost contact with BLUE 1. BLUE 2 then egressed. BLUE 3 and k AH of- BLUE Plight saw the battle between the fI0-17s and P-105S about the same time. As BLUE Flight entered the battle, each element of £LUE Plight started after a separate target . As BLUE 1 and 2 went after their MIGs, BLUE 3 backseat observed BLUE 1 to fire a mis- sile and the missile to detonate near the wing root and the fuselage of a MIG-17. As BLUE 3 and 1 entered the fig.^it in a dive, BLUE 3 saw P-105s with two MIGs on their tails. He al3o saw two MIG-17s high but these were no threat. BLUE 3 also saw two more MIG-lTs, Inverted, In a rolling turn ever the top, trying to dive on the P-105s. Tho KIGs were at 10,000 to 12,000 ft altitude. 1} n'he" Mfp£R was set for the kl'/i-S so 6LUE 1 should 1-ave had a tone. \ 271 ^ 4 bvent 111-23'^ jT BLUE 1 was at Mach 1,2 at this tine and since the l.-iGt two Ml^-iVs were alow, he ^i.^ pulled up In an attempt to get a radar lock on them. iiLUr! I sav. t.i.,'it, he was col»g t-i be too close so he pulled up and barrel rolled to the outside. Air,er r»U'Clng this nancuver, he was still too close, ao another one was exe«*5:ted. .*.t this tint-, BLUE 3 was In a g^ooA position and achieved a radar lock-on on** oi' the KIGs as Li.c ocler .'.yii*: off. BLUE 3 attempted to fire only two mlssJles from an overhea'l 'tr-ink but Inadvertently fired three. BLUI^ 1 had acquired the MIG In the boresi^ht rr.ode an; had switched to full system. Interlocks out. Just after the first missile was i'lre:!, lU-j radar broke lock. BLUE 1 backseat Inuned lately, went back to bcreslghc and obtained &::;;tlii>r lock>on and then switched back to fulJ system. Shortly after the second radar Iccic vis achieved, the second missile was fired followed by the third. The first missile was fired when BLUF. 1 was ac aboui 10,000 ft altitude, at Mach 0.9, pulling 2-3 g's. The MIC was at about 8000 ft ar Mach 0.3 headliu?; about 220° in a slight diving turn. BLUE 1 was in a 2Q° to 30** dive with about 20* ar.fje erf. not In afterburner. The closing velocity was 50 to 100 kts. BLUE l had detected and locked on to the MIG at 2-1/2 niie range. For all firings, the system was set for linear polarization, normal clutter and narrow gate. The first missile dropped below the nose out of BLLF- 3*s sl^:hc, failed to guide, and missed the MIG by a*>out 100 ft. The second missile, fired In aocut the sane conditions as the fl'^'^t except for a slightly lower altitude, dropped cut of but reappeared, and was jeen by BLUE 3 to impact the MIC-17 on top of the fusclepe Jlisi behind the canopy: The MIO-17 disintegrated, resulting in a kill for BLUE 3. When the second missile was fired, the system had been switched to full system by the backseater and interlocks were still out. The third missile was fired In the sar;e parasieters as the second. It was last, observed apparently guiding to the vicinity of the destroyej MI3-17. When hit, the HIG was at about 6000 ft altitude. All firings were made at ^000 to 50UU ft range. Shortly after the third missile was fired, BLUE 3 was at a ran^e such that he needed 4 to 5 g's to keep track of the MIG. Shortly after the MIO exploded, BLUE 3 heard a call indicating KIGs at 3 o*'cloek. No call signs were given so BLUE 3 turned and checked that position but ho MIGs were seen. BLUE 3 reversed and started to look for other y,lGa but BL!'S^ 4 called BI7IG0 fuel. BLUE C had stayed wlch BLUE 3 throughout the fight despite the hindrance of the centerllne tank.. (BLUE 3 had purposefully limited his use of afterburner.) When BLUE 4 called BINOO, he had 3000 pounds less fuel than 3LUE 3- As BLUE 3 and 1 entered their vertical maneuver, J use prior ro BLUE 3*s firings, BLUE observed a NIQ-17 make a pass. BLUE Mas climbing at the time and the MIG was making a level turn, and had about ho° angle off. Therefore, although ch«.' rllG was firing his cannon, he was not a threat to BLUE 4 and this MIC was not called to BLUE 3. BLUE * watched BLUE 3 reverse in the vertical and fire his mir.slles and as the MIO over- shot, BLUE U rolled in the opposite direction of BLUE 3's "cversal and observed the first missile to miss the MIG-17 by about 100 ft: the second one hit the MIG. BLUE ^ did net see BLUE 3's third missile but he did not have 3LUE 3 and the MIG under constant observation. After BLUE 4 called BINGO, BLUE 3 saw two flights cf P-lOfs with MI0-17s after them but the P-1058 were accelerating away from the MIGs and were net in trouble. He saw the MIGs start t-o break away and BLUE 3 and 4 then unloaded and jinked out. Joining some F-105s for egress. BLUE 3 first saw BLUE I's MIO spinning and also saw BLUE 1 once during the battle. Although BLUE 3 was looking down on the MIG when he achieved a radar lock, the use of the boreslght mode put the ground line in a different location than the NIQ return and permitted acquisition. BLUE 3 front did net realize that three missiles had been fired until he noticed during egress that three of the lights were out. BLUE 3 front was not certain which of the missiles hit the NIQ. His plan was to fire two missiles at the first MIG and then drop back and fire two at the second MIS. BLUE Plight reported 37/57rara fire from 21"30'N/105*25'E durlns the MIO encounter. As part of the overall action of 12, 13 » and It Kay 1967, the U.'iAF Tactical Analysis Bulletin 67-4 indicated that intensity of MIG operationr on those dayn was the highest that had been experienced at the time of the Bulletin publication (June 1967), The aircraft of Events III-232 and 111-233 could hr.vo encountered the same group of enemy aircraft; therefore, some of tne MIGs seen by BLUE Flight of III-23I could be the same HIGs as taose seen by the F-4s of Event III-231 • I Event III>33S • Air;; raft Involved: Pour P-105S V8 5 MO 178 hesults: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 2l'*19'N/105®36'E [ [ G C C [ [ L K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION ; Date/Tioe: 13 May 1967/1 62 IH Pour P-lOSs (BLUE fllcht) v.ere pan of a strike force of l6 aircraft attacking the Vlnh Yen Anny barracks (.ICS 3-. 00). T:.<; actions of the other aircraft of this force are described In Events 111-230, -231> a:i>i -2)8. The probable order of flights striking the target were the nights of Events III-2i'i. "221 » and -230* 2. NISSION ROUTE BLUE flight departed Koiat ard rer.'rll.^d on FED AflCHOR. Prom RED ANCHOR the flight proceeded direct to 20''23 • fVlC 3"*^ 3 ' E th-n direct to the target 21'»19'25"N/105'36 'Sl'^E. Egress was direct to 21*00 'N/lOt'S^'E, then direct to RED ANCHOR for post strike refueling The altitude to the target was l6,00C feet; from the target 10,000 feet. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION P-105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. " 6 7S0-lb bcir.bs (one aircraft had 6 500 lb bombs instead of the 750 lb bofflbs) 2 i(50->gal. wing tanks 1 AIM-9B (BLUE 1 and 3 only) 1 QRC-160 pod (BLUE 2 and H had 2 pods) HIO-17 Silver 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO IHg ENCOUNTER Weather : 4/8 cover of scattered clouds. Visibility 15 miles. BLUE 1. 2. 3. t Altitude ; 15,000 Heading ! Unknown Speed ! 0.9 Haeh Fuel State ; Plight Fortaation" ; - Pod formation modified for MIG defense. The element was up about 2000 feet high, with wingman alaost level. ' All nenbera about line abreast. 5. INITIAL DETECTION Just prior to roll in, BLUE 1 saw two MZ0-17s, low. Inbound, BLUE flight had received HIG warnings from the agencies so they were looking for the MIGs. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE flight prQceeded to roll in on the target. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 1 ktpt In contact with the two MICs, and after bombing the target, started to j attack then. Before he could fire on them, BLUE 1 was attacked by three more Mia-17s , from 4 o'clock high. The lea^ KIG of this latter three fired on BLUE 1, and as BLUE 1 i broke, the MIGs overshot and disengaged. ^ 8. ORDNANCE ^ * \ Cannon ; raG -3 1/0 at BLUE 1 f 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS 1 Hone . I 273 Event 111-235 10. AIRCREy COHKENTS Experience Total Hours Co:..bat Remarks Kuur3 Msna BLUE 1 5000 350 50 Had flown most of * Century series fighters ar^d the P-ll. CoBBsnts on this encounter The MICs had used a bait to try to trap the F-105s. Comments on overall experience BLUE 1: Liked the light Indications on the F-105 to tell when the bombs eoffle off. There Is a real swltchology problen in going from air-to-ground to ?if-*«-**-';_^^^ This needs to be simplified. There are too many switches to throw. In this engagement; there was not enough time to do it. Pert the HIO-17 would not uae his radar for gun tracking so the radar warning would not do any good. Liked the high speed at low altitude capability of the P-105. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews BLUE 1, 5 June 1967 Messages ^ 1312082 May 1967 OPREP-3 DOI 1658 388 TPW 1311tlZ Hay 1967 OPREF-3 DOI 1656 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE flight was tht lead flight of a strike force of 16 P-lOSs and BLUE I was the force commander. The I6 F-lOSa were in a "box" fonnatlor with two flights line abreast. Two flights of P-tia from Danang provided MICCA? , flying behind and about 2000 feet higher than the strike force. While inbound to the target, BLUE flight heard warnings from the agencies (ETHAN), that MIGs were in the area. While at. 15,000 feet tltl'^uae and Just prior to roll In, BLUE 1 saw two silver HI0-17S (HIG 1, 2) flying in trf^l foraation about 1000 feet apart. MIQ 1 and 2 were about 10,000 feet below BLUE flight and did net ^pear to be making any attack. BLUE flight then rolled in and Just after setting up his bomb run with a roll Into the left, BLUE 1, looked to his right and observed MIG 1 and 2 descend, almost parallel to BLUE I's course, and start to make a left turn towards BLUE flight. At this time, it was not clear to BLUE 1 if the MIGs had seen him. BLUE 1 released ordnance at 8OOO feet, and as he came off the target he was going 0.9 to 0.92 Mach in minimum afterburner. The external tanks were still on. As soon BLUE 1 got the nose up off the horizon he again saw MIG 1 and 2 who wsre at 10 o'clock level. The altitude was about 5000 feet. BLUE 1, with the flight following In fingertip formation made a hard right turn to put the MIGs at 12 o'clock, and then, with the KlGs at about 2000 feet range in a hard left turn, ^LUK, 1 nade a hard left turn to make a high deflection pass on MIO 1 and 2. At this time BLUE flight was at 21*19*N/105®36 'E, Heading about 3*0 degrees and the time was 162 IH. As BLUF 1 began to pull l^ad for a gun attack, he was f.ttacked by three more MIG-lTs (riG 3, and 5). The MIGs were in an echelon with yilG-H tr.d niG-5 sllghLly behind MlG-3. These MIGs were silver Ir. color with no marklncs no red. They made a quartering stern Attack on BLU2 1 from 4 o'clock high. MIG 3 coi:i.*:iended firing across BLUE I's left wing. On seeing MIQ 3, ^ and 5 attack, bLUE 2 calJt>d for BLUF' 1 tc break right. He called a second time that bullets were pdssjn;; BL'JE I's v/lng. BLUF 1 had MIG 1 and 2 In the wl.id screen and was estimating lead (he d-d not have time to switch to a computing sight). When warned the second time, BLUE flight broke right ani after about 'lO degrees of turn reversed back to the left. The right break caused MIGs 3» '*» and 5 to overshoot ard they went over the flight to the south and were not seen again. The first two MIGs, 'the bait" (MIQ 1, 2} had ( u r ^ L Event 111-235 initiated a hard cUinbine turn once they hod brouef.t ^^K flight behind them and were noM 180 degrees out from BLUE flight headlns In an opposite direction to MIGs 3. ana 5, After the engaeenent BLUE f light egreaued on a heading of 250 degrees at 10,000 feet altitude in KIG defensive formation (see ^>araEraph «). BLUE fitght observed AAA In the target area and saw two SAMS detonate in the dis- tance but took no evasive action. BLUE 2 was close enough to MIO 2 to see the spoilers on him. 275 Event III-'236 Aircraft Involved: tour P-I05s V3 three KIG-178 Results: Two Ktg-I7 destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: 21°33'H/105''25*E 1. PfdMAKY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION D«te/Tlm: 13 Nay 1967/1623H Pour P'lOSa (BLUE flight) were part of a 20 aircraft strike force attacking t,he Yen Vlen Railroad Yard (JCS ig.OCO). The other flights of thij force which encountered MIGs were those described In Events III-237 and -238. The MIGCAP for this force was provided by the aircraft of Events 111-232 and -233. There was an IROH HAND fllcht and B-C6 SCM support 2. MISSION ROUTE Q BLUE flight departed Takhll and after refueling crossed the Red River at about 21 37'N/IOU 55 'E. Prom there they proceeded to 21 3'''N/105°33'E. They then proceeded down Thud Ridge, north and east of Phuc Yen to the target. Egress was back up Thud Ridge. The attack on the target was on a south-southwesterly heading. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION P-105D BLUE 1. 3 BLUE 2. » 6 750 lb bombs 6 750 lb bombs 2 450 gal tanks 2 450 gal tanks 1 AZN-9B 2 QBC-160 pods 1 QRC-160 pod BLUB 1 aquMklng IFF. Rest of fUght IFF. off TACAN receive only TACMI raeelve only MIG-17 Dull Silver No external stores 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Scattered cumulus clouds bases 3-4000 feet, tops S-SOOO feet. Visibility good. BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4 Altitude: 7500-800 feet 320® 550 kts 8000 lb Pllitfit Formation ; Pod formation* element (BLUE 3 and 4) on the right of BLUE 1« almost line abreast, 1000 feet out, level. 5. INITIAL DETECTION While egresslng, BLUE flight detected three MIG-17s at 1000 feet, about 10 miles away, The HIGs were In a climbing right turn, heading west. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE flight turned left to position at the HIG's 6 o'clock. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT The MIGs continued to turn right and started a head on pass at BLUE flight. As they turned BLUE 1 fired a SIDEWINDER which missed. As the .'^Gs continued to close from head on, BLUE 1 and 3 fired their cannon. BL'JE 2 saw one MIC start to trail smoke and the following flight saw the pilot eject from one !UC and anorht-r spinning. BLUE 1 ani 3 are each credited with a kill. The MIGc were not observed to fin . Event III-236 8. ORDNANCE (.To. n red/Ho. hit s ) SIDEWINDER 1/0 Cannon 20mm 1/1 1/1 Remarks One NIG killed One NIO killed Retnarka This Mas third MIC engagement . This waa third NIC engagement . BLUE I BLDE 3 9. EQUIPneNT PROBLEMS BLUE 3 had d pressurlzatlon Tallure. 10. AIRCREW COHNEfTS Ex{>eri'incs Total F- 105 Combat Hours Hours Missions BLUE 1 3300 690 97 BLUB 3 I'lOO 'i50 82 CoBBBnts on this Encounter BLUE 1 The gunsight Is bad. The radar is such that a lock-on for ranging cannot be achieved at below about 10,000 feet altitude due to ground return. Unless full capability is used (radar mode) the sight does not ccnpensate for bullet drop. The sight is not suitable for the environment. The awiteholory necessary to activate the sight is bad. BLUB 3 Although he heard MIC calls Inbound they did not register as being significant, The aggressiveness of the flight enabled them to get the MIGs . The pilots entering the theatre do not have sufficient experience. The nngagement was fought on terr.3 advantageous to the P-10S< It. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE 1, June 1967; BLUE 3« June 1967. Hessages. Reports 355 TFW 131^00Z May 1967 OPREP-3 DOTO-0-11685 355 T7W 131*572 May 1967 OPREP-3 DOTO-0-11687 355 TPW 131616Z Hay I967 OPREP-3 DOTO-O-II688 12. «ARRATIVE BLUE Plight was on a strike against J.CS 19* 00, A strike force from Korat {See Evi-.its 157. 158, 159, 160) was hitting a target In the vicinity about 5 m'.nutes after BLUE Flight TOT. This target was in the vlclnlt;/ of BLUE Flight's egress route, consequently they were expecting to see MICs. On ingress, the force flew In a string of flights in trail, about one mile apart. Although NIG warnings were received, no HXCs were seen by the flight either Inbound or in ttie vicinity of the target. BLUE Plight struck the target first was the first flight out during egress. Since HIGa were up but SLUE fllcrht .had not be<>n attacked, they anticipated that they would see some, While egresslnc up Thud Hlir?-, it 2l"33'- ': '■^"-'■•'E on a heading of 320 dej:, BL'JE flight saw aircraft Ihru^ftteJ i,-jlr.st ir.f vr.lte clc. l... hr alr^r^rt «er<- in a clir.r !r,,-, rSfht turn, heacir.f- itc-t utsi, IC ril^s awny, at lO-lT-.l} o'rlcc:< to LLJH fUiht. -ir-en first se«n t!*e NISs were « little bit lew. Al! if the :;i:ht strAcn siM ihen'stBaltaneouaiy. •an Event I I 1-2 36 After 3-« «c=nd, BLUE 1 and 3, "CcgnUedth. .Ircraft a. «0->7. ««• ThR three MIGs were In an element with a wlncman In a ribntins wing ?S ll?rl hIg-U miG 3) trailed a3 a single aircraft element, BLUE 1 cane, for an attac. - the «ia3 -. BLUE FU.ht lit t;;e/i^---rcrou5;To on the MIGS. The tanks were Jettisoned. ^-^"J^^y^^ ^ their rlBht tum but BLUE Fllsht descended A3 the flight closed, the ,4IG3 |^ayed in pn^^^^ ^^^^^^^ before BLUE FUcht could get ^^^J^"^!* held^on pass at BLUE Flight, they tightened their turn to the right, to start a neaa «n At this tl»c BLUE 1 concentrated hla attack on MIG lead while BLUE 3 concentrated his attack on KIC 3< - AS the «rcs continued to tum right Into BLUE Plight, the flight had to reduce their left hand turn. When th. HIO, reached about 5-6000 •"Sf.^^'^ ?. "otTavf "a'ton. . At firing BLUE 1 va» .Imost head-on ",f =/"-V;l!3 JJe^nsil' to "y ?o "reaK up the BLUE 1 .is stralsnt and level In l-e/JJf '.^S^":'" "J Jjr.a hid gone high In their s?;* S5'2S« 2j=ei5irg''iuih^irai ^s:/M?ir iz fui... ?h. »i..u. ballistic and passed 2O0 feet from the MICs . A, the HIC. had turned, BLUE 3 had a 'ln.?I„M?"ti. ^ii'"^^^!t''^.^ d..„i! 'r;-gh?nnS^?;:JtU ^^^ii i^^i^rf k^°i^\x.i^^\T7,'^^^'' S:?n tr«Sng tS. HIO. well, a. the, cloMd to about 1000 feet. The HlCa passed Oy very ralpdl, Hlthln 300 feet of BLUE PUght. A. they pasaed. BLUE rsa« ihlie s-jKe ulth a pink eMt tr.Ulng fro. one of th. HIO.. At firing BLUE 1 had the sight "'/"-."JJ^^j^n^d aPoul1oo'rSS.rai°?hrSlo!"' sLS ; ^i^t^s'a^th%^!l^?"roo?'diL.«'r•dl«."'r3^,^^^f^^ .-*i th. of firm. Mas enough to cover the MIG. .Kich^srr-oSU r ti,^ 'tJui vzi .lr=ri?t'5lhSrtReT'^He-?^en'^fu.VroMU^^^^ reversed to the left, rolled, and broke for the deck. The only aircraft BLUE i saw were about a -die behl^ that the flight was not In a good posture to turn after the hiqs ana luex flight egressed. BLUE 2 and 4 did not fire. Event III-237 UlrcMft Involved: Three ?-105Da vs six MIG-lTs Result: Two HIC-17s daiojeed Vicinity of Encounter: 21«13'«/105****E 1. PRtHARy MISSION AND TACTICA!. SITUATION Date/Tine: 13 May 1967/1617H Pour P-105S (BLUh; FllRht) were part oV a 20 aircraft strike force attacking Yen Vlen Railroad Yard (JCS 19.00). The other flights of this force whlnh encountered MIGs were those described In REP-3 DOTO-u- 11690 12. NARRATIVE OESCRfPTION After hitting the target BLUE 2 became separated from the flight. While ejtresslnr the ta-Ket arsa In the vicinity of 2 1° 1 3 " N/105*"t1 ' E at l6l7H, at 6000 ?2 alfuSder'DLDE 1 slchte. one MIC-H C'lG 1) at 12 o'clock «I0 1 made a head-on pass at co-altltudc. MIC 1 and bLUE Plight continued on their respective headings without firing. BLUE Flight continued on a 325=" headinp: for ^PP^?^!"'^' 'llj""^' "Jf^^^^ 105«'3'»'E BLUE 1 spotted three X10-17s (MIG ?. 3. M In a C^'^^^^^J*'^^ *'^^Vo.S^«L 10:30 high position at 8000 feet altitude, BLUE Pllsht w^is at the MIG's 6 o'cloclc. BLUE 1 positioned himself on the number ?/.IC (tWG 3) and f^fn firing. BLUE 1 flrel froT, loOO to 'too feet ran^e. with an angle off of ^0- at MIC 3 » 8 <> '"^""y hlBh. BLUE 1 was forced to breal^ off the attack on «IG 3 when the number 3 MIG (MIG «) threatened BLUE I's 6 o'clock position. BLUE 1 claimed da-ia.:e to MIG 3. BLUE Plight continued on course, Jinking between 6C00 and JOOJ, '["^^^^^^'f! -blJ? 1 ^w- ,.7^AT.il^ 7,r 5i<»^r>">i/iQ';«'?0'E one MIG-17 (KIG 5) atteinpved to fire rockets at bluc 1 f'fioi ^heJr'r l'Zcl\ll posulon.° TLVockJta fell short and dropped off without threatening BLUE Plight. m the area 21°38'N/105*28'E, BLUE 1 saw one KIO-17 In a ttescendlng spiral. The HIQ crashed Into the ground. This waa GREEK I's kill of invent ia-233. , ^^,„ icoDM RFM- 1 "iiff^nted a KIC-17 (MIG 6) closing on GREEN 3 of Event TTT ^''cSlEi 3 was Tft'^tSo otLr So^nt; one of';.hlch was trailing white smoke. SiiSi Pgot Jnto flMng posUl'n on «IG 6 and fired one good burst, observing hits, before NIG 6 broke hard right and was lest from sight. BLUE 2 «w another HIG-17 crash In the vicinity of 2l»3'' ' V105-2B'E. This was OREEN 3's kill of Event III-233. BLUE Plight had received «IG warnings prlcr to their J^^^^ tact with the CAP flights in the proxlailty but did not request support. ^ Event 111-233 Alrcral't InvoU'..'«l: Four K-105s V3 seven MIG-17s ViclrM'.y Of Encounter: 21° 19 ' N/105' 35 ' E 1. PRIMARr MISSION KHO TACTICAJ. SITUATION Date/Tine: 13 "-y lK'7/l*--js' ^ . > -.r-f -V 'ore* of I6 aircraft attacking the Vlnh Yen Four F-1053 (bu:- rW^t) v-r.' part of •» "^fj^* .^r.^ oe-cr«bcd in Events Amy Barracki (-:s ^-.-'-J.^^^e -.V.;:^: = uini;' ...iw.' r'. Tor thU mission, i.le JJJSJ; rnW--. r^U.r^nftaU f»*U of UI-W. -231. -238» anJ -230. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE Wtp.t •''lr>35.'''"'-«."«"S'T!;!3'S?SS o°ve?Un. target froci Channel 57 iree event i..-c3J). -te-o -a- up i.iu ^ for re/ueling. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P.lQ ^D gt.'JK I. 3 € - 750 ItJ bcT.as 2 - 450 eal tankj I - Am-93 1 . QRC-160 poJ Canouflar.vd P-106D 3L'J£ 2. " 6 - 7'>0 lb bona 3 2 - U50 -ral tanks 2 - QRC-iCO cad »fin«i7 Silver with red smr on fujel-.^e * Drop tanks 4 FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER y^eather: Scattered cunnl.s with fc.oes at about 10.030 ft. clear with 11 MT"- t-na b'T.b rvjn but the first MIG he saw was one th.. puU.d ;rS=rof'ni:"rS"H''o-4;5ci"- ii^ I nr.. at the «I. but no Mts were Observed. m fi>^ saw two m^G-ITs following himself and BLUE Ourl.v his dive on the target, HLJE i ,r.° t ^ > „..».,^h«i- rt iif ■» "pa-i q o'clocV' Immediate IV thereafter, three HIC-Ha ir. tral- o.err^hot DLUc 3 .ron 9 o ciock high BLUE 3 then saw' BIAiK attacking some MlCr v;.inn .o ,o.n ..In. BLUE 3 for ecress. 281 Event III-238 6. ORONANCE ?Qtm Cnnnon BLUii «• 1/0 MIO 3 9. EQUiPHkNT PR09LEHS None, 10. AIRCREW COftHENTS Kxpcrlenee 23/37mm Cannon 1/0 Remarks 170 rounds Several hundred rounds Fired at BLUE 1 BLUE 2 BLUE 3 CoHT'en.ts on Th P-105 Hours 200 700-800 Combat Htsslons *5 60 Remarks Kncounter BLUE 2 - Tf.e swltctiology prevented switching from air-to-ground to alr-to-alr, con'- sequently he had no sight. He would like a minimum of switching required to 50 Trom air-to-ground to alr-to-alr like a gunslght with trigger actuation. The M-61 cannon Is a better alr-to-alr weapon than a rocket » due In part to th« low altitude of the engageisent. The SIDEWi;{!)£R Is llMited by "g^s" and therefore not too useful In this environment. BLUL 3 - The MICs which attacked during the bomb run were sufficiently distracting to cause the bonhs to miss the target. The flight Integrity was lost (BLUE 2 and it left their element leads). This pre* eluded successful attacks on KIOs in the target area after the bomb run was complete. 11. DATA SOURCES Project ^ Interv * rws ; BLUE 2, June 1967; BLUE 3» June 1967 Hessa.Tea, K<»corC5 ; • 388TPW 131201Z May 1967 OPREP-3 DOI 1657 388TFW 131308Z Hay 1967 OPREP-3 DOI 1658 12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTtON BLUE Plight proceeded to the target In a gaggle. Inbound, MIO warnlnca were heard which indicated were In the target area. The HIGs were first encountered by the menters of BLUE Flight after the bomb run had commenced. Since each member encountered MICs at different tines &nd were separated from each other, the actions of each are de- scribed individually. BLUE 1 During pullout from the target, BLUE 1. observed a single sliver MIG-17 (MIO 3) at 5 o'clock level, approxlrately 1500-2000 ft away. HIG 3 w firing at BLL'E I. BLUE 1 then rolled over and broke right and accelerated away on th^ deck, losing MIC 3. BLUE 2 As BLUE 2 was bottoming out from his bomb run at about 1^500 ft altitude, heading northwest at 550 kts, a single HIC-17 (MIG ^) pulled out In front In a clisib. Although BLUE 2 had heard BLUE 3 call MIGs during the dive bomb run, this was t:to} and recovered at Nakkon Phanoin due to low fuel. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS p,llC BLUE 1. 3 P^UC BLUE 2. >i 2 AIM-9B H AIK-9B 2 AIH-7E k AIM-7E 1 SUU-16 gun pod 1 pod 1 ClRC-160 1 6oo-gal tank 2 370-gal tanks I 370-gal tank BLUE 1 IPP on, TACAN receive only BLUE 1 had no gun camera on the aircraft. WIC-17 Afterburners Dull silver Red stars on wing tips and fuselage Quns At least one with missiles 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTFR Weather ; Tops 3iOOO to 4,000 ft In some places; visibility good. en's 3" Altltude ; 19,000 ft Heading : 075** Speed : 500 KTAS Fuel State ; (12,000-13,000 lb Internal tanks) (1,000-1,500 lb external tanks) Plight Formation : Pod; element on the zlght. 5. INITIAL DETECTION BLUE Plight heard MIC warnings when they departed the tanker. The lead F-105 (Event III-241) flight called the CAP that KIGs were at 12 o'clock low. BLUE 3 called bogeys at 9 o'clock. BLUE 1 then spotted two F-105s outbound being chased by four MIC-17S, in two elesients. «. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 and 2 jettisoned tanks and started to attack the one eleisent of NIGs while BLUE 3 and 4 started to attack the other element and Jettisoned tanks. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT The engagement separated into different parts, each fought by an element of BLUE: Plight. BLUE 1 and 3 lost the element of MIGs as the MIGs turned away. BLUE 1 and 2 subse- quently fired two SPARROWS and some 2Cein at two other MIG-17S. BLUE 1 then successfully attacked another MIC-X7. In dodglni; the explosion BLUE 2 bcc::se separated and egressed St?parately. BLUE 1 then fired an AI.*4-9 at another MIS and followed with a gun attack but was out of ammunition, and egressed. Event III-239 BL'Jh 3 and t flrvJ an AIH-7 at the HIGs without success. Another attack was nade on another .'•;iG-17, anU t l:<.'i another AIK-7 without succt-sa. BLUK 3 then selected another HIG-i7 and attacked «ltn the gun, scoring a kill. BLUE 3 and H then egressed. 8. ORDNANCE (No. Flred/:Jo. Hits) SIDEWIHOHR SPAPPCW AIH-9B AIM-7E SUU-16 Cannon BLUE 1 BLUE 3 MIC-17 MIO-17 1/0 2/0 2/0 3/1 1/1 Soviet ATO[.L 2/0 1/0 Rewarka One Mra-17 killed. BLUE I uaea all of his 2Cmm ammunition. One MIG-i7 killed. Seen by aircraft of Event III-2'<0 High angle off. 9. CQUIPNeNT PROBIENS BLUE 3 had an cuttcard tanic that would not Jettison. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS EKperlenee ; Total Hours Hcurs Ccmbat Missions Remarks BLUE I Front I15OO 250 63 Back 360 93 11 BLUE 2 Front 2900 350 72 Back 60Q 330 Consents on this Encounter: First mission In Route Package VI. Two years In P-1053. BLUE 1 - Front The MI'J pilots were aggressive and good. The KIG that SLUE I hit did not see him. The MISs usea afterburner freely, as seen when nhey passed across BLUE I's nose. When In trouble, they would go to afterburner and descend into the cloud deck. Looking at the radar scope will not permit dete'Jtion of the MIC's movements In sufflelent tir.e to follow him. Never had a chance to shoot the SUU-I6 alr-to-alr before this encounter. Some ZQ!rm were wasted on head-on passes. The tracers that they got later will help a lot. Would like to have had a lead -computing sight. The SUU-16 was a very good gun. The tackseater was used for lookout, much the same as a wlngman, slnct the frontseater who was flying wing had to pay too nuch attention to flying In order to stay with his lead. The SAM was shot at them when they went up high, which could account for the fact that the HIGs did not follow then up. The enemy appeared to use the P-H's IFF to sort out the F-fs from the MI0-17s. The second AIM-7 failure to guide could have been due to being locked on the ground clutter. BLUE 3 The initial WICs that were seen were probably vectored to attack outbound elements of the Takhll force. The MIC-17 ta-.**.lcs were good. Missile capability is degraded by tne low altitudes, because the radir -"jr.ds to lock on to the ground return. An IR missile with a good caoablllty again" a hlg.^-g target would be best. The SPARROW system has suffered from reliability fusing problems. The AIH-7 Is not the answer to this environment. The kills with the gun mode could not have been made with a missile. The MIC-21 kills by missiles have heen due to the MIO-21 climbing awa;; against a clear sky, giving the missile a good target. The SUU-16 was a very good syctem. 2B5 Event I I 1-2 39 Conancnts on Overall Experience ; BLUE 3 ^ . The "C- model P-* U limited in station capability Since ?P?"*r*tS pairs It 13 iSpcsalble to make an Individual station Jg^"' Slrcraft. Lack of nlnor Items such as cannon plugs have complicated making the modifications. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUB 1 and 3, 22 June 1967. Messages : 366TKW 1U18CCZ Kay 67 OPREP-3 JPCCO PASTEL J»63 (Pt 1) UeTVA lUlBOO: ^ay 67 OPREP-3 JPCCO PASTEL ^69 2) 366TFW 1808302 May 67 OPREP-3 OCO 00157 (Sections I and 2) 366TFW l^llOOZ May 67 OPREP-3 DCOI fti*3 Utter-Raytheon OLD 0413, 15 May 67 II. NARRATtVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight -as trailing the strike force, to provide coverage. BLUE PUgh^ ««• first alefted to the presence of MIGs In the targe area t>y * M.O -^^J-Jf ^jj^^^j^jj fro- the agencies for HTne /iG c2 s i^re ci^se to KorS?S'MS:^2ii:r-rSr"JSi':e;?:"the crufcontmued an t... wa, to the •nsagenent . Tn the ensulnK encounters l6 MICHs were seen by members of BLUE ?ll8ht, "^ea of whSh SJre Jnglle" E?ght KIG.178 were seen by BLUE 1 and 2. and an additional eight ll BLUE 3 IS tS. MIG fngagenent permitted the strike force to attack JCS 31.00. At 1605H While ingresslng 2000 r«t above IntfJfJ 'J^JJJ I^lzJu^'TSSMIoi BLOE Plight heard MIGs being called by the lead F-105 flight (Event n.-ZOl). xne .hub Mre called for 12 o'clock low, coming under. . '""fh^i^'■°s^^re"^ilrhfs'' Hue r?h:rcauef ioge^ri:^; inj^cr!:w"nrind?ai:r- J^r^^fel 1h rwe're'ili5!*-At'thts\l?rBL^^^ Jas at 19.000 feet altitude, about 500 iClIs (ioO IAS) neadlng 01-.= at 2C'U6 -N/lOS-Oe'E. wriP wiiffht turned left, and BLUE 3 recognized the bogeys as two P-105s. which had aDi,ea?tf siiJf? 'ro^tJe dllianSe. It was seen that the two F-105s '""J*"**"' IhrtSuially were on a reciprocal heading to BLUE Plight) were t>«l"S Jj, J^JJ ;iw-17s in tio elements of two aircraft each with the elements separated In trail by about one mile . BLUE 1 and 2' selected the lead element of MIGs and called th&t they would attack them anf continued a left hand turn to engage. BLUE 1 and 2 Jettisoned tanks. BLOE 1 and U chose to attack the rear element and from t.hls point on the battle was f«a»h? KcarSely The actions of all meabers occurred within a 15-mlle arc, north^ and i«t of "o'uS'N/iOS-iS'E; over land enclosed by a horseshoe bend in the Black River. Plrst Element - BLUE 1 and 2 a. miiE 1 and 2 dived on the lead element of MIGs (MIG 1 and 2) , the MIOs reversed ^ J!e P-?05s and turi^ ?nto BLUE 1 and 2. The HlGs made a diving left turn; and aa SS JSJnJd Jnslde of i and 2. they passed head-on and were lost from view as they «nt«r«d the cloud deck. The HlOa operated close to the cloud deck throughout. Due co the alt""^« ««mtal!» in tS general area, BLUE Plight did not descend beneath the cloud layer. BLOE 1 and 2 then pulled up to the right to exchange airspeed for altitude. On Peach?if 7J0S feet. bZuE 1 saw Numerous «G-17s In the area. At this time the other night of P-fte (Event III-240) Joined the battle in the general area. The P-105S continued on to the target and after striking the target, egresaed back through the battle area. Prom 7000 feet altitude BLUE 1 saw two «IC-17s (MM 3 and «) in trail at 2 o'clock low snd made a right diving turn Into MIGs- After maklnK the first pass at MIG 1 and 2, the subsequent engagements were the resuU o^ BlSe ?s;Jectlng a^HIG and attacking. He attempted to pick | n he cnuld with the backseat attempting to attain a radar lock ^0^^* SPARROW shot. SLSto** color blended with the clouds, making larg^ separation difficult. When the , ITos lml llilr ^iTcT, they turned Into BLUE 1. resulting m a high rate of closure. By the^tme a lock could be achieved, they were Inside minimum range. BLUE 1 Obtained a boreslght acquisition on . 3 . 1°^^^^;;^^ Sji'fl? U I'illl^ » .^-1, Th. missile was launched from the MIG 'a 4 o'clock, with MIG 3 at 11 o ciock SS'SL-:-r!E: J£Se i Sai arioo liiloJJ true airspeed, .nd 6000 feet altitude, pulllns 3g 266 / r I ■ ' _ ^ Event III-239 In a rli'.ht turn an.! had 150 knots overtake. 7he fU: war, at :000 feet altitude, and the track crossing angle was 110 dep;rt-e5. BLUE 1 oad Interlocks out, linear polarity, and ^ wide gate, he was tJlvldlng his attention botw.-en th? radar scope and the HTG and was 1^ visually estlroatln.: the lead. The CPARROW w:ts flrfl at one and one-half miles range, - and the nlss.Ue select Ughl h.id been on for 10 minutes prior to arming. The nlaalle went 3tral»:ht for th»» frrour.d and failed to ^u^de, dropping quickly from sight. (The OPREP lioS^OZ May 67 Inalcacps that, th': mlssllf was launched In a clutter environne.it, at ar.prcx Inately nlnlrr.un ranpe.) Bl.U.'v 1 contlr.jed his attack on MIC 3 and switched to the gun and fired one burst at the MIC with no results. The MIG by this tirr.e was at a rar.^e of about 1500 feet, and had tlghteni'd his turn tc the rlsht. When he fIrel.feL'.E I was In the MIC's forward quarter. The KIO passed tenoath bL'JE 1 and 2 and duckt'd ln-3 the cloud deck. The altitude was at I 4,000 to 5,000 feet. BLUF 1 and 2 then elinbeO again and when level at 8000 feet altitude spotted a single MlO-17 (KIG 5) at 2 o'clock low, heading south. SLUE 1 made a rl.tjiit diving turn Into the MIG and at 2 relies out acquired a lock-on In boresight, and then switched to a full systems lock — iriterlocks out. With the MIG at 12 o'clock, about co-altitude, BLUE 1 fired another SPAPaOW. At firing, BIVE I was at U*;! knots, and 6500 feet altitude, pulling g's. MIG 5 waa at 6000 feet In a level turn. SLUE i was at UO** angle off frcsi the ^■:G so the pass was a quarterlnc head-on. Altho'igh th° scuroes e'-'-'^? iOO knots overtake, the geometry would Indicate that the actual ^loslnB; v.;l,;clty was nuch higher (j.ore like 700 knots). SLUE 1 attempted to fire with the act centered. The niissil*; did not guide and dropped out of sight. There was conslderatjle grcund clutter and this could have contributed to the missile not guiding on the intended t?rget. BLUE 1 and 2 continued to press cn after MIC 5, and BLUE I fired a long gun burst at MIC 5 as It crossed beneath hl-n In a steep right Lank and the MIC was lost from view before he crossed the bullet flight path. " BLUE 1 tried to keep his airspeed atiove 300 KIAS and stay at high speed and execute J high-g pull ups. 3oth front and backseat were looking around for enemy aircraft and possible 3A.V5. Although the :-:iG3 engaged by ELL'E 1 and 2 kept turning, they were unable to set up : a complete wagon wheel pattern as BLUE 1 and 2 were able to break out Individual (lIGs. • , After firing the second SPAHHOW at "IG 5, r.L'JE 1 pulled up tight tc try tc get behind ' the .XIG after the head-on cass. In dolr.g so, his speea was reaucec tc just at 300' knots. BLUE' 1 then saw a >:Ij-17 (MIG 6) comlnj; In with a scod angle off. 'M(: 6 was flrlno; cannon. BLUE 1 tightened his turn and let the MIG overshoot. BLUE 1 then reversed, and unloaded and went to afterburner. As soon as BLUE I started to accelerate In afterburner, :cUnr. that he had a better attack_on this ; \ MIO, since It was felt that the ;-5ir, did rot =^e bL^J- 1. BLUE 1 '"oj ''"^ ■'g: i jo-Cced for separation and cane down on the sa.-re MIO's tall but slightly above. BLUh^l 9 attenpted to fire his fun from ?CCD feet cut but Jlsccvvred that he had •»P«"^ * L Lrt _v ..e. -. .V . ^1,-- a d In from 6000 to 7000 feet out, the MIG started to tighten his turn. Then JhelilG feSe^sed to the right. SLUE 3 reversed with the MIG and pulled 150 mills of leM a^d opened fire at 1500 to 2000 feet rar.ee. At firing BLVE 3 had about 100 Jtnots iJ^?take aSd almost 90" angle off. He fired a 2 to 2-1/2 seecnd burst and as soon as the s?artc3 shSl^e he s!w fire coming off the KIG BLUE 3 PHirirS" -"ed lead and was not shooting in front of the MIC as he had ^• '^-'Sht. The bullets Imp... ^ in the HIC's midsection causing fire to burst frcr, the fusca^:-. The MIO started burning on the right side about the wing root and aft along the fusrla^.e. i i Event To keep rron overshooting KLUE 3 'Jl'i a high spec! yo-yo and observed the KIC at ? o'clock lo- still na-:lr:P., but in coritroUoJ fllEht In a nose low level descent. As BlSe 3 rolUd ?n for another- .v.tu:k and as he pa^sert nhe MIG he sas flanes also con n? from the eft hand sl'io of fLiselage. At that tine the MIC burst Into massive flanes fr«M eo-JcBlt a!-r obscur'n.- the tall. ?h- r-SIG rollel hard rl^ht 135* and pitched down, J:ro"«Stro!. anfprs^c^^^^^^ tfie un-iercast at ^000 feet «SL position 20«5«« 'N/lOSne'E. BLUE 3 Is credited wlrh a conrirned kill. At the same tlr- bVjL 3 saw another vertical tno'.ce trail from a crashing MIO-17 approxlTately ? miles east. BLU*:^ 3 ai-'d 'i cllrrLie'l to feet and looked down and saw a 5lni;le P-J» (BLUE 1 of Event III-?'"') chaulnr. a rilG at fairly slo*< speed. The MIC was weavln? back and forth and the K'i was observed to fire three ntsslles at the KIO. Mo other HIGs were seen. BLUE then reached BINGO fuel, and BLUE 3 and U egressed at 1?,000 feet and ns knots Indicated until they were outside of the Sfy. defenses. At one tine durinc the er.gager.ent BLUE 3 saw a MIG at 6 o'clock to an P-J "ho/" firing missiles at a HI': m front of the F-*. BLUE 3 watched the trailing WIG fire for several seconds, ELUE 3 cuspecio she KIO fired out. The MIC was not closing and was firing out of ran?e. Thv 'MG siored no hits. BLUE 3 saw another MIC and an F-'" go by on one of the tlaes when BLUE 3 was firing but he did not pay much attention to them. All of the HIO encounters of BLUE Flight occurred between 1605 and 1625H. d69 Event III>2i»a Aircraft Involved: ?our P-«»C8 vs 10 HIC-17s Results: One XIG-17 destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'SO-N/lOS^ZO'E K PRIMARY MlSSlOlt ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: Ik Kay 1967/16UH Po.:. (BLVL FlUht) -ere P^«/{„^^^ve'nf Mr^lS?""-." Tt'ri!;: Tl/c^f ;?S'th«: other CAP flUht's actions are described In Event -II-Z39. siriKc airer» of Events III-2'*!, -2*12. -2»»3. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE PllBnt departed Danang and refuelled on WHITE AKCHOR Fro.^^ ?S^SJget tSen to Dan&ng. 3. AlRCRAn CONFIGURATION BLUE a BtUES BLUE-. ? S SlISl tank 2 3:o4al tan. 1 SOO-gal tanjc 1 ^TO.zal OBD tank 1 SUU/16A gun pod 1 370-6al tanlc i wtlto pod I QRC-160 pod 1 QRC-160 pod Camouflage paint HIC-17 Not "D" model, shiny silver At least one had nlsslles 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: 6/8 cloud cover bases at 1000 tops" at 7000 ft. vlaltlllty 10 miles. BLUE Plight • "-13.000 r. Alrsceea: 525 KTAS i^uel 5'£^tg : Unknown Plight Forrnatlon : Pod 5. IMITIAl DETECTION Qrrp 1 h-ar-H vTG call from the F-105S. but did not see the MICa. (They were enaaged by the F'is\!i i;en"lII-239') He'lhen sighted four silver MIOs at 11 o'clock low and two more at 11 o'clock level. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 Jettisoned the centerllne tank and chose to aetac;: the four MIQs. When gatting within B-"* miles they were positively Identified as HIG-178. 7 SITUATION DEVELOPMENT n.w MTr. -Ar*. In a waeon wheel formation. Bt.UE 1 fired two SiDEWINDERS at a MIG but it turS'ed"^! ;hrmi»h:TlSs:5!*'BLUri and 2 attacked another MIC and -ere subsequently attacked brt«o more MIG-17s. which fired eX BLUE 1 and 2. BLUE 3 and K attacked these Mi:s with BLUE «» firing two SICEWINDEHS without results and BLUE 3 a??er.pt?nrto fire a SIDEWIUDER which did not leave the aircraft. 3LUE U lost the MIGs and then BLUE was fired on by a KTG. but was able to lose him. *««^v,.r MTG nulled m -ront and BLUE it fireO a SIDEWINDER wlf.-.out success. At the same JJme |[ue1 SSf«nsasea"??Sm I MIG at .his 5 o'cluck. BLUE 3 a:.d i* then egr.ssed, following a flight of F-1D5S. BLUE 1. after the second engasenent, saw a MIG-17 at the U:30 position and at.acked, firing two SPARROWS, one Of which hit the MIG, resulting in a kill. Shortly thereafter i SAM was fired at BLUE 1 and 2, and Just after the burat BLUE I engageS another MIgIiT and fired two more SIDEWIHDERS but they missed. BLUE I then fired ripARROW but it too missed, and BLUE 1 and 2 egrcssed. 290 8. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 BLUE ft MIC- 17 MIC-17 MIG-17 Event 111-2*0 (No. rire':/Ko. hits) SPAHRCV 3/1 5:r-Fwi:;i:EP _ 1/0 3/f R enarkj One AIM-7ii 1/0 I/O 1/0 EQUirHiNT PROBLEMS BLlTt I'f. radio Ma.a r.ot j>;e:-a*-lr.p. corr-jctly ind he did not recslvi the MIC calls from the otht-T fllr.nt .Terr.Sors. 10. AIRCREM COMMENTS Combat SLUE 1 (Front) BLUE 1 (Back) 260.1 63 missions; was a ^10 In P-893 m ADC. First RP-Vt Klsslcn CorTTTients on t^.is Encou iter: BLUE 1 , and U all fel". t: r.r.at the SUU-16 would have b^en r.uch more effective against tne MIC- 17s than any of -.nc -ils.il 1-3, BLUE 1 felt that they cculd not ^et set up for a head-'^.i shot. The HIC'3 wagon wheel was efT-.^ctlve as a counter to thtt R^lsslles but It was purely a defenslv • maneuver. It Is si;tj^cc ^c attack' with a B;un, however. Need a nisjllR with sho.-t .T.lrjl.T.u!r. rar.^c.a.'id can attack a tariref lea.neuverlng at 5 or 6 g's. BLUE 1 r«ir chance to use it 11. BATA SOURCES tr.at. Willie a .-un woultl be ' ;?fnl a.-el, the r^.loSl a KIG-17 he uculd no: CO aeai with tne i'.IG- -t a Intervlevs : 2LU; Mesr.ageij, Reports : 3o6Tr-t' l^i^^lCZ y.2y 1967 OPr.EP-3 DCOJ ^^8 356TF'.V l-llOC^Z y.sy 1^-67 0?P.E?-3 DCOI i^t2 366irw 13.:=30Z ."ay i?67 0?r£?-3 DCO-G 0153 Raytheon, letter, Old C*J13 15 May 1557 12. NARRATIVE BLUE Plight was If-srcssln;: to the ta^aet area with the strike force, soaeed between the rii^Rts o? event 111-2^2, -2«3. Atout b .T.i:e£ fron the target, at 17-13,000 ft altl- ';ude, 525 KTA3, heDdln^ 070° In fa-j forr.a*. l3n , SLoE 1 happened to loi'K down and his acten- ticn 1*35 drawn by several silver fia.vt;c-5, wnlch '■jn ;lc3er look appeared te airplanes. . Due to the silver aol.^r tnoy w:;."e i.r.ned lately assu.T.ej to be .'-'IGs. The'"e were fcur MTGs at 1.1 o'clock low and two more iC il o'clock level. All of the ."IGs were atter'.piin?; to enpicge the strike force. . PLUE Flli^ht l.Tinedlately dived tc er.»ai^e the fo-ir low MIC3, and after approaching to within 3-I1 T.lles, BLUE 1 coula ':ot ermine that they were MIG-173, In a left hand crfclt about 1,000 ft above tne cloLid tops iatcut 6,000-7 ,000 ft .'-^SL). BLUE I estimated there were at least 10 I'lIG-lTs In various pcsltlons In a left hanJ SeO" turn. Vhlle the .MIGs were In the pattern, they were puilln?" 2-3 i'/s. No director aircra«*t w-;re observed. On seelr.;? the HIGs, GLUE 1 dlti not Jettison storec, because h» had already Jettisoned the 60C-gal tank. He kept the 370 on throughout. rL'JE Fil.-.nt positioned at the 6 o'clock of the four KIG-17S, but tr.e ."ICs each oroke In a separate clrejtlon. SLUE 1 selected one of the ."'lIGs (MIC 1) for his attack. BLUE 1 closed to 3,50C-ft rar.^e •nlasiles In nlr.l.r.fiTi tl-e, Atout tr.?d until E-L.UE 1 could 5ee a plan view of the MZG frcTJ 7. 0 top, iind tr.e 'M'j was 50'^ to BLUE i's hcadin.-:. .Both missiles apnarently did not f^uldfii i.-.j .T.lsseiJ, passlr.^ off tc tne rear of me MIG , ICQ fr to 50C ft away and level. At flrlnir, cI.UE 1 had a falr-to-j—od clssllo t-.n^, and ho hold tne tone for 3 seconds prior to launch. He was at 3^0 r'.IAo. at 5,000 ft altitude, p;Ulln;- ; c;, with the MIG also at 5,000 ft. liLUE j h.tu nz overtake and was .ir.i-lt -^ff from the MIG. BLUE 1 had r.ct achi'?ved r7ji:-:r Ice;, v.'h'^n he flrt.".: the misciies. 1: :-r« was cloud backr.round with reflection which co'ild have contributed to tne inlsslles' mis-. ;lth the :ar3;et 30* off the nose and fired two AI"-9B .ire of firlnr, the "IC ^1,-htened his left hand turn 291 1 I 3 J I 3 3 a £vcnt I£I.*2.itQ As the nls::lles nl^seil, bLUZ 1 Pll,-ht started t;^ execute n hltrh sp^ed yo-yo reposition. ^ on the other Ml'Jr. , mho still ralnt.ilneJ tr.o left har..: "waKion-w.teei" pattern. -V^ BT/JE FlUnt rolled over the '.'.r> and ?o:ltlcn'.'d ihenselves bc-hlnd another single .>!Te pocitl'M v^s within iO mlies cT Lead 39 .SA^? olLe. The entire en^a^er-ent took place In 3 iO-r.lle ra llu:. cf this site. BLL'E 1 at:d 2 atte.ipt-i to po':!tion cn y.in i, '.nd 'M.VK 3 and movcJ to a p-DRltion aborjC 2,0CO fr out and :.:/,fi. 'AIG 2 rolled and .llveci Int the cloud aeck ani cantact was loct [BLUE 1 felt that he could have fired a 3i;u-l6 iur'.np th.s time as he h&d gocd pofltlonj. While SLL'E : and 2 werrr chasing MIG 2, fcLUE 3 and U otserved and calle*: out t>:o KIC-17S {yilZ 3 ani :>) wno w- re rraklr^ a desc*'rdln? hard left turn to position cn 2LuE I. SLUE 1, due to a ridlj rr^alf ir.ctlon, did not hear '.!\3 calls fron BLUE 2, 3, and Both ^ MIG 3 and H were flrlna; cannons. BLUE j and ^ atter.ptec to position thencelves "r. XIO 3 and li and BLUE * fired two AIM-9B3 at MIG 3 who was at 6 o'clock to nLUf: 1 hr.i firlni?. These slsailes did not appear to traclc ani were not ctservtd as;aln. The rissl.es were fired out of pararneters with no tone in an jttenpt to dls'.ract 'AICj 3 from BLUE I'a till. The alsslles were fired asainst a dark cloud and ^r^und baclc^round. Miu 3, apparent , fired nut and slid tc th» cut side and ahead of BLUE 1. At this time BLUE 3 with a good ■. ne trl^Kiered one Al"-9B tut the claslle did not leev- the rails. At this tlr:e ' u was cn the tall cf BLIT-I ? a.nd flrlr.R. BLUE 2 broke down 8nd left, and went Into the c ud snelf and then eaT.e bd< k out an top. The MIGs had now dlstppeared. BLUE 2 rejoined on .^'E 1 at once. Also at thlc • .T.e, the pllc-t In BLUE U saw a MIG-l? (y.lG 5) at his 7 o'clock. 2,GQC ft ran$e and closlns. :!IG 5 ''as flrlr?, and closing with the projectiles p&sslni; the t.-p left side of the cano;:y -.bcut 15 ft distant, BLUE « uiilDrfled, went afterburner, broke dawn and then back up, Jlnkl-.g. When he leveled off at 12,C3C ft, vi": 5 was gone. BLUE 1 Irmec lately saw another MIG-17 (MTG 6) In a left tirn, then pulllnj; up In front of hln. 3LUE rir--'d one AIX-vB fron the 'MZ's 7 C clock. 2 ,0Z0 ft hl?h, 2,500 ft range with a weak tone ar ' a cloud 13 bactrgrcund. The nlsslle care off the rails but Its flight was not obaervec. i^LUE i felt that If ne had hac a £UU-i6 he ecu 12 nf.ve ctitalned a ijcoU position to use It this :'IC . ] The MIG broke l'»ft and SLUE Joined BLUE 3, Wh'le BLUE " Kas nttcnptlnsi: tc dlrenia^e fron MIG 5, who was on his tall, SL'.i 3 observed still another MIG-l? (KIC 7) clos'lnr on hla 5 o'clock frost about 2,000 ft ran&e. «IG 7 did not r- and BLUE j disengaged by turning Into MIC 7 anc going to afterburner. BLUE 3 an-i ~ -.hen Joined up at about l6l3H, eld a 360° turn and proceeded to sost strike refueling, fcllcwln? a fll^^nt of ?-;05s. BLUE 'i was at BINGO fuel at this time. After br-jaklr..- off their entace.Tient with HIG 2, liLl^E 1 and 1 visually acquired a lone MIG-17 C'lG f: In .1 left tarn at 11: 3C o'clock, 2,3C0 ft hlirh and 3,000 ft distant. With, boreslsht acqulsl.lcn BLUE 1 locked on and thr bac.cseater switched to full systeir.. Inter- locks In. The radir scope showed a "break X." BLfE 1 pulled the trigger about three tlrres but nothing rapper, fi. He then went to Idle power, becajse he surnilsed that he was Inside mlnlnun ran?*,-. Af'-?r openini? slightly on 'AIG 8, BLUE 1 fl^ed '.wo missiles In salvo at "R mln." One mlsrllo went straight ahead and did not guli-?, tie other SPARROW guided nicely and l.r.pacte- cn tr.e right wing root of MIG 3. BLUE 1 and KII 8 were In a level, left hand turn during the attack with both In a 30* left bank at 5,00C ft altitude, pulling 3 s's. KIC 8 was "O" of:' the nose of BLUE 1 and both were at about 350 KIAS. At firing the track crossing angle was about 2C", with zero overtake. The missile which failed to r-ilde passed to the target's 6 o'clock position about 1,000 ft away. T;-.- missile which -jcored the hit was observed by BLUE 1, to go straight out and then break left from the outside of the turn to explode near the right wing root of the MIG-I7< '-'I-j 8 burst into flame and pitched up about 30°, stalled out, and des- cended t£ll first. In a nose high altitude at a rapid rate .'nto the cJoud deck. The tine was .-.ow about i6l6H and BLUE 1 Front and BLUE 2 Back observed a SAM burst at their 10 o'clock lovel (5,000 ft M3L) ij.dOQ ft distant. Tt was felt that Lead 39 was the firing site and wa^ atteriptlng tc hit BLUE Fllsht. Juct after tho SAM burst, BLUE 1 enra.-^ed another ."IIG (MIG 9). The ."?IG was in a left hand turn, In a bank and appeared tc be pullln.; about ^ g. At 3,500 ft range, BLUE 1 Increased his turn to 5 1/2 to 6 ? and put the plpper ahead of the .^IG and released g to let the KIC acne back through the slcht. BLUE 1 (E.-^t a tone (for about 2 seconds) and with .riC 9 20* off the rxce (TCA SO") and BLUE 1 at 350 KIAS and 6,000 ft altitude with :./2 to 1 E on the -aircraft, in a level "turn 60" bank tc the left and 50 kts apenlne, BLUE I >| fired two SIDF.Wi:;Di;.^S . The 31 DEWI:;DEPS ruided partially but the MIG started to pull naitl- \9 r.'M e'r and pL.IleG away fron tne 3IDEV;IIJD£.'!3 r%R,ldly. Tn'e missiles passed aft of the MIG , ^ by 500 ft, and detci;ated atoiit 2 seconds -jfter-they pasned ih-.- "10. Tiure was no clcud IR background for t.nese firings, a.-sd SLUE 1 had a goodt^e. t« a 9 n % I-/; Event i:i-2'iO BLUE 1 :^.n .rC. off went .0. -^..-w^^- ^^'j^^J^ ^fLiS'^eJo: echelon rcr:-..-! '.or. . DHJE 1 "V^ed out cnu- o ^^l^'^';,^' ,rhe fir^d 0 SPAFPOW. t^ri.c;L?':;;"r;;rci;?:.^r.r?n-:.f 5::;';^r.^^",- i^™; BLUE ,.ouc KIAS and b.O-;: ft altlit-vJv. I The ie vr.it oo«» off to th« rlr.nt anc «a= n^t observed araln. ! .,T^ .70 T„.« '-nllcwe-l t^-T tNro'jyh ::evor2l 3^0* turns slttlna; BLUE 1 t^..n .n-.Ts ;"^^.:'='^^!^r^,.\:;;,'^r?, , and :.LLE I was clear, with on the tall r:.- ;.•■•-*/; .'I rj;: 4 .,.a- -,o 5tiv Jnuile tne turn but was j always to:- cr "'V ''r' ,v.f tam r-LUE 1 was aole to Keep position ' onlil"":" ^l^;TT,r"nr^;ir.u:;;/.^to^thrcycu^=an. W.S nut .een .rain. Tne MICs wln^an- had previouniy -J Inaj-r. -sar-ri . i i , The tl.:e ::cw w.c -2^^ ani BLC=: 1 and 2 aft«r c:e.rlrr the area ana observing no nore !i i eneny alrcrart ;r:>ceed-d -iir^zM-j to post-s: rlkt: re. v... K r.,- . S . ^t,*, YTT" w*-<»n B-rt-^n'- ^.^d contln'je'j to stay In the left , , Thrournout the er/a^-3"ont .he ?:.r.;h:^n v.. --c r.ac::ea a.out u.OOO t't ranw, r I' hand pat-em, Ir.r -^i -^^ '.T: s-^r-t" tc l'.o = . out at aaoJt 6 i:. Howev-r, the ■? ! woulJ cirhtt-n t.h-.- t.irn ar::: ---^ Cl;^.";/; M -w::,,;?...! yo-vo.' ^jsplce the capability ; ■ Jr?ep«^e/5nU°=:SK'?:i^ -r^^i:""'^V?r?c^;ly irc^i^nln, ..cceSsful nlsslle launch /\ conditions due t^, the 'M'Z -r^tr.euvers . r i . , 3ttt" ^.-^,rf.-'>r- ''IG 7, all of HLUE Fl'siht observed one MXC-17 i- prior to f^^^i/^r:':^:" a' E^- ar.>.'le into t ho cloud shelf. (One of the Sii'' in h?;rr;U v:^*^ ^ :hi:. of white ^.c.e traiUn. the aircraft ' ; (another of the Kills cf Event HI-;?;. ' * 4v ....n.—i'-'v ^-'5H HL'JE I ?rcnt 52w ore .••nn-l? fir..' :wo ATOLL nlssllec at At aoprox .a.ew --o^ . . ^.trai;;::: ahead and :nair.- < : Jainift^;' ?L ''/o?'th/;io:-'7hrv::^ri.;..d.d t.rr^ts .a-ntalned a perpendicular 1 ■ ATiX pa^h 7he\?;.lle3 appeared to r.t.. -y about 5.000 I't. I , ^ . ,,-4 a- ►he ton rolled over to an Inverted position. On lookln.~ S:n'"^:Si'br-oth;r'n:;5-l7^1;oulS^rco.ln. through and an o-t.lde roll would then rive the F-H a favorable position on the MIG. 4 =ritF 1 ard fie OPrXr :;c-:->:^ dc not conpietely ai^ree on the order ?°-.n..r'i1 Jr^T^: o? S.1n.Vr5^.. cr:;.r_,... .... followed in ..hi. ca=e Of its inclusion cf the otner aircraft In the fils-u. 293 I! Event tlZ-SOl Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105Da vs two MIC-173 Results: Ko damage Vicinity cf Encounter: 21«00'M/105''50'E I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Tine- Kay 1967/cetween I6OCH and I63OK. pour P-105 (BLUE Fn,.t) -er, par- of »3»/inriLnSi''?or«" 31.00). The other strike flights which encountered MIOs are tho=.e deacrlL^ed in Zver.t. riI-2U3 and The "tions of the .r^A "f „ support aircraft whi=n encountered MIGs are descril.--.l In Event IJI-S^O- rV:!."^?! Piir which supported this strike are the aircraft whose actions are disclosed In Event- III-2«»C and 111-201. II. DATA SOURCE 388 T7W 111225 May iS6T OPREP-3 DOI 16.1. 12. NARRATIVE BLUE Plight saw two unidentified aircraft go oown in flames In the vicinity of 20»53'N/105''32'E. One of these was also seen by the aircraft of Event III-2U0. BLUE Plight also observed tne five KIG-l7s attack the IFOH HAND Flight (Event III-23?) as veil as a dog fight between MIC-17s and F-tCs at 20«»52'N/105°12'E. 4r ». 295 Event 111-213 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105D3 vs two MIG-2X* and four MIC-17s Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 20»50»H/105»20'E fron BLUE 1. BLUE flight saN one unidentified aircraft go dovrn in flanes and they put the location of their sighting at 2l»Q0'N/105»32'E. 296 3 3 3 3 \. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 1* Kay 1967/l6nH. o-..- e inR (MitF Pllfht) were oart of a 19 aircraft strike force from Korat aicacK- Pour F-105 (BLIIE Flight) were Par^ * y atrlKe flUhta which encountered Ing the Ha Dong Amy Barracks (uCS 31.00). '^^^^^^^^^''^if^ actions of the IROM HA;'JL «. and III-ZUi. n. DATA SOURCE 388 TPW 1«41226 May 1967 OPREP-3 DOI l67'» 366 TFW ItUOO May 1967 OPFEP-3 DCOI uuz. 12. NARRATIVE „ As the strike force appr:.ached the target area two :^IC-2l3 ana ^^"^ "J*^ .«en !j BlSe night but these pcsed no threat to the force since the P.«3 on MICCAP 3 3 seen oy ouuft lugnv uuu v>ivi><^ y^^^- -- - ^ (Events lIl-2'«0 and III-239) Inaediately engaged ..en. A BLUE flight Observed three SA-2s in the targ.v area. One of which passed 100 feet ^ 0 a 'I B : 0 3 • _ .J. Event III-2*t*t Aircraft Involved: One P-105P and three P-105D8 vs four or five MIS-lTs Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter; 20«53'M/10i»««2'E 1. PRIHAitV NISStON *H0 TACTICAL SITUATIOJi Oate/Tlme: m May 1967/l6l*H. Four F-105 (BLUE FUcht) from Korat -ere providing IRON HAND support for a «rllce against JCS 11.00- The strike fUgnts which encountered HISs ^re the flights In E/ents II1-2U1, -21? . -2Ui. The CAP support fliehts which encountered HIGs are those In Events Ill-^yi. -J**';. 2. MISSION ROUTC Departed Karat and «ent to Channel 97 (probably with alr-to-alr refuellnft). After departing Channel 97 went overland to the target area. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-IO^P BLUE 1 2 • ACr-t-^S 2 * CBU-211 1 - 650 gallon tank P-IOSD BLUE 2 2 - AGM-tS 6 - 500 lb bombs (MK 92) P.IOSD BLUE 3 6 - 500 lb bombs (MK 82) 1 - AIK.9B BLUE ^ 6 > 500 lb boRbs MIG-17 Silver Tanks . 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Some cumulus In the area. Good visibility. BLUE 8. ORONAKCE None expended. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None. 297 T 2 3 ^ I Altitude: 8-10.000 ft . heading - 230-250 degrees gpeed- 550 kts. accelerating jgnr ' 9-10.000 Xbs I Plight Formation ^ BLUE 2 and ft in front of BLUE I and 3 by about 2000 feet and 500 feet below BLUE 1 j and 3. i •5. IHITIAL DETECTION \ BLUE Pll>iht had Just launched SKRIKE missiles at a SAM site and had completed a | wing-over to the left, when they saw 4 or 5 MlG-17s making a descending, head-on pass. i 6. ACTION INITIATED ■ 1 Tne KlOa quickly passed through the flight and two of them turned to position on ♦ j BLUE 1 and 3- ' } 7. SITUATION OEVELOPHEtii 1 BLUE Plight continued to accelerate and the MIGs could not close to firing position. j 10. AIKCRCU COHHENTS Experience ^ Total Hours BLnE 1 Pront 1500 Back Unknown 100 CoMwents on this Encounter BLUE I Front surmised that the MIGs had been tryln? to follon then through the SimiKE launch and did not catch up until BLUE Flight turned. The F-H HIGCAP certainly nelped out, even though they were somewhat separated from the F*105s- Amazed how quickly the Kia-17 could turn around to follow them without Icalng much speed. The turn rate of the MIG-17 was amazing. The speed and acceleration of the F-i05 was a saving factor. Felt the PANSOMO radar was directing the MlOs. The FAMSOMG had opportunity to* fire and was illuminating them, but did not fire. Comnienta on Overall Experience Felt the QRC-160 pods did a good Job, although they are not used by the IRON HAIXD aircraft unless there is a SAM launched. While searching, the pods are not operating. This is due to the fact that with pods operating, the electronic gear that is used to locate the SAHs is blinded. If you can see the SAM in time, it can be outmaneuvered. The IRON HAND aircraft are Jumped by MIQs because of their role and the fact that they are separated from the strike force. U. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE 1 Front and BLUE 1 Sack, 6 June 1967. Messages. Repoi^ts ; 388TFVI IU1230Z May 1967 OPHEP-3 001 1675. 388TFW 141225Z May 1967 OPREP-3 001 l67t. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Flight had detected a SAM site at 21»0i<»N/lCU°i»it'E which was giving high PRP at 2-1/2 rings Intemittant activity. «-hen at 20''53'N/10ti» u2 ■ E at l6llH, SLUE 1 in a 50 degree loft, launched two SHRIKEs, one with a white phosphorus and one with a high explosive warhead. BLUE 2 launched two SHRIKEs also. At launch, BLUE 1 and 2 were heading 355 degrees at 16,000 feet, and ^00 knots, and were 12 miles slant range from thw site. BLUE 3 and H were on the right in fingertip formation (BLUE 2 on the left). Immediately after firing, BLUE Flight executed a hlgh-g wing-over to the left, and descended to gain airspeed. During this maneuver , BLUE 2 slid to the inside and ahead. BLUE 1 lost contact with the flight momentarily and the first one he saw was BLUE 2 so he Joined on him. On completion of about 130 degrees of turn and still descending BLUE 2 and U were out in front of BLUE 1 and 3 by approximately 2000 feet and below them by about 500 feet. BLUE 2 with BLUE iJ on the right bottomed out at 8-10,000 feet and 550 KCAS and a heading cf 250 degrees, and slightly left of BLUE 1 and 3. At this time four MIO-173^, In a diving pass from 11 o'clock passed through the flight. The MIGs were silver in .-olor and no markings v/ere seen. Small drop tanks were seen by BLUE 1. The HIQs came through almost head on and quickly passed through the formation. The MIGs were seen by BLLH 1 and 3 to be in trail in a disorganized pass such that they passed between the two elements of BLUE Plight. The first two MIGs turned into the flight and ended up In trail 2000-3000 back of BLUE 1 and 3, with a slight negative overtake. BLUE 1 obser/ed the 3rd and Oth MM to roll Inverted but did not see them after that although they could have been going after BLUE 2 and U. No firing was observed from the MIGs. BLUE Flight continued to accelerate and Join-d In a defensive fingertip formation and egressed at 8000 feet altitude headin.- 26o degrees. OPREP states 4 or 5 MIG-17S. Event 111-244 P-105 Hours Combat Missions 900 15 15 background Event Ill-Sit On «elng the MIGa . BLUE PUsht Jettisoned ^^IjJ^O gallon tank and ^ jStt^Jo^d started to turn behind the flight the remaining ordnance (IB HK 02 DO...05; at 2C'*53'N/10i4''42'E. . .^^ Although the BULLS EYE system was In effect at J^J* "T? ' "J^^i^^rJSJSfJerH Iny for the area in which the flight was operating. Ho X-band signals were recexvco ^j, tine. I L. 299 Event ril-2ft5 Aircraft Involved: Two P-8Es vs t«o NZG-ITs Result: Two KIC5-l7s destroyed YXclnlty of Encounter: 'Jnknown I. PRIMARY NISSiON ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 19 May 1967/ur.lcnown BLUE Flight (two F-SEs) were providing TARCAP and were covering strike aircraft's departure fron the target. Aircraft were based on CVAs at YANKEE STATION. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-8E BLUE 1. 2 SIDEWINDER (AZH-9D) ZOmiu cannon 5. INITIAL DETECTION An k~us called that he had a HIG on his tall. BLUE 1 sighted the HZQ. At a later time, after BLUE 1 and had rejoined the strike group, BLUE 2 observed a HIC-17 naking a pass on an P-8 aircraft ahead of him. C. ACTION INITIATED In the first sighting, BLUE l broke downward and commenced tracking the MIQ, In the case of the latter encounter, BLUE 2 called a warning and engaged the WIG, 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 1 fired an AIM-90 at the first MIG. The missile did not guide, but apparently caused the KIC to level his wings and break off his attack on the A-^i. The MIG commenced a turn as BLUE 1 fired another AIM-9D. This missile detonated Immediately behind the enemy and severed his tall assembly. The MIC rolled inverted and dove Into the ground. In the second encounter, BLUE 1 fired 20ma! and the HIG broke off his run on the P-6. BLUE 2 fired an AIM-9D which did not guide. BLUE 2 continued to track the MIC, firing 20ara and finally two additional Ai:j-9Ds. Both of these last two missiles impacted In the tall of the MIG. The entmy nosed over and crasned. 8. ORDNANCE 17a ^» Result: One NIG-17 destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: 20**lO*K/105°30'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 19 May 1967/inornlns BLUE Plight (unknown number of P-8Cs) providing TARCAP for Navy strike In the Hanoi area. Aircraft based on CVAs at YANKEE STATION. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-SC BLUE SIDEWINDERS (AIM>9D} ZOm cannon 5. INITIAL DETECTION En route to tar^-et area a MIC-17 was sighted directly behind an A-6A. In the target area one of BLUE Plight observed a MIG-17f low, at hla 6 o'clock position. 6. ACTION INITIATED In the first sighting, two menbers of BLUE Plight turned to attack the MIC. In the sighting in the target area, one mecber of BLUE Plight maneuvered to attack the MIQ. 7. SITUATION OevCLOPMENT One of the two BLUE Plight members who attacked the first MIO fired two AIM>9D missiles plus ?CiRin. The MIC dove away and BLUE Plight proceeded to the target area. In the case of the latter XIC, r.ne of the SLUE Plight perfomed a high yo-yo and maneuvered behind the MIC. He then fired an AIH*9D at a range of kooo ft. The MIG exploded and the pilot ejected. 8. ORDNANCE BLUE (No. fired/No. SIDEWINDER AIM-9D 3/1 hits) 20mm 0 11. DATA SOURCES Messages : CTG 77.0 OPP^P-3 191 ''03Z, May 1967 12. NAitRATIVE DESCRIPTION As above. Event 111-248 Aircraft Involved: Two A-6A8 vs three HlC-Zla Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 20*15 'N/105*25 'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Dftte/Tlae: 19 May 196? . llOOH 11. 12. DATA 5;0URCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION P***** °^ '^^ strike ?roup, egresslng froa target area at 10. 000* af-er weather abort observed three ^.ICs far belcw; estimate MIGs were 12°''^°"*' KIG broke upward, passing In fronc of flight; flight Jettisoned MK-82 and proceeded to coast out point; no further contact with MIGs. 30L i 1 1 3 I i a a a a 1 a a a a Event III-2*(9 Aircraft Involved: Two A-UCs vs five HIGa Kesults: Sighting Vicinity of Encpunter: 20"59'N/lO5*'26'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/Time: 19 May 1967, 1530H II. DATA SOURCe CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTION IROSi HMID flie:ht from Kitty Hawk observed five KIOs of unknown type very low In valley; no attempt to engage made. Event I I 1-250 Aircraft Involved: Three F-ttCs vs one unldent Results: Sighting 'vicinity of Encounter: 20"H0'H/104"30 'E I. PRIHAkY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 19 May 1967, I63OH II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12.' NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ECM escort flight at 31,000* observed a silver A/C; unable to distlnwilsh type due to altitude. ' Event I I 1-251 Aircraft Involved; Four F-lOSs vs four HIG-17a Results: Slating Vicinity of Encounter: Kep A/P I. PRI^'ARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 19 Kay 1967, 16«J1H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. KARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike night observed four MIGs over Kep airfield; MICs apoeared to be In a traffic pattern and In the process of landing or takeoff, at an altitude of approx 2500' . 303 tvent 111-252 Aircraft Involved: Eight P-UCs vs twelve-fifteen MIO-173 Results: Pour Hic-lTs destroyed and one P-iiC lost Vicinity of Encounter: 2i»20»N/l06'25'E 1. PRIMARY NISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Osts/Tlne: 20 Hay igST/from 1629H to 161»0H. Eight F-=«fiufritiy fired three more ^IDEWINDERs and txn s.orv Jt A!-.: -.'..'a without r.ucc«S3. GKK-i.'J ii "ifngaged two y.IC-l7a and fired two SPARROWS without success. BLUE and Zr.y.V.l f'H.-hta then started to vrress but OKEEJI 1 reentered the area, and got b«low a GRiiEN 1 launched two CIl'LU'INDEHs, cnc of which hit and killed the MIC. 8. ORONANCE BLUE I BLUE 3 GREEN 1 CREEK 3 GRESri it MIC-17 HIG-17 MlG-17 MIG-17 2 MIC-17S 2 MIG-17S 2 HIC-17S flred/!Io. hits) 3 r ARROW AI^;-7K 1/0 4/0 3/1 2/0 2/0 Cannon 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/1 1/0 1/0 :/o Remarks Attemptfcd to fire one other AIM-9B Attempted to fire two other AIM-7E At BLUE 3 First pair that fired at GREEM 1 Kit and destroyed GREEN 2 At GREEN 1 9. EQUtPKENT PROBLEMS BLUE 1 - The radar scope In the rear cockpit 7f BLUE l failed. 10. AIRCREW COMHCrtTS Experience BLUE 1 Front Back BLUE 3 Front Back GREEN 1 Front CREEH 3 Front Back <;reeh k Front Back Comments Total Hours 3000 2500 250 4900 31 500 3500 500 Hours 300 U50 215 80 225 200 20Q 150 100 Combat Missions 82 85 Renarks 69 23 56 87 92 36 19 Six years In B-47s Had been In previous MIG engagements; two NIG kills previous to 20 Hay; wing commander Had been In fighters all of his career One live tnlsslle fired; no almu ror runs. BLUE 1, Front - the elements of BLUE tiyi'A GREE:; F ordlnatlcn was nececsary 'ind the win£ir.an riis. Although they were coordinated, sometimes SLUF. and GREEH elener.ts were worklne together. It was difficult tj get Into SIDEWINDER firing parameters ac:3lnst ^he riIC-l7. Used only rlnlKun afterburner so the wlngnan would have full afterburner to use to keep up. AlthoufJ. 5/ "3 end AAA had been observed to be used In conjunction with the MtGs In previous ecga^ec^nts , none were used ihls OLy. Tnore were Instances In the past where MrC-21s lured F-lC js Into SAM rings and otlier 'AtOt would attempt to lure fighters up valleys into flak traps. After the ra-lar dlcplay failed, SL'JS 1 no longer expected the AIH-7E to work so he tried to use H£«T for the rest of th'; f light. Two flight:! of F-Ua are needed to provide adequate coverage for the strike force. Mutual support tetwtsen these flights Is necessary. The prebrlefed tactics of using the vertical agaln.^t the M1G-L7 were successful. Wlt^". the ;.lze of the Mia attacking force It was lsip03Slble to work as a flight. At best, they wer - left with coordlr.dteil eler.ents. The wlngnan stays with the element leader and doesn't attick unless instructed to do 30 by the leader. A .-.Ingl- aircraft or a three-ship flight is In a daneierous situation ir. this type of battle. The chaff carried In the speed brakes helped against SAIIs. If SAH:; were guiding. It forced the Mghters down to the deck and Into flak. There were recorded cases of SAMS guiding at 200 feet ACL. The MISs are getting more aggressive. BLUE 3, Front « by keeping his speed high, he could effectively fight the KICs. Commur.lcaMons were a prsbleir. since t.hL^ backseater and the wlngnan missod several rails by BLUE 3, Front. BLUE 3 had trouble communicating with the baekseater due In part to both tenseness and noise on the radio. GREEN 1, Front - the turning ab.' llty of the KIO-17 Is fantastic. It nuat be seen to be believed. Ther*! was a lot of nol-'j on the radio. The :!Ij-]7, when used as It -.ds this day, is a more forsildable opponent than a Kla-21. The MIG pi lot J were respected and nust be. We must know the capabllltlss and advantages of our air-craft. The cour.ter to the MIG's wagon-wheel defense requires coordination and timing between two F-i* nights, with each of the flight's elenents operatln? ar. a coordinated pair. By coming In low and ccr.lng up at the wagcn-wneel (which can be done In those areas without flak), a coordinated pass with one element keeping the MIGs busy should permit some MIGs to be broken out of the circle. As long as the MIGs stay In the circle they are very difficult to attack. If a tangential attack is made from outside the periphery, the MIGs can break Into the attack, turning Inside of the V-H, If an attack Is made by cutting across the circle, a MIG can easily get on the tail of the F-c. The attacker cannot go to the inside of the circle since this is usually ancnored ever their home base, with corresponding dense flak. The Hl:3-17 wagon-wheel is strictly a defensive maneuver against the P-''. However, the MIGs could use a low flight In the wagon-wheel pattern, and with n high flight for attack, have some offensive capability. The addition of the gun on the F-t would complement the missiles. It could be an advantage at low altitudes and close ranges. However, the gun is not a primary weapon. In som: cajes, achieving the parameters for a gun shot, would permit attack by the MIGs. The MIGs are growing more aggressive. The HIG-21s on the second of January (Event III-52) were not the problem that the MIG-17s were this day. Due to MIG attacks on IRON HAND Flights, the IRON HAND Plights are now getting CAP support. However, the F-^ cannot get roc close to the IRON HAND flight due to the ECH pod interference with the GAM detection gear. The P-105 force is better protected since the F-1Cj5s started to bunch up In gaggles. They are difficult to protect when they were strung out. GRF.iN 1, Bad? - the problem with a boreslght lock at I'.w altitude la x,ha.t the target returr: is difficult to rind If the gyro Is "in" due to the pround line. However, the target 13 a distinct blip if the gyro is "out". However, the gyro should be replaced m to "Ui" before flrin?. The autor.atic switching to full system Is a good feature. ■* By using the glare shield as a hand hold, and by keeping the shoulder harness lock open, *he baekseater can pull himself out of the seat and see well back towards 6 o'clock. 3 ♦ 3 3 3 3 S 3 • 3 3 0 3 S ^ G5-;F.EN I* - Initially the fights of 3LUE ,.ftnd jfeEN Fllfht s started 5eparately In H ; dlff«r?nt locations. As Irng as '.he fights stayed apart, t; ? F-^i? wer<: on the defensive. But wnen the eights merged, the three elements of SLUE and (KEEN Flights were able to work *^ 306 \ t [ ?.vent III-252 to an attack, a >tIG would either cut across the circle to r.eet their attack or one wouu come up rron low. -The MI2 wason-wneel tactic sce.ed like a ,ooparated by 2-3 r^iles . The fights gradually Coalesced or BUU- . na •■'•■^-••^ ^',rh nic^ r .T^tl-.- .•■eparately to provide Liupport to other however, wltn the oldn^ents Ox e^cn ' ^ '■fc' '^ • 'J", "''^'■J,,^ ^K. 3io-n«'i/irk«?<;'E elements. The enga^enents took place within a .0 :nlle radius of 21 .-0 a/lCb 25 E. 307 Event 111-252 Due to the actions which followed, and the fact that each element fron J^, Jj!*' . was working with different elements (but not always certain of the specific Identification) the actions of each element will be described separately. As the P-t engaged the MlOa, the P-105 force proceeded on to their assigned targets. BLUE 1 and 2 Aa BLUE Plight went to afterburner and turned left to attack the MIGa. the MXGs had turned left and cUrabed, to attack the F-1053 from over the top. T^^lf P"^^^^« BLUE Plight's 10 o'clock position, with the F-lis behind the MISs. BLUE I did not isuaediately drop the outboard tank since It still had some fuel In It. The MIGs continued to turn left and BLUE 1 concentrated on two MIC-17s at 10-11 o'clock. BLUE 1 locked on in the boreslght irode. The backseat then =«ltchcd to full systen. Interlocks out. gyro out, and BLUE 1 pulled lead on the MXG and ^J^J SP*JJ°*- The missile guided perfectly but 2-3 seconds before Intercept, the radar scope in the backseat went blank. Although only a faulty fuse had caused the back presentation to turn off (the frcntseat scope was still operattni?) this was unknown to the backs^ater who then broke lock to go to boreslght and the missile missed. BIXJE l had been descending, and he had obtained a lock on and fired at 7000 feet range. At the time of firing BLUE 1 was at about «ach 1 at 5000-6000 feet altitude, pulling 4 g's and closing In on the MIG at 350 knots. The angle off was 20-30 The polarisation was linear and the clutter was In the override position. The wiG-i? was In a left turn at about 5C30 feet altitude. Dtw to the overtake, BLUE 1 closed on the MIC and when about 2000 feet away at several hundred feet altitude, he pulled up In a high speed yoyo, and switched to HEAT. BUE 1 made some other passes on MIGs and during one he saw an F-H pass In front of hln on rire. At this time, as he was coming back up In a left spiral, he saw an F-« at 12 o'clock high, completely on fire. The tall and right wing were missing anj^a;®;;^^^?* burning F-JJ were two parachutes. BLUE 1 saw the parts of the F-4 fall but lost contact with tbe chutes. BLOE 1 made another pass on a NIG-17 but was unsuccessful In achieving SinEWINDER launch parameters. BLUE l was In minimum burner all of the tine. As he worked In the vertical (in a left turn) he repeatedly could see, many MIG-lTs, all in a left orbit, at 10 o'clock. BLOE 2 was clearing BLUE 1. and from 85C0 feet altitude BLOE 1 saw a single F-U (GREEN 1. reeomised since he was a single) with a HIG-17 on hln. BLUE 1 chen started ro attacK this MIO. Before he could alert GPHEll 1. GREtN 1 broke hard left. At this tine GREE" 1 was about 1-1/2 miles away from BLUE 1. As GREEN 1 'jroke , the MIG-17 overshot. The MIG-17 made no move to reattack GREEN 1, but rolled to the right and headed straight toward Kep Airfield. (BLUE 1 could look past the »4IG and ?ee the runway about 8 miles away, J ihe MIG had been at about JlOOO feet altitude and was diving towaro the ground at about 30 degrees, with about one g on the aircraft, and not turning. BLOE 1 got a good tone and fired a SIDEWIMDER. Vfhen he fired, BLUE 1 was at 550 knot . at 2500 feet altitude with one g on the airplane. He was closing on the MIG at 250 knots. The .MIO was straight ahead (0 degree angle off) at about 1500 feet altitude. The missile detonated to the left of the tailpipe. The MIG relied o>^er to the left, on fire, and went straight down from 1500 feet altitude. BLUE 1 is credited with a confirmed kill. BLOE 1 and 2 then turned left and went back up to about S500 feet altitude and returned to the battl« area which was about 4 miles behind them. BLOE 1 and 2 then made an attack on another MIG-17. This MIG was low, at about 200 feet altitude, and although BLUE 1 chased the MIG around, he could never get In a position for a SIDEWIMDER attack. BLUE 1 could not get below the MIG so he could look up and get a tone differentiation. Uhen BLOE 2 called bingo minus SOO pounds, BLUE 1 and 2 disengaged. By this time the MIGs were seen moving off towards Kep, ar.d BLUE 1 and 2 egressed without further incident. BLUE 1 and 2 had not been be lew 500 knots Indicated throughout the fight. BLUE 1 and U As BLUE 1 and 2 dived to engage their first MIG, BLUE 3 and U stayed high and behind for about two turns in order to provide support. After that, 3LUS 3 and 4 lost track of BLUE 1 and 2 due to the confusion of MIGs and F-^s. BLOE 3 and U then attacked a KI5-17 (MIG A) that was low. As BLUE 3 came in on the HIC he was unable to obtain a lock-on so he put the plpper on the MIC an. fired a aPARRO/i In the boreslght mcde, looking down about 10 degrees on the Ml^. The missile missed, without appearing to guide. The MIG was In a turn. The range at firing was about 1.5 miles. CSee firing 1 of Table 1 for parameters.] The MIG reversed his turn and BLUE 3 obtained a full systan lock. With the steering dot centered, and the in-range light on, BLUE 3 fired his secsnd SPARROW at MlG A. The Event III-252 t nlaalle seeT.»f(l to guide InltliUy but missed MIG A. [See firing 2 of Table 1 fop additional details.] With interiocics out, BLUK 3 pulled some l«ad on MIG A and fired his third SPAR"OM at the MIC. The missile paiisod Just behind KIC A. [See firing 3 of Table 1.1 The MIC at this time Mas In a left d»>scendlnR h.ird turn. BLUE 3 with good overtake, then went Into a left climbing turn above the MIG. Tlie HIC made no attempt to follow and did not come close to BLUt^ 3, and CLUE 3 successfully disengaged. BLUE 3 and It cane back around and rolled In on another HIG-17 (MIG B). BLUE 3 put the plpper on the MIC and achieved a lock-on. before BLUE 3 could fire, two other F-'is came between BLUE 3 and MIC P.. At the time that SLUE 3 and 1 rolled out, Just as the other F-'is got between them and MIC B, BLUE 3 noticed another HIO-17 at 5 o'clock, rirlnR. DLUE 3 could see the top of the wing so this MIG was not a threat to 'ilm but the KIC was close to tracking BLUE so BLUE 3 and u went to full burner and started a climbing turn. The MIG started tc follow but fell oack and was cnly a threat for a few seconds. BLJE 3 and 4 then climbed to altitude to position fcr another attack, BLUE 3 saw a lone MIG-17 (HIC C) and turned In on him and attempted to fire two SIDEWINDERS. One SIDE*I!«'DEH hun? and the other missed. [2ee firing and 5 of Table 1.] By the time BLUE 3 had got into r.inge , MIG C had neen him and had started a break. In addition, BLUE 3 had a weak tor.e on the SIDEWINDER , The CIDLWINDER which missed, fell short cf the MIG. BLUE 3 and ti then broke off since the MIC's actions Indicated that BLUE 3 had been seen. BLUE 3 and k climbed back to altitude (i^bout 8000 feet) and on checking the fuel state, determined that they were close to BINGO, so they started to egress. BLUE 3 then saw a lone MIC-17 (MIG 0) low and to the right. The MIG was at a very low altitude and appeared to be heading for Kep. BLUE 3 and ft had enough fuel for one :nore pass, so they went to afterburner a>"d turned right and down. When he saw the MIG, BLUE 3 was between 8000 and 10,000 feet altitude and climbing. The HIC was below 1000 feet. BLUE 3 achieved a radar lock, and went to full system. With the In-range light on and the steering dot centered, he fired his last SPARROW. The SPARROW did not track at all and dived into the (ground. [See firing 6 of Table 1.] Since BLUE 3 had a good rate of closure, and the MIG had apparently- not detected BLUE -3, he closed slightly and descended to 200-300 feet AGL In an attempt to get a good tone. BLUE 3 was unsuccesg Tul , and fired a SIDEWINDER against a green hill background with a weak tone. The missile appeared to track and was headed for the tailpipe but fell short. [See firing 7 of Table 1.] BLUE 3 felt he was In range although he does not remember if the backseater called It out. It was indicated in the OPREP source that BLUE 3 had a radar lock during the last two firings. BLL2 1 then fired his last SIDEWIfJDER and the SIDEWINDER detonated to the right of the KIQ» Just outside of the wing. As the missile detonated, MIG D went i.nto a sharp left turn and when the fire ball subsided the NIG taas still flying. Since BLUE 3 was out of ordnance and fuel, BLUE 3 and <> started a climbing turn and disengaged. [See firing 6 of Table 1.] Altnough BLUE ii had stayed with BLUE 3 throughout the encounters, and was calling to clear BLUE 3, BLUE 3 had difficulty hearing BLUE U. BLUE 3 retained his outboard fuel tank until egress, and did not notice any performance degradation due to it. The lowest speed that BLUE 3 achieved was Results and Reeiarks Missile did not guide* nlssed 500 ft. Steering dot in Ase circle . missile - guided Initially but missed by 300 ft. Interlocks out dulling lead. Ueak Ordnance hung . Weak Hill back- ground* the missile missed by 100 ft short of the NIG. Low Alt. missile hit gnd Ifl bach of NIG. Interlocks out, missed 500 ft. •1 e a K Hill back- ground . missile fell short by 20 ft. i^ea k HiU back- ground , miss Ue detofiited 20 ft away fcut no kill. ■The AlH-7 missile select Hght had been on 60 seconds prior to arming. ^On firing the tone became « low background chopping noise. Event : I 1-252 system and rlpple-flred two SPAHROWs. [See firing 1 and 2 of Table 2.] One of the missiles was not otserveJ, the second tracked well and detonated in the vicinity of MIG E. The MIC caught fire and went down to the left, resulting In a kill for GFEEK 1. The Impact was observed by a member of BLUE Flight. GREEN 1 did not see the r.lssile detonate since he was under attack by two othor MIG-17S. Just before CHiEri 1 had fired, CJHEEtl 1 Back had seen the MIGs cor.lnft In from 8 o'clock high going to 6 o'clock. The MIGs were 1-1/2 to 2 miles away and GKEEt'! 1 Back called ther. cut. These HIGs started firing at GREEN 1. By the time CREEtl 1 had fired hla srARRCWs, these KIGs were In good position and OREEH 1 Front could see the underside of the HIGs. GREE.'J 1 then made a levu-l loft break (aoout 7-8 g's) but the MIGc stayed with him during the turn shooting. GF.EEW I then started to climb and the MIGs broke off to the right when BLUE 1 attacked them. When GKCE:: 1 cane around again. HIG E was burning on the ground. CREEM 1 continued to try to attack other MICs in the area. As GREEN 1 would come across the wagon wheel to attack a MIG who had his tall pointed toward GREEN 1, he in turn would be attacked by other MIGs. This happened three separate times. During these attacks, disengagements, separations, and reattacks, GREEN 1 fired two SIDEWINDERS and one SPARROW, without success, at three different Mj>!s. The first SIDEWINDER was fired out of parameters, and passed behind the target Csee firing 3 of Table 2], The second SIDEWINDER was fired under conditions like the first [see firing k of Table 2]. The SPARROW firing was from inside minimum range, and as the HIG broke, the missile passed behind [see firing 5 of Table 2]. GREEN 1 reached bingo fuel and after calling the other flights, started to egress. As the friendly forces left, most of the MIGs had left except for a single MIG-17 I), circling in the area. At this time GREEM 1 decided to attack this MIG so he descended to low altitude, and from 10 miles away started to approach the MIG. Before he reached firing range the MIG saw OEEEN 1 and started to ta^e evasive action. The MIC stayed low, turning, and GREEN 1 followed, attempting to stay below the MIG. GREEN 1 throttled bacit and stayed behind the HIG, 3000 to ttOOO feet away. The MIG turned up a valley and as he came to the end he flew over a ridge, and was outlined against the sky. The MIG popped over the ridge In a right turn and Im-Tiedlately reversed to the left. GREEN 1 got a good tone and launched two SIDEWi;.*OEF.s. The first was unobserved and the other exploded under t.^e i-IIG's tail [see firing 6 end 7 of Table 2]. The SIDEWINDER exploded 5-10 feet on the right side of the MIG and pieces were seen to come from the HIG as t\.v MIG turned left and down from 200 feet altitude. GREEN I Is credited with a kill. GREEN 1 then broke over the MIG to clear his 6 o'clock and lost signt of the MIn. GREEN 1 then egressed with a 2000 pound fuel state. GREEN 3 and 0 After GREEN 1 fired his first missile, GREEN 3 and t were Instructed to attack other HIOs. As GREE.N 3 and U attacked from a vertical maneuver, MIGs would cut across the circle to counter their attack. GREEN 3 fired six missiles in separate attacks on different MIGs [see Table 3 for the firing order]. At the tine that GHEEN 3 fired his first SIDEWINDER, GREEN k fired a SPARROW at a MIG. GREEN h fired Interlocks out, with a full system lock on. The SPARROV/ was observed tracking but GREEN ^ was unable ta keep track of it as he had to maneuver to stay with GREEN 3. However, the radar stayed locked on for about 5 seconds after he lost visual contact with the HIG. At firing, GP.EEN 'i had 5 degree angle off and was at 8500 feet altitude and 2 g's. The speed was Mach 0.9. He was firing down on a MIG- 17 who was at 3000 feet altitude and 0.3 r-iach. The overtake was about 300 knots. The firing range was about a mile, with lock-on also occurring at one mile. The switch settings were: polarization, linear; clutter, normal; and gate, narrow. The select IJght had been on 5 minutes before arr.li.g. About the second cr third tine around the circle, GREEN 3 and were In a left vertical turn reversal, heading back dcwn when GREEN ti saw GREEN 2 pass In a 20 degree dive with fire coming from the wing roots. (GREEN U thought he was firing his missiles.) Previous to this GREEN U thought he heard a call of "GREEN 2, MIG at 7". As GREEN 3 and f headed down, thev selected some MlOa which had broken off, and after GREEN 3 a id U fired at then, O.^ESN 3 and 'A then went back up and as they did, they saw GREEN : in a stall, on fire, and two parachutes. On the previously described descent, GREEN >i fired nis second SPARROW, under conditions identical to the firs*, firing except the track eror.slns angle and angle off were 20 degrees, and he had 3 g's on the aircraft. Again, a maneuver prevented GREEN i* from observing the BlsFlle flight. GREEN U subsequently atteT.pted to fire tv/c more SPARHOWs but they (the two aft missiles) would not fire and did net leave the alrcrjjgmmKbrr^ I T«b1« 2. GREEN 1 FIRIHG ATTEMPTS' Faring Attempt Ordnance Target 6R£EN 1 Flight Condi tfons Altitude (ft) Speed 6 Haneuver Target FHght CondUions A1 11 tude Relative Altitude Speed Maneuver a"fftliirar-iiT'ir* Tftbit 3. GREEN 3 FIRING ATTEMPTS* Firing Attempt Orilnance Target 6PEEN 1 fUght Condi tions Altitude (ft) Speed (kt) G Hsneuver Tjrget Flight Conditions Altitude Relative Altitude (tgt) Speed Maneuver Geometry Track Crossing Angle Relative Velocity^ (KN) Firing Range AIM-7C Firing Mode Clutter Gate Select Light Pol ar t za tion Detection Range Lock-On Range interlocks A!M'9B Firing Tone Results and Renarkt 1 A1H-7E MI6-17 MIG J 2000 500 1 Slight Dive 2000 Sane 0.8 N Turn 150 a>1 ml Bcreslght Override Narrow Satisfactory Linear A1H-9B H16-17 HIG K 20C0 500 1 Slight Climb 2000 Sane 0 150 No guide Hiss Yes Missile hit. target kill AlH-7£ KIG.17 HIG L 2000 500 4 2000 Same 0.8 H Turn ISO ssl «l Boresight Override Narrow Satisfactory Linear 1-1/2 Out System broke lock , miss i le went on and to the right AIM-9B HIG-17 HIG M 2000 500 3 2000 Same 0 150 AIH-9B HlG-17 HIG 0 2000 500 4 2000 Same 0 150 No Not observed No Did not guide* Ment Into ground Miss possibly due to target AIH-9B HIG-17 HIG P 2000 500 2 2000 Same 0 150 No Not observed i^ t. 4 .-.port. ,h,t Jt» 1 c.lUd. •■ out Of ...sn..-. ft -t >-». 1* t»C» » .».«.,♦.- «» "r. t>. .U.r S»..OW. ''closing. Event III-t52 The P-<5' altitudes during the engagement v&rled from ICO to 8500 feet. The tactics used by both groups of MIG-173 were to stay In a "wagon whe<^l" b."bit» turning to the left. Both groups of P4IG3 orbited lou (one near 1000 feet and anot^e^ near 5000 feet) and in the same location. They operated in pairs or in threes, and when an F-^i elecont rolled In for a pass, at least one MIC would be at their 6-7 o'clock. The hIG-173 would disengage- by executing a spllt-S In the vertical and diving for the deck. The enemy aircraft were extremely agre:..:! ve. There waj also a couple of Kia-173 orbiting very law (100-200 feet- altitude) nsar the center of the orbit and it was surmised that thest were dl;-ector airer-aft. The *1ia-17s used afterburner Intermittently throughout the engageoent. The friendly tactics were to pick an element of MIGs In the orbit and make a high- speed pass, breaking of a /nlnlmwn range to go high to position for another pass. The speed Mas kept high. 3 3 i a 0:| 3 3 3 3 a 31« Jllrcpaft Involved! Event 111-253 Three P-tCs and two EB-66s V5 one unident Results: StEhtlng Vicinity of Encounter: 20«'Oi'H/104«02'E 1. fItlHMT NISSIOII AND TACTICAL SITUATION DateAtnw: 20 May 1967. I6IOH t1. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ECK escorts sighted a laree, high swept wing A/C approaching head-on from the north; the A/C made a wice sMeeplng left turn at approx speed of EB-66 at altitude of 30,000'; numerous MXG calls were heard. 4- Event III-25ti Aircraft Involved: Three P-105s vs seven MIC- 17s .Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21*'X8'rJ/106°43 'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 20 nay 1967, I63OH II. DATA SOURCE . CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike flight IngreaslnK at 5000'; four :MGs came from the south at flight's altitude, gently dropping below flight altitude to a 6 o'clock position; MIC-s were unable to engage due to flight speed; aa flight egressed from target., three HIG-17S at 3000' were observed closing on flight; XIGa could not execute turn to engage flight. I; Event II 1-255 Aircraft Involved: Four F-l»Cs vs one MIO-? and one unldent Results: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: 21"09'N/105'51'E I. PRIMARY HISSION MO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 20 Kay 1967. 163OH II. DATA SOURCE CIHCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION KIOCAP flight, when approx JiO miles short of target, heard MIG call front flight of Event 170; flight continued cover for ?-i05s on into and out of target area; one KIC sighted by *3 going away from the strike force; one unVcnown type A/C was observed, silver in color, marlclngs could not be observed due to distance. 315 Event III>256 Aircraft Involved: Four P-lUSDs »s two KZC-17s Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 2l'^3i'N/lCt;°37*2 1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOJ: Datemme: 20 Kay 1967/about I63CH BLUE flight (four P-lOSgs) was the lead flight of a force of F-105s striking the I^^rallroad yards ct Zl'si'N/loe^SS'E. The racCAP was provided by the alrc^ft of 5"'JP"^52. The other strike flights which saw MIGs are described in Events iII-260 ana -«57» 2. MISSION ROUTE Takhll to target ard return via th^ Culf of Tonkin. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS £=i95£ BLUE 1 BLUE 2 BLUE } BLUE U 4 - CBU-jtis k - CBU-2*s on 6 760 lb bombs 6 - 750 lb beiafes on centerllne centerllne 1 - AIM9B 2 QRC-160 1 - AIM9B 2 - QHC-I6O 1 - QRClfiO 1 . QRC 160 All aircraft carried 2 - 450 gal external fuel tanks and 23 mm guns. All camouflaged. MTQ^IT. MIQ 1. 2 Clean Dull silver color, red stars on wings Cannon 4. FLIGHT CONOITIOhS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Some low, fair weather cumulus In the area; good visibility. BLUE 1. 2. 3. ft Altit:ide : 6,000 feet Heading; 310° Fuel Stat^ t 7,000 lbs Pliidit F ormation ; Line abreast, with 1 and 2 on the right and 3 and 4 on the left. 5. INITIAL DETECTION Two aircraft, subsequently Identified as MIC-l?s, were detected by BLUE flight during ingress, when they were about I 1/2 minutes out rrom the target. Bog-^ys were at 10:30 o'clock, slightly hlgn, about '*-5 miles distance, in a left turn' toward BLI;E flight. MIG wamlnj?s had been hearJ, but none had teen directed at this flit;ht. The bogeys were initially thought to be HICs due to their shape and the direction from Mhleh they came. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE flight lit afterburners and continued their run on the target. The WTGs fell behind as BLUE flight accelerated for the pop up, even though they atteroted tc position for firing. 7. SITUATION OEVELOPKCNT BLUE flight popped up to about 13,000 or 1«,000 ft, making a right hand roll-In for an attack heading of abouc 020 , then Jinking oat in a gener£;lly south to east direction. BLUE flight lost sight of the MIG3 in their maneuvers to stilke the target. Snortly after coming cff target, BLUE U called that he wa3 being fired upon by a KIG as he observed tracers hlgn over his left wing. BLUE U applied negative g's, rent afterburner and successiTully disengaged. When SLUE flight had eg^essed about five miles further from the target and had rejoliied in a line abreast Torriaclon with Bf.UE 3 and '■i on the left, iiLUE 1 saw a KIC-17 closing and passliie; behind iTl.r. In a rlirht turn. The y.lC. wa- unable to atrack BLL'I lead --^ and continued over te attack BLUE The XIG approajr.ed 150: feet range at SLUE t's 316 If J Event iri-256 5 o'clock poslt-lon as BLUE lead called the MIC»3 position and for the flight to g;o after- burner, unload and break rlpht. The P-105s accelerated away from the MIC and the range had Increased ".o 2000 feet before the KIC achieved a firing position. However, the MIC was not observed to fire and It Is doubtful whether the MIC actually achieved firing position. The ^ac fell behind a» OLUE flight e(;ressed toward the coant. Although not definitely ascertained, it waa suspected that the latter two MIO-173 attacking SLUE flight were the same ancs as those making the pass on BLUE flight prior to Striking th« target. 8. ORONAKCE BLUE - none. KIOs - One enemy fired unknown number of rounds of cannon at BLUE it, Ho hits. 9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS None reported. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience ; Total Hours BLirE 1 3100 P-105 Hours 250 Combat Missions Unknown Remarks None CoajBtrnts Kne<« that they could outrun tlitr MIC-17s. 11. DATA '0JRCE3 Project Interviews: BLUE 1, 31 Kay 1967. Messages: 355 TPW Takhll OPREP-3 2013202 May 67, i)OTO-0 II808 May 67. 12. NARRATIVE See 5* 6, and 7. ffv 31: m Event III-257 Aircraft Involved: Four P-lOSDs vs eigne RZG-17a Result : No damage Vicinity of Encounter; 21°26«H/106°20'E 1. PRIHARV HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 20 Hay 1967/about I63OH Pour F-10i>3 (BLUE flight) were part of a strike force from Takhll attacking the Bae Le railroad yard. The other strike flights which encountered MIGa were Ch?s« of Events III-256 and III>260. The NISCAP aircraft were those of Event III-252. 8. ORONANCE BLUE 1 BLUE 2 1Q. AIRCREW CONMENTS Experience BLUE 1 BLUE 2 Compenta 20inn Cannon 3/0 3/0 Total Hours 3300 5100 200 rounds fired 570 rounds P-105 Hours 700 260 Coabat Mission: 90 Two previous air-to-air engagements . 65 Two prior alr-to«> air engageaents . BLUE 1 - the Mia-17's rate of turn is almost unbelievable. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews: BLUE 1, June 1967 Hessages 355 TPW Taithll OPREP-3 201U00Z, May 67, OOTO-0 11812 12. HARRATIVE On ingress, as BLUE flight approached the "pop-up", eight silver MIC-17s In fingertip trail formation were sneounterel. BLl.'E flight was headed west and the MIGs were turning to coae in on BLUE at 6 o'clock. BLUE called the F-t CAP flight and proceeded into the pop-up, bombed and recovered. At this tlae MIGs were sighted in all quadrants. As the flight starred to egress, BLUE 1 and 2 In succession passed three MIGs at three separate times. Each time 3LUE 1 and 2 would fire a burst of 20mm and pass on (vicinity of 21«»26'N/106*20'E}. BLUE 2 fired a total of 570 rounas. The last of these passes by BLUE 2 waa at 100 feet altitude. There was no known damage done to the HIGs. BLUE flight accelerated to 600 kta and continued egress. During the engagement, BLUE 1 saw a single NIG- 17 at low altitude and went down after hln. Just as he was pulling lead to fire on the MIQ, the KIQ broke very sharp and BLUE 1, being unable to follow accelerated away. 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 8 318 n 3 - Event Aircraft Involved: Four F-UCs vs four or five MIG-21S* Results: Two MIG-21s destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: Sl-SS'N/lOS"?! -E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlffie: 20 M.iy 1967/l62*'.H 'rU.I;?.'°o"tt.r«S^;"F-rnU^'. •.;ic:.;tl;ri?JrrAiD klsht (Ev.n. 111-257) -a. ... tacked by KIO-Zlz. 2. MISSION ROUTE ^ , , . „ BLUE PU.« ....... ■--^/S-^^cS'Jo'ira;™;!^™"-?"' r = °?o"'"""'- the reverse rcute. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F-^C BLUE 1. ?. 3» ^ H - AIM-7E SPAP.!^CV; l» - AIM-9B SID£«IHDSH 1 - QRC-I6O pod 1 - 600 gal cent«rlln« tank 1 - 370 eal out&card tank IFP-on-TACAi;-on MIG-21 C and D (at -WQ werB "D") Silver One Mn-21D had CHICCM narklr^s No external stores 4 FLIGHT COHOITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER weather: Tuo-eUr^t^n scattered clouds with tops at 3000 ft. Visibility 20 ml. BLUE T i 3 ^ Altitude: 12.000 ft AOL (approx. 15,000 f" MSL) Hea ding : 137** Speed: 5'*0 kts Fuel "State : 9000 lb Flignt .-orratlon : Pod 5. INITIAL DETECTION force. NITIAL Dtlttiiun of t^e strll f Dur'ne inrress, SLl'E back sa« two KIC-21s attacking the last flight of the strlLe tSI MinsSere heariln? 010- at 8000 ft altitude. 6. ACTION INITIATED ! |, BLUE Plight irwiedlately broke off to attack the MIGs. j ^ 7. SITUATION OEVELOPHEMT , , n^r^,.- qros ^ * I: could fire, a call of brea|^ ^":^?fil*?i?-^c "tar-f^d to rejoin the strike force. tl P f.nr.a., another MIG-21 and began .1 As BLUE Fll.:ht a^aln started down .hud ^Id.^e ELJ. ^ saw an ^^^^^ an attack. 3LU?. 3 ,v,;b.e=,-:ently f";;';^,.^;^^!. ^f"?:;^ 3 !21D wh obtaining ^ lock on ,| l^h^n ^^^Jrorf an^^?t^?r?^ild'^e^V^ItUt:;S.%LUE . called 3r:00 fuel due to a :SShanlca. dirncuuy. .nd Y^^/ ~ ^^^^ 3LUE 1 was success- I.. BLUE 1 and 2 r.hen p'-c'.:en up a -^^^^^ID and .urnea na destroyed the MIG-no. fal in a.Mevm, an attack positic. f^^erriLSE ami 2 sal another ••110-21 at 6 o'clock Tirr^v. .... »nd four w.r. .nr.a;:^.^. or.w re.ber^ validate five, one crew l:;-:r vaUdat:3*?.;;r;".nd four crew :::e.ber.^Ki^three aircraft. 319 i m Event IIt-256 ORDNANCE (No. flred/Ho. hit) BLUE 1 BLUE 3 9. SPARROW AIN-7E 3/1 SIDEWINDER AI M-9S EQUIPHSNT PROBLEMS BL'IE It had a fuel sj-aten nalfunctlon whl'sh caused the engine no burn ojore fuel than normal. BL'JE l'« radar display in t\e backseat had very din presentation. It was difficult to see the radar return and tho presentation had to be held for several seconds before the symbols could be seen. In boreslght racde, the scope was so bright no data could be seen so that lock-ons could not be achieved In boreslght. 10. AlkCREU CONMEKTS Experience TOTAL p.4 COMBAT HOURS HOURS MISSIONS REMARKS BLUE 1 Front 3600 230 70 Plew In Thundarblrds - F-86 pilot Back 500 260 BLUE 3 Front 5000 200 5« Had fired alssllea In flight test Back 610 350 CofTLTients BLin 1 Front - The MIOs were trying to hit the F-1055 from low with a missile pop-up attack. The MIGs were coming In from a bean position to attempt a hit and run attack. The MIC solved BLUE I'a problems by his maneuver. The wlngnan did a good Job. BLUE 1 Sack - The winenan (BLUE 2 and U) did an excellent Job of staying with their element leads. T^.e wlngr.an were irlefed to call the 6 o'clock situation every 15 to 20 sec. BLUE 1 never worried about the 6 o'clock. Although some of the flights had started to carry guns, BLUE Plight had not yet been so configured. BLUZ 1 Front said that due vo his exoerlence in firing SIDEWINDERS, he knew exactly what he wanted to see for a flrl.ig situation. The one he had this time fitted It exactly no clouds, clear blue sky, and target golr^ straight away in afterburner. Due to the failure of the radar set, it was planned to use the SIDEVIIIiDEH. The wlngnan really made the formation since he was checking the 6 o'clock while BLUE 1 was attacking. The frequent calls kept SLUE 1 from having to look around. If fuel was left a'; the end cf a mission, the flights would practice ACT, wlt!i emphasis on the wlngman's functions. In the element lead, the aircraft coinm-der -«as flying for an attack. The backseat on the lead aircraft was looking at the rsdar -o lock on the target. The front seat of the -/ineman was fellow Ing lead and watchln;. to stay with hlra. The backseat in the wln^man's aircraf; was really performing the visual search. They were the ones which spotted the MIOs that led to the kills. BLUE 3 Front - Pelt he could have gotten the last KIO on which he had aenleved a lock, but he had to leave due to SLUE >*. If you want MIOs you must go after the-n and Initiate a radar search If you lose visual contact. The squadron has a lot of people with long experience and they recognize the value of the wlngnan working closely with the leader. n . DATA SOURCE Pro.1est Interview." BLUr. 1 Front, 23 June 1?67 BLUE 1 Back, 23 June 1967 BLUE 3 Front, 23 June 1967 320 1 1 3 8 a 3 s 3 id 0 Event III-258 3f>f'T^"w pon^o:: i-'Ci crrKV-^ fastel 670 3'>>Tr.: Xny lOG? Cr;-r:P-3 FA5TEL 17? 360Th".' 2'-JO30OZ Xay l?67 Cr:it:F-3 ^^(^0 00162 Raytheon letter Oil) OU33 22 May 1967 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION DLL"-- '^llnit war one of two «tCCAP escort fllKhts escortlni; the strike force , Ton Korat. rne strlk..- fore., was In a ^a.-cle foraatl'..'! and the other MIGCAP escort flight was -ib-i'Jt noo ft hS-htr th^r. -v.:i about In th.> r.ltdle of the strike force. BLUE PllRht was behln'i the la.it fllrht rV the fr-r-e, j*bout 2000 ft higher than the rest of the rormnt!on ^r.i trallin? n i:lt. During mrresa to the tar/et at l62aH. vhen in the vicinity of 21» 35 'N/lQit* 35 ' E . BLUE Fll.-nt Heard It:-: fllrht c? Event 111-257 call launch lU:ht3 from Lead 12 (a SAM *lte). Lead 2 (anotner SAM ^ite) was also reported out no ^AMs were observed. ilOTEL was active, t;lv;.i5 two warnings during ingress and three while the strike force was In the target area. When the centerllne tank ^ecap.e empty, it wac Jettisoned and =i-^rtl: after turning down T^ud R'dr". bL-'E *-llrh!t r.eard tr.e IROt! HAND Pll.;ht (Event III-257) call MICs and flleht" lnstruction3 called by P-lQSs. The flrct call h-sard from the IRON' "AND put the .'JiIGs at rhe ^- -O'j*.- ■} c* clock tut BLUE Fllcht v.as unable to gain contact with the HIGs." Another call inJlcated the ■•lICo were going fror; rignt to left, under BLUE Flight, so BLUE 3 and A tanked In an atteript to see under theni. "finally BLUE n backseat jaw two r<1IG-21s (MIG 1 and 2) under the flight, and BLUE 3 picked un a ''iri off to his left (which was to the east). At this time BLUE Plight was at 21°JJ0»N/:05''22'E heading 137" ac 5«0 KTA5 and 12,000 ft ACL. The time was 1625H. MIG 1 and 2 were heading OlO" at 3000 ft AGL and HSO KTAS and were attacking the last flight of P-1053. When 3LU^ 3 p'-ked up the MIG (It was felt that this was one of the first two seen)* he called it and turned left tc start an attack. BLUE 1. who did not see the MIGs at that time th-n indicated th^t SL'JS 1 and 2 would provide cover. The MIG seen by BLUE 3 was Identified as a MIO-21 due In cart to its flashing silver color. BLUE 3 started to close in on the MIG as it turned north and then west. Aithouth tnere hao been two radar con- tacts 'bm;- 3 went fcor'*5i.-ht and the backseat looked on to one of them. At this tine, BLUE 3 lost visual contact with the MIG but followed him by using the steering dot on the radar.. BLUE 3 followed the contact through about 135" of turn and as the ASE circle started to expand a.nd he was ready to fire Interlocks in, BLUE called for a ,t?2-.7S'31ncSl?. that there were "lOs at 7 o'clock. At this time, I626H. BLUE fllcnt was at 21<'5VN/105*21 with BLUE 1 and 2 follov/in5 BLUE 3 and U ly about 5C00 ft at their a-7 o'clock hign. BLU^ Plight after SLUE 3 reauested and received confirmation of the break call, broke left BLUE 3 broke radir cont.ict during the break. .'lo .MIGa were seen, and th"» aircraft observed by BLUE U were -eally BLUE 1 and 2. BLUE 1 attempted to call off the break but, due to the crowded communications channels, the message was not heard. W^ien seen apaln, the MIGs posed no threat to thj strike force so BLUE Flight turned to the southeast' to continue to follow the strike fci-oe. The subsequent actions take place within a 10 mi radius of 21''53 ' N/I05' 2JJ 'E . Shortlv after rolllns; out with BLUE 1 and 2 still behind, BLUE 3 saw another "10-21- (MIC 3) off' to the eact, .^oing rather fast. BLUE 3 went to boresight and locked on «1G 3- The sun rllnts frc^. .'.IG 3's sliver surface had alerted BLUE 3 to the presence of fllO 3 wl.o was atten;:;t'n-; to attack the strike force. When seen, BLUE 3 and MIG 3 were both at 10,000 ft .altitude, with BLUE 3 heading 137* at 5*10 kts. When Initially detected, MIG 3 was at 6 mi range and lock-on was Immediate. After lock-on, BLUE 3 continued to track MIG 3 visually with only an occasional reference to the steering dot- , BLUE 3 closed sUghtlv on the MIG, and both BLUE 3 and MIG 3 started a left descend- ing turn. When at about 5-6 t^I range, BLUE 3 fired his first SPARROW with full system lock interlocks in. BLUE 3 was at 10.000 ft altitude and about O.V Hach. BLUE 3 was about 20-30^ angle off frorr. MIG 3, puUln;; about 2 "g's". The closing velocity was small. The missile cime off the aircraft and tucked dcwn and to the left and went ballistic, passing out of sight.' >0?REr 21^03502 May 15^7 reptrts a 200 ft miss dlstaroe at the MlG»s a o'clock. Event: III-258 BLUE 3 continued to turn left with MIG 3. closing slowly, and ?J » Mlth BLUE 3 8000 rt and about .95 Nach , BLUE 3 fired hla s-jcond oPARROW. The MIG was It Sboit 800§"rt also -??h the other conditions of firlms «bout Jhe sane as the first except the interlocks were out. The second SPARROW also went ballistic* BLUE 3 .nalntalne*n^ Bt II?- T .ind MIG ^ wer- at afcout 6000 ft altitude with iJLUfc 3 ac i.i 'J*^';"'- " , . «ti«n ilr'lar to -he '••artln-Baker seat, and the naln chute had orar.«e and white panels, action slR.iar to -ne • ^ ' Zh» ar iif 7 h-ir!^ would not release. 11. DATA SOURCES ■ Hessages ; 388 TPW Korat OPREP-3 2012252 May, 1967 DOI 1779 M 388 TPW Korat OPREP-? 201250Z May, 1967 DOI 1780 ?| 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE flight was at 21°l*O'N/105°30 'E , heading 133°, 550 kts 5000 ft altitude at 1628H . When silver rlc-Sls were observed approaching the flight from the « °' PJ?"^?"* J When BLUE flight lost them at 6 o'clock. BLUE flight turned the right and the MIGs then || oassed the flight and turned left. Mo firing from the MIGs -..as observed. BLUE flight Snntinti*d their turn CO the right and then to the left, mailing a complete figure eight iTr '^ut SSgr Sev a~a?n spr^.n in on a heading of 130° at 550 lets and 4000 ft R altitude When at 21*35 'N/IOS^SS E at l63fH. BLUE flight observed a silver f«0-21 J JJtacklng them from the 2 o'clo=k high position. At this time BLUE lead Jettisoned U ?"l5-2" (the ot^er would r.-^t release) and BLUE 2 and 4 Jettisoned 6 HK82 bombs each ihl val olewhot the flight, and as he passed In front BLUE !: 21 clea.n of external ordnance. BLUE lead turned to the left to follow the MIO and fired 6B rounds of 20™ with undetermined results. The MIO turned right and cllifibed. and BLUE flight turned left to heading 310 up Thud Ridge. a Q Q Q 0 n u i Event riI-260 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-lO^s vs one MIG-17 Results: No datnase 'V' Vicinity of Encounter: 21'»13'N/106«*6 'E I. PRIHART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 20 May 1967/Approxlniai o ly I63OH Pour P-lQSs (BLUE FllFhM w«?re p'. of a strike force froa; Takhli attacking the Bac U raU^arjard. The rulSt of Evekt III-256 and -257 was part of this strike force, and the flights of Event III-252 were provldlnc MIGCAP. 8. ORDNANCE (No. fired/No. hit) Cannon M(S-I7 1/0 II. DATA SOURCES Messages. Reports : 355TFW Takhlt 201320Z ftey 67, OPREP-3, DOTO-O.II8O8 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION When at ?1«13 ' M/106»16 'E. BLUE Flight (four P-105s) observed MI0-17s engaging a fllKhrof ?io P-105S it approiinately 7900 ft. The flight then noticed a single MIG-17 at Bl5e S's I o'clock, low position 3300 ft range, closing and firing on BLUE J. . The ««»hfr rnMMd afterburner ard BLUE 3 and k made a hard right turn, losing the MIG. BLUE ?ug;j JStSfSSd fo SasrSuh no further incident. MIO warnings were heard throughout the mission but there were none directed at this flight. 325 I i if Event 111-261 Aircraft Involved: Four P-tCs vs oie unldent Results s SlehtlnB Vicinity of Encounter: 20»25'N/X0Tn5*E I. PRIMAUr HISSION MO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlrae: 21 hay 1967, 0853H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Number 1 of escort flight over Gulf of Tonkin observed a llRht colored A/C of unkno^r^Jpe )"aSn. south at SPP-\;"«"?;4°S°;i JJfSt to a westerly heading and proceeded Inland, posing no threat to flight. Event II I- 2 62 Aircraft Involved: Eight P-I05s vs one MIC-17 and two unldents RaauJCs: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: Sl'OT'N/iOT'SO'E ' 21«15*N/107"00*E I. PRINARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlffiet 21 Hay 1967. 0S56H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. narrative' DESCRIPTION Strlke/flak supp flight at altitude 16,000' observed 1 HIC-17 at 13.000' headlni southwest; MIG passed In front of fllRht from left to right; «cond P-105 m^;? on 3?r"e*rds5ion at 6000', observed two unidentified dark SJijjf.*^^ at Sni altitude at seccnd position shown; unldent flight was in a diving turn toward 6 o'clock; bogeys were 3-5 ndles away; no attack attempted. Svent III>263 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-MCs va two unldents Results; Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: 2lO05'M/10«*30'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 May 1967. 090OH II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION P-«C escort flight was at 29,000' when, starting a left tur.i, they spotted two silver, delta wing A/C; bogeys at 10.000' altitude turned away. V 4> Event III-26'l' Aircraft Invclved: Four F-IO53 vs two unldenta Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: Unknown I. 'RlriARt MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 Kay 15 67, 0905H II. DATA SOURCe CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. MARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ■ifr^iic^ rinzht at 7000' slKhted two unknown A/C at 6:30 o'clock low approx two Event lH-265 Aircraft Involved: Two RP-ftCs vs unidentified Results: damage Vicinity of Encounter: 20«56'N/105nO'E 1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tline: 21 IS^T, l'»20H 11. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68, 12. ' NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Photo fURht aborted mission ciue ^:IC3 -a SA.s^ fllgt received two rln^ X-band flight's immediate vicinity; no prior WIG calls received. Event 111-266 Aircraft Involved: Three P-105s vs two MIC-lTs Results: Sighting Vicinity of Ercounter: 21»'<5'N/105»'»3 'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 Kay 1967. I6I6H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-^8. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike flight saw WGs at 16,000*. 327 Event III-267 Aircraft Involved: ivo P-^tCs va t-o MT.C-17s Results: Sighting only Vicinity Of Encounter: 21»10'N/10ft-10'E I. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 May 1967/1620H II. DATA SOURCE CINCFACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12, NARRATIVE OESCRIPTION ErK escort flight Observed two silver-grey MlOs. «IGs were lOK position. 2 mills away. After passing flight, KIGs nade a gentle left turn roll- iroS? and Sived away from flight. Plight did not attempt «nf f« liSJaK' « having departed 10 minutes before due to engine problems. This left only two alrcrart covering three EB-66 and Lead felt there ml^t have been a trap to draw protection away. Event III -268 Aircraft Involved: Three EB-668 wa ono Mlg-? Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 20«30'N/10*«25'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlnje: 21 May 1967/1031H ^^, DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-1(58. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Plight, for Which the flight of Event III-267 providing S^J^^' "PJ^'J^'JlJ"* * possible MIG 14 minutes later than the slfhtlng by that fllgnt. Mo hostile intent was evident . Event III-269 Aircraft Involved: Pour A-fts vs three unidenti- fied Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: Unknown I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 May 1967/Unknown II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Three bogeys were briefly observed by IRON HAKD Flight. Event III-270 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-tC* vs three M1G-I7s Result: No (iamaRe Vicinity of Encounter: 20» aO'N/IOS-ZO'E I. PRIMARY MISSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlr.e: 22 May 1967/0903H . BLUE Flirht (four F-uc) wa. aaaisncd «IOCAP for a strlR. against JCS Target 31.00. tnc ha Uanfi Arr.y liat-racks ar.J Supnly Depot. "olprcr"" :a«. direct ,0 P"-?"'^" rJ:it"-1,nroriSj''H;«t;"l«" cSil"j7, 20<»58'51"M/10b'f7"*2"=:, outbounu neaulnfr 257" until Clear or rj-Hga, direct post-strike pefuellns. direct Channel 27. I I . DATA SOURCES Messares. Reports : 366 TFW. 0PKEP-3/PIM-ACLE 017, 220U55Z May 67. SECRET. 12, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIOH ^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ BLUE Fllgnt was o«^bound cn a head.n? of 2^7 at ou^ ^^^^ approxinately 20«»30'N/105"20'£ -hen ^» alHtude aad appeared to be attemptini! to keep from iSlil ;iSt25!"^"rLUrFnght"?id*h:arrs:fe^^«l? ='a?ls for BULISEYE and southeast of BULLSEYE. No additional infonsatlon provided. / Event 111-271 Aircraft Involved: Two RF-lOIa v» two probable MI0-17S Result: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: ZO'Sl'W/lOS'ftZ'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 22 May 1967/1 35 IH . n. DATA SOURCE Messages. Reports : i»32TRW 2212262 Kay 1967 OPREP-3 TUOC 0^252 12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOK Two RF-lOls (BLUE Plight) were on a mission against the XAC HAI motor pool. The weather was cl»ar with four nlles visibility. The flight departed ueorn and proceeded to 2O''35'N/10^''25'E, then to 21' 19 ' H/IOS" 23 ' E , and returned to L'dom at 27,000 feet altitude. The altitude over the target wis 12,000-1'* ,000 feet. At 13^7H, whlleen route to the target at 20»57*N/105»32'E, the flleht got a SAM activity light anJ Lead saw a single SAH. A second SAM was seen at i3^8 as the fi-ght was heading 090. at a position of 21''00'tl/105'*39'E. As the missile passed, the flight also received sone 85nm fire. The flight ehanged altitude to 18,OOC feet and were again fired on by flak. At 1350, when over the target, heading 180 degrees, a SAM was seen to come from 6 o'clock and detonate at 1 o'clock. 500 feet away. Two more SAKs were fired when the flight was over the target. Over the target the flight heard a MIG alert call on guard at 3ULLSEYE. At I151H, while egressing the target area, heading 320 degrees, two probably MIO-lTs were seen at 8 o'clock. The MIGs were heading south. At 1352H, when at 20''5l'S/105°''2'E heading 230, BLUE 2, who was ahead of BLUE 1 by one inile, saw a Si^M. This was followed by another about two minutes later when the flight was at 2O'''42'iyi05°35'E. At 1353H SLUE Flight heard a MIC call on guard and then guard channel was Jammed. BLUE Flight was heading 220-230 degrees and went into afterburner for three minutes to clear the mountains and then descended to low level to a point southeast of Channel 97. The flight then returned to Udorn. Event 111-272 Aircraft Involved: ?our A-tJEs vs two «10-? and one HIO-17 Results: No dana^e Vicinity of Encounter: 20'"i8'H/i05''38 'E and I. PRIKARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 Hay 1967/Berere 1500II 8. ORDNANCE (Mo. flred/No. hit) AAM or Rockets MIG-17 1/0 II. DATA SOURCES CIMCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68 12. NARRArtVE DESCRIPTION As a flight of four A-'iEs left the mountains, on Ingress to the target at 20»ti8'N/105°38'E, two MIOs f unidentified type) were seen at 9 o'clock high at a range of 6 »i. These MIGs made no run on the strlife aircr.-ift. Later, when the flight waa at 21*58 ' NV105°'>3' E. a MlG-17 was seen at II o'clocic high passing left to right and was observed to fir* an AAM or rockets. The liXQs target was apparently a strike aircraft on another target. ■4 %. .* 331 J 1. Event HI-273 Aircraft Involved: Two RP-lCs vs three unidentified Result: Sighting Vicinity of Encounter: 2O''55'N/lO'J"20'E PKlNAar HISSICU AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/Time: 22 Hay 1967/li|ii5H 11. DATA SOURCE »32 THW 221228Z May 196? OPREP-3 TUOC 0 2. MISSION ROUTE Deoarted Danunc. dirtct to White Anchor extended refueling track, direct Channel 97 dl^crto taJPi? at 20-9' M/105»'«»'E. direct 20«5O'N/105=O3'E. direct White Anchor post-strlite refueling track, direct Danang. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION p.OC 3LL-C 1, 3 4 - SPARflOW (AIH-7E) 2 - SIDEWIHDEH (Ai:^-9b) X - 20mn cannon pod 2 - 370 gallon wing tank:. 1 - QRC-160 ECM poQ Canouflace paint. P~«C BLUE 2. t 4 - SPARROW (A1M-7E) 4 - SIDEWi:.'DER (AIM-9B) 1 - 600 gallon centerllni tank 1 - 370 gallsn wlr.g tanit I - QRC-lbO ECK pod Camouflage paint. MIG-2X yiG I. 2. 3. t Sliver with red stars and bars outlined in yellow on both wings, AAMs Ko external stores observed. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Cirrus clouds at 22,000 ft AGL, 1/8 coverage. 25 n ml- BLUE I Visibility at flight level. Altitude ; Headi ng: Speed 1 IT 16,000 ft AGL 090* 500 kts 10-11,000 lbs Fuel State ; Plight yormation : Standard four-ship ECH pod formation. 5. INITIAL DETECTION Encounter 1 - BLUE flight had heard seven MIG calls while inbound co the target. BLUE lead was searching at 12 o'clock in response to a "Sullseye" (vicinity of Hanoi) rail when the Aircraft Concnander visually sighted an unidentified aircraft ahead of the strike force. The pilot subsequently identified two separate aircraft on radar. En counter 2 - As 6LUE flight was re.Joining on the tail end of the strike forse after temiinatlnr Encounter 1 above, BLUE lead looked over his left shouMer to check his fomation and sighted a MIG-21 closing at a Mgh rate of speed "a slight back froc 6 o'clock to the forrration." 6. ACTION INITIATED En counter 1 - BLUE lead locked on to one of the suspected WIGs and the flight accelerated ahead of the strike force in A3. SLOE lead lost sltrht of the aircraft after It sta-ted a left turn and then reversed to the rl?:ht. ELU^ lead continued a radar steerlnr d-t pursuit In a hard right turn through a cllir.b, djscent, and level flight. After approxlrately 100° to 120* of turn, 31UE<^ead could noc establish a lead or cutoff on the radar tarvet (steering dot in far rlghthUnd side of scope) and elected to break off and return to the =-rike force. This terminated Encount ;r I. 33* 1 a a a a 0 0 3 I.. r r if; Event III-277 Encounter 2 - ULL'E lead Ir^nedlately Initiated a left turn into the MIC-21. As BLUE lead l-ntered the turn the MIC fired an AAN at the strike force and pullt-d "P Into a steep cllnb in a slight left turn. BLUE Lead followed the MIC and flrsd a uIDEWIUDEH as the MIG was entering a *-hlck cirrus cloud layer. .-lIC clircb angle approximately 50 . 7. SITUATIOH OCVELOPNENT The MIO disappeared Into the clouds with the r.IDEWINDSR tracJclni; towards its tall- pipe. BLUE lead rolled off sU^ntlv to the rl?ht and continued through the cirrus clouds to break out on too and found noth^nf; but snokc and debr l:. floatlnc; above the cloud on the left. (This kill was later conflrned by an F-105 m the strike force who saw of debris, one aSouc the size of a wln^ or half a fuselage ^^3^1-1"?/"^:^", a''?"^ JJ 'SJ? " in this area.) Alr.oct Inr.edlately BLi^-E lead sljrhced another Mia-21 at 1 o cjock about one mile away. BLUK lead turned Into this Kir, and fired the second SiDE.;^flDER. which failed to Kulde, r>asr,!nr, off to the rlp:ht and behind tne MIC. The MIG entered a hard left dlvlns: turn followed by violent evasive naneuverlnc from 25.000 ft to 2000 ft. blul lead closed on the MIG in the descent and be^an flrins: a slnRle 253 round burst of 20min cannon durinc the nuUout with no aoparent results. BLUE lead did a pull-up and wing over" to prevent ah overshot and lined uo behind tne MI3 with good overtake for another attack. The vie had leveled out "in a shallow j^lldlns fllRht slowly novtng ^-^ wlnS?, turning left and then right." SLUE lead puUed the trigger as the MIC was passing through 1000 ft; however, the gun Ja.Tjned. BLUE Lead slid off to the left and directed BLUE 2 to take the MIO. However, SLUE 2 did not have a gun and was not In position to initiate an imnedlate nlsslle attacs. Although no additional action was taken, the MIG continued down m a gliding turn to Impact the ground and erupted In a big ball of fire. The flight, havlnis reached BI.'.'GO fuel, egressed the area without further incident. 8. ORDNANCE (Ho. f3red/No. hits) SIDEWINDER 20rm AIM-gB Cannon BLUE I 2/1 1/1 MIG 1 9. .EOUIPMENT PROBLEMS None. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Soviet AAH 1/0 Remarks 253 Rounds 20bct (Tracer every 7th Round} . Total p-t Combat Hours Hours nisslons BLUE 1 Front 5035 139 254 Back oil 351 115 Coimnents Remarks Had previously flown P-59 in SEA combat prior to P-Hs. son l»s«rned Is to keep the orersure on the MIGs and do not give up. thel- Dllots do not have the quality training and experience our y make' fatal .xlstakes and often fail to exploit their advantages or as taken a long time to convince peoole that a run Is needed. This ns»t^3 for those situations where you are ♦^oo close to use missiles is 'not comcatlble for rada- mls3lles oi- the SIDEWINDER. The noncom- not very good at beat. With the fixed sight and boreslght problems it Is a last dlt^h effort that relies on a trene.ndous volume of f*re Ideally, we need an Internal gun in the F-4. Blue 1 - A les It's quite obvious pilots have and tiie capabilities. It h conflp-.uratlon comco or the environment putlng gun sight Is of an external gun, to spray the target n . DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUE 1 (Front) - 23 June 67; telecon with BLUE 1 (Front) - 10 July 68. Kessaras. Penorts ; nfA-^-c-j rroT ='A• 335 Event III-277 12. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTION / BLUE rilrht was positioned forward and to the rl(i;ht of the leading group of P-lOSs •* In the strike force. As the force "passed In the vicinity of Hoa Lac heading east," at Hj, approximately 16,000 ft AOL (500 Jets, 10-11,000 lbs fuel), F.LK'K 1 (Front) "spotted MIGs out In front of the formation; - Just an airplane way out that was not supposed to be there." The pilot (DLUH l-Rear) subsequently Idontlfiert two aircraft on radar. BLUE lead made « borealght lock-on one of the suspected MIGs and the fllp;ht accelerated ahead of the strike force in AB (All oxte-nal t.mks had been previously jettisoned when empty because of numerous MIC calls). BL».£ lead lost sl^nt of tne aircraft after It started a lef*- turn and then reversed to the right. BLUE lead continued a radar steering dot pursuit In a hard right turn through a elln;b, descent, and level fllg.'it. After approximately 100° to 130"* of turn, BLUE l. ad could not establish a lead or cutoff on the radar target {steering dot In far rlghthand jlde of scope) and elected to break off and return to the strike force. As BLUE flight, still In AB, was rejoining on the tall end of the strike force, BLUE lead looked over his left shoulder to cheek his formation sighted a MIG-?1D closinK at a high rate of speed "a slight back Trom G o'clock lo the forTiatlon." BLUE lead immediately Initiated a left turn Into the xrG-21. As BLUE lead entered the turn the MIO ri^ed an AAK at the strike force and pulled up into a steep cllsb in a slight left turn. BLUE Lead followed the MIG firing a SIDEWII.'DER just as the MIC was entering a thick cirrus cloud layer. The MIO had at least a 50* cllnb angle. (The missile was visually launched at apprcxlnately 1 "g" after a good 10 second loud growl tone. BLUE 1 was at 18,000 ft AGL, Mach 0.92; the MIG was at 21,000 ft AGL, 12 o'clock high In steep cllnb, range 2-3 ml.}' The MIC disappeared Into the cirrus with tht SIDEMIIJDER in pursuit. BLUE Lead rolled off slightly to the ri^ht and continued through the cirrus clouds to break out on top and found nothlni^ but sr.oke ar.d debris floating atove the cloud to his left. (This kill was later confirmed by an F-i05 in the strike force who saw two pieces of debris, one about the size of a wing or half a fuselage falling from about 20,000 ft in this area.) Almost Iranediately BLUE lead sighted another Min-21 at i o'clock about I mile away. BLUE lead turned into this MIO and fired the second SIDEWIHDE.'l , which failed to guide, passing off to the right and behind the MIG. (The ralaslle was visually launched wttli ^he plpper on the MIG after a "medium" growl, 5 second tone. BLL^ 1 was at 21,000 ft AGL in a 3 "g" turn. The MIG was at 2 o'clock, range approximately I 7:ile.) The MIG entered a hard left diving turn followed by evasive maneuvering Including "rapid reversals, snapping, turning, and twisting". During this descent over Hoa Lac Airfield, the "ground erupted with antiaircraft fire and five SAMs passed through the rorr.ctlon. " Since BLUE lead was unable to get a radar lock-on to the maneuverlns; '•■IG, he selected the gun and closed on him in AB at hlph speed. As the MIG began a pull out at about 2000 ft ACL, BLUE lead "pulled apsroxlr.ately 7 "p:*8" and hosed hln down good with the run" flrinp; a single 253 round burst of 20rjn cannon with no apparent results. BLUE lead did a pull-up and "wing over" to prevent an overshot and lined up behind the with good overtake "for a.nother attack. The MIC had leveled out "tn a shallow gliding flight slowly moving his wings, turning left and then right." BLUE lead pulled the trigger as the MIG was oasrlng through 1000 ft; however, the gun Jamr.ed. BLUE Lead slid off to tf. ; left and and directed BLUE 2 to take the MIG. However, BLUE 2 did not have a gun and was not in position to initiate an immediate missile attack. BLuE 2 overshot to the right. BLUE Lead started a climbing left turn in response to several BINGO fuel calls from the f'.lght. The flight was still drawing heavy flak at thio time. The MIG "continued in his f:lldlng turn and finally impacted with the groud Just north of the .^ed River and erupted In a big ball of fire." The flight egressed the area hlthout furth.r incident. 'This range figure is quoted from the OPREP-3. BLUE 1 (Fron-. ) stated that the range was possibly 3000 ft but no greatur tha.T one mile - well within launch pararceters. Event I 11-273 Aircraft Invclved: Pour P-105s vs Two MIG-21S Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 20»15'N/105'*10'E ^. PRIMARY MISSION AMD TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 22 May 1967/lDOtiH. Area . 2. MISSION ROUTE , » ^ -r.r-^^ AR TK-,iMnd direct to RED ANCHOR pre-strllte refueling, direct Chanrel 97. i only) 1 - ECM Pod r4TG-21 tao 1. 2 Large nose cone (P or F Model) Silver color AAMs (suspected ALKALI) 4 FUBHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER weather: 9000 ft scattered to broken with cumulus buildups In the encounter, visibility 5.7 miles. 'gy^E^^^ T 2 5 ^ Altitude ! 6,500-8,000 ft Heading ! 260° Speed; ^80-520 KTAS FuTrState : 10,000-11,000 lbs PllB;h»- Formation Unknown four ship, trolling for SAK sites. 5. INITIAL DETECTION ^ 1 nrtiP Piiirnt was on a headlni; of 260" at 6,500-8,000 ft AGL, «80-520 KTAS ^?H?SEf5i^■ln/a^^c 'v2 SArsUe\^^ of Ho^ Binh when BLUE J sighted a Slc-h an o'clock to 6LUE lead and 2. This MIG was within gun range when first sighted and had a high rate of overtake. Encount*>- 2 BLUE Flight was heading 220^ altitude U.GOO ft and was closing on the fllrhrT f£er a break whin another MIG-21 attacked the flight from a diving 6 o'clock position. Initial detectlcr. was outside of 5,00n ft range. 6. ACTION INITIATED Encounter 1. BLUE Flight Initiated a left break Just as the «IG overshot and passe't in front of the flight In a left cllsblng turn. Encounter 2 . BLUE Flight broke down and to the left as the MIG fired at least two AAHs at the flight. ^ PKcP 3 spates WX iiOOQ ft scat tered; however, this pilot report agrees with flight condi- tions described In the OPREP and the Interview. Event III-273 -ul- 52:/^"=-" """"" none of the fliK ht saw tnl3 MIC after the initial attack. 8. OSONANCE (No. flred/Ho. hits) BLUE 2 MIG 2 SIDEWINDER AIM-9B 1/0 Cannon aBo rd8/0 Soviet AAH 2 or 3 Remarks BLUE 2 stated that these were ALKALI missiles. 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS ^ BLUE 2 - The m61 20m cannon was apparently -over^reased or something Sould come out when fired causins an engine compressor staU. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience and large flames Total Hours 750 P-]05 Hours 500 Combat Missions 42 Remarks Went directly froci pilot training to F-1058 - USAPE to SEA. -Unknown- BLUE 2, mid-June 1967. BLUE 2 BLUE 1, 3, <» "-^U. . - T.e «ra-21 "apparently dove t;-J\5™i?:uriir ZUtloHlrlT.^ cumulus buildups so he knew v.-here we were and to us it was oDVious n. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : H^^saffes , Reports ; j^,,?^ mov 67 OPREP-3 HINNACLE 022. SECRET. Ill ircS plfTit llli: lllllli MaJ SpREP.^ pinnacle 023. SECRET. U. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTION for SAM BLUE Flight had preceded \t l^ll IT Sites alons the Ingress route In the = ^ ciSsriv--" Hoa Blnh to investigate ?he target area near Kano . f « [J^f ^^^f ^ J^!" !t 6 S"lock'tS BLUE lead and 2. (BLUE an active SWl Site when oLUE -* called aGL. ^83-520 KTAS.) This NIG was Plight was heading approximately .60» at 6500-8000 ^- At^W J ^^^^^ ^^^^^^ him to within gun range when first sighted anj had a ^^^eak.* There was no overshoot and pass In front of BLUE Flight on ^"^^^ "'^ Flight eased the left turn indication that the MIG fired ^"^ J^^??;",^^^?'' PJ^us-.top up Ingled off and I could as the HIO pulled up in front of the rilg"^ 3D up zo us top v ale a large nose cone which is a D or F Model . . k . BLUE 1 gave the Jead to BLUE 2 "^o^Jf^^/n-^ri^f ,*-$j3nC^'sfi:it:rS Si'is on the switched fron conventional f ;°,?J;J^^*?blU^'2 did not ?urn -p the missile tone volume sight, and conflnjed a |-|«2^.7,f,J|,-if f,' ^/^^^f^^^^ J missile ?on or growl.) This and subsequently ^^^^^f^J.^^^^rJ" pulling an estlm-t.^d 1 1/2 g's. BLUE 2 MIG-21 continued a cll-^blns V^'^^.^ laxed g's and fired an AIH-9P. At launch the placed the sight reticle 0" • "iJJ^'^aDnroxl-.ately 150D ft to one mile range. 10 to MIG was 20 to 50 degrees above the ^orl-on. approxlr^ateiy 5 q^. The SIDE- 12.000 ft ACL, BLUE 2 J, iibo f^^low and to the right. (A satisfactory llZlnl'^llt ^Sefk^rad^C^en"a=romrU3^:d!^°5^Wh;n\ prefllghted It. liU. .ost of our mis- alles here, it was well pitted.") .r— ■ RfiiF pn-h- brcke h ard left and down reversing to the right causing S""o""rth«?! Soi^v^t'BLurf ««S th« the MIO »a. cut In frcnt of the time they reacted for a left break. 338 Event III-J78 The HIC started a dive to the left and BLUE 2 "put' the plpper way out In front of hln and hosed until he flew thrcu^th It. As I did this ~. t^ot lar^e flarries out of the gun and the conpreacor stalled. It was .just like put'lnu; my r.petid brakes on". This action was repeated for two additional I'lr'ini; surctG for a total of rounds of 20nm cannon fire. {BLUE 2 stated tnat the cannon attack was Ineffective since he had fired at an esciraated range of »i500 ft, "well out of gun ran^e"). At this point, three SAKs were spotted by the flight which broke "hard down and to the left" dlsent;av:lr.i; from the KIC' As BLUE Lead was JolnlnR on BLUE 2, another MIG-21 "came In behind us and fired either 2 or 3 of those ALKALI missiles. He flreo In about a 30* dive on us the first tl.rie and, cf course, the missile had very little effect. It Just went down into the ground. As he pulled up rhe next one went past us ... . We were In a hard left turn". This KlU-el was not scer< aitaln ifter this brief encounter. SLUE Fllp^ht, now at ^00 ft AGL, started a cllnb out on a westerly hbsdlnf;. Tlic flight made one last 360** sweep or the area an;! egressed without further Incident. »The OPREP states that tnl= '/.Id started a clinblng left turn and fled on a heading of 020® after the AIM-9B missile launch. :t further stated that 3LUE Fliaht terminated this Ini- tial eni^a^ement by breaking down and to the Itft at 0S092 and then headed west. It reports a second MIG en^ac^enent at apcroxi:nately OdllZ, vicinity of 20*50'N/105°05'E with BLUE Flight "headint; 220°, altltLide ^000 ft. Another r-:ig-21 came on fron 6 o'clock hlp.h. MIG closed to approximately ^UOO ft anc launched two AAf'iS. BLUE (sic) Flight brok« down to the left, back to the rl?;hL , ana back to the left. Both AAMs passed behind the flic:ht as they made their first break to the left. (Since it was not possible to correlate the interview data with the OPPEP, both data are provided for this portion of the encounter.) Event III-279 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105a vs t«o MIC-21» r Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: Ha Dong I. PRIMWV MISSION AWO TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/rine: 22 Kay 1967/161IH II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Stuly 6-68, 12. NAftfMTIVe OESCRtPTION Ha Dong strUta flight sighted two MIGs In target area but no attempt was nade to engage. Event III-2P0 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-I05s vs one HIC-21 Raaults: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: Unknown 1. PRIKAtV HISSIOR ARO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlae: 22 Hay 1967/Unknown n. DATA SOURCE CIMCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. ''st^^rhL^t\'l^tei on. Sliver MIO approach at 6 o'clock position within 1-1/2 •ilea of flight In a harraasment type pass, then pull away. Event III-281 Aircraft Involved: Four P-lOSs V9 one HIG-17 Results: Slanting only Vicinity of Encounter: I. PRIRARY RISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATION Dat«/Tl«es 2* May 1967/after 1715H II. DATA SOURCE CIKCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARBATIWE DESCRIPTION Outbound strike fllRht observed one MIO at low level but no attempt was made to en- gag?. Event III-282 Aircraft Involved: Three P-*»Cs V9 cne unidentified Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21'»55'N/105'»'*0 'E I. PRIMART MISSION AMD TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlno: 26 May 1967/U858H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION MIG CAP sighted an unllentlfled aircraft, turning from 3-H o'clock low, 6 "IJes dis- tant. Pll^ttSmeU to investigate but bogey turned north and departed. It -as no threat to strike force. Event III -2 8 3 Aircraft Involved: Six P-^Cs vs two unidenti- fied Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21«15'N/106«««0'E I. PRIHARy MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 30 "'^y i"9o7/l6lOH II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike escort flights sighted two bogeys at 10 o'clock high but unidentified aircraft were too far away to make positive Identification. Event Iir-28l» -4^ Aircraft Involved: Four P-105S " four MIG-17» Result: No damage Vicinity rf Encounter: Unknown 1. PRINARy MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 30 May 1967/1516H Four P-105S (BLUE Flight) were approaching the roll- In point for an attack against, a SAM site (Lead 52} when they were attacked by four HIG-17s. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER 8. ORDNANCE A section of NIGs fired at BLUE I and 2 in a head-on pass. Ko hits war* scored. 11. DATA SOURCES Message: 355TFW/OPREP-3/3O1505Z Way 1967 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION During an attack on a SAM site, Lead 52, BLUS Plight was attacked by four MIC-178. The MIGs attacked rrom the northwest, four o'clock to BLUE Flight which was turning right at an altitude of '»500 ft and a speed of 150 kts. BLUE 1 (Lead) and 2 continued the attack on the SAM site while BLUE 3 and H turned into the attacking MICs. BLUE 3 and 0 went through the MIG formation which was spread line abreast with the elenents approximately 1500 ft apart, 1000 ft AGL. As the MIG elenents split » one el?nent of two MIGs broke to the rlehc, headed south and was not seen again. The other element (MIG 3 and H) broke left. BLUE 3 and »» Jinked left-right then headed back to Join SLUE 1 and 2. MIG 3 and 4 engaged BLL;e: 1 and 2 In a head-on pass and fired at a range of approximately 2500 ft while clir.blng Into BLUE 1 as BLJE 1 and 2 were descending toward the MIGs. Mo hits resulted. - MIG 3 and passed approximately 1200 ft below BLUE 1 and 103 ft below BLUE 2. As the MIG turned Tor another attack, BLUE 1 and 2 engaged afterburner and egressed the area, in conpany with BLUE 3 and , without further Incident. BLUE Altitude ; Headlng r Speed : 1 3 *• U500 ft Turning through a southerly heading, in a turn to the right 540 kts ^1 Event 111-285 Aircraft Involved: Three F-105s vs four NI3-178 «^ Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21*10 'N/loe^ftO'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH Date/Tlae; jo 1967/1612H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Zngresalng 3trli I Event 111-288 J Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105» v* one KIO-IT Results: No damage I Vicinity of Encounter: 2in»l'N/106-20'E " I. PRIHART HISSIOH WO TACTICAL SlTUATtOR g Date/Time: 30 Hay 1967/l6l6H ^ • II. DATA SOURCE _ CIKCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. ■ into afterburSer and MIO could not maneuver to Intercept. Q 1 Event IIIr289 ^ Aircraft Involved: Pour ?-^Cs vs unidentified .J Results: Sighting only vicinity of Encounter: 20-tt5*H/107**5*E m I. PRIMARY MISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 30 May 1967/1635H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 0 1 1 I 9 Event IXI-290 Aircraft Involved: Four P-"'^* J* l\l and three MIG-Zis Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: Kep. Airfield I. PRIMARY MISSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/Tlme: 30 May 1967/1656H II. DATA SOURCE CIHCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. alerted flight to Kias on two occasions. 344 0 a 1 Event III-291 Aircraft Involved: Four P-'iCs vs four MIG-17s Reaulta: One P-'tC lost Vicinity of Encounter: ai^lT'N/loe^aZ'E While covering the egress of 1. miMART Mission AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/TlBie: 31 May 1967/1551H Four P-ftCs {BLUE Flight) were on a MIOCAP mission, the strike group, four MIG-17 fighters were engaged. 2. MISSION ROUTE PanAnr and Droceel6'E (target). 21«05?0'H/106'>35'E T. PRIRARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 31 May 1967/1610H BLUE Flight, four P-hCs, was providing MIGCAP Tor JCS target 39.^*3 ■ At the time Of the encounter the night was outbound from the target area. 2. HISSION ROUTE BLUE Plight departed Danan;; and proceeded to the TAM ANCHOR aerial refueling area then via direct routes through the following points: 20»07 'N/107*«»3 'E; 21*05'.V107"28*E; target 21*22 'N/IOd^ld 'E. The return route was the reverse trade. 3. AIRCRAFT COKFIGURATIONS F'kC BLl'E 1. ?. 3. 4 SPARROW (AIN-7E) One P^tC loaded with 3 AIM-7 BLUE 1. 3 2 SIDEWINDER (AI.'I.QB) 1 Sini-l6 gun (1200 rd 20.'am) BUJE 2. 1 «l SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B) 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Clear sky, visibility i;r?ater than 15 nlles BLUE _i 2 2 SL Altitude ; 10,000-li< ,000 ft Heading : 120° Speed : 500 kt Plight Formation : Fighting wing 5. INITIAL DETECTION NIG warnings relative to BULLS EYE had been received between IS^OH and IS53H. One MIG>I7 was sighted at 1710H In the 5 o'clock position to BLUE Flight. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE Plight broke to the right and observed the MIC to follow the turn. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE Flight rolled wings level, zoom climbed for altitude and reversed their turn. The MIG disengaged, descended and was lost from view. 11. DATA SOURCE Messages ; 366TFW/OPREP-3/311115Z May 1967 ' ^ 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION While providing MICCA? for a strike flight. BLUE Flight sighted a single MIG-17 at their 5 o'clock position. Frcm their fighting wing formation BLUE Flight broke right. Observing the MIG to follow the turn, BLUE Fllgi-.t rolled wings level, -^oon climbed and reversed the turn. As BLUE Flight was naneuverlng to attack, the MIG turned to the west and disappeared front sight as he descended. BLUE Plight turned outbound arid con- tinued egress from the area. Event I I 1-2 9 3 Aircraft Involved: Three F-105a vs two HIG-21S Results: Vo damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21«25'N/106«»JI2'E I. PRINART MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 31 May 1967/16U8H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Sdff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Flak suppression fllsnt on egress observed two silver MIGs In rleht turn, 3000 ft below Lead and No. 2. Lead Oroice down to engage but HIOs went into an even tighter rlgnt turn and passeJ head-on below Lead. No ordnance was exchanged. Event III-29* Aircraft Involved: Pour P-1058 »a four MlG-lTs Results: SlRhtlng only Vicinity of Encounter: Kep Airfield I. PRIHARY NISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 31 Kay 1967/1650K II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Pulling off target, strike flight observed two elements of two MlOa .'sach orbiting Sep Airfield. KIGs were In right hand turn at 2000 ft. Event III-295 Aircraft Involved: Four P-IOS* »« two HIG-l7s Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: Kep Airfield I. PRIHARY HISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 31 May 1967/1650H II. DATA SOURCE - CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. "•«■ 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION A3 they were rolling on target, strike flight observed twa HIOs on easterly heading and approximately 1 mile east of target at 2-3000 ft. MICs were probably one of the elements sighted by flight of Event III-29't. I- S^jfj^ Svent III-296 Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s vs six MIG-? Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21*14 'N/107'05*E I. PaiMARt MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 31 May 1967/16 50H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike flisnt on e^reas noted four unidentified KlCs at 21" 20 ' tl/ 107° 16' Z and two un- identified KIGs at 21*1U'"/106'59'H:- The flight was at 12,000 ft and climbing and the XICs were at iOOO to 3000 ft. Flight was unable to observe markings. MIGs appeared to [ be camouflaged . The sun angle and clruds precluded positive Identification and the KICs r [ it I did not maneuver. Event I I 1-297 Aircraft Involved; Pour F-4Cs vs one MIG-17 (possible) Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: Pl'lS'N/loe^lS'E I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time; 31 May 19b7/1700K II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Escort flight sighted a possible MlG-17 directly below. The MIG was sliver and at 1000 ft. The fllsht was at 2000 ft. No attempt was made to engage. PIRAZ called on egress that bandit was 5 riiles south and trailing, out flight was unable to sight bandit. Event III-298 Aircraft Involved: Four F-IO^s vs two KIC-21s Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21*20 *N/106*28'E I. PRIMARY RISStON ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 2 June 1967/0930H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION The strike flight was approached by two silver HICs from 7 o'clock position. The flight was at 16,000 ft and the MlCa caise up from 7-8000 ft. The flig.it Jettisoned all ordnance « turned hard lt;ft and then right. The MIGs were not observed again. 319 Event 111-299 Aircraft Involved: Four P-^^s V5 Eieht to Ten MIG-lTa Result : Three MM kill "probables" Vicinity of Encounter: 21-'20'N/106«22'E 1 PRIMAM MISSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATION the first F-105 flight. 2. HISSIOH ROUTE ^ ^ nt^^t to the Brown refueling track over BLUE flight departed 'J^on.f JSJ JJlSf^S^ftSSn !!Sr?S tS 21-05 ' n/107- 28" E, IS rii:crtr2iiSo^ino^"2?:E:' ilVu^VlVJUUe^ and subsequently egreaaed over the reverse route. 3. AIRCRAFT COHFIGURATtOHS P.ao BLUE 1 I; - SPARROW (AIM-7E) a - FALCON (AIM-ttD) 1 - ALQ-71 pod 1 - 370 gallon wlngtank 1 - 600 gallon centerllne tank g.UC BLUE 2. 3. A ]) - SPARROW (AIM-7E) tl - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B) 1 - ALQ-71 pod 1-370 gallon wlngtank 1 - 600 gallon centerllne tank MIG 1>10 Unknown. Weather: 7/8 broken overcast with base at im.uwu diottds. BLUE MIO T 2 3 ^ ^ ^ 8.000 ft 1.000 ft Altitude : 282» orbit Heading : 55O KTAS Unknown Speed : Unknown, protjably Unknown Fuel State : 10-11,000 lb Flight Formation Pod fomatlon. bound to the target area, when f /J,^" "^^ Ailed out by an P-105 fUght and BLUE 3 E^rs nor?^.^s2s."i-\'S^' to right. Time was approximately 1529H. *rr."«""l.. .n. » t.. l.r. .0 ...n ..pa«t«„ ena ».n .o„ rUKt .o achieve firing position. no aamase to BLUE FlljM. 8. ORDNANCE (No. rired/fJo. hits) Event III-259 BLUE 1 SPARROW AIH-7E 1/1 FALCOfI AIM-'^D 2/? SIDEWINDER AIM-QB Remarks Two AIH-TEs observed guiding. One A1M-7E went high. Both AIM-l-i V^ltJJ^^'^^^ reengage the MIGs still in a left turn over Kep. BLUE 1 at 1000 ft AGL. 0.95 Mach (620 KTAS) locked on to a MIC-17 at an estimated 5000 ft range, auto^track. Inter-locks out, full system, narrow gate and fired three AIM-7E missiles In ripple at 3500 ft range US" angle off of the MIG's tail while pulling In 2.5 g s. The target was at 1000 ft AGL In a ha.-d left turn, at 0.9 Mach. Again BLUE 1 was forced to break left by additional Mia-173 In a head-on pass and Intense antiaircraft fire from the Kep area. He did not observe the missile results but did observe that the first and third missile "tracked beautifully" and the second missile "headed high and for parts unknown." ** oTire f'^ ^A^'tu^ ^^frM^^r-.^^J'* ^f***" ^^'^ "'^ ^ Single MIG-17 above him in a left turn. BLUE 2 fired three ArM-9B missiles In rapid succession at 20« angle off. 3500 ft range, with a good r.rowl. The target aircraft was in an easy left climbing turn at missiles launch. BLUE 2 was at 0.85 to 0.9 Mach (5^0 to 570 KTAS), 'JOOO ft altitude pulling about 2 g s at launch. Two of the missiles appeared to track. The third missile was not observed. BLUE 2 did not see the missiles Lit because he broke hard left and down to rejoin blue i. •The OPREP-3 reports BLUE 3 fired at 0-9 Mach (500 KTAS). 6000 ft altitude at 1.5 miles range in a dive, 70«» head-on to the MIG-17 which was headed 2HC^ at 800 ft AGL and 0.9 Mach. Event III-299 BLUE 1 saw BLUE 2 In a left turn and called hltn to break rlrht for rejoin. GLUE 1 then saw a rMG-17 in rirln-: position on DLUE 2 with cannons t)la2ln;5. BLUE 2 responded to a '"break" call and evadu-d ths MIG. ULUE 1 turned to ensage the MIG-17, and encountered an additional fllr.ht of four >!IG-lTs near Kep. One :^lG-i7 made a head-on pass and BLUE I flrea an AVA-UD. The plpper was on the target. BLUE 1 was at 0.95-1 -0 Mach (620-660 KTAS), 1000-1500 ft altitude, pulling about 3 g's with no recollection of tone. The missile passed about 15 feet under the MIS, 6ut since the missile does not have a prox- Inlcy fuze it did not detonate. BLUE Flight observed a second huge fireball at 2l«30'N/106»19'E about this time. BLUE Plight, at BIS'GO Tuel^ egressed and called the other ?-k flight into the area. However, BLUE FliRht's MIG encounter Is the only one reported on this date. A third huge fireball was observeu at 2l«»22'K/106«38*E at 1640H during egress. Official sources do not list any kills or probables on this date. 353 Event III-300 Aircraft Involved: Eight F-1053 vs two HlC-21s Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21«19'S/106«»30'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOK Date/Time: 2 June 1967/1015H 1!, DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION inbound strike flight of four F-105S observed J'-J^^?' f ^iS'SJ?, ^J't S^SeS second strike flight which was Just diving on target. Event III-30I Aircraft Involved: Pour P-J>C8 vs one MIO-17 Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: Kep Airfield I. PRIMARY HISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Time: 2 June l967/l630a II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION HIG CAP night sighted one MIQ. 7-8 miles due east of *^^f ^JoJ^^N^Ut^o'E beJiSn also saw P-Us and silver aircraft engaged in aerial battle ''••^''Ji.^? N/106 30 £ between hnrn «nrf Rooo ft (see Event III-302). liLUE lead observed ar. orange fireball at oomua m 5?S?rS?i?62?6'E iSlIh Appeared to be a large POL explosion or an aircraft striking the ground. Event III-302 Aircraft Involved: Two P-I05s vs four MIG-17s Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21»l6'M/106»ll'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Tine: 2 June 1967/1$33K U. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Ken strike flight was proceeding into target ?rca when Lead and Mo. 2 no^f^^^f®"^ ,ii««r MICs af-hetr 6 o'clock position, and the XIGs were L-1/2 miles from flight on si^ Jeilil^g! TSe fllgSt started cli«b to target and the MICs could not keep up. Event III-303 Aircraft Involved: Four ?-H vs Eight to Ten MIG-17S Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21"'20'H/106»22*E c r L L; 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 2 June 67/1628K BLUE flleht was one of two rilRhta of F-tt aircraft (see Event 111-301) aasUned MICCAP for the ^SSTFW P-105 force. The F-« fllsshtc rendezvoused with the P-105 force me and accompanied the last F-1C5 flight Into tao t.ari'.et area. The other F-1 flight acco...- ing and accompan panled the first P-105 flight. 2. HISSION ROUTE BLUE flight departed t'bon RTAFB, Thailand, direct to the Brown ref-.ellng track over the 3ulf of Tonkin wUh drop-off at 19 = i.'0 ' N/ 106*22«E. The flight then engaged MIGs and sub- sequently eRressed over the reverse route. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION F-i>D BLUE 1 U - SPARROW (AIH-7E) ti - FALCON (kVA'HD) 1 - ALQ-71 pod 1 - 370 gallon wlngtank 1 - 600 gallon centerllne tank F-1C BLUE 2.3.'* H - SPARROW {AIM-7E) • H - SIDLWINDER (AIK-9B) I - ALQ-71 pod 1 - 370 gallon wlngtank I - 600 gallon centerllne tank MIG- 17 MTG ItJ'iO Unknown. 4. 'flight conditions prior to ENCOUNTER Weather: 7/8 broken overcast with base at 1^,000 ft. About 7 miles visibility below clouds, BLUE MIG Altitude ; Heading ? Speed: Fuel State; 8,000 ft 282" 550 KTAS Unknown, probably ICII.OOO lb I - 10 1,000 ft Left orbit Unknown Unknown Plight Formation Pod formation. 5. INITIAL DETECTION No MIC warning calls were received. 2LUZ flight «^*cortlng the F-105 force in- bound to the target area, when five or six KIG-17s passed "f^^LU. night .n a hard lef. turn at about 1300 ft AOL. The MIOs were called out by an F-105 fUaht and ELLE 3 Oackj at about the same time. Apparently the MIGs were headed North, passing frota lefw to right. Time was approximately 1523H. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE flight pulled up and to the left to gain separation and then dove hard right to achieve firing position. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT The MIGs reversed rl^ht end a melee ensued in which BLUE flight fired three 2?,;?.RCW5 (AIM-7E), three SIDEWINDER^ (Aia-9B) and two FALCONS (AIM-i*D). At least two yil^-l.^ fired their ca.'.>'wr.; it 2LUB flight. 355 I ORDNANCE BLOE 1 BLUE 2 BLUE 3 BLUE 1 (No. rired/Mo. hits) SPARROW AIM-7E 3/? PALCOM AIH-M SIDEWINDER AIW-9B 2/1 3/? 1/? Event III«303 Reaaplca < Two AIM-7E3 observed «culdlng. One AIM-7E: went high. Both AIK-tDs appeared to. track, one 15 ft miss observed. i Two appeared to track. One not observeil. Observed for 3-5 seconds and was sulding. WO I-IO Two of the KI0-17S were observed firing their cannons with no hits. 9. EQUIPKENT PROBLEHS BLUE 1 - Tfo Alfi-iiOs cooled off Cran out of time) and could not be used, receiver trouble. BLOE 4 - Utility hydraulic failure shortly after engagement began. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS Experience Total Hours URP mdlo P-4 Hours Combat Wissions Remarks BLUE 1 Front Back BLUE 2 Front Back BLUE 3 Front 4900 268 519 850 260 480 474 187 2700 250 99 105 82 38 84 Previous TAG tours In WWII and Korea. Five previous air-to-air engagements, four confirmed KIO kills in SEA. First tour out of pilot training. 1000 hrs previous RO time In ADC (P-lOl). Seven months in theatre. Two SPARROWs previously fired in traini.ng. j Ho previous live firings - many simulator runs. 2 1/2 years rated, no previous HIG encounters . No previous live firings - many simulator runs. Two years rated* no previous HIG encounters . Air Training Co.iunand Instructor, previous MIG encounters. No Comments from Overall Experience BLUE 1 - Charging SPARROW-type training is not satisfactory for combat. 11. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews ; BLUE 1 (Front) 4 June 1967, Aircrew letter - BLUE 3 (Front), 5 •July 1968. Mesa age J . Reports: OPREP - 3 BTFW 0021330Z June 67, DOI O6OI8, June 67. OPREP-3 366TFW P021355Z June 67, DCOI 005 June 67. Supplement 8TFW PO307052 June 67, 01 06036 June 67. Aircrew's AiM-7D/E missile performance reports. 12. NARRATIVE OtSCRlPTION BLUE flight was one of two F-'* flights from Ubon P.TAFB assigned to fly HIOCAP for an F-105 strike force from Takhll RTAFB. Refueling, strike force rendezvous, and Ingress was without incident until the force arrived in the vicinity of 21''20'tJ/106°22'E. At thl time BLUE fllghr was at 9000 ft, 550 KTAS, on a heading of 282°, or 6 «IG-17s were sighted by BLUE 3 (Back) at 10 o*'?lock low (lOt this in Pod formation when iOOO ft ACL) passing under BLUE flight In a hard left turn. TheOPREPs do not state definitely, but apparently 'the MIGs were headed toward the Morth ana passing from BLUE flight '3 left to right. BLOE 3 (Back) called out the MIGs to BLUE flight. 356 1 a a a 1 a 1: D Q a a a 3 a 3 Event 111-303 SLUE flight, reacting In eler.ents of two aircraft each, pulled up and left to Rain Separation and then dove hard right to achieve firlnt; position. Both element leaders (BLUE 1 and SLU£: 3) were unable to fire cue to the high angle off that the MlSs generated as they reversed turn to the rl^ht and Into BLUE flight. Both BLUE elements broke up and hard right. The MIGs did not follow the F-^is as they zootned, but a MI3-17 was observed firing as he passed between BLUE 1 and 2 at the top of the zoom. The fllj^ht thought that this ;'IC was holding high and "pounced" after their first attack. BLUE lead then saw the HIQs In a left turn near Kep anJ dove to attack. BLl'E closed on one of six MIC-lTs, pulled lead and fired one AIW -''D. with SO^-SC* angle off. BLUE 1 was at 0.95 Mach (620 K7AS), 1000-1500 ft AGL, about 3 £S 150 kts overtake, close range (exact rant^e unknown), with a high growl for a tone. The WIG was In a hard left turn. The missile appeared to track but BL'JE 1 was forced to break hard left to avoid a head-on collision with four MIGs and to avoid heavy autcr.atlc weapon and ilr.n antiaircraft fire from Kep Airfield. BLUE 1 separated from the 'AlQs and as he turned to reengage, he observed an aircraft crash Into the ground in a hugh fireball about one nl le iJorth of Kep. BLUE 3 and zoomed to 12,000 ft after the first pass and observed the lead eletrent stai*t in on their second pass. BLUE 3 then divert down on a second pass but again could not fire because of "too r.uch angle off, dive an/,le , airspeed", and pulled off to the right. BLUE 3 ran into a "blanket" of SSiot .\AA fire and broke hard left loosing sight of the MIQ-17S. As BLUE 3 rolled back to the right he observed three MIG-lTs apparently trying to land at Kep Airfield. The MIGa were in trail about 1/3 to 1 mile apart. BLUE 3 rolled into a shallow dive about 2-3 miles south of Kep Airfield and headed for the number two MIG. The MIGs were 1/2 to 1 mile off the end of the Southwest runway (Northeast of Kep) and BLUE 3 was 1 to 2 miles South of Kep nearly parallel to the Northeast Railroad at about 2000 ft and 500 kts when BLUE 3 (Back) called, "lock-on", and BLUE 3 fired one AIM-7E missile.* BLUE 3 was flying an aircra.''t modified to provide an automatic switch to full system lock on after a boreslght lock on. BLUE 3 observed the SPARROW launch, "roll and guide", for 3-5 seccnds. 3L'JK 3 was getting heavy ground fire and BLUE 4 called that he was experiencing utility hydraulic failure so BLUE 3 broke right without observing the missile results. (Heavy 85mm fire with bursts at 8000 ft was reported in the Kep area.) BLUE 3 and H egreased the area for an emergency recovery at Danang. Meanwhile, BLUE 1 and 2 turned to reengage the MIGs still in a left turn over Kep. BLUE 1 at 1000 ft AGL, 0.95 Mach (620 KTAS) locked on to a MIG-17 at an estimated 5000 ft range, auto-track, interlocks out, full system, narrow gate and fired three AIM-7E missiles in ripple at 3500 ft range 1*5° angle off of the MIC's tail while pulling 2.5 gs. The target was at 1000 ft AGL in a hard left turn, at 0.9 Mach. Again BLUE lead was forced to bra -k left by additional :105a. They acccmpanied one part of the force into the target area and then engaged five MIC-17S near Kep airfield. Three AIM-7E missiles and one AIM-9B missile were fired with no results. 2. HISSION ROUTE buUE Plight departed Ubon RTAFB and proceei^ed directly to the refueling track over the Giiir of Tonkin. Dronoff was at 19°00 ' M/IOT^ZS ' E. Th*} flight then proceeded north to 21»07'N/107<'38'E. and 21*12 •N/107'*33*E for coast In, west alonf. the north side of the ridge to 2l«l«t'»/l06»21'E, and then to the target »rea at 21-16 'H/loe^OS'E. The MIO engagement occurred about 8 miles east of Bae Clang. The flight then egressed east to 21"07'W/ 107*33 'E, direct to poatetrlke refueling and return to Ubcu RTAFB. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P.JtP BLUE 1, 3 4 SPARROWS (AIH«7E) 4 FALCOfIS (AIK-40) 1 ALQ-71 1 370-sal. wing tank 1 600-gal. centerllne tank Camouriaged Avionics - unknown P-^C BLUE 2» H k SPARROWS (AIM-7E) k SIDEWINDERS (AIM-9B) 1 ALQ-71 1 370-gal. wing tank 1 600-gal-. centerllne tank Camoiiflaged Avionics - unknown HIG-173 Unknown armament All aircraft silver with red stars on wing and red stabilizer. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather : Cymulus clouds with bases at 8,000-10,000 f*. ar.d tops above 25,000 ft over the mountains- The valley or flat land area was clear with a slight haze, about 10 miles visibility. BLUE 7,000 ft 300* HIOs 1,000 ft Left turn Altitude ; HeadlngT 5. IftlTIAL DETECTION MIG warnings were not received prior to the encounter. As BLUE Plight turned away from the target area at 7,000 ft altitude, BLUE 1 saw five MlG-17s and one MIG-21 In a flat left turn at 1,000 ft AGL flying In trail formation about 5 miles south of Kep air- field. The KIG-21 was not part of the formation and was not seen again. Time of the sighting was about 16^0 local (Hand). 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 and 2 broke Into the KIGa setting up a moderately tight left hand .i.-n around the MIGs. BLUE 3 and 4 climbed above BLUE I and 2 and waited for an opportunity to engage. It appeared that the MIC strategy was to continue their turn, but always work- ing closer to Kep airfield where BLUE Flight would be vulnerable to the heavy enemy ground fire in that arej», 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT The HICs maintained their left orbit near Kep. BLUE Fl.'ght remained above them and started a yo-yo action in a vertical plane pulling up on one side of the circle to attack a MIG on the other aide of the circle. BLUE Plight stayed o»low 6,000-7,000 ft in their vertical maneuvering. 358 i 1 I 1 1 8 I S • I a i if 3 i Event Ill-son OKOHAKCe BLUE 1 BLUE 2 10. AIRCRCU COHHENTS Experience ; (No. SPARROW AIH-7E 2/0 1/0 rired/ilo. hits) SIOEW:..NDER FALCON AIM>9B AIM-4D 0/0 1/0 BLUE 1 BLUE 2 ( front ) (back) ( front ) (back) Total P-H Combat Hours Hours Missions RenarKs 2892 210 79 No previous MIG encounters 472 175 86 No previous MIG encounters 2t76 190 77 No previous MIG encounters 1131 175 80 No previous niG encounters n. DATA SOURCES Kessages: OPREP-3, 00'i:05Z, June 1967 8TFW DOL 060«1, June 196? DO^iOlOO, 2 June 1967 2TPW, D1060'*8, June 1967 ' Aircrew's AIH-7D/E Missile Perfonnance Reports 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE Plight ftwo P-UDs and two F-UCs) ^as assigned lo fly HIGCAP for a force of P-105 aircraft from TakhU STAFB. BLUE Plight departed Ubon RTAFB, refueled over the Gulf of ?on^In and accompanled one of the F-105 flights Into the target area The ^J^J-'^J^.J^^**!^ t.sctlcs includes attacking Route Package IVA targets by Individual flights with TOTs separated ? to 5 silnutes. The fllKht flew north after refueling and coasted in" about 10 miles northeast of can Pha! tSf roJte! selected to nlninilze flight Mme In areas defended by surface-to- al? missiles, then continued west to Hortheast Railroad in the vicinity of Kep airfield. No MIGs were sighted Inbound to the target. But as BLUE ^l^gj^ ?7fovln'''"r?rall away- from the target to CAP the IRON HA»0 flight, BLU:. 1 saw five ^-^^'l^^ /l^^'^'t''l^J,y^ foSatlon at aboSt 1000 ft AGL. in a flat left hard turn 5 ir.Ues south of Kep airfield oSrviG!5l also seen with the r^G-Hs but not In formation with them, was not seen again SSrlnK the'encoC4e^ bLOe Flight was turning through 300° (the direction of turn was Sot s?a?ed Su^probably to the right or toward the north) at 7C00 ft altitude In J he ;?clnl?5 of 2in5'H/106°20'E at 16<;0H at the tine of the sighting. This ^o"" place the Jics at 12 o'clock low about 5 miles range. All of the MIGs were silver with red stars on the wings and a red vertical stabilizer. BLUE 1 and 2 "broke Intc the MIGs setting up a moderately tight left hand turn around the M?G3 " IJSe 3 anS H went high above BLUE 1 and 2 and waited for an o«°^^^""y ^« ^^^^^ eneaee. The :;iGs appeared to continue their turn drawing closer to Kep airfield where there was heavy ground fire. At the conpletlon of the first shallow diving turn. BLUE Lead obtained a lock-on (at about 3 ^lles) on the lead MIG, turning through north-ncrthvest at 1000 ft AGL. 0.7 ^a^h fSso KTAS). BLUE I fired one AIM-7E missile at 5000-6000 f^J-^ne^ /rom the MIG's 9 o clock ooaltion! BLUE Lead's report Indicates he was at 500 KTAS. 3000 ft altitude In a 1-5 g dlJlni Jurn with 2000 kts overtake, full system launch with clutter In override a ;.d system ?1 aufo ??acJ. The missile cane off. turned left, "then direct" but P"sed about 500 ft h.hTnrf the KiG as the -'JIG pulled -nto a hard left turn. The missile was fired at near m!!;lnl parameters and the'-iof the circle broke X before the mlsslled passed the MIC- \ second a:M-7E missile was fired at the same MIG, when BLUE Lead ".2500 ft about S50 KTAS still in the 1.5 g descending turn at 5CO0-600O ft range. B^UE Lead was at the HIG's 8 o'clock position. This missile also turneti left, "then 306 Aircraft Involved: Two F-lOSs vs two MIG-17s Results: sighting only Vlnlnlty of Encounter: 17*ii9'N/106*12'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 3 June 1967/1651H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. *NAR13' N/106° 12 ' E (with the target at Zl-ie'N/loe* 13'E). Roll In for attack was to the right with a right pullout and planned egress oy indlvlifc^l flights over the reverse course. 3. AlBCRAFT CONFIGUMTIOKS LUE 1. 3 2 - H118, 3000-lb bombs 1 - 650-gal centerllne fuel tank L * ALQ-71 ECM pod 1 * AIN-9B SIDEWINDER tnlsslla 1029 rds KEI 20mm ejiimunitlon. P-105D BLUE 2. t 2 - M118, 3000-lb bonbs 1 - 650-gal centerilne futl tank 2 - ALQ-71 ECM pods (1 on each outboard station) 1029 rds HEX 2Cnm amnunitlon. All P-105S were camouflaged. MIG-17 WIG 1 Armament -unknown - 2 underwing fuel tanks. MTC-17 KTG 2. 3 Unknown. All MTGs were silver with red stars. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER We ather ; Clear over the flatlands with about ten miles visibility. tbe mountains between the NE Railroad and the Gulf. Cumulous clouds over BLUE 2 3 I 5000-6000 ft 095" 600 KTAS 7000-8000 lbs r WIG Altltude: Heaolng : Airspeed : Fuel State : Plight Formation In trail attempting to rejoin, about 500C ft behind lead and BLUE U 500-1000 ft Approx. 300* Unknown Unknown BLUE 2 was about 1000 ft behind BLUE 1. was in trail with BLUE I. BLUE 3 was 5. IIIITIAL DETECTION KIG warnings were called on guard channel as BLUE Flight was pulling off the target. The call was "BULLSr:YE-northeast-30-low-330" which placed tht MIGs almost under BLUE Pllaht flylnn 330° BLUE lead was at 6000 ft headed 095", 600 KTAS, about seven nllea away at 10 o'clock about 500 ft AGL. The MIGs were going from a ciinb to a descent in a shallow left turn through 300<» . They were In trail formation with about 3000 ft spacing. The last MIC In trail was almost at BLUE Plight's 12 o'clock position. 6. ACTION' INITIATED BLUE' Lead called the MIGs and said he was reversing iSo" left. He then entered a hard left 10** nose down turn (still in afterourner) followed by BLUE 2 and 3 . BLUc U was looking away from BLUE 3 at the break and cculd not relocate the flight. He egressed with the second flight off of t.he target. c c c r Event III-308 7. SITlATIGfl OEVELOPME.JT BLUE Fii^-;ht rolled out behind the KIC-17s. Thi- MIG-lTs went into a tlpht left hand ; orbit at about 500 ft AGL. The flights completed one and a half circles when BLUE I fired a SIIEWINDEK (Ai;''-93) at "IG The MIC attempted unsuccessfully to evade the SIDEWINDER. ; Aft'T the SIDEWINDER danat-.ed the KIG, BLUE 3 closed In firing 20r:n K£I. The HIC was trailing sroke fron the s:i;SV;iNDEK but exploded in fla-ne apparently from the 20n;in hits. BLUE Lead then cleared BLUE 2 to after KIC 1, In the ensuing twisting, seissorlnsj f enfiapement, BLUE 2 flrea three bursts before MIG I was hit, MIG I's left win? blew U3 and KIG 1 crasiiod in flames wlcr. no chute observed. BLUE Lead obtained lead crt KIG 2 and I fired a SlDcWIIiDER (AIH-QB) which flew Into the ground. BLUE Lead made one more 3^0* turn and fired a iili;n an;?le off burst of 20irjn at MIG 2, and apparently mlsseo. BLUE 2 and 3 exited the area ahv*ad of BLUE Lead, but tne three .-i. .-craft rejoined after refueling and 1 returned to Korat. The only da.Tiage to the U.S. alruraft was a small hole In BLUE 2's left intake duct possibly caused oy a particle from HIG 1. 8. ORDNANCE mo. fired/No. hits} SIDEWINDER AIH-93 20mni Reis^rks BLUE I 1/0 Short burst/0 BLUE 2 ' 450/1 MIO 1 left wing blown up. BLUE 3 l/l 376/1 AIM-9B hit first, follow-up ;un attack blew up MIG 3. NIGs ....-Ho known ordnance expended—— 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS BLUE 1 - No reticle (no :>xght} on combining glass. PLUE 2 - Radar would not lock on in air-to-air mode. BLUE 3 - None. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS j BLUE 2 and 3 Jettison speed for the 650 gal centerll.ie tank Is not compatible vfith combat speed and naneuverlns, "It Is dangerous to drop t.le 65O (centsrllne fuel tank) unless you unload j-> the aircraft ( aerodynamic ally ) first". I BLUE 2 ^' Cockpit fog and canopy vapor restricted visibility. I could only see through the forward windshield. f * For air-to-ground attack, we need an auto bomb release system with a positive Indlca- [ tlon to the pilot that the cor.?uter has a solution and will release the bcrobs. Por air-to-air, suggest a series of fixed ranges on the combining glass. I.e., 500, 1000, 1500, 3000, and about 6000 ft (for hi-alt strafing). These ranges would of course be lead or g computing constantly. Keed an additional radio for communication bet-*een flight members. The primary strike channel la saturated during periods of action when it Is needed most. A direction flndin? vector strobe toupled to t.he flight frequency would aid flight members In maintaining mutual support position. The ease with which the P-105 will gJ supersonic and maintain near supersonic speed in military power has been a terrific asset against MIGs and reduces time in the hostile envlrcnment. BLUE 3 Would Ilk- to have a simpler method of switching from bomb ordnance to missile and gun firinc capability with a cc-nputing sight. Five switches are currently required. The capability of firing the IR missile by plaulng the plpper on the enemy aircraft should be retained. P e' ■ I t IV L. Kes s a^es . ."ecorts : I V 38e TFW OPiiEP-3 JPCCO FAr.TEL DOT 202^ June 67 0il«J202. U. DATA SOURCES Project Interviews : BLUE 2' - 6 June 1967 BLUE 3-7 June 1967 'This event was reconstructed by BLUE 2. Event III-303 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION inc^''"^ Flight was the lead fllcht of a force of four strike and one IROM HAMD fiij5hts of F-1055 launched fron Korac RTAFB, Thailand. The mission was to destroy JCS 18.23, the Bac Clang RH/HUhway Brla«e at 21*»16 'M/lOi" U 'E and the adjacent railroad yard on the south aide of the bridge. The four strike ril2;hts penetrated the SAM defenses while Ir.bound to vne target in a standard "pod" formation. I.e., a Hamond of four flights with four air- craft per flight. The force departed Korat and flev, directlv to the Gulf of Tonkin fo*- rendezvous with ****-??"o*" "^^^ force then flew north to 20«a8' rJ/I07''13'E and coasted In at 21 08*H/107'33'E, The force then flew about 270* to the roll-in point selected about three miles south of the target, nade a right roll^ln to bonb release and subsequent right recovery to a heading of 095*. BLUE Plight was the first fliRht on and off target. The 85 and lOOcun antiaircraft guns opened fire when the P-105 force was about fifteen nlles short of the roll-in point. Thy force was staggered between 16,000 and 18,000 ft at that time. Durlnj the dive bonb run, BLUE 2 fired a short burst for flak suppression and in an effort to obtain photography of the active AAA gun emplacements adjacent to the tar- get the overrun on the gun ca.-nera fila was set at three 92conds. BLUE Flight recovered fron the rtlve bomb pass with BLUE 2 about 1500 ft bi^llnd BLUE Lead and BLUE 3 about a mile behind PLUE Lead. All BLUE Plight -■neiabera were attempting to close to pod for.-Tiation In afterburner for egress with BLUE 2 reporting a speed of rtach i.Ol at 5000-6000 ft heading 095**. Roughly six miles fron the target, SLUE Lead saw three MIC-17s at 10 o'clock low (less than 1000 ft altlcude) about two nlles ranse. The MICs were In a shallow left climb- ing turn through 315" and the lead .'••IG was reversing from a cllnb to a dive. The MICs were spaced about 3000 ft In trail so that the third MIG was almost at BLUE Lead's 12 o'cLack position. BLUE Lead called the MIG ' s position and began making a iSO* left turn, BLUE 2 and 3 saw che MICs l.Tmedlately after Lead's call and followed BLUE Lead through a 10« nose- down, 5 to 6 g turn. BLUE 4 almost collided with the second flight off the target and lost the rest of BLUE Plight in the turn. He tnen elected to stay with the second flight and egressed with them. The HIGs entered a tight left orbit at less than 1000 ft altitude and BLUE Flight was not able to obtain a firing position on the first turn. As BLUE Lead overshot the MICs and pulled high, BLUE 3 attempted to achieve a firing pass and as SLUE 3 overshot, SLUE Lead turned back Into the MICs atteaptlng to fire. BLUE 2 remained about 500 to 600 ft behind BLUE Lead looking for other MIGs attacking from the rear. During the high g turns at low altitude, the BLUE Fll^nt members had considerable trouble with cockpit fog and canopy vapor interfering with their vision. BLUE Lead and BLUE 2 Jettisoned the 650 gal external fuel tank after the first 360® of turn. This was accomplished at 550 kts CAS, by obtaining almost zero g prior to pickling the tanks. BLUE 3 did not Jettison the 650 gal centerline until he was outbound after the air battle because "It is dangerous to drop the 650 unless you unload the air- craft." BLUE 3 felt that he had mora speed than the KIC-17s even with the centerline tank. After the first 360* turn, the MICs loosened their orbit with MIG 1 in front, MIG 2 to left (Inside the turn) and KIG 3 drifitlng to the outside the turn (down very low and falling back?. As a result of reducing g to Jettison the centerline fuel tank, BLUE 1 and 2 were outside the raalus of all of the MIOs but with cc.-.c -derably more airspeed. BLUE Plight was about 2000 ft altitude with 6C0 KCAS between mlnlx-jr.-to-full afterburner power. BLUE 2 was able to solve the cockpit fog problem at this time ■ turning the cockpit ventilation system completely off. BLUE 2 cleared the area t ' he rear noting BLUE 3*s position and no MIGs at 6 o'clock. Ha.r-fay around the second orbit (headed 270*) BLUE Lead vlrh BLUE 2 In flKhtlns wing position, turned Into the MIGs and again at'.empted to obtain firing position. But the HIGs were now spread In a wide V and MIG 3 had crosse-i from th> outside of the turn to the inside of the turn at very low altitude (about 200 ft) anJ at a slower airspeed than the other MIGs. Thus as BLUE 1 came thr3uc:h a southwest heading, KIC 3 was at BLUE 2's 10 o'clock low position aocut 300 ft out slowly rocking his wiigs. MG 1 was at BLUE I's 12 o'clock low and MIG 2 was In the process of crossing from l>ft to right, very low between KIO 1 and BLUE 1. BLUE 2 was at BLUE I's 7 o'clock position about 500 ft back. Ourl'.g the sane period of time (from a heading of 270" to about 200") BLUE 3, who was flying the element position unaware ^hat BLUE U was not with him, observed MIQ 3 cross to the Inside and waver moner.tarlly. BLUE 3 had set switches to fire his single AIM-9B durln? the previous 360° orbit and new decided to fire at MIC 3 -iurin?: KTC 3*s moment of hesitancy. 5LL-E 3 dived down on MIG 3, put the plpo^r on the HIG's tailpipe and as MIC 3 "graciously lit his afterburner", fired the SIDEWIiJCER. BLUE 3 assumed that the AIH-QB IR i eeker was aligned with the plpper and did nor atter-.pt to obtain a missile tone prior -o flrlns. BLUE 3 estimated 2500 ft ran.:-,», cio.'jure speed of 100 kts at an altitude of 1 00 ft In a 15* 5') 20" dive, in full afterc^rner and with the 650 gal centerline tank sti 1 on tne centerline position. Event IIl-?08 The missile went straight for the MIQ-L7, which '>ntered a shallow left turn. When the missile was about tfOO ft from HIG 3. MIC 3 broko Into a hard left climbing wln?:over maneuver as though he suddenly becasje aware that Che mlsrllc wjs tracklnfi him. The KIC turned almost 90" to a heading of ea^t , and had 90° of bank wi»h his nose about 20° above the horizon when the SIDEWINDER exploded. Exanlnatlon of HLL'E 3'o film Indicates the missile went aloneslde of the tallploe and from BLUE 2'g aescrlptlon "exploded about a foot or two away from the tailpipe at the o'clock positon ( fron the rear) and about 2-3 ft forward froii the end of the tailpipe." The KIG Itr-Tcdlately started to trail a heavy white "vapor" looking smoke that appeared to come from the bottom of the tailpipe. BLUE 3 continued closing on the MIG as the .■•!IG rolled over and started down, and with the sight set on missiles air (g computing for a fixed rantje of 1100-1500 ft) put the plpper "up and right In front of him and worked It right down through hia", firing 376 rounds at a high angle off. BLUE 3 did not observe any cannon hits and l.i.-.t saw the MIG as he rapidly overshot htm and turned to 090* calling "SLUE 3, I got one.". However, both BLUE 1 and 2 observed the nUaalle hit, the trailing smoke and the MIG blow up in a ball of fire. BLUE 1 observed the MIG impact at 21'ie'«/106«21»E at 1653H. Meanwhile, MIC 1 was at BLUE Lead's 11 o'clock position about a mile range and MIC 2 had crossed to BLUE Lead's 1:30 o'clock position a-, aoout 1/2 nils rantre. MIG 2 appeared to have slowed down and was at a very low altitude 3LUE 2 called both MICa to BLUE Lead and BLUE Lead replied, "If you can ?et one, go get lil:n"." BLUE 2 was In position to attack MIG I and as he tlgntened up the left turn to actacK ;iIG 1, MIG 2 turned left toward BLUE 2. BLUE Lead subsequently attacked MIC 2. BLUE 2 Immediately obtained a ^5" angle off shct at MIG I and at about 2000 ft range, while pulling 5 to 6 e's, placed the plpper in fror.-. of MIG 1 and fired a short burst. BLUE 2*5 alr-to-alr radar mode was inoperative (previously checked while Inbound to the target) and he had selected l8 nils fixed bombing depression as a compromise for air-to- air. However, BLUE 2 did not have enough lead and was unable to track the MIO through the turn. As BLUE 2 started a hi-speed yo-yo to reduce nls overshoot, «I0 1 reversed into a hard right turn partially solving SLUE 2's tracklr.g rroblem. After a few maneuvers, BLUE 2 and MIG 1 were on oarallel flieht paths several hundred feet apart with BLUE 2 about 500 ft behind MIG I's orthogonal position. As the flight p;»ths started to converge, MIG 1 again rever:;ed Into a left 60" banked turn with his nose about 20* above the horizon. This allowed BLUE 2 (still In a hls;h 5 left turn) to momen- tarily pull lead and again run the plpper through 'AlC, 1. BLUE 2 fired a fairly long burst at about 1200 ft range, 5 to 6 g':;, and 590 KCAS with no observed hits. It now became apparent to BLUE 2 that i8 mils was not enoui^h lead under these g conditions. MIC 1 rolled further left and entered a 120** oanked dive with his nose about 20" below the horizon. BLUE 2 was now ciosl..g rapidly at about 200 kts overtake speed when MIG I established a smooth tignt descenaing turn to the left possibly redm.l'"t power to force an overshoot. BLUE 2, oulllng maximum g (Just short of complete loss of vision) was able to align the P-105 fuselage with the MIG but unable to pull lead. As a last resort BLUE 2. by rapid aft stick movement, was able to rctate the "-aCS fuo^lage enough to put the sight well in front of the MIG and opened fire at a little over 200 ft range forcing the MIO to fly through the stream of 20.Tm cannon fire. The underside of the MIG ' s left wing exploded at a point two thirds of t.^.e way between the fuselage and the external underslung fuel tank. BLUE 2 relaxed back stick pressure as the fire and debris from the 'AIG engulfed the P-1Q5, and passed about 25 ft below the MIG a.** the MIG rolled inverted and crashed. The MIG was hit at a range of 210 ft with 55 mlla lead at about uoo-700 ft of altitude. Time from hit to i.'npact was >t to 5 seconds during which no chute was observed and the MIO did not roll frcm the Inverted position with impact at 21'l6'N/106'25'E. Meanwhile, after SLUE 2 passed BLUE Lead, NIG 2 'at BLUE Lead*8 2 o'clock) crossed back from right to left under BLUE Lead ana behind 3LrE 2. BLUE Lead pulled lead on MIG 2, and as MIG 2 crossed the "field of view" of BLUE Lead's SIDEWIKDEH (AIM-9a), BLUE Lead observed good tone and fired. The missile launched out ahead of BLUE Lead and then turned and headed straight for the ground. BLUE Lead overshot MIG 2 and turned wide. After about 360* of turn, BLUE Lead was again able to cut off MIC 2 and fired a short burst from a high angle off with no sight display and no apparent damage to the MIC. BLUE 2 experienced a surging engine and rapid deceleration as a result of passing through the fire from MIG l. BLUE 3 Joir.ed up with £LU5 and accompanied him toward the coast but about 30 miles from the coast, BLUE 2's engine began to function normally. BLUE Lead egressed alone and rejclned 2 and 3 after refueling on separate tankers. The BLUE Plight aircraft broke off the engagement with about ^*0Q0 lbs of fuel, bingo fuel for unre- fueled recovery at Da Nang AS, South Vietnam. The only damage to the P-lC5s was that absorbed by BLUE 2, a windshield partly coated with xolten aluminu^n, some grease blobs on the fuselage and a one-inch hole Inside the left intake duct. Event tir-309 Aircraft Invplved: "our P-I05s vs five MIG-17s and two HZC-2Is Results: iio damage Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^aS'tVlOS^^'E K PRIHARV Mission AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/Tlne: 5 June I967/1638H 11. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION IRON HAND flight (BLUE Plight) between 8-9.000 ft had Just fired SHRIKEs at target and made a left turn when they observed two MI0-17s at 5:30 o'clock high (10,000 ft). MIGs were In trail with Lead MIC approximately 2000 ft behind IRON HAHD flight and second MIO 1000 ft behind Lead MIC. The flight lit burner and cor.pleted turn and left MIGs. The night then Observed an P-< observed high at 9 o'clock and at 3 o'clock. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE I (Lead) and 2 went after the MIG at 9 o'clock and BLUE 3 and attacked the HIQ at 3 o'clock. 7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT ; BLUE 1 and 2 gained a firing position on the KIO and launched two AIM-* nlssllea. j The first missile did not guide and the second was not observed. After repositioning, J BLUB 1 launched four AIM-7E missiles at an altitude of 500 ft AGC, none of which was • observed to gvlde. Again the element maneuvered fcr separation and the lead was passed j to BLUE 2. BLUE 2 acquired a firing position on a single MIG-17 which was about 900 ft J ••" AGL an'l launched two AIM-9B missiles with approximately 15 degrees angle off with the MIG in a left turn. Both SIDEWINDERS guided and impacted in tail section of the MIO. | The HIG cortinued .In a steep left turn until impact with the ground. Just prior to j ftt Inpact the canopy separated frcn the airplane and the pilot ejected. BLUE 1 and 2 departed the area and returned to base. I In attacking the HIG at 3 o'clock BLUE 3 and U maneuvered Into a firing position at | approximately 5000 ft in a level left turn. At approximately 3500 ft range with 35* | angle off SlUE ? launched one AIM-"* which wq!« observed to guide to a 20 ft miss behind I the MIO. As BLUE 3 and it maneuvered for separation, two more MICs were sighted at i it/. 9 o'cloi.k low in a shallow left turn. BLUE 3 maneuvered to a position 3000 ft at the j MIG 6 o'clock with less than 15° angle off and laurc^.ed an AIM-'J . The missile was J observed to pass within 10 ft behind the MIG. A second AIM-*» was cooled and with a high i pitched tone BLUE 3 fired the -nisslle which aborted on the launcher. At this time BLUE 3 I overran the MIG and pulled up to gain separation and altitude. A lone MIG was sighted | very low (500 ft) and appeared to be returning to base. BLUE 3 and 5 moved below the HIG j at his 6 o'clock and when the MIC pulled up to cleer a hill, he was silhouetted against the sky. with a high pitched tone from an AIM-^*, BLUE 3 launched the missile which was observed to guide to within 10 ft of the MIG's tail pipe. BLUE 3 and li were at BIKGO fuel so ditparted the area and returned to bast . 367 Event III-312 0. ORDNANCE BLUE 1 SPARROW AIM-7E «/0 BLUE 2 BLUE 3 11. DATA SOURCES Messages, Reports: (No. flred/No. hits) FALCON SIDEWINDER AIH-1 2/0 4/0 AIM-9B 2/2 Remarks Launched all AIM-7E3 In boreslght node with range lock, narrow gate. One NIG-17 kill. Near nlSBes. 8TPW/OPREP-3/05132Z June 1967, Raytheon Missile Firing Maiuo of 6 June 1967. Aircraft Involved: Pour F->iiCs vs four HIG-17i* Results: One MIG-17 destroyed Vlclr.lty of Encounter: 2l«»17 'N/105'»50'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION ANC TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 5 June 1967/15*5H Four F-iiCs, BLUE Flight, were on a KIGCAP mission. Numerous MIO alerts had been broadcast by ETHAM ALPHA. No SAMs were sighted. 2. MISSION ROUTE Departed Danang and flight refueled In area WHITE ANCHOR before proceeding to TACAN Channel 97. Route to the tar«?et was via the following points: 21*»55'N/10«»*83'E, 21»5«»' N/105* 12 'E/TAR ART 1759/5161. Egress was the reverse of the inbound route. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS F-UC BLUE 1 and 3 1 SPARROW (AIM-7E) 2 SIDEWINDER (AIH-9B) 1 SUU-16, 20nun gun (1200 rd) BLUE 2 and H 4 SPARROW (AIM-7E} BLUE 2 only three AIM-7E i| SIDEWINDER (AIH-9B) HIO-17 MIQ I. 2. 3 Silver color with no narklngs observed MIC H Fainted red around the edge of the air Intake, on the wing tips and the rear half of the vertical stabilizer. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Scattered clouds (1/7) with visibility greater than 15 miles* BLUE _1 2 3 !i_ Altitude ; 17.000 ft Heading ; 13S* 5. INITIAL DETECTION While on a southeasterly heading BLUE Plight sighted four HIOs heading north at an altitude of 8,000 ft. MZG warnings had been received. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE 1 (Lead) rolled in for a diving SPARROW attack from the MIC's 12 o'clock position. With the radar in bcresight mode, no range lock-on and Interlocks out. BLUE 1 launched a SPARROW which was observed not. to guide. 7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT BLUE 1 Ixunediately pulled up sharply and executed a turn reversal that placed him at the 6 o'clock position of the MIQ. After firing 202 rounds from the SUU-I6 gun, BLUE 1 observed two explosions which Immediately gutted the aft end of the fuselage of the MXG. The MIO was observed to crash by all members of BLUE Plight. Before BLUE Plight could effectively pursue them, the other three HICs departed the area. 8. ORDNANCE (No. flred/No. hits) SPARROW SUU-16 AIH-7E 20mw Remarks BLUE 1 1/0 "Missile wa; fired out of parameters and functioned properly. Guidance was hopeless. " 202 rd MIG-17 destroyed. 369 Event I 11-313 10. AIRCRtU CONNENTS Ejcperlenee ; BLUC 1 F.'ont Back Total Houra 3«»05 618 2«7 397 Combat Hlaslons 105 103 Remarks Previous combat firing on l"* May 1967, two AIM-7E and one AIM-9B. No hits. In previous tralnln? In RTU and charglns SPARROW fired two Ai:*i-7, 9 AlK-9 and 20 simulator firings. Training firings of one AIB-T and 4D simulator firings. 11. DATA SOURCES We88ag«s iK!:S^J;Ji!!rSI«F^roa5lm W67/DOCO OOXH 12. WARRATUE DESCRIPTION M >...< - iiiTr« RTUF 1 fLsadl rolled into his attack from the 12 o'clock i IpJmSS mJssSSe maneuvered with the MIG and attained a 6 o'clock po.ltion froa which a SPARROW taissiie, ^f,''" ^ e-ur ifi irun The followlnK data were reported for the Blsslle P"«<1 2500 r« a* J ° bo'eslght. interlocks out and no range lock-on. Evaluation ;nSu8 SSlSd "ss?le laiSched out of envelope and alt.hough the .yateni ' functioned properly guidance was hopeless." (Ref O8080OZ) Aircraft Involved; Event III-311 Two P-'JDs and two P-lCa vs eight to twelve MIG-lTs Result: One MIG-17 destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: 21»30'N/105'">5*E \, PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Time: 5 June 1967/1535H BLUE Plight (four P-its) was providing HICCAP for an IRON HAND flight In the vicinity of Thud Ridge. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE Plight departed Ubon and proceeded to ORANGE ANCHOR for refueling to the target was via the following points: TACAN 97; 21*55'H/10U 38 E, 25 i« " 21«»«»5'N/105'"»2'E; Sl^afi 'N/105°52'E, ALFA day frag NR 125. 3. AIRCRAFT COhF IGURAT IONS ?~iiD BLUE 1. 3 H SPARROU (AXM-7E} 4 PALCOH (AIM-U) y-dc BLUE 2. n ft SPARROW (AIM-7E) 4 SIDEWINDER (AIH-9B) HIO-17 Silver with red star^ on the wings 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather ; Clouds, scattered to clear with visibility greater than seven miles. BLUE 330"= Heading : 5. 'INITIAL DETECTION BL!IE 3 and t first sighted the MIGs in their 5 o'clock position making a firing pass. 6. ACTION INITIATED During the maneuvering of BLUE 3 and U to defend against Jh? »«*f i"!. JS^'i wJwn and U became separated. BLUE 1 (Lead) and 2 attacked several HIQs that were in a wagon wheel forniatlon. 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT While maneuvering independently. BLUE U launched SPARROW as BLUE 3 fired o^ FALCON and one SPARROW. No results were observed. In «*h«J/?f!?f ISSrrov was iaunch^a . PALCON Mhlch did not guide, and two SPARROW xlSElles. The first SPARRO.1 was iaun^n.a InswfSinlHi™ range 2he?ea3 the second SPARROW, launched with full system lock-on against a third MIG. was credited with a kill. 8. ORDNANCE (Mo. flred/No. hits) SPARROW FALCON BLUE BLUE BLUE MIGs n. 1 3 4 DATA SOURCES Messages, Reports ; AIM-7E 2/1 1/0 1/0 AIM-^< 1/0 1/0 Remarks One MIG-17 kill. Plrpd guns at BLUE Plight. No hits. 8TFW/OPREP-3/051'<30Z June 1967 Raytheon Missile Performance Report AIW-TD/t 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION After co.pl.tin, a second troll along ^J^^^.^^^^-^^^^^^i^ ^^^.^ TisSaiird t ^.^^^^ ^ ^^^^ Troi ^T^^^^l^l :^u:^^Sti^^ had «cved to 371 Event Ill^Slii the outside of BLUE 3 '^nd hdd started to pull back to the Inside when the firing pass was made by the MIHs. BLUE 1 called a break and after considerable maneuvering BLUE 3 and U became separated. BLUE It launched a SPARROW In the boreslKht mode with interlocks In and range track. At tine of missile launch the MIG was movlnis from the 10 to 13 o'clock position, TCA 30°, range 3 miles, altitude 7,000 ft, speed approximately 0.9 Mach. SLUE ^ also was at 7,000 ft, speed 0.9 Mac^.. Immediately after laur.ching the missile BLUE broke right .as another MIG was making a fit-ink^ patis frou, tild 5 o'clock position. Upon reaching BIMGO fuel state, BLUE 4 egressed the area. In Che me time, BLUE 3 rolled in on a single MIQ-17 that was in a level right turn. From a 30* dive and 15* right bank BLUE 3 fired a FALCON. At launch, angle-off was good but the KIG Increased his rate of turn and BLUE 3 passed over the MIG without observing the performance of the missile. After cllmbins to gain separation, BLUE 3 rolled In behind a single MIG at a range of 5 miles but due to the dive angle and sun, the Identi- fication was delayed. A SPARROW was launched at a range of 2 miles at which tiste the KIG broke right. Both airplanes were at 2Cas ft with the P-U Indicating 0.9 Mach e.ni the NTO estimated at 0.8 Mach. TCA was 60**. The flight of the missile was not observed as both the MIG and the SPARROW were lost from view. BLUE 3 then egressed the area and rejoined BLUE 4 on the way out. BLUE 1 and 2 sighted seven or eight MIu-17s In a wagon wheel pattern and attempted to break up the formation. During the air tatnie BLUE I fired a FALCON which did not guide. Ar.gle off was 10° with th*» target head-on and level. On ^ second pass a SPARROW was launched with angle off and target aspect almost identical to the first pass but was inside stlnlmum range. BLUE 1 observed one MIG high and two others slightly to his left and acquired a full system lock-on on one of the niGs. With ths steering dot centered BLUE 1 launched a SPARROW head-on. Target altitude was 6000 ft. D*«tectlon range was 2-1/2 miles, lock-on at 2 miles, launch at 2 miles, fighter altitude 6000 ft, speed 0.9 Hach. BLUE 1 heard a call to break right and did not observe the flight of the missile. However, BLUE 2 observed the missile guiding down toward the MIG. BLUE 2 was at 500-1000 ft. Within seconds BLUE 2 observed 55'N/!55'28'E, heading 219 degrees, at 19.000 feet altitude and a speed of 525 knots. it ►S*, h*\^e*lved a one -inK x-band TWS rapidly increasing to 3-1/2 rings ana {ra52unrr?om 3 TcIocTto To- ciofk position. tSi. Ling tooW one minute to complete. BLUE PliKht went to 500 feet AGL in less than one minute, an<*,.«»r°PP«^. 3 bursts of •> Chaff bundles. Burst one broke the lock but It came back on tt seconds later. After bursts 2 and 3, lock-on was never reestablished. BLUE Flight accelerated to 660 knots on the deck and continued on until he reached 20'»27«N/103'"*2'E. As BLUE Flight was ingresalng to the weather point Indications were received of a OCX paint. The weather was a solid undereast with tops at 10,000 feet, with visibility 10 miles. Mo MIC warnings were received. Event Iir-316 Aircraft Involved: Four P->1059 vs one KIO-17 Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: Bac Clang I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Time: fi juna ig67/15S0H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION mrn °^ "^^''^ ^"^^ di&nz ?R and highway bridge slanted one silver mo heading west away from the target but tn» HiO posed no Sreat to thi mlsslSS. Event IIJ-317 Aircraft Involved; One P-105P vs Unidentified Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 20*10 •N/105*20'E I. PRIMARY NISSIJM AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Time: 7 June I967/2137H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION hu^.?S"B °f J"®!! i?*-""^ ^^^^^^ ^ flowing light which appeared to be a MIG after- SK^Tf ?5 ® o'clock low, approaching and skinning in and out of the tops of a cloud la-^r nJJfn' 5 miles of the F-105 who tSrned left toward llSgt anS ?t appealed to pitch up and disappear. Thirty seconds later a strange ELINT signal with the chaJa? teristlcs of a SCAN Pix was Intercepted for 3 to »l seconds. iSoM?G«ni iiri ?ec2?JIS: Event I I 1-3 18 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-103s vs one MIC-21 Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 20«50*N/105»10«E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 11 June 1967/090OH II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Event ZII-3I9 Aircraft Involved: Two RP-^iCs vs one MZQ-21 Result ; No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21«»22'N/105*10'E 1. PRIMARY HISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/Tlne: 10 June I967/1312H Two RF-HCd (BLUE Plight) were on a mission to Fhu Tho railroad yard. 2. MISSION ROUTE BLUE Plight departed Udorn and croceeded to 19«15'N/103**15'E at 25,000 feet altitude; then direct to Channel 97 (20«28«M/lb3*''»3'E) at 30,000 feet; direct to target at 21»2«'?l/ 105°lj'i: descending to 500 feet ACL. 8. ORDNANCE Wo. flred/!lo. hits AAM MIG-21 1/0 • U. OATA SOURCE Meaaagea. Reports : IJZTRW 100950Z June 67 OPREP-3 TUOC 05162 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION • 9 BLUE Flight was enroute to the target at 21''00'N/105*25'E, at 130HH, a MIG warning was issued by Red Crown "Bandits, bandits BLXLSEYE orbiting north." DEEP SEA 22 (AEW aircraft) issued a warning to BLUE Plight call sign when the flight was at 21*13'N/10'«''57'E at 1308H "Bandits at BULLSEYE plus 20 miles west, medium altitude. At 1309. when 3LUE Fllsht was at 21=*20' fJ/lC5°08 '"J, Dl-EP SEA ?2 again warned BLUE Plight by call sign Chat bandits were 5 rrilles south of -heir position and closing. When at 21*22 •:i/105'*10'E, and 1312H BLUE Flight c/^served a MIG-21 approximately miles distanc at their 3-3:30 o'clock position. An air-tn-air missile of unknown type was fired at BL'JE I and at that point X-band strobing was -eeelved of three plus rings covering a 30 degree sector of the scope with an uncharacv-eristlc dotted line video pattern of multiple strobes. The missile left a visible black trail and appeared to- guide accurately toward BLUE 1. BLUE 1 called a hard left break and deacendet'. What ippeared to be the missile detonation was observed below BLUE 1 (the flight wj.s at 2j''18'N/105*10'E) . BLUE Flight pulled out at 1000 feet ACL heading 230 degrees, -ind muzzle flashes were seen at 21*20 'N/105'05*E but no air bursts or tracers were seen. The MIG was not observed again nor were X-band strobing received again, but warning calls continued from DEEP SEA 22. "Bandits, bandits 20 miles west." The last call heard was "Bandits, bandits BULLSEYE plus 50 miles west." The flight continued outbound at 1000 feet ACL until reaching 21'»05'N/10U«10'E when a climb to 30,000 feet altitude was initiated. The weather was clear with visibility unlimited. %feffl3ir^*lL Event III-320 Aircraft Involved: Ore F-105 va two MIGa Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21*31 * N/ 105' 30 'E }. PRIMARY MISSION A.tO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 11 June 1967/0909H 11. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. MARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike flight was at 17,000 ft when two NIG contrails were observed at 25,000 ft by No. 2 due east of Phuc Yen. MIGs headed toward faght but then turned away. Event HI-321 Aircraft Involved: Four F-105s vs two Hia-17a and two MIC-213 Reaulta: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21"»ttO'N/105"30 'S I. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: n June 1967/0915H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Inbound strike flight observed two silver MIG-17s proceeding UMW alo^f Jhud Rldw at 1000 ft. The flight also observed two shiny MIGs, probably MI0-21s, at Zl^SO'H/lOS'SS'E. Event III-322 Aircraft Involved: One RF-lOl vs one MI 0-21 Results: Mo damage Vlciiiity of Encounter: 21'05'N/10ll°06 -E K PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tloe: 11 June 1967/09 30K II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION BLUE TREE aircraft at 25,000 ft slg.-.ced a MIG with contrails at 30,000 ft approxi- mately 5 miles distant. Tne MI^T executed a rl^ht de-scendlng "urn toward the ■ reconnais- sance al-craft. The reconnalss.-.;je aircraft Jettisoned external fuel tanks, executed a left divine turn to 100 ft, we..c .iiterourner and exited the area at o20 Knots, x-hana strobing wL received. Ihe y.:G appeared to paraUel the pnoto aircraft course In descent bu^ wM n^t oDserved again after 2C«i*5':.VlQ3''eC'E. Numerous a5 warnings were being re- ceived for 60 miles west to 30 sslles northwest of Hanoi. Event 111-323 Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s va three uniden- tified Results: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'lS^K/lOT'OO'E I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Oate/Tlme: 11 June 1967/16*5K II. DATA SOURCE CXNCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike flli;ht at l3,00'J ft observed three silver aircraft In an element of two with th!rd aircraft following in trail; aircraft approacned flight at 7 o'clock low; aircraft overshot and flight continued on to varget area. Event III -3 21 Aircraft Involved: Three P-I05s vs two. NI0-17s Results; Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21'»lO'N/106'>50 'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AKO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tl.iw; 11 June 1967/l63^H II. DATA SOURCE CINCFACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. 'NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike flight observed two MIGs. The HICs were low at 1-2000 ft and performing 5- tums . . Event III-325 Aircraft Involved: Two F-lOSs vs two unidenti- fied Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 21"-0«N/107*'28'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 11 June I967/I658H II. DATA SOURCE CXNCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Two shiny aircraft were sighted by ei^ressin? IRON HAND flight. The bogeys appeared to be at 1000 ft and to be dolnj; victory rolls. The aircraft could have been rocking and the reflection of the sun could have given rolling effect. The type of aircraft was un- known due to distance. Event II 1-326 Aircraft InvolveU: Pour P-105s vs on« MIG-21 Results: Sight Ins only Vicinity of Encounter: 21»00'M/lO«i«»50*E I. PRIHARf HISSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM Date/Tlo«: 12 June 1967/i60UH II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff "tudy 6-68. 12. N; MVE OtSCRIPTIOM StrU. flight sighted silver KI3; «IG -as heading MW and made a left turn Into clouds and mss not farther observed. Event Iir-327 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs seven MIGb Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: ai«05'»/I06*'>5'E I. PRINARV NtSSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 13 June I96?/l636H _ II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike flight sighted seven possible MICs heading west at approximately 8000 ft. Event III-328 Aircraft Involved: Eight P-lOSs vs ten- eleven HIC-21S Results: Sighting only Vicinity Of Encounter: ^l-^ioij/ioe^so;! 1. PRIMART MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 13 June 1967/1639H n. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-^8. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Strike flight sighted two sliver MIGs at an altitude of 2O00 ft; flight also obaervftd flieht of flve-3lx sliver MIGs at an estimated altitude of i-3000 ft; this Hia flight was trailed bv another flight of three MICs at the same altitude and on the same heading, approximately 1 die behind the first; second P-105 flight also saw second group of MICs. i [ Event 111-329 Aircraft Involved: Two RP-UCa vs one MIO-17 Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: ZO^OO •N/106*05'E J 1. PRIMARY MISSIOI* AND TACTICAL SITUATION i Date/Tlrae: 16 June 1967/1615H IK OATA SOURCE r - CIMCPACPLT Ctaff Study 6.68. L NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOH Photo flight Observed MIQ heading 330«; no engagement. 1^ 379 I Event III-330 5 Aircraft Involved: Pour P-I05e v« one H.:o-21 j Results: Sighting only | Vicinity of Encounter: 21^50*N/10ii"ti5'E ' t. PRINARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlrae: 18 June 1967/C902H 11. OATA SOURCE CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOH l«v.ls MIO tuR»d and htadad northw.t* atp.«r.d to b. fiyinj at tnt-tep Event III-331 Aircraft Involved: Four F-I05s vs two MIC-Zls Results: Glr,!itln? only Vicinity of Encounter: 21'»3'*'H/10?''36 'E I. PRIMARY MISSION MO TACTICAL SITUATION Dat«/Tline: 19 June 196 7/09 3 IH II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68, 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION No. 2 of strike flight at 9000 ft observed two silver MlCs parallel "/JlJ^^ JJ^i^f down Thud Ridge; MiGs were 5 alles aouth at an estimated altitude of 500 ft; MIGs did not engage and flight lost sight. Event 111-332 Aircraft Involved: Pour F-ICs vs two unldent (possible EB-66) Reaulta: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: Gulf of Tonkin 1, PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 20 June 1967/1635H n. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-63. 12, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Flak suppression flight Ingress ing when IIo . 2 observed two silver l^ranf':* approximately 3 niles distant at 3 o'clock; strangers were at altitude 25,000 ft; Initial heading 210* » then turned north; possibly tB-fabs. Event III-333 Aircraft Involved: Four F-105s vs two M1Q-? Results: Slghtm? only Vicinity of Encounter: 2i»25"N/10i»«>10'E I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 June 1967/0900H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Anna ft flak suDor-ssion flight saw :«Gs at 2-3 o'clock; MICs of unknown type headln? down tS2 song Jh^y rfver vilLy at no closer than 10 >nlles; flight then lost sight of HIOs, Event III-33O Aircraft Involved: One P-105 vs one MIC-? Results : Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: ai^ZS'H/loa'lO'E I. PRIMART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATtOK Oate/Tlme: ^3 June 1967/JC50H II. DATA SOURCC CINCPACFLT Sriff Study 6-68. 12. KARRATTVE DESCRIPTION Kenber of strike flight at 3000 ft when aircraft believed to be MIQ was sighted heading soutnwest at altitude 12-13,000 ft; suspected MIC lit afterburner and P-i05 lost sight of aircraft. Event III-335 Aircraft Involved; ^ow P-105a va one unldent Results; Uo Canaga Vicinity of Encounter: 2i«05'M/10«i»50'E 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 23 June 1557/0050K n. DATA SOURCE CINCPACRLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. 'nAiIRATIVE DESCRIPTION IROM HAND flight received momentary x-band signal; F-105» brcke left and signal went off; at 16502, (22 June), '»5 rnlles south of Yen Bay. flight saw an afterburner light at their 12 o'clock position, approximately 2 miles ahead In a slight cllnb; light went off and then ca^ie cack cn, enabling pursuing P-105s to identify swept-back wing features and to see that the fuselae? was silver-grey In the moonlight; suspest fllG was now heading NW in slight clizb approxlr.ately 1 mile in front of flight, which turned into suspect Nin and his afterburner light went cut; shortly thereafter the afterburner was relit, showing unidentified to be In sllgiit right dive; once again afterburner light went out and flight lost track of the unidentified. Event III-336 Aircraft Involved: Three T^^rs vs one Mia-2l, one unidentified Results: Sighting only Vicinity of Encounter: 2 1^40' N/1 04* 15 •£ I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 27 June 1967/09 15H II. DATA SOURCE CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION Escort flight heard continuous MIG calls from C056Z until 0133Z; ECM aircraft was at 30,000 ft when MIC was sighted at 7 o'clock posltlor. by escorts; MIO was at 30,000 ft approxlBsately 1 r.llc distant; XIS nadc no attempt to engage and was not further observed; at approximately 0117Z, flight starting i left turn observed an unidentified silver, fighter typs; air-raft at rn.^ht'.s. 12 o'clock pcslt <^^^ofi;ey was heading HW up the Hed hibor; bocey appeared t? b« in a gentle cll»ib aiid •SjHIBHI^i' > was approximately 7-8 miles distant and posed no threat to fli^t. ■ Event II 1-3 37 j Aircraft involJtH^^W^-''C vs two MIC-l7a Reault: One P-'iC destroyed Vicinity of Encounter: Hainan Island 1. PRIHARt NISSION ARO TACTICAL SITUATION Date/TlB*: 26 June 1967/17 32H Qm p.»C Perry Plight from Clark APB to Da Nang 2. HISS I OH ROUTE OMuioim ^ I 3. AIRCRAFT CORF I CURAT IONS F-«IC BLUE 1 i ~ !■ 600-eal eenterllne tank j HER S outboard. TETIS Inboard BLU/IB ba«ga«e rack on left inboard teh. I 4. FLI6HT COR01TI0R5 PPIOR TO EHCOUHTER Weather : Wind, aloft forecast 25 kt» from 100- at 3y,000 MSL. BLUE 1 Altitude ; 26,000 ft Heading ; 210 Speed : Unknown fueTIState: LO" 0" Plight Formation ; H/A 5. INITIAL omCTIOR , . , . BLUE 1 -as subjected to surprise attack Sy twn HIQ-lTs from hia 6 o'clock position. , I 6. ACTION INITIATED | See Itea \2 7. SITUATION OEVELORHENT See Itea 12 I 8. ORDNANCE BLUE I - Kone MIG-178 - Unknown 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEHS -i inr 'i Heading Indicators, Primary and Standby In both cockpits were In error and had BLUE :l north of course. 10. AIRCREM COHHENTS 11. ORTA SOURCES Heaaages. Reports: 366 TFW OPREP-3 DtIG AS RVN DCOl 809 June 67 261620Z 366 Tp5 OPREP-3 dug A3 RVN DCOl 8l2 June 67 2618^52 CTP-77 SITREP-1 June 67 270902Z 12. fUsht, departed Clark AB and planned tc arrive at Da Nang with 3200 rn^l reserve Sinds enroute^t planned altitude of 39.000 ft KSL /o^ecast to be ^ Lrniv tcG" at 25 kts/ The headinR Indicators (both Primary and Standby) in both approximately caused the pilot to proceed north of course. BLUE 1 was In cockpits in r^«S tr^ PhillDDlne ADIZ' until letdown intc what was thought to be the *Alr Defense Identification Zone 382 Event in-337 CREEN Pll(;ht, returning; fro.'n RP VI strike, ROt AOF tearing on BLUE 1 transmissions and gave pilot a steer of SiO" for lUo n ni , which proved to be correct. BLUE 1 followed this steer at 26,000 ft MSL jntll subjected to a surprise attack by two f'.IG-lTs from his 6 o'clock position. Aircraft was hit, flro warnln?; 11,-^hts were illuminated, pilot pulled throttles to Idle and both engines fctllcd. Pilot extended RAT', Jettisoned external stores* and continued on course- by controllir.i; aircraft with rudder through a series of dives and zooms. At 8000 ft both pilots ejected and were picked up 1 1/2 hours later by a navy helicopter. Position of tailout approxls:ateiv 10 n nl south of Hainan Island. Pilots did not sustain any injuries. [; n 'Paia Air Turbine 383 ' 7 11 r ii I t [; Svent IIl-3'iO Aircraft Involved: Four A-^s vs five HIC-21S Results: No daraape Vicinity Of Encounter: SO"*;? •N/106*21'E I. PRIHARY NISSIOS AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH Dace/T.'ne; 11 July 1967/0838H Two elerents of A-^a part of a strike force frcni the Consellation were attacking a target in the Kal '3uone area. The strike group consisted of A-63 and an F-4 flak sup- pression fllcht. 8. OAONANCE (No. fired/::o. hit) AAM or Rocket Remarks MIG-21 1/0 Fired at A-*5 II. DATA SOURCES Hessaggs. Rtcort?. : CTO 77. U 110100 Julv 67 GPREP-3 PINN 003 CTC n.k 110110 July 67 OPREF-3 12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOM At oa33H, as the Consellation strike ^roup approached the target at position 20*55' 35'*:.'/13£»2O'10''E ^nd ir. iltltude of 12,000 ft on a heading of 358"*, the F-U TABCAP/ flak suppression and strike aircraft conrenced their attack followed by eTements of A-6s and A-I5. Two elements of A-Us glchted a total of five NIG-Zls. The HICs were on a heading of 090* at 17,000 ft altitude and 3-5 "1 froa the strike group. The MIGs were called, but at this tli.;e trie r-iis and the rvst of the strike grcup were coimlttod to their attacks. The MiGs approached over the strike group at the same time the group entered Into the Im-Tttdlite target area. As flak started from the target area, three of the HIC-21s engaged afterturr.er , rained altitude, and were not coserved thereafter. Two of the MIG-Sls were observ^ed t? ccrr.ence a shallow dive toward the strike group and one fired a missile or rocket. The exact "lyre was undetermined due to the strike group's concentration on the target. The smoi^e or vapor trail from the weapon was seen momentarily as the on}y Indication that a weapon had been fired. No strike aircraft were damaged, and the target of the MI'1 attack was unknown. Immediately after completion of their ordnance delivery runs the F-^s pulled up, climblnE nortnwest , to enijaee the MIGs. Although the ?-fis remained In the vicinity of the tarret to cover the egress of the A-U and A-6 aircraft and continued to search for MIGs, they were unable to make either radar or visual contact with the MICa . The weather was scattered clouds at 16,000 ft with visibility unlinited. The best estimate of the flight crews is that the MIGs approached from the west at about 18,000 ft and flew over the strike group. The ones that attacked the group egressed on a right cllmolng turn to the west. 385 r I Event jill-jHI Aircraft Involved: Pou:* F-Bs/pne A-UE vs two :'»IG-21s Result : No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 19"n'H/l05'25'E 1. PRINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION D«te/Tljne: 17 July 1967/0900H BLUE Flight {four F8s) on a TARCAP niSBlon aPQ GREEN Plight (one A«E) on RESCAP tnisslon Mer« involved in this event. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS P-8 BLUE 1. ?. 2. H Ait- Unknown QREEN I ZUNI rockets and 20 n ml mc»2ia I. 2 8. AAN - quantity unknown ORDNANCE BLUE 1, 2. 3, GREEN 1 MIC-2I9 ZUWI Rocketa 8/0 20 n ml 30/0 Soviet AAH 1/0 Remarks HIG3 11. DATA SOURCES Messages. Reports : CTG 77.8 OPREP-U July 1967 1708202 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION At ogoOH, SL'JE Pli5:.t sighted two MIG-Sl aircraft while on a TARCAP nlssion. vere approachlns BLUE Flight and flak suppression aircraft from the south at approximately 6000 ft when BLUE Pil^tit assumed chase. MIGs made a hard left nose low turn to north. BLUE Plight could not close and dropped off MIGs. HIGis then turned back and headed toward strike ijroup. BLUE Pll GREEN Plight (one AttE] crossing in front of al.v-^*- .^-^ , - uxr- ;u e. air type nlssile at BLUE Flight in front of him. GREEN one maneuvered to the MIG ,^3 6 O'clock position, 8000 ft altitude, 3/'* mile behind and fired 8 ZUNI rockets and 30 rounds of 20iiim. MIQ-21 pulled away from engasement and departed to the north. ; close and dropped off MIGs. HICs then turned oacK ana nesoep i-owbi-b 'light resu.T.ed chase and MIGs again turned north and dlsappeai;ed. :) flying RESCAP flak suppression for SAR e 'fort sighted MIG-?! al.-craft vicinity 19*'»7'N/105°25'E at ITOO^gZ. Saw MIG flreHalrTtOr 1 k ■ ■ X 'i. 386 A m ii|J!^IHiUWJlJA.4W» Event III-3I2 Aircraft Involved: Four A-^iEs vs four MIC-21s Kesult: Kc dar.r-.ge Vicinity of Encounter: 20»30'rV105*55'E PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tlr.e; 18 July ICoT/lf-CZ!! The A-!iE were part of a f-^roe of 1^* A-Es and 7-85 attackln;; the Dlen Xa storage area, tip. fIr'"i/N'J. hits AAM 1/0 8. OROMANCE MIG-21 n. DATA SOURCES y.es3ar«» s. Re?:rt3 ; CTC 77.5 l8l30CZ July 67 OPPEP-5/005 - ' C70 77.8 1B1202Z July £7 OPREP-I 12. NARRATIVE CESCRIPTION Two elenents of the strike force encountered KIG3 as follows: Two A-f*'^ flak supprestir,n alrrrafl, with a TOT cf If^Oa. «ere at that tine In the vlcmuy 0° ^c°31' S-N/lC^'^^'Ol'-E when one of rhe pilots saw three KIC-218 300° liSieiie rillih?: The XlOs'^ere at lU.OOO feet altitude h-.ading 220 degrees. The MICs were quickly lost from view. b> ■'wo lr.OU HA:ID al-craft In the vicinity of JO'Sg'N/lOSO^VE, heading OJil s [r-aT^l^a'^^t-^-lnb-'^r;-:?;'^ f r^c'eror AAM f.c. lO.OQQ feet altitude. 7000 feet'^anie! The :ontinued to cllT.b to 13.000 feet and heading north. 337 ii I I i \ 1 . ! 1 Event III-3«3 Aircraft InvlJ^e>'^^Sur P-«Ds va elgl:t KIG-IU Result: No damage Vicinity of Encounter: 21»19'M/105»53'E 1. PRIMARY HISSIOri AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/?lre: I? July 1967/16522 w i- r». -our ''-uo, (3Lt- nUht) -ere on an ar:.ed reconnaissance mission against the ha Gla transht^Jent ?oln?V. 29»19' 25"N/105-53'00-E In Route Package /la. 2. MISSION ROUTE , . BLUE flight «aa fro™ Ubon and probably Ingreaaed and eeressed overland. 3. AIRCRAFT CONriCURATlON ' " J : S!tiriiH-;pro...l, c.m.d «, »nfl^r.tlon l«,.rd p,l.«. Vcm PC) (no AIM-i»D carried) HTC~17 Karklngs unobserved Cannon 5. irilTtAL OETECTtON, BLUE fU?ht ctaerved ? ft SPARROW AIM-7 - quantity for flight unknown BLUE flight had a total of 13 M-117 bonbs at 3 CE«-2*is. 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather: Unknown BLUE 1 Altitude: 15 #000 ft Head ins : 120«» Speed : Unknown Fuel State : Unknown Plight Fomasion : Strike formation 5. INITIAL DETECTION After hlttlne the target, and while egresslng, received warnings from HOTEL' about MlQa In the area. SLUE fil,5ht sighted a single lon?-nosed, delta wing, silver aircraft at altitude 2000 ft, heading 050", 500 kts. approximately 1652 local time. 6. ACTION INITIATED BLUE flight pursued the HIG to 21»21'N/IC7*«»8'E 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE 1 (le'\d) rired an AIM-7 at the MIO fron 2 n ml out, 10* dive, altitude 8000 ft, heading 05<» , lock-on Indicated (full system) at time of firing, but missile did not appear to guide. BLUE flight broke off attack due to proximity to CHICOM border. MIO believed to have proceeded across Into CHICOil airspace « BLUE lead carried a blister camera on board and expended 200 feet of flln. 8. ORDNANCE (No. flred/No. hits) SPARROW AIM~7 Remarks BLUE 1 1/0 Missile failed to guide 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS ' BLUE 1 - SPARROW missile failed to guide. 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS None 11. DATA SOURCES Mess ages. Reports ; OPREP 2011502 Jul 67 from 366 tTV ■ Danang AB RVN >See Item 12. 2dIA Intelligence summary lists the MIQ as firing one AAM. Mo other source Indicates this firing. Event III-3*!* 12. MRRATtVe OESCRIPTtON See ttens 5, 6, 7. PLIGHT reports the followiriE: calls from HOTEL. Red for CGI at 0810Z Tit PSN at 21" 16 ■ tl/107*01 'E) Yellow for CCU at OS'iOZ (fir PS» at 21*17 'N/lOT^Ott 'E) Bandits NW It 06253 SU 25 N^ed at 0333Z NW 25 at 083^2 South at 0S3:!s S HO heading 090° at O838: HOTEL radio sounded garbled c [ [ I. r i 391 Event ri:-3'»5 Aircraft Involved: Result One A-IC and four P-8Cs va eight MIG-17D3 Three MICs destroyed, two MIC s damaged and one probable kill. Two F-8Cs damaged. Vicinity of Encounter: Hanoi 20 miles northwest of 1. PRtHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Time: 21 July 1967/1519H to 16I»6H Stride mission on the Ta Xa fuel -"rage depot JO ^^/.^/-.lint slJn"""'' p.8Ca were on TARCAP and one P-8E was escorting the A--C iru« n*i.*u wi-aa 8. ORONAMCE (No. fired/Ho, hits) AIH-gP 20inm ZUNI Unk/1 Onk/1 Unk/0 Onk/l Unk/3 6/unic Remarks Carried AIH-9D. No data. Unobsenred. Hit. Probable kill. Kill. Kill. ' Three hits. One kill. BLUE 1 BLUE 2 BLUE 3 BLUE It P«8E 11. DATA SOURCES Messages: OPREP-5/021 2116U7Z. July 1967 from CTO 12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTION While en route to the target, a force of at least Jjf J{ PS'^^^^Jru^"?!."?.? ^.ngaged attac!!^d the TARCA? and IHOH HAND PC^plng up ^^J/' .^f dfrfct the MIG-17S m a dog fight and shot ^S^^.I^I^n'dowSed by canron fire and another hit from a SIDEWINDER missile. 0"* "^«;;:/"o^^''^!Ser MIG waf^Jtacked with a SIDE- MS destroyed oy ZUNI rockets ^nd 20mm -J;*; to detonate. Uter a parachute iiS'luhtS! "ihe'ifo^SirnsteS f.'\\To\:Al jru!"Two ot.er .IGs were damaged in the """'^iwrnror'TARCAP were damaged Jy/^nnon fire One F-8 was hit ^Je right ^ aileron and the ether -^^^J^ff^/"" iy3'2„^;:emei "Sk.ta and cannon, F-8 was able to outturn the MIG-17 m tnis engagcm.ui.. 392 ii I. Event III-3'>6 Alrcra^^B^^^^ Two F-'tCs vs two NIG-'31s Result: ^^^K^ killed (probable) Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'OT'N/lOS'lT'E PftlNARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Date/Tine: 27 July 1967/1600H Two P-oc aircraft (BLUE Plight) on an escort nisslon approximately 35 miles west of Hanoi. BLUE 1 and 2 had air aborts. BLUE 3 and 4 were involved in this encounter. 3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS p.»C BLUE ?. « AIN.7 AIH.9 MIC-ais Dark silver color with no vir<.ble markings. 4. FLIGHT CONOITIOKS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER Weather; Unknown BLUE 3. 1 17,000 ft 325' 460 KTAS Unknown Altitude ; HeadlngT Speed : • Puel State ; 5. INITIAL DETECTION The two MIG-21S were first called as bogeys at 10 o'clock by the flight that was being escorted. 6. ACTION INITIATED SLUE Plight engaged the two MIG-21S almost Imaedlately . 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT BLUE Plight first sighted the two HIG-213 (dark silver with no visible markings) pass from left to rlisht across nose of ELwE Flight aparoxiraately 1/^ miles distant In a descending rignt turn. SLUE Plight followed In pursuit. BLUE 3 ha'' one NIG centered at 3000 ft distance. The MIG lit afterburner Just prior to missile ler.nch. The SIDEVrtNOER tracked strai-^ht ahead until r.otor burnout, then turned right dlrecvly after the HIO-21. The SIDEVIt.'DEH was last ::een In full guided flight approxlnately 200 ft directly aft of the HIC-21, but no detonation was observed. One MIG-21 started Into a left descending turn. (At this time the second MIG continued straight ahead and was not pursued.) BLUE 3 and ^ continued a left turn In pursuit of first MIC, and at altitude 9000 ft, heading 090°, 25 degree dive, 150 kts overtake with interlocks in and full systems lock-on, BLUE 3 fired one AIK-7 from 1-1/4 ml out, 10 degree aspect angle 20 degree angle-off. The missile left the launcher with b.<.as, and appeared to track Immediately. The MIG-21 was in a moderate descending left turn, headed for the undercast at altitude 6OOO ft. The missile was last seen tracking 2000 ft behind the HIQ-21 In a lazy pursuit curve. This was classed as a' probable kill. BLUE 3 Initially tried to fire but the dot was out of the ASE circle; when the dot was brought into the circle tlie missile launched. ORDNANCE BLUE 3 BLUE 4 (No, flred/No. hits) SPARROW SIDEWINDER AIH-7 AIM-9 l/Kprob) 1/0 0/0 0/0 Remarks Probable kill with SPARROW 9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS None stated for BLUE 3 and 4. BLUE 1 and 2 aborted early in mission. 11. DATA SOURCES Messa<:fe3. neciorts : OPREP-4368 2712502 from 366TPrf Danang AB RVM 393 0, Technical Report distributed by Defense • Technical Information Center /Acquiring Information- imparting Knowledge Cameron Station Alexandria. 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NOTICE (This cover sheet is unclassified when separated from classifled documwis) o 00 00 ^X^SHG RLFOIIT 116 ^' . A I R • T O - A f E .N C u> I J N T E R S / N SOUTHEAST ASIA (U) a. o V 0 i -J rn c I V : :kv?A y 5 c 5 April 1 968 I n c ! i; li i .T "Urauthorizeii Dt»cloauro Siibj«c! 10 D D C I ;.•'! a-t^ '.'itt jEXCLlJDZD FRCK Tii2 GD3 nvsvk>'> hv ■ j.j: a'» I '"i?. !t; vi: ;;^:-* y 1-:; a;.' V :.j;iivi:. AKiJSw":^:,. v.- "EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECUSSinCATIOM ... - — ^ SCHEDULE." PRESCRIBED BY E. 0. 11652 ' mnm m i m nc hrill □ ionuieaiiM IT DttnniiiN/iiiMiiiLin mo tat Milt MirtTSwiP 0 THi: documsnr contoim j^irrcfio^cffscJlnj tho nafiofwl dtfenjo snrcri^i in ciV>^n3nneik{e^Jn •jneiifnorizfld 0 the hc^Tzf cr!.j^yjjL:=.-v^pro*N^Acpovc refer " inferirat ioii zor*alr.c:c r.;;r-ii. ■ "— ■ ■ — "nC>'i ' .- viO '■- C4 t£Si.-MfS *Ty*". **>lATIONAL S£:c.U..frY .... JRMATOJT "Vaaulhotiied DUclosiuta Subject Id [sSCIiiMSS FROM tili: GD3 | 1 |M *WP ' j I T ' ' *!" ^> 1 ' ' ' . ■ H '*l«' I (Thb page h CCHrtDl' orncE or thc pirfctor of Df-rrNsc RrscARCH and CNciNECRmc WEAPONS SYSTEMS LVALUAHOM GROUP WASHINGTON. U C 2C305 D DC i OCT 24 I9f75 MdM U ILLU D 21 May 1968 MEHORANDUK FOR THE CirAInMAIf , JOINT CIIIEF3 OF STAFF SUBJECT: Alr-to-Air Encounters In Southeast Asia (U) (U) The abstract of WSEG Report Wo. 116/ "Air-to-Alr Encounters In Southeast Acia - Volume IV: Analyses," is con- tained in Section I telcv/. Additio.nal coiTLT.ents on the study are contained in Scctlcr. II. I. ABSTRACT (U) Title fxr.d Date of Report : "Air-to-Air Encounters in South- east Asia - VoluHie IV: Analyses," WSEG Report No, 116, April 19w3. (U) Conducted by : WSEG (U) For : DDRiE Kcla2£2_l2.' I^^ontiricatlon of research ani ctsve J-Oprxnt prooie:ns Trom analyses of air-to-air combat ii^ Southeast Asia. (C) Si :n:r.ai\v of I'tethcdolc^y it^A Dizcu5?,ior. : Extensive detailed in forma c ion was gacr.ered from SiA cor.bat aircrew dtbriefin.:s by specially trained r.llitary and civilian toa;-s to :'^upple- ment* the inf orrrial? on contained in the jombat repcrtint" systems. The collected data, coverins the period April i9o5 to Auf;ust 1967, v.'ere organized in outline and narrative for- mat and also encoded fcr computer use. Two independent analyses of the data were performed: a quantitative^ analyi:ij; of the various T^hasss of each en^arorr-ent and a qualitative analysis of each event as a whole. The quantitative anal- ysis examined the separate phases of combat, first by quanti- fying the Darar.-?ters and then by analyzing each of the separate chasos, bct'n individually and collectively, in all of the documented events. Resul'-5 of the qualitativa analysis identifiod the factors affecting the outcome of the air battles and fron these factors areas requiring research and development effort were identified, (C) Principal Firviinrs_: The study indicates that concerted research ai;a dSv\rlocrem: effort tcwavd effectlnff, improve- ment^jn the foiiowing areas would eniiance the effectiveness of U.S. cP'?r?.!;iorj in air-to-air coirbat: fihto page Wj n-OC CONTROL -t \ i Enemy position and direction information, Lonc-rance positive identification. Weapon versatility and reliability. Target dlscririiaatlon acalnst ground return. Aircraft rearward visibility. Man/nachlne compatibility. II. COMMENTS (U) This study is responsive to a request fron the Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering (ODlRSE) for an analysis of air-to-air encasements directed toward identify- ing those areas cortlnent to research and develor^.ent for air- craft weapons systems of the 1970-1975 time period. Basic authority for the study is contained In 28 May 1965 and DJSM-16Q2-66 , 6 December 1966. JCS concurrence in this DDRiE study Is recoEniced in J3M-1929-66, 2 December 1966.. (U) This study should prove useful in: • Providing data on SEA air-to-air combat events which hcrotofcre have not been available from other sources. • The identification of research and development goals for improving current v:eapons systems as v/ell as the design of future aircraft v/eapons systems. • Other studies or follov/-on efforts in suggesting data collection and analytical methodclosy for similar operational analyses. • Providing coTjnanders and aircrew personnel a source of information on the achievements and the mistakes of U.S. pilots in air-to-air combat in SEA. • The development of tactics as a consolidation of experiences in air-to-air combat. (U) It should be noted that the data collected for this study, although v:g11 taoulated and presented, are primarily based on observations 2nd estirr.ares nade by individuals under the stress of ccrr.bat and thus subject co the frailties of human memory. The lnterviev;s frcn which the data were gleaned were conducted at varying tln:es follov/ing the actual combat; some immediately following the action and others as much as one year later. (S) In addition to those areas identified in the stijdy 0 a a fl n 0 a a a i for research and development investigatxcn, another area - countermeanures to defeat or de^^rade eiieiiy weapons and v/eapon systems - appears to .Indicated by the Increased employment effectiveness of enerty air-to-air weaponr> subsequent to the data cut-off date of 1 Auj,ust igC?. In the short five-nonth period from 1 August 1967^0 3 January 3.968 , the U.S. lost two aircraft to enetriy air-to-air gunfire and 12 aircraft to enemy air-to-air ruinjiles. During this period neither side intro- duced nev/ Dircraft and/or v/earcns or appreciably chang:od its sortie ratea. Ther>e recent losses to air-to-air missiles alone account for 40 percent of the total U.5. . SEA alr-tc-air losses and 70 percent of the total losses to air-to-air missiles. (S) Two other research anu developir.ent problem areas, while identified in the report, were not stressed. These are voice comnunications and aircraft performance, which also appear to warrant serious investigation for future weapons systems, (U) It should be noted that ths conclusions reached in this study v/ere based solely on data gathered during a specific time period and from the United environment of SEA. Therefore, the indicated areas for research and development effort which have been identified are not necessarily all-inclusive for all environments . (U) The effort in this project was directed toward the identification of problem areas v/ith research and development implications. This objective appears to have been met; hov;ever, a continuation of the data collection effort is desirable in order for there to be a data base fcr such further analyses as. may be desired. It is recommended thac this f 'motion be accom- plished by the Services , with channels provided for the ex- change of information. The follGv;-on data collection effort would, hopefully, be consistent v;ith d^ta collected for this study both in content and quality in order x;o assure ccm.mon data for the tctal period. " V/SSG is prepared to cooperate fully with the Services in casslnr; c:i the skills, techniques, data foi'mats and instructions developed in acquiring the data used in this study. (U) Volume I cf this report, "Accont of P-^ and F-8 Events Prior to 1 '-larch 1967 (U)," v;as distributed in October I967. Volumes II and III, covering air-to-air encasements through 1 August 1967, will be forwarded upon completion, on or about 15 August 1968. Vice Aomirai, U3N Dj rector J 3 ■ ■ B f - a a" ia la DFORN i8 REPORTjR-l23'»^f-^^ : TO-AIR ENCOUNTERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.^) Volume "C^"^ Analyses CnA\(c^ April 1968 ^ This report ho^ been prepared by the Systemi Evotuot.on D.vmon of the Imtitulefor Oefcr.se Analyses i"f"P«""!f ^.^^^'^'^V^^!,* l!"!! tvcluotion Group Talk Order 50-OAHCI5 67 C 00I2-H04A doted 6 December 1966. ^"Y^j T"^"^ ^- C ! ^ C ^ A 7 - Ol ' J tn the work under this Task Order, the Institute na$ beert oi»:$ted by .mililcr/ personnel assigned by WSEG. "AATIOHAI^ SECURIZX UVORUAXIOB" ' 'Unauthorized Disclosure Subjeot .to^Crlaloel " Sanctions* ^ V ) / _ ' ^ ' ' 1-^ t ST' ' ^- "EXCLUDED FROM GENThAL ULCLAiSJilHCAIlUN ^ ^ SCHEDULL" PRESCRIBED BY L 0. 11652 - • INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES SYSTEMS EVALUATION DIVISION 400 Army-Navy Drive. Arlington. Virginia 22202 OCT 24 1979 D IDA Log No. HQ 68-8621 NOFOIIN FOREWORD (C) At the request of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the Systems Evaluation Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses in conjunction with the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group has undertaken a study of air-to-air encounters in Southeast Asia. The effort, called Project RED BARON, sought to obtain and analyze data, primarily to assist in the selection of suitable research and development programs for future high- performance fighter aircraft, and also to provide a much-needed source of basic data for use by the military services and the scientific community. (C) Project RED 3AR0N Is reporting its findings in four volumes. Volu.iie I (IDA Hepcrt R-123; V.'oEG Report ll6) documents air-to-air encounters in SEA involving and P-8 aircraft prior to 1 March 1967. Volume II will document those encounters involving P-105 aircraft for the same period. Volume III will give the data for all air-to-air events in the period from 1 March 1967 to 1 August 1967. These three volumes constitute the collection of basic data. (C) Volume IV presents the results of the analyses which were performed on the data base. The extensive effort exerted by the RED BARON Project in obtaining and organizing a detailed and reliable data base involved hundreds of people and many man- years of vjork. Those people v/ho assisted primarily in the data collection effort are listed in the Foreword of Volume I, and their assistance is here, again, gratefully acknowledged. (U) The Project also v;i::Jie3 to think Mrs. Antoinette Hudson and Mrs. Elizabeth Bash.-iin, who assisted in many clerical and administrative areas since the beginning of the Project. The special art and reproduction problems for the project were ably handled by Walter Hamilton, Robert German, and the staff of the Publications Department, and Edgar Boling of the Editorial, Staff. (U) In addition, the Project wishes to express its appre- ciation to the many members of IDA/WSEQ support staff who re- sponded to the unusually heavy work load resulting from the massive interview data. (U) Appreciation is also expressed for the assistance and guidance provided by T. L. Johnson, Captain, USN, and his replacement , William Russell, Captain, USN, and Phil H. Van Sickle, Colonel, USAF, of ODDR&E Tactical Warfare Programs. (U) The analytical effort rested principally on those members of IDA and w35G who constitute the .RED BAROM Project staff, and on those consulting specialists from outside the ID*\/Vi3EG organization who contributed to the analyses. (U) The members of the RED BARON Project are as follows: SED Members John S. Attinello, Project Leader Douglas N. Beatty, Asst. Project Leader John W; Rubino Earl A. Thomas Charles W. Gardner Velma M. Archer WSEG Members John W. Walden, Cdr., USN, Primary Military Project Member Richard C. Stewart, Capt., USU Floyd A. Prlesen, Cdr., USN Philip Brooks, Col., USAF Ralph L. Kuster, Ma J., USAF M. J. Agnew, Lt.Col., USAF Charles R. Shaw, Col., USA (U) Other assistance in the analyses, as consultants to the Qualitative Analysis Panels, is gratefully acknowledged: Dr. Sidney Alexander, Advanced Research Projects Agency Mr. V/illiam C. Barnum, Aeroneutronic Division, Philco-Pord UElCLASSinZD Mr. Richard C. Beall, USAP Syc terns Command, Aeronautical Systems Division Mr. Harold Dradshaw, Naval Air Systems CoTjnand Mr. A. DeGray, Jr., Naval Air Systems Command Mr. L, Franceschi, Raytheon Corporation Mr. Herbert Goda, IDA/STD Dr. A. Hyatt, Morth A.-nerican Corporation Mr. William H. Laudel, HcDonnell-Douglas Mr. James McCarthy. USAF Systems Coironand. Aeronautical Systems Division Mr. Paul Okamoto, IDA/SED Mr. James A. Perkins, McDonnell-Douglas Mr. John Transue, IDA/SED Dr. Robert D. Turner, IDA/STD Mr. C. C. Welssman. Office of the Chief of Haval Operations Mr, Frank Wyche, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Lt.Col. David Young, USAF, WSEG (U) The Project also wishes to thank those who reviewed the final draft of Volume IV and contributed their comments and suggestions: a Mr. George E. James, IDA/SED, representing Dr. All 3. Cambll. IDA. Vice President for Research Mr. Peter G. Freck, IDA/SED Mr. Herbert Goda, IDA/STD Mr. Terrell Greene, The RAND Corporation Mr. Bruce Powers, Center for Naval Analyses. (U) Although volume IV represents the combined effort ol the entire Project staff, and all members contributed in some measure to all sections, there were principal authors for each of the major areas considered. Those authors names are indi- cated m the Contents with the sections for which they had primary responsibility. (U) The project wi.hes to hereby acknowledge those. air- crewmen Who as interviewees for the data base, so generously Ut:ClASS'i:';!ID v UNCLASSiFIED contributed their time and Interest and insight, without which the analysis would have been severely restricted. vl UIJCLASSiriED CONTINTS ... 1 I. SUI-TMARY AIID COIICLUSIOIIS Project otaff ^ II DACKGROIJMD AND STUDY APPROACii J.S. Attir.ello, J.V/. Rubino, D.M. Beatty Character of the Air-to-Air Uar in Southeast Acia — • ^7 19 Study Approach * * ' 25 III. -QUAHTITATIVE AliALYSIS ... 27 Acquisition and Identification F.A. Friesen Attack Pl-aso K.A. .Thomas Firins Phase, DanaG© Phase C.W. Gardner, D.M. Beatty Termination Phase .D.H. Beatty, J.V;. V/alden ^ ^ IV, QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS J.V/. Waldon, u.H. Beatty Background and Scope Methodology Findings V. INTEGRATION OP ANALYSES Project Staff .121 Introduction ^^14 Attack Phase * . . 125 Acquisition r'hase \ 126 Firing Phase, Damage Phase Termination vii UHCLASSiFIED APPENDIXES APPENDIX A - The North Vietnamese Air Defense Environment ..«••> 13,p> All heodlngs in this document are UNCLASSIFIED, vill J.W. Rub: r»o APPENDIX B - Aircraft and Ordnance D.N. Be; .ty APPENDIX ; - The Data Definition and Collection Program . 169 J.W, Wa-den ' . ' APPENDIX D - Short-Range Weapon Employment Opportunities - 1;9^1 A.L. Kuster S ^1 ^fl i I. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS SUMMARY (S) The results of the Project RED BARON analyses must be viewed In light of the Southeast Asia environment In which U.S. fighters operated. This ene.T^y environment has evolved in- to a sophisticated, integrated air defense syotcm consistins of MIGs, surface-to-air missiles, and intensive AAA, employed simultaneously with effective enemy early warning and GCI. One of the sicnificant constraints in employing U.S. fighter weapons systems has been the requirement for positive, visual identifi- cation before firing. Air-to-air encounters in this environ- ment are characterized by close-in combat, high-g maneuvering, and visual cues. (S) The major findings of this report are based on data collected to 1 August 1967 Other findings may reflect more recent data, as noted in the text, but these subsequent data (principally missile firing results) are from sources outside the major data collection effort. The analysis of air-to-air encounters is based on detailed reconstructions by the Project. These reconstructions were made primarily from data which the Project obtained by interviewing air-combat participants. The methodology and procedures devised for these aircrew Interviews are discussed in Appendix C. (S) As a result of mutually supporting, independent analyses undertaken by the Project, R?<6 problems v;ere identified. The Project carefully avoided suggesting specific solutions, so as not to prejudice the definition of the problem areas. The following problem area? are determined to be most significant and deserving of maxir.um P.iLD attention. LOCATION MO DIRECTION INFORMATION (S) Thi. problem tn^or'aUoron^fhe^loolJifin "f flLht'path^f alrfrfrt'operatlne ?n the vicinity. ?{;?s informauon shoild be su'pplen.ented "eans for establishing positive identification of these aircratt. (S) Studv of the acquisition and identification proc«-ss I^'se! {Section III-A) revealed ^hat these important initial chases of air battles took place at short rangts (median ran|e of all acquisitions examined was 2 rjlles). iSd were dU tribute d anong all quadrants around the U.S tJrcraft. In^approxmately 25 percent of the encounters, the enemy was able to position himself In ^^e rear Wdrant of the U.S. aircraft before detection. These -quaarant oi i. aircraft at a disadvantage in occurrences put the U.S. axrcra. o a -vaslve (•hat- little or no time was available to taice evasive ■ aoUon before be?ns fired upon. The frequency of rear- oSad^nt aoquisltlSns indicated that visual search methods, ?u?ren? A? radars, and MIG warning "chniques were inade- quate to prevent surprise attacks upon U.S. aircraft. (S) Study of the attack phase (Section III-B) in11="«'* thkt the enemy's ability to achieve a Position to fire on U S. aircraft was alnost entirely dependent upon the abiliti to attain the rear-quadrant position before de- tection conversely, whenever the U.S. aircraft acquired thf ene^y a??craft bkore the attack maneuver was com- pleted! U.S. aircraft negated the ^■aneuverJiPor£.e.nt fhP tine The requirement for real-TIme Inforraation on l^l posiiio; of the enemy aircraft is apparent from these two results. • (S) Positive identification was required ^^^^E A due to the presence of U.S. and third-country aircraft in the combat area. This requirement makes it Iniportant for the ■ • aghter to-have the capability to identify targets at ranges commensurate with his ability to acquire them. WEAPONS RELIABILITY l/s) Weapons reliability was identified as a sienificant problem by the oualitative analysis (Section 1\) and was Substantiated by detailed catec^orization of malfunctions in the studv of the firing phase (oecv^ion lii-o;. should be n'oted, however, that the missile syste^.s employed in S:.A were not designed for use in close-in, dog- fight encounters characterized by high-g maneuvers. \t J ? firing phase studies (Section III-C) were based on firing atter.pts" since In the real world of aeria3 combat, the perforniance of the weapon for each "trigf-o- squeeze' is the most meanin.-ful criterion for success. The missile hlt-to-firlng-attempt ratio (as ccnputed on a moving average, and for ail types of missiles combined) had steadily decreased from a value of 25 percent in April. 1965 to 12 f)ercGnt In January 1968, In addition to overall missile systems performance, the analysis exa-r- Ined each missile system in detail. The SIDEWIIiDER (AIT-I- 9B and AIM-9D) failure rates were decreasinfi:. whll^» the SPARROW (AIM- 7^) failure rates, though Wr' than during the early phases of the war, were not decreasing. (S) With reference to gun systems (Section III-C), the results indicate that the failure rate has decreased from 21 percent to 10 percent. WEAPONS VERSATILITY ^^^c-^?^"^^®^ °^ acquisition, attack, and firing phases of ScA air battles indicate needed ImDrovemeniss in the versa tillty of current air-to-air weapons.' The qualitative analysis (Section IV) identified the need for weapons usable within ranges shorter than the minimum range of the cu^re'-t missiles (Section III-C and Aopendix 3). The studies of •r.EA acquisitions -(Section IIi-A) substantiated this reau^re- ment for short-range capabilities. In addition to the' short-range proble.-rid, expansion of current weaoon envelopes is required to offset the envelope shrinkage and distortion which results from low-altitude air battles against a highly maneuvering target (Section III-C). In the'combat environment the mechanical time delays required for properly aiming and firing current weaoons are frequently unacceptable, a.nc have highlighted the' need for quick response weapons. The boreslght mode of firing the Ai:'-7 a aegraded technique for "snapshot" capability, has been * unsuccessful in combat (Section Ill-C). In 65 attempts to fire In the boreslght mode, only one hit resulted. is) With reference to guns, the results indicate approxi- mately the same level of performance as missiles in terms of kills per firing attempt. For the period of the RED BARON study, gun system overall kill effectiveness pe^ attempt was 14 percent, compared to 17 percent for the missiles . TARGET DISCRIMINATION AGAINST GROUND RETURN fS) Although airborne intercept (AI) radar has in some cases been asset to U.S. fighters (Section W). In llhll cases It was Inadequate for use against the low- flylne targets which have characterised "Jf ^ °f battles in SEA. WIO approach tactics have «Plo"«<» ^rrent AI -<^ar limitations by use the^.VN^CCI^^^ , lt?flsluLrwere":;rutl'Ld at relatively short ranges '^median of 2 miles. Section III-A). (S) Ground clutter not only hampers the AI radar in reduce the probabilities for success (Section III-C). AIRCRAFT REARWARD VISIBILITY e^SasUed t:ne imoortance and dangers of /«^7« j-C^*^ was severely hampered by the multiple switch procedure; therefore restric^ntr needed capability. / CONCLUSIONS^ (S) This study of air-to-air encounters in Southeast Asia identifif.d a number of assets and problem areas relating to future fighter aircra-^'t weapons systems. JeSi^ Th£ following problem areas were determined to be the most sif.aificant and deserving of serious H/(d attention: >1'mPR0V:0 l^OCATION AMD o'iRECTIOM INFORMATION • .•^MPRO^fED WEAPON RELIABILITY* (J'" ',^ncr':ased weapon VERSATILITYJ /^MPROVEO TARGET 01 SCRI MINAT ToN AGAINST GROUND RETURN^ / ^MPr^OVED AIRCRAFT REARWARD VISIBILlTYy .'^ i INCREASED MAN-MACHINE COMPATIBILITY, J^gff^ "-Developing specific solutions to th^ese problem areas will require detailed investigation of all corkributing opera- tional factors and applicable technologies, in conjunction with an evaluation of related on-going R^D programs. 11. BACKGROUND AND STUDY APPROACH (C) The purpose of Project RED BARON v/as to collect detailed data to analyze air-to-air encounters in Southeast Asia and to Identify research and development required for future fighter aircraft xveapons systems. All air-to-air en- counters through July I967 were analyzed in this study. (C) The original task order requested analysis of air- to-air events from the first known event in April 1965 through 1 March 1967. A significant increase in the intensity of the air-to-air war during April and May of 1967 prompted an ex- tension of the time period covered by the study to 1 August 1967. •(C) Since information relative to all aspects of enemy encounters was desired (including disengagements and inability to engage) the study included all contacts with bogies not identified as friendly even if they were only sightings and in- volved no maneuvers. Furthermore, this study was limited primarily to encounters involving high-performance U.S. air- craft. A total of approximately 400 events have been identified and the results of F-3 and F-105 encounters (approximately 350) are analyzed in this volume. Approximately 85 percent of the encounters were with USAF forces. The data also include one P-100 encounter. • A. CHARACTER OF THE AIR-TO-AIR WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (C) Essentially all of the air-to-air encounters con- sidered in this study involved MIG-17 or MIG-21 aircraft viith the exception of tv;o instances when Colt- type (AN-2) aircraft c D were Intercepted in night engagements. In general, the en- counters took place over North Vietnam although a few were in g the vicinity of Hainan Island. •(C) The nature of the war placed operational constraints g on U.S. pilots involved in the air-to-air encounters; in most cases their missions were defensive. Generally, fighter air- craft (P-^ls and P-85) were assigned to escort a strike force U or other support aircraft thus limiting opportunities to pursue the enemy. Since the primary mission of the fighter was to jj protect the strike force, the enemy would be engaged only if the mission was threatened. The primary mission of P-105 air- g craft was generally a strike mission and their primary objec- tive was to deliver ordnance on target. Thus, they were in- H structed not to engage unless directly threatened. There was a few instances when U.S. fighter aircraft were employed in MIG -p sweeps and only then did they assume an initially offensive role. U (C) A further constraint on operations was the requirement n for positive identification. This required visual confirnatlon U of the target since numerous nonhostile aircraft (both U.S. — and neutral country) might be operating In proximity. Thus, [j i-^r-to-air battles except for a few isolated Instances depended on visual cues. The requirement for positive identification y before firing required a close approach which tn some cases forced the U.S. fighter to pass entirely through the missile jjj launch envelope in order to make the identification. Thus, the element of surprise was lost as well as exploitation of the advantages offsred particularly by the longer range all-aspect missiles. (S) The North Vietnamese air defense environment had a D Significant effect on U.S. air-to-air operations. It was - characterized by the fact that (1) U.S. aircraft operated U in a hostile GCI cnvironme.nt , (2) surface-to-air missiles were used for the first time in a war, and (3) ^he opposing enemy .[j D fighter force was relatively small compared to number of U.S. aircraft Involved. This differed sharply from the Korean conflict wherein both the U.S. and enemy forces had GCI capa- bility and approximately equal numbers of fighter aircraft in the combat area. The North Vietnamest Air Defense System (C) There have been a number of recent studies^ coverL.g various aspects of the air war In North Vietnam (NVH) and. these have included a detailed examination of the air defense environment. A brief summary of this environment Is included to describe the conditions under which the air-to-air fighters operated. A more detailed description is given in Appendix. A. (S) The NVN Air Defense System had developed r-^rom a rudimentary system in 1964 to a relatively complex, up-to-date, and formidable system in 1967. The weapons employed as part of the air defense system can be classified into three major groups: (1) grcund-cascd guns, (2) surface-to-air missiles, and (3) fighter aircraft. (SNF) The AAA environment encountered in NVII has been extremely dense, particularly in portions of Route Packages V and VI. By the end of July 1967, more than 5600 37mm/57mm guns and 1700 85rrun/10Crr.m guns were deployed in North Vietnam. This has had a significant impact on choice of tactics for strike aircraft which, in turn. Influenced the altitudes of the protecting fighter force. The antiaircraft artillery capability was further supplemented by surface-to-air missiles. ^(U) a. JC3 Air Operations Study Group — Joint Chiefs of Staff, Factors Affect: inn- Combat Air Qperatlor.s and Aircraft Losses in So utheast A.-rla (o), i.ovember 19o6, TOP SKCKKT/NQFOHN . b. Night Song Study Group — Joint Chiefs of Staff, Might Sonp; Report (U), Volumes I and II » 30 March 1967, TOP SECRET/ NOFOHM . c. V/SEG/IDA Study — Analysis of Combat Aircraft Losse:^ in Southeast Asia (0), IjA Report H-l^Q, l/SEG Report 12b, dated April 196H. NOFORN 9 NOFORN (SNP) The SA-2 was initially used In combat In July 1965. Since that time there has been a steady buildup of prepared sites to a level of 235 sites by the end of July 1967. It shoulvd be noted that these are not occupied sites but that ■approximately 25 SAM battalions move between these sites on a scheduled (but nonpredlc table) basis. The heaviest concen- tration of these sites has been in the Hanoi-Haiphong Area, but strategic location of sites near the DMZ and in Route Package V have also been employed by the Morth Vietnamese to protect these areas. (SNF) The enemy fighter inventory consisting of various versions of the MIG-17 and MIG-21 has remained relatively con- stant during the past two years at a level of approximately 50-60 MIG-17S ani 15-20 MIG-21s. As previously mentioned, this is in sharp contrast to the Korean War when the North Koreans had a force of approximately 500 MIG-15 fightors. Since the beginning of 1967, a large part of the MIG-17 inventory has been stationed outside of North Vietnam, Similarly, 50-60 percent of- the MIG-21 force has been moved out of North Vietnam since September 1967. These moves appear to be related to U.S. strike forces bonibing North Vietnair.ese airfields. As will be discussed in the MIG tactics section, there has been an observed change in North Vietnamese control procedures in that fewer aircraft are up at any one time but are controlled in a more selective manner and appear to attack only when they think they have an advantage. As a result, they have been more effective. A description of enemy aircraft and ordnance Is given in Appendix B. (S) The GCI system employed to control MIG aircraft is a manual system. However, control procedures have been achieving a reasonable degree of sophistication as evidenced by the simultaneous employment of AAA, SAMs and t4IGs in an integrated fashion. This represents a significant change from the early days of the air war when presence of MIGs would 10 Indicate an absence 'of SAMs and vice-versa. The effectiveness of the GCI system Is evidenced by the fact that t4IG Inter- ceptors contact U.S. aircraft during cloudy as well as clear ' weather and approach in a manner Indicative of radar-initiated Intercept, (S) The radar order-of-battle (ROB) in North Vietnam consists of a diversified surveillance net and fire control radars. As of early August 1967, more than ^00 sets have been Identified .1n North Vietnam Including over 200 early- warning CiCI radars, 17b AAA fire control radars, and approxi- mately 25 FAHSOMG-B missile control radars.^ The radar deployment both in terms of numbers of equipments and the wide frequency diversity is particularly impressive. While ECW has been extensively employed by the U.S. to degrade the effectiveness of the North Vietnamese surveillance net and weapon control radars, the jamming effort has not been able to deny the combined radar net the capability of maintaining an accurate track of .penetrating flisl^-ts. Thus, succ.ess-fu'l QCI operations are at this time well within, the "capability of the North Vietnamese air defense ^system. MIG Tactics (S) In general MIGs rely on GCI to position them close to the target before the pilot takes over the Intercept. ^ Firing is usually accomplished visually although it is possi- ble for some MIG-21 aircraft to fire without visual reference. Soviet training manuals indicate that they favor a two-ship element with the wingman flying about 5000 ft to the rear and 50 degrees off the leader's wing. Three types of intercepts* are practiced, pursuit curve, parallel course attack, and lead cut-off attack. MU) Source: Defense Intelligence Agency, 9 August 1967. 2(U) 8th Tactical Fighter V/lng, Tactical Doctrine , DCO-67-S- 01070, 1 March 1967, SECRL:t. (S) The pursuit curve is used with a track crossing angle of 30 degrees and a closing velocity of 100 knots. In a typical GCl approach profile the MIG-21 fighter Is vectored at about a 30 degree angle from the rear of the target so that visual detection may take place through the glass or. the side of the canopy as the fighter approaches the target at a closing rate of about 50 to 100 knots. (S) The narallel course attack is a displacement to the side of the target and on the opposite heading, and at the proper time the OCI controller turns the KIO into the target for a tall attack. According to the Soviets, if an Intercept la attempted by a MIG-21 on a counter heading, that is. a head- on engagement, visual detection is nearly impossible due to forward visibility restrictions. (S) The lead cut-off attack Is similar to rejoining aircraft Into the formation by leading and cutting off to the inside of the aircraft under attack. (S)- The MIO has pritaarily been committed to low and medium altitude attacks against U.S. strike forces. However, attacks have been made against EB-66 aircraft at 30,000 feet (particularly by the MIG-21). The hostile GCI environment within which U.S. aircraft are forced to operate gives the MIG the definite advantage and places stringent demands on visual scan. (S) When attacking a maneuvering target the Soviets first recommend use of the IH missile. ^ They train their crews to overlead the target and reduce g loading to permissible launch parameters. If a missile attack cannot be accomplished cannon may be used although only 60 rounds of ammunition are carried. A normal pursuit curve is used when attacking a maneuvering inn Ho 388th Tactical Fighter Wing, Combat Tactics and Tech- niques; DOA-67-033il, 22 August 1967, SrXHET. tareet. A desired firing ranee for cannon is under 2000 feet, howevsr. firlne can be expected as far out as 3300 feet. (S) The maneaverlng advantage of the Mia-21 relative to the F-105 is exploited by defensive tactics against the P_105. If normal acceleration can first gain the tCG separa- tion, this Will be followed by a vector to a position advantage. Further, a climbins hi5h-g turn is reccmended if a speed surplus exists. Alternatively . it can be a diving high-g turn for a low position. This high-g turn is considered by the Soviets to be the BIC-21's best defense against the mis- slles or guns of the P-105. (S) Another tactic encountered during the middle part of 1967 was the so-called "wagon wheel" employed by MIG-17 aircraft.' During this period larger flights of aircraft (per- ' haps 8 to 10 in number) were common. The tactic was utilized When these flights encountered U.S. aircraft and ^"-^-^J descent to low altitude and the setting up of a wide circular pattern. Because the HIGs were spread out around the circum- ference It was difficult for U.S. aircraft (e.g.. the to make an attack on any single MIG without coming under attack from a trailing MIG. In addition, the low altitude used precluded the F-4 fron. obtaining either a radar lock due to the proximity of the ground, or a good IR source due to «>ackground IR radiation. Thus, the combination of low altitude ana highly maneuvering targets negated effective launch of U.S. missiles. ZiU tt F-^ wa.- continually able to reposition for attack under these Situations by yo-yoing in and out of the wagon wheel, in- sufficient time was available to permit an attack. Ofoen a single HIG-17 was seen in the area, and it was hypothesized by U.S. pilots that this was a l^ad or director aircraft. l(U) See Volume III of this report. (S) Experience has shown' that the r4IGs do not engage unless they think they have an advantage (i.e., they chose when and where to engage). They have been observc-d to rur. rather than engage the P-^IC, .however, they are generally airborne any time strike fighters are in the area. Jus^. because MIGs are airborne is no assurance that the enemy will or will not use SAM and AAA defenses simultaneously. If the MIG force is outnumbered they may be ordered to disengage. When they disengage U.S. aircraft must be alert for concentrated AAA and SAM defense. (S) There has been increasing evidence of changes In MIG fighter tactics since August 1967 which have resulted In increased U.S. losses. i During the period of the study the North Vietnamese Air Force attempted a high volume. of inter- cepts and indulged in dogflghting in the congested air space within the 30-mile circle around Hanoi. This complicated " their intercept problems and GCI control training. The more recent success. level appears to be largely a result of fewer MIGs being handled at any one tirr.e by controllers of increased skill level. This change in operating procedure represents a critical element of NVN air defense capability. The combina- tion of increased skill level of the controllers and their control of fewer aircraft is one of the major factors which have made the hit-and-run tactic of MIG-21s on P-lOSs as successful as they have been in the latter months of 1967. Typically, a high speed (usually supersonic) deLcending pass is made against trailing or isolated U.3. flights and when the MIG-21S make visual acquisition and reach missile range they have both the speed and position advantage. In addition they are also positioned for sa fe high speed withdrawal. ^U) Sources: a. Hq. PACAP, TACS.VAL 5u lie tin . Movember I967, SECRET b. Hq. PACAF, TAClriVAL ?;ulletin . December 1967, SECRET* c^.™^^^ '^-Q^3^Z liov, 1967; PADA? Bulletin No. Hq , d. CIMCPACAF r^sg: 050.32i000) maps of North Vietnam with transluscent overlays were used during the interviews to record the geometry of the engagement. Including flight paths of both U.S. and enemy air- craft. It was found that the landmarks identified on the maps frequently aided the interviewee in reconstructing the engagement. Data Reduction (U) The information obtained from the interviews along with with data from the official reporting channels was then utilized by the project staff to reconstruct the events in detail. This made It possible to resolve conflicts in the data by using those data elements consistent with a logical development of the event. (U) General Interest in the collected data expressed by the Services, airframe and missile contractors as well as stuc^y and analysis institutions influenced the decision to publish the reconstructed events separate from the analysis. Each event was identified only by a nurrber and aircrew or official call signs v/ere not used. Anonymity of the interviewees was assured during the Interviews to permit greatest possible freedom of comment and criticism. The data for F-^ and P-8 events through I March 196 7 have been published as Volume I of this report, and the remalnlnf; data will be published In Volumes II and III. ^ (U) To Insure that the large data base could be effl- •^lently utilized, an automated Event Index wa s developed. The Index contained data sufficient to categorize each event and to permit rapid Identification of specific events for analyses. Analysis (U) The data oollc>cted v/ere analyzed using two Independent approaches: a quantitative analysis which examined the air- to-air engagements by separate phases, quantified the key param- eters influencing each phase, and analyzed these across the spectrum of all events; and a qualitative analysis which examined each event as an entity. Thus, the qualitative analysis ex- amined the Interaction betvreen the defined combat phases as well as other nonquantlfiable factors, for example, enemy mistakes . (C) The quantitative analysis examined the Identifiable phases of alr-to-alr combat. The flow chart in Figure II-l Indicates their relationship to each other. The engagement always begins at the acqu isiti on and identification phases. Since no knowledge was available concerning these first phases from the enemy's point of view, only U.S. actions can be re- corded. The following phases, hov/ever, may be described as either U.S. or enemy actions and include challenge, attack, position to fire, firing, damage and separation phase. In any given alr-to-alr engagement the action flow may recycle to either U.S. action or enemy action or to any other phase until finally one or both combatants terminate the engagement. (U) The phas-:3 as listed above are defined as follows: » Acquisition. The radar or visual detection of an aircraft (or evidence thereof, i.e., contrail). SIARTj START •< VISUAL ^ O U.S. ENEMY I U.S. MANEUVW '■"^ TOWARD tNtMY U.S. ATTACK BYPASS ACHIEVt VM POsniON NONI NON- PATAi INIMY KILUO U.S. AtXCRAPT ACTION FlOW^ ENEMY AIRCRAFT ACTION. FLOW, / ENEMY ACHIEVE FIRE rosnioN MANCUVIR TOWAKD U.S. -*> EN£M> AIIACK FIRE RECYCLE t U.S. INITIATE 1 + lOtMINATION I .1 _ ^ TERMINATION LOST CONTACT i U.S. LOST U.S. DAMACEO I I I M .4. I I I '4 I I ENEMY INITIATE / FIGURE IM (S). Encounter Flow Chart (U) c3> 0'Ci3»-€jS> ci> o -o o a> C2» c:^ o i22> o o • Identification , The definite determination of identity of the aircraft acquired, • Challenre . The portion of the engatjement where one participant takes the first aggressive action that can be discerned by his opponent. 9 Attack . The phase of maneuvering to achieve tactical advantage. ♦ Position to Fire . The period of maneuver necessary to place the opponent in the firing envelope of the weapon to be used. • Fire . The period of ordnance expenditure (for U.S. air- craft this included attempts at ordnance expenditure). » Damage . The results of the firing phase. Damage was classified as none, damage, or kill and further classified as possible, probable, or confirmed, • Separation . The termination phase of an engagement which ends in loss of contact. (U) The concurrent but Independent qualitative analysis phase was conducted for each event as an entity. This approach was used so that many important factors, not readily quantifiable, would not be overlooked. The analyses were conducted by. panels of experts in the field of aircraft, avionics, and alr-to-alr weapons design (missiles) together with a qualified fighter pilot. The panel moderator, who was a member of the project staff, guided the efforts of the panel. For each event, all factors in the engagement v/hlch Influenced the final outcome were studied and identified. After the panel reached agreement on the relevant factors, the research and development impli- cations represented by the factors were identified. In some aa&es these Implications were identified as assets of the current weapons system, rather than RiD problems. These were also documented in order that the desirable characteristics of current weapons systems be incorporated or improved in future weapon systems design. This precaution was taken to prevent "designing out" of new systems those characteristics proven advantageous in combat. (U) The frequency of occurrence of the R&D problems is not UKCLAS necessarily a measure of Importance as related to success In air-to-alr con*at. To aid In establishing the significance of R4D problems Identified by the qualitative analysis, the re- sult, of the independent quantitative analyses were Thlre the results of the quantitative and qualUat ve analyses were mutually corroborative, strong emphasis was given to the R&D problem so Identified. Those R4D problems not supported by the detailed analyses of each phase were then considered separately and given less emphasis. Definitions ..4..„„-i_ („) TO establish a consistent nomenclature for categori- zation of the data, several definitions were developed. The, are presented here and are used throughout the analysis: .Aa^ is a ^--lP,^;;??,?^,%f run?t nl'lZ Purpo^es^" rf-^doruSenfarior Te^eil'Lllll, involves the action Of one flight. . . v,^ .v, V ^ ^- n 1-1 ne continuous sequence during whlcn >An_ encounter a ^t;'^'^ he-omes aware of one or i[t"least one ^^^^"^1^. ^^^^^f ' ^d^atlL^ts to maintain more possible Vnem! The encounter encounters. .An en'a A Dir^est Gf the Sriorinr, on the Ar.vilpic af the Korean Air V.'ar , University of Chicago, May 13, 19b^ Formerly ProlJect CHORE, COHFIDHIJTIAL. ! 32 VI 3-18-^-17 FIGURE tll-A3 (C). Clock PosiMon of MIG-15 from F-86 (U) parameters of the two wars. U.S. pilots in Korea launched di- rectly for MIG Alley to seek out and destroy MIGs. Allied and Communist air forces used GCI radar. Altitudes at acquisition were generally 30,000 to ^10, ODD -feet, and ground fire was not a factor. By contrast, in SEA MIG aircraft were vectored for intercept by a very efficient" GCI system while U.S. pilots had to rely primarily on visual acquisition. Also, U.S. fighter missions analysed in this study were .T.alnly defensive and were ® FORWARD QUADRANT UFT REAR @ FIGHTER CENTERED COORDINATES INDIVIDUAL ACQUISITIONS 3Y CLOCK POSITION AND RANGE 0TOTAL ACQUISITIONS BY QUADRANT VISUAL RADAR e RIGHT TOTAL EVENTS 58 3-18-68-18 FIGURE 1II-A4 (S). F-4, F-8 Initial Acquisitions Versus Rcnge by Event, 1 April 1965 to 1 August 1967 (U) flown in a sophisticated MIc;. SAM and AAA environment where altitude was chosen as a compromise between the various hazards The. MIC force encountered in SEA was substantially smaller than that encountered in Korea (pp 8-10). (S) Figure III-Al is a plot of Initial P-^, P-8 acquisi- tions by clock position and range in 58 cases, both visual and radar. All radar acquisitions were made by F-^t aircraft. The P-8 radar v/as normally in standby because of the magnitude of ground clutter at the low altitudes flown, and the necessity in thp single-place aircraft for a continuous visual lookout. The sample is smaller than that shown in Figure III-A3 because for some acquisitions only the clock position was reported. Radar acquisitions were all beyond 10 miles and visual acquisi- tions "l^ss than 10 miles (except for several detections of contrails at 20 miles and over). (S) Figure riI-A5 displays the distribution by clock position of a total of 121 initial and subsequent acqulsitionc by- F-4 anH F-8 aircraft. A chi-squaro test shcv;ed that no quadrant had a statistically greater percentage of acquisitions than any other quadrant for the size of the sample. (S) Figure III-A6 illustrates both initial acquisitions and subsequent acquis itiuns which followed initial radar ac- quisitions. Note in particular that once an enemy v;as ini- tially acquired visually there were no subsequent radar acqulsl tions (Figure III-A7). Radar lock-ons during maneuver to fire are not acquisitions. Note also the random cluster of acquisi- tions Inside ^1 miles of range for both figures. (S) P-^, F-8 initial acquisitions for which range data were available are plotted in Figure III-8. The median range Is approximately 3 miles. For all acquisitions, initial and subsequent, the median range is about 2 miles. Since most acquisitions were visual and ranees were usually estimated 35 3-18-68-19 |f FIGURE III-A5 (S). F-4, F-8 Visual Acquisitions by Encounter 1 April 1 965 to 1 August 1 967 (U ) j ■ . ■ • [ without the aid of radar, the initial acquisitions have been plotted by range increments in Figure III-A9. The greatest: number, 15 visual acquisitions, were in ths 0 to 1 mile range increment. Compare this with Figure III-AIO, a similar graijh for the Korean War, The graph of P-86 sightings versus range Increments reveals zero detections inside tv:o miles and the | greatest number of acquisitions were between ^ and 10 mllesi FIGURE III-A6 (S), F-4, F-3 Acquisitions Versus Range Commencing with Initial R-'dor Acquisition, 1 April 1965 Through 1 August 1967 (U) 37 FIGURE III-A7 (S). F-8 Acquisitions Versus Range Commencing with Initial Visual Acquisition, 1 April 1965 Through \ August 1967 (U) 12 10 z o i 8 o —I < 6 Z lb o s ^ I I tOHM VISUAL n) 10 & OVER FIGURE III-A9 (S). F-4, F-8 Initial Acquisitions Versus Range 1 April l'/65 to 1 August 1967 (U) 30 3 . o z ro *liHlilw»« for Air Weapon* RtMfdch, F'36 Vtrjut MIG- 15, A Oigeit of th« * Briefing oo tVt Analjriii of ih« Korcon Air War, U'tivtMity of Chicag'), Ma^ 19, - Formerly Proi*rl CHORE, CONfiOCNTIAU 39 0-1 I -2 2-4 4-10 RANGE INCREMENTS (ihIIm) I0& OVER FIGURE lil-AIO(C). Extreme Ranges Between F-86 and MIG-15 76 Sighting Reports (U) initial acquisition was about two miles, the same as for P-^l and P-8 aircraft. Decoys (S) An investigation of possible enemy tactics was made to determine whether they could have been using decoy aircraft to draw the attention of U.S. pilots to the forward quadrant to mask an almost simultaneous attack from the rear. An anal- ysis of 78 F-^, P-8 events between 1 April 1965 and 1 March 1967 failed to confirm this tactic. Evidence strongly indi- cated that there was a simultaneous vectoring of multiple MIG aircraft on a single flight of U.S. aircraft with each enemy intent on conduct Ing an attack. Events 26, 37, and 39 of Volume I are examples which illustrate this tactic. '13 FOKWMO QUAOKANT (38^ ltfT(3<> TOTAL I3S EVENTS (n) total acquisitions aVCUAORANT INITIAL ACQUISITION • TOTAL ACQUISITION BY QUADRANT @*IGHT FIGURE I a -A 11 (S). Ranges and Bearings of F-105 IniHal Acquisitions (U) Identi f Icatlon (S) Identification range was available for almost every event in which acquisition data were available. The identifi- cation range was the same as acquisition range in about two- thirds of the encounters. In other words, at the close ranges of detection, identification occurred simultaneously. A cor- relation between long-range identification and the ultimate success of an engagement was soug.'it, but from the sparse data available wherein long-range identification took place, no correlation could be found. (S) Identification means included color (MICs were usu- ally a distinctive silver metallic color, occasionally camou- flaged), silhouette, and the sighting of missiles or bullets being fired by an aircraft. In at least two cases the color of contrails v/as used to Identify MIGs. In many cases, how- ever, the specific means of identification was not or could not be recalled by the pilot and thus an inadequate sample was available .for analysis. (S) The full value of a long-range identification capa- bility could not be fully discerned from the quantitative re- sults of the air-to-air engagements, U.S, aircrews encountered several difficulties that were either caused or aggravated by lack of a long-range identification capability. First, there was no complete record of false alarms in the SEA area. Pilots Intercepted -bogies only to find they were friendlles and these were not reported via official channels, although these false alarms were mentioned in pilot interviews conducted by the RED BARON team. Thus, these events could not be analyzed due to the inadequacy of data but the time and fuel wasted by these unnecessary diversions must have been* considerable. When the identification proved the bogey to be hostile, the uncertainty in the initial phase of the pass created new probli ns, i.e., speed may have been too great to jettison some external stores, handicapping the acceleration, maneuverability and weapons Choice available to the U.S. aircraft. In some cases it was necessary for the U.S. aircraft to pass entirely throuch is weapons envelope to .a.e visual identification at a -"Sejoo close to employ Its weapons. This placed a require:nent on he U.S. aircraft to achieve separation (sometimes by deceleration) With all the difficulties and dangers Involved J ^J^^J ver A dlscu3Slon of the effect of short range identification on the success of an alr-to-alr encounter is discussed fron. a qualitative approach In Section IV. Section tll-8 ATTACK PHASE A. SUMMARY l^y^) The not critical air-MO-air requirement was to achieve a position to fire first. h (S) The importance of firing first can be seen in that for the 209 encounters studied, i n only four ease s did an^air^ craft attacked firs t by another aircraft rianage to destroy the attacking aircraft. It is of some interest that in all four 5r^hese encounters it was the U.S. aircraft that accomplished the conversion. (S) U.S. P-^l and F-8 aircraft were successful in achiev- ing a position to fire first approximately 95 perce nt of the (/time v;hen the enemy aircraft was detected befor e passing to the rear quadrant . (S) The enemy was able to attain a position in the rear quadrant before detection in approximately 25 percent of the encounters analyzed. (S) V/hen the enemy attained a rear quadrant position ^ before detection , the enemy fired first approximately 90 per- cent of the time. ^ (S) The success rate of U.S. first firing pass was 27 percent. (S) The enemy success rate for first firing pass was 13 percent . B. OBJECTIVE (C) The primary objective of -his section ::as to deterr.iine whether the relative position 'of the combatants when aerial combat began* had a significant effect upon the outcome, C. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE Background (C) Proper Interpretation of the numerical results de- tailed in this section requires an understanding of the envi- ronment In which the events occurred. During the time period covered by this analysis the enemy had a capability to main- tain an essentially continuous track of the location and alti- tude of U.S. aircraft from ground stations. This capability was used to conduct ground controlled intercepts (GCI). (C) The U.S. aircrews, essentially unaided, were tasked with: • Detecting the presence of other aircraft. •Making visual Identification of the other aircraft. • Maneuvering to attack hostile aircraft while avoid- ing attack upon themselyes or the aircraft they were protecting. Scope (U) This section analyzes the results of P-8 and F-^l aircraft against enemy jet aircraft from April 1965 to 1 Au- gust 1967. (S) With few exceptions almost all these encounters began ^(U) More explicitly, the relative positions of the two comba- tants are recorded at the point in time when the U.S. aircraft detected the enemy aircraft. In many encounters the enemy aircraft (with the aid of GCI) were av.-are of the position of the U.S. aircraft and had already started their approach and attack maneuver undetected. In some events the first Indi- cations of enemy aircraft v/as enemy ^ fire. Therefore, it is obvious that the relative positions* of the combatants at the point. in time when the enemy initiated the engasement, though unknown, was different than the recorded position. This is an important distinction when interprotinr? the results that follow. kG when the aircraft were flying CAP and escort missions. This differs In many respects from F-105 encounters most of which were initiated at various stages of a strike mission. On these missions the P-105s were instructed not to react to the pres- ence of MIGs unless under imminent threat. D. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS^ Measures of Success (S) Fnemy kills ftr.d U.S, losses vrere examined as a poten- tial measure of success for the attack phase. However » this measure is the compound result of achieving a position to em- ploy weapons and the effectiveness of the weapons employed. The results of weapons fire for both participants were variable and uncorrelatcd to initial combat conditions. This measure had to be discarded since weapon performance effectively ob- scured any determination of the effect of initial conditions on the outcome of the maneuver-to-fire phase of the attack. .(S) Examination of the results (see Figure III-Bl) re- vealed that 75 percent, of MIG kills by U.S. F-^ and F-8 air- craft occurred on the first attack. Furthermore, seven out of eight U.S. losses occurred on the enemy's first firing pass, rrhis result implied that achieving a position to attack (fire) first was probably the most reasonable measure of success for the maneuver phase of the attack. Data Base (S) The events described in Volumes I and III were exam- ined to identify all encounters v/here there was an apparent attempt by one or both particpants to engage the other aircraft. Examination revealed that approximately one out of four encoun- ters terminated or aborted without either partlcpant discharg- ing weapons. The reasons for enemy-initiated termination were not always discernible. V/here the U.S. aircraft initiated the disengasement it v;as primarily for reasons unrelated to the r^UMBER OF FIWNC ENGAGEMENTS gQ9 3-18-68-8 U.S. FIRED FIRST 154 (75%) ENEMY FIRED FIRST 55 (25%) U.S. KILLS ON FIRST FIRING PASS 41 (27%) U.S. MISSES ON j FIRST FIRING PASSJ^ 113(73%) I r U.S. LOSSES ON FIRST FIRING PASS 7(13%) U.S. KILLS ON SUBSEQUENT FIRING PASS 15 G ENEMY MISSES On] -HFiRST FIRING PASS-** 48{87«;'o) j U.S. LOSSES ON SUBSEQUENT FIRING PASS 1 ■ FIGURE ni-Bl (5). Results of Engagements in Attack Phase Analysis (U) potential outcome, e.g.. returning to escort position rather than continuing to chase a KIG element that had turned away, etc.. (see Section III-D) . Any attempt to evaluate the poten- tial'outcome of these encounters would be pure conjecture and they were consequently not Included in the subsequent analy- ses. The encounters Included (1) the U.S. aircraft attempted to fire its weapons, and (2) the enemy aircraft was observed to fire its weapons. It is recognized that there probably vere instances where the enemy achieved a firing position and even fired its weapons without" being obse -ed. This might give a slight upward bias to the ratio of U.S. enemy firing attempts. (S) Initially this sample of engagements was restricted to include only those engagements for which the following in- formation was available at acquisition: .^'U.S. aircraft type ^-Hostile aircraft type ^^^^cquisition range ^•''Acquisition clock position ^Hostile altitude ^✓^^Friendly relative altitude ^^Tlme of day Stage of war Method of acquisition and identification. (S) This selection was based primarily on availatLillty of data. Other equally or more important factors such as cross- in g angles , attitude., sun positio n, m aneuver sequence , etc., were not available on all engagements with the desired accura-- cy. One hundred and nineteen engagements met the above cri- teria and were analyzed to determine which of the prior se- lected factors, if any, influenced the outcome. It was deter- mined that on this subset of encounters, four faetoi^ip correlated with_5Jie results in a complex wa y — en emy airc raft type ^ "qu^dnant, re lative altitud e, and a cquisition rang e. f^(The latter two factors, while statistically significant, had / a small effect upon results compared to quadrant). No signi- ficant statistical difference was noted between the results (achieved by the different U.S. aircraft types, when adjusted for relative starting position. No significant difference could be detected among the three nonrear quadrants. Accord- ingly, the data base v;as reexamined to identify all engagements that could be categorized with respect to the following factors ^U.S. aircraft type •^ostile aircraft type J,Ac,uisltion range { ff " <^^cqulsltion quadrant Relative altitude Rear quadrant All others 0 + 2000 feet = coaltitude Altitude difference >2000 feet « unequal altitude Numerical Results (C) The results of the 209 engagements for each of the factors listed In the data base are presented in Figure III-B2 and Figure III-B3, and Table IIl-Bl and Table III-B2. Interpretation of Numerical Results Acquisition in Other Than Rear Quadrants (S) The performance of U.S. aircraft, combined with the skill and tactics employed by U.S. aircrews versus the enemy aircraft/crew combinations, resulted in a 111/8 advantage against the Mia-17 and 36/1 advantage against the MIG-21. This result indicates that under the prevt?illng conditiony, t imel y f position information of the enemy c\i:-;raft was the single most significant requirement to enable U.ii. aircrews to achieve a position to fire first. (S) However, reference to Figure III-Bl indicates that only iil of 15^ or 27 percent of U.S. first attacks resulted a MIG kill, improvement in U.S. weapons or weapon de- livery capability would result in an appreciable number of MIG kills for these acquisition conditlom>. Acquisition in Rear Quadrant (S) The implications of the observed results, when the enemy is detected in the rear quadrant, are more serious and more complex. There are three numerical ratios to be examined: The relative frequency of attaining a first firing ( position when the enemy is not detected until posi- tioned in the rear quadrant. The effectiveness cf the ener.y's weapon system in / utilizing the first firing opportunity. COALTITUDE (±2000 n ) 3-1B-68-9 UNEQUAL ALTITUDE OIFFCRENCE(>2000FT) 2 N Ml RANGE FIGURE III-B2 (S). Ratio of U.S. to MIG-17 First Firings for Different Acquisition Ccnditions (U) COALTITUDt (±2000 FT) U.S.; 8 MIG: 0 3-I8-6B-10 2 N Ml RANGE UNEQUAL ALTITUDE DIFFERENCE ( > 20C0 H ) U.S.: 13 MIG: 1 FIGURE 11I-B3 (S). Ratio of U.S. to MIG-21 First Firings for Different Acquisition Conditions (U) T.hle 111-81 (S) RATIO OF U.S. AIRCRAFT/MIG-17 FIRST ATTACKS ■ AS A FUNCTION OF INITIAL POSITION AT ACQUISITION (U) ••tlo * BltiO ftitio f-t. 'NI6-I7 Teui U. Ouidrint Other Outdnntt B««r Ou4dr«iit Ciiidrtnt Other Ou^irmti Re2 • mi '0 °'„ Ooo^w* 1 Alt. 01 r. »t00Q ft Clot* >2 n at ''. lOTAL "'s 'J 4-Z9-48-3 • The relative frequency of rear acquisitions to all acquisitions. ^(U) The third item includes the results of Section III-A, but will be discussed herein, .. -^i (S) -The enemy, when not detected until he positioned himself in the rear quadrant, usually succeeded in making the first attack. The enemy success ratio in attaining a position to fire first under these circumstances was 37/2 for the MIG- 17 and 9/5 for the MIG-21. The possibility of significantly affecting this result appears negligible. The short ranges of detection in this quadrant indicate that the MIG was within a few seconds of a- firing position and in several cases he was already firing. The previous statements are made in relation to the enemy's current weapons capability. If and when the enemy increases the range of his weapon system to ? to li miles, there would be no time interval at all for evasion before the attack. (S) The second item relating to the effectiveness of the enemy's attack has two aspects. First, the success ratio of the enemy's first attack was approximately 13 percent. Tacti( or equipment that would degrade this limited effectiveness or CoaUi tude + 2000 ft Unequal Alt. Dif. >2000 ft CI ose <7. n ml Distant >2 n ml Close <2 n mi Distant >2 n mi TOTAL Total U.S.3/MIG-21 Rear Quadrant v; other Quadrants 8 13/ * 36 •This result includes one - J.^^^-^,,,,*" against the MIG-21 are for the F-4C ai reran. at least counterbalance the enemy's attempts to Increase the effectiveness of his firing attempts could reduce or prevent an increase in U.S. losses. .(S) The slsnlflcanoe of rear acquisition Is apparent, in 25 percent of the encounters the enemy managed to position in the rear quadrant before detection. In most events this was not a chance phenomenon but appeared to be the result of ground controlled Intercepts. A study of Intercept patterns indicates that many enemy aircraft must have passed through other quadrants where they were at least theoretically visible but went undetected. The short range of most of the acquisi- tions indicated In the previous section of this report make it quite clear that, under prevailing operating conditions, a MIG can pass through the detection ran^e of 3 to 10 miles with som. positive orcbabllity (higher than desired) and then turn into the roar quadrant for hi= attack run undetected. Since, (S) However, there is a more alarming aspect to the data. The frequency of encounters in which the enemy has successfully attained the rear-quadrant position undetected is probably be- low the potential achievable for forces with a GCI capability acainst penetrating aircraft dependent on visual detection. If it may be presumed that the enemy wore still in the early part of his learning curve, then an increase in the relative frequency of this type of attack could be expected which would seriously reduce the observed U.S. superiority unless timely and adequate countermeasures are introduced. The seriousness of this is illustrated in Figure III-B^I and Figure III-B5. For example, reference is made to Figure III-B5 for the MIG-21. Point (A) indicates the ratio of U.S. (F-VF-8) to MIG-21 kills over the study period. If more effective utilization of GCI permitted the enemy to position in the rear quadrant before detection, in one-half the encounters the kill ratio would change to that shown in Point (D), other things being equal. AlRo z roint not to be reelected Is that an increase in enemy weapon delivery capability to equal the U.S. capability would further reduce this ratio to Point (E) . E. CONCLUSIONS (S) U.S. aircraft attained a position to fire first on the enemy aircraft in 95 percent of the engagements when the enemy aircraft did not attain a close-in, rear quadrant posi- tion before detection. (S) Unaided visual search and existing AI radar were un- able to prevent enemy aircraft from an unobserved approach to the rear quadrant of the U.S. aircraft in 25 percent of the engagements. (S) Real-time position and direction information of enemy aircraft would reduce the frequency of undetected rear quadrant attacks. (S) If the undetected rear quadrant attacks could have been prevented, the U.S. to ene», success ratio would have been significantly higher. ' (S) The relative advantage of U.S. to enemy air-to-air weapons in these encounters was approximately two to one A large nu-nber of the U.S. attacks that did not succeed can be a«rlhuted to the low reliability of some U.S. weapons and the limitations of these weapons In a Mo..-1n , Z ^^^^, vlrorment. (These latter points are more explicitly set in the* following section.) Section lll-C FIRING PHASE, DAMAGE PHASE A. SUMMARY (S) Each of the air-to-air engagements of the period April 1965 to 1 August 1967 was examined to determine the spe- cific' results of the ordnance expended. Additional material for the period August 196? to 3 January I968 Is included where applicable. All results were examined on a firing attempt basis where an attempt is defined as a trigger squeeze, (S) The following conclu?ions were reached. • The AIH-9D (SIDEV/INDER) has ' shovm a signifi- cantly better target-hit performance than any other r.issile system. • The boreslght mode of firing the Air4-7D and AIM-7E (SPARROW) was not successful in the dogfight conditions of the present air war. • SIDEV/INDER (AIM-9B, Air4-9D) failure rates are decreasing while SPARROW (AIM-7E) failure rates are not decreasing. • The data do not provide a measurable difference in the effectiveness of Navy and Air Force use of the AIM-7 and AIH-9B missiles. • In view of the high percentage of missiles fired out-of-envelope, the pilots need either more training, an improved on-board indication of the envelope, and/or a larger margin of error as provided by a larger envelope. • The hit-to-f Iring attempt ratio v:hen combined for all missiles reached a value of 12 percent (as of 3 January 1968} and was in a downward trend. • Missiles and i;uns showed essentially the same effectiveness in terms of kills per firing attempt. "0 25 30 75 100 PERCENT OF ACQUISITIONS IN REAR QUADRANT FIGURE III-B4 (S). Estimoted Kill Ratio for Different Levels of Enemy Copability -MIG-17 (U) 0 23 50 75 ICO PERCENT OF ACQUISITIONS IN REAR QUADRANT 3-18-AB-12 FIGURE 111-65 (S). Estimated Kill Ratio for Different Levels of Enemy Copobility -MIG-21 (U) when the MIG Is detected prior to this' turn, U.S. elements have demonstrated a high degree of success in the ensuing en- counter, it is obvious that if a real-time position and direc- tion information on the enemy elements were made available to the U.S. aircrev:s, other things being; equal, the enemy MIGs would seldom attain a favorable combat position. B. OBJECTIVE (C) The objective of this section was to categorize the results of air-to-air ordnance firing attempts and to deter- mine those significant categories and trends of interest to the R&D community. C. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE (C) The following sources of data were available to Pro- ject RED BARON: • Aircrew interviews • OPREPS^ • PMSAEG forms 2 • USAP missile firing reports (since May 1967) • USAF supplementary OPREPS (since May 1967). All available data were screened to identify all attempts to expend ordnance. The more valuable sources of data were the aircrew interviews, the USAF missile firin? reports, and the USAF supplementary OPREPS : In general, the data available from OPREPS were not sufflclontly detailed to determine firing parameters. In addition, the OPREPS do not list all missile firing attempts. (C) All of the data sources listed above were based on the aircrew's description of the ordnance expenditure. Since no other sensors recorded these data, it follows that although specific quantities are derived from the reports, they are subject to some inexactness. These limitations have been rec- ognized and have been taken into account when defining the re- sults categories and when computing the various ratios and trends which follow. It is not felt tnat the inherent inexact, ness in any way negates any of the conclusions. ^(U) Joint Chiefs of Staff Operational Reporting System. ^(U) Fleet Missile System Analysis and aluatlon Group. (C) This section identifies and discusses the var^lous ^ categories of results in terms of all attempts by the p-ilot to expend rrdnance; that is, each trigger squeeze is a flr|ing at- ; tempt. The analysis covers a discussion of the total ^^tempts to expend ordnance in order to identify results relatedjj to all ^; elements of the weapon system (I.e., pilot, aircraft, and mis- sile). In general, discussion is made relative to total fir- j Ing attempts and the analysis has not addressed mlssll^) single- j shot kill probability or reliability ger se. Slngle-shjot kill { probability is a predictive measure (as opposed to a past de- | scriptlve measure) which , has limited use in light of the ob- jectives of this study. Therefore, the percentages pre;sented j in this section are not estimates of kill probability, i In 1 addition, no overall estimate of the reliability has b^en made ^ since the total number of missiles carried in all sortl|es and J the malfunctions found during pref light testing were no.t col- j lected as part of the data. For example, a gun's flrlrig his- , J tory prioi: to tiie air-to-air engageinenu is unknown and j it may i| have been used in an air-to-ground mode. Thus, reliability as j expressed by rounds between failures could not be assessed. j In the case of missiles, the data analyzed represent only those missiles which were attempted to be fired. Definition of Results Categories i; (C) An assessment of the air-to-air ordnance expenditures has been made and the results categorized. In several; respects the categories included here differ from those of a rai^ge test.' This is because it was not possible to determine why a missile, failed to guide or why a radar broke lock. On the other hand, many range test firings are (justifiably) considered "no test," Out-of-Envelope firings, for example. In this study the re- sults of each trigger squeeze have been placed in one of the r following 17 categories: | • Failed to Leave Aircraft : Results were recorded in thi3 category v;nsn a firing attempt was made 59 ( ■ 60 r ■ but the missile did not leave the aircraft. (This includes AIM-^^D ar.d AIM-9 No Motor Ignitions). Many of the reporting media overlook this category when making their standard reports. Included in this sub- division were tv;o firing attempts which failed be- cause the multiple ejection rack (MER) could not be Jettisoned to complete the enabling circuit on the forward missiles. No Motor Ignition (AIM-7) : Applicable to AIM-7 mis- siles which were successfully ejected from the air- craft but were not observed in powered flight. Even H though ejected, this category is considered as a pre- il ; launch failure. j." • flesults Unobserved : Results recorded here came from \\ two sources: ^\ Unobserved by crew, except when superseded by I' other sources. iJI ; Insufficient data available to permit reason- able assignment to any other category. The latter source accounts for only a small number if - * of firing attempts. The major cause was that the :! crew lost sight of the launched missile due to fj clouds or U.S. aircraft maneuvers. i! • - Desperation : Those missiles deliberately fired out ; ■ of parameters for tactical reasons are categorized _ -as fired in desperation. Inclusion in this category [ j required a pressing need to put the enemy on the • 1 defensive or to attempt to cause him to break off I , his attack on another aircraft. • Personnel Error : Personnel errors are limited to those firing attempts in which a missile was launched in spite of ind:' cations present that the missile could not function. For example: Firing an AIM-7 with the radar in search; that is, with the antenna sv/eeping Target aspect switch in head-on mode when attacking from the target's rear. Overriding circuit breaker to fire missile past centerline stores. • System Failures ; For missile systems, this category • is comprised of rare occurrences v/hich did not fit f * in any other place. They are: no ready light, ord- nance rack malfunction, radar malfunction, and me- chanical failure. In the tables which follow, the first tv/o groups are included in Failure to I;eave Aircraft while the others are li5~ed specifically. > listed sepa- discussion Out-of- Por gun systems. System Failures cover all occur- rences which prevented the firing of thefguns. Out Maneuvered: A missile was "out maneuvered" if there was a sTrong indication that the t^arget had exe^^uted a violent evasive maneuver after the "Jfssiie had left the aircraft. It was also necejssary that the missile had been launched within parameters and had begun to guide on the target. ! Out-o f-r.nvelcce ; Where applicable, an estimate of the kinematic launch envelope was made gased on the weapon type, the firing parameters of Jhe attacking aircraft, and the maneuver undertaken by the target. This cGUiilea v/ii;h thQ .^i^^^ar limit:, of tae missile determined if the missile could physically guide to an intercept. Not included in this category are those missiles which could be judged to | have been fired inside the minimum range of the missile. Xnsid« Mini mum Ra nge: Those out-of-envelope firing attempts wnicn v;ere clearly within the minimum range defined by the safety and arming ^-^^^^^^^^^^-^-^^^^^^ tions were categorized here. These are] rately in the tables but in all further they have been included in the category Envelope , Ra dars Broke Lock After T.aunch (AIM-7) . • All Instances of break-lo'ck are groupec here. The re 'as on s for break-lock were seldom available, !■ Illumination Interrupt (AlM-7) . Aircraft tactical maneuvers to avoid enemy attack may pull the radar antenna off the target with the resulting loss of guidance information for the missile. I Failure to Guide ; Those missiles which: failed to guide properly (including catastrophic [failures ) were summarized here. It should be observed tha^" In the case of the AIM-7 the failure to guide could be caused by a misaligned radar as i^rell as by a failure in the missile's guidance system. The data base contains seven engagements in which two or more AIM-7 missiles were fired by a specific aircraft and for which the only result was failure to guiae. The limits of the launch envelope (e.g., gilmbal angle limits on the AIM-9B) may cause some ambiguity as Out-of-Envelope firing resembles failure to guide. However, such results were listed as Out-of-Envelope . 9 Boresif rht Mode M iss (AIH-7) : This category is re- stricted to fWr-.-ls fired in the boresight mode; that is, with the radar antenna fixed and aligned with the centerline of the aircraft. In order for the and Missile Out Maneuvered. Therefore, the estimates for Des- peration, Missile Out Maneuvered, and Minimum Range must be considered lower bounds; the combination of Minimum Range and Out of Envelope is aloo a lower bound (Out of Envelope may con- tain some Minimum Ranges). While no general rule can be im- plied, in many cases results were categorized as Failure to Guide when the original data would not Justify placement In the above categories. However, if there were serious doubt, the result was listed as Unobserved. (S) V/hile enemy countermeasures could have caused re- sults v;hlch appear like False Detonations or Failure to Guide, there Is no evidence which Indicates the employment of ECM against the radar missiles or flares against the IR missiles. D. RESULTS (S) This section Is subdivided Into three parts: Sum- mary of Firlnrr Attempts, Gun Firing Attempts, and Missile Fir- ing Attempts. The gun subsection Is subdivided by aircraft type v;hlle the missile subsection Is subdivided by missile type and by major categories: Summary of Fir-'ng Attempts (S) A su.T.niary of the results of expenditures is given in Table III-Cl v/hich gives the total confirmed kills made by each f ighter/target/v;eapon com.bination. Enemy missile firings are not Identified by missile type due to the difficulty of Identi- fication. These results are presented for the time period April 1965 to 1 August 1967 and also through 3 January 1968, a period for which some additional ordnance expenditure data were avallabZe. (These additional data are limited In most respects but jo contain all the kills.) (S) Table III-Cl excludes the following categories of aircraft kills: Table III-C1 (S). RESULTS OF ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES CONFIRMED KILLS BY AIRCRAFT ORDHAHCE ONLY (U) April 1965-1 August 1967 Aoril 1965-3 January 1968 MIG-17 HIG-ZI MIG-17 MIG-21 Enemy Kills By: 1 F-8 Gun 3 0 0 AIH-9 8 9 1 F-48 1 AlH-7 2 0 3 AIH-9 1 0 1 2 F-4C/F-40 Ann 3 1 5 2 AlM-7 5 9 7 9 1 n AIH«9 in 13 1 0 AIH-4 (F*4D 0 0 3 0 Only) F-105 Gun c u 0 25 0 AlH-9 3 0 3 0 HIG-17 MI6-21 MIG-17 MIG-21 Guns Hlsslles Guns Mi ssl 1 es U.S. Losses:' ft F-8 3 0 3 0 F-4B 1 0 2 0 F-4C/0 4 0 5 5 F-105 4 5 4 12 The MIG-17S have acmevea zero kims wnn a mi»aii^. 7"''r have achieved zero kills with a gun system. Neither MIG.has achieved a km with a rocket system. o Enemy loss resulting from enemy pilot error rather than missile hits. • Probable enemy aircraft losses (11 MIG-lTs and 2 MIG-21S through 3 January 1968). It Is of interest that although the MIG-1? was equipped at times with missiles, all of its kills were achieved by the gun system. Also, the MIG-21 has only achieved kills with missile ordnance even though it frequently attacked with guns while Table IIl-CZ (S). GUN-FIRING ATTEMPTS APRIL 1965 TO 1 AUGUST 1967 (U) Aircraft: F-105 F-105 F-3 F-4C F-4C 1 F-lOO • Target: HlG-1 7 MIG-17 HlG-17 MlG-21 HIG-17 Totals F 1 ring Attempts 134 14 25 13 1 3 190 System Fai 1 ures Ordnance Power Fa i 1 u re 1 1 1 no Hinniiin i l i nii 1 1 2 Swi tcho 1 ogy 1 1 4 Gun Jam Q o •» 1 1 12 Over Gassing 3 3 Hal functi ons 1 2 Z c 3 Total 13 . 5 7 2 27 Mi sses 76 8 11 8 2 105 Hits 28 Damage 24 1 3 • 1 Probable Kill 1 1 3 Confir^ned Kill 20 3 3 1 27 • Total Hits 45 ' 1 7 3 1 1 58 4.U-68-I flying without missile ordnance. In addition, although both the MIG-17 and the MIG-21 have fired rockets, no hits have been recorded. Gun Firing Attempts (S) A total of 190 gun firing attempts .was analyzed. A summary of the data collected is shown In Table III-C2. For all gun systems, 31 percent of the attempts resulted in hits. Given a hit, a kill occurred 47 percent of the time. Con- sidering confirmed kills only, the gun system's overall ef- fectiveness per attempt is 14 percent compared to an overall effectiveness of 17 percent for missiles. is) The combined gun firing effectiveness is plotted in rigure III-Cl. A movinp; average, plotted at the midpoint of 0 3-26^7 i^i/U \0fW66 l/t)3/67 3/01/67 4/19,^7 "4/28/67 5/12/47 3/19/67 5/52/67 20 40 60 SO 100 FIRING ATTEMPTS 120 140 160 FIGURE Ili-Cl (S). Trends for All Gun-Firing Attempts (U) t80 53. attempts, was computed for the firing altitude and the three categories of results: Hits, Misses, and Failures. Enemy aircraft kills are also shown in this figure. The kill trend rises from 10 percent to 20 percent following the hit- trend line, but then quickly levels off at a reduced value of 15 percent. This value Is close to the overall average of kills per attempt for all gun systems. (S) It can be seen that the number of P-i05 attempts is much greater than the other gun attempts. In addition, the i 3 3 0 0 0 •i ^# 0 installations of the various e;un systems are different between aircraft. For these reasons the various aircraft will be dis- cussed separately* F-105 Gun-Firing Attempts (S) There were 1^18 F-105 gun-firing attempts from April 1965 to 1 August 1967, as shown in Table III-C2. Of these, 90 percent of the attempts and all but one hit were against MIG-17 aircraft. Table :iI-C3 compares the F-105 frequency of Table in.C3 (S). COMPARISON OF F-105 EXPOSURE AND GUN- FIRING ATTEMPTS . APRIL 1965 to 1 AUGUST 1967 (U) Frequency of Exposure Frequency of Gun- Firing Attempts MI6-17 125 134 HIG-21 77 14 TOTAL COUNT 202 Events 148 Attempts exposure to the frequency of gun-firing attempts against MIG aircraft. Exposure is measured in terms of the number of events in which F-105s encountered MIG aircraft, \fliile 38 percent of the F-105 events Involved MIG-21S, only 9 percent of the gun- firing attempts were against MIG.213. The gun- fir- ing attempts occur significantly less frequently than the ex- posures. The same result is evident for F-105 missile-firing attempts over the period December 1966 to 1 August 1967.^ (S) There are several reasorts which account for this discrepancy. The main reason is the performance differences between the F-105 and MIG-17 contrasted to those between the F-105 and MIG-21. While the F-105 cannot out turn either \u) Frior December 19=6 a fissile was seldom carried. After December 1966 some F-105s of each flight regularly carried the AIi-i-9ci. 67 aircraft, the acceleration and high speed capability relative to the MIG-17 permit disengagement at will. Against the MIG- 21 the P-105 has higher maximum speed at sea level but has inferior acceleration. Because of these performance differ- ences, an F-105 pilot will generally choose to evade a MIG-21. (S) A related reason for the variation in exposure and firing attempts is tactics. The MIG-17 can exploit only AltIL \9ii - I AUGUST IM7 14 FIRING AHEMPrS SIGHT INFOKMATION SIGHT INFOftMATtON FOK KILLS FIGURE III-C2 (S). F-105 Gun-Firing Attompts Summary (U) N limited tactics,* due to the performance deficiency relative to the F-105. The MIG-21, on the other hand, has had more tactical latitude to negate F-105 attacks, including evasion when necessary. Finally, the mission of the P-105 aircraft was not to attack other aircraft unless seriously threatened by attack. Therefore, engagements with other fighters were normally avoided. (S) The F-105 firing attempts can be summarized as 31 percent hits, 12 percent failures, and 57 percent misses as shown, in Figure III-C2, The probability of a kill given a hit is 0.^6. The largest source of failure was gun Jams. In most cases the cause of a Jam could not be ascertained. (S) Effective gun utilization requires the use of a - gun sight. However, in many engagements the sight was set for air-to-ground use and either there was no image on the combin- ing glass or the sight picture v/as fixed plpper (usually de- pressed for bombing) . Sufficient information to permit a de- terinina*;ion of the sight states v/as available for 33 of the 1^48 firing attempts. Of these 83, ^1 attempts were made with- out the aid of a computing air-to-air sight; that is, with no image or depressed pipper only. The remaining ^2 attempts were made with the pipper depressed as a function of aircraft g-loading for a fixed range. The range presented depended on the mode selected and could vary from 8OO to 1^400 feet. Vari- able ranging is available if a radar lock-on is achieved. However, no radar lock-ons were obtained because of the very rapid nature of the combat and the several seconds of settling time required after achieving a radar lock. In addition, some target acquisitions were made inside minimum lock-on range (2200 feet). (S) The F-105 was credited with 20 confirmed gun kills, two of which were made head-on. One-half of t!ie kills (10) *(U) See Tactics Section, II-A. were made despite the absence of computed sight Information. Only fixed-range information was available for eight of the remaining ten kills. No information regarding sight status was available for the other two kills. A summary of the F-103 sight information is presented in Figure III-C2. (S) This ineffective use of the P-103 gun sight Is In- dicative of man-machine incompatibility. The sight could not be exploited to its full capability (radar ranging); moreover if radar ranging lock-ons were attempted but not achieved « no sight picture would be available. In addition, even If lock- on had been achieved, several seconds of settling time would be required for the computations to be made. In half the cases no computing sight was available. The failure to achieve even fixed-range computations was influenced by the swltchology in- volved. Therefore, despite the fact tftat guns could be fired Immediately by simply squeezing the trigger, the lack of accu- rate sight information to the pilot reduced the gun capability in the snapshot role. (S) Figure III-C3 displays the F-105 gun-firing results for the period of the study, plotted as a 51 point moving aver- age. The altitude at firing has remalnded relatively constant in the 3000- to 7000-foot band. The percentage of failures shows a steady decrease. The percentage of hits shows a steady increase until December I966 at which time a level of 45 per- cent was reached. After December a decline is noted which lev- eled off at about 20 percent in the final 2 months of the study. Other Gun-Firing Attempts (S) The other £un-flring attempts listed In Table III-C2 represent a much smaller sample than that of the F-105. The F-lOO was involved in only one event' (3 firing attempts) and Navy aircraft had much less exposure to MIGs. The P-Uc alr^ craft carried external gun pods as air-to-air armament only since May 1967. 7/10/65 10/05/66 12^0/66 1/21/67 3-26-68-6 4/1 9/67 4/28/67 5/12/67 20 40 60 BO FIRING ATTEMPTS 100 120 FIGURE III-C3 (S). Trends for F-105 Gun-Firing AHempt$ (S) 5/22/67 140 (S) The F-8 Mk 12 gun .-system was plagued by many dif- ficulties, particularly early in the war. This accounts for the relatively higher percent of attempts resulting in failure. Al:?o, the P-8 gun sight computed inaccurate lead if the fight- ers v;ere pulling more than 3 ;7« Missile-Firing Attempts I (S) The results of all the mlssile-flring attempts for the study period are presented in Table III-CH. Table III-P5 is a further categorization of the missile failures. Tables III-C6 and III-C7 are an extension of the missile-firing re;- suits and the failure classifications for the period Augustj: 1967 to 3 January 1968. The information contained in Tables III-C6 and IIX-C7 is based on supplemental data, not invoivjing aircrew interviews, and consequently is much less detailed j than those of the remainder of the report. Note that Hits are the only known information for the AIM-9B and AIM-9D. In the case of the AIM-^D, the information is a little more complete but not as detailed as that in Tables III-CU and III-C5. The data for the AIM-7E were obtained from forms completed by the pilots and permit an adequate characterization of results. Even in the case of the AIM-7, however, it is not known that all launch failures are included, and for this reason the num- ber of attempts represent a lower bound. j (S) Table III-C8 presents the results of the 65 boreslght Table III-C4 (S). SUMMARY MISSILE-FIRING ATTEMPTS BY ORDNANCE, AIRCRAFT. AND TARGET - APRIL 1965 TO 1 AUGUST 1967 (U) | A»r Table 1II-C5 (S). MISSILE SYSTEM FAILURES APRIL 1965 to 1 AUGUST 1967 (U) • ;9 All*. «• "IC l«'i«t: f » 4C II f > 4I W f . ;i »>. j IJ 17 * ( 1 f -48 f . 4C :i ICS 2\ \J F-B 1 » j"Fr it 1 1 t ! ; 1 t i u i ? 1 i 1 i 1 1 2 t * 1 4 > II ; 1 »• i«n t i * 1 « i 1 1 • HtttM* fatlatti I i ) n « 1 < :^ 1 0 3 » 5 0 < a 0 III 10 17 u 44 It 1 1 1 1 1 t 18 1 1 i 1 14» Table ni-C6 (S). ADDITIONAL MISSILE-FIRING RESULTS •AUGUST 1967 THROUGH 3 JANUARY 1968 (U) tin ■40 UN -«t am ■10 •(rcrtft: 40 f . «l f-40 r-it f.40 f-8 f -4t Nit larftt; 17 • 11 IT : n 1? . 21 17 it 17 17 '. 21 Tault • S i 1 7 1 I) 40 » « « 1 7 to 114 I 1 1 Z > 4 1 « 2 t 1 » 1 I i 5 T \ 1 1 t I Jtircritt l*nfH««r t « i 1 tv failUime* f«tlur» 1 i ) i Out-Ot-t Aiit*»»* (Km t*n)t> RtSt J (I) I 1 i . 1 ()> ! ,;> 2 IS <1) 4 mt (rros rtll) lino ' (11 1 (1) ■ ft) 1 2 ! (>> , n» 1 (U (1) . (2) li (?) tn (10) ! 1 I *( I IMKItn tuit ftUt irclultf in pr««i«'i t3t4t. Table III-C7 (S). ADDITIONAL MISSILE SYSTEM FAILURES AUGUST 1967 THROUGH 3 JANUARY 1968 (U) llrcrtft: ■tS Tir««t: f.49 »«t«««tl«... i« Kttl ••M*<«M RMt Ftr«M T*itt C««l«rt« rirlii AttMftI > *rtUiir« Oala Mt avallwlt for U I > t 1 f Table III-C8 (S). AIM-7D AND AIM-7E BORESIGHT MODE FIRING ATTEMPTS (U) 0«tt: 1 «ar «»• 1 *«« «l 1 •«« 1 Jaa M 1 Apr tl-l Jaa (| Tatal NIB Tarftt: r II II i " i; 1 n OatMratiaa laaack raltara ■• Natar Ifattlaa 1 1 t 1 1 ) t > 1 t % t 1 1 « Ottoxttion li<«r Irak* tact 3 t 0)* 1 J ■ } 1 t ■oMflfHt RaO Hlti I«*tlo9* • Str>tr«l iMvtlept - Nln laaft rUta T«r««t 1 t 1 1 t 1 * (41 I ii) to 19 1 1 « t 13 10 mat trrar 1 1 M1«a Firing *tt*a«t( for III Alrcrirt ti \i 0 {0 SO 0 10 U it %t •i ) 14 2* e.Jt HI** U 11 II 2) 111 ft.ti UO II tl tt 14 t» 1M e.» SO 40 «- 20 n 20 10 o.;f ««0 II 23 23 240 ■A (trrjrir.) t^«t ai'.fllt. AettpltKCt U.tl: t«t hf»»lK*it\ II ttt*9tt4 tf IRt ca">«tt4 srsfatBilttr tk4t t^f >««plc COaid kM kttA 4r«M CMelvitoit: Itth prj-.iti)!*^ *• irt*t<'' . 'f'rttnrt, f^t K/ret^e%-1 it «cc«p:«d f«r t*ca vMti tn«t It, no aiMfr.-.ci' ttt.^-c. tir-.ri;t t/r»l. the missiles currently in the inventory, the missile with the smallest percentage out-of-envelope is the AIM-7E closely fol- lowed by the AIM-9D.. The air war in SEA has fluctuated through periods of no activity to periods of Intense activity. This variation can be observed by the changing slope of the cumula- tive total of firing attempts shown in Figure III-C4. (S) A. test of the hypothesis that there was no measur- able difference in performance between aircraft carrying a given missile resulted in the probability values also given in Table III-C9. The Yates-corrected chi-square procedures were used because of the large variation in the expected value 3S0 300 250 200 I 190 100 50 A M J J A S O N 0 J 1965 * FMAMJJA SONOJFMAMJ J A IM6 • »W» 3-7-68- I FIGURE III-C4 (S). Cumulative Total of Missile Firing Attempts April 1 965 to Augujt 1 967 (U ) Table III-CIO (S). COMPARISON OF MISSILE RESULTS AND TARGET TVPES (U) er«M«!••: tr ;i ri If 71 U ;i rirlMf Ittcapti Nttt FalUrtt Pr«»4ftUUy It 0 1 ■ 0 It « II 0.0 «• t i « lot It 11 it 0. 1* w 11 II 11 1} i « 0. 1 0 0 ;s ■■■ ■ — ■ U S J»Mrj 11(1 Hill ■ u 1 0. > 0 lOJ 0. It II 11 lOi II 0. u u l( 0. ti 1 10 HypttHtllC *9r t lOCCWic tNtrt 1« •<» BtAlyrtel* «iff»r*" yfrf or^txc* »tti>»ti ic(t»(c4 if '.ti« ;»'^>iiti'< trattoiMtf ck*: t*« »«••>« cojl* kr>* 4r*aH ff9«i « i«t no-: •« •it soul tlt'iKtv M ^naur 0.9*. CMCU*I*II: (id prgsitttUf H frdltr tU' J. 31, T-irtfort tn« itfpothfili It «Ct«>t«< f»r t«C« •tlliU t^flt; th«t U, *• «trftrtnc« kctmiii lirftt t|p«. ••M4M of Individual cells. The level of rejection was placed at 5 percent. On the basis of these tests (the lowest probability was 0.28) the hypothesis was accepted that there Is no differ- ence* in aircraft types and throughout this report the missile carrier is suppressed in favor of the missile system itself. (S) A similar computation was made on the variation of missile results with target type. Table III-CIO presents these data for the missiles currently in the inventory. The table is subdivided into the two periods, April 1965 to 1 August I967 on top and April I965 to 3 January 1968 on the bottom. The hypothesis tested was that missiles worked ■ equally well on both targets and the level of rejection was placed at 5 per- cent. Based on this criteria, the hypothesis could not be re- jected. The relative low probability for the AIM-7E during the early period is a direct result of the high ratio of MIG- 21 kills. This tendency was reversed in the last six months so that the probability that there is no difference between the targets is increased when considering the entire period (April 1965 through 3 January 1968). 3 lESItLIS UNOSSERVCD 10% AIM 70 APtlL IMA - I AUCUST 1947 AtM7E Ami 1965- I AUGUST \W 2» RESULTS UNO6SIRVI0 16% DCSFCitATION OUT-Of-Eh*VtLOPI 3% PUT-OF-£NyElOI« 11%! ,MlsailAN£OUS 3% 19 MISSILE SYSTEM FAIIUXES MISSILE SYSTEM FAILURES S6% MB,F*4C 9, f-dC 99, F-40 IT, 79 FIKING ATTEMPTS 127 FIXING AITEMMS I2.5.^*96 FIGURE III-C5 (S). AIM-7 Summary (U) AIM 70 AIM 7E ARIL IKS - ATXIL I96A AKIL l«»5 - 1 AUGUST IV«7 FIGURE 11I-C6 (S). AlM-7 Missile System Failures (U) 78 AIH-7 SPARROW (S) The AIM-7D was employed in SEA from April 1965 through April 1966. The AIM-7E replaced the AIM-7D in April 1966 and has been used since that time. The summary of AIM-7 results is shov/n in Figure III-C5, while Figure III-C6 further subdivides the missile system failures. Note that the frac- tion of attempts fired out-of-envelope Is small and that the fraction of prelaunch failures of the AXH-7D has been reduced. When corsid?r?r.s the pcstlauneh rnrults of the Airf-7S, the environment should be examined. Figure III-C7 combines a time-based histogram of AIM-7D and AIM-7E firing attempts (subdivided Into illts. Missile System Failures, and other re- sults) with a target maneuvering, non-maneuvering dichotomy APRIL IMS -I AUGUST l%7 30 ^ 40- J 1 30- S 20- 10- POST LAUNCH MISSILE SYSTEM FAILUXcS O TARGET JMANEUVERING • TARGET NOT MANEUVERtr4C AIM-7E ALTITUDE "**■" 4 MONTH MOVING AVERAGE ^ ^ AIM-.7D ALTITUDE L£AST SQUARES FIT 8 }■ < 6 T M A 3-25-68-9 HIT MISSILE SYSTEM FAILURE OTHER 1 — I — r 1 I — I — n — r MJJA SOND IMS I F M A M J J 5 O N 0 AIM-/D • 1966 — AIM-7E F M A M J J A 1967 FIGURE II1-C7 (S). Hislor/ of AIM-7 Firing Affcmpts (U) superimposed on the target- altitude profile. The solid line on the left shows a least- squares fit for the four groups of altitudes for the Air4-9D, while the dotted line on the right Is a four-month moving average of AIM-7E altitudes. It should be remembered that the SPARROW, like the SIDEWINDER and the FALCON, was designed for use against high-flying, non- maneuvering targets. This was not the combat environment dur- ing 1966 and the first half of 1967. (S) Figure III-C8 presents results of the 65 boresight mode firings of Table III-C8 for the period 1 April 196^ through 3 January I968. It should be noted that the only hit was one of ten boresight-mode firing attempts made -ri^h range lock. Firing in the boresight mode in the dogfight environment of SEA was not successful. FALCON (S) The AIM-4D was introduced into the theater during the last three months of the data collection phase. Of the first ten missiles fired the results were one prelaunch fail- ure, one post launch failure, eight fired out-of-envelope, and zero hits. The preliminary data received on the firings be- tween 1 August 1967 and 3 January 1968 indicated that the AIM-4D has achieved three hits in 13 additional firing at- tempts assuming all firing attempts have been reported. The overall hit/f Iring-attempt ratio is a maximum of 13 percent (similar to the AIM-7 but less than the AlH-9). Ani!L l%S • 3 JANUASY \96B 65 FIRING ATTEMPTS 10 ATTEMPTS V.'ITH RANGE LOCK •RANGE LOCK ATTEMPTS 3.7-68-14 FIGURE III-C8 (S). AlM-7 Boresight Firing Summary (U) AIM-9> SIDEWINDER (S) The summary of the AIM-9B results Is shown In Fig- ure III-C9. The observed percentage of hits for the AIM-9B Is higher than that of the AIM-7 but less than one-half that of the AIM-9D. Percentage of failures Is significantly less t;ian the AIM~7 and comparable to the AIM-9D, The percentage fired out-of-envelope is over twice as high as for either the AIM-7 or the AIM-9D. Figure III-CIO presents a more de- tailed description oi' the AlM-^b post- and prelauncij failures. Similar detailed information for the AIM-9D is shown in Fig- ure III-Cll and Figure III-C12, Note that the much smaller percentage fired out-of-envelope and the much higher percentage of hits. (S) If the preliminary data of August 1967 through January 1968 are included, the AIM-9D hit/f i : ing-attempt ratio is redi?ced to ^0 percent, ' APRIL l%5 - I AUGUST 1967 AMHL }965 - I AUG 1967 ISO FIRING ATTEMPTS 3-7&-66-I0 FIGURE III-C9 (S). AIM-9B Summory (U) 5 FIGURE lll-ClO (S). AIM-9B Missile System Failures (U) APRIL IMS - I AUCUST l«67 AWL IMS - 1 AUGUST l«67 30 FIRING AHEMPTS fOST-lAOKO* ttFiUNGAnEMnS FIGURE III-C12 (S). AIM-9D Mrssile System Failure (U) FIGURE lll-Cll (S). AIM-90 Sununory (U) Out of Envelope (S) Figure III-C13 presents a comparison of the per- centage of missiles fired by each a ire raft -ordnance combina- tion together with the number fired out of envelope for each category. Chi-square tests of these comparisons indicate that the combinations are heterogenous at the 5-sigma level and therefore there is near-zero probability that this set could have been dravm from a homogenous random sample. (S) A detailed. examination of the data identified those combinations which contributed to the heterogenous results. This process indicated that the AIH-TE/F-^IC had relatively the least out-of-envelope firings 'and the AIM-UD/F-i»D and the AIM-9B/F-^;c had relatively the most out-of-envelope firings. (S) V/hen a coniparison is made of the percentage of out-of-envelope firings with altitudes, there is a statistical 82 Area 1963 • I AUGUST (96; 40 < Z 30 Ml 20 [" jn PERCENTAGE OF 346 F WING ATI CmPTS \ ■-. \ PERCENTAGE OF 78 0UT-0F-EN7fL0?£ FIRINGS m LARGE OiFFE((CNC£ DENOTES AlliCfiAFT -O90NANCE COMBINATION or INT&IES1 10 I F-:D AIM 40 Jl F-4( F<«C AIM 7D 4-13- XL F-48 F-4C F-40 AIM 7E f.A^ F-4C. F-135 F-103 AM 9S F<8 F-4B 90 3-7-68-3 AIRCRAFT -ORDNANCE COMftlNATICNS FIGURE III-C13 (S). Comparison of Aircroff-Ordnance Combinations for Percentage Fired Out of Envelope (U) Inverse correlation between the two; that Is, as the altitude decreases, the percentage "of out-of-envelope firings Increases, as depicted in Figure III-Cl^. (S) There are a variety of contributing causes to the out-of-envelope phenomenon; among these are missile type, air- craft g»3, target g*s, and altitude at time of firing. Al- through less obvious, the effect of altitude on out-of-envelope fir-ngs becomes (Apparent by a cor.parison of envelopes at n 83 40 30 20 10 I I I I I I I I I 4 AAONTH MOvrNC AVERAGE 'V7 7 40 30 s i s 20 J O 3 t: .oS AMJ JASONDJ FMAMJJASONDJFMAMJ J. A \96S I 1966 1967 3-26-M-13 FIGURE in-C14 (S). Comparison of Altitude ond Out-of-Envelope Ratio (U) different altitudes. As altitude decreases, the envelope shrinks rapidly, predominately as a result of increased aero- dynamic drag. The capability of the target to distort the en- velope also increases as altitude decreases. Representative envelopes are shown in Appendis B. Hits (S) The desired result of a missile firing attempt is a target hit. In this sense all results in the other categories (with the possible exception of desperation firing) must be considered a nonsuccess. Figure III-C15 shows the percentage of firing attempts together with the percentage of hits for each aircraft-ordnance combination (data through 3 January 1968). Again the combinations are heterogenous (at the 2.6- algma level). The AIM-9D hit ratio was significantly higher than that of the other missile types. No significant differ- ence could be detected among the remaining missile types. (Note that the zero hits of the AIM-9B/F-^IB do not negate this conclusion because the sample size is small). AraiL 1965-3 JANUARY 1968 i 1 PERCENT AGE Of 460 FIRING ATTEMPTS PERCENTAGE OF 82 MISSILE HITS LAKGE DIFFERENCE DENOTES A«CltAFT>OKDNANC^ COMflCNATION OF INItXtST m F-4D AIM O 3-7-68-4 F-48 F-4C AIM 70 F-4B AIM 71 f-8 F-4ft F-4C F-105 AIM 9B F-a F-JB AIM 90 AIXCRAH -ORDNANCE COMBINATIONS FIGURE ill-C15 (S). Comparison of Aircraft-Ordnance Combinations for Percentage of Missile Hits (U) Hisslle System Failures Trend Analysiu (S) It was recognized early in the analysis phase that any cumulative results such as those of Figure III-C16 may distort evaluation of a missile system if most of the failures occurred early in the war. A method to test a hypothesis that the failures v/ere decreasing was by means of trend analysis. The specific procedure selected was the method of moving averages . (S) It was found that the choice of a base was not critical. For the Individual mif^sile^;, a summing base of approximately one-third the r.uKt'.*r of flrlnrs sr.othered the to ss so 46 Ama I96S • I AUGUST 1967 r I KERCENTACE OF 346 FJRING ATTEMPTS PttCCNlACe OF 122 MISSILE SYSTEM i AILUKES LARGE DIFFfcKENCE DENOTES' AIRCRAFT -OSONANCE COMUNATION OF INTEREST 3S 20 15 10 Jh. I n EL u. mi n F-4D AIM 40 F-4a F-4C AtM 7D F-4B AIM 7£ F-40 F-8 F>4B AIM 9B F-]05 . F7-6t{-2 FIGURE in-C16 (S). Compcrison of Aircraft-Ordnance Comb inaf ions for Percentoge of Missile S/stem Failures (U ) minor variations v;hlle leaving the major trend visible. It should be noted that the abscissa for most of the plots is firing attempts rather than calendar -days. This scale was selected because the rate of fire varied over such a wide range that any grouping by week or month distorted the trends. Those trends which are plotted as a function of time were com- puted using firing attempt.*: and then plotted by date. Co 4/23/66 I2/t9/66 l/6,'67 V9/67 5/20/67 8/13/67 10/54/67 )2/lV67 I I I 1 I I 1 1 0 25 50 75 100 I2S 150 17S FIRING AITCMPTS ).7-68-ll FIGURE II1-C17 (S). AiM-7ETnnd Analysis (U) (S) The moving average plots for the AIM-7E are shewn in Figure III-C17. The failure rate can be seen to be holding at a 60 percent value until mid-May 1967. The low point was reached In August and has been gradually rising until the final of ^9 percent failures is obtained. Unfortunately, the decrease In failures did not result in a corresponding in- crease in hits as the hit trend remained fairly constant at 10 percent throughout the entire time period. It should be reemphaslzed that these percentages do not reflect kill prob- ability or missile reliability. (S) Figure III-CI8 presents the trend plots for the AIM- 9B. Note the decreasing failure r^te. The hit percentage is returning near its original value of 28 percent after reaching a low of 10 percent. The out-of-envelope percentage increased 3-7-68-t2 FIRING ATTEMPTS FIGURE m-C18 (S). AIM-9B Trend Anoiysis (U) to IS FIGURE I1I-C19 (S). AIM-9D Trend Anolysis (U^ as the altitude decj'eased as discussed in the out-ol'-enve- lope subsection* (S) The number of AIM-9D firing attempts is too small (30 for the time peilod of the study) to justify any detailed trend analysis. However, Fig- ure III-C19 indicates that the trend of each curve appears to be favorable: hits up, fail- ures and out-of-envelope per- centages down. An analysis of the AIK-^lD was not considered becap.se of the small number of firing attempts and the incomplete- ness of the post-August 196? data. A'nalysi.s of Overall Trends (S) One measure of effectiveness for the air-to-air war is the composite hit-to-f Iring-attempt ratio. A 51 point mov- ing average plot of th^s measure is shown in Figure III-C20. S 40 iw o < 2 Mi - cu ATI LO VE F MPT s n RING A7TE 1 1 ,'l TO OF HIT S 1 fl?INC ATTE V.'nS * 1 1 -1 1 ! / 1 \ l> J" "X "A 1 _._ 1 — ' 1 A' -\ t t 1 1 i ! 1 i i 1 _J II 400 < 350 O 3 250 1 200 ISO iO 0 1«6S 1W6 1967 1968 FIGURE ill-C20 (S). Hit Trend Analysis (U) The moving average Is plotted at the date of the midpoint. The cumulative total of all micsllc firing attempts Is In- cluded for comparison. (Note that the specific combination of missiles expended in any specific period is not Indicated.) The general trend Is a series of plateaus of decreasing value and reaching 12 percent in April 1957. The ratio increases to 22 percent in June, A low point of 6 percent was attained in October, The final value for percentage of Hits (repre- senting data as of 3 January 1968) can be seen to be 12 per- cent in a downv/ard trend. (S) The moving average of altitude at which missiles were fired Is presented in Figure III-C21. While the early air battles were at high altitudes since mld-1966 the altitudes have been lower and followed a more seasonal trend (lower In the summer than In the winter). Figure III-C22 shows the mov- ing ^average of altitude for the MIG-17 and the MIG-21-. ; The cumulative- total for each target Is also Included. Of Inter- est is .the, fact chat the altitudes at which MI0-17s were en- gaged Is significantly lower than those of the MIG-21s. Table FIGURE lll-C2^ (S). Altitude Trend Analysis (U) 90 Table in-Cn (S). COMPARISON OF ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE ALTITUDES, APRIL 1965 - 3 JANUARY 1968 (U) HIG-21 MIG-17 No. Mean Altitude K Feet Standard Devi ation K Feet No. Mean Alti tude K Feet Standard De V i ati on K Feet ProbabUUy Missi les Only 134 16.4 9.3 208 7.3 9.1 0 Guns Only 7 9.3 8.3 56 4.4 3.0 0.09 Hypothesis: There is no measurable difference in altitude of ordnance ex- penditure against the MIG-17 or the MIG-21 Procedure: Student's t Test. Acceptance The hypothesis is accepted if the computed probability that L«ve1 : the sample could have baen drawn frmm a set of homogenous elements is greater than 0.05. Conclusion: The probability that missile system firing altitudes are the same for each target fs less than 0.05. Therefore, the hypo- . thesis is rejected for missiles. That is, theie Is a differ- ence in target altitude (MIG-21S higher than HIG-I7s). How- ever, the computed probability for gun systems is 0.09. •Therefore, the hypothesis is accepted. That is, there is no difference in target altitudes for the gun systems firing attempts. of Investigation Is based on factoring the hit * probability into its conditional probabil itle.s . The factors chosen are: • A. Probability of successful launch given a launch attempt * • B. Probability missile fired in envelope given a successful launch. • C. Probability missile will track to the target given it was launched in envelope. • D. Probability of target hit given the missile tracked the target. (S) The product A*B«C'D is the hit probability given a launch attempt. Table III-C12 provides the specific defini- tions for these probabilities alon;^ with the basic data and the resulting Individual probabilities. The disposition of Desperation, Unobserved, and Personnel Error results should bo noted. Desperation attempts were included in the denominator «0 1 » 49 ! » 1 10 ALTI 10 « 1 1 1 1 1 4«l MIC-I7FI(ING ATTtMm SI rOtNl MOVING AVfrAOC nrtllB At ki-ICMifil 1 MIC M Mni ano cum AtllMPTS rtiiui 1 1 Alll n r 1 — i Ul. . —1 1 — 1. a .J 1 — [ ,--f 1 t 1 1 1 l_l — 1_1 .1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 t t i 1 . I : , 1 1 ! J : 5j?53::}ics|rj5|p5|:igoa|r|5| — MIC -21 r- AL IITUD t J- i "Li *^ CU.VJLAIIVC TCTAi. ! 1 rrH . . i "* i 1 SOD 400 < 300 200 too a I I i I .I 1 i 1 ; ■ t i. :. i i i ! j ' I ■ * ■ ■ . FIGURE IIK22 (S). Altitude of Firing Attempts b/ Target Type (U) III-Cll summarizes the altitude information for missiles and for guns. The hypothesis that the altitudes for the MI0-»17 and the MIG-21 are the same may be accepted for gun-firing attempts but must be rejected for mlssile-f irlng attempts (MIG-17S lower than MIG-21s). Hit Probability Components • (S) Up to this point, tiie missile-firing results have been considered as a c*.cscriptton of past performance on the basis of three major categories: hits, missile failures, and missiles fii-ed out-of-envelope. "A second method of 91 of factor B as they were not fired in envelope . Unobserved attempts were Included In factor A since they were launched successfully, but were discarded from the other factors. Personnel Error results were not Included In any of the factors . (S) These four factors (A,B,C,D) and their' product (A-B-C-D) were plotted as a moving average for the AIM-7E, AIM-9B, and AIM-9D as shown in Figures III-C23, and* C-25. (S) The curves for the AIM-7E indicate that the early prelaunch failure problems have been solved: the probability of launching in envelope has climbed back up from a low of 0.6 to above 0.9; and the probability of a missile tracking (given a successful launch in envelope) increased toward the later periods fronj a low of 0.2 to a value of 0.5, The big- gest single contributor to the latter factor was Failure to Guide. (S) -Except for two peaks which reached above 0.8, the probability of a hit (given a successful track) has been going down steadily from an early value of 0.6 to a value of 0.3 in January I968. The first of these peaks (at ^5 Firing Attempts) occurred during Operation hOLO. The second peak occurs In late May, early June 1967. No other corresponding cause-ef- fect relationship was observed. The major single contributor to the Hit factor was the False Detonation category. While the seven False Detonations represent only 5.5 percent of the 127 AIM-7E firm- attempts, this contributor is given great leverage due to the small number of missiles which success- fully tracked the target. (S) The precombat estimates of these factors by OPTEV- PORi are given in Table III-CI3. These values may be compared (U) Operational Tsst and Evaluation Force, Norfolk. Virginia. Q 0 a Q 0 0 Q (1 0 0 Q Q 0 a 1 Tible in-C12 (S).' HIT PROBABILITY COMPONEHTS Table Ul M^^l )^^^ _ ^ AUGUST 1 967 (U) Result AIM-4D \ «» S, R 10 'll 'li '13 '14 F«nure to Launch Desoeratlon Out of Envelope FaMure to Guide False Target Boreslght Mode Hiss Hech«n1c8l Failure Radar Broke Lock Out Maneuvered Fuze Failure False Detonation Hit Unobserved Personnel Error TOTAL AIM-70 AIH-7E 12 1 1 7 10 20 2 14 27 9 1 7 3 7 15 ?1 1 AIM-9B AIK-90 7 14 SI 9 29 127 8 3 4 33 17 1 150 14 4 30 Factor/Description A Probability of successful launch given a launch attempt 2? ^^ 0.90 0.59 0.84 0.95 0.93 Probability nissile fired in envelope given a successful launch 12 •B . -l^i 0.11 0.86 0.81 0.48 0.83 i-2 ^ Probability missile will track target given it was launched In envelope 12 C • i?9^1 0.42 0.36 0.80 0.75 D Probability of a hit given the missile tracked target 0 • 1^12 NA i-9 Product A-B.C-0 1.00 0.21 0.60 0.15 0.69 0.25 0.93 0.54 Mi|>i|liJi*>ii'i. 60 FIRING AITCMPIS FIGURE III-C24 (S). Trends of AIM-9B Probability Factors (U) 0 96 n J FIGURE III -C23 (S). Trends of AIM-7E Probabiliiy Factors (U) | 95 j / '11/ APRIL 1965 TO I AUGUST 1967 n POINT MOVING AVERAGE PLOTTED AT MID POINT 30FJRING ATTEMPTS PROBABILITY OP A. LAUNCH S. EN'/ELOPE C. TRACK ^.o.. D. KIT i.... Aaco 6/12/46 6/12/66 6/21/66 4/^4/67 5/19/67 5/19/67 „l \ I I I I 0 3.28-68-5 10 15 20 FIRING ATTEMPTS 25 30 35 FIGURE IH-C25 (S). Trends of AIM-9D Probability Foctors (U) 97 Table III-C13 (S). COMPARISON OF PRECOI'.BAT ESTIHATES Table lu i-u \ i^^^^ ^^^^^^ p^^^ (yj ■ ■((titrtil U«me» »• •"••UM ft. »r»ktktlttr iM(Mi(«t trtck O.I« I O.tl O.I* I Oil o.j> : O.J* I o.u : 0.12 o.ss o.u 0.»J 0.0« o.M I o.n set ' »*• ' t'*"*" 0.«9 o.«J O.ll o.ir o.zt ! 1.90 o.ni '00 a.6< o.«J I o.;» ! I O.St • O.OJ »|W fO ^ so; ' 74: ' lOCi 1 Cil'-»t*' ! 1.00 .1.00 o.» i o.to o.»i 1 t.oa i »-00 O.S) 0.20 o.?» : o.« 0.71 I O.M 0.11 with the missile firms attempts corresponding to 50. 75. and 100 percent of the sample size.' It can be seen that the big- gest discrepancy betaeen precombat and postcombat results Is In the Hit factor. : (S) Figure III-C2M shows these probability trends for AIM.9B. comparison with Table III-C12 Shows that the Launch. Track, and Hit probabilities are adequate. However, as dls- ■ cussed previously, the Out-of-Envelope firings are negating ^ the effectiveness of this system. I (S) The AIH-9D curves of Figure III-C25 show that early : difficulties have been overcome. The last values actually surpass the precombat estimates by OPTEVFOR. It will be of ; interest to observe the next 30 firing attempts to see if these favorable trends continue. '(U) For example there -re IS^^^^^^ attempts.^ With a^51 ?!irprr:cnf l^^^^^t^^^ ^^ ... ^ percent point occur, at 121 and the 50 percent point is at 73- I: il E. CONCLUSIONS (S) The' analysis as pre:;ented in th(* preceding sections has indicated the follovrlnr: conclusions: • With the cxreption of the .MM-9D (3IDEV/IKDF.R) which v/as sir.niricantly tetter, all missiles and missile- alrcrarc conbinalions shov;od essentially the sane level of tarcet-hit pof romance. • The lack of success of the Ai:"-? (SPARROW) when fired in the bores lr:ht mode (1 hit jn 6? att',:j.'npts ) Indicates, that *".his mode v/ai; not successful In the dogfiglit conditions of the present air war. • Failure rates for the various missiles are quite erratic and each trend nust be analyzer^ separately: The AIM-7D (SPARROW) has been phased out. The AIM-7E (SPARROW) held a 60 percent pic.teau from April 1965 to June I967 and then dropped to ^0 percent in th.e suniner of 19^7 . Addi- tional data collected on the from August 1VG7 to 3 January 1963 Indicate the failure rate has increased to acproxina::ely 50 percent. The Ai:'-9B (SIDEWINDER) trend has decreased to about 10 percent . The AIM-9D (SIDLV;iriDER) trend has decreased to about 15 percent . Thus, SIDi::wi:iDER failure ral:es are decreasing while SPARROW failure rates, though better than during the early phases, are not decreasing. • Missile performance (as measured by a chi-square comparison of Hits, Missile System Failures, and Out-of-Hnvelcpe firing atten\pts) is similar for each aircraft type. Thus, the results of the ord- nance firing attempts did not provide a measurable difference in the effectiveness betv/een Navy and Air Force use of the AlM-7 and AIM-9B missiles. • The correlation of Out-of-Envelope firing attempts with altitude (the percentage increases as altitude decrear;es) coupled v/ith the high percentage in this catef^ory for both the AIM-4D and the AIM-9B indi- cates that either: The pilots need more training to knov/ v;hen they are v/ithin the envelope; The pilots need an improved on-board indication of v/hen they are within envelope; and/or The pilots need a lar^e weapon envelope to provide more latitude in launch paraneters. The bit-to-firlns attemof. ratio when combined for all missiles reached a value of 12 percent (as of 3 January I968) and was downward trend. Ihls ratio, as computed on a 'jl attempt movins average, has varied between a high of 25 percent (at the start of the war) and a low of 6 percent. Although employed under varying conditions o^'^^ar-- eet typo and altitude, :ni33iles as one set and guns considered as a second sc. showed essentially the san.'i effectiveness .'n terms of kllls-per-f irlng att .'mpt . 100 0 0 0 G Q Q Q 0 0 Section lll-D TERMINATION PHASE a Q Q 0 f! (S) The analysis of the termination phase has indicated that the major causes were less of contact, fuel limits, and amission require::ients. While termination due to expenditure of all available ordnance occurred only 7 percent of the time, P-8 aircraft which terminated due to lack of ordnance did so U relatively more frequently than the F-^ . [I B. OBJECTIVE (U) This portion of the analysis souj|;ht to determine n the reasons which caused termination of air-to-air combat. A. SUMMARY C. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE (S) Current doctrine dictates that the tactical unit^ maintain integrity. Therefore, when an individual aircraft of the unit must terminate, it is standing operating procedure for the others to accorr.pany. Under the exigencies of combat, however, tactical unit integrity frequently v;as not maintained, For this reason the analysis sought first to identify those tactical units cperatlns independently during any event. (S) As discussed in previous sections, the actions of any one event can be conposed of multiple encounters. For this analysis, however, only the last encounter of any inde- pendent tactical unit or aircraft was considered to be of interest. The data base used were all F-^l and P-S events over ^(U) The tactical unit may consist of a flight (4 aircraft), or an element (2 aircr-jft). V 101 the time period April 1965 to August 1967- For each of the •encounters Identified In the events, a reason for termination was specified. No a priori categorization of reasons was; made; however, the results can be summarized by the following::; • Fuel: Fuel limits were specified as a f^ason for ^^ination for those units which were contact with the enemy but could not P^^^'f "^^.^e the engagement because of low fuel state. Ihe normal operational procedure is to refuel USAb ^ strike and CAP aircraft inbound tc the target. 5sAF aircraft are also refueled outbound, unless the distance from the strike to the recovery base is such that more fuel is required to reach a [ tanker than recover. Due to the distances, USN air craft are not refueled on a regular basis, '-netner or not ^efSelins was planned, the fuel levels estab- lished for mission termination "^^^^^f turn to some friendly base was possible without re fueling. In a majority of terminations due tO: fuel the normal levels were observed. . • Ordnance E xpended : The category includes those termination^ caused by lack of usable ordnance. o Loss of Contact : Inclusions in this category are . the result or tw o major situations J^^l^^ cessful completion of an attack, no .urther ta^-^s were contacted and a Judgment was made to f^tire the termination was included, ^he other situations are those encounters during whicn the U.S. xorces unintentionally lost contact with the enemy force. Due to the imprecise knowledge of enemy acw.ions, it is not possible to ascertain how many of the latter cases could be attributed to a successful enemy disengagement. • TacticalDlsadvanta^e: If the U.S. fighters decided to disengage due co i'avorable enemy position, and contact was broken in the process, the termination waS categorized as the result of tactical disadvantage. • Battle Damaee: If damage to the friendly aircraft caused the cermination it is included in this cate- Kory. Inclusion occurred if a U.S. fighter was forced to break off action., even though the source of damage was flak or SAMs . i • Enemv r^ofg r^c^ or Sanctuary : If contact was broken because^he enemy v;enL iii^o China or a restricted zone, the termination is included in this category. Also included are those cases where contact was broken due to the presence of flak or SAM concentrations . • Mlr,r.lon: If the encounter with enemy aircraft was terminated clue zo ovorrldlncs mission require- menta, it was categcri"cd as mission. An example of this termination is the determination not to pursue enemy aircraft who pose no immediate threat to an escorted aircraft. 0. RrSllLTS C'j) Since any one event was usually comprised of the actio'.s of several tactical units which couid terminate sepa- rately, at different times, or for different reasons, these tacMcal units form the basis of the count of terminations. No*..- that this is on a slightly different basis from the en- cct.nter or event count used in other parts of the analysis. To bo consistent, these could be called the terminal encounter .'ount. Table IIX-Dl presents the catehorlzation of all l60 Identified F-^i and ?-8 terninations for the time period April 196t; to August 19C7. Not included in this total were the 8 confirmed U.S. losses during this period. Table III-Dl (S). REASONS FOR TERMINATION F-4 AND F-8 TO 1 AUGUST 1967 (U) Reason Number Percent Fuel Ordnance Expended Lost Contact Tactical Disadvantage Battle Damage Enemy Defense or Sanctuary Missi on 37 11 51 11 15 10 25 23 7 32 7 9 6 16 160 (S) The highest frequency of terminations were in the group coni'prislng loss of contact with the. enemy and no more targets, v/hlch represented 32 percent of the cases. Both of these catecorlos imply the need to know eneny location in order to reestablish contact; that is, some sort of enemy position and direction information as well as better vislbi:-.- ity from the cockpit. In several cases contact was lost when radar return was obscured by ground clutter. In other canes » visual contact v/as lost due to poor visibility (e.g., haz;). (S) The second major catej^cry for termination v;as fuil limits. Most of these terminations resulted from the obse:- vatlon of normal fuel levels and in only 8 of the 37 cases would the aircraft have been lost without refueling. The ability of U.S. aircraft to disengage successfully permitted termination when nor::ial fuel levels were reached. There was no difference betv/een F-'* and P-.8 relative' frequency of termi- nations In this category. (S) . The third most frequent reason for termination was mission requirements. In general, there are no R&D Implica- tions In this item. There Is no evidence that equipment deficiencies v/ero the basis of the mission requirements that required the escort to terminate, (S) An Item which occurred with small frequency but with potential rt&D Implications is the lack of useful ordnance. This circumstance occurred 11 times. Almost half of the cases (5 of the 11) were F-8 aircraft, which carried only tv/o mis- siles and had 6 seconds of gun-firing time. The poor reliabil- ity of the Mk 12 cannon system over the period of the study also contributed to the unavailability of ordnance on the F-3, since gun failures were frequent (28 percent of firing at- tempts) in air-to-air combat. In the remaining 5 cases the P-^ aircraft were loaded with only a partial missile comple- ment (usually due to operational considerations, such as landlnc weight for night carrier operations or bombs in store locations otherwise occupied by miosilcs. In only one case ■did an aircraft armed with 8 missiles expend all ordnance dur- ing air-to-air conibat. (S) There, was a significant difference between the F-U and F-8 relative frequency of terminations due to ordnance expenditure, with the F-8 terminating more frequently. This would indicate that two missiles «nrt a f?».l lure-prone gun sys- tem are insufficient armaments for the type of combat experi- enced in SEA. In the other categories of terminations the relative frequency is about the same for both F-M and F-8 aircraft. E. CONCLUSIONS (S) The successful termination when fuel limits were reached was evidence of U.S. ability to disengage at will. •(S) The relatively higher frequency of F-8 terminations due to ordnance expenditure indicate.:^ -hat two mJosiles and a failure prone gun system are not sufficient for the type of combat experienced. IV. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS A. BACKGROUriD AND SCOPE (U) In this study It was appropriate to go beyond the usual quantitative methods of analysis. Important considera- tions were: • The air combat process offered a particular type of complexity with its great number of variables, and the interdependence and interaction of all elements of a fighter weapon system, • The data for reconstruction of encounters were in many ways quite subjective in nature. Since thei*e v;as no real-time recording of flight data, it was necessary to exploit the human ability to sense, analyze, and recall the details of an encounter. « Many do poet* of air cciabat si;aply do uot lend themselves 'to quantifica-ion, e.g., the development of the pilot's rationale for the actions he took over a period of time, or some of the maneuvers which took place: "I went into a high speed yo-yo." (U) It was determined that these considerations could be most effectively dealt with, in the light of RED BARON- purposes and in addition to quantitative analyses, through a qualitative approach by persons intimately familiar with the various aspects of the fighter weapon system and its employment. (C) Six qualitative analysis panels were formed to assess the various air-to-air encounters. The panels were composed of experienced individuals both from within the IDA/WSEG organization and elsewhere, representing the major subsystems of the fighter weapon system.^ liach panel consisted of an Ku) For purposes of analysis the fighter weapon system is con- sidered to be composed oT the follov;ing four subsystem: the airframe, propulsion, and controls; avionics; weapons and fire control; the iiurrian bein*-; (pilot and crew). aeronautical engineer with fighter design background; persons with design and development experience in avionics and in ^ air-to-air weapons, and an experienced flghtor pilot. Addl- tlonally. a member of the RED BARON Project acted as moderator ^ for each panel. (C) The objective of a panel was to consider each air- to-alr encounter assigned to it and to identify the factors. I.e.. systems, subsystems, and environment . etc., which H contrlbuced to coiaplete success, partial success, or failure In the U.S. fighter weapon system. From the factors Identified. « the panel was then to outline the R4D Implications for future U weapons systems. Q B. METHODOLOGY « (C) The 78 events in the period from April 1965 to [j IMarch 1967 documented in Volume I of this report were assigned to the panels, each group being assigned events representing |j equivalent cross-sections of complexity, outcor.e, and chronology. Panel deliberations were limited to the Volume I Q events since these were the only ones sufficiently recon- structed to permit qualitative analysis. Q (C) The qualitative analysis panels were given the following guidelines: Q • The outcor.e of the events in air-to-air engagement can Se%onsidered as a spectrum of P--^^^^f/j^,^f' ^^|?,3e3 success and failure. For the purposes of these analyses, succesi occu.^s when an enemy aircraft is =-'Stroyed and the U.S. fighter is undamaged and returns safely to base. The oth^r eltrerr.e is failure, in which a friendly air- c^ift is downed by enerr.y air action .Ul outcomes which are neither success nor failure are designated "o^" success. It should be noted that in any one event there may be multiple outcoir.es. •For each event the panel should attempt to answer, in terms of the R&D implications, the following basic p questions: tJ (1) In those insta:^cec v/here success v.-as achieved, which , ■ ^ ^ were the key elerr.ents :.hich contributed to success? g (2) Where success was not achieved, to which factors may nonsuccoss be attributed? Also, sugeest the possibilities which may have resulted in success . (3) In cases 1 or 2, where failure was narrowly averted, which were the key elements In averting failure? •The results cf the above findings will serve to highlight problem areas, as well as the strengths and desirable qualities of the v/eapons systems, •In asseaslnc an encounter the panel should avoid com- pound speculations. While certain suppositions are clearly necessai-y , * supposi tion based on suppusltion should be avoided, e.g., "if this had been the case, then that would have occurred." •The panels should recognize that the collection of assessments from each of the panels, for all the events considered, v;ill be examined by the Project for patterns of findings, and degrees of significance to air-to-air combat. C. FINDINGS . (C) Each "panel produced a report on each event it con- sidered in which it identified the factors affecting the outcomes of the event and the R&D implications of each factor in the v/ay of assets or problem areas. Assets (C) The significance of identifying assets was to emphasize the characteristics of the current weapons systems that should not be designed out of the future v/eapons systems. The items identified as assets were those considered to have significantly and favorably contributed to the outcome of the • events studied. The assets have been grouped by the two pri- mary aircraft types considered by the panels: The P-i» (as shown in Table IV-1), and the P-8, since there is a clear distinction between the assets attributable to each. ^(U) To consider something; that did not happen (i.e., nonsuc- cess) and make stater.encs about clear" requires supposition. Table IV-1 (S). F-4 ASSETS (U) APRIL tSm- MARCH IW7 ;>«f;FOflMANCC (A I KAOAjt , 10 15 EVENTS 20 25 SPCCD AND ACCELERATION TURNING ABIUTV ClIMt RATE MANEUVERABILITY OeStRVATION TO WAR ASSISTANCE TO PILOT FLEXIBILITY SELECTIVnY LONG RANGE CAPABILITY PERFORMANCE ACQUISITION 9S EVENTS ».26^I7 F-4 Aircraft (S) There were 58 P-^ events considered by the panels. Of these, the performance of the F-^ was Identified as an asset In 23 events. Performance was divided into subfactors such as speed and acceleration, turning, and vertical climb ability. Of these, the most significant factor to emerge • was that of speed and acceleration, which permitted successful separation and disengagement at the discretion of the pilot. (S) The other Items of performance relate to maneuver- ability and require some elaboration. In the SEA environment they were employed to: •Defeat AAA fire. •Evade SAMs. •Negate enemy aircraft gun attacks. 110 - - 1 J •butmaneuver enemy alr-to-alr missiles, •Keep a maneuvering target within weapon launch envelopes. The maneuverability of the aircraft (and Its weapons | must be such that it can be converted Into some tactical adv^tage which can be exploited. Howover. this advantage need not Jxlst under all conditions.- For example, althoueh unable to out turn the MIG-17. the climb capability of the P-i| relative to the Min-17 permitted vertical maneuvering to reposition for reatltack. While the P-K had a slight excess power advantage at ilow alti- tude (below 15,000 ft) relative to the MIG-21. it was! Insufriclent to be tactically exploited and the combat resulted in; a stale- mate With neither aircraft capable of achieving an advantage. The conditions which permitted the P-H to attain a taklcal advantage (or stalemate) were devised in part on the basis of the energy maneuverability concept, and have in general proved successful when executed correctly. This depends on Jilot skill which some lacked due to peacetime restrictions on ali combat nancuverin^. (S) While performance aspects, such as velocity land accel- eration, were recognized as contributing to the succesl. per- formance must be utilized and controlled to be an assei. The control which can be successfully employed depends in Urt on such items as aircraft handling qualities, aircraft stkbility control forces, and inertlal coupling, if these Itemsi are poor the pilot must exert extra attention to flying the aircraft and' must limit the perforaance to those conditions for whl4h good control can be exercised. j (S) Although in collecting the data no special ei-fort was made by the interview teams to discuss the pros and cohs of 'one- and two-seater fighters, in 15 cases the assistance to the pilot provided by the backseater was a contributing factor tj the out- come of the engagement. This assistance was over and Love that of operating the radar. The advantages attributed to t!he 111 backseater primarily concerned his ability to provide addi- tional visual surveillance. There were Instances of his malcing the initial visual identification, and of his assistance to the pilot by keeping him advised of the tactical situation during combat. (S) The advantages of the weapons systems accrued from their flexibility and selectivity (in terms of IR or radar mis- sile selection and the inherent characteristics of each), and the long-range capability of the AIM-7. These desirable weapons systems qualities were prevalent in 12 of the 58 F-^ cases con- sidered. (S) In addition to the long-range capability of the weapons, the long-range and all-weather AI radar capability in the F-^ had a favorable effect on the outcome in 7 cases. F»8 Aircraft There were eight P-8 events considered by the panels. The F-8 had much less exposure to enemy aircraft during the time period of the study as evidenced by the small number of events, and only encountered the MIG-21 once. In four of the eight cases, performance (mainly the turning and high-speed capability) was considered to be a major factor exerting a favorable effect on outcom.s of the engagements. R&D Problems (S) The panels considered 66 events where there were sufficient data to identify factors affecting the outcomes of the event. R&D problems were then derived from considera- tion of these factors. These R&D problems have been combined into general areas and are listed in Table IV-2 with the number of events in v.'hich they occurred. Whereas in the case of assets it was meaningful to distinguish between the type of aircraft being referred tc, with regard to problem areas 3,t v;as more desirable to generalize. The problems were carefully Identified In terms which did not indicate specific solutions but rather indicated areas for further R&D consideration. Ulti- mate solutions depend on considering the problem in its many ramifications and interactions with other requirements, vxhich was outside the scope of the study. The relative importance ascribed to the problems here depended on the context of conbat in SEA, but of course, ultimate solutions rest in the overall needs of the U.S. defense posture. Tabic IV-2 (S). R&O PHOSLEMS IDENTIFIED F-4/F-8 EVENTS APRIL 1965 TO MARCH 1967 (U) NO. EVENTS A. ENEMY POSIT tON AND OIREaiON INFORMATION 39 ». WEAPON VERSATILITY * 37 1. SHORT KANGE WEAPON (20) 2. EXPAND PERFORMANCE ENVELOPE the (S) A meaningful facet of the man-machine compatibility problem concerned the armament. Particularly in the case of the IR missile, little or no information is available to the pilot for the assessment of proper missile launch parameters. This was also true to a lesser extent for the radar missile. since the mechanliied launch zones do not take into account tar- get mar»cuvers . In addition, the pilot has no indications from the weapon system to permit accurate assessment, prior to •launch, of the target onto which the missile is locked. Prob- lems of this nature were Identified several times by the panels, (S) Another contributing factor to man-machine compati- bility problems v;as the switchology necessary to set up weapons and Jettison ordnance. Although not investigated by the panels > the Project recognized from its investigations that the P-105 armament system was also characterized by this problem. The seat restraint harness was identified in two events as re- stricting the pilot's movement within the cockpit. Aircraft Turning Capabilities (S) Some aspects of aircraft performance v/ere identified as assets in that they .permitted tacti os .that.-.as£i.sJted positioning to fire. Deficiency in turn capability, however, was a factor af.fecting the outcome of 11 events. This occurred despite other aircraft performance capabilities which could have permitted tactical advantage (e.g., F-4 climb vs . MIG-17) • These other capabilities could not be em- ployed due to other aspects of the combat situation (e.g., SAM, weather). The turning capability of the including the pilot's ability to control the aircraft In a turn, was de- ficient against the MIG-17 aircraft. Although the could turn with the MIG-21 below approximately 15,000 feet, there was no evidence that this performance was adequate for the F-4 to attain position to fire on the MIG-21. External Stores Problems (S) The R&D problems categorized as "external stores" were identified in 9 events and could be classed in two categories. The first was a reliability problem evidenced by malfunctions In the tank jettison system v/hich precluded tank release. The s second category relates to thos. aircraft which accelerated to combat speed on bOGoy slshtlngs, and thereby exceeded the [} speed at which stores (primarily the ceaterllne external fuel tanK) could be Jettisoned. The extra drag of the external y store affected the performance of the P-l to the extent that the inadvertent tank retention was considered a factor . g affecting the outco,«e of the 9 events. Another factor was the inability of the P-t to expend the forward two AIM-7s. as a ft result of the centerline store failure to Jettison. U B Enemy Defenses (S) The RiD problem categorized as enemy defenses was associated with the limitations placed on U.S. fighter operation Q in a SAM environment. Some battles were terminated prematurely when enemy aircraft entered areas protected by SAMs, causing R U S aircraft to break off. It was noted that SAMs place constraints on U.S. fighters which could not be readily measured ^ by the panels in that the altitudes of the CA? and escort U missions were influenced by the SAM environment. Intraflight Position Information (S) The final item which became evident in 7 events was y intraflieht position information. The factors which emphasized this problem arose when friendly aircraft did not attack due to imprecise knowledge of the position of other flight members. Two of the events in which this occurred were at night and came about although there was positive, friendly GCI. In one daylight event, lack of position information resulted in a mid- air collision. This problem is. of course, related to, but goes beyond, that of cockpit visibility. 6 120 s 0 1 U ^ S V. INTEGRATION OF ANALYSES A. INTRODUCTION (C) Two independent analyses of the collected data were performed as part of the KED BARON study; a quantitative analy- sis of the various phases of each engagement and a qualitative analysis of individual engagements as a whole. While the events were subdivided into various conbat phases and selected parameters quantified, there were many aspects of importance that did not lend themselves to this approach. To insure that these factors be considered fully, each event was studied in its entirety. The relationship of the analyses can be described as a matrix in which one dlr.enslon represents the various phases of each event and the second dimension repre- sents the individual events. This is Illustrated in Table V-1. Table V-1 (S). INTEGRATION OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSES (U) Event 1 : Event i : 2 i Event 3 Event N Acquisition snd Identi f ication • : Acquisition : and J Identification Acquisition and Identification Acquisition and Identf fication 1 Attack I Attack Attack Attache J Firlng/Oatnage 1 Firing/Damage « F1 ring/Damage Fi ft ng/Damage Termination ; Termination Termination Termination legend I Quanti tati ve Analysis 1 QuaHtatfve Analysis J.3l.4>i-I jggPP^^t 121 (C) The Qualitative Analysis Panels examined each event separately as an entity identifying the factors which influenced the outcome of each event. From a composite of these factors the research and development implications were determined. Those factors that affected the outcome favorably were classi- fied as "Assets" and those that exposed system deficiencies were identified as "R&D Problems." Although the qualitative analysis identified factors with research and development Implications for each event, their overall relative importance could not be determined directly because these factors varied In importance from event to event. (C) The quantitative analyses examined the air-to-air events by separate phases of combat actions, quantifying the key parameters and analyzing them across the spectrum of all events. Thus, the expected frequency of various combat situa- tions could be determined, permitting an evaluation of U.S. weapons system effectiveness in reacting under these conditions. However, this approach has several Inherent limitations: •It cannot take into account those factors not readily quantifiable. •It does not provide perspective for the interaction of the various phases of individual events. •It does not identify directly the research and develop- ment implications. (C) This quantitative approach may be likened to a sub- optimizing process whereby a segment of the process is viewed in detail but in Isolation and v/ithoiit considering the relation to the whole and interaction with other segments. While this can be a powerful analytical tool, it is important to recognize that erroneous conclusions may be reached, unless great care Is exercised to consider the effects within the overall context of the problem. (U) The results of the two approaches complemented each other and both vxere utilized to arrive at ^he study conclusions. 1 3 3 rt 3 0 n Ui CO >- < o o o: CM I HVS IV Jiff 9)1 •Q'l papuffdx3 uodtan uogs uo 1 4 ; ^Od lO c— c « « C7> 3 e — a. .L. ■ <7>1 3 Li. (OC C <^ £ u. Is: jo 123 (S) The interrelation between the two Independent analyses methods employed can best be visualized as a matrix which is presented in Table V~2. The R&D problems Identified through the Qualitative Analysis Panel deliberations of each air-to-air event and discussed in detail in Section IV, are listed as one dimen- sion. The significant findings of the quantitative analysis efforts, which examined specific phases of combat for all events , are listed as the other dimension. Whenever quantitative analy- sis results supported the panel findings directly a "D" appears In the table In the appropria'-e row and column. An "I" appears ,ln the table wherever a quantitative analysis result supports an R&D problem through inference. Table 7-2 may also be employed as an index to Identify sections of the report which present relative and supporting data concerning a given R&D area or com- bat phase. The following discussion summarizes the reasons for the entries in the matrix. B. ATTACK PHASE (S) ' The analysis of the attack phase demonstrated that enemy success in achieving a position to fire was almost entirely dependent upon the ability to maneuver into a rear quadrant attacking position uefore detection . Conversely, whenever U.S. aircrews acquired the enemy aircraft before the attack maneuver was completed, U.S. aircraft negated the maneuver 95 percent of the time. The require.ment for real time information on the posi- tion of enemy aircraft is apparent from these two -results. (S) In the events analyzed the U.S. aircraft were primarily on CAP or escort missions. On this type of mission the primary aircrew function is to search for enemy aircraft. Despite the search, enemy aircraft attained a position in the rear quadrant before detection in approximately one-fourth of the encounters. This indicates that the unaided eyeball is an Inadequate mechan- ism for detection of enemy aircraft in a hostile GCX environment. At low altitudes, haze conditions over North Vietnam often limit visual capability. (S) The AI radar was Inadequate ]*or supplementing visual search because of its limited field of view and degraded performance due to ground return (as discussed in Section IV) . (S) The relative frequency of rear-quadrant attacks emphasizes the R&D problem area of rearward visibility. In close-in, dog-fight situations, a fighter is hampered by a blind spot in his field of view. (S) The number of very short-range and short-duration acquisitions under combat conditions in SEA indicates that there were opportunities to employ a short-range, snap-shot weapon system, had one been available. (S) The analysis of the attack phase indicated the advantage of attaining a position to fire first. As the weapons envelope increases, the probability of attaining a position to fire first increases. (S) The analysis of the attack phase revealed that only 27 percent of U.S. first attacks \;ere successful. This result combined with the results of the firing analysis indicate that unreliability of the weapon systems v/as one of the major contributors to the number of unsuccessful attacks. C. ACQUISITION PHASE (S) Acquisitions of enemy aircraft during the period of the study were primarily visual at close range, and in all quadrants. A method of determining enemy position and direc- tion information at longer ranges would have enabled greater preparedness for aerial combat. At these short ranges « two- thirds of the identifications occurred simultaneously with acquisition. The data suggest that a rioderate increase in acquisition ranges v/ould result in irproved ID ranges within limits of visibility and human vision. Further increase in * acquisition and IL range will require supplementary sensor equipn-.ent. 125 (S) The need for improved rearviard visibility is indi- cated by the several instances recorded in the data where pilots first became aware of MIGs by observing enemy fire from the rear. Although the structure in present fighter aircraft restricts rearward visibility, by employing special formations and maneuvering, the pilots in SEA have achieved 25 percent of their acquisitions in the rear quadrant. (S) When acquisitions resulted in combat, the parameters of acquisition again supported RiD problem areas identified by the qualitative analysis. The short range at acquisition -(median of two miles) caused external stores problems, such as difficulty in jettisoning of external tanks at high speed and Inability to fire certain ordnance with external stores aboard. In addition, the short-range visual acquisitions at ■ all bearings around the fighter aircraft (and with resultant short-range identification) frequently precluded firing of missiles on the first pass at the enemy. This supports the R&D requirement for an improved weapon, which may include a short- range weapon, or an expanded weapon envelope of present weapons, or a snap-shot weapon requiring almost no warmup or preparation time . 0. FIRING PHASE, DAMAGE PHASE (U) Because of the many differences in the two firing modes, gun systems will be discussed independently of missile systems . Gun System Results (S) The results of the analysis of gun firing attempts directly confirm three problem areas isolated by the panels and indirectly support two additional problems. Wea porv Reliability . (S) The F-8 v. as the only gun- carrying aircraft considered oy the paiiels. Twenty-eight per,- cent of these gun- firing atte-pts resulted in a weapon failure. 126 For comparison, the value for the P-105s was percent. While the failure ratio is not a direct measure of reliability. It directly supported need for improved reliability of gun systems in general and the Mk 12 in particular. Snapshot Weapon . (S) Those aircraft with gun systems had a weapon which responded almost instantaneously to the squeeze of the trigger, a snapshot weapon. However, even this fast response system required several seconds for the prop- er use of a computing sight. In this environment, even two seconds is often too long to wait. The alternative was to fire in a noncomputing mode which required the pilot to estimate lead. Han-Hachine . (S) The gun system results give direct evidence of the efects of man-machine incompatibilities which exist in the current v/eapon systems. While the panels con- sidered only the ?-i^/F-8 events, the F-105 events also revealed similar problems. The case in point concerns the F-105 gun« sight which required av/kward switching from the air-to-ground to the air-to-air mode for proper usage of the gunslght. Short-Ranqe Weapons . (S) The gun firing results do not directly support the short-range weapon R&D problem since the problem area was not present as such when guns were carried. However, an estimate of the potential use of a short-range weapon may be interpreted from these results. Expanded lieapon Envelope . (S) The need for an expanded envelope applies more directly to missile systems. However, it was noted that the F-8 gunslg^ht computed an Incorrect lead angle when the aircraft pulled more than 3 g*s, thus reducing the effective envelope of the Mk 12 system. Missile System Resu1 ts (S) The results oi* the analysis of missile firing attempts directly co:irir:r. eight problom areas isolated by the panels. These areas are: 127 wea pon Reliability . (S) While the ratio of missile system failures to firing attempts Is not a direct measure of system reliability, this ratio does support the panel's conclusion that there is a need for an increase in ordnance reliability. Expanded Weapon Envelope . (S) While an expanded envelope . includes an increased maximum range, its primary implication is a reduced minimum range and a broader angular coverage. An appreciation for the effect on missile performance by an incr-ase in weapon envelope may be obtained by comparing the re:iults for the AIM-9B'and the AIM-9D (SIDEWINDER). Other modifications were made but the major change was the increase in missile envelope. (See Appendix B for typical envelope geometries.) While no direct cause and effect relationship can be proven, the data ■strongly suggest that the AIw-9D success is due to its larger envelope. Short-Ranqe Weapon, Decelerati on Capability. (S) Five per- cent of the missile attempts were fired at less than minimum range. While the inclusion of an additional short-range weapon or an improved deceleration capability would not eliminate this problem relative to present missiles. It would provide the pilot with an alternative to the present fire/don't fire dichotomy. . Snapshot Weapon . (S) The lead time required when firing missiles varies from the two or three seconds required for the SIDEWINDER to the six to eight seconds required for the SPARROW. One reason for using the SPARROW boresight firing mode was the fact that it eliminated the time required to obtain a radar lock-on. Al Radar . (S) The missile firing results reflect the need for an improved air intercept radar. First, in several instances a degraded mode was selected over full system mode because ground return precluded radar lock-on. Sixty-five firing attempts in this degraded mode (boresight) resulted in* I :J J n one hit. Second. 17 percent of the AIM-TE missilss, successfully fired within envelope, broke lock. | Han-Machine . (S) The missile firing phase provides, j^everal man-machine problem areas which are enumerated in the data. .Personnel errors, such as firing an AIM-7 with the Jgdar in search, or switches in the head-on mode when firing f?om ?he targ:et'3 rear, as well as the out-of-envelc^pe firings revell the need for improved training or simplified switchclogy. I • The percentage of r.issiles fired out-of-envelope indicates a need for additional training and/or an improved in- envelope indicator.^ •The degree of variation allowed is much less in the^J^ore- sight mode of firing since the radar does "Ot have juto- matic tracking and must be- aimed '"o^i'^e^^^^ «rf Ihe Aircraft maneuvers pull the radar illumination off Jhe. tarBefwit^the resulting loss of AIM-7 guidance information. External Stores . (S) In a few events, an AIM-7 missile could not be launched because of the interference of external stores. These cases are included in Launch Failures cat|gory. E. TERMINATION (U) An examination of the termination phase of thef air-to- air engagement indicated support for the following R&D p,roblems identified through the qualitative analyses. I (S) The most frequent reason for termination — losing contact with the enemy (32 percent) - supports the neecj; to know '(U) Although the AIM-7 weapon system indicates ralniraum ,and maxi- mum rir5nE%anees. the "v""'^-*-°?^»YR-\^^"L are uCnehed' i-ar.3.««- In c^eneral. v;nen tne IR missiles are launcnea. n^enveloof i^fcrSafion is'availatle except as estimated by the n?io? The AI'1.9 system dees no-, indicate proper firirig con- dlt^oAs except for the tone which signifies that the J^sslle ha^^ocked on tc so:ne tar.^et and provides no ranre dat|. The vtl svstem l^n indicate r.axlmurr. and ninimum ranges fo^ the AT" ATM-^D i'-' the rauar is locked on the target Cwhich is norusuallf the^a;er:>o^^^ a^ain only for a nominal 1 g (nonmanc-uverins) target. 1^9 vS,.-. enemy position and direction information. The termination occurred because U.S. aircrews were unable to regain contact, due in part also to lack of visibility and radar search capability. (S) The second. most frequent reason for termination — fuel limits (23 percent) — was caused in part by the necessity / of U.S. aircraft to use fuel to make an identification of friendly aircraft. Therefore, a need for longer range Identifl- catlcn is indirectly supported by this result. (S) Two categories of termination which occurred with small frequency support other of the R&D problems. One case of termination due to lack of usable ordnance was caused by the failure of external stores to Jettison. Those terminations due to SAM defensei directly support the need to extend the capability for operating in a SAM environment. Appendix A ! i I NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR DEFENSE ENVIRONMET^T NOFORN THE NORTH V!ETNAAAESE AIR DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT (C) There have been a number of recent studies* covering various aspects of the air war in north Vietnam (IJVN) and these have included a detailed examination of the air defense envi- ronment. A brief summary of this environment is included to describe the conditions under which the air-to-air fighters operated. (SNP) The NVN air defense system has developed from a rudi- mentary system in 196^1 to a relatively complex, up-to-date, and formidable system in 1967. The weapons employed as part of the air defense system can be classified into three major groups; (1) ground-based guns, (2) surface-to-air missiles, and (3) fighter aircraft. (S) Ground-based guns in NVN range from small arms and automatic weapons to antiaircraft artillery (AAA) consisting of light AAA (37mm and 57mm guns) and medium AAA (85mm and 100mm guns).' Considering the effective range and altitude coverage capabilities of these weapons, only the light and medium AAA weapons offer a serious threat to fighter aircraft on CAP mis- sions. Pertinent characteristics of ground guns are shown in Table A-1. ^(U) a JCS Air Ooerations Study Group — Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pa c t o r" A f ''e c t ^' ^'-^ Cc^.bat A.lr Operations and Aircraft Losses in Southeast AslT lU), ;:ove:aoez> iSbb, TO? 3ECRET/^0r-'0R« . b. Nir^ht song Study Group - ^cin^ Chiefs of itaf., So np;'Study Report (U), Volumes I and II, 30 March 1967. TOP ^^^''^c'^visFG/IDA Studv — Anilvsis oV Combat Aircraft Losses in So utheast ^Asla (U), IDA Hcoort fi-l^.O, WSiiG Kcport 12d, dacea April l9bST r NOFORN Table A-1 ($). SUMMARY OF GROUND GUN CHARACTERISTICS* (U) Weapon Estimated Maximum Effective AAA Range'J (feet) Practical Rate of Fire (Rounds per Minute per Gun) 'I2.7inm heavy machine gun 3,300 80 14.5mm heavy machine gun 4,600 150 37mm gun 5.600 13,100^ 19.700O 80 57mm aun {S-60) 70 85mm gun 27,500 15-20 100mm gun 39,000 15 *Data obtained from DIA publication ST-CS-07-2-67- 1 NT . Anti- Aircraft Gun Sys tems - Eurasian Communist Countries (ur, TMay 196), SECRET/NOFORii. ^As defined by DIA. ^On-carr1age fire control. ^Off-carriage fire control* f the various AAA guns. For the altitude banis of interest (1,000- 30,000 feet) the minimum range for engagement Is approximately 5 n ml and extends out to ap- proximately 17 n mi. This com- plements the 100mm gun which has an estimated maximum effec- tive range of 39,500 feet (ap- proximately 6.5 n mi). (SWF) The SA-2 was initially used in combat in July 1965. Since that time, the number of prepared sites has steadily in- creased to a level of 235 at the end of July, as shown in Figure A-3. These sites are not all occupied; in fact, he approxi- mately 25 SAM battalions* move between these sites on a sched- uled* (but nonpredictaols ) basis. In late 1967, there has been a tendency to concentrate these in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Typically 16 to l8 of the 20 most active sites in a given month have been located within 20 miles of Hanoi. In addition, some SAM sites have been strategically located near the DMZ and Route Package V. The concentration and location of SAM sites has played a definite part in restricting the tactics that were employed by fighter pilots during MIG encounters. (SNF) The enemy fighter inventory, consisting of various versions of the MIG-17 and KIG-21, has remained relatively con- stant during the past two years, as shown in Figure A-^. Since early 1967, v;hen Morth Vietnamese airfields were first bombed, a large part of the MIG-17 inventory has been stationed out of Alt JULY Oa I JAN *W JUIY 0C1 I JAN Af« JUIV Vawai •M-HiMOHMtooiMiv FIGURE A3 (SNF)._ Prepared SAM Sites in NVN (U) ^(U) One battalion occupies one site. NOFOKN 137 3-18-68-6 FIGURE A4(SNF). Ml G Order of Bottle (U) Similarly 50 to 60 percent of the MIQ-21 t--'« the country. 3lnoe September 1967. A8 dla- has been moved out of the ooun y NVN GCI procedure has been observe ^^^^ given in Appendix B. - ■ «T «r 1-he air defense system. 138 of AAA, SAMs, and MIGs In an Integrated fashion. This repre- sents a significant change from the early days of the air war when presence of MIGs v/ould indicate an absence of SAMs and vice versa. U.S. aircraft are faced with SAr4 and AAA defenses as soon as they penetrate the coast line from the east or cross the Red River from the west, indicating coordination between radar surveillance and weapon system selection and command. Furthermore, MIG interceptors contact U.S. aircraft during cloudy as well as clear weather and approach in a manner Indic- ative of radar-initiated Intercept. (S) The Radar Order of Battle (ROB) in NVN consists of a diversified surveillance-radar net and weapon-control radars. The surveillance net is employed for early warning, tracking, and the control of interceptor aircraft. The weapon control radars control the operation of AAA and SAM batteries. As of early August 1967, over ^00 radar sets have been identified^ In NVN Including over 200 early warning/GCI radars, 175 AAA fire control raddrs, and approximately 25 PANSONG B missile control radars. The early warning coverage and EV//GCI radar locations are shown in. Figure A-5. Locations^ of AAA and missile fire control radars are shown in Figures A-6 and A-7. The figures point out the heavy concentration of weapon-control radars in the Hanoi-Haiphong target complex. The radar deployment. In terms of number of equipments and wide frequency diversity, is particularly impressive. (S) In a concurrent IDA/WSEG study, ^ the U.S. electronic countermeasures (ECM) effort in N\'N has been analyzed. ECM is extensively employed by the U.S. to degrade the effectiveness of the NVN radar surveillance net and weapon control radars. ^(U) Source: Defense Intelligence Agency, 26 July 1967. ^(U) These are locations on a particular date (9 August 1967) and vary with time. \u) Op.cit. 1^0 FIGURE A5 (S). Rcdar inventor/ North Viotnom (U) u 0 0 e 0 ; G i 0 0: S:J O' 0 0, j 0 n I 0- NOFORN ECH operations i. NVN are of two types: standoff Jamming and self-protectlHG Ja:-.ins. Standoff Jam.alne, using special- purpose aircraft (e.c. EB-66. EA-3B. and EA-IP) in orbits out- Side of the hleh threat zone, is directed at the air environment and is intended to protect penetrating U.S. forces by denying the ener.y efficient use of his radar sensors. Self- protective jan..mlng. on the other hand, is carried on board the penetrator and is designed to protect the penctrator against the terminal defenses, i.e.. the SAI* and radar controlled AAA. (5) It was concluded in the referenced study that although jamming can prevent successful tracking of flights radars, the combined radar net is generally capable of maintain • ing an accurate trac. of penetrating fli^.ts. Thus successful GCI operations are well within the capability of the NVN air defense system, as evidenced by typical MIG approach profiles. These profiles are described in the MIG tactics section. (SNP) Typical NW reaction' to th. U.S. standoff Jamming eff rt was to concentrate radar activities in bands not Jammed at a particular time; also they frequently changed frequencies In order to evade the Jamming. An effective ECCM employed by HVN was the activation of two BAR LOCK radars, one near Ha p hong With early warning coverage well out over '^J j;^" / and one in the western part of Route Package V with EW/GCI Toterage at least 90 n mi Into Laos. This effectively covered refueung tracks and Yankee Station. This action may have reflected an NVN evaluation of: « r^T>PP•^se Ions-range early warning and • Tu^v^nilnce Lrability ?° t:-ir air defense system. . The effectiveness of Ea-66 standoff Jamming against the lower frequency raoars, , *-i,„> Invulnerability of the high-powered • ritlbet^TAR'SocHIdar to^ide-lobe Jamming. li a Q Q 0 Q Q 8 0 0 Q 8 B 0 0 .,.n>lo. ««• BAH LOCK/BIO 0»» typ« «' ■■•■'=>■ " ••"•••>"' " .p,™xl.»t.l, 8 h~r= » M=o~ op.mion.l Ti.r -o.- i„, on .It,. Th. t™cl.-».m.d »«CE rMu-, "M«» W „ . e» tlU.r, b. lut in »,«P.tlO« 1» .W" 1» -l"""- -^t rmmtries , Vol. II, DIA hu\ RoHar. f ^t>.^^k^^;. ) --^-..>-o q-t iin Corrjiup. i 3 1 Countries, '.o ilLllTm. ST-HB:ot,:ol-6o June 196.. SECRbT. Its UNGLASS:ri£D Appendix B AIRCRAFT AND ORDNANCE I. INTRODUCTION (U) The purpose of this appendix Is to describe the varl ous air-to-air weapons used during the study period. The description of ordnance types is not meant to be exhaustive; however, those operating characteristics which are pertinent t the analysis are briefly covered. The general characteristics of the aircraft types most commonly involved in air-to-air combat are also given. II. GUN SYSTEMS (U) The characteristics of the various gun systems employed in the air-to-air battles in Southeast Asia are pre- sented 3n Table B-1, for both U.S. and enemy. (S) The weight shown for each gun is the- individual weapon weight and is not that of the total installation. 3y a compari- son of the firing rate and the number of rounds carried, it is evident that the F-^l gun systems have potentially twice the fir- ing time as that of enemy gun systems, ■ (S) The M-61, when employed in the P-^*C and F-UD aircraft, Is carried externally in a pod. This installation is called the SUU-16/A or SUU-23, with the major difference being that the SUU-23 pod uses internal aircraft power instead of a ram air turbine. The maximum effective range for all of the guns is about 3000 feet. (S) For proper aiming of the gun systems, particularly at the longer ranges (>1000 feet) a signt is necessary to direct Table B-1 (S). GUN SYSTEM (U) Cun Systen Gun Weight lbs Muzzle Velocity Ft/Sec Firing Rate Rounds per Hinute Installation Aircraft Type Kk-12 zona 101 3200 1000 F-8 F-105 N-61 20ra 2(0 3200 6000 F-4C F>4D 23nn B3 2250 800 HIG-17 37ffln 232 22S0 400 HIG-17 HR«30 30ma 1S1 3200 700 H1G-2K Nunber of Guns Rounds per 'Gun 100 1029 II 1200 I! 1200 I. 80 |l 40 80 Mhe MI6*17 cirrles both guns stnuUaneously. the aimpoint In order to compensate for the bullet flight p^th. However, several seconds (2-3) are necessary for the sight com- putations to be conducted and smooth tracking of the target lis required for this time period. The gun firing delay Is short, however. The response time of the SUU-16 pod, from trigger, pull until the first round has left the barrel is 0.2 second. Within 0.^ second the gun has achieved full firing rate. (S) The F~^C was initially armed with the M-6l cannon air-to-air use in May 1967, installed externally as the SUU;jjl6/A gun pod. However, a lead-computing sight was not available for target tracking. The F-^ID, when armed with the M-61, utilizes the SUU-23 pod and Is equipped with a computing sight. (S) All F-8s are armed with the Mk-12 cannon system and all F-105 aircraft carry an Internally mounted M-61 cannon.! Both aircraft have a computing sight. The F-8 sight, however, computes insufficient lead over 3s. for 150 I. III. AIR -TO-AIR MISSILES (S) The major characteristics of the missile ordnance that has teen employe, in S.A are siven in Tahle ^-^^ - sue Side vieus are shown to the same scale. Some additional pertinent characteristics of each missile type are discussed below. A. SPARROW AIM-7D AND E (S) T^e AIM-7 SPARROW was the only 0.5. radar guided mls- .iie s!d. and it existed in two ma,or variants and AIM-TE. both Of Which were carried by the ^-^^'^l'';'' 'J^; v,as the earlier variant used until ear y 6' Which "it was retired from conbat use. The major difference be ween the D and E model, was that the AIM-7D could only be f!red at targets for which the closing velocity was greater than t e bo:t 150 .nots). while that of the AIM-7E is minus 300 Knots (i.e.. opening). In addition, the AI.WD generally had less maximum ran.^e than the AIM-7E. (S) Because it experienced a much greater number of combat firings, than the AIH-7D. the remaining discussion "J" fined to the AIH-7E. Since the AIM-7 employs a semiactive guld- sy t the target must bo illuminated by the -dar antenna Tf the attac.in. aircraft until missile intercep . ^° -^"^^^ radar illumination the aircraft must be pointed o within 0 IL target If the missile is fired when the. radar is in the ore— (antenna caged> to the aircraft centerline) then the llunch aircraft must be pointed exactly at the target. \u) AliEneci and fixed Table B2 (S). MISSILE ORDNANCE (U) nANfOIlM CUIt>ANC( lYK WtlGHF CM WAKHEAO WIICHT (UOIUS OF tool FUZE I- MM-7D SPA.WOW SEMI-AOIVC RADAR 402 AS l> ROD/MR ROX AND CONTACT MM-7E SfMKOW SEMI -ACTIVE 4M 71 lIROO/aSfT 1 KOXAND CONTACT i AIM-«ft SIOEWINOER ■ ^ IR 164 2SUtLAST FRAG nOXAND COMPACT AlM-90 SIOEWINOW t* lU 2SlltOe/17PT 1 PROX AND CONTAO AIM-40 FALCON » 134 7uiusr CONTACT O^N>V ATOU aa: (USSS) B > IR 140 HASf FIAO FVOX AND CONTACT AUCAU AAI (USttt ^'^^^ K> ^ tCAM IIMR IBO U.U FROX AND CONTACT (S) The AIM-7E has the following sequence of ever degrad- ing modes of operation. • (1) The first Is full system lock where botii range and angle tracUinc of the target are provided to the missile as well as closing velocity. In this case, if interlocks are "In" the missile cannot be fired unless the launch paranieters satisfy computed firing envelop3s. •(2) This mode is the same as Mo. 1 except Interlocks are "out;" that is, the missile may be fired at any time, even though the system docs not indicate that the proper Ir.unch conditions have been satisfied (launch within computed paraTietcrs and aim-dot within allowable steering error circle). (S) In all remaining modes, the system operates as If the Interlocks were "out." (S) Modes 3, *l and 5 are categorized as boreslght firings. In these, the radar antenna Is caged to the centerllne of the aircraft and Illumination to the target is provided by the pilot sighting on the target with a fixed pipper. The radar antenna is then pointed at the target. • (3) A system lock may be achieved under boresight con- ditions so that while angle track is not being pro- . vided (the antenna remains caged) closing velocity and range can be fed to the missile. • (^) Boresight firing can be accomplished with the target aspect switch (when it is Installed). In this type of firing, although the missile does not receive the true closing velocity and range information, the target aspect sv/itch permits a false closing velocity to be fed to the missile and the missile speed gate will then search for the target return over a narrow band about the input closing velocity. •(5) Boresight launch with missile speed gate in wide sweep. . This means that .the missile speed gate is sweeping over the entire spectrum of possible target return. This was the most frequent mode of boresight firing during the study period. • <6) Launch of the missile v/hile the radar in the search mode. In this situation, 'the missile is launched v;hiie the radar is in its normal search pattern; that is, sweeping back and forth. This Is Is purely a ballistic rocket. (S) While boresisht firings were not successful, the use of the radar antenna caged in boresight to achieve acquisition . and lock was extremely useful in combat. With the antenna caged in boresight. the target return appeared on the scope in a pye- dlctable manner- (particularly in a maneuvering environment) , : therefore enhancing acquisition. (S) In some of the late model P-Hs automatic switching, has been provided to go from boresight to full system, and in this situation, upon achieving a locK onto the target the ^ radar locked in the boresight mode, the system will automatically switch to a full track. On the F-1 models covered during the period of the RED BARON study, this automatic feature was no^t available and a switch had to be activated by the backseater^ In order to go from the boresight lock on to a full system sltna- tion; that is. go from either modes 3. «• or 5 to either 1 or 2. Frequently, during this operation, the system would break lock. (S) AH air-to-air combat Is predicated on actions an^ reactions which are dependent on the enemy actions. In a maneu- vering situation the only method of determining enemy actions was visual. This is true for the employment of all weapons under discussion and the crew of the launching aircraft Is 1^ likely to experience considerable difficulty keerlng the target in sight during hard maneuvering close-in combat. This is specifically mentioned in the case of the AIH-7 to emphasize that although there can be radar Inputs, visual contact muS;t still be maintained. Also, if the radar gimbal angles were exceeded, visual contact was necessary for reacquisitlon. (S) A problem experienced by the AIM-7 is that the AN/APA- 157 computer only gives the proper firing solution for targets under nominal 1 s niz^l. Therefore, against maneuvering targets, the computed launch envelopes are not an accurate AIM 7E SPARROV/ TARGET VELOCITY, MACH 0.9 UUNCH VELOCITY, MACH 0.9 ALTITUDE, SEA LEVEL 3g TAftCn 7 US N TO LEFT 3-20-68-2 TARGET CENTERED COORDINATES FIGURE Bl (S). AIM 7E Missile Lounch Envelope (U) indication of whether or not the aircraft has achieved satis- factory launch conditions. Figure B-1 gives an AIM-7E launch envelope* The envelope is shown in target centered coordinates and Is for a cospeed attack at sea level against a target T— (U) Tne ]aunch envelopoc shov.n are the kinematic launch bound- aries and ar.sume that the nissile has been launched under specified Initial conditions (vclocit;;, altitude, rancre and bearing from the tarj;et). The boundary so defined represents those conditions wherein an Interccct is possible. Joint USU/ USAF ?ro.:o'^t for Invo.icl ^gt j or. of ^tm- - ^ yip3 j i es A ^-n TTvit Mane^rvorinv: Tarr et. rinii Heport 0/V n'i, , COMO PTEVrXK ' 39 30-0/^'- ^9 Ser 00101, 1 Au^^ust 1966, ZliCR-iT. turnlnc at 3 g. The area represented gives the permissible azimuth-range combination for launching the missile. .(S) The minimum range for the AIM-7E Is a complex inter- action of the time to arm and the satisfaction of certain guid- ance inputs. The AIM-7 missile is the only one which does not have a lock before launch. The missile speed gate must be locked on the target for at least two seconds before the fuze is enabled lock can occur about one second after launch. Therefore, about three seconds are required after launch for proper fuze activa- tion. A better consideration of the minimum range would be the total time from system lock on (when the attack display appears on the scope) until the missile Is completely armed. About four seconds are required after the attack presentation appears before all information has been fed to the missile. Trigger squeeze before that time has elapsed can mean that the missile will not achieve proper guidance. Prom the time that the trigger is squeezed, about 1.25 seconds elapses before the missile leaves the aircraft. Therefore, from attack presentation to missile launch can take as much as five seconds. This delay, of course. Is not normally included in the launch envelope presentation. However, since the times involved are relatively long at nominal closing velocities, the minimum range can be significantly altered by the Inclusion of these time delays. These delays were excessive for some of the situations which developed in the air-to-air ctmbat in Southeast Asia. (S) When fired in the boresight mode, the required four second time delay between lock and trigger squeeze is not present (since no lock is achieved). However, in this mode the missile speed g.ite searches for the target return over the entfre range of closing velocities. Therefore, the missile requires a longer time in which to achieve a lock. Because of the additional time it takes to search for the target, and the fact that due to the frequency of ground return, the missile will frequently lock on to this instead of the target return, the boresight mode firings have severe limitations. ' B. SIDEWINDER AIM-9B (S) The AIM-9B is an Infrared (IR) homing missile. It was used by the USAP on the F-^IC aircraf t in addition to the AIM-7 armament. Until December I966 it was sporadically carried on F-105 aircraft. After that date, It v/as standard practice to carry some in each flight. The USN uses AIM-9B on both the F-AB and P-8 aircraft. (S) This infrared missile uses a simple aiming system and is sighted by the pilot throuGh a fixed pipper. There is some latitude of aiming error since the field of view of this missile is 2.5° and the seeker is caged to the missile centerline. Due to the pointing requirement, the launch aircraft must fly a pursuit course at firing. This, coupled with an IR seeker, requires a stern quarter attack. V/hen locked on to the teu?get, an audio tone is received by the pilot. The tone, however, is not indicative of the missile launch envelope. (S) The missile leaves the launch rails about one second after- trigger squeeze and the" trigger must remain depressed throughout this entire time. (S) Due to the size of the launch envelope (restricted in part by the 25* half angle gimbal limit of the seeker) severe launch restrictions are present against maneuvering targets. Because the launch envelope for the AIN-9B is roughly a cone extending from the tail of the target, the envelope swings to the outside of the target's turn as it maneuvers. If the target maneuvers strenuously, the launch envelope may disappear com- pletely. It should be noted that in aerial combat to be on the outside of a turn is unfavorable to the attacker. (S) A launch envelope for the AIM-9B against a 3 g target is shown in Figure B-2.^ The minimum range is due to the safety *(U) NAVAIRSYSCOM, "Air-Launched Missile Bulletin 32, Attach- ment 1," 7 October 1?C6, 3ECHET. FIGURE B2 (S). AIM 9B Missile Lounch Envelope (U) and arm, and the proximity fuze does not arm until motor burn out (two seconds after launch). The seeker of the AIM-9B detects IR radiation in the 1.8-2.7 micron oand and therefore can receive unwanted IR radiation from the clouds and ground. C. SIDEWINDER AIM-9D i. (S) The AIM-9D is a much different missile than the AIM-9B, although they both use IR homing for guidance. The AIR-9D has a greatly enlarged launch envelope and performance capability, as well as a different v/arhead. The IR seeker is cooled fori added sensitivity, and senses IR radiation in the 2.7-3.7 micron band. The gimbal limits of the seeker have been in- i - creased to 40 degrees. ' hjii^}^ FIGURE B3 (S). AIM 9D Missile Launch Envelope (U) (S) The launch sequence is similar to the AIM-9B vjith an audio tone indicative of the missile lock onto a target. Due to the sensitivity of the seeker, hov;ever, there is some launch capability from all aspects of the target if the target is emit- ting sufficient IR radiation. (S) An approximate launch envelope against a 3 g target is shovm in Figure While a considerable head-on inter- cept capability is shown, this assumes a suitable IR source, which may not be available' against some types of targets. \u) ::OTS, "AIM-'lD/AIM-93 Cc.r.p arisen Kc-port," August 196^1, (S) The AIM-9D Is only used by the USN and Is carried on both F-i*B and F-8 aircraft. D.. FALCON AIM-4D (S) The AIM-ilD was introduced into the theater with the arrival of F-^D aircraft in June 1967. Although it is an fR homing missile, its operation is more complex than that ofi the SIDEWINDER. (S) The optimum launch situation is in conjunction with a radar lock on the target. In this case the missile IR see|cer is slaved to^ the AI radar (unlike that of the SIDEWINDER which is caged in boresight), and the missile can then be fired f*lth lead as computed by the fire control system. In general, jthe rapidly changing combat situation precludes this mode of ' operation. (S) Firing with lead but without radar lock can be a,ccom- plished by uncaging the missile IR seeker and allowing It to track the target. This mode of firing requires locking on! to the target with the missile seeker caged, and then verifying lock on by a change of audio tone as the trigger is squeezed. Once the lock is verified, the seeker can be uncaged and lead pulled as estimated by the pilot. Even this mode had limited utility in the SEA combat environment experienced over the: period of .the study. i (S) The missile can also be fired much like the SIDE- WINDER, with the seeker caged on the aircraft on a pure pursuit course-. However, since the missile is not fired with lead, the performance envelope shrinks . (S) Figure B-H^ shows launch envelopes for the AIM-ilD both with and without lead against a maneuvering target. The larger *(U) Unpublished oerformance curve from Analytic Services,; Inc., June 1967, SECRET. 160 FIGURE B4 (S). AIM 4D Missile Lcunch Envelope (U) envelope is for firing vfith proper lead while the smaller two areas at the nose and tail of the target represent the launch envelope when the missile is fired with minimum lead. The mis- sile arms when motor burn out occurs after 1.^1 second of flight. Also, full guidance does not occur until that time. The AIM-^D has no proxip.ity fuze and therefore must hit the target to detonate the warhead. (S) The IR seeker of the AIM-^D is cooled and is sensitive in the 3.8-5,M micron band. The seeker has a field of view of 6. 5. degrees and gii^-bal limits of kB degrees. (G) The AIM-'ID suffers from an operational restriction due to the limited amount of coolant available to any missile. The coolant flow Is continuous and, once activated, cannot be stopped. The AIM-^ID requires three seconds to be brought Ito ready state from total quiesence. It then can be fired In, an additional one second, during a succeeding two-minute Interval. Once the two-minute period Is exceeded, the missile is I effectively dead. IV. ENEMV MISSILES (S) MIG aircraft have been observed firing missiles, unguided rockets and guns. Doth MIG-17 and MIG-21 aircraft have fired missiles although it was not possible to determine the missile type in all cases. Air-to-air rockets, carried in external pods, have been fired by both MIG-17 and MIG-21 ' aircraft. (S) The enemy missile types observed over the period of the study were: •AA-1 ALKALAI - radar beam rider •AA-2 ATOLL - IR homing (S) The AA-1 ALKALAI launch envelope is shown in Figure The launch envelope of the AA-2 ATOLL is similar to that of -the AIM-9B since the ATOLL is a direct copy of that missile. V. AIRCRAFT is) The major aircraft types involved in SEA air-to-air combat are shown in Figures B-6 and B-7. The .drawings are to scale. There are several variants of each type, but their external configurations are almost identical. The most obvious external difference is that displayed between the various FISH- BED C (or E) and FISHBED D since the latter is equipped with a large centerbody in the intake, housing AI radar, v/hich enlarges the fuselage nose. ^(U) USAP Foreign Technology Division, "FRESCO (r.:iG-17) Weaoons System," FTD-CS-09-5-67 . 13 July I967. SKCRET. ^^eapons FIGURE B5 (S). ALKALAl Missile Lgunch Envelope (U) (U) The figures also show the following characteristics: •Maximum gross weight (pounds) • Normal air-to-air ordnance carried (less frequently carried, additions in parentheses) • Maximum Mach at altitude • Maximuin velocity at sea level (knots) •Ratio of maximum sea level static thrust to combat weight (T/W) • Ratio of combat weight to wing area (W/S) (S) The P-i* exists In three major variants, the F-^IB, used by the USN, and the F-^IC and D used by the USAP. The P-^IB has a slightly different radar and the backseat, unlike that of; the P-IC and D, is not configured with flight controls. U.S. F-I05D GROSS WEIGHT AIR TO AIR ORDNANCE 29675 NVN MIG-21 FISHBED 16300 NVN MIG-17 FRESCO 3-26-68-19 1 SIDEWINDER 1029 ROUNDS 4 AIM-9 4 AlM-7 (SUU-16 POD, 1200 ROUNDS) 2 AIM-9 400 ROUNDS 2 ATOU . 123 ROUNDS 200 ROUNDS (2 ATOLL) FIGURE B6 (S). Aircraft Characteristics (U ) U.S. F-105D MAXMACHATALT COMBAT MAX SL VELOCITY 2.1/no U.S. F-4 2.15/710 U.S. F-8 1.7/651 .745 92.5 7, .79 81 / urn- — .69 69 NVN MIG-21 . 2.0/595 NVN MlG-17 FRESCO .97/574 .88 58 .64 44 3*26-68-20 FIGURE B7 (S). Aircraft Characteristics (U) (S) The majority of F-105 aircraft involved with MIGs were the P-105D. The other variant vxas the two-seat P-105P> configured to locate SAM sites. (S) During the early period of the war (1965), USAF F-M aircraft were painted with light grey tops and white bottoms. The F-105 aircraft were silver. By 1966, however, all USAF fighters were camouflaged with tan and two shades of green on upper surfaces and white underneath. Except for a few air- craft which were camouflaged for only a short period of time, all USN aircraft exhibited the standard grey color on upper surfaces and white underneath. (S) MIG-17 aircraft were initially either silver or a dull grey except for a few Isolated contacts which were painted odd colors. Later in the war the MI0-17s were encountered with camouflage paint schemes. The MIG-21S, except for a few rare cases, have been silver, either natural or painted. I, INTRODUCTION (U) This appendix is Included: •To afford perspective as to the precision, limitations, and usefulness of the data used in the project; and •To document the somev;hat unique experience of the RED BAROM Project, for its value to ether projects in the future . (U) The appendix contains a description of the rationale and nethodology used in defining and acquiring the needed data and t-rxnlains, in detail, the data collection techniques, v/hich involved primarily the interviev/ing of air combat participants. II. BACKGROUND - GOALS AND LIMITATIONS (C) In nursuit of the basic task, which v/as to "analyze air-to-air encounters...," the goal formulated for the data definition/collection effort was to obtain sufficient data to en.ible reconrir. ruction of the encounters in appropriate detail with maximum, accuracy and completeness. (C) The scope and detail of the necessafy data were not simoly defined, for they had to meet the needs of the R&D community, and yet recognl::e the limitations of the available data. The rrir.ary limitation had to do, of course, v;ith hum.^n ability to ."ensc and recall. There v/ere no real-time recording devices in U.;".. aircraft, and therefore, v;ith fev; exceptions (such as taped comnuni cations and photographs), all data had to be recalled by participants and observers. (C) There was also the question of adequacy for project use of the data reported from Southeast Asia via the standard reporting system. By September 1966, when the RED BARON Pro- ject was organized, ' ;EG/IDA had accumulated some significant experience with regard to the SEA air war and its R&D aspects. Field Representatives, both military and civilian, had been carrying out detailed R&D-oriented studies in the combat the- ater for more than a year. They had dealt at length with all levels of command from CINCPAC down to the smallest oper- ating unit* Various study documents on :he air war had been published and other studies were being conducted.* Important points which stood out in these documents and which were- clear in the minds of the Field Representatives had to do with the Inadequacy for R&D purposes of combat data being reported through the standard reporting systems. Indeed, data Inadequacy provided the need for existence of Field Representatives. (C) Most of the combat reporting systems, and appropri- ately so, were' operationally rather than R&D oriented and did not have the detail or completeness needed by the R&D community. The few R&D-dlrected reports were generally incomplete, and there were alv;ays events which, due to the press of the situation in the combat theater, v;ere never reported at all, or were reported inaccurately. The tremendous reporting burden already imposed upon the operating forces and the existing orientation of reporting personnel precluded meaningful emphasis on the initiation of reports of real value to the R&D scientists. ^(U) Published v/ere: V/5EG Keport 90, Prelinlni.'ry Analysis of Com- bat Air Qperatlc ns in Southeast Asia (U) , TOP SHCHiT, Nov. 1965 ; V.'Sii Q Heport lOi, Heculret.'cnus of Dv'fcp.se R&D Agencies for Data fron Ccr tii^z Air Oper at: icns ir _S o u ^heast Asia ( U) , SECRET, Aug. i9£fc, '■■.'SiiG He-rof:; 103 > Int:erdicr ion of the Ko Chi M mh Tr^.:i (U) SECRET riOFORH, Auf^. 19co; numerous and various staiT s":v.dies a£soclat2:.T , 1. Veather, enroute and on ..tat ion. 2* Equlpnent malfuneticns prior to cnfaj:enent. ' 3* Readiness eonditlcn of weapons systers (warn-up, etc.). 1. Deviations fror. r.ls^lon plan. Reasons for deviation. 5< Inbound refuellr.g. 6. Radar scale and search pattern. 7. Coir.T.unlcatlon frcsi/to ot:i«r aircraft or surface craft. ' 8. Aircraft flight condition (aitltu:s-a?er (looking outside, at scope). 2'!. Electronic wamlr.r, 25' Effect or early vimlng on engagenent. 26. En<»rjy tactics. 27. KIC wanilnc;, if received, and fror. wh.OB. 28. Descrlpilor of er.or.y aircraft type(s): Kodcl (e.g., y.-.i'.rT?. £). Exterr.al sto:'" ;onrifl;uraticn. Amapent, r.lsslles, (nuT.cer, type, losatlcn, alr^to-alr rocket p'.ds). L;c3tl:n cn A ii-u »M^9t Description of vehicle Support provide by other air or aurfaee sources* 4. Plan an<: Inter.ted taetlss. 5. Effect of weather cn 'actlca. 6. Eneny tattle and r.ar.euvers . 7. Uae of r.'Jtual support p^slil^" of winRsan. 8. Relative pos'tien, sic:/ ?oc!e bearing of eneisy aircraft and r.elN3d cf d-terr.lrln^ dlstancea f.-aiar, visual). 9. Changes in aircraft store condition (itores» tank, configuration] . 10. Description of cineuvers for each aircraft. 11. Haeh nurber ( Indicated) atteicpted and held. 12. "C" :^-vils t.llcl J^rlr.? r.:_-:i:uv.TS . criiililo poner liriltstlor.3) r-jritlcn cf -.-r.ciiver. (S-jf feting) . 13. Altitudes during the ra.'.L-uvera . 14. Use of afterturner. (Juration, adequacy of AB eodulatlon control) . 15. Firing by ener.y (type and hits). 1$. Chances in r:3ne'jvering (e.g., nole in tall). 17. Backse^ter z^slscance. 18. Effect on cnscy of no SCI control. 19. Attenpta to ret Into flrlns envelope. EXPEMDIT'JRE OP ORDHAHCE 1. First flrlnfi (U.S, or enerry). 2. Ordnance expended {U.3. e:;e:^y>, range, attitude, target angle "b"3, TiT.euver Involved at tiza of flrlns, weapon closest point of approach. 3. Firing cnvelcpe (reaay llc^t on nisslle, position in envelope) . 1. Airspeed (ln;ilC3ted .Vic^:) and position of each aircraft. 5. freflrlr.s :J:eci<9 corviete. 6. Duration if trigger i-^v-, 7. Counterre\.v,;r9S used f^y ener.y anrf u.3.> against firing. 8. Cessation ;f rirlng, pian of flrln?. 9. Direction of the attack (ty vhom). 10. Coanunlcatlcn arottg oa^^cseater, pilot, and other aircraft, and eorxiunleaclon procler.s. 11. Hits on enery (where? w«5h what?). 12. Gun al-lr.g (Cli gunsli^c give proper lead?) 13- Visual loss of target d'-irins £un act up. lU. Weapons perforr.ance (Did w-acon zulds? - Vaa there a look-on? How long befcre flrln? was lock-on obtained? Old weather degrade anv weapon sys^er.7). 15. SID£WIN:^P. tone at firing. 16. Duration of .-un burst, 17. Equlprent or weapons nalfunctlons . IB. Action* of eneir.y aircraft after hit/fire, what color, s'^oke. cxpioslonz. pieces ieavine aircraft, pilot eject, ■ damaee ir.echanisr!? ) . 19 > Conflrraticn of kill. TERMINATICtJ OF EN'CAGir^ENT (Egress and postfllg-nt inspection} 1. Termination of enragerent (ef.*r.y, friendly). 2. Reason for t'>rr.lr.a^lcn : dl!»n;-:iscr.ent) . 3. Initial nisslcn 2c:o-.pil:r.r.Ent . 4. Fuel state at cn-i of enparercnt. 5. Location at end of engagement. 6. Location of oth^r airaraft in the area. 7. Aircraft conrir.:ratlcn a: end (weaptr.s regaining, store). 8. Nur.ber of raunds left, 9. Heider.tlflcatlon of flight. 10, PostrilG->t :heck3 perforr^d, and status of systet&s. -66-2\ (2 or 2) Data Collection (C) The very detailed information which the Project wished to collect and the shortcomings of the standard report- ing systems, necessitated some unique data collection effort. In addition to all possible documentation on air-to-air encoun- ters j It was determined that the primary source of data for the Project would be those individuals themselves Involved in alr-to-alr events. The Project determined to actively Inter- view those participants and obtain firsthand accounts by which to reconstruct the mission in detail. (C) The Data Collection Program then involved several interrelated procedures: •Identification of air-to-air encounters and the 'participants. •Continuing definition of specific data needs and resolution of needs with the limitations in acquiring data. •Collection of appropriate documentary Information on Southeast Asia air-to-air encounters. •Development of optimum interview techniques. •Location of participants and arrangements for inter- vlev/lng them. These operations were not necessarily sequential and they were continued throughout the Data Collection Phase. (C) Encounters v;ere identified through a search of exist- ing documentation, various formally and informally maintained "box scores" and other files, and early information was gained from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the USA? Air Staff. Additional basic documentation came from the USAP Tactical Fighter V/eapons Center, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACA?, CQM- NAVAIHPAC, and the Commander, 7th Air Force. It was quickly determined that the various "box scores" did not agree. This was attributed to a variance in definition of what constituted an air-to-air encounter/engagement and possibly administrative, or communications failures within the commands. •I ID fQ Q 0 Q 0 0 n 0 (C) Additionally, early in the f*tudy, the CNO and the Chief of Staff, USAF, were advised of Project RED BARON and reque:^Ued to provide reference to appropriate documentation. \ p' "Numerous replies v;ere received from various offices v/ithin the 1^ Services. Gradually, sources of documented information were I increased until they Included: standard reporting system li (Oi'REPs, COACT, Mavy 3^80-^ Reports, Guided Missile Perfor- mance Reoorts); various reoorts of associated studies made by |}( OEG representatives and other analytical groups; letters from * aircrev;men v/ho could not be Interviewed; various records kept t n at all levels of command; gun-camera films, tapes of communl- 1 cations made by aircrewmen; and miscellaneous message traffic among military commands. (C) Identification of participants was a particular prob- lem since there was no existing mechanism for providing this information. V/ith relatively few exceptions, names of partic- i. - ipants v^ere not included in standard reports. However, names I y were e;radually acquired through infornial communications with USN and USAF aircrewmen and, as the interviev; program proceeded, other persona were identified by the intervlev/ecs . (U) There were potential problems involved with the inter- view program. The problem.s were related to such considerations as the human ability to recall stressful Incidents and the effect of elapsed time between the event and the attempt to recount it. . Also large numbers of people throughout the world had to be interviewed, great quantities of interview data had to be reduced, and time and manpower had to be considered. ■ (U) Considerable time and effort were devoted to develop- ing interviev/ techniques. At an early point in the Project IDA psychologists, H. V/. Sinaiko and VJ. Richard Kite, were called in as consultants. They continued to work with the P -^ject through the phase of development of interview proce- dures. An interview program was designed which would allow 177 MiHdriiMiliiiUiiiMdyiiHi ■ )t the greatest number of interviews, while maximizing the quality, depth, and scope of Information obtained from each interviey. (U) The basic interview concept stressed unhurried j; informality, anonymity of the interviewee, a chronological approach to the entire flight in question (not just the air- to-air encounter period of it), and use of visual aids (maps, sketches, airplane models) to reconstruct events. i (U) A systematic prograri was developed to interview a ■. maximum number of participants in the combat theater and throughout. CONUS and Europe. Since there was little chance "to control' the elapsed time between event and interview, the elapsed time varied from a few days to more than one year. ' (U) The efficiency of the interview effort was approached in various ways. Several levels of encounter were deflned| according to complexity and intensity,^ and the basic inter- view procedure was somewhat expanded or abbreviated according to the level of encounter and the knowledge of the interviewee. Data formats were devised which attempted to facilitate th^ recording' (and subsequent reduction) of information while i stimulating the memory of the interviewee. ^ (U) In a]l, ten persons were trained as interviewers.;. Because of the specialized techniques developed for and by the Project and the type of data desired, considerable effort 'was required in training proficient debrief ers. At the start, various test interviews were conducted, their results evalu- ated, and Improvements made before a large scale program was undertaken. Minor changes in procedure were made through(^ut the program. (U) Although the Project wanted to interview a maximum number of aircrewmen, the overriding aim was coverage of the ^(U) Sirhtin^ only (visual or radar); either side taking hostile or evafive action; expenditure of ordn..nce by either side; . loss or danage by either side. largest number of the more meaningful class of encounters. Consequently, where a choice had to be made as to whom to interview, breadth of coverage and type of encounter were the primary considerations. For comprehensiveness, attempts were also made to interview all participants of each encounter. Where it was possible to ooraraunlcate with a participant but not practical or possible to interview him, he was contacted by mail. UilClASSiFiED IV. THE INTERVIEW PROCEDURE (U) Although small changes evolved and flexibility was Introduced to accommodate individual situations, the basic interview procedure remained largely constant after the early test cases. The interviews sought to reconstruct the events in as much detail and as accurately as possible, and to in- clude the items of information formulated by the Project (as presented in Table C-1), This, listing was used as a guide for discussion, not as a rigid set of requirements or as a ques- tionnaire from v/hich specific questions should be asked. Early experience and study by the Project had shoiifn that the inter- rogation should allow the subject to tell his story as he lived it, and for the interviewer to occasionally interject questions of interest. (U) An important aim of the interviews was to identify why certain aspects of the events occurred in the manner de- scribed. It was felt that the most value in identifying R&D lessons learned lay in answering the why questions. If the reconstruction provided good answers to the items in Table C-1 the reasons why many parts of the event occurred as they did should be identified. (■J) Ideally, the interviewee was given advance notice and a general idea of what would be discussed. The interview team consisted of two persons, one a military aircrev/man with a significant amount of flying experience and the other a mili- tary officer or civilian. The team would meet with one crew- man at a time in a closed room, with minimum distraction, and with what was intended to be more than ample time allotted for UIICLAS£i?iE9 181 UUCinSSiFlED the meeting. The team attempted to create an air of relaxed Informality, (Uj The interview that followed was permitted to vary somewhat in detail depending on the complexity of the encoun- ter and knowledge of the interviewee, but the basis procedure was always used. This consisted of some explanation to the aircrewman, a narrative account of the event by the aircrew- man, a detailed sketch of flight paths with accompanying notes, a final review of the whole encounter and a period in which the aircrewman was encouraged to comment in general on the event and related subjects. * (U) The interviewee was given an explanation of the study, how it came about, what It hoped to accomplish, and what his role was to be. To encourage frank and honest answers, it was emphasized that the interviewee's name would not appear in print and that, in general, attempts would be made to preserve his anonymity. The complete interview procedure was explained in detail. (U) The aircrewman was then asked to give his background and an uninterrupted narrative of the encounter in question. . He was asked to start from planning for the mission and to discuss all aspects of the flight through its return to base. He was given examples of the kind of detail desired. Early in the project it became standard practice for the interviewers to use a tape recorder for the narrative phase with the Inter- -viewee's consent, of course, and his understanding that he could eraso anything he Isht-d from the tape. He was assured that the tape was used only to gain complete, accurate infor- mation from the meeting and that its use was limited to the project. ;-. (U) Following the aircrewman' s narrative of the entire mission, the event was again reconstructed with careful at- tempts to record all situations and circumstances in very great detail. 182 UI^CLASSinED (U) In this detailed phase, depending on the intensity and complexity of the encounter, some type of sketch of the action was made. The detailed sketch covered not only the air-to-air encounter itself, but also ingress and egress. For the sketch, a transparent papor overlay was placed on a large scale map^ and the paths of the various aircraft known to have been present were traced relative to known geographical points, to the best of the interviewees* knowledge or estimation. This v;as done f»s ?. plan view. The third dimension to the picture was introduced by means of a keyed time -sequence versus alti- tude plot at the top of the overlay. A copy of this overlay is shown as Figure C-1. The horizontal and vertical lines re- present a 5 mile square on a 1:125,000 scale — the scale of the charts used. (U) The use of the map as a background in attempting to retrace flight paths was intended to stimulate the aircrewman»s recall. The introduction of geographical references, including terrain features sought to reduce some of the abstraction Involved in reproducing flight paths. Although controlled experiments were not conducted, aircrewman reaction to the interview techniques suggests that real benefits were gained by the use of the map background. (U) Early in the study it became clear that the air-to-air combatant rarely had an accurate concept of the time duration of events or phases of the combat. He was better able to re- call the sequence of events. Therefore, time was reconstructed m terms of a time sequence. This procedure allowed the inter- viewer to "stop the action" at a point where something signi- ficant was occurring and try to elicit a detailed account of the scene at that instant — tho location and altitude of each participant, status of ;;he interviewee's aircraft in the way of speed, g's, fuel state, avionics modes; action by the ^U) Soeclal reorir.tc, of JOC(k) charts were made to a 1:125,000 scale by the U..:. ::avy Hydrc-rarhic orflce. 1S3 UNCLASSIFIED era ''^^ M, Z_ tv«n* |ntarwi<« Oof* tNTtgVIW NOTES r.-i CO CO FIGURE C2(U). 1 individual and his reasons therefor; communications which took place; enemy actions; etc. After such a stop the description would continue until the next significant event occurred at which point the action would again be stopped. These stops correspond to the "T" (of "Time") marks in events and pictures. While one team member worked with the aircrewman in making the Sketch, the other kept notes on a specially designed note pad, a sample page of which is presented in Figure C-2. (U) Upon completion of this step-by-step, detailed recon- struction the interviewers asked specific questions from the checklist about points which had not been covered. (U) Finally, the interviewee was encouraged to comment on the whole range of considerations which might be of interest to the study — comments derived from his experience in the specific encounter as well as from his overall experience. The Interviews lasted from a few minutes to several hours, depending on the significance and complexity of the encounter and on the knowledge of the interviewee. 186 V. GENERAL COMAAENTS ON DATA (C) The Project identified ill3 air-to-air events that occurred prior to 1 August 1967. Participants in 227 of these events were interviewed, with a total of ^18 interviews con- ducted.^ In addition, 37 written accounts of events were re- ceived. In general, priority in conducting Interviews was given to the more complex encounters. Events for which no interviews were conducted were usually sightings only, with no R&D significance. (U) The 37 written accounts, referred to above, were letters from aircrev/men who could not readily be interviewed and who v;ere contacted by mail. These letters contributed very little to the information on any given event and in some cases introduced confusion. In general , this was an unsuc- cessful technique for gathering data, (C) The most Important question that can be asked about the RED BARON data has to do with validity, i.e., how close do the final event reconstructions used for analysis compare with what actually happened? There is nothing approximating laboratory control or measurement about the SEA air war and, therefore, njjj. precise answer to this question can ever be given. There are some meaningful things to be said on the subject, however: •Real-time recorded information was at a minimum (there wera a few communications tapes and films). (U) If an individual was interviewed in connection with two or more different encounters, this would be considered as two or more interviews. Practically all basic- data depended upon the human ability to sense, analyze and recount. •This fact was recognized from the beginning as of primary imoortance to the project and all activities - data definition, collection, analysis — were formu- lated with it in mind; that is, data requirements were continually refined in attempts to define what was reasonably achievable; the interview techniques and their taeo-by-step , systematic, detailed approach with words and sketches were carefully devised to give the aircrewraan maximum assistance in analyzing and recalling what actually occurred and to introduce checks on the validity of the alrcrev:man ' s recounting. The final reconstruction of each encounter, by uti- lizing and comparing all of the sources of data, again was devised so as to enhance completeness and validity in reaching some determination and logical explanation of what really happened. •With regard to analyzing the data, only after com- pletion of the collection and event reconstruction phases v:ere decisions made as to vjhat could consti- tute a meaningful analysis of this kind of material. •There were indications during the interview program that the techniques used did in fact achieve certain success in enhancing the alrcrevraan ' s analysis and recalling of his encounter. It v;as not unusual, in the middle of creating a step-by-step sketch of an encounter, for an aircrewman to exhibit certain surprise and state that only now could he understand what really occurred. Prior to this exercise he had had misconceotions about or paps in his understanding of what had taken place, or things could not have happened as he stated in his post-flight debriefing. •Many of the interviev/s took place weeks or months after the encounter and there is question about how the time lapse betv/een encounter and interview influences the aircrev/nan's ability to recount things as he actually sensed and analyzed them. Intuitively, it. might seem that the best information would be obtained by minimizing this lapse. However, there are illustrations v/hich counter this. In an early stage of its activities, the Project was advised by its psychologist consultants of the remarkable human ability to recall the details of stressful events and not lose recall over. time. Comparisons by the Project of information obtr^ined from aircrew- men immediately after an air-to-air encounter and some weeks or months later, as well as comparison of OPREP reports with Interview d£.ta substantiate. m general, this human ability. The checks on validity which came about throuch the interview and final reconstruction techniques substantiate to some degree the consistency and accuracy of this recall over time. Additionally, there are opinions from alrcrov.T.cn who have participated in air-to-air engagements which say that Immediately following the occurrence- their thoughts were quite jumbled and it took them days or weeks to understand and analyze what had occurred in this fast moving, complex situ- ation. In summary, then, the Project cannot prove or disprove any precise statement about the effect oi elapsed tine on the validity of recall. On t>fljnce, th-rc sec:r.3 to be little to substantiate the intuitive notion that recall is a function of time lapse. Dates of events and interviews have been published with the data. There is a place for additional psychological study in this area. (C) The precedure of conducting some 1*00 interviews and the reduction of the Interview material to reconstructions ^of the encounters was extremely laborious and time consuming. In any follow-on investigation of this type, the effort could and should be reduced — not by the sacrifice of detail or com.- pleteness but. rather, by more efficient formatting of the material as it comes out in the interview. It is not complete- ly clear how this might be done without loss of the unhurried, informality of the interview; however, the optimum procedure probably makes a lltt;le more use of forms by the Interviewer. The effort cculd also have been greatly reduced had there been considerable recording equipment in our aircraft. In the absence of 5uch equipment (and to some degree even with the existence of it) there is no substitute for the technique whereby the analyst, with a clear idea of the subject matter he wants, has a face-to-face meeting with the air battle participant. Only in this way can detailed, clear, complete, authentic information be recorded. Data retrieved from forms ^(U) .\c'--oviinately 15 wan-months were devoted to conducting interv^ewo'.* Volume I represents approximately 50 man-months of work following the completion of data collection. I I. INTRODUCTION (U) The purpose of thiv analysis Is to explore more com- pletely the extent of the shc.rt-range weapon requirement iden- tified by the ?SD BAHC:: Qualitative Analysis Panels (see Section IV). The analysis qu-intlfies the number of events where a short-range v:eapon enployment opportunity existed for an aircraft v;hlch carried onJy air-to-air missiles. This pro- cedure was based on an cxper' onced fighter pilot's judgment in analyzinp; the information published in the RED BAROM Report. 11. SCOPE .(S) The data for this cinalysis were extracted from the F-*} events which occurred between April 1965 and 1 March 1967 as published in Volume I. The F-^l was not equipped with a short- range weapon until the SUU-16 gun pod vras utilized for air-to- air armament in ^lay 1967. Sh..rt range, for this analysis, is identified as leas than mini:..um missile range, i.e., 2000 to 3000 ft range. The characteristics of the 20mm, M-61 Catling Gun, were chosen to identify :he short-range envelope. The characteristics of this existing weapon were selected Instead of a hypothetical weapon. This should not be construed as a recommendation for any specific type of short-range weapon. (S) The three necessary conditicns for an event to be Included in this analysis were: • The U.S. aircraft Involvd was an F-^. • The event contained a vi..ual sight ing of the eneny aircr-aft. • There vras a reasonable opportunity for U.S., enemy, or both opponent aircraft fire crcnance during the event. 111. DISCUSSION (S) Investisation of the data published in Volume I Iden- tified 29 events which fulfilled the above requirerae|hts . These 29 events can be subdivided into five categories of related air-to-air missile succesc. The total number of eve^hts per- taining to each category is also listed. j| • (1) Four events occurred where a short-range weapon opportunity v.-as available, but there yere no air- to-air missile firing attempts and no; enemy air- craft were destroyed. • (2) Five events occurred where a short-raiige v/eapon opportunity v;as available, but althou^gh there were air-to-air missile firing at temtjjts in each event, no enemy aircraft -rfere destrOiij!ed. • (3) Six events occurred v/here a short-range v/eapon oppcrtur:ity ^vas avciilable against ensiny aircraft other than those destroyed by air-to-air missiles. ' ' - ■ ■ 11 i'. • (4) Eight events occurred v;here a short-range weapon opportunity was available against an |;ene!ny air- craft which was destroyed by >n air-to-air missile. { • (5) Six events occurred where HO short-range weapon opportunity v;as available. Air-to-air missile firing attempts v/ere made in each event and de- stroyed eneny aircraft in three of th'ese six events . • (S) The 15 events listed in categories (1), (2), and (3) Identify at least one additional enemy aircraft in each event which could have beer* placed under U.S. fire. Thus; the enemy aircraft benefited frcm the short-range sanctuary in front of the F-^f in approximately half of the day-visual eveijts. (S) These short-range weapon employment opportunities occurred in spite of the flight tactics which were designed to achieve missile firing position. It is not possible 'to speculate whether fewer or less short-range firing opportuni- ties would have occurred If the F-t had been equipped with a short-range weapon during this study period since the enemy would have avoided this short-range area and the F-t tactics would have been modified to exploit the additional weapons system capability. The interplay between offense and defense makes the net effect of adding short-range weapon uncertain since each tactical ploy has Its tactical answer. However, If the only effect Is to force the enemy to open range to avoid the short-range envelope, the ene.^ becomes vulnerable to the longer range missile attack. IV. CONCLUSIONS (S) Enemy aircraft have had a sanctuary of approximately one-half mile in front of an F-^ fighter, which carried only AIM-7E and Air':-9B misailes. The enemy benefited from this sanctuary in half of the events studied, V, DATA (U) The 29 events used in the short-range weapon study are listed below. Each event is identified v/ith the Volume I event number. Where applicable, a time sequence mark (example: T-6).ls also listed following the event number. This time mark refers to the location of the passage in Volume I which led to the identification of the short-range firing opportunities. (S) Event 2 (T-i3). Eight AIM-7 and two AIM-9 missiles were fired with one probable MIG-17 kill by an AIM-7. Short- range weapon employment opportunities were available following the high-closure rate missile attacks. (S) Event 6 (T-11, T-5, T-9). Eight AIhj-9s were fired and destroyed two MIG-17s. Both attacking aircraft closed to short range as their respective missiles destroyed the enemy aircraft. (S) Event 9 (T-6). One AIK-7 fired for a probable kill. The U.S. aircraft then closed and passed a second enemy air- craft from six 6 'clock but inside of minimum missile firing range . (S) Event 12 (aircraft com!?andc: 's coni-nent ) . The A/C stated, "A gun would have been useful on the first ID pass because the intercept ended in good position for a gun attack, but Insufficient time remained to maneuver for a missile launch before the MIGs disappeared into the clouds." (S) Event l8 (T-3A). A close-in maneuvering engagement occurred with no missile firing opportunities. U.S. aircraft forced overshoots but the enemy aircraft stayed well inside of minimum missile firing range. (S) Svent 22 (T-6) . Six missile firing attempts were made. Four AIM-9 missiles scored a probable kill against one MIG-21. The short-range weapon employment position vms avail- able to press the attack. (S) Event 23 (T-5 4 T-10) . Two MIO-17 aircraft v/ere de- stroyed, one by each type missile. P-^l pilots were In a cir- cling battle where a cannon would have been a better weapon against the highly maneuvering targets. (S) .Event 26 (T-11) . Four AIM-9 missiles were fired. One HIG-21 pilot ejected when a missile passed close to his air- craft. One of the U.S. aircraft closed to 500 ft behind a second MlG-21 not destroyed in this engager.ent. . (S) Event 27 (T-8), Two AIM-9 missiles were fired in des- peration to divert a MIG attacking another flight member. Both nlssiles missed. The cannon would have provided a weapon for a follow-up attack with proper discrimination between the U.S. aircraft under attack and the attacking MIG. - (S) Event 28 (T-2 narrative). Three AIM-9 missiles were fired with one kill. A second MIG pilot crashed into the ground while maneuvering to avoid one of the missiles. There was an established closure rate on both of these »MIG aircraft for a follow-up short-range vieapon employment opportunity if necessary. (S) Event 32 (T-^l). Two Air-l-g missiles were fired, re- lyyn— p— IP— i in . I II' II r. iii 'M M- i iTT'" i » it m;y . ? sultiHG in one MIG kill. A second U.S. aircraft inadvertantly maneuvered to less than minimum missile firing ran^e behind an enemy fighter not" destroyed in this en-acement. (S) Event 37 (T-l^A plus snapshots of T-9A, T-6B, and T~^IC). Two AIM-7 missiles were fired but missed their target while one AIM-9 downed a MIG-17. There was a good gun tracking position available for a long burst from a head-on firing pass against an enemy aircraft not destroyed in this event. (S) bivent 39 (T-1 and Five AIM-9 missiles were fired destroying two MIG-21s. Two U.S. aircraft closed rapidly through the radar missile envelope to less than minimum missile firing ran^e. Both HIG aircraft would have come under fire from a cannon sooner than from the missiles. (S) Event 45 (T-9A, T-U. T-7B). Six missiles were fired in a maneuvering dogfight. Good short-range weapon employment opportunities vrere available against additional enemy aircraft. (S) Event 'l6 (T-2 and T-3). ?our AIM-7 and six AlM-9 missiles were fired in this engagement with no hits. Four of the six AIM-9 missiles were fired inside of minimum missile firing range. (S) Event (T-2). The U.S. wingman sighted a MIG-21 at his four o'clock position, 800 feet out, firing at his lead. A right turn would have given the wingman an immediate short- range weapon employment opportunity. (S) Event 56 (Narrative). A MIG-Sl was in an escort for- mation for thirty seconds. As Num.ber Three attempted to open range, the MIG turned away and departed. Mumber Three returned to escort formation. A ca.nnon would have provided a weapon for imiacdiate attack without opening range. (S) Event 57 (T-10). Six missiles were fired, two AIM- 7s and four AIM-93, with no hits. Friendly lead at one time was 500 feet behind a nonrn:neuverins MIG-17 atteniptin^ to open range for miss lie attack. 199 (S) Event 60 (T-6. 6A). Two MIG-21 aircraft were de- stroyed, one .y each ..IssUc type. The Short-range weapon e-nployment opportunity preceded a missile firing opportunity. • (s) Event 68b (T-5 narrative plus a snapshot at T-5). Six missiles were fired. One AIM-9 destroyed a MIG-21. A good head-on flrlne; opportunity was available. (S) Event 68c (T-13). Sixteen missiles were fired. The 12 AIK-7 missiles fired resulted in three Vao-Zl aircraft destroyed. One pilot had a choice either to continue for a short-range attack or to open range for a missile attack. (S) Event 71